News in Brief

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23 Sep 25. S. Africa – Increasing defence spending to 1.5% of GDP will take many years – Motshekga. Increasing South Africa’s defence budget to 1.5% of GDP as recommended by the South African National Defence Force’s (SANDF’s) Journey to Greatness plan will take many years, and spending will only reach over 2% of GDP in 30 years’ time. This is according to Defence and Military Veterans Minister Angie Motshekga, who was answering a parliamentary question on 11 July. Maliyakhe Shelembe of the Democratic Alliance wanted to know over what time frame is the 1.5% increase anticipated. Motshekga replied that “the incremental growth of the defence funding will happen over six multi Medium Term Strategic Framework Periods.” Each of these is five years long. The Minister added that defence spending would grow from the 0.67% at present to 1.35% over a period of six years and hit 2.40% on year 30. When asked how the increase is reconciled with the current budget ceilings confirmed by the National Treasury, Motshekga said an increase would “require a strategic decision leading to a government policy resolution on the new defence funding model that will allow an injection on the current budget ceilings by National Treasury.”

“The 1.5% defence funding is viewed as an intervention towards incremental allocation that will allow implementation of reconfiguration and future force phases of the SA National Defence Force,” Motshekga concluded.

There has been much talk of increasing defence spending to 1.5% of GDP in recent times, particularly since President Cyril Ramaphosa issued such a directive in 2023. Motshekga has also been pushing for this, particularly after the July defence budget vote debate. According to the Department of Defence, it is underfunded by at least 50%. Deputy Defence Minister Bantu Holomisa earlier this year complained that “Every minister I can think of has been complaining since time immemorial that defence is declining. They have even ignored the president in 2023 who said the budget of defence must move from 0.75% of the GDP to 1.5% of the GDP. What have they done?” He said Parliament and the Government of National Unity must establish a structured, accountable process to implement resolutions, especially those related to defence and oversight bodies. Chief of the South African Navy, Vice Admiral Monde Lobese, is another vocal critic of defence underfunding, accusing National Treasury of sabotaging the SANDF by refusing to release sufficient funds. Answering another question in July from Shelembe, Motshekga revealed that the Journey to Greatness plan is unfunded, although some objectives have been prioritised and included in the Medium Term Development Plan (MTDP). The Journey to Greatness plan was developed in 2022 and approved for promulgation in 2023, she said but “is yet to be scheduled for the Cabinet consumption.” (Source: https://www.defenceweb.co.za/)

 

23 Sep 25. “The war in Ukraine has diverted Russian resources and attention away from critical domestic security problems, creating a vulnerability to terrorism, corruption, regional instability and post-war social challenges.” This is the view expressed in How Russia’s War in Ukraine is Creating Domestic Security Gaps, a new RUSI research report by Emily Ferris, which says that Russia’s preoccupation with its war in Ukraine is undermining its ability to manage urgent domestic security challenges. The research said that by focusing the Kremlin’s political, financial, and human resources on the war, domestic terrorism has been deprioritised, Chechnya risks instability with the uncertain health of its leader, systemic corruption has hollowed out border defences, and the return of hundreds of thousands of veterans presents future social and political challenges that Moscow may not be able to control. The report says the war has deepened pre-existing weaknesses in Russia’s security system and these vulnerabilities risk becoming more destabilising if left unaddressed. The research concludes that the war has become the “entire organisational logic” of President Putin’s governing system, fixated on demonising the West, and absorbing resources and attention in ways that leave Russia dangerously exposed to long-term domestic fragility.

Key Findings

• Counterterrorism failures expose blind spots.  The report notes the increased politicisation of the Federal Security Service (FSB) in service of identifying political opponents rather than investigating terrorism. It says the Crocus City Hall attack in Moscow in 2024, by gunmen pledging allegiance to the Islamic State in Khorasan, should have been anticipated. The report says: “The FSB’s focus on targeting political opponents and those critical of the war has sidelined the investigation of domestic terrorism…A series of fatal terrorist attacks within Russia since the war began have highlighted intelligence failures across the board, a deep distrust of the West, and the Kremlin’s greater interest in the pursuit of Russia’s political opponents than the investigation of terrorist threats…The resurgence of terrorism in Russia since the war began is one of the starkest reminders of the consequences of ignoring intelligence assessments.”
• Demobilised veterans could fuel political instability in future. The report says: “There is a risk that demobilised veterans, potentially dissatisfied with the outcome of the war, might be able to translate their grievances into a political organisation…The Kremlin has anticipated this threat and has set up several initiatives to contain it, absorb the veterans and neutralise them in advance…however, the Kremlin’s fixes are not failsafe…The question remains as to whether the veterans as a group could pose a longer-term political problem for Russia.”
• Chechnya’s uncertain succession poses risks. The report considers the complex and dynamic relationship between President Putin and Chechen leader Ramzan Kadyrov: “It is likely that frequent rumours about the ill-health of Chechen strongman Ramzan Kadyrov will force the Kremlin to revisit succession plans for the region sooner than expected, with potentially far-reaching political and security consequences for stability in the North Caucasus if they are not handled with care…Kadyrov’s attempts in the past year to move his close family out of political power in Chechnya, seek refuge abroad and broker relationships of his own in the Gulf indicate a growing overreach of his position that suggest his actions are only partially under the Kremlin’s control.”
• Corruption has undermined border security. The report says: “The Ukrainian armed forces’ incursions into Kursk, on Russia’s southern border, meant that for several months in 2024 Russia was not in control of its own borders. This was a vulnerability that emerged as a direct result of a corrupt system in which Russia’s regional elites have enriched themselves at the expense of national security. The corruption networks around the then-regional governor of Kursk, and in procurement and construction that failed to shore up Russia’s civilian defences, had security consequences for the war…Roman Starovoit, the then-regional governor [and future Transport Minister]…and his associates had embezzled bns in kickbacks from construction companies hired to deal with Kursk’s defences…The Kursk incursions and Russia’s vulnerable border with Ukraine have also demonstrated an interesting new political dimension, as it has delineated more clearly the limits of elite patronage networks. Corrupt practices that had led to weak border defences and a resulting security problem meant that high-level officials were dismissed despite their strong personal connections to powerful oligarchs, who are themselves close to Putin.”

Conclusion

With Russian State Duma 2026 elections looming, the research illustrates how Russia’s priorities and decision-making have shifted since the war against Ukraine began. It concludes that it would be premature to suggest that the potential weaknesses identified are a sign of imminent regime fragility, but they do reflect an ongoing struggle for limited resources. As the war has become the entire organisational logic of the political system, it will necessarily continue to be the priority for attention and funding. It is likely that the longer the war goes on, additional security gaps will emerge – either politically or practically – and the Kremlin’s resources will be spread even more thinly. While the Kremlin has shown that it can suppress dissent and neutralise immediate crises, its solutions are often temporary, reactive, and politicised. The report warns that if its domestic vulnerabilities are not carefully managed, they could undermine the very stability that Putin has sought to guarantee, with consequences that will be felt well beyond Russia’s borders. (Source:: RUSI)

 

22 Sep 25. US-Venezuela: Military strikes on suspected drug traffickers will sustain elevated regional tensions. On 19 September, US President Donald Trump announced that a military strike on a suspected drug trafficking vessel killed three people in the Caribbean Sea. The attack marks the third US strike on suspected drug traffickers in the region since 2 September. The US currently has a significant military deployment operating in the Caribbean Sea, composed of at least eight warships and various aerial assets based in Puerto Rico. On 20 September, President Trump called on the Venezuelan government to accept deported prisoners (without providing any details on their identities), warning Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro that ‘the price you pay will be incalculable’ if he refused the US request. Reports on 20 September indicated that President Maduro had offered to engage in direct talks with US Special Presidential Envoy Richard Grenell, aiming to improve bilateral relations. We assess that President Maduro’s offer indicates his willingness to discuss possible concessions (such as accepting deportation flights) in exchange for a US military drawdown in the short-to-medium term. However, if bilateral negotiations fail, further US strikes on suspected drug trafficking vessels are highly likely. Nevertheless, armed conflict risks remain low. (Source: Sibylline)

 

22 Sep 25. Afghanistan-US: Demands to regain air base will drive bilateral tensions. On 21 September, the Taliban government stated that ‘Afghanistan’s independence and territorial integrity are of the utmost importance’, encouraging the US to uphold past agreements. This comes in response to US President Donald Trump’s interest in reacquiring the Bagram Air Base, coupled with comments stating that ‘bad things’ will happen if the US is unable to do so. This airfield is located 31 miles (50km) north of the capital Kabul and was the US’ largest military site in Afghanistan; the Taliban government took over the base in 2021 following the US’ withdrawal. Afghan officials have rejected President Trump’s demands and criticised his interest in renewing US presence in the country. The Taliban government will be highly likely reluctant to comply with such demands, while China (which has worked to foster ties with the Taliban government since 2021) has also criticised the demands, stating that it would be invested in not allowing the US to retake control of the Bagram Air Base. We assess that continued US demands to regain the air base will drive bilateral tensions, possible jeopardising future prisoner exchanges. (Source: Sibylline)

 

22 Sep 25. South Sudan: Vice president’s trial, escalating clashes will increase armed conflict risks. On 22 September, Vice President Riek Machar and seven co-defendants from his Sudan People’s Liberation Movement – In Opposition (SPLM-IO) party will appear in court in the capital Juba. Machar faces multiple charges for his alleged involvement in attacks against the South Sudanese armed forces (SSPDF) in March (see Sibylline Special Report – 8 April 2025). Machar’s court appearance comes amid escalating clashes between the SSPDF and SPLM-IO-affiliated militias, which killed at least 48 people in Nasir county (Upper Nile state) on 20 September. Developments in Machar’s case and proliferating clashes will increase the risk of broader SPLM-IO and affiliate mobilisation in the coming weeks. Such mobilisation is highly likely to trigger escalatory clashes with SSPDF units, particularly in Jonglei and Upper Nile states, compounding nationwide conflict escalation risks. Such conditions will increase the risk of a broader deterioration in security conditions, and exacerbate the threat to life for NGO staff, including in Juba. We assess that the SSPDF will likely adopt an elevated posture in the city and will possibly establish movement restrictions, limiting the feasibility of staff evacuation. (Source: Sibylline)

 

19 Sep 25. Department of War and Mongolian Ministry of Defense Conduct Bilateral Defense Framework. Mr. Alvaro Smith, Deputy Assistant Secretary of War (DASW) for China, Taiwan, and Mongolia and Major General Gankhuyag Davagdorj, State Secretary of the Ministry of Defense of Mongolia (MOD) conducted the annual U.S.-Mongolia Bilateral Defense Forum (BDF) meeting on September 19, 2025.  The two officials affirmed their commitment to deepening bilateral defense relations based on mutual interest and a common-sense approach to security and prosperity in the Asia-Pacific region. They discussed regional security matters as well as concrete opportunities to further enhance security cooperation, including through exercises, training, security assistance, and defense equipment sales. They also discussed areas where additional defense expenditure by Mongolia could significantly improve the Mongolian Armed Forces’ capabilities and readiness. DASW Smith commended Mongolia for its embodiment of the warrior ethos and its engagement in peacekeeping operations. Mongolia and the United States emphasized the importance of their Strategic Third Neighbor Partnership in advancing the security and economic prosperity of both countries. (Source: U.S. DoD)

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Military And Security Developments
Sep 25.
KEY DEVELOPMENTS
IRAN
• Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei has explicitly ruled out further negotiations with the US, meaning that UN sanctions will almost certainly be re-implemented in the coming days.
• Iran’s efforts to re-develop its nuclear and missile programmes will sustain the risk of a resumption in Israeli airstrikes in the medium-to-long term.
ISRAEL
• A second Houthi drone strike in Eilat (Southern district) in seven days highlights the elevated security risks facing the city (and wider district).
PALESTINIAN TERRITORIES
• GAZA STRIP: The IDF’s intensification of its military operations in Gaza City will elevate the risks for hospitals and other humanitarian facilities.
• GAZA STRIP: US President Donald Trump has reportedly discussed a new post-war governance plan for Gaza, though the prospects for the establishment of a ceasefire in the short term remain low.
• WEST BANK: BANK: The closure of the Allenby Bridge border crossing will elevate economic and security risks in the West Bank.
IRAN
• Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei has explicitly ruled out further negotiations with the US, meaning that UN sanctions will almost certainly be re-implemented in the coming days. On 22 September, Khamenei gave a televised address in which he emphasised his opposition to further negotiations with the US, stating that further engagement would harm Iran’s national interests. As such, the resumption of talks with the US – i.e. the E3’s (France, Germany and the UK) key condition for an extension of sanctions relief for Iran – is highly unlikely in the coming days. The reimplementation of UN sanctions is therefore highly likely after the current sanctions-relief guarantees expire on 30 September. This will include the re-imposition of a weapons embargo on Iran, as well as asset freezes, travel bans and financial sanctions targeting specified Iranian entities and individuals associated with Tehran’s nuclear and ballistic missile programme (see Sibylline Special Report – 28 August 2025). The re-imposition of sanctions would significantly increase compliance concerns and sanctions-exposure risks for regionally engaged firms, particularly in the shipping, logistics and technology industries. Increasing economic pressure on Iran would also likely trigger an escalation in hybrid threat activity targeting states that enforce UN sanctions, while also elevating the risk of further cyber attacks, vessel hijackings in the Persian Gulf and intensified espionage campaigns in the coming months.
• Iran’s efforts to re-develop its nuclear and missile programmes will sustain the risk of a resumption in Israeli airstrikes in the medium-to-long term. On 22 September, the head of Iran’s Atomic Energy Organization (AEOI) travelled to Russia to discuss nuclear co-operation. They signed an agreement to build at least eight additional nuclear power plants, including four plants at the Russian-built Bushehr Nuclear Power Plant (Bushehr province). Considering Iran’s repeated threats to withdraw from the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) in the event of the reimplementation of UN sanctions, co-operation with Russia will sustain concerns that Iran seeks to leverage its expanding civilian nuclear programme to advance its weaponisation capabilities without international oversight. On 23 September, the Associated Press published satellite imagery indicating that Iran has begun reconstructing solid-fuel missile-manufacturing sites at the Parchin (Tehran province) and Shahroud (Semnan province) military complexes. Taken together, these developments will likely compound international concerns regarding the status of Iran’s nuclear programme, particularly as international access to nuclear facilities remains extremely restricted. Such concerns and the redevelopment of Iran’s ballistic missile-production capacities will sustain elevated regional tensions, as well as the risk of resumed Israeli airstrikes targeting nuclear and military facilities in the medium-to-long term.
ISRAEL 
• A second Houthi drone strike in Eilat (Southern district) in seven days highlights the elevated security risks facing the city (and wider district). On 24 September, an explosives-laden Houthi drone struck the Club Hotel Eilat, injuring over 20 people. According to initial investigations, Israeli air defences detected the drone only after it successfully infiltrated Israeli airspace, likely due to its low flight altitude. Its altitude also negated the effectiveness of fighter jets and likely prevented two Iron Dome interception missiles from countering the ordnance. This is the third Houthi drone to penetrate Israeli air defences in the past month; one drone crashed near the Jacob Eilat Hotel (Eilat) on 18 September, while another hit Ramon Airport (ETM) on 7 September (both Southern). These incidents highlight the Houthis’ growing capacity to evade air defences in southern Israel, and therefore the elevated security risks facing personnel and assets in the area. Following the latest incident, local media reported on 25 September that the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) will deploy its new laser-based air defence system (‘Light Shield’) in Eilat (see Sibylline Middle East Crisis Update – 29 May 2025). However, despite this new deployment, security risks stemming from Houthi ordnance and shrapnel will remain elevated across the district – and particularly Eilat – in the coming weeks. In addition to the deployment of Light Shield in the coming weeks, Israel is likely to lower its threshold even further for triggering warning sirens in southern Israel, increasing their frequency (and exacerbating operational disruption as a result). Furthermore, the latest attacks will increase the likelihood of event and travel cancellations during the Jewish High Holidays, driving financial losses for businesses in the hospitality and tourism sectors operating in southern Israel (and particularly Eilat).

PALESTINIAN TERRITORIES
• GAZA STRIP: The IDF’s intensification of its military operations in Gaza City will elevate the risks for hospitals and other humanitarian facilities. Earlier on 25 September, the IDF confirmed that it conducted airstrikes against more than 170 targets across Gaza over the past 24 hours, while Divisions 98 and 162 continue their advance deeper into Gaza City. Additionally, on 24 September, the IDF published footage of militants firing live rounds from within the Shifa Hospital in Gaza City. The publication points to the elevated risk of IDF strikes targeting the hospital in the coming days, as well as likely ground operations in the coming weeks. These will significantly increase security risks for medical and NGO personnel (as well as patients within the hospital compound) due to misidentification, misfire and the impact of blasts. Security risks will also remain elevated at other hospitals and humanitarian facilities within Gaza – particularly those within Gaza City – in the coming weeks.
• GAZA STRIP: US President Donald Trump has reportedly discussed a new post-war governance plan for Gaza, though the prospects for the establishment of a ceasefire in the short term remain low. On 23 September, President Donald Trump met with the leaders of eight Arab and Muslim-majority countries to discuss a proposal to end the Israel-Hamas war and establish a post-war governance framework for Gaza. Details of the proposal have not been publicly disclosed. However, reports indicate that it centres on establishing a permanent ceasefire in Gaza in exchange for the release of all remaining Israeli hostages, a phased IDF withdrawal, the deployment of a joint Palestinian-Arab-Muslim-majority state security force and the establishment of a new administration with limited involvement from the Palestinian Authority (PA). Trump also reportedly stated that he will not allow Israel to annex the entirety of the West Bank, amid increasing concerns that Israel will retaliate to growing international recognition of an independent Palestinian state (see Sibylline Situation Update Brief – 19 September 2025). The meeting underscores the Trump administration’s increasing efforts to broker a ceasefire in Gaza. However, Hamas is unlikely to agree to the proposal, as Israel will likely condition its acceptance of a permanent ceasefire on Hamas agreeing to disarm and demobilise. As such, we assess that Israel will almost certainly continue to intensify ground operations in Gaza (particularly Gaza City) in the coming weeks.
• WEST BANK: The closure of the Allenby Bridge border crossing will elevate economic and security risks in the West Bank. On 23 September, the Israel Airports Authority announced the closure of the Allenby Bridge (King Hussein Bridge) border crossing until further notice. The closure follows a shooting attack at the crossing on 18 September, which killed two Israeli soldiers (see Sibylline Middle East Crisis Update – 18 September 2025). The key crossing is the only connection between the West Bank and Jordan; as such, the closure will highly likely impact Palestinian businesses in the West Bank, particularly those in the agriculture and retail sectors. The closure will likely further increase socio-economic pressure on the PA, exacerbating existing economic and security risks. Furthermore, reduced economic activity (and employment potential) will elevate radicalisation risks among the local Palestinian population, particularly younger demographics, driving the risk of attacks as long as the crossing remains closed. The closure of the Allenby Bridge crossing will also increase travel disruption at other crossings from Jordan into Israel due to the diversion of trucks, increasing supply chain delays and further disruption. In Jordan, partial disruption to several fresh produce imports from the West Bank is almost certain, likely prompting the government to increase imports (slightly) from other regional markets (particularly Egypt and Lebanon) at a higher cost. However, this is unlikely to impact Jordan’s economy or market significantly.
RED SEA
• An intensification of Israeli strikes against Houthi targets in Yemen is almost certain in the coming days; pre-strike warnings are unlikely. Earlier on 25 September, Israel conducted intense strikes against several Houthi targets in Sanaa (Yemen) in response to the Houthis’ drone attack in Eilat (see above). Previously, Israel would typically publish an evacuation warning between one and three hours before the strike; by contrast, there was no prior warning for the latest strike. It is almost certain that Israel will continue to intensify its strikes against Houthi targets in the coming days. Further strikes without prior warning in the coming days are also possible, particularly against targets in Sanaa and other population centres. Israeli strikes are likely to target critical and dual-use infrastructure, including factories, fuel depots, logistic hubs, ports, power stations and warehouses within Houthi-held territory. There is a realistic possibility that any such strikes would also target government facilities, elevating collateral risks for personnel in Houthi-held territories due to blasts, building collapses, shrapnel and stampedes during evacuations. Long-term power cuts are also likely, as is deteriorating food security due to supply chain disruption.
• An attack against a vessel off the Yemeni coast highlights the persistently elevated security risks across the Gulf of Aden and Red Sea. On 23 September, UK Maritime Trade Operations (UKMTO) reported an attack against a vessel located approximately 120 nautical miles (222km) east of Aden (Aden governorate, Yemen). The crew of the unnamed vessel reported an explosion in their vicinity, though they were able to proceed safely to the next port of call. No group took responsibility for the attack, which comes amid a sustained threat of attacks against shipping in the Red Sea by the Iranian-backed Houthis (underscoring their likely involvement). The attack highlights the continued elevated risks facing vessels, cargo and crew in the Gulf of Aden and the Red Sea, sustaining supply chain disruption risks and elevated financial costs for shipping companies operating in the area.

REGIONAL AND GLOBAL DEVELOPMENTS
Israel-Italy-Spain: The presence of Italian and Spanish naval vessels escorting the Gaza flotilla will exacerbate existing diplomatic tensions with Israel; however, confrontation with the IDF is highly unlikely. On 24 September, the Italian navy sent two ships to escort the Global Sumud Flotilla (GSF), hours after a claim by its organisers that a drone attacked the Gaza-bound vessels south of Crete (Greece). The alleged attack caused minimal damage to five vessels (and no injuries). The Italian defence minister, Guido Crosetto, stated that the primary goal of the naval force is to assist Italians aboard the flotilla; he urged activists to abandon plans to breach the Israeli blockade on Gaza. Similarly, Spain also announced on 24 September that it sent a ship to escort the flotilla. Nevertheless, while these moves will increase the ongoing tensions between Israel and the two EU members (particularly Spain), we assess that a confrontation between the IDF and the naval ships escorting the flotilla is highly unlikely. We assess that the Italian and Spanish naval vessels will likely cease their escort prior to reaching Gaza to avoid a significant escalation with Israel. Meanwhile, earlier on 25 September, the GSF warned of an imminent threat from the IDF against its vessels over the next 48 hours, underscoring the heightened risk of IDF interception in the coming days. While the IDF will likely attempt to conduct such an operation peacefully, the possibility of misfire and fatalities remains.
• Lebanon: Security and bystander risks will significantly increase in the capital Beirut during the 18-day commemoration of Hassan Nasrallah’s assassination. Earlier on 25 September, local media reported tensions between the government and Lebanese Hizballah (LH) over the group’s controversial plans to commemorate the anniversary of the assassinations of its former leaders Hassan Nasrallah and Hashem Safieddine. LH had previously announced that it would hold a series of memorial ceremonies between 27 September and 12 October, including major gatherings at Nasrallah’s burial site in Beirut and Safieddine’s grave in Deir Qanoun En Nahr (South governorate). Hundreds of thousands of Shia supporters are highly likely to attend the main LH event in Beirut on 27 September. The largest crowds are likely to congregate in the southern suburbs of the capital, particularly the Bourj el-Barajneh area (where Nasrallah is buried) and possibly also in the area around the Camille Chamoun Sports City Stadium. This is highly likely to cause widespread mobility disruption across Beirut, particularly along Ziad Rahbani Avenue, which links Beirut-Rafic Hariri International Airport (BEY) with the capital’s downtown area. We also assess that there is a realistic possibility of sporadic clashes and altercations between LH members and the Lebanese security forces, particularly if LH elements attempt to organise an armed parade through the city. The risks will be heightened until 12 October (though they will reduce after 27 September). Furthermore, during the 18-day commemoration period, bystanders’ exposure to the security forces’ use of crowd-control tactics will remain elevated near large Shia gatherings in LH strongholds in Ballebek-Hermel, Nabatieh and South governorates.
• Divestment from Israeli state-controlled assets underscores increasing corporate governance risks amid the ongoing escalation of operations in Gaza and the West Bank. On 24 September, Denmark’s AkademikerPension fund announced that it will exclude Israeli sovereign and state-linked securities, citing ‘human rights concerns’ relating to Israeli settlement expansion in the West Bank and the ongoing humanitarian crisis in Gaza. The USD 24.75 billion pension fund, which manages the pensions for staff in Denmark’s education sector, previously held approximately USD 22 million in assets in Booking Holdings and Alstom, two Israeli firms identified in a 2023 UN Human Rights Office report as supporting Israeli settlements in the West Bank. The announcement comes several months after AkademikerPension’s beneficiaries backed a motion calling for a total divestment from Israeli assets due to human rights concerns. The divestment underscores increasing corporate governance and ESG concerns for institutional investors with exposure to Israeli equities, bonds and related interests. In the coming months, scrutiny from beneficiaries and shareholders will increase pressure on high-profile businesses to divest from Israeli-linked interests. This is particularly pertinent for technology firms tendering contracts with the Israeli government, as well as agricultural entities sourcing produce from the West Bank and construction firms supplying Israel’s security forces with demolition and construction equipment. Increasing isolation will likely undermine investor confidence in Israel’s economy more broadly, elevating the risk of capital flight and exacerbating socio-economic pressure in the coming months.
• Israel-Yemen: Retaliatory Israeli action in Yemen is almost certain following Houthi strike on hotel. On 24 September, a Houthi drone strike near the Club Hotel Eilat (Eliat, Southern district, Israel) injured over 20 people. In the past three weeks, a Houthi drone successfully hit Ramon Airport (ETM, Israel) on 7 September while another crashed near the Jacob Eilat Hotel on 18 September (both Eilat). These incidents highlight the Houthis’ growing capacity to evade air defences in southern Israel, and therefore the elevated security risks facing personnel and assets in the area. This will increase the likelihood of event and travel cancellations in and around Eilat during the Jewish High Holidays, driving financial losses in the hospitality and tourism sectors. In the coming days, intense Israeli retaliation against Houthi facilities in Yemen is almost certain. We assess that strikes will target critical infrastructure such as ports and power stations, including in the capital Sanaa. This will heighten security risks for NGO personnel in the country; it will also significantly increase energy security risks, disrupt supply chains and degrade already critical humanitarian conditions in Yemen.
• Iraq: Election campaigns will increase risk of sporadic clashes in coming weeks. On 24 September, limited clashes erupted in Abu al-Khasib district (Basra governorate) between the Iranian-backed Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq and the Saraya al-Salam militia; the latter is the military wing of the Sadrist movement. The clashes injured several individuals. Local media reported that the fighting took place over the placement of campaign posters for candidates running in the upcoming parliamentary elections in November. We assess that further sporadic clashes between Iranian proxies and the Sadrists are likely during the campaign period over the coming weeks, despite the latter not participating in November’s elections. Notably, intra-factional clashes between elements of the Iranian-backed Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) are also likely; ongoing political rifts and internal competition inside the umbrella group will exacerbate this risk. Such clashes would, in turn, increase security risks in the vicinity of Iranian proxies’ headquarters and electoral events in the capital Baghdad and most major Iraqi cities in October. However, we assess that such altercations are unlikely to evolve into a wider civil conflict.
Sep 23.
• Syria: Memorandum of understanding highlights growing global integration. On 21 September, the Central Bank of Syria and Mastercard signed a memorandum of understanding that establishes a framework for future collaboration on digital payment infrastructure and the issuance of bank cards. The memorandum is non-binding, emphasising the ongoing hesitation of international banks and payment networks to commit fully to investing in the Syrian economy. The Syrian state’s and financial sector’s access to a fully digitalised payment system would possibly facilitate the country’s smoother integration within global financial networks, driving foreign direct investment (FDI). It would also support the growth of the formal economy and encourage the establishment of new international business operations. Over time, we assess this will reduce money laundering, as well as regulatory and compliance risks in Syria. However, the political and security environment remain two key factors that will continue to challenge this trend; their stabilisation will remain necessary for reducing and avoiding said challenges.
• Iraq: Energy deal will reduce socio-economic pressure despite insecurity, political instability. On 22 September, Iraq and the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) reached a deal with oil firms to resume Kurdish crude oil exports to Turkey via the Kirkuk-Ceyhan Oil Pipeline following a two-year pause in operations. The Iraqi cabinet is highly likely to grant final approval in the coming hours. However, local media reported that two oil firms have not yet fully agreed to the deal; they are demanding compensation from the KRG over the shutdown. While we assess that the oil pipeline will resume operations within 72 hours, continued political uncertainty in the KRG will sustain threats to the deal, particularly relating to revenue sharing with Baghdad. Nevertheless, the resumption in oil exports will partially reduce socio-economic pressure while also increasing the willingness of foreign companies to invest in this sector in 2026. However, persistent security risks – particularly attacks targeting Kurdish oil fields – will continue to drive market fluctuation and instability in the key sector.
• Italy: Clashes during pro-Palestine general strike highlight persistent ethno-religious tensions. On 22 September, violent unrest broke out in several towns during one of Europe’s largest nationwide pro-Palestine demonstrations. Tens of thousands of people participated in a 24-hour union-led strike demanding the suspension of Italy’s commercial and military ties with Israel, causing widespread cross-sector disruption (including for education, transport and public services). In Milan (Lombardy region), at least ten people were arrested after clashes erupted outside Milano Centrale station. Protesters armed with batons reportedly threw smoke bombs, bottles and stones at the police, who responded with tear gas. The Italian news agency ANSA reported that 60 police officers were injured. Similar clashes occurred outside Naples Centrale station (Campania region) and at a roadblock along the A14 near Bologna (Emilia-Romagna region). Further supply chain disruption has stemmed from dockworkers blocking operations at key shipping ports (including Genoa, Livorno, Venice and Trieste) in an effort to deny the use of Italian ports for arms transfers to Israel. Unlike several other Western European leaders, Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni has ruled out recognising a Palestinian state. As such, we assess that the risk of (smaller) pro-Palestine demonstrations will remain elevated, possibly driving physical risks for Israeli businesses and/or personnel.
• Lebanon- Disarmament plans
Key points
• The disarmament of Palestinian refugee camps will likely continue without major resistance through Q4 2025, though sporadic clashes with radical elements will remain possible.
• The Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) will likely continue the disarmament of Lebanese Hizballah (LH) south of the Litani River without facing resistance.
• LH will likely resist disarmament north of the Litani River, elevating domestic unrest risks in LH strongholds, particularly in the capital Beirut.
• The LAF will possibly extend the disarmament timeline for LH to avoid major unrest, reducing risks of civil war but elevating tensions with Israel; this will sustain risks of airstrikes, though a ceasefire collapse will remain unlikely.
Context
On 13 September, the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) reported that local Palestinian factions based in the refugee camps of Ain al-Hilweh (South governorate) and Beddawi (North governorate) had handed over five truckloads of weapons. The handover is part of a plan to implement a state monopoly over all arms in the country by the end of 2025. Notably, on 5 September, the government approved a disarmament plan targeting Lebanese Hizballah’s (LH) arsenal, despite persistent rejection by LH’s leadership and its cabinet ministers. While details and the exact timeline of the plan have not yet been disclosed, the LAF said that its implementation will depend on available capabilities (which are still limited in terms of logistics, as well as material and human resources).
Forecast
Major unrest within Palestinian camps is unlikely, though small-scale clashes between rogue radical Islamic groups and the LAF will remain possible throughout the disarmament process
We assess that the disarmament of Palestinian refugee camps inside Lebanon will largely remain peaceful. In the coming weeks, the Palestinian Authority (PA) and prominent factions (including Fatah and Hamas) will likely sustain high-level co-ordination with the LAF, mitigating risks of major unrest and clashes. The Lebanese government will possibly allow local camp administrations to keep small arms for policing in their jurisdictions, albeit under strict supervision by the new government. Despite overall co-operation, there is a realistic possibility that small Islamic groups inside these camps (indirectly affiliated with Islamic State and/or al-Qaeda) will reject the disarmament process. This will elevate the risks of sporadic clashes with the LAF and other Palestinian factions, particularly in Ain al-Hilweh and Nahr al-Bared (Akkar governorate).
LH will likely continue to reject full disarmament, prompting its members and supporters to protest in Beirut, increasing bystander and security risks in the coming weeks
Throughout Q4 2025, LAF will likely primarily focus on disarming Palestinian camps, though activities to confiscate LH weapons south of the Litani River (Nabatieh and South governorates) will likely continue. Despite LH’s overall resistance to its disarmament, we assess that the Iran-backed group will seek to retain the current ceasefire with Israel, foregoing resistance to LAF disarmament activities south of the Litani River. However, LH will highly likely continue to reject the full disarmament of its arsenal and military capabilities in regions north of the Litani. The organisation will likely exercise particularly strong resistance in its strongholds in Baalbek-Hermel governorate, Beirut and in regions bordering Syria. As such, LAF is unlikely to conduct major disarmament measures in LH strongholds without a voluntary agreement with the group, mitigating the risks of a major armed conflict and a civil war.
Even so, during the next three months, protest activity by LH members and Shia supporters in the southern suburbs of Beirut will highly likely increase. Such protests will elevate mobility disruption risks near Beirut-Rafic Hariri International Airport (BEY) and the Dahieh area of the capital in the coming months. Smaller protests will be highly likely in cities in Baalbek-Hermel, Beqaa, Nabatieh and South governorates, increasing risks of broader operational disruption. During these events, LH members will possibly attempt a show of force and demonstrate with small arms, increasing risks of altercations with the security forces and/or anti LH factions. As such, LH will highly likely use these protests as a political tool to pressure the government during talks, elevating risks of further unrest and social instability.
The Lebanese government and the LAF will possibly extend the disarmament timeline to between 12 and 18 months, sustaining risks of further tensions and border disputes with Israel until mid-2026
We assess that the government and the LAF will possibly extend the disarmament timeline to between 12 and 18 months to mitigate risks of broad conflict with LH and major unrest. This extension would increase the risks of misfire and elevated tensions between the LAF and Israel in southern Lebanon. Nevertheless, armed conflict between the LAF and Israel is unlikely; the ceasefire between LH and Israel will likely remain in place over the coming six months.
During this period, any initial agreement between LH and the government will highly likely be conditioned upon an Israeli withdrawal from sites in southern Lebanon and/or international guarantees of such withdrawal, as well as the halt of Israeli attacks targeting LH. These demands will likely be the main challenge to any prospective disarmament deal; Israel is unlikely to accept them without significant guarantees and/or pressure from the US. This will sustain risks of Israeli airstrikes in southern Lebanon, but is unlikely to lead to the collapse of the current ceasefire between Israel and LH.
Any disarmament deal with LH will highly likely focus initially on several heavy weapons arsenals in the Beqaa Valley (Beqaa governorate) and Baalbek-Hermel governorate. Later phases of the plan will likely focus on dismantling LH-affiliated smuggling networks along the border with Syria in Akkar, Baalbek-Hermel and Beqaa governorates. This will increase the risks of armed clashes with groups within these networks, increasing bystander security risks in areas near the Lebanon-Syria border. In turn, this will drive elevated operational and supply chain disruption risks, particularly to logistics firms and NGOs relying on movement between Lebanon and Syria. If the government focuses on LH’s heavy weapons and smuggling networks, there is a realistic possibility that it will allow LH to retain its small arms arsenal in Beirut. In this case, the government would likely postpone the handover of this arsenal until after the 18-month period.
Sep 22.
KEY DEVELOPMENTS
IRAN
• The UN Security Council (UNSC) rejected a resolution that would have permanently removed UN sanctions on Iran, underscoring the likely re-imposition of sanctions in the coming weeks.
• Iran tested a medium-range ballistic missile, underscoring the long-term risks of resumed Israeli strike action targeting nuclear and military facilities within Iran.
ISRAEL
• Israel will possibly respond to the international recognition of a Palestinian state by partially annexing the West Bank, increasing compliance, financial and reputational risks for Israeli-linked entities.
PALESTINIAN TERRITORIES
• GAZA STRIP: Israeli military operations in Gaza City will likely continue to intensify in the coming days; sporadic rocket launches against Israeli population centres remain likely.
• GAZA STRIP: The increasing prominence of Israeli-backed, anti-Hamas militant groups will highly likely further undermine security conditions within Gaza.
• GAZA STRIP: Although the Allenby Bridge border crossing has re-opened for general use, the suspension of aid deliveries from Jordan to Gaza will exacerbate food insecurity and the risk of looting targeting aid operations within the enclave.
• WEST BANK: Escalating militant efforts to produce and launch rockets will increase security risks in central areas of the West Bank and likely trigger intensified IDF operations.
• WEST BANK: The increasing international recognition of a Palestinian state will elevate risks of domestic unrest and attacks in the West Bank.
IRAN
• The UN Security Council (UNSC) rejected a resolution that would have permanently removed UN sanctions on Iran, underscoring the likely re-imposition of sanctions in the coming weeks. On 19 September, the UNSC rejected a resolution that would have provided permanent sanctions relief to Iran from 30 September onwards by terminating the pre-Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) sanctions regime. Unless the UNSC adopts a resolution to extend existing sanctions relief by 30 September, the pre-2015 sanctions regime on Iran will come back into effect. In the coming week, diplomatic efforts to resolve deadlock over Iran’s nuclear programme will almost certainly intensify as regional tensions remain significantly elevated. However, on 20 September, Iran’s Supreme National Security Council (SNSC) announced that the UNSC decision would ‘effectively suspend the path of co-operation’ with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). The E3 (France, Germany and the UK) have conditioned extending sanctions relief on Iran co-operating with the IAEA, re-entering nuclear negotiations with the US and accounting for its stockpiles of enriched uranium. As such, a breakthrough and subsequent extension of sanctions relief remain unlikely in the coming days. The re-implementation of UN sanctions would substantially increase pressure on Iran’s economy, triggering a further devaluation of the Iranian rial (IRR) and increasing the risk of hybrid Iranian retaliation targeting nations that enforce sanctions. Such retaliation would possibly include measures such as the detention of foreign nationals associated with enforcing countries, vessel hijackings in the Persian Gulf and economically motivated cyber attacks targeting private and public sector entities (see Sibylline Middle East Crisis Update – 18 September 2025).
• Iran tested a medium-range ballistic missile, underscoring the long-term risks of resumed Israeli strike action targeting nuclear and military facilities within Iran. On 18 September, Iran conducted a missile test at the Semnan Space Centre (Semnan province). During the Iran-Israel war, Israel conducted airstrikes targeting this facility due to its close association with the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps’ (IRGC) missile-development programme. At the time of writing, the type of missile that Iran tested remains unclear, though footage indicates that Iran possibly tested components of the domestically produced Sejjil-class system, a medium-range ballistic missile capable of reaching Israel. The test comes amid increasing concerns that Iran intends to re-develop its ballistic missile production capabilities rapidly following the Iran-Israel war (see Sibylline Situation Update Brief – 15 July 2025). Further Iranian missile tests and demonstrations of medium- and long-range ballistic missile capabilities will increase the risk of resumed Israeli strike action targeting Iranian nuclear and military facilities in the long term, though rapid escalation into sustained regional conflict remains unlikely.
ISRAEL
• Israel will possibly respond to the international recognition of a Palestinian state by partially annexing the West Bank, increasing compliance, financial and reputational risks for Israeli-linked entities. Following announcements by Australia, Canada and the UK regarding the recognition of an independent Palestinian state (see below), Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu stated that Israel’s response would be ‘forthcoming’. We assess that Israel will likely issue a formal response to growing international recognition after Netanyahu meets with US President Donald Trump on 29 September. In the coming days, hard-right parties within Netanyahu’s coalition government will likely call for the annexation of the West Bank; however, full annexation would severely harm Israel’s diplomatic standing, particularly with Arab nations (including signatories of bilateral peace agreements and the multi-lateral Abraham Accords). Total Israeli annexation of the West Bank would also likely harm the US’ standing in the region and is unlikely to gain substantial support from the Trump administration. As such, we assess that Netanyahu is unlikely to announce the imminent and total annexation of the West Bank. Even so, there is a realistic possibility that Israel will announce plans for a partial annexation of the West Bank, possibly in the Jordan Valley. While partial annexation would reduce the risk of a complete breakdown of Israel’s accords and agreements with regional states, it would almost certainly trigger significant diplomatic backlash from regional and international parties. Retaliatory measures would possibly include limits to bilateral trade with Israel, which would especially impact Israel’s agriculture, chemical and defence industries. Regional states would also possibly move to adopt broader sanctions targeting Israel, including measures targeting Israeli government officials and Israeli-affiliated entities, among other associated individuals. These measures would substantially increase operational and supply chain disruption risks for entities operating within Israel and the West Bank, while also compounding broader compliance, financial and reputational risks for Israeli-linked entities. Increasing international isolation would also increase the risk of capital flight from Israeli markets, impacting the profitability of local companies and Israel’s long-term socio-economic health.
PALESTINIAN TERRITORIES
• GAZA STRIP: Israeli military operations in Gaza City will likely continue to intensify in the coming days; sporadic rocket launches against Israeli population centres remain likely. On 21 September, Gaza-based militants launched two rockets from northern Gaza, triggering sirens in Ashdod (Southern district, Israel). The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) intercepted one rocket while the other fell in an open area without causing any material damage. The launches come amid the ongoing intensification of IDF operations in Gaza. Division 99 is operating in northern Gaza. Divisions 36, 98 and 162 are operating in Gaza City. Division 143 is operating in southern Gaza. In response to advancing IDF operations, militants will likely attempt to use their hidden arsenal before the IDF discovers and destroys it, increasing the risk of sporadic rocket launches in the coming days. However, rocket launches are unlikely to pose significant security risks for Israeli population centres in southern Israel and are unlikely to reach major population centres in central Israel, moderating the risk in cities such as Tel Aviv (Tel Aviv district). In the coming weeks, the IDF will likely continue deepening and intensifying its operations in Gaza City, possibly prompting Hamas to issue renewed ceasefire proposals. However, Israel is unlikely to stop its operations in the short term and is unlikely to agree to engage in negotiations without significant pressure from the US, which remains unlikely.
• GAZA STRIP: The increasing prominence of Israeli-backed, anti-Hamas militant groups will highly likely further undermine security conditions within Gaza. On 18 September, a former member of the Palestinian Authority (PA)’s security agency, Hussam al-Astal, announced the formation of an anti-Hamas armed group in the Khan Yunis area. The announcement comes amid increasing reports from regional media outlets regarding the Israeli-backed formation and mobilisation of several anti-Hamas militant groups within Gaza, such as the Popular Forces (an anti-Hamas militia led by Yasser Abu Shabab). On 17 September, the Haaretz media outlet reported that the IDF and Shin Bet have recently engaged various Gaza-based militant groups to carry out military operations in exchange for pay and territorial control. Although the mobilisation of anti-Hamas militias will possibly contribute to broader IDF efforts to undercut Hamas’ militant and civil enforcement capabilities in the medium term, the devolution of security operations to local militant groups will increase the risk of proliferating inter-militant clashes throughout Gaza. Decentralised and localised clashes between Hamas and anti-Hamas militant groups would increase the risk of attacks and bystanders’ exposure to intense conflict in areas that have not been issued with evacuation orders as well as within the al-Mawasi humanitarian zone (southern Gaza). The increasing prominence of anti-Hamas groups would also increase the risk of Hamas-ordered executions targeting individuals alleged to have ‘collaborated’ with Israel, as reported on 20 September. Such conditions would increase critical threats to life for locally engaged NGO staff and disrupt the continuity of aid supply chains, contributing to the broader deterioration of security conditions throughout Gaza.
• GAZA STRIP: Although the Allenby Bridge border crossing has re-opened for general use, the suspension of aid deliveries from Jordan to Gaza will exacerbate food insecurity and the risk of looting targeting aid operations within the enclave. Following a shooting attack at the Allenby Bridge border crossing (see Sibylline Middle East Crisis Update – 18 September 2025), the IDF Chief of Staff Eyal Zamir announced the indefinite suspension of aid deliveries from Jordan to Gaza via the border crossing. Although deliveries from Jordan accounted for less than 7% of aid deliveries into Gaza from 1 August to 18 September, the suspension will further disrupt aid supply chains and distribution within Gaza, compounding critical food insecurity conditions therein. The resumption of aid deliveries via the Jordan-West Bank-Israel-Gaza corridor would possibly trigger a resumption of anti-aid protests by the hard-right Tsav 9 activist group, increasing the risk of vandalism targeting aid convoys and proximate vehicles transiting this route. Within Gaza, looting and attacks targeting aid convoys remain widespread. UN data indicates that of the approximately 63,000 aid pallets collected from border crossings since 1 August, approximately 50,000 have been intercepted during transit. Such conditions are highly unlikely to improve in the coming weeks, sustaining critical threats to locally engaged NGO staff and compounding the risk of scrutiny for Israeli-linked firms operating worldwide.
• WEST BANK: Escalating militant efforts to produce and launch rockets will increase security risks in central areas of the West Bank and likely trigger intensified IDF operations. On 19 September, the IDF discovered dozens of rockets (without warheads), IEDs and other explosive materials in Ramallah and al-Bireh governorate (West Bank). This comes amid growing efforts by militants in the West Bank to produce rockets and launch them towards Israeli population centres. On 11 September, militants conducted a test launch of a rocket (without a warhead) from Kafr Ni’ma (Ramallah and al-Bireh), which fell near Route 443 (without causing damage). On 15 September, IDF operations in Kafr Ni’ma located an additional rocket (without explosive materials). These developments underscore the increasing risk of rocket launches from the West Bank, particularly during the upcoming Israeli holidays (22-24 September, 1-2 October and 6-14 October). Even so, such rocket launches will almost certainly be limited and sporadic, meaning they are unlikely to present significant security risks for Israeli population centres. However, possible rocket malfunctions will increase security and bystander risks within proximate Palestinian population centres and major thoroughfares within the West Bank. Militant rocket launches are also almost certain to prompt an intense Israeli military response in the surrounding area, including house searches, military cordons, increased checkpoints and limits on transport. Such measures would likely lead to localised travel and operational disruption, while possibly triggering clashes between security personnel, militants and/or suspected perpetrators.
• WEST BANK: The increasing international recognition of a Palestinian state will elevate risks of domestic unrest and attacks in the West Bank. In the coming weeks, the increasing recognition of a Palestinian state (see below) will likely trigger celebratory demonstrations in large cities, particularly Ramallah (Ramallah and al-Bireh governorate), as well as temporary transport and operational disruption. However, this growing international recognition of a Palestinian state will likely exacerbate already-elevated ethno-religious tensions within the West Bank. Among Palestinian communities, the risk of radicalisation and militant recruitment will increase in the coming weeks, as will the risk of attacks targeting Israeli targets in the West Bank and Jerusalem areas. The risk of such attacks will also remain elevated in Israel, though they will be comparatively lower. Among Israeli settlers in the West Bank and pro-settlement extremists within Israel, the risk of attacks targeting Palestinian civilians and population centres will also increase. The Israeli security forces’ efforts to intervene in ongoing attacks will increase the risk of clashes between right-wing extremists and Israeli security personnel. Such clashes would increase the risk of pro-settler protests within Israel (particularly in Jerusalem), as well as domestic unrest affecting IDF bases in the West Bank, exacerbating localised travel disruption and security risks.
REGIONAL AND GLOBAL DEVELOPMENTS
• Israel-global: The growing diplomatic trend of recognising Palestine will increase compliance and reputational risks for global entities dealing with the IDF and Israeli government in Q4 2025. On 21 September, Australia, Canada, Portugal and the UK announced their formal recognition of an independent Palestinian state. French President Emannuel Macron also announced France’s impending recognition on 22 September. We assess that the growing number of Western countries that confirm their recognition of Palestine is highly likely to increase compliance and reputational risks for global entities dealing with the Israeli military and/or Israeli settlers (see above and Sibylline Situation Update Brief – 19 September 2025). Similar risks apply to global businesses already operating in Israel and/or those Israeli firms with which they are partnered, particularly in the shipping, technology, pharmaceuticals and retail sectors. We also assess that IDF operations in Gaza and the possibility of Israel annexing parts of the West Bank (see above) will possibly prompt additional European states to review and amend their trade and co-operation relationships with Israel in the coming weeks, widening the scope of these compliance risks for further European companies dealing with Israel. These companies (particularly those in the defence and/or shipping sectors) will also likely face increasing scrutiny from pro-Palestine activists, increasing the risk of supply chain sabotage, operational disruption and vandalism of assets by radical elements.
• Israel-Palestinian Territories: Western recognition of Palestinian state will drive security risks. On 21 September, the governments of Australia, Canada, Portugal and the UK formally recognised a Palestinian state. Belgium and France are also likely to announce their recognition at the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) over the course of this week. Israel’s Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu stated that he would respond following his meeting with US President Donald Trump on 29 September. The response will likely include withholding funds from the Palestinian Authority (PA), exacerbating its ongoing fiscal crisis and elevating socio-economic health risks in the West Bank. Israel is also likely to accelerate its approval of settlement expansion in the coming weeks, driving diplomatic escalation with its Western partners. We assess that Western recognition of a Palestinian state and subsequent Israeli responses will increase the risk of domestic unrest, sole-perpetrator attacks and militant activity targeting the West Bank in the coming weeks. Furthermore, there is a realistic possibility that Western states will impose sanctions on an increasing number of Israeli entities, possibly disrupting supply chain integrity and raising reputational risks for companies operating in Israel.
• Iran: Possible resumption of sanctions will trigger socio-economic instability, regional tensions. On 19 September, the UN Security Council (UNSC) voted against a draft resolution to permanently lift sanctions on Iran. Consequently, unless Iran meets the criteria laid out under the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), the UNSC will reimpose snapback sanctions on 28 September. There remains a possibility in the coming days that the Iranian government would convince the UNSC powers to delay the re-imposition of sanctions in favour of further negotiations. However, there is a realistic possibility of sanction resumption, which will increase compliance and operational disruption risks for financial, technology and shipping firms dealing with the Iranian government, government-linked individuals and private entities. Furthermore, we assess that any re-implementation of sanctions is highly likely to increase Iran’s socio-economic instability through currency devaluation of the Iranian Rial (IRR) and substantial supply chain disruption to imports. In this scenario, Iran will likely withdraw from its recent agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), increasing regional tensions and risks of resumed Israeli airstrikes in the coming months. (Source: Sibylline)
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Military And Security Developments

Sep 26.

Risk Forecast Executive summary

• In our Strategic Risk Forecast, we put forward various scenarios in which we hypothesise the trajectory of the Russo-Ukrainian war in the next 12 months. Our baseline scenario is that the war will likely continue in some form without a definitive resolution; there is also a realistic possibility of a fragile ceasefire that will fail to stop the fighting entirely.
• US President Donald Trump stated on 23 September that, with the support of the EU and NATO, Ukraine can win the war against Russia and retake all of its territory. While this is nominally a significant pivot in the US’ position, it remains our assessment that this shift is likely an attempt to pressure European states to increase their support for Ukraine, rather than signalling growing US involvement or a dramatic shift in policy that aims to step up Ukraine’s offensive capability. Our assessment is informed by the fact that just days beforehand, Trump conditioned further sanctions on Russia while also taking the unprecedented step of partially easing sanctions on Belarus’ main airline. This likely indicates that the Trump administration still favours economic reproachment with Russia rather than embroilment in Ukraine.
• This month witnessed an unprecedented incursion of at least 19 Russian drones into NATO territory overnight on 9-10 September. The incident marked the first time NATO forces had intercepted Russian assets since the full-scale invasion of Ukraine; it led to Poland invoking Article 4 of the North Atlantic Charter to deliberate with allies on the ‘next steps’. Subsequent aerial incursions in Estonia and suspected Russian drone activity in Denmark point to a broader pattern that we have routinely forecast; these incidents are highly likely part of a broader Russian test of NATO’s responsiveness and cohesion as an alliance. Further tests and interceptions are likely in the coming month.

Key triggers, warnings and indicators (TWIs) to watch for in October include the possible setting of a bill before the Danish parliament; its approval would empower airports and ports to shoot down drones, a measure that would then possibly spread across Europe.

Sep 24.
KEY DEVELOPMENTS
• DONETSK: Across Pokrovsk (Donetsk oblast), Russian forces are innovating their drone tactics, relying on cheaper drones to conduct reconnaissance, which will only increase the saturation of Ukraine’s defences with drones
• BUDGET: Russia’s finance ministry has proposed raising value-added tax (VAT) from 20% to 22% starting in 2026, as Ukraine’s strikes against Russia’s oil refining capability have likely impacted revenues
• BILL: Lawmakers from Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky’s ruling Servant of the People (SN) party have registered a bill that would likely undermine media freedom and impact due diligence procedures
• FORECAST: On 23 September, US President Donald Trump stated that Ukraine could reclaim all its territory from Russia with EU support, though this is unlikely to reflect a dramatic pivot in US policy towards ramping up military support for Kyiv
• BAKHMUT: Russian troops continue to slowly encroach towards Siversk (Donetsk oblast), likely attempting to accumulate forces to support further offensive efforts. Geolocated footage published on 23 September indicates that Russian forces have taken Pereizne (Donetsk oblast), a village located approximately six miles (9km) south of Siversk. Meanwhile, footage from 24 September also indicated Russian advances to the north-east, with forces slowly advancing towards the eastern outskirts of Siversk. On 24 September, a spokesperson for a Ukrainian brigade fighting near Siversk reported that Russian forces are currently trying to target Ukrainian drone launch positions with small infiltration groups. This Russian initiative includes attacks on motorcycles and the use of anti-thermal imaging cloaks, which are designed to hide the infantry from drone operators. However, Russia’s efforts to accumulate forces are facing limits along frontlines, with Ukrainian forces broadly able to identify any concentrations of troops before attacks take place. This situation is informing Russia’s reliance upon small infiltration groups.
• BAKHMUT: Further south, Russian forces have continued to make slow and minor advances to the south of Kostiantynivka (Donetsk oblast); Ukrainian defences are holding for the time being, slowing Russia’s rate of advance. Geolocated footage from 23 and 24 September indicates that Russian forces have advanced into central Nelipivka (Donetsk oblast), a village located around four miles (6.5km) south of Kostiantynivka. On 23 September, the spokesperson for Ukraine’s 11th Army Corps reported that nearby Russian forces are focusing on improving their logistics and on rotating naval infantry units, likely in preparation for future intensified assaults towards Kostiantynivka.
• DONETSK: Across Pokrovsk (Donetsk oblast), Russian forces are innovating their drone tactics, relying on cheaper equipment to conduct reconnaissance. The commander of a Ukrainian drone-interceptor battery recently noted that Russia is increasingly deploying Gerbera drones (frequently used as Shahed drone decoys) equipped with cameras for reconnaissance purposes. According to this official, these drones are highly cost-effective compared with high-end reconnaissance unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) such as the Orlan, Superkam and ZALA products. This shift likely underscores Moscow’s continued efforts to adapt and develop cost-effective technology for the frontline; it also reflects the overall increase in production rates of larger drones, including Gerbera decoys.
• DONETSK: Ukrainian military officials have noted that Russian forces continue to rely on small infantry groups to penetrate deep into Ukrainian positions and disrupt logistical routes. There are also some indications that Russia is slightly increasing its use of armoured vehicles in the area. However, according to a military intelligence officer, Ukrainian drone operators systematically target such incursions. Russian forces have made confirmed advances within western Udachne (Donetsk oblast), located to the south-west of Pokrovsk. Meanwhile, Ukrainian forces recently advanced east of Kozatske (Kherson oblast), located to the east of Pokrovsk; they have also moved into eastern Novopavlivka (Dnipropetrovsk oblast), a town to the south of Pokrovsk.
• DONETSK: In recent days, Ukrainian forces have continued to advance in the Dobropillia sector (Donetsk oblast). Geolocated footage from 23 September shows Ukrainian troops progressing into southern Novotoretske and southern Boikivka (both Donetsk oblast), both located to the south-east of Dobropillia. Meanwhile, Russian milbloggers reported that Russian forces have withdrawn from Zapovidne (Donetsk oblast), also situated to the south-east of Dobropillia.
• KHARKIV: Nothing significant to report
• KURSK-SUMY: Nothing significant to report
• OSKIL-KREMINNA: In the direction of Lyman (Donetsk oblast), Russian forces have continued to make gains, but at a high cost as they rely on poorly trained and equipped units. The spokesperson for a Ukrainian unit has reported that Russian offensives in the sector were mostly conducted by small infantry units that launched ground assaults. Another military official noted that while Russia maintains a high offensive tempo in the area, Russian units’ exposure will soon increase as natural cover disappears with the coming of autumn. This will likely prompt the Russian command to adjust its tactics. Geolocated footage posted on 22 September shows recent Russian advances north of Derylove and east of Shandryholove (both Donetsk oblast), two villages located to the north-west of Lyman. Meanwhile, to the east of Lyman, Ukrainian forces have made confirmed advances north of Torske (Donetsk oblast) at the time of writing.
• SOUTHERN: Nothing significant to report
• STRIKES: Russian strikes in recent days have involved over a hundred drones per attack, accompanied by a variable number of missiles. These attacks have continued to target energy facilities, including in Kharkiv oblast on 24 September and in Vinnytsia oblast earlier on 25 September. Russia is highly likely to increasingly target energy infrastructure in the coming weeks, ahead of the heating season. Other targets have included civilian sites as well as a Ukrainian training ground, which was hit by Iskander-M ballistic missiles on 24 September. We previously reported that Russia had intensified strikes against training grounds and recruitment centres. This trend is likely to continue, as both sides are struggling to concentrate their forces without being identified and consequently struck by each other. In response to these strikes’ targets, Ukrainian officials have pledged to reinforce the protective infrastructure of energy and civilian facilities, though we continue to assess that these sites are likely to remain vulnerable.
• STRIKES: Ukraine has continued its strike campaign against Russian oil infrastructure. A significant target is the ‘8-N’ oil pipeline control station (Bryansk oblast), which is crucial for supplying fuel to Russian forces. Other targets that have been hit in recent days include pipeline infrastructure across Samara oblast, a Gazprom Neftekhim Salavat petrochemical plant in the Republic of Bashkortostan and oil pumping stations in Belgorod and Volgograd oblasts.
POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS
• BUDGET: On 24 September, Russia’s finance ministry proposed raising value-added tax (VAT) from 20% to 22% in 2026 as part of the country’s new three-year budget. The slight increase would generate an estimated RUB 1.3 trillion (USD 15.5 billion) in revenue annually. Russian President Vladimir Putin had previously promised that there would be no further tax increases before 2030. However, Russia’s federal budget deficit reached RUB 4.88 trillion (USD 61.1 billion) between January and July, surpassing the government’s target for the full year.
• BUDGET: Ukrainian drone attacks on oil refineries have likely hindered Russia’s ability to generate revenue. Reports from 23 September claimed that strikes have pushed Russian diesel exports close to their lowest levels since 2020. According to the Financial Times, Ukraine has struck 16 of Russia’s 38 refineries since the beginning of August, with some facilities hit multiple times. Despite worsening economic indicators, we continue to assess that the Russian economy is unlikely to be on the brink of collapse in the coming months. Similarly, our assessment remains that the Kremlin is willing to endure significant economic hardship to sustain the war effort; this includes raising taxes, which is unlikely to generate significant societal backlash.
• BILL: On 21 September, lawmakers from Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky’s ruling Servant of the People (SN) party and those from the opposition registered a bill that would likely undermine media freedom in Ukraine. According to Ukrainian investigative media outlet Bihus.Info, the proposed legislation increases legal liability for publications that could be considered ‘critical’. The bill also suggests automatically labelling information as false if it has not been confirmed by a court ruling. It would also allow individuals to seek ‘moral compensation’ for criticism if they feel their dignity or reputation has been harmed.
• BILL: Aside from the likely adverse impact on media freedom and investigative journalism if the bill passes, we assess that certain provisions would likely render it harder to conduct due diligence procedures in Ukraine. Lawmakers have suggested allowing the removal of content (even if factually correct) if it is deemed outdated or ‘no longer of public interest’; however, these terms are not defined in the bill. If members of Ukrainian society perceive that the legislation undermines free speech and is detrimental to Ukraine’s media climate and fight against corruption, this could realistically increase protest risks in the coming weeks and months. We assess that controversial legislation and corruption-related developments will likely be triggers for domestic unrest following large-scale protests in July.
• POLITICS: On 23 September, Politico reported that Ukraine’s Western allies have expressed concerns regarding Zelensky’s apparent efforts to centralise power. This is according to three European envoys in Kyiv, who said that such criticism has not been voiced publicly so that Russia cannot use it for propaganda purposes. Nevertheless, in an interview on 24 September, Zelensky refuted the concerns raised in Politico’s report and stated that Ukraine is prepared to hold elections, even during a ceasefire, if partners can guarantee they can be held securely. However, holding elections under a ceasefire would face a myriad of organisational and security obstacles. It would be difficult to organise voting for Ukrainian refugees abroad and almost impossible to ensure a fair voting environment for soldiers and civilians in Russian-occupied regions. The threat of Russian sabotage and other subversive activity, as well as renewed military aggression by Moscow, would also be very credible security concerns.
• POLITICS: Growing domestic and international pressure likely contributed to Zelensky stating that he is prepared to step down once the war is ended. He made the comments in an interview with Axios published on 25 September. However, while it remains highly unlikely that that war will end in the short-to-medium term, the prospects of elections also remain very low.
FORECAST
US: On 23 September, US President Donald Trump stated that Ukraine could reclaim all its territory from Russia with EU support. He made these remarks during a meeting with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky at the UN General Assembly (UNGA). Later, on social media, Trump reiterated that financial support from the EU and NATO would enable Ukraine to retake its territory, as well as potentially to expand into Russia.
We assess that such statements are unlikely to signal a major shift in President Trump’s stance on the war. Increasing Ukraine’s offensive capability to that extent would entail an unprecedented and substantial increase in aid. Trump did not indicate whether the US itself would be prepared to increase its support for Ukraine, only that the US will continue to supply weapons to NATO for the military alliance to use as it sees appropriate. In any case, increasing military aid to Ukraine and committing to helping Kyiv regain all its land controlled by Russia would almost certainly face resistance from Ukraine-sceptic members of Trump’s support base. Rather, we assess that Trump will likely maintain a transactional approach to supporting Ukraine and will condition assistance on EU and NATO allies purchasing US weapons for Ukraine’s benefit. More broadly, Trump’s remarks appear aimed at pressuring European countries to deepen their security commitments and support for Ukraine, rather than at signalling increased US involvement.
Media reports have claimed that Trump’s comments may have been influenced by recent briefings regarding the current battlefield and the promise of a possible Ukrainian offensive that would require US intelligence assistance. The Wall Street Journal (WSJ) reported this on 24 September, citing two unspecified insiders familiar with the matter. US Ambassador to the UN Mike Waltz and the special envoy for Ukraine, Keith Kellogg, were reportedly among the officials briefing Trump. The briefing reportedly emphasised Russia’s failure to make significant territorial gains despite staging large-scale offensives across multiple regions of Ukraine. We cannot confirm whether these briefings influenced Trump’s recent comment and, if so, to what extent; however, Trump disparaged Russia’s military capabilities on social media and called Russia a ‘paper tiger’. The US president described Russia as having ‘been fighting aimlessly for three-and-a-half years’, adding his opinion that ‘a real military power’ would have won the war in less than a week.
Trump is highly likely attempting to increase pressure on Russia to take steps to end the war by simultaneously praising Ukraine’s military capabilities and signalling that more support for Kyiv is possible. Trump has historically emphasised Russia’s military might; since returning to office, he has sought to improve relations between Moscow and Washington DC. This week’s comments mark the most recent apparent policy shift on Ukraine. On 24 September 2024, Trump criticised his predecessor Joe Biden’s public policy of supporting Ukraine in its pursuit to reclaim all its territory and praised Russia’s historic military record. Nevertheless, recent comments from officials within his administration indicate that Trump is growing more frustrated with the lack of progress towards resolving the Russo-Ukrainian war; this could realistically be pushing him to change strategy in his attempts to influence the war’s outcome.
On 24 September, US Vice President JD Vance stated that Trump is growing ‘incredibly impatient’ with Russia, as Moscow refuses to make sufficient steps towards ceasing hostilities. Vance’s comments echo remarks made on 23 September by US Secretary of State Marco Rubio, who said that Trump’s patience is ‘not infinite’ and that he has options for imposing new sanctions against Moscow. However, Trump and officials in his administration have made similar comments when the peace process appeared to have reached an impasse in recent months. Ultimately, unless the US follows through on Trump’s comments with clear policy changes (namely ramping up sanctions and increasing military aid), we assess that his statements are mostly rhetorical and an attempt to influence the Kremlin and to push European governments to step up support for Ukraine.
• Europe region-US-Russia: US support for NATO allies to defend airspace will sustain regional tensions. On 23 September, US President Donald Trump announced Russian aircraft should be shot down by NATO allies if they enter their airspace. His comments follow the recent uptick in Russian jet and drone incursions along NATO’s eastern flank in Estonia, Poland and Romania. Additionally, Denmark’s Prime Minister Mette Frederiksen has not ruled out Russian involvement in the drone activity that temporarily closed the capital’s Copenhagen Airport (CPH) on 22 September. During a bilateral meeting with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky at the UN General Assembly (UNGA), President Trump stated that US military support for a NATO member state engaging with Russian aircraft due to an airspace incursion would ‘depend on the circumstance’. However, President Trump also expressed ‘strong’ support for NATO members’ commitment to increasing defence spending from 2% to 5% of their gross national product (GDP). These comments highlight the Trump administration’s current hardening of its stance against Russia. This posture will likely embolden NATO allies (particularly in the Baltic region) to strengthen their air defences and deterrence posture. While any engagement with Russian jets would spike regional tensions if Russia continues to test NATO’s eastern flank, we assess that a major open NATO-Russia war remains highly unlikely.
• Ukraine-US: US is unlikely to significantly shift aid posture towards Ukraine. On 23 September, US President Donald Trump stated that Ukraine could reclaim all of its territory from Russia with EU support. He made these remarks during a meeting with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky at the UN General Assembly (UNGA). Later, on social media, Trump reiterated that EU-NATO financial support would enable Ukraine not only to retake its territory but potentially to expand into Russia. We assess that such statements are unlikely to signal a major shift in President Trump’s stance on the war, as it would entail an unprecedented and substantial increase in aid to Ukraine. Rather, President Trump is likely to maintain a transactional approach to supporting Ukraine, conditioning assistance on EU and NATO allies purchasing US weapons for Ukraine’s benefit. This was illustrated by the recently delivered US military assistance to Ukraine, as reported on 18 September. More broadly, President Trump’s remarks appear aimed at pressuring European countries to deepen their security commitments and support for Ukraine, rather than at signalling a growing US involvement.
Sep 23.
Denmark-Norway: Drone incursions will continue to drive operational disruption risks for aviation. On 22 September, detected drone activity near Copenhagen Airport (CPH, Denmark) and Oslo Airport (OSL, Norway) caused significant disruption. At least two or three ‘larger’ drones were observed at CPH at 2030hrs (local time). The police believe that a ‘capable’ threat actor was behind the incident based on the drones’ sizes and flying patterns. Danish Prime Minister Mette Frederiksen called the incident ‘the most serious attack on Danish critical infrastructure to date’. In Norway, at least two drone sightings prompted the closure of OSL at around midnight. Both airports have since reopened. However, flight delays and cancellations are likely until the end of 23 September. While the incidents are under investigation, there is a realistic possibility that they are part of Russian grey zone operations. In recent weeks, there have been multiple Russia-linked NATO airspace incursions in Europe. Since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, NATO countries in the Baltic and North Sea regions have reported multiple drone sightings over strategic areas. We assess that further such incidents are likely, increasing operational risks for critical infrastructure operators.
Ukraine: Russian groups’ co-operation underscores long-term cyber espionage risks to organisations
On 19 September, the Slovakian cyber security company ESET reported that two Russian state-sponsored groups (‘Turla’ and ‘Gamaredon’) collaborated in several cyber espionage operations against Ukrainian entities between February and April. In the earlier stages of this collaboration, Gamaredon reportedly infiltrated several organisations and deployed multiple malware payloads before handing over access to compromised systems to Turla. Turla then installed a backdoor (‘Kazuar’) on four occasions to maintain persistence and enable remote control for espionage purposes. In March, Gamaredon started deploying Kazuar without Turla’s intervention, likely showcasing the evolution of the groups’ tactics and co-operation. Gamaredon has conducted opportunistic cyber attacks against multiple sectors in Ukraine since at least 2013; Turla has focused on targeting entities elsewhere. Consequently, we assess that Turla’s participation in Gamaredon’s attacks underscores the continuous development of Russia’s cyber strategy vis-à-vis Ukraine. This will sustain security and cyber espionage risks to Ukrainian organisations amid the ongoing Russia-Ukraine war.
Sep 22.
KEY DEVELOPMENTS
• SOUTHERN: Russian forces likely currently enjoy a significant personnel and equipment advantage along the Donetsk-Dnipropetrovsk oblast border, where Russian forces have made steady gains in recent weeks
• STRIKES: Overnight on 19-20 September, Russia launched a large strike package including eight Iskandr-M/KM-23 ballistic missiles, 32 Kh-101 cruise missiles and 579 drones
• SANCTIONS: On 19 September, the EU presented its 19th package of punitive measures against Russia, which includes plans to ban imports of Russian liquified natural gas (LNG) a year earlier than originally planned
• FORECAST: Recent Russian provocations in the Baltic region likely indicate continued attempts to test the readiness and resolve of NATO’s eastern flank, despite Donald Trump’s latest assurances that he would support eastern states
• BAKHMUT: Geolocated footage from 18 and 19 September indicates that Russian forces have advanced to the south of Oleksandro-Shultyne, a village located under four miles (6km) to the south-east of Kostiantynivka (both Donetsk oblast).
• DONETSK: Geolocated footage from recent days shows that Russian forces advanced in and to the west of Novoekonomichne, a highly contested town located to the north-east of Pokrovsk (both Donetsk oblast). We previously reported that Ukrainian forces had regained control of the settlement, after Russian forces initially held it in July. The latest developments suggest that the settlement remains highly contested, with Russia intensifying efforts to recapture it. Novoekonomichne is a tactically important satellite town for Russian operations surrounding Pokrovsk; its recapture would place significant pressure on Pokrovsk’s north-eastern flank. A Ukrainian military source operating in the area also confirmed that Russia has expanded its range of drone attacks in the area, adding significant pressure to Ukrainian defensive operations.
• KHARKIV: Nothing significant to report
• KURSK-SUMY: Nothing significant to report
• OSKIL-KREMINNA: Russian forces continued to make gains around Kupiansk (Kharkiv oblast) while conducting infiltration attempts against Ukrainian defensive positions in the city. On 21 September, a prominent Ukrainian military observer reported that Russia had captured Kindrashivka, located to the north of Kupiansk. The observer stated that Russian troops were leveraging their numerical advantage to launch numerous infiltration attempts towards Kupiansk from several directions. While Russian forces are struggling to transfer heavy equipment across the Oskil River, they reportedly face no such difficulties in moving personnel.
• OSKIL-KREMINNA: Russian forces have made tactical gains in recent days to the south towards Lyman (Donetsk oblast). Geolocated footage from 19 September shows Russian troops advancing along the northern bank of the Siverskyi Donets River in the Serebrianske forest area, to the south-east of Lyman. Footage from 20 September indicates further Russian gains in eastern Shandryholove, located to the north-west of Lyman.
• SOUTHERN: Geolocated footage from 20 September indicates that Russian forces have seized Berezove (Dnipropetrovsk oblast), a village located 15.5 miles (25km) to the west of Velyka Novosilka. Ukrainian sources also reported on 21 September that Russian forces have taken Sichneve, located around six miles (10km) to the north-east of Berezove (both Dnipropetrovsk oblast), along the border with Donetsk oblast.
• SOUTHERN: A prominent Ukrainian milblogger with connections to the Ukrainian High Command assessed on 21 September that Russian forces likely currently enjoy a significant personnel and equipment advantage along the Donetsk-Dnipropetrovsk oblast border, where Russian forces have made steady gains in recent weeks. According to military analyst Kostyantyn Mashovets, nearby Russian forces have three to four battalions for every Ukrainian defence battalion, though this ratio can increase to five or six battalions for each Ukrainian battalion in certain areas. This is reportedly impacting Ukraine’s ability to maintain an effective and continuous defensive line in the area, forcing Ukraine to focus on strongpoints, leaving what could prove to be significant gaps. We assess that similar dynamics exist elsewhere across frontlines, but that Russia’s steady gains on the Donetsk-Dnipropetrovsk oblast border likely indicate its advantage is sufficient to enable further advances.
• STRIKES: Overnight on 19-20 September, Russia launched a large strike package including eight Iskandr-M/KM-23 ballistic missiles, 32 Kh-101 cruise missiles and 579 drones. Ukrainian forces reportedly intercepted 552 unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), two ballistic missiles and 29 cruise missiles. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky reported that the attack targeted Dnipro City (Dnipropetrovsk oblast), where a missile equipped with cluster munitions reportedly struck a residential building. Other targeted oblasts included Chernihiv, Kharkiv, Khmelnytskyi, Kyiv, Mykolaiv, Odesa, Poltava, Sumy and Zaporizhzhia. Earlier on 22 September, Russia conducted a smaller similar strike. A prominent Russian milblogger claimed that the attack targeted, among other sites, the Boryspil Reinforced Concrete Plant (Kyiv oblast). While Ukrainian sources have not corroborated damage to these facilities, we continue to assess that Russian forces will target businesses they deem associated with Ukraine’s war effort, including civilian-produced dual-use products and service providers.
• STRIKES: Ukraine continued to heavily strike Russia and Russian-occupied regions, reflecting Ukraine’s sustained capability to hit Russia’s rear. Russian authorities have reported the interception of 114 UAVs overnight on 21-22 September. The drones were shot down over Astrakhan, Belgorod, Bryansk, Kursk, Rostov, Volgograd, Voronezh and Yaroslavl oblasts as well as Krasnodar Krai and occupied Crimea. In Krasnodar Krai, the attack caused a fire at an electrical substation. Previously, Ukraine’s military intelligence (GUR) reported that it struck two Be-12 ‘Chaika’ aircraft and one Mi-8 helicopter in occupied Crimea on 21 September. This is the first time that Ukraine has struck Be-12 aircraft, of which Russia retains only a small number. While old and designed for a different age of naval warfare (being from the 1960s), the Be-12s have likely played an important role in conducting maritime patrols and protecting Russia’s Black Sea Fleet from Ukraine’s uncrewed surface vehicles (USVs).
POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS
• NUCLEAR: Russian President Vladimir Putin has proposed extending the only remaining nuclear treaty between Russia and the US for another year. President Putin made the offer earlier on 22 September as Russia’s Security Council convened for a meeting. President Putin said that prolonging the New Strategic Arms Reduction treaty (‘New START’), which is set to expire on 5 February 2026, would help maintain a ‘reasonable degree of predictability and restraint’. However, he stated that an extension would only be possible if the US reciprocates and refrains from actions that ‘would undermine or disrupt the existing balance of deterrence’. President Putin’s offer almost certainly aims to appeal to US President Donald Trump’s eagerness to make deals and be perceived as a peacemaker. The proposal also shows Russia’s attempts to negotiate and engage with the US on various issues outside of efforts to end the war in Ukraine, which President Trump has sought to resolve since resuming the presidency with limited success.
• SANCTIONS: On 19 September, the EU presented its 19th package of punitive measures against Russia, which includes plans to ban imports of Russian liquified natural gas (LNG) a year earlier than originally planned. The EU seeks a full prohibition of Russian LNG supplies by January 2027, full transaction bans for Russian oil producers Gazprom Neft and Rosneft, as well as additional sanctions against Russia’s shadow fleet. Previously, member states had aimed to phase out imports of Russian gas and oil by 2028, though the US has made its tightening of sanctions pressure conditional on the EU ending energy dependency on Russia. While Hungary and Slovakia will likely oppose the new sanctions, delaying the timeframe for their implementation, the EU will possibly incentivise them to eventually approve the measures.
• ASSETS: On 19 September, a bipartisan group of US senators introduced a bill to send frozen Russian assets to Ukraine. The Rebuilding Economic Prosperity and Opportunity (REPO) for Ukrainians Implementation Act 2.0 envisions sending at least USD 250 m worth of frozen Russian assets held in the US to Ukraine every 90 days. The legislation would also seek to encourage the US Secretary of State Marco Rubio to persuade foreign allies to repurpose at least 5% (approximately USD 15 bn) in Russian sovereign assets for Ukraine’s benefit every 90 days. The majority of frozen Russian assets are held in Europe; in December 2024, the US previously gave USD 20 bn to Ukraine funded by the profits of seized Russian assets.
• ASSETS: The legislation would provide a way for the US to assist Ukraine without having to pay for such support, which would possibly make the bill more appealing to some Republicans sceptical about aiding the country. As the REPO Act 2.0 has bipartisan support and is based on previous legislation passed in 2024, this renders it more likely to pass in Congress. However, it is ultimately uncertain when the bill could be voted as it is unlikely in the near term. We assess that any such move to use frozen Russian funds will highly likely increase the prospect of Russia retaliating and seizing Western assets.
FORECAST
INCURSION: Recent Russian provocations in the Baltic region likely indicate continued attempts to test the readiness and resolve of NATO’s eastern flank. On 19 September, three Russian MiG-31 interceptor jets entered Estonian airspace over uninhabited Vaindloo island (Lääne-Viru county) in the Gulf of Finland and remained there for 12 minutes. Separately, on 21 September, two German Eurofighter jets intercepted a Russian IL-20 reconnaissance aircraft flying unidentified over the Baltic Sea.
Russia’s Ministry of Defence (MoD) denied violating Estonia’s airspace, though the growing trend of Russian airspace violations and the nature of the incident suggest that it was a deliberate incursion. According to the Russian MoD, the aircraft were conducting a routine flight from Russia’s Republic of Karelia (which borders Finland) to an airfield in Kaliningrad oblast, an exclave bordering Lithuania and Poland. Russia asserts that the jets flew over neutral waters in the Baltic Sea just under two miles (around 3km) from Vaindloo island. However, Estonia has disclosed that the jets did not have flight plans, had turned their transponders off and that the pilots did not communicate with air traffic control. Estonian Foreign Minister Margus Tsahkna stated on 19 September that Russia has violated Estonia’s airspace four times in 2025, but described the most recent incursion as ‘unprecedentedly brazen’. We assess that the pilots’ conduct highly likely reaffirms that Russia sought to gauge the response of Estonia and the broader NATO alliance, as well as possibly to test escalation thresholds
The UN Security Council (UNSC) will convene later on 22 September to discuss the recent breach of Estonia’s airspace, though its response will highly likely be limited and will not deter further Russian action. Poland similarly requested an emergency meeting after Russian drones violated Poland’s airspace overnight on 9-10 September (see Sibylline Ukraine Update – 11 September 2025). As a permanent member of the UNSC, Russia would be able to veto any hypothetical resolution on this matter. Estonia, like Poland, has invoked NATO’s Article 4 after the airspace incursion. However, as this provision enables holding consultations if a member state feels that the ‘territorial integrity, political independence or security’ of any member is believed to be under threat, Russia will highly unlikely be deterred by this move. Nevertheless, NATO’s North Atlantic Council will meet on 23 September to discuss the incident.
Estonian Defence Minister Hanno Pevkur claimed that the incident showed NATO was ready to respond with force as ‘the last resort’, though such a consensus within the alliance would be highly unlikely. NATO decisions require consensus, and there are Russia-friendly and Ukraine sceptic (Hungary and Slovakia) member states, while other members would be concerned about the risk of escalation. Nevertheless, such messaging is highly likely aimed at signalling strength and willingness to act in order to deter Russia from engaging in similar activity in the coming weeks and months. We continue to assess that Russia does not want a direct military confrontation with NATO at present, especially given its military embroilment in Ukraine. Rather, it is highly likely seeking to use such tests and violations to achieve its broader geostrategic objectives of pressuring NATO and increasing the threshold for escalation by effectively normalising such incursions, thereby undermining the alliance’s ability to respond to future (potentially more serious) incidents.
President Trump said that he would help Baltic countries and Poland if Russia continues to escalate provocations in the region, though it remains to be seen what action (if any) the US would take in the future. President Trump also appeared to express concern about escalation and warned that repeated incidents could ‘be big trouble’. However, this condemnation has not assuaged concerns among European partners. President Trump has threatened to sanction Russia numerous times since resuming the presidency, but failed to increase such pressure to encourage President Putin to end the war. Meanwhile, an unspecified White House official disclosed earlier in September that the US will end a long-standing security programme for countries bordering Russia. Ultimately, such precedents have highly likely caused doubts about the Trump administration’s willingness to support European partners in the face of growing Russian grey zone provocations.
On 20 September, Bloomberg cited numerous unnamed ‘people close to the Kremlin’ as claiming that President Putin is convinced that military escalation is the best way to force Ukraine to agree to talks favourable to Russia. According to these sources, the Alaska summit left President Putin convinced that President Trump has no interest in intervening in the conflict. Bloomberg assessed this approach in relation to Russia’s escalation of its strike campaign inside Ukraine (which has notably intensified in recent months, despite Trump’s efforts at diplomatic engagement). However, it remains likely that President Putin also views a limited and graduated escalation outside of Ukraine as to be in his interests, as illustrated by Russia’s recent actions.
It remains our assessment that Russia’s recent drone and aircraft incursions are in part testing US and European assurances to enforce NATO territorial sovereignty, which will help Moscow determine what assistance the US in particular would be willing to provide European states during a potential future escalation with Russia. While we continue to assess that Russia does not seek open war with NATO, it will highly likely continue to test its boundaries through grey zone operations below the threshold of war with the aim of raising that threshold with every such action against the alliance. Therefore, Russia will highly likely continue testing NATO’s eastern flank for the foreseeable future until such a time when either it is persuaded that the alliance will respond (thereby deterring further action), or that further action could weaken NATO and improve Russia’s future room for manouevre in eastern Europe.
• Estonia: Russian airspace incursion likely amounts to further testing of NATO response, readiness. On 19 September, three Russian MiG-31 interceptor jets entered Estonian airspace near Vaindloo island (Lääne-Viru county), located in the Gulf of Finland, without permission. The incursion lasted approximately 12 minutes; according to Estonian defence forces, the jets were intercepted by Italian F-35 fighter jets based in Ämari (Harjumaa county) as part of NATO’s Baltic Air Policing mission. While unauthorised Russian aerial incursions occur on a semi-regular basis in the Baltic region, there has been a notable uptick in recent weeks. Alongside the unprecedented Polish airspace incursion by at least 19 Russian drones on 10 September (see Sibylline Alert – 10 September 2025), two German Eurofighter jets intercepted a Russian IL-20M reconnaissance aircraft flying unidentified over the Baltic Sea on 21 September. NATO’s North Atlantic Council will reportedly meet on 23 September to discuss Russia’s violation of Estonian airspace, which likely reflects enhanced Russian testing of NATO’s readiness and responses. We assess that an elevated NATO presence along its eastern flank is unlikely to deter further Russian grey zone activity in the coming months, sustaining the risk of temporary airspace closures and spikes in tensions as Russia continues to test the alliance.
• Ukraine: External financial assistance will remain crucial for long-term socio-economic resilience. On 19 September, Ukrainian Finance Minister Serhiy Marchenko stated that Ukraine’s foreign financing needs under a new four-year programme with the International Monetary Fund (IMF) amount to between USD 150 and 170 bn. However, the IMF reportedly warned that Ukraine’s requirements appear to be between USD 10 and 20bn over the government’s estimate of USD 37.5 bn per year. These discrepancies have emerged as the IMF and Ukraine negotiate external financing needs for the years 2026 and 2027. Previously, the IMF urged Ukraine to raise taxes in order to increase revenues and to curb the shadow economy, which accounts for around 30% of the country’s gross domestic product (GDP). Meanwhile, European partners are considering loan mechanisms backed by frozen Russian assets to offer Ukraine financial support, but several EU member states remain opposed to this idea. As Ukraine’s state revenues are primarily allocated to defence spending, the country continues to rely heavily on external financial support for other government expenditures. We assess that securing international financing will remain essential for Ukraine’s socio-economic outlook, particularly as the war is likely to continue in the long term.
• Moldova: Searches indicate elevated threat of Russian destabilisation before parliamentary elections. Earlier on 22 September, law enforcement officers conducted over 250 searches as part of an investigation into suspected preparations by Russian-linked entities aiming to carry out ‘mass riots and destabilisation’. According to Moldova’s General Police Inspectorate (IGP), law enforcement personnel conducted searches at the homes of individuals suspected of being involved in such preparations, as well as unspecified prisons. Igor Dodon, the former Moldovan president and current leader of the pro-Russia Socialist Party (PSRM), claimed that unspecified ‘colleagues’ in northern Moldova were targeted. The development comes ahead of parliamentary elections on 28 September, which will highly likely represent a flashpoint for Russian destabilisation efforts. Although limited and mostly non-violent pro-Russia protest activity is likely around the electoral period, we assess that the likelihood of large-scale riots is lower. The authorities will almost certainly remain proactive at identifying any potential Russian-linked destabilisation activity, though their resilience in fully countering such threats is limited. (Source: Sibylline)

 

19 Sep 25. Ukraine claim to liberate area around Pokrovsk despite Russian offensive. It is said that 160 sq km have been liberated, and over 170 sq km have been cleared of Russian forces.
• President of Ukraine says 160 square kilometres liberated in the Pokrovsk and Dobropillia areas.
• Russian losses since the start of Ukraine’s counteroffensive – in the Pokrovsk area alone, in these past weeks – are already more than 2,500.
• The counteroffensive checks Russian land grab ahead of future negotiations.
In a visit to the Donetsk region on 18 September 2025, the President of Ukraine, Volodymyr Zelenskyy, was briefed on the claimed success of Ukrainian military units stalling the Russian offensive, and even liberating a swathe of territory in the Pokrovsk and Dobropillia areas.
The head of state presented awards to personnel on the frontlines for their achievements in battle. “The fighting is intense,” Zelenskyy said, “but we have inflicted significant losses on the Russians.”
Not only had Ukrainian military units stalled the Russian offensive in this long-contested locale, but since the start of the operation, Zelenskyy stated that Ukraine has liberated 160 square kilometers (sq km) and over 170 sq km have been cleared of Russian forces entirely.
This area of the frontline in North West Donetsk formed a salient between the strategic cities of Pokrovsk and Myrnohrad since the fall of Avdiivka early last year.
According to open source intelligence, Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Pokrovsk direction on 18 September but did not make confirmed advances. Notwithstanding the the Russian force presence around the city, which is reportedly the largest since the beginning of the full-scale invasion.
In this specific area, Zelenskyy stated that Russian losses since the start of this counteroffensive – in the Pokrovsk area alone, in the past few weeks – are already more than 2,500, of which over 1,300 Russians have been killed.
This loss of manpower remains a fundamental problem for the occupying forces. Both Ukraine and the UK claim that Russia has sustained more than one m combat casualties in the war, with London stating Russian military casualties in 2025 was in excess of 260,000 personnel.
In the backdrop of the Russian offensive, after the US-Russia summit in Alaska at the end of August, the Kremlin has dismissed the possibility of an early meeting between Putin and Zelenskyy, for which Trump has been pressing, as Russia tries to push the boundary as far as possible before coming to the negotiating table. (Source: army-technology.com)
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Founded in 1987, Exensor Technology is a world leading supplier of Networked Unattended Ground Sensor (UGS) Systems providing tailored sensor solutions to customers all over the world. From our Headquarters in Lund Sweden, our centre of expertise in Network Communications at Communications Research Lab in Kalmar Sweden and our Production site outside of Basingstoke UK, we design, develop and produce latest state of the art rugged UGS solutions at the highest quality to meet the most stringent demands of our customers. Our systems are in operation and used in a wide number of Military as well as Homeland Security applications worldwide. The modular nature of the system ensures any external sensor can be integrated, providing the user with a fully meshed “silent” network capable of self-healing. Exensor Technology will continue to lead the field in UGS technology, provide our customers with excellent customer service and a bespoke package able to meet every need.

A CNIM Group Company
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Sponsored by Bertin Exensor

 

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22 Sep 25. War Department Continues Nuclear Modernization. In light of the changing global security landscape, the War Department is considering how to approach modern-era deterrence differently, said Air Force Maj. Gen. Brandon D. Parker, director of global operations at Strategic Command.   Parker spoke today about modernizing the nuclear triad, at the Air Space Cyber Conference at National Harbor, Maryland.

“We see a lot of promise, both in the programs of record, but also in the legacy systems that we have existing today,” he said. “So, while we go through that modernization process, it’s equally important that we sustain the capabilities that we have today so that we can continue to deter and, if necessary, respond.”

The programs of record include the LGM-35A Sentinel intercontinental ballistic missile, the B-21 Raider stealth bomber, Columbia-class submarines and nuclear command, control and communications upgrades.  The legacy systems include the Minuteman III ICBM, the B-52H Stratofortress bomber, the B-2 Spirit bomber and the NC3 that links space-based capabilities.

Modernization of NC3, Parker said, will include incorporating cybersecurity, designing it to integrate with existing and future systems, and incorporating data analytic tools, automation, machine learning and artificial intelligence to aid the operators.

“The nuclear triad is the bedrock of our national defense. There’s no element of U.S. military power that can replace the unique deterrence characteristics of nuclear forces,” he said.

The triad provides a wide range of options to the president, Parker added.  The 2022 Nuclear Posture Review reaffirmed the nation’s commitment to a safe, secure, effective, nuclear force posture, which includes all three legs of the triad, he said, referring to submarines, bombers and land-based missiles that can delivery nuclear weapons. (Source: U.S. DoD)

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Founded in 1987, Exensor Technology is a world leading supplier of Networked Unattended Ground Sensor (UGS) Systems providing tailored sensor solutions to customers all over the world. From our Headquarters in Lund Sweden, our centre of expertise in Network Communications at Communications Research Lab in Kalmar Sweden and our Production site outside of Basingstoke UK, we design, develop and produce latest state of the art rugged UGS solutions at the highest quality to meet the most stringent demands of our customers. Our systems are in operation and used in a wide number of Military as well as Homeland Security applications worldwide. The modular nature of the system ensures any external sensor can be integrated, providing the user with a fully meshed “silent” network capable of self-healing. Exensor Technology will continue to lead the field in UGS technology, provide our customers with excellent customer service and a bespoke package able to meet every need.

A CNIM Group Company

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Sponsored by Bertin Exensor

 

www.exensor.com

 

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25 Sep 25. EIB Group approves €7.1bn in new financing for European tech leaders, energy security, defence and support for Ukraine

• EIF approved 21 operations strengthening Europe’s technological leadership, including first-of-its-kind fund supporting therapeutics for the central nervous system.
• New investments approved for Ukraine’s businesses and to support the country’s energy, transport and digital infrastructure.

The Boards of Directors of the European Investment Bank (EIB) and the European Investment Fund (EIF) held meetings this week and approved a total of €7.1bn in new financing to support the European Union’s (EU) technological leadership, boost investment in energy security and life sciences and back projects for climate adaptation and urban development in Italy, business support in Spain and sustainable transport in Greece. The Board of the EIF approved the launch the 3Seas Fund-of-Funds facility to support infrastructure development in Central and Eastern Europe. The EIF also endorsed investments aimed at reinforcing Europe’s technological leadership, with a focus on life sciences, digitalisation and defence capabilities. More specifically, a total of 21 operations contributing to the TechEU initiative were approved, including the first-of-its-kind life sciences fund dedicated to therapeutics and medical technology for the central nervous system.

“We are well on track to deliver record financing this year in support of European Union priorities from energy security to supporting Ukraine and strengthening Europe’s voice in a shifting geopolitical landscape,” said EIB Group President Nadia Calviño. “New investments approved under our flagship TechEU initiative will support homegrown innovations that will shape tomorrow’s economy.”

TechEU is the EU’s largest financing programme to date in support of innovation and tech leadership to attract talent, capital and investment in Europe. TechEU will provide €70bn in EIB Group equity, quasi-equity, loans and guarantees in 2025-2027 and crowd in private capital to generate at least €250bn in investments.  In addition, the EIB Board approved two new investments in venture capital funds aimed at supporting emerging start-ups and local entrepreneurs in Ukraine, as well as energy, transport and digital infrastructure. The EIF also approved an operation to facilitate access to finance for small businesses in Ukraine. Since the start of the Russian invasion, the EIB Group has provided €4bn to Ukraine, repairing critical infrastructure, rebuilding schools, kindergartens, hospitals and securing the country’s energy supply. The EIB’s Board also approved new financing to support the deployment of public transport in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, the largest city in East Africa.

Background information

The European Investment Bank (ElB) is the long-term lending institution of the European Union, owned by its Member States. The EIB finances investments in eight core priorities that support EU policy objectives: climate action and the environment, digitalisation and technological innovation, security and defence, cohesion, agriculture and the bioeconomy, social infrastructure, a stronger Europe in a more peaceful and prosperous world and Europe’s capital markets union.    The EIB Group, which also includes the European Investment Fund (EIF), signed nearly €89bn in new financing for over 900 high-impact projects in 2024, boosting Europe’s competitiveness and security. Approximately half of the EIB’s financing within the EU targets cohesion regions, where per-capita income is below the EU average, while almost 60% of annual EIB Group investments support climate action and environmental sustainability.

 

25 Sep 25. “Europe’s defence industry needs to access capital and financial services amidst growing security demands. Bureaucratic red tape, banks’ reputational concerns about funding defence, and the general characteristics of the defence market limit that access, not ESG.” This is the view expressed in Are ESG Standards the Scapegoat for Stalling Defence Growth? – a new RUSI research report by Linus Terhorst, which says the most acute financial problem facing Europe’s defence sector is the often-unexplained refusal of crucial business-securing products – and debanking – of small and medium-sized businesses. The research says many small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) in the defence sector − which play a vital role in delivering innovation, subcomponents, and services across supply chains − are currently facing a quiet financial crisis. But it makes clear that these challenges have nothing to do with ESG (Environmental, Social and Governance) regulations, since in both the UK and EU, these do not mandate the exclusion of defence businesses. Instead, it is lenders’ interpretation of compliance obligations and reputational risk management that often leads them to cut off smaller firms from the financial system. With some firms being debanked by major institutions, denied access to insurance, export guarantees and loans, they are often unable to grow, or even operate, due to their struggles complying with these rigorous financial compliance regimes. The report adds that the key restrictions to growth in the wider defence industry are structural issues – such as the long-term cyclicality of many defence products – which have curtailed its capacity to attract investment.

Key Findings

• SMEs in the defence sector are frequently denied financial services. The report says: “These issues…range from having bank accounts closed (‘debanking’) and limited access to insurance and lending to struggling with the underwriting of international exports.”
• Denial is unrelated to ESG regulation but stems from broader compliance pressures. “ESG regulatory standards and investment approaches are not a primary barrier to investment in the European and UK defence industry… Putting the blame on ‘ESG’ is often unsubstantiated, as financial regulators have not imposed such exclusions.”
• Large contractors can navigate complex banking standards – but SMEs struggle. “These standards can create a reporting burden for companies to prove that they have systems in place that mitigate the associated risks… Large defence companies (‘primes’) typically have the necessary expertise to comply.”
• Banks may be less inclined to help SMEs in navigating compliance. “SMEs generate lower revenues for banks and so can represent less of a priority for banks than primes… Banks are less inclined to provide professional resources to support SMEs throughout their due diligence processes.”

Key Recommendations

• Ensure clearer guidance on sustainable finance for defence: “Policymakers and regulators should continue to help promote greater clarity on how sustainable finance regulations apply in practice to investment or finance for defence companies.”
• Align guidance with the FCA’s position on defence: “Any new policy guidance for the financial sector should align with, or build on, the Financial Conduct Authority’s position on sustainability regulations and UK defence.”
• Banks should consider refining their messaging on defence investing: “Financial institutions offering ESG products and services should consider ways to improve their communication to clients and customers… on the potential opportunities that exist already to invest in defence within ESG investing approaches.”
• Compliance support for defence SMEs: “Policymakers should help defence SMEs comply with reporting standards (both financial and non-financial), including within the existing due diligence and procurement frameworks.”
• Financial institutions encouraged to ease SME reporting barriers: “Policymakers should continue to incentivise banks to consider ways to ease specific reporting barriers to promote access to capital for SMEs in the defence industry.”

The research follows a call by more than 100 Labour MPs and peers earlier this year, urging UK banks and investment firms to relax their rules on investing in defence companies. Alex Baker MP, who co-authored the initial letter by the Labour MPs, has welcomed the report’s findings, saying: “Financing is the lifeblood of our defence industry, and this report makes an important contribution by showing how we can get capital flowing to where it is needed most.

“The war in Ukraine has underlined the urgency of building greater capacity and resilience, and that depends on supporting the SMEs and supply chains at the heart of our industry.

“I welcome the report’s focus on tackling financial barriers, because without action our innovators and local employers will continue to face unnecessary hurdles. By recognising these challenges and setting out practical solutions, this report helps point the way to a stronger defence sector that can keep Britain safe and support prosperity in communities across the country.”

James Alexander, chief exec of the UK Sustainable Investment and Finance Association (UKSIF), whose members have over £19 trillion in assets under management, further welcomed the report’s core high-level findings on the relationship between ESG factors and defence, saying:

“Emerging defence firms are clearly experiencing financing issues, but this report draws a line under the notion that ESG standards are stopping capital from flowing into the industry.

“This analysis shows that structural issues, such as complex procurement processes and long development cycles, are the main barriers to business growth, while SMEs face challenges complying with important international banking standards.”

Conclusion

The report finds that the real barrier to the UK defence industry financing, and specifically SME’s, is not the ESG framework but wider factors such as an underexamined system of financial exclusions.  Smaller firms – which are essential to Europe’s rearmament plans − face risks of being debanked and denied key services, not because of their products, but because they lack the compliance infrastructure and financial footprint of major contractors. The result is a systemic vulnerability in the foundation of the European defence sector. The report issues a clear warning: policymakers must shift the conversation from ESG scapegoating to practical reform. The path forward is not less regulation but smarter, fairer enforcement that ensures SMEs have the tools to comply, and that banks have a responsibility to support. By introducing clear guidelines, incentivising minimum standards of support from financial institutions, and offering practical government assistance, Europe can unlock the full potential of its defence SME base. Without intervention, calls to ramp up industrial defence production face financial barriers.

 

25 Sep 25. Bosnia and Herzegovina: Political impasse will persist, sustaining elevated policy risks. On 24 September, the parliament of Bosnia and Herzegovina’s majority ethnic-Serb Republika Srpska (RS) paved the way for the ruling Alliance of Independent Social Democrats (SNSD) to backtrack on previous threats that it would boycott the entity’s early presidential election, scheduled for 23 November. The election for a new RS president comes after a court verdict recently imposed a six-year political ban on (now former) RS president Milorad Dodik, revoking his mandate. However, Dodik continues to lead SNSD and has so far refused to step down, intensifying his secessionist rhetoric in recent months. We previously forecasted that Dodik and SNSD will likely backtrack on these threats. Nevertheless, Dodik will highly likely maintain control over SNSD and its future nominees. SNSD’s decision not to boycott the November election is a step towards the de-escalation of ongoing tensions. However, Bosnia and Herzegovina’s severe political impasse, reinforced by its complex power-sharing structure, will likely persist in the coming months, sustaining elevated policy risks. (Source: Sibylline)

 

23 Sep 25. European Council to negotiate with UK and Canada on SAFE defence loan. The talks will address terms for British and Canadian companies to participate in procurements funded by the EU’s SAFE initiative.. The European Council has approved the commencement of negotiations with the UK and Canada concerning their involvement in the €150bn ($176bn) Security Action for Europe (SAFE) defence loan instrument. This decision, made on 18 September 2025, authorises the European Commission (EC) to engage in discussions. These talks will focus on the conditions under which British and Canadian companies and products might partake in procurements supported by the SAFE funding initiative. Enacted by the council in May 2025, SAFE is a financial tool aimed at assisting EU member states in enhancing their defence capabilities through collective procurement. It is the first element of the EC’s ReArm Europe Plan/Readiness 2030 initiative. This strategy seeks to facilitate up to €800bn in total defence spending over five years. The loans provided under SAFE will be available to interested member states upon request and based on their national plans. These loans will feature competitive pricing and long maturities, requiring repayment by the beneficiary states. The SAFE framework also accommodates participation from third countries. This includes acceding countries, candidate countries, potential candidates, and nations that have entered into Security and Defence Partnerships with the EU, such as the UK and Canada.  These countries are eligible to join common procurements. Additionally, Ukraine and European Economic Area-European Free Trade Association (EEA-EFTA) countries will receive treatment equivalent to EU member states, allowing them access to common procurements and equal terms for their industries. The upcoming negotiations with the UK and Canada will focus on establishing terms for extending access to their companies and products within this framework. The European Commission is tasked with conducting these negotiations on behalf of the EU, maintaining continuous coordination and dialogue with the council throughout the process. Upon conclusion of these negotiations, any resulting agreements will require consent from the European Parliament before coming into effect. In May 2025, the UK government stated that a new agreement with the EU “will pave the way” for Britain’s defence industry to participate in the SAFE defence fund. (Source: army-technology.com)

 

19 Sep 25. France seeks ‘mutually acceptable’ accord on next-gen fighter progress. France said it’s fully committed to reaching a “mutually acceptable solution” with Germany and Spain this year on the next phase of the Future Combat Air System, as prospects for the next-generation fighter project remain troubled amid infighting amongst the industrial partners. France, Germany, Spain and the companies involved are “fully mobilized” to prepare phase 2 of the program, which includes building a demonstrator of the combat aircraft at the heart of the system, the French Armed Forces Ministry said in an emailed statement on Saturday. France earlier this year asked Germany and Spain to redesign their FCAS cooperation to focus on “strengthening industrial leadership,” in order to meet a deadline for a future fighter to enter into service from 2040 onwards. Dassault Aviation, the French industrial partner for the fighter part of the program, has repeatedly said wrangling over work share with partner Airbus is causing delays.

“France and Germany remained determined to successfully carry out the FCAS program in cooperation with Spain,” the ministry said, adding it’s “fully committed, alongside its German and Spanish counterparts, to reaching a mutually acceptable solution by the end of the year.”

Dassault Aviation has reportedly been seeking a greater share on some parts of the program, with CEO Eric Trappier highlighting that the company, in combination with its French industrial partners Safran and Thales, has all the necessary skills to develop an aircraft on its own. Spanish Prime Minister Pedro Sánchez said the original work-share plans must be respected, at a press conference with German Chancellor Friedrich Merz on Thursday, according to media reports. Meanwhile, Merz said talks among the three partiers are ongoing, saying “we cannot continue as things are at present.”

The current difficulties on FCAS echo those around a joint European fighter program in the 1980s, where France opted to go it alone after disagreements on design authority and operational requirements. That split resulted in Dassault Aviation developing the Rafale, while partners Germany, the United Kingdom, Italy and Spain developed the Eurofighter Typhoon. Following completion of the first stage with the signing of contracts to develop key technologies, the FCAS team is “mobilized for a decision at the end of 2025,” the French armed forces ministry said. Germany’s defense ministry discussed FCAS with Airbus earlier this month, and told the company it was exploring potential closer cooperation with Sweden or the U.K., or going it alone with Spain, Politico reported on Thursday, citing two unidentified people familiar with the discussions. The U.K. is cooperating with Italy and Japan on the Global Combat Air Programme to develop a next-generation fighter, while Sweden is looking into its own future air-combat system. The various approaches, including programs in the United States, typically follow a system of systems approach: a crewed sixth-generation fighter at the core, teamed with unmanned wingman drones and remote carriers, using AI to reduce pilot workload and speed up decision making, all of it tied together through a combat cloud network.(Source: Sibylline)

 

19 Sep 25. Germany: Approval of 2025 budget underscores surge in defence expenditure. On 18 September, the Bundestag approved the federal budget for 2025. The late budget approval is due to the collapse of the previous government in November 2024 and the snap federal election in February. The budget provides for over EUR  500bn (USD 589bn) in spending and EUR 140bn (USD 165bn) in new debt, the second-highest amount in the history of the federal republic. While the largest proportion of spending is set aside for the Ministry of Social Affairs, EUR 86bn (USD 101bn) has been made available for defence spending, making German defence expenditure among the highest globally. Due to the budget’s late approval, it will only be valid for another three months (the government has so far operated under a provisional budget). The Bundestag is therefore set to consider the 2026 budget as early as next week. As the Union (CDU/CSU) and the Social Democratic Party (SPD) command a majority in the Bundestag, we assess that the 2026 budget will likely be passed without any major obstacles. (Source: Sibylline)

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Founded in 1987, Exensor Technology is a world leading supplier of Networked Unattended Ground Sensor (UGS) Systems providing tailored sensor solutions to customers all over the world. From our Headquarters in Lund Sweden, our centre of expertise in Network Communications at Communications Research Lab in Kalmar Sweden and our Production site outside of Basingstoke UK, we design, develop and produce latest state of the art rugged UGS solutions at the highest quality to meet the most stringent demands of our customers. Our systems are in operation and used in a wide number of Military as well as Homeland Security applications worldwide. The modular nature of the system ensures any external sensor can be integrated, providing the user with a fully meshed “silent” network capable of self-healing. Exensor Technology will continue to lead the field in UGS technology, provide our customers with excellent customer service and a bespoke package able to meet every need.

A CNIM Group Company

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Sponsored by Bertin Exensor

 

www.exensor.com

 

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17 Sep 25. Sri Lanka: Firearms audit highlights concerns of military personnel’s links to organised crime. Earlier on 17 September, local media reports claimed that the Sri Lanka Army had almost completed a comprehensive audit of weapons stored in the army’s camps nationwide. This exercise aims to identify the type and number of weapons missing amid concerns that defected and active military personnel are increasingly linked to organised crime groups. Earlier in the year, Sri Lankan President Anura Kumara Dissanayake stated that 73 T56 assault rifles had gone missing and were believed to be in the possession of a criminal group; around half have since been recovered, with 13 soldiers arrested in connection with the case. There has been an increasing crackdown on organised criminal activity in the past year (primarily involved in drug trafficking), with military personnel deployed to Southern and Western provinces in late August to counter spikes in activity. While most related violence will likely remain inter-gang activity, the military authorities’ involvement will sustain security risks if not stymied. (Source: Sibylline)

 

17 Sep 25. China-Philippines: Collision in disputed South China Sea highlights elevated maritime tensions. On 16 September, a collision occurred between vessels from China and the Philippines in the South China Sea. Chinese officials accused the Philippines of ‘deliberately ramming’ one of its coast guard vessels, while the Philippine Coast Guard (PCG) claimed that the China Coast Guard (CCG) used a water cannon against its ships. A PCG vessel reportedly sustained damage and a crew member was injured. The incident took place near Scarborough Shoal, which is claimed by the Philippines but controlled by China. On 10 September, the State Council of China announced plans to establish a nature reserve on the islet, which were rebuked by the Philippines and the US. We assess that China and the Philippines will increase their coast guard presence around the shoal over the coming weeks, driving the potential for further close encounters and/or collisions. However, both sides remain intent on avoiding a wider armed conflict in the medium term, reducing the risk of material disruption to regional shipping lanes. (Source: Sibylline)

 

17 Sep 25. Uganda-South Sudan: Bilateral investment underscores close economic, military ties. On 16 September, the Ugandan finance ministry presented a plan to parliament to borrow over USD 350m from regional lenders to develop power grid interconnection projects with South Sudan. Parliament will highly likely approve the plan in the coming weeks, underscoring Uganda’s rising status as an energy exporter, following the completion of the Karuma Hydropower Project, which increased Uganda’s national generation capacity to over 2000 megawatts (MW). We assess that the investment will likely consolidate relations between Uganda and South Sudan, facilitating further economic integration and military co‑operation in the short- to medium term. If implemented, the grid integration project will possibly improve energy security conditions in South Sudan in the medium-to-long term; however, effective interconnection will likely require substantial investment in South Sudan’s weak transmission infrastructure, which significantly undermines the national grid’s reliability and resilience. Firms tendering development and auxiliary contracts will almost certainly face exposure to significant corruption and clientelism, increasing governance concerns and reputational risks.  (Source: Sibylline)

 

17 Sep 25.  Congo (DRC): Government-aligned militia proposal will compound security risks in eastern regions. Earlier on 17 September, government-aligned militia forces (known as Wazalendo) sent a memo to President Félix Tshisekedi demanding several concessions from the government to retain their loyalty. The Wazalendo’s demands include that their political leaders are integrated into state institutions and participate in upcoming peace talks with the Rwanda-backed M23 rebel group in Qatar. While Tshisekedi has yet to respond, he is unlikely to accept the proposal, which would further complicate efforts to formalise a peace agreement. The government will highly likely be unwilling to devolve power to the Wazalendo, which includes numerous disparate factions with broadly transactional loyalty. However, increasing tensions over the Wazalendo’s political influence will likely undercut military co-operation with the Congolese military (FARDC), increasing risks of factional defection. Increasing fragmentation of the Wazalendo will drive risks of clashes with the FARDC and among different Wazalendo factions. We assess that this will compound risks of attacks, clashes and sexual violence in eastern DRC, including for locally engaged staff and NGO personnel.  (Source: Sibylline)

 

17 Sep 25. China-Philippines: Collision in disputed South China Sea highlights elevated maritime tensions. On 16 September, a collision occurred between vessels from China and the Philippines in the South China Sea. Chinese officials accused the Philippines of ‘deliberately ramming’ one of its coast guard vessels, while the Philippine Coast Guard (PCG) claimed that the China Coast Guard (CCG) used a water cannon against its ships. A PCG vessel reportedly sustained damage and a crew member was injured. The incident took place near Scarborough Shoal, which is claimed by the Philippines but controlled by China. On 10 September, the State Council of China announced plans to establish a nature reserve on the islet, which were rebuked by the Philippines and the US. We assess that China and the Philippines will increase their coast guard presence around the shoal over the coming weeks, driving the potential for further close encounters and/or collisions. However, both sides remain intent on avoiding a wider armed conflict in the medium term, reducing the risk of material disruption to regional shipping lanes. (Source: Sibylline)

 

15 Sep 25. Armenia-Turkey: Improvement in regional ties, connectivity is unlikely despite engagement. On 12 September, Armenian and Turkish representatives responsible for normalising the historically strained relationships between the two countries met for the sixth time. The engagement failed to result in an immediate, significant breakthrough. According to the Armenian foreign ministry, the special representatives agreed to ‘expedite’ the opening of border crossings, an agreement that they reached in July 2022. The two sides also agreed for their respective authorities to conduct technical studies for the restoration of the Gyumri-Kars railroad. The railway, which has been closed since 1993, runs from the Turkish city of Kars (Kars province) to Armenia’s second-largest city, Gyumri (Shirak province), before connecting to the Georgian capital Tbilisi. Turkey continues to condition the normalisation of relations with Armenia on separate Armenian efforts to make peace with Azerbaijan, a close regional ally of Turkey. As Turkey will likely maintain this stance for the foreseeable future, we assess that a significant improvement in Armenian-Turkish ties and regional connectivity is unlikely in the medium-to-long term. (Source: Sibylline)

 

15 Sep 25. Pakistan: Recent attacks underscore elevated militant threat in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. On 13 September, at least 19 soldiers were killed in separate militant attacks in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province, near the border with Afghanistan. In one incident, militants targeted the military convoy in South Waziristan, killing 12 soldiers. Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) has claimed responsibility for the attack; the group also claimed it had captured Pakistan military personnel’s weapons. This comes as the TTP has ramped up attacks in the province, particularly against the military, since the Taliban took over in Afghanistan. The uptick in militant activity also comes amid Islamabad’s strained relations with Kabul, which Pakistan has accused of providing safe havens to the TTP. Given the frequent attacks, we assess that the military will likely launch a counter-terrorism operation in the coming weeks, with a realistic possibility that strikes will target TTP hideouts in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, as well as in Afghanistan. In the short term, this will increase the risk of attacks by TTP, as well as clashes with the security forces at the border, driving border closures and disrupting trade and travel. It will also likely drive tensions with Afghanistan. (Source: Sibylline)

——————————————————————————————————————-

Founded in 1987, Exensor Technology is a world leading supplier of Networked Unattended Ground Sensor (UGS) Systems providing tailored sensor solutions to customers all over the world. From our Headquarters in Lund Sweden, our centre of expertise in Network Communications at Communications Research Lab in Kalmar Sweden and our Production site outside of Basingstoke UK, we design, develop and produce latest state of the art rugged UGS solutions at the highest quality to meet the most stringent demands of our customers. Our systems are in operation and used in a wide number of Military as well as Homeland Security applications worldwide. The modular nature of the system ensures any external sensor can be integrated, providing the user with a fully meshed “silent” network capable of self-healing. Exensor Technology will continue to lead the field in UGS technology, provide our customers with excellent customer service and a bespoke package able to meet every need. A CNIM Group Company

——————————————————————————————————————

Sponsored by Bertin Exensor

 

www.exensor.com

 

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Military And Security Developments

Sep 19.

Recognition of Palestinian State.

Key points

• Australia, Belgium, Canada, France and the UK are likely to recognise a Palestinian state in an official capacity at the UN General Assembly (UNGA) between 23 and 27 September.

• Various individual Western governments’ official recognition of a Palestinian state is highly unlikely to yield meaningful progress towards full UN recognition of said entity.
• The process will likely increase reputational risks (and possibly supply chain and operational disruption risks) for businesses operating in Israel and the Palestinian Territories.
• Israel is likely to continue expanding settlements in the West Bank (Palestinian Territories) and to continue restricting financial transfers to the Palestinian Authority (PA), increasing domestic unrest risks in the West Bank.

Context

On 22 September, France and Saudi Arabia will host a high-level conference at the UNGA in New York City (New York, US) that aims to advance the two-state solution. During the UNGA General Debate in the days following the conference, several Western countries, including Australia, Belgium, Canada, France and the UK, are likely to recognise a Palestinian state in an official capacity. At the time of writing, reports indicate that the UK will possibly recognise a Palestinian state in the days preceding the UNGA.

The recognition of a Palestinian state by individual states is separate from UN recognition. Although the Palestinian Territories has been a UN non-member observer state since 2012, the UN Security Council (UNSC) must approve its application for full UN membership before it is considered by the UNGA, where a minimum of two-thirds support is required for the application to be approved. A UNSC resolution requires at least nine votes in favour out of the fifteen members, with no vetoes from the five permanent members (China, France, Russia, the UK and the US). The US has repeatedly vetoed UNSC resolutions to recognise a Palestinian state, most recently in 2024. The US authorities have withheld or revoked visas for Palestinian Authority (PA) officials who were due to attend the 2025 UNGA, underscoring elevated bilateral tensions.

Forecast

Increasing recognition of a Palestinian state is highly unlikely to yield meaningful progress towards UN recognition

We assess that the US will almost certainly veto any future UNSC resolutions to recognise a Palestinian state, rendering the prospect of said entity’s full UN recognition highly unlikely in the short term. During the French-Saudi conference and subsequent UNGA, the US will possibly issue a counter-statement denouncing its allies’ recognition of a Palestinian state, though this is unlikely to generate significant diplomatic tensions between these Western nations. Even so, diplomatic fallout between Israel and its Western partners is highly likely in the immediate aftermath of the conference. The Israeli government’s leadership will likely accuse Western governments and leaders of appeasing Hamas and ‘rewarding’ terrorism. Tit-for-tat diplomatic escalation will possibly ensue, especially in the context of Western opposition to the expansion of the Israel-Hamas war and the development of Israeli settlements in the West Bank.

Unilateral recognition by Western states will increase reputational and operational disruption risks for businesses in Israel and/or their Israeli partners

As Western countries unilaterally recognise the sovereignty of a Palestinian state, the legal basis for governments to challenge Israeli actions within the Palestinian Territories will expand moderately; this includes the ability to impose both targeted and broader sanction regimes. Amid the ongoing intensification of the Israel-Hamas war in Gaza and the continued expansion of Israeli settlements in the West Bank, Western states will possibly move to sanction increasing numbers of Israeli entities and members of Israel’s coalition government in the coming weeks. An expansion of sanction regimes would possibly disrupt supply chain continuity for firms with a presence in Israel, increasing financial risks and disrupting business operations more broadly. Sanctions would compound already-heighted reputational risks for businesses operating in Israel and/or those Israeli firms with which they are partnered, including in the technology sector. In the medium term, increasing governance concerns and sanction-exposure risks will possibly reduce the appeal of the Israeli market to foreign direct investment (FDI), undermining socio-economic health conditions.

International businesses headquartered in countries that choose to recognise a Palestinian state will possibly face increased hostility towards foreign investment vis-à-vis their operations in Israel; various Israeli entities will likely choose to boycott popular brands, leading to reduced footfall and revenue. Israeli businesses reliant on supply chains from those countries that choose to recognise a Palestinian state will possibly consider diversifying their suppliers, impacting operations and creating additional financial risks. There is a realistic possibility of sporadic protests outside the Australian, Belgian, British, Canadian and French embassies in Israel between 22 and 27 September; any such gatherings would restrict access to targeted facilities and consular services for foreign nationals in Israel in the coming days.

Israel is likely to continue expanding settlements in the West Bank while cutting off PA funding, driving domestic unrest risks in the Palestinian Territories

It is highly unlikely that various Western countries’ recognition of a Palestinian state will prevent Israel from supporting the expansion of Israeli settlements in the West Bank, such as the recently approved development of the E1 settlement. This project involves building approximately 3,400 new housing units that would disrupt territorial continuity between Bethlehem and Ramallah and al-Bireh governorates (West Bank). In the coming weeks, Israeli Finance Minister Bezalel Smotrich is likely to continue supporting applications for the construction of new and expanded settlements, while also delaying fiscal transfers to the PA as outlined in the Oslo Accords. Disrupted access to funds would likely exacerbate the PA’s ongoing fiscal crisis, as well as long-standing socio-economic health risks in the West Bank.

Increasing financial pressure on the PA would possibly limit its capacity to finance core functions, resulting in restricted access to public services and increasing the risk of operational disruption for firms reliant on permits, licenses and visa renewals to facilitate their operations in the West Bank. Such delays would also increase the risk of staff being exposed to petty corruption and entrenched clientelism within the PA’s broader bureaucratic structure, compounding governance concerns (particularly for locally engaged NGOs).

The risk of protests driven by socio-economic concerns will increase within major Palestinian population centres, elevating the risk of unrest and strike action in the coming weeks. Increasing socio-economic concerns will also exacerbate the risk of sole-perpetrator attacks and militant activity targeting Israeli security positions, settlements and civilians in the coming weeks. In response, the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) will likely reinforce its posture in the West Bank and Jerusalem areas, particularly during Jewish and Islamic religious holidays, compounding ethno-religious tensions (particularly in Jerusalem’s Old City).

• Egypt-Turkey: Joint navy drills will increase diplomatic, security tensions with Israel. On 18 September, the Turkish defence ministry announced that Turkey will conduct joint navy drills with Egypt in the eastern Mediterranean region between 22 and 26 September. The drills will include attack vessels, fighter jets, frigates and submarines; they will be the first joint drills between the two states in 13 years. The announcement comes days after the Egyptian president’s first official visit to Ankara (Turkey), underscoring the strengthening of bilateral ties since 2023, following years of strained relations. We assess that the drills will highly likely exacerbate the ongoing tensions between both countries and Israel, amid the Israel Defense Forces’ (IDF) continued military advance to capture Gaza City. While Turkey has severed its trade ties with Israel, the drills are unlikely to signal a significant risk to trade or gas deals between Egypt and Israel. Furthermore, despite the heightened tensions, Israel and Egypt will likely sustain their security co‑ordination along their borders in the coming weeks.
• Israel-Yemen: Drone attack underscores security risks in Israel, strike risks in Houthi territory.On 18 September, a drone crashed near the Jacob Eilat Hotel (Eilat, Southern district), causing minor damage without casualties. Later that day, the Iran-backed Houthis claimed responsibility for the attack. The attack followed an earlier successful attack on Ramon Airport (ETM, Southern district) on 7 September (see Sibylline Middle East Crisis Update – 8 September 2025). Together, these highlight the Houthis’ growing ability to evade detection in southern Israel, sustaining elevated security risks for personnel and assets across the area in the coming weeks. Israel will likely lower its threshold for sounding sirens in the coming days, increasing the frequency of sirens and elevating business disruption risks. In the coming days, Israel will likely intensify its strikes against Houthi targets in Yemen, including in the capital Sanaa and against dual-use infrastructure such as ports and power stations. This will significantly elevate energy security risks, supply chain disruption and security risks for assets and personnel throughout Houthi-held territory.

Sep 18.

KEY DEVELOPMENTS

IRAN

• Iran has not met the E3’s (France, Germany and the UK) conditions for extending the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA)’s snapback clause, increasing the likelihood of the UN re-implementing sanctions in the coming weeks.
• The re-implementation of UN sanctions would substantially increase pressure on Iran’s economic stability, elevating the risk of hybrid retaliation targeting those nations that enforce sanctions.
• The US continues to expand sanctions targeting Iran’s ‘shadow banking’ network and oil exports, undercutting Chinese demand for Iranian crude.

ISRAEL

• The beginning of Israel’s major ground operation in Gaza City (Gaza, Palestinian Territories) will likely trigger significant protest activity; demonstrations will likely intensify ahead of 7 October.

PALESTINIAN TERRITORIES

• The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) has initiated its ground operation in Gaza City, significantly increasing security risks for civilians, despite the announcement of new evacuation routes.
• A shooting attack at the Allenby Bridge (King Hussein Bridge) border crossing will likely disrupt cross-border mobility in the coming hours, as well as supply chains delivering aid to Gaza.

IRAN

• Iran has not met the E3’s (France, Germany and the UK) conditions for extending the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA)’s snapback clause, increasing the likelihood of the UN re-implementing sanctions in the coming weeks. On 17 September, the E3 and the EU’s foreign policy chief, Kaya Kallas, spoke with Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi to discuss the possible re-implementation of UN sanctions on Iran in the coming weeks. Germany, the EU and the UK subsequently released statements indicating that Iran has not met the E3’s conditions for securing a temporary extension of the JCPOA’s snapback clause. In the coming days, Iran is highly unlikely to meet these conditions; these include resuming nuclear negotiations with the US, allowing the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) unrestricted access to nuclear facilities and accounting for all enriched uranium stockpiles in its possession. As such, the E3 will highly likely move to re-impose UN sanctions on Iran in the coming weeks. Sanctions-exposure risks for regionally engaged financial and shipping firms will also increase, particularly those firms with operations and/or customers in or associated with Iran. In response, Iran is highly likely to withdraw from its agreement with the IAEA; it will also possibly withdraw from the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). This would highly likely compound concerns regarding the status and possible expansion of Iran’s nuclear programme in the medium-to-long term, increasing the risk of a resumption of Israeli strike action targeting Iranian nuclear facilities in the coming months (see Sibylline Special Report – 28 August 2025).
• The re-implementation of UN sanctions would substantially increase pressure on Iran’s economic stability, elevating the risk of hybrid retaliation targeting those nations that enforce sanctions. The implementation of sanctions would highly likely trigger a further devaluation of the Iranian rial (IRR) and undermine socio-economic conditions nationwide, increasing the risk of limited anti-government protests. The re-implementation of sanctions would also increase the risk of substantial supply chain disruption to imports, elevating the risk of both operational disruption for locally engaged firms and commodity shortages, including food staples, pharmaceuticals and electrical goods. Amid increasing fiscal pressure resulting from UN sanctions, Iran would possibly resume its hijacking campaign targeting vessels in the Persian Gulf to secure periodic sanctions relief and the release of frozen assets. Vessels associated with nations enforcing sanctions and carrying lucrative cargo (particularly oil) would face an elevated risk of targeting, increasing security threats to crew members, who would also likely face lengthy stints in Iranian detention facilities. The Iranian authorities would also possibly retaliate to the enforcement of sanctions by detaining foreign nationals associated with any enforcing countries, increasing human rights concerns and threats to locally engaged staff. In the medium-to-long term, Iran would also likely intensify its economically motivated cyber threat campaign targeting public and private sector firms. Such activity would increase the risk of ransomware attacks and exposure to cryptojacking, particularly for firms holding large amounts of sensitive data, as well as those operating high-value digital infrastructure or possessing large-scale computing resources.
• The US continues to expand sanctions targeting Iran’s ‘shadow banking’ network and oil exports, undercutting Chinese demand for Iranian crude. On 16 September, the US sanctioned four Iranian nationals, 13 UAE-based entities and one China-based entity for allegedly financing Iran’s security forces. The US will highly likely continue to expand and rigorously enforce sanctions targeting Iran’s ‘shadow banking’ networks in the coming months, increasing compliance concerns and due diligence requirements for regionally engaged firms, particularly in the oil, shipping and technology industries. Also on 16 September, Reuters reported that Iran has begun offering China deeper discounts on crude oil purchases due to softening demand. Iranian Light crude now trades for USD 6 below Brent Crude benchmark prices, compared to USD 3 below Brent Crude in March. Softening Chinese demand likely stems from decreasing government oil quotas, as well as rising oil stockpiles at domestic refineries and the suspension of operations at the Haiye oil products terminal in the Dongjiakou port area of Qingdao (Shandong province, China). This terminal serves as the primary handler for Iranian crude imports in China. The US sanctioned its operator, Qingdao Port Haiye Dongjiakou Oil Products, in August, whereupon the terminal subsequently suspended operations. The suspension and subsequent decrease in Iranian crude imports underscore the broader impact of intensifying US sanctions targeting Iranian oil exports. In the coming months, the expansion of sanctions targeting Chinese entities will likely further soften demand, triggering additional price cuts for Iran, while also undermining access to critical export revenues and exacerbating broader socio-economic concerns (see above).

 

ISRAEL

• The beginning of Israel’s major ground operation in Gaza City (Gaza, Palestinian Territories) will likely trigger significant protest activity; demonstrations will likely intensify ahead of 7 October. On 16 September, the Hostages and Missing Families Forum declared a ‘state of emergency’ following the IDF’s initiation of ground operations in Gaza City (see below). The forum announced the establishment of a tent encampment outside Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s residence on Gaza Street in Jerusalem (Jerusalem district). It plans to hold daily protests at this location from 1900hrs (local time) onwards. In the coming days, protest activity will likely intensify across Israel, particularly in Jerusalem and Tel Aviv (Tel Aviv district). While demonstrations will likely remain largely peaceful, there is a realistic possibility of sporadic altercations, particularly if the Israeli police employ heavy-handed dispersal measures, such as mounted units and water cannons. Increasing protest activity will moderately increase security risks for proximate installations and will likely disrupt localised travel and supply chain continuity.

PALESTINIAN TERRITORIES 

• The IDF has initiated its ground operation in Gaza City, significantly increasing security risks for civilians, despite the announcement of new evacuation routes. On 16 September, the IDF confirmed that it had begun a ground operation in Gaza City (named Gideon Chariots 2). Three divisions are currently operating within the city – 36, 98 and 162 (Division 143 continues to operate in Khan Yunis and Rafah in southern Gaza). On 17 September, the IDF announced that it would open a temporary transit route through Salah al-Din Street to facilitate civilian movement southwards from 1200hrs on 17 September to 1200hrs on 19 September. As operations in the Gaza City area intensify in the coming weeks, the IDF will likely announce additional periods of civilian access to evacuation routes. However, this is highly unlikely to mitigate against security risks for personnel and civilians within Gaza City in the coming days.
• A shooting attack at the Allenby Bridge (King Hussein Bridge) border crossing will likely disrupt cross-border mobility in the coming hours, as well as supply chains delivering aid to Gaza. On 18 September, a Jordanian national opened fire at the Allenby Bridge border crossing, killing two Israeli nationals. The security forces neutralised the perpetrator at the scene. According to initial investigations, the perpetrator was a truck driver operating a humanitarian aid truck bound for Gaza. The authorities subsequently shut the Allenby Bridge crossing; the facility will likely remain closed over the coming 48 hours. There is a realistic possibility that the Israeli authorities will close the other border crossings between Jordan and Israel in the coming hours due to wider security concerns. Additional restrictions to cross-border movement would increase the risk of travel and supply chain disruption in the coming days, impacting the movement of goods between Jordan, Israel and the West Bank. Further border closures would also increase the risk of temporary labour shortages for firms employing Jordanian nationals, undermining operational continuity, particularly in the West Bank and Eilat (Southern district, Israel). Following the attack, the IDF established a cordon and conducted search operations in the Jericho area (Jericho governorate, West Bank), located close to the Allenby Bridge crossing. These operations will continue over the coming 24 hours; an elevated security posture in the area will also exacerbate the risk of travel disruption in the coming days. Given the profile of the perpetrator, Israel will possibly impose new restrictions on aid deliveries bound for Gaza that transit Jordan, the West Bank and Israel. Such restrictions would increase the risk of critical disruption to aid delivery and distribution operations, undermining humanitarian conditions within Gaza. There is a realistic possibility that such a decision would also increase diplomatic tensions with Jordan and radicalisation risks among Jordanian nationals, though wider retaliation from Jordan remains unlikely.

Sep 17.

• Syria: Ethno-religious tensions will persist in south, despite new roadmap. On 16 September, Syria’s foreign ministry announced a US and Jordan-backed roadmap for reconciliation between the government and the Druze in Suwayda governorate. The roadmap includes launching a UN-backed investigation, in co-ordination with the pro-government Druze factions, into July’s clashes and the deployment of the government’s internal security forces in Suwayda. The deal would also increase the volume of humanitarian aid entering Suwayda and facilitate reconstruction efforts. However, in response, the Suwayda Supreme Legal Committee, headed by the Druze cleric, Hikmat al-Hijri, has rejected the plan and reiterated its calls for self-determination. Al-Hijri militias’ refusal to accept Damascus’s control will likely increase challenges and delays in implementing the roadmap, sustaining uncertainty regarding any timeline. Furthermore, we assess there is a realistic possibility that the new roadmap will increase risks of intra-Druze conflict inside Suwayda in the coming weeks, as well as the resumption of Israeli airstrikes in the region, exacerbating security instability in southern Syria.

Sep 16.

Israel-Palestinian Territories: Major offensive on Gaza City will worsen humanitarian environment. Earlier on 16 September, the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) announced that tens of thousands of troops had expanded ground operations overnight into Gaza City (Gaza, Palestinian Territories). This follows days of intense Israeli airstrikes. An IDF spokesperson has urged civilians to leave Gaza City; they claim that approximately 40% of the population has already done so, leaving around 600,000 people in the city. Hundreds of thousands of civilians will almost certainly face displacement; many will likely seek shelter at overcrowded informal sites in areas such as al-Mawasi in southern Gaza, worsening the already critical strain on aid and intensifying the humanitarian crisis. We assess that the operation will significantly exacerbate the direct threat of injury and death for NGO personnel and journalists on the ground. Furthermore, the offensive will almost certainly face international backlash due to the increased likelihood of harm to civilians and mass casualty events, heightening reputational risks for companies operating in Israel and/or with Israeli firms.

Sep 15.

IRAN

• Amid increasing concerns regarding Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei’s longevity, escalating political factionalism will drive long-term government stability and policy risks within Iran.
• While 16 September marks the three-year anniversary of Mahsa Amini’s death in police custody, major unrest in Iran remains unlikely.

ISRAEL

• Tel Aviv’s stock exchange indexes decreased following Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s statements regarding Israel’s political isolation, as well as the possible resultant harm to Israeli trade relations and the associated long-term socio-economic health risks.

PALESTINIAN TERRITORIES

• The increased frequency and intensity of airstrikes indicates that Israel has entered the final preparation stages for its impending ground operation in Gaza City, elevating humanitarian and security risks therein.
• In the West Bank, the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) will likely intensify military operations in Tulkarm governorate following an increase in IED incidents.

IRAN

• Amid increasing concerns regarding Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei’s longevity, escalating political factionalism will drive long-term government stability and policy risks within Iran. On 12 September, the London-based IranWire outlet published a report outlining increasing factionalism among high-ranking members of Iran’s political echelon who are in line to succeed Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei. IranWire cites an unnamed Iranian diplomatic source, who alleges that Khamenei’s broad retreat from political engagements since the Iran-Israel war has resulted in a breakdown in communication between Iran’s ministerial bodies and the Supreme Leader’s office. This generally aligns with the significant reduction in the frequency of Khamenei’s public appearances following the conflict. In the coming months, increasing concerns regarding Khamenei’s longevity and potential succession will highly likely trigger growing competition between high-ranking political elites to consolidate their political influence during any potential succession period. The competition will likely be most acute between factions aligned with Ali Larijani, the leader of the Supreme National Security Council (SNSC), and Mohammad Mokhber, a senior advisor to Khamenei. Any such competition would increase the risk of government instability in the event of Khamenei’s incapacitation or death. Additionally, Khamenei would possibly interpret increasing factionalism as a challenge to his authority, increasing the risk of political purges in the coming months, which would in turn drive longer-term policy continuity risks.
• While 16 September marks the three-year anniversary of Mahsa Amini’s death in police custody, major unrest in Iran remains unlikely. Amini’s death triggered mass anti-government protests in 2022. The security forces engaged in broad and lethal crackdowns that resulted in hundreds of deaths and thousands of arrests in the subsequent weeks. Despite a moderate uptick in protest activity on the anniversary in 2023, sustained repression deterred significant attendance in 2024; widespread demonstrations therefore remain highly unlikely in the coming days. Even so, the security forces will likely adopt an elevated posture in Bukan and Mahabad (both West Azerbaijan province), Rasht (Gilan province), Sanandaj and Saqqez (both Kurdistan province) and the capital Tehran. They will almost certainly detain individuals suspected of attempting to mobilise or attend anti-government protests. This posture will increase the risk of surveillance, harassment and detention for locally engaged staff, particularly female personnel, ethno-religious minorities and foreign nationals. The authorities will also likely increase their policing of digital platforms and communications services, possibly triggering service disruption and localised blackouts in the coming days. In Sistan and Baluchistan province, the security forces will also likely adopt and maintain an elevated posture in major cities to deter efforts to commemorate the 30 September 2022 Zahedan Massacre, when the police and security forces killed over 90 civilians attending an anti-government protest in Zahedan (Sistan and Baluchistan). Such a posture is likely to disrupt operational continuity within the province, compounding longer-term ethno-religious tensions and the risk of attacks by secessionist militants. Although the anniversary is unlikely to trigger mass protests and unrest within Iran, anti-government activists among Iran’s diaspora will likely call for demonstrations, consequently increasing the likelihood of peaceful protests in Australia, Canada, France, Germany, New Zealand, Sweden, the UK and the US; such gatherings will possibly emerge outside Iranian embassies and associated institutions.

ISRAEL 

• Tel Aviv’s stock exchange indexes decreased following Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s statements regarding Israel’s political isolation, as well as the possible resultant harm to Israeli trade relations and the associated long-term socio-economic health risks. On 15 September, Netanyahu discussed Israel’s political isolation during the Accountant General’s Conference in Jerusalem (Jerusalem district). He also underlined how this isolation will possibly force Israel to adopt greater economic self-sufficiency. Netanyahu’s comments came after 80 of Israel’s most senior economists signed an open letter, which was published on 15 September. The letter warns of the significant danger to the strength and stability of the Israeli economy due to the ongoing Israel-Hamas war and the government’s plan to occupy Gaza City. Following the publication of the letter and Netanyahu’s comments, the Tel Aviv stock exchange experienced a decline; the steepest drops were recorded among Israeli security and defence companies. While there is a realistic possibility that the stock exchange will bounce back in the coming days, we continue to assess that the ongoing war will elevate the risk of Israel’s economic isolation. Furthermore, the war will continue to elevate the long-term socio-economic health risks facing Israel’s education system, as well as its national infrastructure and various other government initiatives that aim to support businesses.

PALESTINIAN TERRITORIES 

• The increased frequency and intensity of Israeli airstrikes indicates that the IDF has entered the final preparation stages for its impending ground operation in Gaza City, elevating humanitarian and security risks therein. In recent days, the IDF has intensified its airstrikes across Gaza City; it completed five waves of strikes against more than 500 targets in the past week. The intensification signals that a large ground mobilisation into the city is likely in the coming week. According to recent assessments by the Israeli security agencies, approximately 300,000 residents (of roughly 1 m) have already evacuated to humanitarian areas. As such, there is a realistic possibility that the IDF will continue to facilitate evacuations from the city amid the impending ground operations. This will significantly elevate misidentification and security risks for personnel present within Gaza City in the coming weeks; attacks by militant elements along evacuation routes also remain possible.
• In the West Bank, the IDF will likely intensify its military operations in Tulkarm governorate following an increase in IED incidents. On 15 September, the IDF discovered an IED attached to a vehicle that had returned from operational activity in Tulkarm. This follows an earlier event on 11 September in which militants threw an IED towards an IDF vehicle close to the border fence in Tulkarm, lightly injuring two soldiers. Following these events, the IDF is likely to intensify its operations in the northern West Bank, particularly in Tulkarm. These operations will likely increase mobility disruption risks throughout the northern West Bank in the coming days, as well as the risk of sporadic armed confrontations between militants and IDF soldiers (in turn elevating security risks for personnel and assets).

RED SEA

• The latest round of US sanctions targeting the Iranian-backed Houthis will elevate compliance risks and regional tensions. On 11 September, the US Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) designated 32 individuals and entities, as well as four vessels, for sanctions. The move aims to clamp down on the Houthis’ illicit revenue and procurement networks, signalling elevated compliance risks for companies, particularly shipping companies with operations in the Red Sea. While the sanctions do not signal an imminent risk of US military action against the Houthis, they indicate increasing US efforts to degrade the group financially and militarily. Over the coming months, these efforts will exacerbate tensions between the Houthis and the US, in turn raising the likelihood of Houthi attacks targeting US vessels (and possible US military retaliation).

REGIONAL AND GLOBAL DEVELOPMENTS

Developments

• Israel’s National Security Council (NSC) has issued travel warnings for Israeli and Jewish travellers ahead of several upcoming religious holidays, underscoring the threat of targeted harassment and violence. On 14 September, the NSC issued a warning for Israeli and Jewish individuals travelling overseas during the upcoming ‘High Holidays’ (22-24 September, 1-2 October and 6-14 October) and the anniversary of the 7 October 2023 attacks. The warning underscores the NSC’s concerns that Iran, Iranian-backed groups and various jihadist terror organisations operating across the Middle East, North Africa, South Asia and Sub-Saharan Africa regions will possibly attempt to conduct high-profile attacks against Israeli nationals and Jewish individuals during this time. The warning also advises individuals not to post online footage of their military service and/or operational activity in the Palestinian Territories, reflecting the growing risks of harassment, doxxing, legal exposure and prosecution for war crimes facing Israeli nationals travelling to states where courts retain universal jurisdiction (such as Australia, Belgium, Canada, the Netherlands, Spain and the UK). In the coming months, Israeli and Jewish travellers will highly likely continue to face elevated risks of targeted harassment and violence, particularly in the Middle East, North Africa and Turkey, though more moderate risks of physical and verbal harassment are also present in Europe and North America.
• A meeting of Arab and Islamic officials in Qatar will likely increase diplomatic tensions between Israel and its neighbouring states. Earlier on 15 September, Qatar hosted an emergency summit of the Arab League and the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) in the capital Doha aimed at condemning Israel’s airstrike on Hamas officials in the city’s Katara district on 9 September. During the meeting, Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian, Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammed Shia’ al-Sudani and Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan condemned the attack; the head of the OIC also called on the UN Security Council (UNSC) to hold Israel ‘to account’. The gathering underscores the rising diplomatic tensions between not only Israel and its neighbouring states, but also its regional allies such as the UAE, which maintains relations with Israel under the Abraham Accords. The airstrike and its subsequent condemnation are likely to delay the normalisation of ties between Israel and Saudi Arabia, and also to stall the future expansion of the Abraham Accords to states such as Lebanon and Syria. Claims by Chinese and Iranian state-affiliated media that the US knew of (and participated in) the 9 September attack in Doha are unlikely to undermine US regional co-operation significantly. However, they will possibly sustain anti-US rhetoric among populations already espousing elevated levels of anti-West sentiment, including Iraq, increasing the risk of protests, domestic unrest and hostility to foreign investment therein.
• A flotilla carrying prominent international activists departed Tunisia for Gaza earlier on 15 September, increasing security concerns for crew members and possible reputational risks for businesses operating in Israel. The pro-Palestine Global Sumud Flotilla (GSF) departed from Bizerte (Bizerte governorate, Tunisia). The flotilla aims to break Israel’s blockade of Gaza and includes at least 20 vessels carrying dozens of pro-Palestine activists, including the high-profile Greta Thunberg. Thunberg previously participated in a failed attempted to penetrate the blockade in June. In recent weeks, security incidents – including suspected drone attacks against vessels harboured in Sidi Bou Said (Tunis governorate, Tunisia) – have delayed the GSF’s departure. Israel will highly likely attempt to prevent the vessels from reaching Gaza by seizing them in international waters, detaining their occupants in Israel and deporting them to their home countries. However, given the scale of the flotilla, Israel’s naval forces will possibly employ more forceful interception tactics, especially if smaller vessels go undetected and enter waters in the immediate vicinity of Gaza. Such action would significantly increase the likelihood of serious and potentially fatal incidents involving flotilla vessels. In any such scenario, reputational risks for Israeli and Israeli-affiliated businesses would increase.
• Israel is highly unlikely to withdraw military from southern Syria in the short term despite the Syrian president’s announcement of ongoing discussions. On 12 September, Syrian President Ahmed al-Sharaa announced that talks are ongoing with Israel in an effort to secure a security agreement. Such an understanding would involve Israel withdrawing from areas in southern Syria, which it has occupied since the fall of the al-Assad regime in December 2024. Israel continued to conduct military operations in the days following the statement, including a ground operation in Syria’s south-western Daraa governorate on 14 September. It is highly unlikely that Israel will agree to conditions that require it to withdraw from southern Syria (particularly Quneitra governorate) in the short term. Rather, al-Sharaa’s announcement likely aims to serve as a demonstration of his diplomatic ability in front of a domestic audience at a time when sectarian violence and political instability are increasing in Syria. Israel will almost certainly seek to maintain its presence in southern Syria due to concerns over the potential build-up of Iranian proxies along the Israel-Syria border and the risk of political collapse within Syria’s central government (which would likely lead to further sectarian conflict and increased security risks in southern Syria).
• Syria: Delay in parliamentary elections will elevate domestic unrest risks. On 14 September, Nawar Najma, spokesperson for the Higher Judicial Committee for Elections, announced that parliamentary elections will be delayed and will take place by the end of September instead of between 15 and 20 September. Najma confirmed that the committee is currently reviewing membership in the electoral bodies and preparing to finalise their lists, after which the committee will release a timeline for the electoral process. The delay highlights complications with the chosen hybrid electoral process, amid criticisms of minority exclusion and vague eligibility criteria (see Sibylline Situation Update Brief – 10 September 2025). As such, there is a realistic possibility that the election process will extend beyond the end of September. While large protests are currently unlikely, we assess that an extension will increase the risks of irregularities in the voting process and domestic unrest, particularly in large cities and governorates with limited minority participation, such as Al-Hasakah, Raqqa and Suwayda governorates. This will also elevate risks of sectarian violence and excessive use of force by the authorities near protest locations, elevating security risks for personnel and assets.
• Turkey: Adjournment of ruling on opposition leadership will moderate domestic unrest risks. Earlier on 15 September, a civil court in the capital Ankara adjourned a ruling on whether to annul the opposition Republican People’s Party’s (CHP) 2023 congress over alleged procedural irregularities until 24 October. The court ruling could remove Özgür Özel from the party’s leadership. The adjournment followed protests in Ankara on 14 September, in which tens of thousands of people called for President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s resignation. The ruling’s adjournment will likely moderate domestic unrest risks in the short term, with demonstrations over the weekend likely fuelled by fears of Özel’s immediate removal. However, we assess that sporadic anti-government protests will likely persist in the lead-up to the ruling in October, particularly in Ankara and Istanbul (Istanbul province), heightening proximate bystander security threats. Ongoing political instability will likely continue to influence Turkey’s markets, increasing investor hesitation and reducing foreign direct investment. Visitor travel to Turkey will possibly decrease in the coming months as security concerns grow, exacerbating financial risks for the hospitality and tourism sectors. (Source: Sibylline)

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Military And Security Developments

Sep 18.

KEY DEVELOPMENTS

• OFFENSIVES: Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky has stated that Russia is preparing for ‘two more heavy offensive campaigns’ this autumn
• STRIKES: Russian strikes over recent days have included relatively small barrages, including against railway infrastructure, with the largest attack on 17 September involving 172 drones
• DRILLS: Joint Belarus-Russia military drills (‘Zapad-2025’) concluded on 16 September without resulting in a significant provocation to neighbouring NATO countries, following the drone incursions into Poland
• FORECAST: The first batch of US military assistance for Ukraine under President Donald Trump’s administration, funded by allies, has arrived in Ukraine; aid packages will likely include air defence systems and missiles
• OFFENSIVES: Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stated on 16 September that Russia is preparing for ‘two more heavy offensive campaigns’ this autumn. While he did not provide details of where and when such operations could be launched, it remains likely that Russian offensive operations will continue throughout the autumn and into the winter, despite worsening weather conditions. There has been a shift away from mechanised and armoured assaults, towards dismounted infantry, infiltration and all-terrain vehicle (ATV) operations supported by drones. As such, ground conditions are less significant than earlier phases of the war; however, they will remain significant to logistics and both sides’ ability to rapidly reinforce areas of the frontline.
• OFFENSIVES: In the meantime, Ukrainska Pravda, citing two unnamed sources in the Ukrainian military, stated that Ukrainian Commander-in-Chief Oleksandr Syrskyi had removed two army corps commanders. The commanders of the 17th and 20th corps had overseen defensive operations in Zaporizhzhia and Dnipropetrovsk oblasts, where Russian forces have made slow but steady gains over the last two months. No official reason for their removal has been provided; however, there is a realistic possibility that they were removed due to their inability to prevent Russian advances into Dnipropetrovsk oblast – which remains one of the few areas of the frontline in which Russian forces are slowly advancing at a regular pace. Ukrainian defences on this axis are likely less well-prepared than those on other, more long-lasting frontlines, which could realistically provide further opportunity for slow but steady Russian advances in the coming months.
• BAKHMUT: Geolocated footage published on 16 September indicates that the Russians have continued to make modest advances in the south-eastern suburban outskirts of Kostiantynivka (Donetsk oblast). Meanwhile, to the north-east around Chasiv Yar (Donetsk), footage from 15 and 16 September indicates that Russian and Ukrainian forces respectively advanced to the south-west of Chasiv Yar, suggesting that the south-western outskirts remain contested.
• DONETSK: Zelensky claimed earlier on 18 September that Ukrainian forces have retaken 60 square miles (160 sq km) in eastern Donetsk oblast during an ongoing ‘counteroffensive operation’. Zelensky reported that seven settlements have been retaken in the Dobropillia-Pokrovsk area – where the most intense fighting has taken place in recent weeks. We cannot confirm the precise amount of territory retaken; however, Ukrainian forces have been launching counter-attacks and pushing the Russians back since the tactical penetration east of Dobropillia resulted in Russia struggling to consolidate its position. In the meantime, on 15 September, a Ukrainian source claimed the recapture of Pankivka, located to the east of Dobropillia. Russian sources acknowledged this and the intense fighting taking place in the settlement, claiming it remains a grey zone area.
• DONETSK: Geolocated footage from 17 September shows that Russian forces recently captured Troyanda, located immediately to the south of Pokrovsk. A Ukrainian military source operating in the sector noted that Russian command is committing significant troops to the area and has redeployed units from Kursk oblast and other operational areas. The source also reported that Russia is launching assaults supported by armoured vehicles on the eastern flank of Myrnohrad, located to the east of Pokrovsk.
• KHARKIV: Nothing significant to report
• KURSK-SUMY: Nothing significant to report
• OSKIL-KREMINNA: Russian forces have expanded their presence within Kupiansk (Kharkiv oblast) in recent days. Geolocated footage from recent days shows that Russian forces have advanced in central Kupiansk. The push is from north of the town, possibly indicating that Russian forces have been able to transform their initial infiltration of the city into a more tactical offensive. Nonetheless, Ukrainian military sources operating in the area note that Russian troops are operating in small infantry groups that are poorly trained and equipped and are incurring heavy losses. In recent days, Russian forces have also made confirmed advances within Stepova Novoselivka, located to the south-east of Kupiansk.
• SOUTHERN: Geolocated footage from 15 September indicates that Russian forces have seized Olhivkse (Zaporizhzhia oblast), a village located around 15 miles (25km) to the south-west of Velyka Novosilka (Donetsk oblast). Footage from 16 September similarly indicates Russian advances to the north, in the eastern sector of Novoivanivka, located 16 miles (26km) to the west of Velyka Novosilka. Novoivanivka notably sits on the main road between Velyka Novosilka and Huliapole (Zaporizhzhia oblast); further advances westward would likely support further consolidation of the ground that Russian forces have taken inside neighbouring Dnipropetrovsk oblast as well.
• STRIKES: Russian strikes over recent days have included relatively small barrages, including against railway infrastructure, with the largest attack on 17 September involving 172 drones. The attack targeted railway infrastructure, causing delays to passenger trains in Ukraine’s Dnipropetrovsk and Odesa oblasts. The Ukrainian authorities reported that Russia has intensified strikes against railway infrastructure since July. These strikes typically target power substations linked to railway infrastructure, locomotive depots and passenger stations. Such attacks mirror Ukraine’s strikes on similar Russian infrastructure and are aimed at degrading Ukraine’s ability to transport military equipment and reinforcements to frontline areas. The attacks also cause significant disruption for civilians, increasing logistical hurdles and undermining supply chains.
• STRIKES: Meanwhile, Russian oil producers are facing mounting operational pressure due to increasingly frequent Ukrainian strikes on oil processing infrastructure. In recent days, Ukrainian forces have continued attacks on oil infrastructure in Russia, targeting the Saratov oil refinery (Saratov oblast) on 16 September and a Gazprom oil plant in the Republic of Bashkortostan earlier on 18 September. On 16 September, Reuters reported that Russia’s oil pipeline monopoly Transneft is considering cutting oil output following Ukrainian drone strikes against strategic export ports and refineries. This information was shared with the media outlet by three industry sources; however, Transneft dismissed such reports, claiming they were Western disinformation.
• STRIKES: We previously reported on the increasing frequency of Ukrainian drone strikes against oil infrastructure since August. Such attacks have repeatedly targeted prominent refineries and are increasingly impacting oil output, causing fuel shortages in various regions. We assess that the Kremlin will prioritise exports due to their importance for state revenues; production cuts will mostly affect the domestic market.

POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS

• DRILLS: Joint Belarus-Russia military drills (‘Zapad-2025’) concluded on 16 September without resulting in a significant provocation to neighbouring NATO countries, following the drone incursions into Poland. The exercises were significantly scaled back compared to the last iteration in 2021, which had involved up to 200,000 personnel, likely due to Russia’s manpower and resource needs to sustain the Ukraine war. According to the Belarusian Ministry of Defence (MoD), around 7,000 troops were involved in the Zapad-2025 exercises – 6,000 of which were Belarusian personnel and 1,000 Russian soldiers. We previously assessed that an attack against a NATO member state or renewed invasion into northern Ukraine was highly unlikely during these exercises.
• DRILLS: The attendance of US officials at the Zapad-2025 exercises was particularly notable as it marks the first known presence of its kind at Russian military drills in recent years. The US Pentagon confirmed on 16 September that incoming and outgoing US defence attachés in the Belarusian capital Minsk had observed the drills the day prior. The Pentagon also disclosed that the US embassy in Minsk had accepted the invitation following recent ‘productive bilateral engagements’ between Belarus and the US. The presence of US observers at the drills further reflects the growing rapprochement between Belarus and the US, as evidenced by recent limited sanctions relief (see Sibylline Ukraine Update – 15 September 2025). However, the US’ presence at these exercises will highly likely reinvigorate concerns among NATO member states bordering Belarus and Russia about the US’ commitment to aiding their security, particularly as the exercises took place days after Russian drone incursions into neighbouring Poland.
• TREATIES: On 17 September, the Ukrainian parliament ratified a 100-year partnership agreement with the UK. The treaty consists of ten main pillars, which are largely military and security-focused. These include strengthening defence capabilities, supporting Ukraine’s ambitions to join NATO and maritime security partnership. According to the Ukrainian parliament, the treaty outlines that the UK will allocate at least GBP 3.6 billion (USD 4.9 billion) in military aid annually until the fiscal year 2030/2031 and thereafter as needed. The agreement includes other elements related to cultural, economic and energy co-operation. The UK parliament has yet to ratify the document but will almost certainly do so. This treaty underscores London’s willingness to be a crucial partner to Kyiv in the long term, especially amid concerns about traditional allies’ commitments to ensuring Kyiv’s long-term security. While the treaty does not represent a security guarantee, we assess that the UK is among the European states that are most likely to commit to Ukrainian security for the coming decades.
• POLITICS: A long-time associate of Russian President Vladimir Putin who had opposed the full-scale invasion of Ukraine has resigned, likely illustrating the consolidation of a pro-war consensus within the Kremlin. Russian news outlet RBC reported on 17 September that Dmitry Kozak will leave his position as the Kremlin’s deputy chief of staff to possibly move into the private sector. Earlier in August, The New York Times reported that Kozak had lost his influence with President Putin because of his belief that the full-scale invasion of Ukraine had been a mistake. Kozak also reportedly presented the Russian president with a proposal to stop the war and hold peace negotiations and suggested outlines for domestic reforms earlier this year. It remains unclear whether opposition to the war was a driving factor in Kozak’s resignation. Nevertheless, we assess that Kozak’s departure from the Kremlin will likely consolidate support for continuing the war across the Russian state.

FORECAST

AID: The first batch of US military assistance for Ukraine under President Donald Trump’s administration, funded by allies, has arrived in Ukraine. Ukrainian media reported details of its arrival earlier on 18 September, citing an unspecified NATO representative. Until now, the Trump administration had only sold weapons to Ukraine or shipped military assistance that was approved under the former president, Joe Biden. The new initiative, the Prioritized Ukraine Requirements List (PURL), pools contributions from NATO members and allows them to purchase US weapons for Ukraine’s benefit.

President Zelensky disclosed on 17 September that Ukraine will receive missiles for Patriot air defence systems and High Mobility Artillery Rocket Systems (HIMARS) in the first tranche of support. According to reports, the first two aid packages are worth USD 500 million each. Ukraine has so far secured over USD 2 billion for new weapons under the new mechanism, though Zelensky expects the total committed funds to reach USD 3.5 billion in October. Besides air defence support, it remains unclear which other forms of military assistance Ukraine could realistically receive in the near term. Nevertheless, air defences are crucial for protecting Ukrainian urban centres and infrastructure from Russian long-range strikes. The total number of air defence missiles Ukraine is set to receive remains uncertain, but the deliveries will likely moderately strengthen Ukraine’s strained air defence network.

Meanwhile, European governments are reportedly looking at how they can further expand the use of frozen Russian assets to support Ukraine, with Germany said to be increasingly willing to use these funds. Bloomberg reported on 17 September that Berlin’s interest has grown, largely due to concerns that Germany would be expected to be Ukraine’s key supporter if US support wanes. These concerns are likely connected to the fact that Germany is Europe’s largest economy and the second-largest contributor of military assistance to Ukraine after the US (as per the Kiel Institute). While the outright confiscation of Russian frozen assets will remain unlikely in the short term due to legal issues, the EU is also reportedly considering options to access these funds for Ukraine. Nevertheless, any attempts to use frozen funds will highly likely increase the risk of Russia seizing Western assets in retaliation, which has already occurred several times since the beginning of the full-scale invasion.

Besides developments related to aiding Ukraine, the EU is seeking to increase pressure on Russia by expediting efforts to reduce the bloc’s reliance on Russian energy. On 16 September, European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen disclosed plans to speed up the phaseout of Russian fossil fuel imports. Under its current plan, the bloc aims to end the import of Russian gas and oil entirely by the end of 2027; von der Leyen did not specify a potential new timeframe for abandoning Russian energy. Her suggestion followed a call with US President Donald Trump, who recently stated that Europe should cease purchasing Russian oil before the US placed new sanctions on Russia.

US Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent said on 15 September that Washington DC will not impose new tariffs on Chinese goods to stop Beijing from purchasing Russian oil unless European countries first adopt their own measures. The US’ growing calls for European partners to increase sanctions have highly likely influenced the EU’s own sanctions agenda. For instance, Bloomberg reported on 16 September that the EU had delayed its 19th sanctions package, though the bloc will possibly present the new measures to member states as early as 19 September, according to new reports. As per Bloomberg, the EU is still considering imposing sanctions on companies in China and India that handle Russian oil, as part of its latest tranche of punitive measures. Although this would likely gain more support from member states than steep tariffs against China and India, given the importance of relations with these two countries, full agreement on such action is highly unlikely. However, it remains to be seen whether EU sanctions on Chinese and Indian companies would be sufficient for the US to increase sanctions pressure against Russia.

Sep 17.

• Ukraine: Russian strikes against railway will highly likely cause travel, supply chain disruptions. Earlier on 17 September, Russian forces struck railway infrastructure, causing delays to passenger trains in Ukraine’s Dnipropetrovsk and Odesa oblasts. The state railway operator Ukrzaliznytsia reported delays to 46 trains. Ukrzaliznytsia head Oleksandr Pertsovskyi noted that Russia has intensified its attacks on railway infrastructure since July. While frontline regions such as Dnipropetrovsk and Kharkiv oblasts have been targeted, other regions, including Odesa and the more central Vinnytsia oblast, have also been affected. The strikes typically target power substations linked to railway infrastructure, locomotive depots and passenger stations. These attacks mirror Ukraine’s strikes on similar Russian infrastructure and are aimed at degrading Ukraine’s ability to transport military equipment and reinforcements to frontline areas. The attacks also cause significant disruption for civilians, increasing logistical hurdles and undermining supply chains. We assess that, despite contingency measures, repairs to critical railway infrastructure will likely be time-consuming and resource-intensive.

Sep 15.

KEY DEVELOPMENTS

• SOUTHERN: Russian forces have made a series of advances along the Donetsk-Dnipropetrovsk oblast border region north-west of Velyka Novosilka
• SANCTIONS: US President Donald Trump has stated that he is ready to increase sanctions against Russia once NATO countries stop purchasing Russian oil, as he partially lifted sanctions on Belarus – a significant precedent
• NEGOTIATIONS: The Kremlin has stated that negotiations between Russia and Ukraine aimed at ending the war have ‘paused’
• FORECAST: NATO has announced the establishment of a new mission to bolster the alliance’s posture on its eastern flank after the unprecedented incursion of Russian drones into Poland, amid uncertainty over US commitment
• OFFENSIVES: Earlier on 15 September, the satellite internet provider Starlink confirmed a global outage of its service, impacting both Ukrainian and Russian forces that rely upon Starlink terminals for battlefield communications. Ukraine is more reliant upon Starlink than Russia, indicating that the temporary outage will likely have had a more significant impact on defensive operations. Nevertheless, Russian sources have also commented on their forces’ reliance upon Starlink; the prominent Russian source Rybar claimed that the outage impacted Russian forces for approximately thirty minutes.
• BAKHMUT: Geolocated footage published on 13 September indicates that Russian forces have advanced to the south-eastern suburban outskirts of Kostiantynivka (Donetsk oblast) for the first time. Russian forces have advanced along the O-0519 road that hugs the Naumykha River and are now operating in the city’s suburbs, though they have yet to reach the city proper.
• BAKHMUT: Meanwhile, further to the west, geolocated footage from 12 September indicates that Russian forces have advanced south-east of the village of Sofiivka, located around 13 miles (21km) to the west of Kostiantynivka. These small advances continue to mutually reinforce advances towards Kostiantynivka in the east and the stabilisation of Russia’s salient north-east of Pokrovsk (Donetsk oblast); the latter remains vulnerable to Ukrainian counter-attacks, despite weeks of attempts to consolidate the area.
• BAKHMUT: A Russian source claimed on 12 September that Russian first-person view (FPV) drones have attacked Kramatorsk (Donetsk oblast) for the first time, indicating the ever-expanding range of Russian drones. While we cannot confirm this, it would be in line with wider indications that Russian forces have deployed FPVs at ever-greater ranges, threatening to bring much of the fortress belt of cities (including Kostiantynivka, Kramatorsk and Sloviansk) within drone range. Meanwhile, glide bomb attacks against Kramatorsk and other cities in the area remain heavy; reports from a Ukrainian brigade soldier indicate that Sofiivka alone was attacked by glide bombs 20 times in one day.
• DONETSK: In recent days, Russian forces have continued to launch multi-directional assaults against Pokrovsk, sustaining a high offensive tempo. On 14 September, a Ukrainian military spokesperson reported that Russian forces carried out a record number of assaults in the Pokrovsk direction last week. On 12 September, a Ukrainian unit operating in the sector noted that Russian forces were increasing pressure south of Pokrovsk. Meanwhile, Russian milbloggers reported that Russia has continued efforts to capture Krasnyi Lyman and Rodynske, located to the north-east of Pokrovsk, as part of a broader attempt to encircle Myrnohrad, located immediately to the north-east of the city. Geolocated footage published on 14 September indicates that Russian forces have advanced in the fields east of Kozatske, situated to the east of Pokrovsk.
• DONETSK: Meanwhile, further to the north-east of Pokrovsk, Ukrainian forces have continued to clear Russian positions near Dobropillia, where Russian troops conducted a penetration in August. The 1st Corps of the National Guard of Ukraine, known as ‘Azov’, which was deployed in the area to contain Russian advances, is reportedly retaking previously held territory. Earlier on 15 September, the unit reported the recapture of Pankivka, located to the east of Dobropillia.
• KHARKIV: Nothing significant to report
• KURSK-SUMY: On 12 September, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stated that Russia’s offensive in Sumy oblast has been ‘completely thwarted’. Both Ukrainian and Russian sources continue to report on heavy fighting at various points along the northern Sumy line; however, Russian forces have made very little progress over the last two months, marking a notable reduction in the tempo of assaults and rate of advance compared to in the spring. Over the last week, additional Russian sources have reported a reduction in the number of relatively elite Russian forces, including naval infantry and airborne units, as well as elite Rubikon drone units; this indicates that Sumy has been deprioritised by the Russian High Command. Russian sources have also claimed that their forces in the area are struggling to fulfil orders due to reduced troop numbers, including the seizure of Yunakivka, which is reportedly the primary objective of Russian forces on this axis.
• OSKIL-KREMINNA: In the Kupiansk sector, Russian forces continue to rely on infiltration tactics to penetrate the town. On 12 September, Ukrainian open-source intelligence (OSINT) group DeepState reported that Russian troops had infiltrated Kupiansk (Kharkiv oblast) via a gas pipeline from Lyman Pershyi, located to the north-east of the town. Russian forces reportedly reached Radkivka, on Kupiansk’s northern outskirts, and established positions for drone pilots within the town. The use of the pipeline reflects similar tactics employed earlier this year during Russia’s offensive to recapture Ukrainian-held territory in Kursk oblast. DeepState reported that Russian forces have continued to operate in Kupiansk as of 13 September, though Ukrainian forces have reportedly regained control of the pipeline’s exit.
• OSKIL-KREMINNA: Further south, Russian forces have also advanced in the Lyman sector (Donetsk oblast), where they are increasingly applying infiltration tactics. Geolocated footage posted on 11 September indicates that Russian forces recently advanced north-west of Stavky, located to the north of Lyman. Various Ukrainian military sources operating in the Lyman direction have reported on Russia’s growing reliance on infiltration tactics in the area.
• SOUTHERN: Russian forces have made a series of advances along the Donetsk-Dnipropetrovsk oblast border region north-west of Velyka Novosilka (Donetsk). Geolocated footage from 11 September in particular indicates a number of advances, including the seizure of Khoroshe, Oleksandrohrad, Sosnivka and Vorone, all located around 12 miles (20km) to the north-west of Velyka Novosilka. Geolocated footage from 12 and 13 September also indicates that Russian forces have seized Novomykolaivka and Ternove, located to the south of the villages mentioned above. While much of the frontline remains contested, these advances reflect Russian forces’ steady rate of advance into Dnipropetrovsk, though Ukrainian counter-attacks to the north along the Vovcha River continue to limit the rate of Russian advances south-west of Pokrovsk.
• SOUTHERN: Meanwhile, at the extreme western flank of the Zaporizhzhia axis, geolocated footage from 14 September indicates that Russian forces have advanced into eastern Stepnohirsk, located approximately 15 miles (25km) to the south-east of Zaporizhzhia city (Zaporizhzhia oblast).
• STRIKES: In recent days, Russian strikes have involved relatively smaller attacks, though Russian drones violated the airspace of NATO member Romania on 13 September (see FORECAST). Attacks in recent days have typically involved limited numbers of missiles and have continued to target Ukrainian infrastructure sites, including in Chernihiv, Dnipropetrovsk, Kharkiv, Mykolaiv and Sumy oblasts.
• STRIKES: Ukraine is meanwhile intensifying strikes against Russian energy infrastructure, particularly oil facilities, which is causing increasing disruption and knock-on effects to Russia’s energy security and revenue. On 12 September, Ukrainian forces targeted Russia’s north-western Baltic Sea port of Primorsk (Leningrad oblast), a key export hub for Russian oil and the largest port facility in western Russia. The attack was reportedly carried out by Ukraine’s Security Service (SBU). An unnamed SBU source also claimed that the SBU had targeted pumping stations that feed crude oil to the port of Ust-Luga in Leningrad oblast, a major export hub for Russian energy in the Baltic.
• STRIKES: On 12 September, Ukraine’s military intelligence agency (GUR) reportedly co‑ordinated a drone strike on the Bashneft-Novoufimsky refinery in Ufa, the capital of Russia’s Republic of Bashkortostan. The facility, located around 930 miles (1,500km) from Ukraine’s border, is one of Russia’s major oil refineries. Multiple powerful explosions were reported at the site, likely indicating that the strike caused significant damage. On 14 September, the regional authorities in Russia’s Leningrad oblast reported that drone debris had sparked a fire at the Kirishi oil refinery, another major oil processing facility that refines approximately 17 m tonnes of crude annually.
• STRIKES: Intensifying Ukrainian strikes against Russian oil infrastructure will moderately drive global oil price volatility, while likely increasing pressure on the Kremlin’s finances. Last week, global oil prices rose slightly amid Ukrainian attacks on major Russian oil refining facilities. We assess that such strikes will likely impact the supply of oil products and undermine Russia’s credibility as a reliable global oil supplier. We previously assessed that these strikes would cause domestic shortages; however, Russian military forces remain less affected by petrol shortages as they primarily rely on diesel. While these strikes demonstrate the growing assertiveness and effectiveness of Ukrainian drone operations, they are likely to trigger only moderate international backlash due to their impact on oil prices.

POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS

• SANCTIONS: On 13 September, US President Donald Trump stated that he is ready to increase sanctions pressure against Russia after NATO countries stop purchasing Russian oil. Trump has criticised NATO allies’ continued purchases of oil from Russia, arguing that this weakens bargaining power over Moscow. According to Trump, shunning Russian oil and imposing tariffs ranging from 50% to 100% on China until the war ends would help bring a conclusion to the conflict. Since returning to the presidency in January, Trump has made various threats about increasing sanctions pressure on Russia that have so far failed to materialise. Most recently, the Trump administration has spoken in favour of working with the EU to increase sanctions pressure against Russia, but this may well come with conditions (see Sibylline Ukraine Update – 8 September 2025).
• SANCTIONS: Conditioning further Russian sanctions on all NATO countries ending Russian energy imports will likely seriously delay such sanctions, as the prospect for European (and wider NATO allies) to end all imports remains very slim in the coming year. Turkey was the third-largest importer of Russian crude oil and purchased the most Russian oil products in June, according to the Centre for Research on Energy and Clean Air (CREA). The EU was the fourth-largest buyer of Russian crude oil in that same time frame. Hungary and Slovakia (both of which are members of the EU and NATO) are significant importers of Russian oil and are currently resisting EU efforts to speed up the timeline for a ban on all Russian energy imports (currently set for 2027, though it could realistically be imposed later). These countries are highly unlikely to stop purchasing Russian oil in the near term. In addition, given their significant trade reliance upon China, it remains highly unlikely that European NATO members would agree to impose significant trade tariffs on China in exchange for US sanctions against Russia.
• SANCTIONS: The US’ decision to extend limited sanctions relief to Belarus likely indicates that the Trump administration’s ultimate goal is to relax punitive measures on both Belarus and Russia, rather than tighten them. On 11 September, the US partially eased sanctions on the Belarusian airline Belavia after the Belarusian authorities freed 52 political prisoners (see Sibylline Daily Analytical Update – 12 September 2025). We initially assessed that this sets a significant precedent for sanctions relief and gradually resetting relations, with Belarus likely representing a test for easing sanctions against Russia in the future. US Vice President JD Vance stated in an interview published on 10 September that Trump does not believe Russia should be isolated economically beyond its war in Ukraine. Despite stalled progress in normalising US-Russia ties and brokering peace, we assess that the Trump administration is open to exploring commercial opportunities with Russia once the war ends, indicating that serious US sanctions are unlikely in the short term. For further analysis, see Sibylline Ukraine Update – 22 May 2025.
• NEGOTIATIONS: The Kremlin has stated that negotiations between Russia and Ukraine aimed at ending the war have ‘paused’. On 12 September, Kremlin Press Secretary Dmitry Peskov stated that while negotiators can use established channels to communicate with one another, discussions have reached an impasse ‘for now’. Peskov made similar comments earlier on 15 September and attributed the blame to the Ukrainian side, claiming that Kyiv is not demonstrating flexibility and readiness to begin serious negotiations on reaching a peace settlement. We continue to assess that Russia shows no genuine willingness to make concessions that would help end the war, with the Kremlin almost certainly considering that an end to the war is currently not in its military, political or strategic interests. Ultimately, the prospect of a revival (let alone a breakthrough) in peace negotiations is unlikely in the near term.

FORECAST

DRONES: NATO has announced the establishment of a new mission to bolster the alliance’s posture on its eastern flank after the unprecedented incursion of Russian drones into Poland. According to a readout published by NATO’s Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE) on 12 September, ‘Eastern Sentry’ is expected to commence in the near future and continue for an undisclosed period of time.

Several NATO countries are expected to commit aircraft and naval assets as part of the mission. Denmark will contribute two F-16 fighter jets and an air defence frigate, with France committing three Rafale aircraft and Germany pledging four Eurofighters. The UK has also expressed its willingness to support, though the extent and type of any assistance remains unknown. The Operational Command of Poland’s armed forces stated on 13 September that the initiative sends a ‘clear message’ that NATO’s borders are ‘inviolable’ and that it demonstrates the alliance’s unity in taking steps to defend its frontiers. It remains our assessment, however, that this alone will not deter further Russian drone incursions in the future.

The drone incursion has almost certainly reinvigorated concerns about the US’ commitment to European security, despite the US pledging to protect NATO territory. The acting US ambassador to the UN, Dorothy Shea, told the UN Security Council on 12 September that the US would defend ‘every inch of NATO territory’ after the recent violation of Polish airspace. However, President Trump has yet to issue a strong condemnation of the recent incursion of Russian drones into Poland. Trump stated on 11 September that the incident ‘could have been a mistake’ and said that he was dissatisfied with ‘the whole situation’ regardless. Meanwhile, when asked about the incursion on 12 September, Trump emphasised that he was not going to ‘defend anybody’, raising serious questions about the US’ commitment to NATO.

We assess that Russia’s drone incursions were highly likely an intentional test of NATO and aimed to foment transatlantic divisions. Ultimately, the lack of a unified response between the US and its traditional European partners will realistically encourage Russia to further test boundaries with other grey zone activity in Europe over the medium-to-long term.

On 13 September, Romania’s defence ministry reported that it scrambled two of its fighter jets to monitor a drone in Romanian airspace during long-range Russian attacks against Ukraine. Romania did not shoot the drone down, with the UAV then returning to Ukrainian airspace. Although several stray Russian drone fragments have crashed in Romania’s territory during the war, the timing of the latest incident is notable following events in Poland. While we cannot confirm whether the Romanian incursion was deliberate, Romanian Defence Minister Ionuţ Moşteanu said that such airspace violations occur almost weekly. The frequency of these incidents therefore underscores the ever-present risk of conflict spillover in NATO countries neighbouring Ukraine. However, we reiterate our assessment that a major Russia-NATO direct military conflict remains highly unlikely in the short-to-medium term.

Clarification from Poland that it will practice downing drones with Ukraine on Polish territory, rather than inside Ukraine, will reduce the risk of direct escalation between NATO and Russia. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky had insinuated on 11 September that Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk had agreed to send specialists to Ukraine for such purposes. Meanwhile, Reuters, citing an unspecified insider, stated that Polish military representatives would undergo training on shooting down UAVs, without specifying exactly where. If such training had gone ahead on Ukrainian territory, this would have represented an unprecedented step and would have highly likely put any involved personnel at risk of deliberate Russian long-range attacks. Russia has consistently opposed the presence of Western (NATO) forces in Ukraine; it would therefore highly likely regard them as legitimate military targets and would wish to ‘make a point’ by targeting any such deployment to deter a wider coalition of the willing presence in Ukraine. As such, the fact that the training will occur in Poland, rather than Ukraine, will reduce escalation risks and the threat of direct confrontation between NATO and Russia, which we assess remains low. However, this threat will realistically steadily increase, especially if further airspace violations occur and subsequently increase the possibility for miscalculation.

• Ukraine: Likely mobile internet slowdown during drone strikes will increase operational disruption. On 14 September, Ukrainian Chief of the General Staff Andriy Hnatov announced discussions on reducing the quality of mobile internet during Russian drone attacks. The move would aim to prevent Russian forces from using mobile networks to co-ordinate drone strikes. Hnatov explained that the authorities would reduce network quality rather than impose full-service blackouts in areas affected by strikes. Given the high frequency of Russian drone use, we assess that the measure remains likely, mirroring Russia’s own implementation of limited mobile and internet shutdowns to disrupt Ukrainian drone operations. There is a realistic possibility that Ukraine will resort to localised mobile internet blackouts if a slowdown proves insufficient to hinder Russia’s co-ordination of drone strikes. Ultimately, restrictions on mobile internet quality will likely increase operational challenges for businesses, which will likely be required to invest in backup communications, such as satellite links or landline alternatives, to reduce disruption. However, even these backups will remain prone to disruption, given the recent Starlink outage, for example, which also disrupted Ukrainian military operations. (Source: Sibylline)

 

17 Sep 25. Ukraine to receive missiles in first US weapon supply under new system, Zelenskiy says. Ukraine will receive missiles for Patriot air defence systems and HIMARS rocket launchers in the first batch of weapons being sent under a new funding programme agreed by the U.S. and Ukraine’s European allies, President Volodymyr Zelenskiy said on Wednesday. The Trump administration’s approval of weapons aid packages for Kyiv on Tuesday. Ukraine has so far secured over $2 billion in financing for U.S.-produced weapons via a NATO-led mechanism called the Prioritized Ukraine Requirements List (PURL), according to Zelenskiy. He said he expected the total committed funds to reach $3.5bn in October. (Source: Reuters)

 

12 Sep 25. Sweden presents $985m military support package to Ukraine. The package includes the procurement of 18 Archer artillery systems, complete with ammunition, and long-range drones. The Swedish government has rolled out its 20th package of military aid to Ukraine, valued at approximately Skr9.2bn ($984.95m). The assistance is a response to the ongoing conflict with Russia and aims to address the specific needs conveyed by Ukraine. The package includes the procurement of 18 Archer artillery systems, complete with ammunition, and long-range drones, totalling around Skr3.6bn. Additionally, marine equipment such as coastal surveillance radar systems, tross boats fitted with grenade launchers, diving chambers, and crane lorries are part of the support, valued at around Skr2.1bn. For air defence and space capabilities, the package includes ammunition, sensors, and command and control systems for the Tridon anti-aircraft system previously supplied by Sweden. It also comprises equipment for airbase operations and sensors for drone and robotic system detection, amounting to approximately Skr3.5bn.

Sweden Defence Minister Pål Jonson said: “Sweden is now increasing its military support to Ukraine to put greater pressure on Russia. More Archers, drones, and ammunition will make a difference on the battlefield. Europe’s right to peace and freedom must be defended.”

The Swedish Armed Forces are also contributing material donations within this category, which will be replaced accordingly and include transportation costs. Looking ahead, the government has proposed in its 2026 Budget Bill an increased financial framework for military aid to Ukraine by an additional Skr31.5bn for that year and extending support into 2027.

With this proposal, military aid would reach a total of Skr40bn annually for both years. Furthermore, the budget bill outlines plans to raise ambition levels for development assistance to Ukraine. The government intends to allocate a minimum of Skr10bn per year from Sweden’s development assistance budget for civilian support in 2026–2027 and at least Skr10.5bn in 2028. Separately, the UK government has committed £142m ($193m) to assist Ukraine through the winter months and into the following year.

UK Foreign Secretary Yvette Cooper disclosed the financial support on 12 September as she arrived in Kyiv for her inaugural visit since assuming office.

Of the total aid package, £100m is earmarked for humanitarian efforts to aid civilians in conflict zones, safeguard vulnerable groups, and provide emergency assistance in response to ongoing Russian hostilities.

Yvette Cooper said: “Through our ongoing military support, lifesaving funding announced today, the UK-Ukraine 100 Year Partnership and our ongoing leadership of the Coalition of the Willing, we will be by Ukraine’s side to achieve a just and lasting peace, and in friendship for years to come.

“Putin’s bombardment of Ukrainian civilians, his stalling and delaying in internationally-backed peace talks, and his blatant disregard for human life must end.”

In a related development at DSEI 2025, UK Secretary of State for Defence John Healey announced a collaborative effort with British industry to produce interceptor drones for Ukraine.

Earlier in May 2025, the UK government allocated more than £1bn to enhance its armed forces’ capabilities, including new battlefield systems and cyber warfare advancements. (Source: army-technology.com)

 

15 Sep 25. Terma, a trusted defense partner to Ukraine, has strengthened its long-term commitment by establishing a fully owned subsidiary in Kyiv. With combat-proven solutions already deployed on the frontline, Terma’s technology is actively protecting lives, supporting sovereignty, and enhancing Ukraine’s defense every day. The milestone was marked on September 12 with a reception in Kyiv, where Terma CEO Henriette Thygesen joined Denmark’s Minister of Foreign Affairs, Lars Løkke Rasmussen, and Ukrainian partners to celebrate the opening of the new subsidiary. The event took place alongside official meetings underscoring Denmark’s broad political, civil, and military support for Ukraine.

“This is more than delivering advanced systems – it’s about standing shoulder to shoulder with Ukraine at a defining moment in history,” said Henriette Thygesen, CEO of Terma. “By establishing a permanent presence in Kyiv, we are sending a clear message: Terma is here for the long term.”

Terma’s systems are not aspirational – they are operational. Deployed across critical areas, they deliver measurable results where it matters most: on the battlefield. From enhancing force protection to enabling modern military capabilities, Terma’s technologies provide a real and immediate impact.

“Terma is bringing real combat power to the frontline. This is the difference between words of support and action that saves lives,” Henriette Thygesen added.

The Kyiv-based subsidiary will enable closer collaboration with Ukrainian authorities, defense forces, local industry, and international partners. It marks not a temporary engagement, but a long-term partnership grounded in trust, shared responsibility, and collective security.

“We are committed to Ukraine – today, in defense, and tomorrow, in rebuilding,” said Henriette Thygesen.

Establishing a local entity in Ukraine is both a practical step and a powerful symbol of solidarity. It reflects Terma’s values and our belief that technology must serve people – providing not just protection, but the time, space, and confidence to act.

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Founded in 1987, Exensor Technology is a world leading supplier of Networked Unattended Ground Sensor (UGS) Systems providing tailored sensor solutions to customers all over the world. From our Headquarters in Lund Sweden, our centre of expertise in Network Communications at Communications Research Lab in Kalmar Sweden and our Production site outside of Basingstoke UK, we design, develop and produce latest state of the art rugged UGS solutions at the highest quality to meet the most stringent demands of our customers. Our systems are in operation and used in a wide number of Military as well as Homeland Security applications worldwide. The modular nature of the system ensures any external sensor can be integrated, providing the user with a fully meshed “silent” network capable of self-healing. Exensor Technology will continue to lead the field in UGS technology, provide our customers with excellent customer service and a bespoke package able to meet every need.

A CNIM Group Company

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15 Sep 25. Military deployments will raise unrest, operational disruption risks in multiple urban centres. On 12 September, President Donald Trump stated he would send National Guard troops to Memphis (Tennessee) to combat crime. Memphis Mayor Paul Young stated that he did not request the move. On 13 September, the Trump administration drafted a proposal to deploy around 1,000 Louisiana National Guard troops to conduct operations across the state’s urban centres. Earlier on 15 September, Trump stated he would call a national emergency and federalise the capital Washington DC after the city’s mayor said the police forces would not co-operate with federal immigration agents. While specific details of the deployments remain unclear, troops will likely enter Memphis in the coming week. In the short term, we assess that this will drive an immediate decrease in violent crime in Memphis, though longer-term crime trends will likely be sustained. As both Memphis and New Orleans (Louisiana) are Democratic-leaning cities in Republican-led states, any deployments will likely trigger activist backlash. Activism will possibly include moderate demonstrations, though these will likely remain peaceful. Furthermore, in all the above-mentioned cities, a bolstered law enforcement presence will possibly cause traffic and operational disruption risks for nearby firms. (Source: Sibylline)

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Founded in 1987, Exensor Technology is a world leading supplier of Networked Unattended Ground Sensor (UGS) Systems providing tailored sensor solutions to customers all over the world. From our Headquarters in Lund Sweden, our centre of expertise in Network Communications at Communications Research Lab in Kalmar Sweden and our Production site outside of Basingstoke UK, we design, develop and produce latest state of the art rugged UGS solutions at the highest quality to meet the most stringent demands of our customers. Our systems are in operation and used in a wide number of Military as well as Homeland Security applications worldwide. The modular nature of the system ensures any external sensor can be integrated, providing the user with a fully meshed “silent” network capable of self-healing. Exensor Technology will continue to lead the field in UGS technology, provide our customers with excellent customer service and a bespoke package able to meet every need.

A CNIM Group Company

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Sponsored by Bertin Exensor

 

www.exensor.com

 

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16 Sep 25. Sweden raises defence budget by 18% for 2026. The increased funds will be spent on acquiring new air defence systems, vessels, vehicles and aircraft, among other assets. The Swedish Government has unveiled plans to significantly increase its defence budget in the 2026 budget bill, allocating an additional Skr26.6bn ($2.87bn). This funding surge represents an 18% hike from 2025. It is the largest boost to the nation’s defence capabilities since the Cold War era, the country’s Ministry of Defence (MoD) said. Projections based on current gross domestic product (GDP) forecasts and the proposed allocations in the Budget Bill indicate that defence spending will rise to 2.8% of GDP in 2026, aligning with NATO’s benchmark.

By 2028, this figure is expected to reach 3.1% of GDP. Specifically, the government proposes a Skr10bn rise for military defence. Within this sector, appropriation 1.3 will see incremental increases over three years: Skr4.7bn in 2026, Skr6.7bn in 2027 and Skr7.5bn in 2028. The Swedish Army will use the increased funds to procure air defence systems, rocket artillery, ammunition and combat vehicles. The Marines are planning investments in new surface combat vessels and combat boats, while the Air Force aims to enhance its fleet with tactical transport aircraft and extended-range combat capabilities.

The MoD statement reads: “The investments bolster Sweden’s military, civilian and economic strength. The substantially increased defence budget, investments in innovation and expansion of Sweden’s defence industry also create opportunities for technological advancement that benefit the entire country.

“This also creates thousands of employment opportunities, having already accounted for 6,000 new defence industry jobs in 2024.”

Recently, the Swedish Government launched its 20th package of military aid to Ukraine, valued at approximately Skr9.2bn. The nation also recently invited NATO to establish a logistics headquarters within its territory. (Source: army-technology.com)

 

15 Sep 25. Kosovo-US: Suspension of strategic dialogue underscores ongoing regional ethnic tensions. On 14 September, the US indefinitely suspended its planned strategic dialogue with Kosovo. The US embassy in Pristina cited ‘concerns about the caretaker government actions that have increased tensions and instability’. The US has been the major international supporter of Kosovo, whose independence remains unrecognised by five EU member states. In recent years, tensions between the US and Kosovo have increased due to Kosovo’s actions to establish sovereignty in majority ethnic-Serb North Kosovo, without co‑ordinating with the US. Since the February parliamentary elections, Kosovo has been unable to fully constitute its Parliament and form a government. The trigger for suspending the strategic dialogue was likely the Parliament’s refusal to appoint a deputy speaker from the largest ethnic-Serb party Srpska Lista, contrary to the Kosovar Constitution. The suspension of the US-Kosovo dialogue underscores that progress in the Kosovo-Serbia dialogue is highly unlikely in the coming months. We assess that it will also negatively impact the US’ diplomatic, security and economic support for Kosovo, thereby increasing governance risks in Kosovo. (Source: Sibylline)

 

15 Sep 25. UK fighter jets to join NATO operation to bolster European security. The UK will contribute Typhoons to NATO’s Eastern Sentry mission, after Russian drones violated Polish airspace. British fighter jets will fly air defence missions over Poland to counter aerial threats from Russia, including drones, as part of NATO’s Eastern Sentry mission. Royal Air Force Typhoons will join allied forces, including from Denmark, France, and Germany, to bolster NATO’s defence and deterrence along its eastern flank.  This comes days after a reckless and dangerous incursion by Russian drones into Poland’s sovereign airspace – the most significant violation of NATO airspace by President Putin to date – and a further breach of Romanian airspace by a Russian drone over the weekend. The Typhoons will operate out of RAF Coningsby in Lincolnshire and are expected to start flying missions over Poland in the coming days. They will be supported by RAF Voyager air-to-air refuelling aircraft from RAF Brize Norton. The commitment follows a meeting of the North Atlantic Council on Wednesday 10 September where the UK and allies discussed the situation following Poland’s request for consultations under Article 4 of the Washington Treaty. Allies expressed full solidarity with Poland. This new era of threat – exemplified by Russia’s intensifying airspace violations – requires a new era for Defence, and this Government is delivering the largest sustained increase in defence spending since the end of the Cold War, to 2.6% of GDP by April 2027. The UK’s national security – the foundation of the Government’s Plan for Change – starts with an unwavering commitment to NATO and Euro-Atlantic security. (Source: https://www.gov.uk/)

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Founded in 1987, Exensor Technology is a world leading supplier of Networked Unattended Ground Sensor (UGS) Systems providing tailored sensor solutions to customers all over the world. From our Headquarters in Lund Sweden, our centre of expertise in Network Communications at Communications Research Lab in Kalmar Sweden and our Production site outside of Basingstoke UK, we design, develop and produce latest state of the art rugged UGS solutions at the highest quality to meet the most stringent demands of our customers. Our systems are in operation and used in a wide number of Military as well as Homeland Security applications worldwide. The modular nature of the system ensures any external sensor can be integrated, providing the user with a fully meshed “silent” network capable of self-healing. Exensor Technology will continue to lead the field in UGS technology, provide our customers with excellent customer service and a bespoke package able to meet every need.

A CNIM Group Company

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Sponsored by Exensor

www.exensor.com

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11 Sep 25. Russia-EU: Possible new punitive measures are unlikely to force Moscow to end war. Bloomberg reported on 8 September that the EU is considering imposing new sanctions on several Russian banks and energy companies to push Russia to end its war in Ukraine. The measures would be part of the 19th sanctions package issued by the bloc since the beginning of the full-scale invasion in 2022. According to unspecified insiders familiar with the matter, the EU will possibly target Russia’s payment and credit card systems, crypto exchanges and place further restrictions on Russian oil trade. Separately, the bloc is considering using its ‘anti-circumvention tool’ for the first time against Kazakhstan. In this case, the Central Asian state would face restrictions on importing specific machinery that EU data indicates is still being sent to Russia in large quantities. Any such measures would aim to undermine Russia’s ability to generate revenue and source equipment to sustain the war. However, we assess that the continued imposition of Western sanctions alone is unlikely to push Russia to cease fighting in the coming months.
(Source: Sibylline)

10 Sep 25. Nepal: Army presence will likely gradually mitigate security, operational disruption risks. Earlier on 10 September, the Nepali army stated that a nationwide curfew would remain in force until at least 0600hrs on 11 September, restricting non-essential movement. The army announced its intention to take control of security late on 9 September following the deadly unrest that led to the resignation of former prime minister, KP Sharma Oli (see Sibylline Situation Update Brief – 9 September 2025). There were reports of incidents of lootings and robberies amid the unrest, along with inmates escaping from multiple prisons. Army efforts to arrest individuals involved in such activity are ongoing. The deployment of troops has coincided with a notable reduction in protests in the capital Kathmandu on 10 September so far. While rescue operations continue, ongoing fires started on 9 September will continue to pose safety risks for bystanders. Also on 10 September, the Civil Aviation Authority of Nepal reportedly permitted Tribhuvan International Airport (KTM) to resume operations, allowing international travellers to leave the country; flight delays and disruption remain likely. The army’s presence and proposed talks between protesters and the authorities will ease unrest risks in the coming hours and days; however, there remains a latent risk of sporadic protests, heightened criminal activity and extended prohibitory orders, sustaining security risks and operational disruption. (Source: Sibylline)

09 Sep 25. Russia: Soaring defence expenditures amid declining oil revenues will continue to broaden deficit. On 9 September, Russian Finance Minister Anton Siluanov announced that the government will increase borrowing in 2025 compared to earlier forecasts. He acknowledged that, despite Russia’s relatively low debt, multiple factors are driving the deficit upwards, most likely the soaring defence expenditures linked to Moscow’s war in Ukraine. In early August, official data showed that Russia’s seven-month budget deficit had already exceeded the full-year target by 25%. Siluanov also noted that the 2026 budget has lowered the predicted price for Urals crude to USD 59 per barrel (pb), down from USD 66 the previous year. In the first eight months of 2025, oil and gas income fell by around 20%. Declining oil revenues will further undermine Russia’s fiscal stability, as hydrocarbon exports account for 30-50% of federal revenue. Russia’s federal budget is projected to run a cumulative deficit of USD 133 bn between 2025 and 2027. We assess that the ongoing Russo-Ukrainian war will continue to strain Russia’s public finances, steadily heightening socio-economic health risks. (Source: Sibylline)

09 Sep 25. Mali: Airstrikes underscore increasing force posture, threats to locally engaged staff. On 8 September, the Malian armed forces (FAMa) conducted airstrikes in Diema and Nioro du Sahel (both Kayes region) against targets associated with the al-Qaeda-affiliated Jama’at Nasr al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM). The strikes come after JNIM announced a blockade on fuel imports entering Mali on 3 September; JNIM also announced on 4 September that it would indefinitely restrict civilian movement into and out of Kayes city and Nioro du Sahel. The blockades underscore deteriorating security conditions in western Mali as JNIM continues to expand and consolidate its presence in the mineral-rich Kayes. In the coming weeks, JNIM will highly likely continue to conduct ambush and arson attacks targeting vehicles transiting along the region’s major thoroughfares, increasing threats to staff during overland movement and undermining supply chain continuity for key commodities, particularly fuel. FAMa will almost certainly continue conducting airstrikes targeting locations directly and tangentially linked to JNIM activity, increasing the risk of exposure for locally engaged staff. However, we assess that such strikes are unlikely to degrade JNIM’s capacity meaningfully in the short term. (Source: Sibylline)

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Founded in 1987, Exensor Technology is a world leading supplier of Networked Unattended Ground Sensor (UGS) Systems providing tailored sensor solutions to customers all over the world. From our Headquarters in Lund Sweden, our centre of expertise in Network Communications at Communications Research Lab in Kalmar Sweden and our Production site outside of Basingstoke UK, we design, develop and produce latest state of the art rugged UGS solutions at the highest quality to meet the most stringent demands of our customers. Our systems are in operation and used in a wide number of Military as well as Homeland Security applications worldwide. The modular nature of the system ensures any external sensor can be integrated, providing the user with a fully meshed “silent” network capable of self-healing. Exensor Technology will continue to lead the field in UGS technology, provide our customers with excellent customer service and a bespoke package able to meet every need. A CNIM Group Company
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BUSINESS NEWS

Sponsored by SPX Communication Technologies (TCI & ECS)

www.tcibr.com

www.enterprisecontrol.co.uk

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12 Sep 25. Motorola Solutions welcomes CRFS Limited and CRFS, Inc. Motorola Solutions (NYSE: MSI) is pleased to welcome CRFS Limited and CRFS, Inc. (together, CRFS), a global leader in radio frequency (RF) intelligence technology, as part of its acquisition of Silvus Technologies. CRFS’ innovative solutions empower defense agencies and intelligence communities to detect and geolocate RF signals in congested and contested environments; technology that strongly complements Motorola Solutions’ global leadership in mission-critical communications.
The acquisition comes at a time when demand for RF intelligence is accelerating across global defense operations, where superiority in the electromagnetic spectrum and the ability to rapidly geolocate signals of interest are decisive factors for mission success. CRFS’ advanced RF technology is engineered for the toughest environments and provides vital intelligence that is processed at the edge to enable rapid situational awareness and accelerate decision making.
“Motorola Solutions understands the imperative for the front line to have accurate intelligence that informs decisions at the speed of the mission,” said Jack Molloy, executive vice president and COO, Motorola Solutions. “CRFS’ advanced electromagnetic sensing and software-defined capabilities are a powerful complement to our own, and together, we plan to build even more powerful solutions that can deliver actionable RF intelligence to military and national security customers worldwide.”
“CRFS was founded to develop the best possible deployable systems for RF detection and geolocation, and we believe if it emits or transmits, we can find it,” said Nick Balon of CRFS. “We are excited to join Motorola Solutions. We share the same dedication to designing extraordinary communications technologies that can empower defense agencies and help protect national security. It’s a powerful mission that drives and inspires us all, and I look forward to our future together.”

12 Sep 25. Italian rocket maker Avio approves 400-m-euro capital raise to boost production. Italian rocket maker Avio (AVI.MI), approved a 400-m-euro ($468.96 m) capital increase plan on Thursday to finance expanded manufacturing capacity at a time of robust opportunities in the global space and defence industries.
In its new 10-year business plan, the group is targeting a 10% average annual growth of revenue and a 15% rise in core profit.
Make sense of the latest ESG trends affecting companies and governments with the Reuters Sustainable Switch newsletter. Sign up here.
“The acceleration of growth opportunities in the space and defense markets in Europe and the United States will require the strengthening of the Company’s production capacity, both in Italy and in the United States, together with greater vertical integration,” Avio said in a statement. (Source: Reuters)

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SPX CommTech, part of SPX Technologies Inc, innovates specialised technologies within the Radio Frequency (RF) spectrum to ensure a smarter, more secure future for all. Formed by TCI and ECS, SPX CommTech’s Battlespace portfolio enables defence and security teams to detect, defeat and exploit RF signals to enhance communications intelligence (COMINT) and counter unmanned aerial systems (Counter-UAS). Additionally, its Tactical Data Link portfolio allows intelligence gathering agencies, special forces, emergency response, and security teams to securely and reliably transfer video and data between enabled-aircraft and ground teams over long distances for airborne Intelligence, Surveillance, Reconnaissance (ISR). For more information visit www.tcibr.com and www.enterprisecontrol.co.uk
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Sponsored by Exensor

 

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Military And Security Developments

Sep. 12.

KEY DEVELOPMENTS

IRAN

• Despite Iran’s engagement with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), the E3 are unlikely to delay their re-implementation of UN sanctions (unless Iran agrees to negotiate with the US in the coming days).
• Iran will likely continue to increase defence spending in the coming month, undermining broader efforts to improve economic resilience and elevating the risk of protests.

ISRAEL

• The recent Israeli airstrike in Qatar has undercut the prospects for a ceasefire, driving the risk of armed conflict.
• The strike in Qatar has increased the risk of attacks by Hamas and Hamas affiliates against Israeli targets in the coming weeks.

PALESTINIAN TERRITORIES

• Despite the ramping up of evacuation operations in Gaza City, the risk of further civilian casualties will increase scrutiny of Israel and Israeli-linked firms in the coming months.
• Israeli military operations and security deployments in the West Bank have increased following a shooting in Jerusalem (and in preparation for the recognition of a Palestinian state).

IRAN

• Despite Iran’s engagement with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), the E3 are unlikely to delay their re-implementation of UN sanctions (unless Iran agrees to negotiate with the US in the coming days). On 9 September, Iran reached an agreement with the IAEA on nominally resuming inspections of Iranian nuclear facilities. The agreement comes amid increasing tensions between Iran and the E3 (France, Germany and the UK) after the latter initiated the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA)’s snapback process (see Sibylline Special Report – 28 August 2025). Although the agreement underscores partial Iranian engagement with the E3’s conditions for extending the snapback process, it has not been finalised. Furthermore, a key condition – the restoration of nuclear negotiations with the US – has not been met. In addition, Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Argachi has stated that all instances of co-operation will require approval from Iran’s Supreme National Security Council (SNSC) and that the agreement will be void if ‘hostile action’ is perpetrated against Iran, including the re-imposition of UN sanctions. The agreement underscores Iran’s efforts to leverage strategic ambiguity regarding its nuclear programme so as to delay the re-imposition of sanctions. The agreement is insufficient alone to delay the snapback process, though there is a low-level possibility that Iran will seek to engage with the US on nuclear negotiations in the coming days. This would increase the likelihood of the E3 extending the snapback clause deadline (currently 18 October) instead of re-imposing sanctions.
• Iran will likely continue to increase defence spending in the coming month, undermining broader efforts to improve economic resilience and elevating the risk of protests. Late on 7 September, Iran’s Parliamentary National Security and Foreign Policy Committee approved a six-point bill increasing funding for the security forces and guaranteeing the delivery of annual budget allocations. The bill also earmarks over USD 2.3 bn for ‘foreign purchases of major defence items’ and increases funding for the Artesh (Iranian army) to improve its air defence systems. The bill’s approval underscores continuous Iranian efforts to re-constitute its security forces’ capacity through purchases of likely Chinese and/or Russian air defence systems and missile production components following the Iran-Israel war. However, the purchases will likely exacerbate socio-economic health concerns within Iran by limiting available capital for investment in infrastructure and economic diversification. Reflecting broader socio-economic concerns, on 7 September, Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei called for the government to engage in greater market regulation so as to ‘discipline the market’ by building up reserves of key commodities to protect civilians from price hikes and economic precarity. However, these measures are highly unlikely to address the institutional factors that undermine Iran’s economic resilience and productivity, including broad international sanctions, a lack of economic transparency and entrenched corruption and patronage networks. Pressure on the economic conditions within Iran will likely continue to mount in the coming months, particularly if the E3 proceed with measures to re-implement UN sanctions (see above). Further currency devaluations, price hikes and goods shortages will increase the risk of anti-government protests over this period, in turn elevating the risk of security force crackdowns targeting activists, foreign nationals and individuals associated with demonstrations.

ISRAEL 

• The recent Israeli airstrike in Qatar has undercut the prospects for a ceasefire, driving the risk of armed conflict. On 9 September, an Israeli airstrike hit Hamas’ headquarters in the Katara district of Doha (Qatar) during a meeting of the group’s political leadership. Hamas confirmed that the strike killed five members but denied that any of these individuals were leadership figures (the group notably claimed that leadership figures were in attendance at the meeting). Comments by Israeli officials also indicate that the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) possibly failed to assassinate the targeted Hamas leadership figures. As such, further Israeli airstrikes or assassination attempts in Doha remain a low-level possibility in the coming weeks. While Qatari officials have already confirmed the indefinite suspension of mediated ceasefire negotiations, we assess that the move against Hamas’ leadership renders a resumption in ceasefire negotiations a remote chance in the coming weeks; this will severely undercut the prospects for a ceasefire in the coming month. As such, Israeli efforts to capture Gaza City (Palestinian Territories) will likely escalate in the coming weeks (see below).
• The strike in Qatar has increased the risk of attacks by Hamas and Hamas affiliates against Israeli targets in the coming weeks. In Gaza, Hamas’ rocket launching capabilities have been severely curtailed; such ordnance is unlikely to travel further than the borders of the strip (which presents limited security risks). However, it is possible that Hamas will increase its efforts to kidnap Israeli soldiers operating in Gaza. Any such attempt, if successful, would likely increase domestic opposition to the war in Israel, while also possibly prompting a significant intensification of Israeli military operations in Gaza (particularly clearing operations designed to occupy terrain that could be used for surprise attacks). In the West Bank (Palestinian Territories), Hamas is likely to increase its mobilisation and radicalisation campaigns, driving the risk of attacks (primarily those involving small-arms and/or bladed weapons) against Israeli targets throughout the West Bank and Israel, particularly Jerusalem (Jerusalem district). Threats by Hamas and Hamas affiliates against Israeli nationals, officials and assets will also increase globally over the coming weeks. The risk of attacks will be particularly elevated around areas with large Jewish communities and around symbolic Jewish facilities. Reports also indicate that Israeli security officials are increasingly concerned about the rising likelihood of attempted attacks and/or sabotage targeting Israeli aviation assets outside Israel; they are taking steps to bolster security, accordingly. The Iranian-backed Houthis are also likely to increase the frequency and scale of their strikes on Israel. This underscores the elevated security and operational disruption risks across the country, though we assess these will be moderated by the sustained capacity of Israeli air defences to intercept most ordnance. Further Houthi attacks in the Red Sea against Israeli-affiliated vessels are also likely, driving risks for non-affiliated vessels due to misidentification.

PALESTINIAN TERRITORIES 

• Despite the ramping up of evacuation operations in Gaza City, the risk of further civilian casualties will increase scrutiny of Israel and Israeli-linked firms in the coming months. On 11 September, the IDF released an assessment in which it stated that approximately 200,000 civilians have been evacuated from Gaza City ahead of the planned ground operations to take control of the city; international aid agencies estimate that approximately 1 m civilians reside in the city, many of whom have been repeatedly displaced during the Israel-Hamas war. The IDF also announced it had established a public phone line for civilians to report instances of Hamas militants preventing evacuations from the city. Despite these measures, the rapid and total evacuation of Gaza City remains unlikely in the short term, increasing the likelihood of civilian casualties amid intensifying preparations for the impeding ground offensive. Mass-casualty incidents will likely attract further scrutiny of Israel from international partners, particularly EU member states and the UK, increasing the risk of sanctions targeting members of the coalition government, as well as suspended arms export licenses and reduced co-operation under bi/multi-lateral frameworks. Private-sector entities will likely face increasing scrutiny from pro-Palestine activists and consumers due to their potential links to Israeli entities, particularly technology firms, weapons contractors and agricultural collectives sourcing goods from Israeli settlements in the West Bank (see below).
• Israeli military operations and security deployments in the West Bank have increased following a shooting in Jerusalem (and in preparation for the recognition of a Palestinian state). Over the past week, the IDF has intensified its military operations throughout the West Bank following a shooting attack in Jerusalem (Jerusalem district) on 8 September (see Sibylline Middle East Crisis Update – 8 September). This was matched by an augmentation of the IDF’s on-the-ground presence and operational preparedness in the West Bank due to an assessment concluding that the scheduled recognition of a Palestinian state by several countries during the UN General Assembly (UNGA) on 9-23 September will increase the risk of unrest and attacks. These conditions are likely to compound the already growing risk of attacks ahead of the Jewish holidays, such as Rosh Hashanah (22-24 September). The risk of attacks will be most pronounced around Israeli settlements, major transit nodes, Jewish religious sites and Jerusalem’s Old City.

REGIONAL AND GLOBAL DEVELOPMENTS

Developments

• Europe-Israel: The Dutch government’s plan to ban imports from Israeli settlements will drive further compliance risks for local retailers, supermarkets and shipping companies in the coming weeks. On 10 September, European Commission (EC) President Ursula von der Leyen stated that the organisation will propose sanctioning extremist Israeli ministers and violent settlers as well as suspending trade ties with Israel. Although the mentioned proposals are unlikely to pass in the coming weeks due to the need for unanimous support among EU members, Von der Leyen’s statement underscores the growing tensions between the EU and Israel. Tensions were also evident in the Dutch government’s plan (announced earlier on 11 September) to ban imports of goods produced in Israeli settlements in the West Bank in response to Israel’s reported plans to annex these areas and advance its military offensive in Gaza. These decisions will drive further compliance risks for Dutch companies and local retailers importing goods from Israel, particularly fresh produce. This will entail knock-on impacts for shipping and logistics firms operating between the two countries in the coming weeks. Furthermore, we assess that additional European states will likely review and amend their trading relationships with Israel, widening the scope of these compliance risks for more companies and retailers across the continent. However, we assess that substantial and prolonged operational disruption risks for European retailers and supermarkets will not materialise, as several entities in the sector have already shifted to alternative fresh produce markets (such as Egypt and Morocco).
• Israel-Tunisia: Two consecutive attacks against Gaza-bound vessels have elevated security and bystander risks in the vicinity of Sidi Bou Said port (Tunis governorate, Tunisia); further attacks are likely in the coming days. On 10 September, the Global Sumud Flotilla (GSF) claimed that a drone attacked one of its Gaza-bound vessels; the asset is currently docked at the port of Sidi Bou Said. This comes one day after a similar attack on the flotilla’s lead vessel. Both attacks resulted in minor fires on the vessels’ decks; neither attack led to any deaths or injuries. Notably, the Tunisian authorities disputed that a drone was involved in the first attack and stated that an initial inspection indicated that the explosion originated in or on the vessel. However, the authorities are yet to comment on the second claimed attack. Meanwhile, security camera footage released by the GSF showed that an ordnance struck the vessels from above in both attacks. We assess there is a realistic possibility the ordnance was an incendiary or smoke grenade carried by a drone or a flare shot from a distance. Despite the uncertainty concerning the exact mode or motive of the attack, we assess that heightened security and bystander risks in and around Sidi Bou Said port will persist in the coming days, or until the flotilla leaves the facility. Furthermore, large pro-Palestine protests in support of the flotilla are likely to break out in the capital Tunis and other major Tunisian cities, elevating the risk of mobility disruption therein over the coming days.

Key points

• Over September, there is a realistic possibility that militias affiliated with the Government of National Unity (GNU) in the capital Tripoli will launch a major offensive against the rival Special Deterrence Forces (RADA), triggering a large-scale armed conflict.
• In such a scenario, both parties will almost certainly seek to control the Central Bank of Libya (CBL) and state-owned companies in the capital, triggering wide operational disruptions across all business sectors, basic amenities and government services.
• Given that Libya’s major oil fields are controlled by the Libyan National Army (LNA) and not the GNU, impacts on the energy sector will likely be limited to the country’s north-western region.
• However, a protracted armed conflict in Tripoli will raise the possibility of our most dangerous scenario, the GNU’s collapse and subsequent attempts by the LNA to take over the capital, which would expand the scope of the conflict.

Context

As of 12 September, large deployments of GNU-affiliated militias, mainly from Misrata (Misrata district), remain encamped across Tripoli in support of government forces, amid persistent tensions with the RADA militia. Both parties’ military presence in the city has substantially increased since 30 August, when the GNU ordered the RADA militia to hand over fugitives (including members of RADA and allied groups) wanted by the attorney general. Tensions in the capital have been rising since the assassination of the leader of the now-dissolved Stability Support Apparatus (SSA) militia (an ally to RADA), which resulted in major clashes between pro and anti-GNU armed factions in May. Despite a ceasefire, which resolved these clashes, RADA and other anti-GNU groups have continued to act as de facto autonomous organisations in Tripoli, exerting control over western areas of the city.

As such, the mobilisation of both sides’ forces over recent days has exacerbated already-heightened tensions, resulting in numerous sporadic bouts of violence across the capital and aggravating the fragile security environment. Notably, on 3 September, the government-aligned 444 Brigade militia said that a vehicle-borne IED (VBIED) targeted its headquarters in the town of Bani Walid, located 105 miles (170km) south-east of Tripoli, signalling a possible extension of the conflict beyond the capital if wider clashes erupt.

Sep 11.

• Iran: Agreement with UN watchdog is unlikely to stop process to re-impose international sanctions. On 9 September, Iran reached an agreement with the UN’s International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to resume inspections in Iran. The government had banned IAEA inspectors from visiting its nuclear facilities since the Iran-Israel war in June. The agreement comes amid increasing tensions between Iran and the international community over its nuclear programme. In August, the E3 countries (France, Germany and the UK) warned Iran that they will move to re-impose UN sanctions unless Iran resumes nuclear negotiations with the US, complies with its obligations to the IAEA and initiates steps to address international concerns over its highly enriched uranium stockpile. Following limited engagement from Iran, on 28 August, the E3 initiated the snapback process. The new agreement partially improves prospects for further nuclear negotiations, but it is insufficient alone to stop the snapback process. However, there is a low-level possibility that Iran will seek to engage with the US on nuclear negotiations in the coming days. This would increase the likelihood that the E3 will extend the snapback clause deadline (currently 18 October) instead of re-imposing sanctions.
• Israel-Qatar: Strike will likely undermine prospects of ceasefire deal in coming weeks. On 9 September, an Israeli airstrike targeting high-ranking members of Hamas’ political bureau, including its leader Khalil al-Hayya, Khaled Mashal, Muhammad Darwish, Nizar Awadallah and Zaher Jabarin, hit Hamas’ headquarters in the Qatari capital Doha. The status of these individuals remains unclear at the time of writing; Hamas has claimed that Israel failed to assassinate its political leaders, but has admitted the death of five members, including al-Hayya’s son. Additionally, Qatar announced that the strike killed an internal security officer at the scene. We assess that the strike will likely undermine prospects for a resumption in ceasefire negotiations in the coming weeks. As such, Israel will likely proceed with its plan to occupy Gaza City, further elevating regional tensions, as humanitarian conditions in the enclave will likely deteriorate. Meanwhile, we assess that Hamas will likely attempt to escalate attacks in the West Bank and inside Israeli cities in the coming weeks, sustaining heightened security risks.

Sep 09.

• Israel-Syria: Fresh airstrikes will sustain bystander risks in vicinity of military sites across Syria. On 8 September, Syrian state media reported that Israel struck several locations in the vicinity of Homs (Homs governorate), Latakia (Latakia governorate) and Palmyra (Homs, all Syria). The Syrian government condemned the airstrikes and described them as a ‘blatant infringement’ of its sovereignty and regional stability. Israel has not confirmed responsibility for the strikes. However, given its modus operandi in Syria over the past nine months, we assess that Israel likely targeted former military bases and weapons depots. As such, further strikes targeting military locations across Syria (including airports and camps situated inside urban centres) in the coming weeks remain likely, sustaining proximate bystander risks. Even so, we assess that such strikes are unlikely to prompt Syrian retaliation against Israeli troops stationed in Daraa and Quneitra governorates (both Syria) or hinder the ongoing security talks. However, retaliation by rogue Islamist factions that drives clashes with Israeli troops in southern Syria remains a realistic possibility in the coming weeks.

EVENT

The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) conducted an airstrike targeting Hamas’ headquarters in the Katara district of Doha (Qatar). Preliminary reporting indicates that the strike targeted numerous high-ranking members of Hamas’ political bureau, including Khaled Mashal, Khalil al-Hayya, Muhammad Darwish, Nizar Awadallah and Zaher Jabarina. The status of these individuals remains unclear at the time of writing.

SIGNIFICANCE

• Ceasefire negotiations between Israel and Hamas have stalled in recent weeks as the IDF prepares to expand its ground operations into Gaza City (Gaza Strip, Palestinian Territories). On 7 September, US President Donald Trump issued a ‘last warning’ to Hamas to accept a US-backed ceasefire proposal and release all remaining Israeli hostages in Gaza (see Sibylline Middle East Crisis Update – 8 September 2025).
• Following the airstrike, Qatar announced the indefinite suspension of mediated ceasefire negotiations.
• The US embassy in Doha has issued shelter-in-place orders for its facilities; it has also advised all US citizens to shelter-in-place until further notice. However, Qatari airspace remains open at the time of writing.

FORECAST

Mobility disruption across Doha is likely in the coming hours, though flights are unlikely to be impacted; there remains an unlikely but low-level possibility of further airstrikes in Doha in the coming weeks. In the coming hours, mobility disruption in Doha is likely, particularly in the areas around Katara. Road closures and an augmented security presence are also likely to impact travel along highways connecting downtown areas to Hamad International Airport (DOH). However, the strike is unlikely to disrupt operations at DOH significantly in the next 24 hours; Qatar’s airspace will also likely remain open. While further imminent Israeli airstrikes against Hamas and/or Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) members in Doha are unlikely in our assessment, such action remains a low-level possibility in the coming weeks, sustaining heightened security risks across Doha.

The airstrike and subsequent suspension of ceasefire negotiations come ahead of an almost certain intensification of Israeli military operations in Gaza (and associated international backlash). The Israeli airstrike, if successful, will likely have severely undercut the prospects for a resumption in ceasefire negotiations in the coming weeks, due to both a reduced willingness from Hamas to engage in talks and the group’s weakened capabilities (senior personnel are likely to go into hiding). In the absence of negotiations, Israel is highly likely to proceed with its plans to take over Gaza City. We assess that IDF military operations will intensify further in the coming days, including in areas from which civilians have not been evacuated. This is likely to compound international backlash against Israel in the coming days, elevating reputational risks for companies working with the Israeli government, as well as divestment risks and restrictions imposed on the movement of defence goods to Israel. This will possibly further undercut joint initiatives between Israel and various European states.

The risk of retaliatory attacks by Hamas and its supporters against Israeli targets will increase in the coming days. Following the strike, there is now an elevated risk of the Yemen-based Houthis increasing the frequency of their strikes against Israel and Israeli-affiliated vessels in the Red Sea in the coming days. Furthermore, the risk of attacks targeting Israeli nationals across the region will also be heightened, including efforts to lure specific targets to vulnerable locations (known as ‘honey traps’). A slight uptick in rocket launches from Gaza targeting Israel is also a realistic possibility. However, Hamas’ capabilities remain very limited; such attacks are therefore likely to be sporadic, mitigating against central and northern Israel’s exposure to launches. More concerning will be any attempts by Hamas to escalate attacks from the West Bank; any such attempts would drive the risk of small-arms and stabbing attacks across Israel in the coming weeks, particularly in and around Jerusalem (Jerusalem district).

 IRAN

• Despite its continued engagement with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), Iran’s unwillingness to commit to negotiations with the US will sustain the risk of sanctions being re-imposed.
• Media outlets affiliated with the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) continue to call for increased economic self-sufficiency and reforms to the governance of the security forces; however, broad reforms remain unlikely.

ISRAEL

• A successful Houthi attack against Ramon Airport (ETM, Southern district) has underscored the elevated security risks facing southern Israel.

PALESTINIAN TERRITORIES

• Airstrikes targeting high-rise buildings in Gaza City highlight that Israel has launched its occupation plan for Gaza, as well as the elevated risks facing personnel and residents of the city.
• Despite increasing pressure from the US, ceasefire negotiations between Israel and Hamas have not demonstrably progressed, underscoring sustained armed conflict risks in Gaza.
• A recent shooting will likely prompt an intensification of military operations in the West Bank over the coming days, as well as elevated ethno-religious tensions and an increased risk of attacks.

IRAN 

• Despite its continued engagement with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), Iran’s unwillingness to commit to negotiations with the US will sustain the risk of sanctions being re-imposed. On 5 September, Iranian representatives met with the IAEA in Austria to discuss the possibility of resuming co-operation (see Sibylline Middle East Crisis Update – 7 July 2025). The meeting almost certainly forms part of Iran’s efforts to demonstrate its willingness to engage with international monitors and avoid the re-imposition of UN sanctions following the E3’s (France, Germany and the UK) triggering of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA)’s snapback clause (see Sibylline Middle East Crisis Update – 1 September 2025). However, the meeting is highly unlikely to result in the immediate resumption of co-operation or the continuous and universal monitoring of Iranian nuclear facilities by international observers. As such, the E3 are unlikely to support a temporary extension of the snapback clause, unless Iran agrees to the immediate resumption of nuclear negotiations with the US. In the long term, continued restrictions to IAEA monitoring practices will also sustain significant concern regarding oversight of Iran’s nuclear programme, as well as the risk of resumed Israeli strike action targeting Iran’s research and enrichment facilities (see Sibylline Special Report – 28 August 2025).
• Media outlets affiliated with the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) continue to call for increased economic self-sufficiency and reforms to the governance of the security forces; however, broad reforms remain unlikely. On 3 September, the IRGC-aligned Tasnim news outlet published an op-ed calling for a substantial re-orientation of Iran’s political, economic and security structures to address a state of ‘no war and no peace’ with ‘the enemy’, a reference to Israel and the US. The op-ed primarily calls for greater flexibility to confront hybrid security threats; it criticises the highly centralised structure of Iran’s security forces. Its demands also include nuclear energy development, increased media censorship (including of online platforms), economic diversification away from crude oil and increased governmental scrutiny of exports. Subsequently, on 7 September, Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei stated that ‘the enemy’ aims to establish conditions of ‘no war, no peace’ with reference to the US-brokered Iran-Israel ceasefire. The rhetorical alignment of these statements underscores Khamenei’s likely support of such measures as part of his and the IRGC’s broader efforts to project an image of engaging in institutional reforms following the Iran-Israel war. However, these efforts likely primarily seek to moderate and deter domestic criticism of the government and security forces rather than to initiate broader reform efforts. As such, wide-ranging shifts across the operational environment within Iran remain unlikely. However, the Iranian authorities will almost certainly continue with their efforts to re-develop the country’s nuclear capabilities in the coming months, while also continuing to monitor, censor and limit media coverage of domestic and international developments intensely. Amid mounting economic pressure, there is also a realistic possibility that the government will further augment export controls and scrutiny of exported products in general, increasing operational disruption, corruption exposure and compliance risks for locally engaged firms.

ISRAEL 

• A successful Houthi attack against Ramon Airport (ETM, Southern district) has underscored the elevated security risks facing southern Israel. On 7 September, an Iranian-backed Houthi drone directly struck ETM in southern Israel, damaging the arrivals terminal and lightly injuring five individuals; no sirens were triggered. The airport resumed operations two hours after the attack. According to investigations, the drone was part of a swarm of at least four drones, three of which were intercepted by the Israel Defense Forces (IDF); the fourth was mistakenly classified as non-hostile. This is likely due to the proximity of the airport to the Jordanian border and highlights the risk of the Houthis exploiting neighbouring territories to mask their attacks. Given the success of this attack, the Houthis are likely to continue targeting the area, elevating operational disruption risks in southern Israel. Furthermore, Israel is likely to increase its sensitivity vis-à-vis flying ordnance, increasing the risk of Israeli interception operations taking place in the airspace of neighbouring countries. This will increase the risk of debris and shrapnel falling within these neighbouring states’ territories, particularly Jordan, slightly elevating the security risks facing personnel and assets in the vicinity of Israeli interceptions. Despite the successful attack and the likely increase in the Houthis’ targeting of Israeli airports in the coming days, Israel’s air defence capabilities will continue to moderate these risks (broadly). It is likely that Ben Gurion International Airport (TLV) is better protected than ETM due to its location in central Israel and proximity to numerous population centres. We assess that the successful strike on ETM does not indicate that such strikes are equally likely to hit TLV. Even so, there is a realistic possibility that airlines flying to and from Israel will cancel or reduce their operations from ETM and TLV in the coming weeks, elevating the risk of travel disruption.

PALESTINIAN TERRITORIES

• Airstrikes targeting high-rise buildings in Gaza City highlight that Israel has launched its occupation plan for Gaza, as well as the elevated risks facing personnel and residents of the city. These airstrikes are likely designed to prepare the area for ground operations, which are likely to escalate gradually in the coming two weeks; the IDF will possibly reach full mobilisation levels for the operation within four weeks. The IDF will also possibly attempt to divide the city via military cordons in order to tackle areas therein systematically, limiting the movement of individuals between these areas. However, such a plan will significantly increase the threats to civilians and personnel inhabiting these areas. As such, there is a realistic possibility that the IDF will facilitate limited evacuation corridors in the coming days. However, during the intensification of Israel’s operations, there will also be an elevated risk of IDF strikes against humanitarian-designated areas due to suspected infiltration by militants during evacuations (see Sibylline Middle East Crisis Update – 7 August 2025).
• Despite increasing pressure from the US, ceasefire negotiations between Israel and Hamas have not demonstrably progressed, underscoring sustained armed conflict risks in Gaza. On 7 September, US President Donald Trump issued a statement calling on Hamas to release all remaining hostages in Gaza, characterising the demand as his ‘last warning’. Trump also stated that Israel had accepted a US-backed ceasefire proposal, likely in reference to a renewed US proposal that would establish a permanent ceasefire in Gaza in exchange for the immediate release of all remaining hostages and Hamas’ eventual disarmament and possible exile from Gaza. Hamas has repeatedly rejected these proposals and subsequently re-iterated its support for the so-called Witkoff proposal, which would establish a temporary ceasefire in Gaza in exchange for the release of several living and deceased hostages. The contrasting statements underscore the persistent deadlock in ceasefire negotiations as Israel continues to intensify its operations in Gaza City (see above). Consequently, the immediate implementation of a ceasefire remains unlikely. However, diplomatic engagement will likely continue in the coming weeks, with the US likely intensifying diplomatic pressure on Hamas through mediators to secure further concessions towards Israel’s negotiating positions.
• A recent shooting will likely prompt an intensification of military operations in the West Bank over the coming days, as well as elevated ethno-religious tensions and an increased risk of attacks. Earlier on 8 September, two Palestinian gunmen killed at least six people and injured over 20 others in a small arms attack against a bus station and two stationary buses at the Ramot Junction in Jerusalem (Jerusalem district). An armed civilian and a soldier shot and killed the assailants at the scene. No group has claimed responsibility for the incident. According to the initial investigation, the two assailants entered Israel through a gap in the West Bank’s barrier fence. Following the attack, the Israeli security forces closed all the crossings between Israel and the West Bank in the Jerusalem area. Furthermore, the IDF established military cordons around the villages of al-Qubeiba and Qatanna (both Jerusalem governorate, West Bank), where the gunmen were residents. The IDF has also begun to search for suspected collaborators. At the time of writing, the Shin Bet, Israel’s internal security agency, announced that it had detained a suspect in East Jerusalem. The attack highlights the elevated security risks across Israel – particularly in Jerusalem and the West Bank – ahead of the Jewish holidays (22-24 September, 1-2 October and 6-14 October; see Sibylline Middle East Crisis Update – 4 September 2025).

In the coming hours and days, the IDF is likely to intensify its military operations across the West Bank, particularly near Ramallah (Ramallah and al-Bireh governorate). This will likely include an increased proliferation of checkpoints across the territory, driving travel disruption and the risk of arbitrary arrest and detention. Furthermore, the IDF is likely to carry out raids in villages and cities across the West Bank; associated armed clashes with militants are possible, driving crossfire risks for proximate personnel and assets. Such operations are also likely to drive radicalisation among Palestinian residents, increasing the risk of attacks taking place in the following weeks and months.

In response to the incident, Israeli settlers and extremists are highly likely to launch retaliatory attacks on Palestinian villages, particularly those around al-Qubeiba and Qatanna. Such attacks would significantly elevate ethno-religious tensions in the West Bank, driving further cycles of violence between Palestinians and Israelis, including around religious sites, such as the Cave of the Patriarchs in Hebron (Hebron governorate). Additionally, there is a realistic possibility that Israel’s security agencies will restrict Israelis’ ability to enter religious places within the West Bank, elevating the risk of civil disobedience. We assess that attacks on Palestinian villages and restrictions around religious sites would increase the risk of clashes between the Israeli security forces and Israeli extremists, driving security risks around IDF bases.

RED SEA

• Israel-Yemen: Israeli airstrikes against Houthi targets in Yemen are likely to increase in frequency and intensity following the Houthi drone attack on ETM (see above). Targets will likely include dual-use infrastructure such as electric power stations, logistical hubs and ports, as well as (possibly) governmental buildings, institutions and symbolic centres. There is also a realistic possibility that Israel will attempt to increase its interception of weapons being smuggled to the Houthis, including through strikes on suspected vessels. However, any such operations are unlikely to impact the Houthis’ capabilities significantly, sustaining the threat posed by the group in the Red Sea and across Israel in the coming weeks.

REGIONAL AND GLOBAL DEVELOPMENTS

Developments

• Israel-UK: Large-scale arrests of pro-Palestine activists will highly likely prompt further protests, elevating the risk of clashes with the security forces in the coming weeks. On 7 September, the Metropolitan Police arrested 890 protesters at a demonstration in London (UK) against the ban on the Palestine Action (PA) group. The authorities announced that 857 people were arrested under the Terrorism Act for showing support for a proscribed group, while 33 people were arrested for other offences, including 17 for assaults on police officers. The protest organisers claim that the demonstration was peaceful. Nevertheless, we assess that the arrests are highly likely to trigger further reactionary protests by the pro-Palestine group in the coming days, particularly during the expected visit to London by Israeli President Isaac Herzog on 10-11 September. We assess that PA activists are likely to continue operating via proxy groups, as well as by infiltrating legitimate protest movements to radicalise participants, likely increasing the severity of policing around pro-Palestine marches in the UK. Protests by PA and affiliated groups are likely to target the London offices of UK and international corporations that work with the Israeli government and related entities. This will increase the risk of further altercations in central areas of London in the coming weeks. Activists are also likely to target the UK offices and production facilities of the Israeli defence company Elbit Systems.
• Israel-Spain: The closure of Spanish ports and airspace to vessels and aircraft transporting arms to Israel will raise compliance risks for shipping and logistics companies with a presence in both countries. Earlier on 8 September, the Spanish government stated it would ban Israel-bound ships and aircraft carrying weapons from docking at Spanish ports or entering Spanish airspace. The government added that it will also increase aid to the Palestinian Authority and the UN Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA) and impose an embargo on goods made in Israeli settlements in the West Bank. In response, Israel banned Spanish Labour Minister Yolanda Diaz and Youth Minister Sira Rego from entering Israel. Meanwhile, at the time of writing, Spain officially recalled its ambassador from Israel. We assess that the Spanish measures will almost certainly increase compliance risks for shipping, logistics, tourism and airline companies with a presence in both countries, driving operational disruption risks through H2 2025. We also assess these risks are liable to increase significantly if the IDF advances its plans to occupy Gaza City in the coming weeks (which would likely lead to a deterioration of humanitarian conditions in the strip). Notably, the Spanish measures also came a day after a pro-Palestine activist caused a minor crash during Stage 15 of the Vuelta a España cycling race. The incident underscores the sustained physical security risks facing Israeli tourists and athletes in Spain and other European countries with significant pro-Palestine movements during such events (see Sibylline Middle East Crisis Update – 4 September 2025).

Sep 08.

• Israel: Shooting will drive further ethno-religious violence in West Bank. Earlier on 8 September, two gunmen killed at least five people and injured over 20 others in a small arms attack on bus passengers at the Ramot Junction in Jerusalem (Jerusalem district). An armed civilian and a soldier shot and killed the gunmen on the scene. No group has claimed responsibility, but Hamas hailed the attack and called on West Bank Palestinians to escalate the confrontation with the Israelis. Meanwhile, the Israeli security forces are conducting searches for other suspects while also surrounding villages near Ramallah. The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) will almost certainly increase the scope and frequency of its operations around the Ramallah area, elevating risks of retaliatory attacks from radical Palestinian cells. We further assess that the attack will almost certainly prompt radical settlers in the West Bank to conduct retaliatory attacks against Palestinians in the coming days, fuelling the existing cycle of ethno-religious violence. Risks of mutual attacks against religious sites, farms and business assets in the West Bank, as well as further shootings, will increase in the coming days.
• Turkey: Protest risks will increase following court ruling against provincial opposition leader. Late on 7 September, the authorities in Istanbul (Istanbul province) imposed a temporary ban on public gatherings in the city’s Beşiktaş, Beyoğlu, Eyüpsultan, Kağıthane, Sarıyer and Şişli districts. The police also barricaded areas around the opposition Republican People’s Party (CHP) headquarters in Sarıyer. Access to online platforms, including Facebook, Instagram, TikTok, WhatsApp and YouTube, has also been restricted across the country. These measures follow the CHP’s call for demonstrations in protest against a court ruling appointing trustees to the party’s provincial administration in Istanbul. The internet restrictions highlight ongoing threats to freedom of expression in Turkey and underline the increased regulatory and operational risks for technology firms operating in the country. We assess that, despite the restrictions, large gatherings will remain a realistic possibility, particularly near the CHP office in Sarıyer and possibly close to the Istanbul Metropolitan Municipality building in Fatih district. This will elevate risks of sporadic clashes between protesters and the authorities. In the event of clashes, the security forces will likely use water cannons, tear gas and rubber bullets to disperse crowds and employ arbitrary stop-and-search practices, elevating security risks for personnel and assets. (Source: Sibylline)

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Military And Security Developments

Sep 12.

KEY DEVELOPMENTS 

• BAKHMUT: Indications are growing that Russian forces are using ‘mothership’ drones across the frontline, allowing them to deploy first-person view (FPV) drones at ever greater ranges, threatening Ukrainian logistics and civilian centres
• DONETSK: The absence of reported Russian advances in the Pokrovsk sector in recent days likely indicates preparations for a wider offensive push in the coming weeks
• AID: The US House of Representatives passed a USD 892.6 bn defence policy bill, which would authorise USD 400 m for Ukraine aid, confirming that there are still elements of bipartisan support for arming Ukraine
• FORECAST: Overnight on 9-10 September, multiple Russian drones violated Poland’s airspace ahead of joint Russian-Belarusian military drills, likely marking a deliberate (and the most significant to date) test of NATO responses by Russia
• BAKHMUT: A Ukrainian soldier reported on 8 September that Russian forces are now conducting first-person view (FPV) drone attacks against the T-2122 highway running between Barvinkove and Izyum (both Kharkiv oblast), around 25-31 miles (40-50km) from the frontline near Siversk (Donetsk oblast). The soldier indicated that Russian forces are using drone ‘motherships’, which deploy FPV drones further behind the lines; this aligns with wider indications in Zaporizhzhia oblast that we reported on last week. Such innovation will threaten Ukraine’s ground lines of communication (GLOCs) ever farther from the frontline, compounding the already significant pressure on Ukrainian logistics and troop rotation operations. Meanwhile, geolocated footage published on 8 September indicates that Russian forces have advanced marginally north of Hryhorivka, located around three miles (5km) to the north of Chasiv Yar (Donetsk).
• BAKHMUT: Further south, geolocated footage from 9 September indicates that Ukrainian forces have made minor advances north-west of Toretsk, in the northern sectors of Katerynivka, located under six miles (9km) to the south of Kostiantynivka (all Donetsk).
• DONETSK: The absence of reported Russian advances in the Pokrovsk sector in recent days likely indicates preparations for a wider offensive push in the coming weeks. Over the past 24 hours, Russian forces have nevertheless reportedly launched 57 attacks in the area but have failed to make territorial gains. Earlier on 11 September, a Ukrainian media outlet reported that Russia has concentrated around 150,000 troops near Pokrovsk (Donetsk oblast). According to the same report, these include five Russian naval infantry and airborne brigades, a tank regiment, an infantry regiment and two motor rifle brigades that have redeployed (or are in the process of redeploying) from Sumy oblast to the sector around Pokrovsk. If confirmed, these reinforcements would increase the likelihood of a major Russian offensive push in the coming weeks or months. Pokrovsk is a key logistics hub for Ukrainian forces in Donetsk, and its loss would undermine Ukraine’s defensive posture in the region.
• KHARKIV: Nothing significant to report
• KURSK-SUMY: On 8 September, a prominent Ukrainian milblogger with connections to the military claimed that Ukrainian forces have liberated Bezsalivka, a settlement located just south of the international border and over 28 miles (45km) to the north-west of Sumy city (Sumy oblast). While we cannot confirm this, the Russians have likely lost control of the town; however, fighting could well be ongoing, making the settlement a contested space.
• OSKIL-KREMINNA: In the Lyman direction, Zarichne remains highly contested, with intense fighting taking place in and around the settlement. Geolocated footage from 8 September shows recent Ukrainian advances in eastern Zarichne, located to the east of Lyman (Donetsk oblast). Meanwhile, footage from 10 September shows Russian forces operating in northern Zarichne, suggesting they have likely advanced in the area. On 8 September, the Ukrainian General Staff claimed to have captured the settlement. However, according to Ukrainian military intelligence sources operating in the sector, Russian forces have re-entered Zarichne by concealing themselves among the civilian population and dressing in civilian clothes. These tactics form part of Russia’s broader infiltration strategy, which it has increasingly relied upon across the frontline; however, this would amount to perfidy, a war crime under the Geneva Convention, if confirmed.
• SOUTHERN: Nothing significant to report
• STRIKES: Overnight on 9-10 September, Russia launched a large-scale attack involving 415 drones, 42 Kh-101/Kalibr/Kh-59(69) cruise missiles and one Iskandr-M/KN-23 ballistic missile. Some of the drones penetrated Poland’s airspace (see FORECAST). Ukraine intercepted 387 drones and 27 cruise missiles. The attack heavily targeted residential, commercial and energy infrastructure in Chernihiv, Kharkiv, Khmelnytskyi, Vinnytsia, Volyn and Zhytomyr oblasts. Strikes on other days were relatively smaller.

POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS

• AID: On 10 September, the US House of Representatives passed a USD 892.6 bn defence policy bill, which would authorise USD 400 m for Ukraine aid. The new funds would be allocated under the Ukraine Security Assistance Initiative (USAI), a programme which supplies arms to Kyiv through contracts with US defence companies. Although the New York Times (NYT) reported that the Ukraine provision faced Republican opposition, the House rejected a proposal to stop funding Ukraine from Republican Congresswoman Marjorie Taylor Greene. Lawmakers also added a requirement that the Pentagon report to Congress on any plans to cancel or suspend military aid to Ukraine that Congress had already approved.
• AID: The Senate is expected to complete considering its version of the bill in the near term; lawmakers from both chambers will likely have to negotiate to reach a final consensus, meaning that elements of the bill could realistically change. Nevertheless, the House vote underscores that there is still bipartisan support for arming Ukraine in Congress and that certain lawmakers seek more oversight for any possible future cases of aid for Kyiv being halted.
• AID: Air defence will almost certainly remain one of the most vital forms of military aid over the coming months, with Ukraine said to be at risk of shortages due to slower US shipments. The Financial Times (FT) reported on 9 September that a Pentagon review in June had resulted in irregular and smaller shipments of air defence support in recent months. According to unspecified senior Ukrainian and US officials, the Pentagon first paused and then slowed down shipments of PAC-3 interceptors for Patriot air defence systems, dozens of Stinger man-portable air defence systems, as well as over 100 Hellfire missiles and AIM missiles. Ukraine uses AIM missiles with NASAMs air defence systems and F-16 fighter jets. While we cannot confirm the extent of the risk of air defence shortages, weaker air defence capabilities will diminish Ukraine’s ability to intercept Russian long-range strikes, increasing the lethality of strikes against civilian and military infrastructure in the coming months.
• AID: Meanwhile, the EU is considering allocating EUR 6.6 bn (USD 7.7 bn) to buy US weapons for Ukraine. Ukrainian Defence Minister Denys Shmyhal announced this on 10 September, adding that the funds would be directed from the European Peace Facility (EPF). The bloc has used the EPF to reimburse member states for military assistance provided to Ukraine during Russia’s full-scale invasion. However, Hungary (which has one of the most Russia-friendly governments in the EU) has blocked EPF allocations for several months. It remains unclear how the proposed funding allocation would bypass any potential Hungarian attempts to block the use of such funds in the coming months.
• ENERGY: Ukraine’s largest private energy firm, DTEK, has launched the country’s biggest battery storage facility; it will likely aid in bolstering energy security and resilience during the winter months. The company announced the development earlier on 11 September, adding that six battery storage systems have been connected to the power grid in the capital Kyiv and Dnipropetrovsk oblast. Those facilities have the capacity to store enough electricity to power 600,000 Ukrainian households for two hours, amounting to 400 Megawatts per hour (MVh). DTEK said the new systems will increase the security of the electricity supply and reduce the risk of outages.

FORECAST

DRONES: Overnight on 9-10 September, multiple Russian drones violated Poland’s airspace. Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk reported that 19 drones flew over Poland, of which four were shot down by NATO aircraft and air defences, while Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky claimed that as many as 24 drones entered Polish airspace. Other drones reportedly crashed. According to Tusk, the incursion lasted around seven hours, beginning at 2330hrs (local time) on 9 September and ending at 0630hrs on 10 September (see Sibylline Alert – 10 September 2025).

A senior Polish military official reported that some of the drones that entered Polish territory were likely Gerbera decoy drones, which are designed to mimic Shahed-type unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) and overwhelm Ukrainian air defences. Previous drone incursions into Polish airspace occurred during much smaller-scale Russian UAV strikes against neighbouring Ukraine. These incidents were often attributed to guidance malfunctions or navigational errors, which inadvertently led a small number of UAVs into NATO territory. In contrast, the latest incursion took place amid a massive strike package of 415 UAVs, significantly increasing the likelihood that multiple drones would intentionally or unintentionally cross into Poland.

However, the large number of drone incursions increases the likelihood that the incident was deliberately orchestrated by Russia in a bid to test NATO responses and a potential effort to conduct reconnaissance of air defences. The flight paths of some drones support this assessment. A German media outlet reported, citing an unnamed senior NATO official, that five drones were on a direct flight path toward a NATO base. Additionally, according to some reports, several drones flew in the direction of Rzeszów Airport (RZE, Podkarpackie voivodship), the most significant logistics hub for transporting military supplies to Ukraine. However, NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte refused to confirm whether the incident was deliberate and stated that an assessment was ongoing.

The Russian MoD has not overtly denied that its drones entered Polish airspace, but it has claimed that there had been no plans to target facilities on Polish territory. The ministry reported that Russian forces had carried out large-scale strikes against Ukrainian military facilities in western Ukraine overnight on 9-10 September. The ministry also claimed that the drones used in the attack against Ukraine have a maximum flight range of nearly 435 miles (700km) and, therefore, could not have entered Polish airspace. However, it remains possible that Russia could have made upgrades to the UAVs to increase their range if Russia did indeed send these into Poland intentionally. The Russian MoD has said it is prepared to discuss the matter with the Polish side, though Poland and its allies will unlikely believe Russian explanations for the situation.

In July, Polish sources had claimed that Ukraine had discovered Russian UAVs with Polish and Lithuanian SIM cards; while we cannot confirm these claims, they could indicate preparations for penetrations of NATO airspace. As we reported as recently as 8 September, Russian drones have been known to use Ukrainian SIM cards to aid navigation and to obfuscate electronic warfare (EW) interference. While we cannot confirm this, it remains a realistic possibility that Russia could at least have experimented with the use of Polish SIM cards to test the technology and its ability to penetrate NATO airspace.

Belarus, Russia’s main ally, has attempted to absolve itself from involvement and portray itself as a responsible actor by communicating with regional countries. Belarusian Chief of the General Staff Pavel Muraveiko stated that Belarus shared information with Lithuania and Poland overnight on 9-10 September regarding drones approaching their borders. Muraveiko also said that Poland similarly notified Belarus concerning drones flying off course, allegedly from Ukraine. The Belarusian MoD also implied that Ukrainian EW may have been responsible for the drones entering Polish airspace; it also reported shooting down an unspecified number of drones over Belarusian territory. Poland has corroborated that Belarus had sent such alerts of incoming drones. While such communication channels likely aided in managing already-high regional tensions, we assess that the incident will nevertheless almost certainly sustain friction between regional countries over the foreseeable future.

The UN Security Council will convene over the drone incursions, though its response will likely be limited, given Russia’s veto powers. Poland’s Foreign Ministry announced earlier on 11 September that Warsaw had requested an emergency meeting on the matter, though it remains uncertain when this will take place. Poland has already activated NATO’s Article 4, which allows member states to start a formal discussion within the alliance about threats to their security. However, contrary to discussions within NATO, Russia (and possibly China) could theoretically veto any Security Council resolution on the matter.

The latest incident likely highlights capability gaps in NATO countries’ ability to counter inexpensive systems such as drones. Following the latest incident, Poland requested additional air defence systems and counter-drone technologies from its allies to strengthen its defences against Russian UAV incursions. While the recent interception of Russian drones demonstrated Poland’s and NATO’s readiness, the reliance on fighter jets to counter drones would not be sustainable in a high-intensity conflict; such reliance likely indicates a gap in cost-effective systems for addressing UAV threats, which is a significant issue for NATO capabilities on land, at sea and in the air.

The recent incursions have almost certainly reinvigorated concerns regarding the security of NATO’s eastern flank and US commitment to ensuring the security of the alliance. Earlier on 11 September, lawmakers from Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania (which all border Russia) urged the US Congress to reject a proposal that would cut about USD 200 m annually in defence support for the Baltic region. The Baltic Security Initiative (BSI) programme has supported the three countries’ defence investments by between USD 168m and USD 231m annually since 2018. Ultimately, a weakened, less-equipped Baltic region could realistically empower Russia to increase grey-zone and sabotage operations over the long term and impact regional countries’ abilities to respond. The US, meanwhile, has made no major announcement relating to the drone incursion, though a statement could realistically be made following Article 4 deliberations.

Despite recent developments, we have not adjusted our assessment on the forthcoming military drills in Belarus; the drills are highly unlikely to be cover for a full-scale attack against Poland and/or other NATO neighbouring countries (such as Latvia and Lithuania), or indeed another invasion of northern Ukraine. The joint military exercises between Russia and Belarus, Zapad-2025, will take place on 12 and 16 September. The recent incursions have almost certainly further elevated regional tensions; the risk of direct Russian conflict with NATO remains low, but is steadily increasing.

Regional countries have taken precautions to improve their security during these exercises. Poland is closing its border with Belarus at 0000hrs (local time) on 12 September. Meanwhile, Latvia has closed its airspace along its eastern border until at least 18 September. However, these closures are unlikely to result in significant disruption. Poland has already closed most of its border with Belarus, while the EU closed its airspace to Russia in the days after the full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022.

Sep 08.

KEY DEVELOPMENTS

• SOUTHERN: Russian sources have claimed that Russian first-person view (FPV) drones are operating inside Zaporizhzhia city (Zaporizhzhia oblast) for the first time, using new innovative tactics, though we cannot confirm this
• STRIKES: Following the largest combined strike of the war to date on 6-7 September, official buildings and the premises of foreign businesses in Ukraine will remain at increasing risk during large-scale strikes
• GUARANTEES: Following the Coalition of the Willing summit in Paris (France), Russian President Vladimir Putin has stated that Russia would regard Western troops deployed to Ukraine as ‘legitimate targets’
• FORECAST: US President Donald Trump has implied that he is ready to increase sanctions pressure against Russia, but it remains unclear whether further sanctions will be imposed amid discussions around Europe’s own energy imports
• BAKHMUT: On 5 September, the Russian Ministry of Defence (MoD) claimed that its forces had seized the village of Markove, located four miles (7km) to the north of Chasiv Yar (Donetsk oblast). However, we cannot confirm this. Otherwise, there has been little confirmed movement around Kostiantynivka (Donetsk) in recent days.
• DONETSK: On 7 September, Ukrainian Commander-in-Chief Oleksandr Syrskyi reported that Ukrainian forces lost two square miles (5 sq km) but regained control of ten square miles (26 sq km) near Pokrovsk (Donetsk oblast) in August. Syrskyi added that a similar ratio of territory lost and regained was observed near Dobropillia, located to the north-east of Pokrovsk and where Russian forces attempted a penetration in August. Ukrainian gains in the sector are possibly correlated to a slowdown of the Russian offensive, indicating that Moscow is preparing for a renewed push in the Pokrovsk area.
• DONETSK: Ukrainian military officials recently reported that Russia has deployed experienced naval infantry units to the sector, where they are attempting to secure new positions. Ukrainian units also reported that Russia is concentrating troops and equipment in preparation for a potential renewed offensive push. Russian tactics have largely involved deep infiltration into the city while avoiding direct clashes with Ukrainian forces. Concurrently, Russian forces have intensified airstrikes. We assess that Russia’s heavy use of infiltration tactics and intensified strikes is likely intended to prepare the ground for such a push by identifying weak points and targeting military assets and logistical routes, though it remains unclear how significant any renewed Russian offensive will be.
• DONETSK: Geolocated footage published on 5 and 6 September shows recent Russian gains in south-western and north-western Udachne, located to the south-east of Pokrovsk. Last week, the Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces had recaptured Udachne. Reports of the latest minor Russian advances underscore efforts to contest Ukraine’s control over the settlement. Russian forces also made marginal progress north of Myrolyubivka, located to the north-east of Pokrovsk, as of 6 September.
• KHARKIV: Geolocated footage published on 7 September indicates that Russian forces have advanced on the south bank of the Vovcha River and taken up new positions in the Vovchansk Oil Extraction Plant. Overall, Russian progress in Vovchansk (Kharkiv oblast) has remained extremely slow over the last year, with recent Ukrainian counter-attacks pushing them back in the centre of the city.
• KURSK-SUMY: Russian sources affiliated with the Northern Grouping of Forces have reported that North Korean forces have now arrived in Kursk oblast, near Guyevo. The source claims that this is to strengthen the border region with Ukraine, with reports indicating that the deployment of North Korean troops will facilitate the withdrawal of Russian conscripts to rear areas and other Russian bases. Russian conscripts do not fight in the ‘special military operation’ inside Ukraine; as such, North Korean forces will likely take up positions in more dangerous areas of the international border to free up conscripts. However, it remains unclear whether North Korean forces will be used in offensive operations inside Ukraine.
• KURSK-SUMY: Meanwhile, inside neighbouring Sumy oblast, geolocated footage published on 4 September indicates that Russian forces have advanced to the south of Yablunivka, located around 16 miles (26km) to the north-east of Sumy city. Meanwhile, footage from 5 September indicates minor Ukrainian advances further to the west, near Kindrativka, located 14 miles (23km) to the north of Sumy city.
• OSKIL-KREMINNA: Following recent infiltration efforts, Russian forces have likely established forward positions in north-western Kupiansk (Kharkiv oblast). Last week, the Russian MoD released footage showing Russian troops holding positions in four parts of the settlement, located in northern, north-western and western Kupiansk. The latest geolocated footage indicates that Russian forces are currently operating mainly in north-western Kupiansk, with little wider evidence indicating Russian control elsewhere in the city.
• OSKIL-KREMINNA: In the Lyman direction, both sides have made confirmed advances. On 8 September, the Ukrainian General Staff reported the capture of Zarichne, located to the north-east of Lyman (Donetsk oblast), following earlier indications of Ukrainian advances in the settlement. Meanwhile, geolocated footage from 5 September shows Russian advances in southern Shandryholove and north-west of Stavky, located to the north-west and north of Lyman, respectively.
• SOUTHERN: Russian forces continue to make slow advances along the Donetsk-Dnipropetrovsk oblast order, taking several small settlements in the latter in recent days. Geolocated footage from 4 September indicates that Russian forces have taken the village of Novoselivka, located around 15 miles (25km) to the north-west of Velyka Novosilka, notably inside Dnipropetrovsk oblast. Meanwhile, footage from 5 September indicates Russian advances in eastern Sichneve, located to the east of Novoselivka, indicating that Russian forces have likely not yet consolidated the ground lines of communication (GLOCs) running west into Dnipropetrovsk oblast.
• SOUTHERN: Russian sources claimed on 6 and 7 September that Russian first-person view (FPV) drones are operating inside Zaporizhzhia city (Zaporizhzhia oblast) for the first time, using new innovative tactics. The sources claimed that Russian forces used a drone mothership, equipped with FPVs, which flew towards the city; drone operators then controlled the decoupled FPV drones using a SIM card once the drone entered the coverage of the mobile operator. Russian forces have been experimenting with using Ukrainian SIM cards and telecommunications systems to their advantage; if accurate, this would be the latest innovation allowing Russian forces to hit targets at much further range. Meanwhile, further south along the Zaporizhzhia frontline, geolocated footage from 5 September indicates minor Russian advances in southern Prymorske, located around 14 miles (23km) to the south of Zaporizhzhia city.
• STRIKES: Following the largest combined strike of the war to date on 6-7 September, official buildings and the premises of foreign businesses in Ukraine will remain at risk during large-scale strikes. The attack involved 810 drones, nine Iskander-K cruise missiles and four Iskander-M/KN-23 ballistic missiles. Ukrainian air defences achieved a high interception rate, downing 747 drones and four cruise missiles; however, the remaining projectiles struck 33 locations, causing significant damage, including in the capital Kyiv, which was heavily targeted.
• STRIKES: For the first time since the war began, the Cabinet of Ministers building in Kyiv was hit. It remains unclear whether this strike was deliberate. Sites in central Kyiv are rarely hit due to the density of air defences. However, in recent months, amid intensified Russian bombardment, other official buildings have also been struck, including the EU representation in Ukraine and the British Council. This underscores the ever-increasing threat posed by long-range strikes, as well as the pressure Ukrainian air defences are under amid Russia’s innovation and expansion of its long-range strike capabilities. Smaller-scale attacks have also inflicted damage on critical infrastructure this week, such as early on 8 September, when strikes damaged energy facilities.
• STRIKES: Russia’s ability to mass-produce drones and missiles will sustain the risk of frequent, large-scale combined strikes. On 7 September, Ukraine’s military intelligence (GUR) reported that Russia plans to manufacture up to 2,500 high-precision missiles in 2025, including cruise, ballistic and hypersonic systems. On 5 September, GUR spokesperson Andrii Yusov also noted that Russia can produce as many as 2,700 Shahed-type drones each month, in addition to unknown numbers of (much cheaper and easier to produce) decoy drones. Reports of steadily expanding production capacity suggest that Moscow will be able to continue its strike campaign at the current tempo into the winter heating season, when the intensity of strikes traditionally increases.
• STRIKES: Russia is also modernising its drones and missiles while deploying more sophisticated strike tactics. According to GUR, instead of flying to their targets directly, Russian drones now circle for several hours and vary their altitude. This likely complicates Ukrainian detection and interception efforts. Such circling patterns increase the complexity of drone flights, thereby reducing the predictability of strikes.
• STRIKES: Meanwhile, Ukraine continued to strike Russian oil infrastructure, targeting several facilities on 5 September. The attacks hit the Rosneft refinery in Ryazan (Ryazan oblast, Russia) and an oil depot in occupied Luhansk oblast. The Ryazan Oil Refinery is one of the four largest oil refineries in Russia. On 5 September, Ukrainian forces struck an S-400 air defence system in Kaluga oblast (Russia). On 7 September, Ukraine also struck the Druzhba oil pipeline in Russia’s Bryansk oblast. The pipeline delivers Russian oil to Hungary and Slovakia; the attack will highly likely spark renewed tensions with both countries, which have already adopted an anti-Ukraine stance.

POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS

• GUARANTEES: Russia would regard Western troops deployed to Ukraine as ‘legitimate targets’, according to President Vladimir Putin. On 5 September, Putin implied that any security guarantees that would involve troops on Ukrainian soil would violate Moscow’s objections to NATO troops in Ukraine. Putin also stated that their deployment would not be necessary if a peace deal is reached, claiming that Russia would comply with any agreements in full. The statement follows a meeting of European leaders in Paris (France) on 4 September, whereafter French President Emmanuel Macron stated that 35 states agreed to form a ‘reassurance force’ as part of post-war security guarantees for Ukraine, including potential deployments to Ukraine.
• GUARANTEES: We have repeatedly assessed that the deployment of Western troops (especially those from NATO countries) will highly likely remain a non-starter for Moscow. Meanwhile, Putin’s comments will almost certainly provide no real reassurance for Kyiv, given that Russia has violated numerous previous agreements with Ukraine. Putin’s comments further reinforce our assessment, and such remarks are highly likely aimed at deterring countries willing to send troops from doing so by warning that they could be military targets. Italy, for example, has already ruled out deploying its troops within Ukraine, instead supporting a reassurance force outside of Ukraine. Other states will likely resist deployments internally, even far from the frontline, given Moscow’s clear opposition, which is highly unlikely to change. We continue to assess that any major NATO deployment inside Ukraine will likely indicate an absence of a peace treaty with Russia, rather than being part of a strategic settlement to end the war, given Russia’s war goals.
• RECRUITMENT: Ukrainian estimates indicate that Russia continues to successfully attract manpower to sustain the war; Russia has reportedly recruited around 280,000 contract soldiers in 2025 thus far. According to the Deputy Head of Ukraine’s military intelligence (GUR), Vadym Skibitskyi, this figure is current as of 1 September; Russia is believed to enlist at least 35,000 soldiers per month. Skibitskyi attributed Russian recruitment success to lucrative financial incentives and propaganda campaigns. Ultimately, both Russian and Ukrainian sources indicate that Russia is successfully recruiting to not only offset their losses, but also slowly increase the overall size of the armed forces and their commitment inside Ukraine.
• RECRUITMENT: Nearly 700,000 Russian military personnel are now deployed in Ukraine, according to Ukrainian assessments. A spokesperson of Ukraine’s GUR, Andriy Yusov, shared these figures on 5 September, adding that this number includes National Guard (Rosgvardia) personnel, special forces and support units, and is a notable increase on estimates from earlier this year. According to Yusov, most Russian service members are deployed in Russian-occupied Donetsk oblast, which Yusov stated shows Russia’s priorities. Ukraine’s military consists of almost 900,000 service members; however, Russia clearly holds a numerical advantage in certain parts of the frontline, due to the allocation of manpower, and has a much larger pool of personnel to draw from.
• PROTESTS: Meanwhile, continued attempts to introduce controversial legislation will possibly reduce the willingness of Ukrainians to enlist in the war over the coming months, following modest protests. On 5 September, hundreds of demonstrators gathered on Kyiv’s Independence Square to protest draft laws that would impose tougher criminal penalties on soldiers for disobedience. One of those bills effectively reinstates criminal liability for soldiers using ‘illegal’ weapons, while the other increases liability for military personnel who disobey orders. The protests come after large-scale demonstrations in July across Ukraine (including in Kyiv) to decry legislation targeting two key anti-corruption agencies. We assess that those protests will highly likely set the precedent for future war-time protests and attempts to challenge the government.
• BORDER: On 6 September, Polish farmers staged another temporary blockade along part of Poland’s shared border with Ukraine. The demonstration began at 1250hrs (Kyiv time) at the Medyka-Shehyni border point and was expected to last at least six hours; however, protesters stopped blocking truck traffic at 1530hrs and the blockade ended fully at 1700hrs. Polish farmers and truckers have periodically blocked traffic along the Polish-Ukrainian border since 2023, typically to protest what they see as unfair competition. We assess that similar future protests along the border are possible over the coming months, which will likely precipitate moderate (but temporary) supply chain disruption.

FORECAST

SANCTIONS: US President Donald Trump has implied that he is ready to increase sanctions pressure against Russia after its largest aerial bombardment of Ukraine since the beginning of the war. On 7 September, Trump stated that he is ready to transition into a ‘second phase’ of sanctions against Moscow. However, he did not provide any additional details of what this would involve or offer a timeline of when the US could impose new sanctions. That said, Trump has previously announced deadlines for increasing pressure on Russia without following through on such threats.

Trump also claimed that he will speak with Putin ‘over the next couple of days’ and expressed confidence that the US would be able to help resolve the Russo-Ukrainian war. However, the US president did not provide any further insight into what could realistically lead him to impose additional sanctions on Russia. So far, Trump’s administration has been reluctant to increase sanctions pressure against Moscow over concerns that this could deteriorate the limited progress made in the pursuit of peace.

If Trump does indeed threaten to issue new punitive measures targeting Russia and/or its trading partners during his expected forthcoming call with Putin, this will unlikely encourage Russia to change its course of the war. It remains our assessment that sanctions have done very little to influence Kremlin decision-making or foreign policy; this is unlikely to change in the short-to-medium term. Kremlin press secretary Dmitry Peskov stated earlier on 8 September that no sanctions could force Moscow to change its position on Ukraine. We assess that Russia is highly likely willing to endure significant economic hardship over the coming months in order to achieve its war goals in Ukraine.

Nevertheless, US Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent has signalled that the US is open to working with European partners to ‘collapse’ the Russian economy. On 7 September, Bessent said the US is ready to increase pressure on Russia, but that Europe must also be ready to follow suit. According to him, this includes issuing more sanctions and secondary tariffs on countries that buy Russian oil. This broadly aligns with what Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky has called for following the large-scale attack against Ukraine on 6-7 September. Zelensky advocated for additional sanctions against Russia and individuals associated with Russia, strong tariffs and other trade restrictions with Moscow.

Notably, US Energy Secretary Chris Wright indicated that European countries should also stop buying Russian oil and gas if they want the US to further tighten sanctions on Russia. According to Ember, Russian gas accounted for 14% of the EU’s overall imports of fossil fuels in 2024, up by 28% compared to 2023. The EU is currently drawing up legislation to phase out Russian oil and gas by 2028; however, the fact that the bloc still imports notable quantities of Russian energy will likely reinforce Washington DC’s reticence to impose secondary sanctions on other states that purchase Russian energy in large quantities. The US has already done so against India, but Wright seemed to imply that further European divestment away from Russian energy (and purchasing US oil and gas in its place) would encourage the White House to proceed with further sanctions against Russia.

Several European officials are expected to visit the US Treasury in Washington DC later on 8 September to discuss ways to exert more pressure on Russia economically. While details on the matter are limited, the unspecified members of the European team reportedly have a focus on energy, financial services, sanctions and trade. This could realistically indicate which sectors could be targeted under any new sanctions. The meeting underscores the US’ preparedness to work with Europe to increase sanctions pressure on Russia, which would ultimately increase alignment between Ukraine’s primary partners and improve sanctions enforcement. However, it remains to be seen how far the US is willing to go to increase punitive measures against Russia, with the EU likely more prepared to escalate sanctions pressure than Washington DC.

• Intensifying Russian large-scale strikes will increase risks of significant damage in capital. Overnight on 6-7 September, Russia launched its largest long-range strike to date, involving 810 drones, nine cruise missiles and four ballistic systems. Ukrainian air defences achieved a high interception rate, suppressing 747 drones and four cruise missiles. The remaining projectiles struck 33 locations, causing significant damage, including in the capital Kyiv, which was heavily targeted. Notably, for the first time since the start of the war, the Cabinet of Ministers building in Kyiv was hit. Sites in central Kyiv are rarely hit due to the density of air defences. However, in recent months, amid intensified Russian bombardment, other official buildings have also been damaged, including the EU delegation in Ukraine and the British Council. Ukraine’s military intelligence (GUR) has noted that Russian forces are employing increasingly sophisticated strike tactics and modernised equipment to enhance the lethality of their operations. We assess that Russia will likely maintain its current tempo of high-intensity combined strikes as part of its pressure campaign against Ukraine. Frequent, large-scale attacks will continue to pose elevated security risks to urban centres nationwide, including Kyiv. (Source: Sibylline)

 

12 Sep 25. Groundbreaking Ukraine tech sharing agreement to deliver drones and support jobs.  ‘First of its kind’ industrial partnership allows the UK and Ukraine to share detailed designs for cutting-edge air defence drones and other equipment.  The UK will manufacture and jointly develop cutting-edge military equipment with Ukrainian industry through a groundbreaking new technology sharing agreement which will support British jobs and strengthen both UK and Ukrainian national security. The first joint project, to be announced at the DSEI trade show in London tomorrow (Thursday), is an advanced new air defence interceptor drone, named Project OCTOPUS, which will be mass produced in the UK, with a target to produce thousands per month to provide to Ukraine to support its ongoing fight for freedom against Putin’s illegal full-scale invasion.

Interceptor drones are considerably cheaper than regular air defence missiles and are proving to be highly effective in countering the waves of one-way attack drones Russia continues to launch at Ukraine’s cities. They fly quickly to intercept incoming drones and missiles, destroying them before they reach their targets. They will help Ukraine defend against aerial attacks such as Russia’s reckless overnight attack against western Ukraine, which saw Poland and NATO scramble to intercept Russian drones that entered Polish airspace. The Prime Minister and Defence Secretary both condemned Russia’s attack, voicing support for Poland. The new tech sharing agreement has been made possible as a result of the growing industrial partnership between the UK and Ukraine, announced by the Prime Minister after meeting President Zelenskyy this summer. Last week, Defence Secretary John Healey visited Kyiv and signed an expansion to the partnership, allowing sharing and joint development of intellectual property.

The technology sharing arrangement is among the first of its kind signed with Ukraine, allowing for unprecedented collaboration between British and Ukrainian companies, in a move that provides options to expand industrial capacity and harness defence as an engine for growth – supporting investment and delivering on the government’s Plan for Change.

It comes as the government announced hundreds of ms of pounds of new investment through the Defence Industrial Strategy this week to make defence an engine for growth, with £250 m of new funding to for new defence growth deals across the UK, and £182m to fund a new skills package to be delivered by five new defence technical excellence colleges, to train and upskill thousands of workers.

The drone developed under Project OCTOPUS was designed by Ukraine with support from UK scientists and technicians and has already proved successful on the battlefield, proving highly effective against the Shahed one-way attack drone variants used by Russia – despite costing less than 10% to produce than the drones they are designed to intercept.

The Defence Secretary has hosted his Ukrainian counterpart, Denys Shmyhal, and other European Defence Ministers in London this week for the latest meeting of the 50-nation strong group dedicated to providing military support for Ukraine, co-led by the UK and Germany. During the Ukraine Defence Contact Group meeting, he confirmed the UK-led International Fund for Ukraine had surpassed £2 bn in funding commitments from the UK and 11 other countries.

The growing industrial collaboration delivers on the 100-Year Partnership signed between the UK and Ukraine in January, while supporting the priorities set out by the Defence Secretary to ensure Ukraine is supported to defend itself against Putin’s illegal invasion now, as well as to deter against threats in the future.

The Prime Minister and Defence Secretary have both highlighted how supporting Ukraine is essential to the security of Europe and the UK, with national security acting as a foundation of the government’s Plan for Change.

The UK remains fully committed to securing a just and lasting peace in Ukraine and is engaging with key allies in support of this effort, which is why £4.5bn is being spent on military support to Ukraine this year, the largest amount provided to date. Last month on Ukrainian Independence Day, the Defence Secretary confirmed the UK’s world-leading programme of training for Ukrainian recruits would continue through 2026.

In March, the Prime Minister announced a historic £1.6 bn deal to provide more than five thousand air defence missiles for Ukraine – creating 200 new jobs and supporting a further 700. The UK will also invest a record £350m this year to increase the supply of drones to Ukraine from a target of 10,000 in 2024 to 100,000 in 2025.

The government’s new Defence Industrial Strategy will equip the UK workforce with the expertise needed to meet the new era of threat set out in the Strategic Defence Review and the demands of a rapidly evolving defence sector to innovate at a wartime pace. (Source: https://www.gov.uk/)

 

12 Sep 25. Cuashub.com said today that Rheinmetall to supply Ukraine with Skyranger Mobile Air Defense Systems. Rheinmetall will deliver Skyranger mobile air defense systems to Ukraine under a contract valued at “hundreds of ms of euros,” company CEO Armin Papperger told German media on Sept. 8. The deal is scheduled to be signed in London on Sept. 10, with the first units expected to arrive in Ukraine by the end of the year. The Skyranger system can be mounted on platforms such as Leopard tanks and is designed to defend areas of up to four square kilometers against drone threats. It combines advanced tracking sensors with a rapid-fire revolver cannon, capable of firing specialized airburst ammunition that detonates near targets to increase interception rates. Rheinmetall says this provides a lower-cost alternative to missile-based systems, which are often too expensive to use against mass drone attacks.

Ukraine has struggled to keep pace with Russia’s escalating use of Iranian-designed Shahed drones. According to Ukrainian figures, more than 6,000 launches were recorded in July 2025, a 14-fold increase compared to the same month last year. While Ukraine has employed systems such as NASAMS, IRIS-T and Patriot to shoot down drones, the high cost of interceptor missiles makes this approach unsustainable against swarms of inexpensive targets.

The Skyranger builds on the same technology as Rheinmetall’s Skynex system, a larger modular platform already delivered to Ukraine. By offering a mobile, short-range option, Rheinmetall says the Skyranger is suited to countering saturation attacks while reducing overall costs. Each interception is estimated at around $4,000, compared to hundreds of thousands or even ms for missile-based defenses.

Germany has been one of Ukraine’s largest defense supporters in Europe, with Rheinmetall supplying tanks, artillery rounds, mortar shells and surveillance drones under government contracts. The addition of the Skyranger is expected to strengthen Ukraine’s layered air defense network as it faces growing pressure from Russian drone and missile strikes. (Source: https://cuashub.com/)

 

09 Sep 25. Ukraine’s chief arms producer and Thales register joint venture in Ukraine. Ukraine’s state-owned defence conglomerate UkrOboronProm has registered a joint venture with French defence company Thales (TCFP.PA), a Ukrainian official said on Tuesday. The Ukrainian government is seeking help from its foreign partners to scale up its domestic defence industry as it fends off a bigger and better equipped Russian army in the fourth year of war. The registration took place at the beginning of July, UkrOboronProm director Herman Smentanin said on the Telegram messaging app during a visit to London. He said the joint venture would work on creating “advanced technological solutions” in air defence, radar systems, electronic warfare and tactical communications. (Source: Reuters)

 

10 Sep 25. Poland shoots down drones in its airspace during Russian attack on Ukraine.

• Summary
• Poland’s army calls violation of airspace an “act of aggression”
• Poland says allied weapons also used to ‘neutralise’ drones
• Poland closes airports amid drone threat, FAA reports
• Senator Durbin warns Putin testing NATO resolve

Poland said it scrambled its own and NATO air defences to shoot down drones on Wednesday after a Russian air attack on western Ukraine, the first time in the Ukraine war that Warsaw has engaged assets in its airspace.

Poland’s military command said drones repeatedly violated Polish airspace during the Russian attack across the border in Ukraine, and the defence minister said NATO command had been briefed. (Source: Reuters)

 

06 Sep 25. Zelenskiy says nearly 60% of Ukrainian arms home-produced. President Volodymyr Zelenskiy said on Saturday that nearly 60% of weapons used by Ukraine’s military were domestically produced, already exceeding a target he set two months ago.

“During this war, Ukraine has reached the point where nearly 60% of the weapons we have, the weapons in the hands of our soldiers, are Ukrainian-made,” Zelenskiy said in his nightly video address. (Source: Reuters)

 

11 Sep 25. Pearson Engineering partners with Ukrainian system integration company to develop maintenance, training and equipment in-country. North East defence engineering leader Pearson Engineering has signed a Memorandum of Understanding with the Ukrainian defence company Ukrainska Bavovna. The agreement will develop the provision of high-quality repair and maintenance service for systems already delivered to Ukraine, training users of engineering equipment, and will explore production of Pearson Engineering’s life-saving equipment in Ukraine as part of the significant efforts in both the current military campaign and also to restore land for domestic and agricultural purposes.

Pearson Engineering has a proud history of delivering systems that protect lives and mobility on the battlefield. Its equipment has played an important role in post-conflict recovery. In 2024, the company exported nearly £60m worth of equipment globally, including supplying specialist mine clearance equipment to Ukraine to support humanitarian demining, making civilian areas safer and enabling reconstruction. Ukrainska Bavovna is a Ukrainian defence system integration company providing support and organisational services to enhance the capabilities and efficiency of the Armed Forces of Ukraine.

Speaking following the signing of the Memorandum of Understanding, Pearson Engineering Group Chief Executive Officer Ian Bell commented: “Pearson Engineering technology delivers groundbreaking opportunities – on the battlefield and in restoring post-conflict terrain to safety. This agreement works in the interests of a safer and more secure environment for the people of Ukraine in future”.

A UB Spokesperson added: “This collaboration with Pearson Engineering on testing, research and development of minefield clearance equipment will bolster both our Armed Forces’ capability to manoeuvre and our civilian emergency services’ demining capabilities. Ukraine is now the most heavily mined country in the world and we need the mobility support that Pearson Engineering’s equipment provides. As this equipment is so important we want to build the capacity in-country for future manufacturing, maintenance and training.”

About Ukrainska Bavovna:

Ukrainska Bavovna Ltd is a Ukrainian defence system integration company, which combines subsystems created by different manufacturers into one larger system to meet clients’ requirements. It integrates and combine components (including software) from multiple manufacturers from different countries at the customer’s request; manufactures military or double-use products in Ukraine with quality control; organises field and battlefield testing of any product with proper reporting and signing of end-user certificates and license agreements; and teaches the end-user to use the provided product and create a program of instructions for every member of the battle unit to use the product most efficiently on the battlefield.

 

09 Sep 25. £2bn of military support for Ukraine secured through UK-led initiative. The International Fund for Ukraine has delivered thousands of drones, missiles, and radars for Ukraine. More than £2bn of military support for Ukraine has now been secured through the UK-led international fund for priority military equipment to support the most urgent requirements of Ukraine’s Armed Forces.  It comes as the Defence Secretary hosted NATO Secretary General, Mark Rutte, along with Ukraine’s Minister of Defence, Denys Shmyhal, and Germany’s Minister of Defence, Boris Pistorius, for the 30th meeting of the 50-nation strong Ukraine Defence Contact Group dedicated to providing military support to Ukraine. This follows the Defence Secretary’s fifth visit to Ukraine last week where he chaired a meeting of the Coalition of the Willing Defence Ministers from Kyiv.

As Russia’s war in Ukraine intensifies – with the largest wave of Russian air strikes on Ukraine over the weekend since the illegal invasion began – the Defence Secretary said that Putin’s attacks were only strengthening nations’ unity for Ukraine and said that countries must “go further and go faster” in surging the right support into the hands of Ukrainian fighters.

Defence Secretary, John Healey MP, said: “Putin is escalating his attacks on Ukraine, so we must go further and go faster to surge vital military kit into the hands of Ukraine’s war fighters. After my fifth visit to Ukraine last week, it was a pleasure to host Minister Shmyhal, Minister Pistorius, and NATO’s Secretary General at the Ministry of Defence in London for the 50-nation strong Ukraine Defence Contact Group. We see Putin’s aggression increasing, but this only strengthens our unity and our determination to step up military support for Ukraine.

This £2bn funding milestone from the UK-led International Fund for Ukraine is symbolic of unity, with 11 countries working together with the UK to ensure Ukraine receives the urgent support it needs to fight today, while the countries of the Coalition of the Willing continue work towards securing a just and lasting peace in the future.”

The Defence Secretary announced that the UK-led International Fund for Ukraine (IFU) has delivered equipment including more than 1,000 air defence systems, more than 600 uncrewed aerial systems, electronic warfare systems, and air defence radars – with further deliveries due in the coming weeks.

Deliveries over the summer focused on equipment including tactical boats to help build up Ukraine’s maritime forces to defend coastal and inland waterways, along with more air defence radars and vital artillery ammunition for the frontline. Supporting Ukraine’s defence benefits wider European security, reducing economic uncertainty and supporting the Government’s Plan for Change.

One-way attack drones also continue to be vital for Ukraine’s defence. Over the next 12 months, the UK will fund the delivery of thousands of long-range one-way attack drones, built in the UK, and supporting our 100-year partnership with Ukraine.

The Defence Secretary will then host Defence Ministers from France, Germany, Italy, and Poland tomorrow (10 September) in London for the next meeting of the E5 group of countries, with Ukraine’s Minister of Defence also due to attend. Discussions will focus on the situation in Ukraine, wider European security developments, nuclear cooperation, and investment in vital European defence industry.

The International Fund for Ukraine is administered and led by the UK Ministry of Defence to procure equipment using funds provided by Australia, Canada, Denmark, Germany, Iceland, Lithuania, the Netherlands, Norway, New Zealand, Portugal, Sweden, and the UK.

Both the Prime Minister and Defence Secretary have been clear that the UK’s national security – the foundation of the Government’s Plan for Change – starts in Ukraine. The UK remains committed to securing a just and lasting peace in Ukraine, with £4.5 bn being spent on military support to Ukraine this year – the UK’s highest ever level. (Source: https://www.gov.uk/)

 

09 Sep 25. Ukraine weighs lifting arms-export ban to make drones in Europe. Ukrainian officials are exploring a mechanism to ease weapons export restrictions in sectors such as drone production, paving the way for cooperation with Baltic and Scandinavian countries as well as the U.K. and the Netherlands, according to a Ukrainian official. Since the launch of Russia’s full-scale invasion in February 2022, Ukraine has implemented an embargo on arms exports in an attempt to direct all supplies to its defensive efforts. Lawmakers have been pondering recently how some constraints could be lifted to generate revenue that could then flow back into the local arms industry.

“The embargo remains in place, but we are working on a formula that would allow it to be lifted for certain industries, including drones, for possible cooperation and production with Joint Expeditionary Force [JEF] countries,” Ihor Brusylo, foreign policy adviser to President Volodymyr Zelenskyy toldDefense News in an interview.

The JEF is a U.K.-led coalition of ten countries, including Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Iceland, Latvia, Lithuania, the Netherlands, Sweden, and Norway.

Brusylo added that the framework being assessed would entail an understanding along the lines of “so long as the war continues, all the production would be sent back to Ukraine for use by our troops, but once the situation stabilizes and the war is over, production would be split 50-50.”

Although the JEF is not a stand-alone army, it was designed to be an agile defense force that can deploy troops swiftly in response to crises and assist in international operations led by NATO, the United Nations or other organizations.

Despite being granted “enhanced partnership” status in May, Ukraine is still pushing for full membership in the JEF, a goal it hoped to achieve this year but has yet to realize, according to Brusylo.

“Becoming a full-fledged member of the JEF was a goal we had for this year, which unfortunately has not yet materialized as some countries still had some reservations. … I am hopeful Ukraine will gain membership in the next year,” he said.

Joining the alliance, he said, would allow broader opportunities for Ukraine to not only observe but actively join JEF exercises, improve interoperability and knowledge-sharing and would send a message that Ukraine’s future lies with Europe.

He added that it would be a necessary step towards “enhancing deterrence without JEF countries needing to join the hostilities of the war.” Countries could also leverage Kyiv’s battlefield experience against Russia to improve their own capabilities.

In June, officials from eight Northern European countries, including the U.K. and Nordic-Baltic states, called for Ukraine to become a full participant in the defense framework. In a letter co-authored by eight lawmakers representing these countries, they argued that “if NATO cannot take further steps towards Ukraine’s inclusion, the JEF should do just that.”

Ukraine’s prospects of obtaining NATO membership have recently stalled. As of last year, at least seven countries were against the country immediately joining the military alliance, which included Germany, the U.S., Hungary, Slovakia, Slovenia, Belgium and Spain, according to a report from Politico. Brusylo said that while NATO remains Ukraine’s ultimate goal, full participation in the JEF would be a welcome short-term step. (Source: Defense News)

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www.exensor.com

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11 Sep 25. Germany: Sporadic far-left attacks on defence, high-tech companies will highly likely continue. On 9 September, anonymous far-left actors claimed responsibility for an arson attack on two power masts in the Treptow-Köpenick borough of the capital Berlin earlier in the day. The attack left approximately 50,000 households and businesses in Berlin without power supply; as of 10 September, an estimated 20,000 households remain without electricity. Several thousand households and businesses will likely continue facing power supply disruption in the coming days. In the letter of responsibility (‘bekennerschreiben’), the authors claim that they targeted the ‘military-industrial complex’ at the Adlershof technology park. This is Germany’s largest science and technology park, hosting approximately 1,340 companies and research institutes. In addition to targeting the defence sector, the letter cites grievances towards technological progress and innovation. We assess that high-tech companies will likely continue to be targeted by far-left actors. The risk will likely remain highest in Berlin, though sporadic attacks will also be likely in Munich (Bavaria state) and North Rhine-Westphalia state. (Source: Sibylline)

 

12 Sep 25. British economy sees defence dividend as new figures reveal above inflation increase in spend with industry. Government spending in the UK defence industry grew by 6% in real terms to £31.7bn, according to latest figures for 2024/25 published today.
Working people will feel safer and see the economic benefits of the record investment in defence the Government has delivered, new figures (MOD regional expenditure with industry 2024/25 – GOV.UK) reveal.
In a powerful boost to the UK economy, the figures which cover the 2024/25 financial year, show a 6% rise in real terms expenditure bringing the total to £31.7bn.
In an increasingly unstable and volatile world, this includes a 21% uplift to investment in the Weapons and Ammunition sector after inflation, so the UK is resilient and responsive to any challenge.
The figures show how the Government is making defence an engine for growth, with increased investment creating jobs and opportunities in communities across the country to raise living standards and put more money in working people’s pockets.
The figures show an exceptional increase from the previous year, representing the highest level of defence investment in UK industry for over a decade. This substantial investment translates to £460 for every person living in the UK, up from £440 the previous year.
The benefits will be felt across the UK, with Yorkshire and Humber seeing the biggest percentage rise in spend, increasing by 30%, with London (18%) and the North West (15%) also seeing big increases.
Defence Secretary John Healey said: “This record investment shows how we are making defence an engine for growth, supporting jobs and prosperity for British working people and boosting businesses across the United Kingdom. These new figures show how the defence dividend from our record investment is benefitting working people across the UK. It follows the launch of our Defence Industrial Strategy this week, which will provide the resilient industrial base that we need for the future.
This record spending directly supports the Government’s Defence Industrial Strategy, launched this week, which focuses on enabling the building of a resilient supply chain and supporting innovation across the defence sector.”
Small and medium-sized enterprises continue to benefit from defence investment, with direct defence spending supporting innovation and growth in businesses across the UK. This reflects the Defence Industrial Strategy’s commitment to diversifying the supply chain and ensuring smaller companies can contribute to Britain’s defence capabilities whilst driving local economic growth.
Much of the Ministry of Defence’s global expenditure remains anchored in the UK, ensuring that taxpayers’ investment in defence translates directly into British jobs, skills, and economic growth. This includes both direct payments to UK industry and indirect spending through international agreements where work subsequently takes place in Britain. (Source: https://www.gov.uk/)

12 Sep 25. Germany – Defence Overhaul.
Key points
• We assess that Operationsplan Deutschland (OPLAN) would place a significant burden on critical infrastructure operators in the event of a defence emergency (which we assess is unlikely to materialise in the short term). However, it would also lead to opportunities for the defence sector and adjacent industries, while simultaneously boosting national resilience.
• The critical infrastructure umbrella law (KRITIS-Dachgesetz) will introduce more immediate compliance risks for critical infrastructure operators in 2026-27.
• There has been a spike in far-left, anti-war attacks and threats targeting businesses, business executives and critical national infrastructure (CNI) in 2025; we assess this will likely continue on trend for at least the next six months.
Context
Three and a half years after the former chancellor, Olaf Scholz, announced the ‘Zeitenwende’ (‘turning point’) in Germany’s defence and security policy, this shift is gaining momentum (albeit gradually). So far in 2025, the Bundeswehr has outlined OPLAN, a strategic ‘military readiness’ plan. The government has also loosened the country’s debt brake to facilitate higher defence and infrastructure spending, while the defence company Rheinmetall has opened Europe’s largest ammunition factory. In addition, the government has agreed on a new military service law, which edges Germany closer to conscription. Germany has also overseen its first permanent foreign troop deployment since the Second World War (in Lithuania, under NATO auspices). We assess that procurement bureaucracy and post-war pacifist traditions are among the key factors that will likely weigh on the speed of this defence overhaul. Aspects of the initiative will require compliance from the private sector. The move has also triggered a surge in far-left, anti-war activism, including direct attacks on businesses, business executives and CNI.
Forecast
OPLAN would place a significant burden on the private sector in the unlikely event of a defence emergency, though it would also present business opportunities
OPLAN is a classified strategic document designed by the Bundeswehr to ensure that the military, civil society and private sector are all appropriately prepared in the event of a defence emergency. This is typically envisaged as Germany acting as a critical hub for transporting troop and equipment towards NATO’s eastern flank in the event of an attack in that region. In this (unlikely) scenario, the private sector would be called upon to facilitate Bundeswehr and NATO requirements. For instance, the Bundeswehr would likely call on the capacity of private logistics companies to support the transport of supplies such as fuel. Certain power plants would almost certainly have to be protected to ensure continued power supply. Overall, the plan would likely place a higher burden on critical infrastructure operators, as key sectors such as transport, energy and communication services would need to remain functional in the event of an emergency.
Nonetheless, the plan is also likely to present opportunities, particularly for the defence and transport sectors and adjacent industries, while also boosting overall national resilience. For example, the defence company Rheinmetall received an order from the Bundeswehr worth EUR 260m (USD 305m) to provide logistical support under the framework of OPLAN. The company will set up and operate holding areas or Convoy Support Centres (CSCs) and assembly areas along convoy routes. This reportedly renders Rheinmetall the first industrial partner to provide such support to the Bundeswehr under OPLAN. Other such opportunities are likely to arise for the wider defence and transport sectors; subcontracts are likely to present business opportunities for a far wider range of sectors, such as hospitality and retail – as well as other defence and technology small- and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs).
KRITIS-Dachgesetz will highly likely introduce more immediate compliance risks for critical infrastructure operators
Chancellor Friedrich Merz’s government has approved a draft of the KRITIS-Dachgesetz, which was initiated by the coalition government headed by Scholz. It will implement the EU’s Critical Entities Resilience (CER) directive into national law. The umbrella law (KRITIS-Dachgesetz) seeks to enhance the physical protection of critical infrastructure and assets by ensuring that infrastructure operators carry out risk assessments, implement resilience measures and are compliant with strict reporting obligations. For example, a critical infrastructure operator must report an incident to the Federal Office of Civil Protection and Disaster Assistance (BBK) within 24 hours of becoming aware of such an event.
An operator of critical infrastructure is defined as any legal person who exercises decisive influence over one or more critical installations, the failure of which would lead to supply shortages or threats to public safety. Such an operator generally supplies at least 500,000 people. The approved draft estimates that there are approximately 1,700 such installations across the following sectors: energy, finance, food, healthcare, information technology (IT), social security benefits, telecommunications, transport and water. Failure to comply with the law can entail fines ranging from EUR 50,000 (USD 58,000) to EUR 500,000 (USD 587,000). However, independent experts have critiqued these fines as insufficient; they predict that operators will be inclined to pay the fines rather than invest in resilience. It remains possible that fines will increase during the legislative process. It is also possible that the legislation will come into force in early 2026, meaning companies are unlikely to be required to comply fully with the law until H2 2026 at the earliest.
Far-left and anti-war activism will pose a growing security threat to businesses and CNI
The defence overhaul has triggered a marked uptick in far-left and anti-war activism in Germany in 2025. Firstly, there have been several disruptive attacks against CNI, including an arson attack against a railway line connecting Duisburg and Düsseldorf (both North Rhine-Westphalia state) in July that caused major disruption to train services in western Germany for 48 hours. The uptick also included an arson attack in September against power masts in the capital Berlin that knocked out power for approximately 50,000 households and businesses – as well as transport services.
Secondly, threats to defence executives have increased. In June, far-left threat actors claimed responsibility for torching the car of Kajetan von Mentzingen, the CEO of the defence company Vincorion. In August, Rheinmetall Entwaffnen (‘Disarm Rheinmetall’) doxxed the address of Rheinmetall’s CEO, Armin Papperger, and held a protest near his private residence.
Thirdly, defence firms and numerous other companies with perceived connections to the defence industry have been directly targeted. For example, fleets of vehicles belonging to the e-commerce company Amazon and telecommunications company Deutsche Telekom were torched in June for their alleged partnerships with the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) and Bundeswehr, respectively. The identification of the IDF connection underscores the increasing crossover between various pro-Palestine and anti-war groups.
Several far-left groups typically – and explicitly – claim responsibility for such attacks. A group called Angry Birds Commando has claimed responsibility for numerous incidents, including the sabotage attack targeting the railway line between Duisburg and Düsseldorf. There are also so-called Vulkangruppen (‘Volcano groups’) that have claimed responsibility for attacks in Berlin.
Rheinmetall Entwaffnen has organised numerous anti-war protests. However, most attacks are claimed by anonymous threat actors citing ecological, anti-war or anti-fascist causes as their motivation. In Munich (Bavaria state), no-one (even anonymously) has claimed responsibility for a spate of attacks against business and law enforcement assets; the authorities suspect a far-left group carried out the attacks.
We assess that far-left and anti-war attacks against infrastructure and private companies will continue to pose a heightened risk, at least for the next six months. Anti-war narratives and actions increasingly feature across far-left online platforms, which, until recently, were dominated by environmentalist issues. Messages of solidarity with Daniella Klette – the alleged former member of the left-wing Red Army Faction (RAF) terrorist group who is currently on trial – are common. In its most recent annual report, the Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution (BfV), Germany’s domestic intelligence service, assessed that far-left extremism in Germany falls below the threshold of terrorism. However, if this strand of extremism is left unchecked, a new left-wing terrorism threat is liable to emerge. While we assess that this is unlikely in the short-to-medium term, we also assess that the scope for such radicalisation is likely greatest in relation to anti-war extremism. (Source: Sibylline)

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Founded in 1987, Exensor Technology is a world leading supplier of Networked Unattended Ground Sensor (UGS) Systems providing tailored sensor solutions to customers all over the world. From our Headquarters in Lund Sweden, our centre of expertise in Network Communications at Communications Research Lab in Kalmar Sweden and our Production site outside of Basingstoke UK, we design, develop and produce latest state of the art rugged UGS solutions at the highest quality to meet the most stringent demands of our customers. Our systems are in operation and used in a wide number of Military as well as Homeland Security applications worldwide. The modular nature of the system ensures any external sensor can be integrated, providing the user with a fully meshed “silent” network capable of self-healing. Exensor Technology will continue to lead the field in UGS technology, provide our customers with excellent customer service and a bespoke package able to meet every need.

A CNIM Group Company
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Sponsored by Exensor

 

www.exensor.com

 

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Founded in 1987, Exensor Technology is a world leading supplier of Networked Unattended Ground Sensor (UGS) Systems providing tailored sensor solutions to customers all over the world. From our Headquarters in Lund Sweden, our centre of expertise in Network Communications at Communications Research Lab in Kalmar Sweden and our Production site outside of Basingstoke UK, we design, develop and produce latest state of the art rugged UGS solutions at the highest quality to meet the most stringent demands of our customers. Our systems are in operation and used in a wide number of Military as well as Homeland Security applications worldwide. The modular nature of the system ensures any external sensor can be integrated, providing the user with a fully meshed “silent” network capable of self-healing. Exensor Technology will continue to lead the field in UGS technology, provide our customers with excellent customer service and a bespoke package able to meet every need.

A CNIM Group Company

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Sponsored by Exensor

 

www.exensor.com

 

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08 Sep 25. Europe’s defense gaps loom large as weapon makers schmooze in London. Despite increased investments in homegrown weapons and systems, European nations are still facing major gaps in intelligence gathering, space access, long-range strike and missile defense, leaving governments here heavily reliant on the United States, according to a recent report. The findings by a London-based think tank come ahead of one of Europe’s largest defense exhibitions, DSEI, hosted in the British capital Sept. 9–12. The trade show is expected to see an uptick in European participation this year, with more countries and companies represented —specifically from nations such as Lithuania and the Czech Republic. Still, the U.S. government and arms industry are set to have a significant footprint, with only five of the 11 international pavilions listed on the DSEI website coming from European states. In 2024, Europe raised its defense spending by nearly 50% in comparison to 2014 levels. Yet pervasive readiness gaps remain, according to the latest dossier published last week by the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS). The document, which assessed current progress and shortfalls in European defense, listed capability deficiencies across several critical domains. The first involves a lack of sufficient intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance aircraft as well as geospatial capabilities among NATO European countries. IISS estimates that it may cost Europeans up to $4.8 bn to replace the eight signals- and electronic-intelligence platforms that Washington currently allocates for NATO contingencies. While some European countries are starting to buy ISR aircraft and slowly develop national satellite constellations, American-made systems remain the core of NATO’s capability in this area. For instance, according to IISS data, the U.S. operates at least 80 crewed ISR aircraft and 34 signals-intelligence planes, compared to 36 and 11 in Europe, respectively. A similar gap also exists in medium-altitude, long-endurance UAVs used for intelligence operations. The report identifies space capabilities as another key shortfall, noting Europe’s limited launch capacity and reliance on France’s Ariane and Vega systems, despite efforts by countries like Germany, Italy and the Netherlands to expand their space architectures.

“Currently, it largely depends on the U.S. for access to space – SpaceX’s Falcon 9 [launcher rocket] has conducted more launches in the first half of 2025 than the combined European Arianne and Vega launcher families since 2015,” it says.

Another important vulnerability concerns long-range strike capability. With few exceptions —primarily France and the UK — European forces lack sufficient land- and sea-based missiles that can reach targets at ranges over 1,000 kilometers, limiting their ability to sustain high-intensity warfare. The report also points to a growing trend regarding ground-based air- and missile-defense, for which the European defense market has been found to increasingly lean on non-NATO suppliers – notably Brazil, Israel, and South Korea. Driven largely by the need to meet Europe’s urgent military modernization, defense export contracts from these three countries were found to have increased by almost 1,000% from 2018-2021 ($2.48 bn) to 2022-2025 ($27.11 bn). IISS analysts further highlight that Europe’s integrated air and missile defense is still underdeveloped. The continent urgently lacks sufficient layered air defense across short, medium, and long ranges, where even operational systems are not accessible in the required quantities.

“European terminal-phase missile defense capabilities rely mainly on the U.S., either through U.S.-made systems operated by national militaries or American deployments to Europe — principally the Patriot,” the report said. (Source: Defense News)

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Founded in 1987, Exensor Technology is a world leading supplier of Networked Unattended Ground Sensor (UGS) Systems providing tailored sensor solutions to customers all over the world. From our Headquarters in Lund Sweden, our centre of expertise in Network Communications at Communications Research Lab in Kalmar Sweden and our Production site outside of Basingstoke UK, we design, develop and produce latest state of the art rugged UGS solutions at the highest quality to meet the most stringent demands of our customers. Our systems are in operation and used in a wide number of Military as well as Homeland Security applications worldwide. The modular nature of the system ensures any external sensor can be integrated, providing the user with a fully meshed “silent” network capable of self-healing. Exensor Technology will continue to lead the field in UGS technology, provide our customers with excellent customer service and a bespoke package able to meet every need.

A CNIM Group Company

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Sponsored by Exensor

 

www.exensor.com

 

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08 Sep 25. Hanwha present a comprehensive portfolio of advanced defence technologies at Defence and Security Equipment International (DSEI) 2025, showcasing not only proven platforms such as the K9 family and MCS, but also its next-generation Targeting Web and Deep Strike Capabilities. At this year’s exhibition, Hanwha will highlight its transformation into a truly multi-domestic partner—investing, producing, and sustaining capabilities within customer nations. This model not only ensures rapid gap-filling but also strengthens local supply chains, create jobs, and aedvances technology transfer.

Hanwha’s experience in Poland—where it rapidly delivered K9 self-propelled howitzers while simultaneously establishing a large-scale partnership base, and supplied the Homar-K, a localized version of its deep strike system—together with its Australian AS9/AS10 program, exemplifies this approach. Both programs demonstrate how Hanwha delivers immediate readiness while embedding lasting industrial benefits in allied economies.

“Customers today demand not just cutting-edge technology but trusted partners who can reinforce their defence ecosystems,” said Michael Coulter, CEO of Hanwha Global Defense. “Hanwha’s commitment is to act with speed where it matters, while building sovereign capabilities together with our partners – producing locally and becoming part of the industrial base that strengthens allied security.”

“Hanwha is committed to bringing its world class technologies to the region as a true partner,” said Ben Hudson, CEO of Hanwha Defence Australia and UK/Europe. “Your future is our mission and we partner with sovereign nations to deliver the capabilities needed.”

The Hanwha booth is located at Stand N10-270, South Korean Pavilion, Excel – London.

Key Products and Solutions at DSEI 2025

Modular Charge System (MCS)

Hanwha’s 155mm Artillery Modular Charge System (MCS) is designed for NATO-standard 39- and 52-caliber guns and projectiles compliant with the Joint Ballistic Memorandum of Understanding (JBMoU). It operates reliably across temperatures from -46°C to +54°C. The system burns cleanly upon ignition, leaving minimal residue, which eliminates the need for barrel swabbing and supports sustained high rates of fire.

Deep Strike Capability

Hanwha’s Deep Strike Capability provides a flexible, multi-caliber rocket launch capability, adaptable to diverse mission profiles ranging from suppressing enemy fire support to neutralizing high-value targets in complex environments. The integration of GPS/INS hybrid navigation ensures high-precision strikes, even against moving targets, enhancing both responsiveness and accuracy. Its dual-launcher configuration allows the deployment of a wide range of guided and unguided rockets from a single platform, delivering superior firepower and operational flexibility.

This system has been internationally validated, most notably through Poland’s acquisition of over 200 units of the localized Homar-K variant, which integrates onto Polish platforms and customized fire control systems. The program underscores the system’s adaptability to national requirements and its ability to enhance both operational effectiveness and industrial collaboration.

AS9 Self-Propelled Howitzer (K9 Family)

The AS9 Huntsman is the latest evolution of the globally fielded K9 platform, incorporating lessons from more than 2,400 K9 and K10 vehicles in service across more than ten nations, including NATO members. The AS9 offers a proven 52-caliber 155mm gun system, fully digital architecture, and high levels of protection and survivability. It is optimized for interoperability with NATO’s Advanced Field Artillery Tactical Data System (AFATDS), delivering precise and responsive fire support across ranges of 30–60 km.

The AS10 (Australian variant of the K10) complements the AS9 as a highly protected and maneuverable ammunition resupply vehicle. Its automated loading system reduces crew exposure under fire and enables sustained high-tempo operations. Together, the AS9 and AS10 form a mature, low-risk protected mobile fires platform designed to meet the evolving needs of the British Army and allied forces.

L-SAM (Long-range Surface-to-Air Missile System)

An advanced upper-tier interceptor designed to neutralize ballistic and other aerial threats at very high altitudes. Incorporating technologies such as precision Divert and Attitude Control Systems (DACS) for hit-to-kill accuracy and high-thrust propulsion for rapid intercept, L-SAM expands coverage several times beyond lower-tier systems. It enhances layered air defence networks by offering wide-area protection against next-generation threats.

Infantry Fighting Vehicle

A next-generation tracked IFV that delivers high survivability, mobility, and lethality. Redback integrates advanced sensors, modular armor, and powerful weapon systems, making it adaptable to NATO standards and a strong candidate for ongoing European IFV modernization programs.

Space-based Surveillance (SAR Satellite)

Synthetic aperture radar satellites offering persistent, all-weather, day-and-night intelligence and targeting support, ensuring resilient situational awareness in contested environments.

Counter-UAV Systems

Mobile and fixed-site systems designed to detect, track, and neutralize hostile drones. These systems provide layered defence for maneuver units and strategic infrastructure, leveraging extensive operational experience.

Naval Solutions: MUSV & Smart Battleship Concepts

Unmanned surface vessels and digitalized naval platforms designed for surveillance, deterrence, and combat operations. These concepts combine multi-mission flexibility with advanced digital integration to support the future of European maritime security.

 

08 Sep 25. ST Engineering, a global technology, defence and engineering Group, announced strong momentum and deeper engagements in Europe and the Middle East as it presents its latest suite of integrated solutions at Defence Security and Equipment International (DSEI) 2025, designed to address the evolving needs of today’s armed forces.

Demonstrating its innovation and engineering strength, ST Engineering is unveiling the Light Reconnaissance Strike concept, a formation-level suite of solutions that equips light infantry forces with greater mobility, precise firepower and enhanced survivability.

With its Electronic Architecture Kit (EAK) as the digital backbone of the Light Reconnaissance Strike concept, the Ground Deployed Advanced Mortar System (GDAMS), Counter Unmanned Aerial System (CUAS), ADDER Remote Weapon System and UGVs can be integrated onto a land platform to create a self-contained sensor-to-shooter ecosystem. The platform-agnostic solutions transform existing analogue platforms into digital-enabled assets, addressing the urgent modernisation needs of today’s armed forces.

Demonstrating their adaptability and ease of integration at DSEI, the EAK is featured on nine different tactical vehicles across ST Engineering’s and partners’ exhibits while the GDAMS is displayed on three partner platforms.

“Modern warfare is changing, and militaries are reviewing their concept of operations. The Light Reconnaissance Strike concept is designed to provide rapidly realisable capability upgrades for forces to meet today’s operational challenges with speed and agility,” said Chua Jin Kiat, Executive Vice President and Head of International Defence Business, ST Engineering. “By upgrading existing equipment through digitalisation, armed forces can achieve force multiplied outcomes through a quick modernisation cycle.”

ST Engineering is also advancing its European manufacturing capacity for its battle-tested armoured platform, the Bronco. At DSEI, a Bronco produced locally in Finland with Sisu is featured at its booth, while a variant built in Italy with ARIS and Leonardo takes centre stage at ARIS’ booth.

Chua added, “We work hand in hand with partners like Sisu, ARIS and Leonardo to build capability. By localising production and establishing in-country support, we contribute to stronger, more resilient defence ecosystems.”

ST Engineering is focusing on segments where it brings proven strengths and clear differentiators. At DSEI, the Group is announcing plans to expand several collaborations with leading industry partners, including one with Leonardo and ARIS for the provision of specialised systems and modules for the Bronco 3, and another with EDGE Group to expand the existing partnership to jointly explore opportunities in shipbuilding, advanced mortar capabilities, training and simulation, smart MRO and satellite systems.

In addition, it will sign Memorandums of Understanding with Armormax, Echodyne, Equivital and MyDefence to explore collaborations in areas such as counter unmanned aerial systems, mortar systems and soldier systems. These agreements underscore the Group’s commitment to co-developing innovative solutions with partners and accelerating its international growth.

Attendees can visit the ST Engineering showcase at booth 310 in Hall 3 at DSEI UK 2025, from 9 to 12 September 2025.

 

08 Sep 25. Nigeria: Boko Haram assault underscores elevated attack risks in Borno state. On 6 September, Boko Haram militants killed at least 60 people, including seven soldiers, during an assault on Darul Jamal town (Borno state), adjacent to the Cameroonian border. The Nigerian Air Force (NAF) claimed to have killed 30 militants in subsequent airstrikes. Residents had recently re-settled in Darul Jamal, having previously been displaced to camps in the Bama local government area (Borno) following a wave of Boko Haram attacks. The attack possibly reflects Boko Haram’s efforts to re-establish dominance over communities living along the Nigeria-Cameroon border and thereby secure its freedom of movement. As such, further Boko Haram attacks across Borno state will be likely in the coming weeks. This will likely trigger an augmented security response, possibly including the use of further airstrikes; this would increase mis‑identification and collateral risks. However, we assess that the Nigerian security forces’ limited capacity to maintain rural positions will dilute the effectiveness of any such operations, driving further bouts of displacement and compounding mounting pressure on aid provision in Nigeria. (Source: Sibylline)

 

08 Sep 25. Mali: Increasing JNIM activity underscores increasing pressure on government stability, attack risks. On 6 September, the al-Qaeda-affiliated Jama’at Nasr al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM) conducted numerous attacks in central and south-eastern Mali. In Mopti (Mopti region), militants killed at least two civilians in a shooting attack targeting the police commissariat. JNIM militants also conducted several arson attacks targeting fuel tankers entering Sikasso (Sikasso region) and obstructed movement along the Bamako-Ségou highway (RN6) between Markacoungo and Kassela (both Koulikoro region), approximately 20 miles (33km) from the capital Bamako. The attacks underscore JNIM’s increasing capacity to conduct simultaneous operations nationwide while maintaining blockades on numerous population centres in western Mali, including Kayes and Nioro du Sahel (both Kayes region). In the coming weeks, we assess that JNIM will likely continue bolstering its presence in Koulikoro amid efforts to increase pressure on supply chains to the capital Bamako, driving the risk of key goods shortages and undermining energy security. JNIM hostilities will likely continue at pace nationwide, sustaining significant attack, arson and kidnap-for-ransom risks for locally engaged staff and assets. (Source: Sibylline)

 

08 Sep 25. Japan: Prime minister’s resignation will exacerbate political instability. On 7 September, Japanese Prime Minister Shigeru Ishiba announced his resignation as president of the governing Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) to avert a ‘decisive division within the party’. This comes after the LDP lost its majority in the upper house in elections in July. Ishiba stated that it was the right time to step down, having finalised a trade deal with the US last week. Ishiba will remain in office until a new prime minister is elected. The LDP will first elect a new party president (likely on 4 October), after which the candidate must win votes in both chambers of the National Diet before taking office. We assess that the two main candidates are Sanae Takaichi, who represents the party’s conservative wing, and Minister of Agriculture Shinjirō Koizumi. As the LDP has a minority government, the new leader will struggle to pass major legislation, sustaining policy risks. We assess that political instability will likely undermine investor confidence, given the underlying uncertainty over whether a new leader will maintain fiscal discipline amid financial challenges, such as inflation and rising debt obligations. (Source: Sibylline)

 

05 Sep 25. Belarus: Upcoming military drills will exacerbate risk of arrest facing certain nationals. On 4 September, reports emerged across Belarusian media claiming that the authorities had arrested a Polish citizen on suspicion of espionage in Lepel (Vitebsk region). The Belarusian state news agency Belta reported that the man – whom it described as being an agent of Poland’s special services – was in possession of ‘secret’ documents concerning upcoming joint Belarusian-Russian military drills (ZAPAD). The authorities also arrested a Belarusian citizen. The joint military exercises will run from 12 to 16 September; they will be the first of their kind since Russia launched its full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022. Our assessment remains that a Russian invasion into northern Ukraine from Belarus is highly unlikely during these exercises, as is an attack against a neighbouring NATO country (namely Latvia, Lithuania and Poland). Nevertheless, given the heightened tensions, we assess that the risk of arbitrary arrest and interrogation of nationals from the abovementioned countries by the Belarusian authorities will be elevated over the coming weeks. (Source: Sibylline)

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Founded in 1987, Exensor Technology is a world leading supplier of Networked Unattended Ground Sensor (UGS) Systems providing tailored sensor solutions to customers all over the world. From our Headquarters in Lund Sweden, our centre of expertise in Network Communications at Communications Research Lab in Kalmar Sweden and our Production site outside of Basingstoke UK, we design, develop and produce latest state of the art rugged UGS solutions at the highest quality to meet the most stringent demands of our customers. Our systems are in operation and used in a wide number of Military as well as Homeland Security applications worldwide. The modular nature of the system ensures any external sensor can be integrated, providing the user with a fully meshed “silent” network capable of self-healing. Exensor Technology will continue to lead the field in UGS technology, provide our customers with excellent customer service and a bespoke package able to meet every need.

A CNIM Group Company

——————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————–

Sponsored by Exensor

 

www.exensor.com

 

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08 Sep 25. MoD Must Marshal UK Financial Services to Boost Defence, Urges Landmark Report

• Landmark report urges Government, the City of London, and the Ministry of Defence to work together to unlock defence investment and accelerate innovation
• Authors say that faced with a range of geopolitical threats, the government defence budget is not enough to fund the pace and scale of innovation needed in fields like AI, quantum, cyber, and space
• Supported by Sonder London, UK’s leading communications agency for growth-stage defence firms,and space-focused private equity firm NewSpace Capital, the report presents a ‘charter for change’, including recommendations for a Defence Growth Fund, refreshed public-private partnerships, and a ‘defence guarantee’ to encourage private sector lending
• Air Marshal Andrew Turner CB CBE, co-author of the report, says the UK is currently ‘underinvested’, but ‘has the potential to lead’
• Rt Hon Tom Tugendhat MP, who wrote the foreword, says the ‘holiday from history is long over’

A landmark report argues that the UK must marshal its financial and professional services to strengthen national security and defence. The authors say that in the teeth of increasingly serious geopolitical threats, the government budget is insufficient by itself to fund the pace and scale of innovation needed. Authored by Air Marshal Andrew Turner CB CBE and Mark Wheatley, the report, entitled ‘Mobilising the UK Financial Services to Advance United Kingdom’s Interests: Moving at Pace, with Enterprise for the Good of All’, paints a grim picture of the current geopolitical scene, noting that the combination of state threats, cyberattacks, and foreign wars demand a step-change in how the UK approaches rearmament and innovation. Though defence technology is increasing in sophistication globally, UK innovation is currently hampered by bureaucracy, a risk-focussed culture, and a lack of investment. So far, the City has been hesitant to back defence, due to a combination of ESG concerns, regulation, and the intrinsically slow-moving character of the sector. But defence, argues the report, is crucial to resilience and growth. The report stresses that the scale of investment the UK requires in defence and security now far outstrips what the government can commit on its own. Mobilising private capital at speed has therefore become a national security priority. The authors argue that renewed public-private financial machinery is essential, not simply to keep pace with technological change, but to underpin the Treasury’s wider vision. Without new routes for private sector participation, Britain will struggle to generate the scale of innovation needed to deter adversaries and defend its interests. One of the most acute challenges for emerging defence technology firms is scale capital – the funds that allow an idea to move from the lab to battlefield. The MoD has done this superbly with dedicated funds and abbreviated due diligence processes for Ukraine through Task Force Kindred. It must now do the same for UK technology, firms and security concerns. To close this gap, the report calls for the creation of a Defence Growth Fund, either within Defence or as a carve-out from the National Wealth Fund. By providing safe, low-cost growth capital in the £10m to £20m range, such a fund would give Britain’s innovators a path to scale at home, ensuring technology vital to national security is not lost overseas. Published to coincide with DSEI 2025, the report – put together by Delano Wheatley Consulting and Skadden, with support from space- and defence-focused communications agency Sonder London and private equity firm NewSpace Capital – notes that London remains Europe’s financial centre and has the muscle to fuel a transformation in how the UK approaches national defence and security.

The authors recommend a series of urgent measures, including:

• Government-backed sandboxes for defence innovation.
• A Defence Growth Fund to provide safe, scalable capital (£10–20m tickets).
• Refreshed public–private partnerships for critical infrastructure.
• Stronger incentives for SME finance and exports.
• A ‘defence guarantee’ to encourage greater private sector lending.
• Streamlining of defence accelerators and the procurement regime.
• Embassies tasked with championing UK defence exports.

In his foreword, Rt Hon Tom Tugendhat MP said the ‘holiday from history’ was over: ‘From Taiwan to Alaska, the return of state-based threats and instability has reawaken an era of competition. Nowhere is this more fierce than in technology. The age of incremental investment has to give way to a generation of innovation. Defence industry, and capital markets, are key. The shift in technology – in areas like AI, quantum, cyber and space – show the need to rethink where modernisation matters and adapt our industry and those that support and train our future innovators. We no longer have the luxury to ignore our own security needs.’

Air Marshal Andrew Turner CB CBE, co-author of the report, said: ‘Investment in security and driving national growth are not just symbiotic, they are critically inter-dependent. The markets and Government must work together to unlock public and private capital, drive innovation, and ensure that the United Kingdom retains its edge. The potential to lead is within reach, but greater and faster  investment is required.’

The report is expected to shape debate among ministers, officials, industry leaders, and investors.

About the Report

‘Mobilising the UK Financial Services to Advance the United Kingdom’s Interests’ is published by DWC Technology, supported by Skadden, Sonder London, and NewSpace Capital, and authored by Air Marshal Andrew Turner CB CBE and Mark Wheatley. It sets out a charter for change to mobilise the UK’s financial services in support of defence and national resilience.

About the Authors

Air Marshal Andrew Turner CB CBE FRAeS CMgr CCMI is CEO of Saibre Capital Limited and Space4Sight Limited, and serves on the National Quantum Strategic Advisory Board. He previously served for four decades in the Royal Air Force, rising to Deputy Chief of the Service. Mark Wheatley is the founder of Delano Wheatley Consulting, a multi-stream advisory business, and sister company DWC Technology. He is also a local politician in the City of London. In 2019, he was awarded the Masaryk Medal for work to promote UK-Czech bilateral Trade.

 

08 Sep 25. No 10 backs ‘fed up’ Londoners in tube strikes row – as pressure grows on Khan. No 10 has called on Sadiq Khan to take action to end tube strikes. No 10 has backed “fed up” Londoners hit by tube strikes on Monday as Mayor Sadiq Khan was urged to find a solution with the trade union RMT to end industrial action.  People across the capital have been hit by strikes stopping services on the London Underground, with disruption to last until Friday.  The prime minister’s spokesman weighed in on the matter as he said the government agreed Londoners will “rightly be fed up with the disruption from tube strikes.”  The spokesman highlighted the troubles facing parents dropping kids off at school and getting to work.

“RMT and TfL need to get back around the table, work together to resolve this dispute in the interests of passengers,” the spokesman said.

The government said it was in the interests of Londoners that the two “work together in good faith”.

Sadiq Khan, who serves as the chair of Transport for London (TfL), is under growing pressure to speak out on the strikes, with the London Mayor so far not making any public media appearances. In a statement, a spokesperson for the Mayor said: “Nobody wants to see strike action or disruption for Londoners. (Source: City AM)

BATTLESPACE Comment: One of the biggest casualties has been DSEI, a show thought to be on Sadiq Khan’s hitlist to remove from London, so more pressure from No10 and the MoD might have to be applied?

 

08 Sep 25. Backing British business: reforms to champion UK defence companies on the world stage. Defence Industrial Strategy will unveil reforms to champion British defence businesses to increase export sales through cutting red tape and expanded financial backing.

• Red tape cut to shorten the time it takes for British businesses to complete international export deals.
• Work to expand financial backing for UK defence firms seek international exports.
• New Defence Industrial Strategy will make the UK the best place in the world to start and grow a defence firm.

British businesses will be championed on the global stage to increase export sales, under reforms taking place in the Defence Industrial Strategy, due for launch later today.

In a significant change to boost exports, UK firms will be able to apply for export licences whilst they are bidding for international work, rather than having to wait for the process to conclude.

This move will help UK companies win significant work on the international stage, shortening order timescales and giving greater confidence to overseas customers that UK companies are a reliable choice.   The Government is also taking steps to expand UK Export Finance (UKEF)’s ability to back major defence contracts, legislating to increase the maximum size of UKEF’s financial portfolio.

International defence contracts are increasingly demanding state-backed financing to be fulfilled. To ensure the UK remains a highly competitive partner of choice for international defence contracts, the government will bring forward legislation to expand UKEF’s financial capacity and will consider a new strategic approach to defence financing for larger, multi-billion-pound deals.

Defence Secretary John Healey MP said: “We’re backing British businesses to win on the international stage by cutting red tape for major export campaigns. Ensuring our firms can bid for international work with greater confidence is an important change that will make defence an engine for growth and good jobs for people across the nation.”

Kevin Craven, CEO of ADS, representing 1600 businesses in aerospace, defence, security and space, said: “Exports from the UK’s defence and security sectors have doubled in the last decade. UK-made capability is in demand, and any way that government and industry can work together to speed up this process is welcomed. The ability for businesses large and small to be able to secure licenses during the tender process means that production can begin sooner, workers can be retained, and ultimately, the UK’s competitive advantage can be secured.  On behalf of our over 1,000 industry members operating in this space, we look forward to partnering with the government to ensure that the UK’s rigorous export licensing systems are maintained while business thrives within that system.”

The UK’s defence industry is a global powerhouse showcasing hundreds of thousands of highly skilled workers and the very latest cutting-edge technologies. The reforms come after the UK recently announced a deal to export at least five Type 26 frigates to Norway in a £10bn boost to the economy, supporting over 4,000 British jobs for years to come.

UKEF support has already been a critical enabler for UK defence exports and the work to expand their financial capacity will help boost further opportunities for British companies to secure international orders.

Defence exports are now worth over £14.5bn annually and growing – making Britain the world’s second-largest arms exporter after the United States, supporting work to make defence an engine for economic growth and delivering on the Plan for Change. (Source: army-technology.com)

 

10 Sep 25.  Clear controls in place to manage UK-Saudi military contracts.

• The MoD’s current controls for how it manages two major military programmes on behalf of KSA are clear, with no areas of concern identified in how contractors are paid.
• The MoD has strengthened its processes by applying lessons learned from a court case relating to historic corrupt practices in one of the programmes.
• The programmes are intended to strengthen and enhance the UK-Saudi defence and security relationship, bringing economic, military and geopolitical benefits to the UK.

The Ministry of Defence (MoD) has in place a clear set of controls to manage military contracts on behalf of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA) and has applied lessons learned from a court case to strengthen its processes further, according to a new National Audit Office (NAO) report.1 For more than four decades, the MoD has run two major programmes for KSA, which it considers as economically, militarily and geopolitically beneficial to the UK. The Ministry of Defence Saudi Armed Forces Projects (MODSAP) supplies military aircraft, naval vessels, weapons, training and associated support services to the Saudi Armed Forces,2 while the Saudi Arabia National Guard Communications Project (SANGCOM) delivers telecommunications capability for the Saudi Arabian National Guard. A Serious Fraud Office (SFO) investigation into corruption involving the then prime contractor for SANGCOM led to prosecutions in 2021 and 2024. In the first of these, the judge was satisfied that the government was “substantially involved in the historic corrupt arrangements” that led to the prime contractor’s conduct.3 Following the conclusion of the court case, the NAO has reviewed the MoD’s current arrangements and activities for managing the two programmes.4,5 It finds that the programmes now have clearly defined and structured governance arrangements, including oversight by senior MoD officials. The MoD has processes in place to ensure that payments made to contractors working on both programmes are appropriate, with no significant control weaknesses identified. In recent years, the MoD has also strengthened how it manages the programmes after implementing recommendations from internal audit reviews looking at their respective governance arrangements, and in October 2024 it completed an exercise for MODSAP to learn lessons from the recent court case.

1. The report will be available on the NAO website via the following link from 00:01 Wednesday 10 September: https://www.nao.org.uk/reports/management-of-contracts-by-the-mod-on-behalf-of-saudi-arabia/
2. Through its support services, the MODSAP team provides a range of skills relating to commerce, digital, engineering, finance, operational delivery, policy, project management and quality assurance.
3. This court case related to SANGCOM and the SFO made no allegations regarding MODSAP.
4. The investigation does not examine previous arrangements, including those in place during the period covered by the SFO investigation, which have been superseded. It does, however, consider the extent to which the MoD has applied lessons learned from issues raised during the court case. It does not evaluate the value for money of the arrangements, because they are fully funded by the government of KSA.
5. In addition to MODSAP and SANGCOM, the MoD also runs one further, smaller programme on behalf of the KSA – the British Military Mission – through which the UK provides advice and training to the National Guard on infantry and explosive ordnance disposal capabilities. This is not included in the scope of the investigation because it does not involve the MoD managing the supply of equipment to the KSA.

 

08 Sep 25. UK: Industrial action will cause significant travel disruption in capital over coming days. On 7 September, members of the National Union of Rail, Maritime and Transport Workers (RMT), including drivers, signallers and maintenance workers, started a series of strikes to demand better pay and working conditions. The industrial action will cause severe travel disruption on public transport services in the capital London until at least 11 September. The London Underground service lines will have limited to no service. The Docklands Light Railway (DLR) will be non-operational on 9 and 11 September due to a separate dispute. While other public transport services, such as London Overground and buses, will continue to run, they will be almost certainly overcrowded, unable to stop at all stations and possibly experience delays. Services are set to return to normal operation on 12 September. We assess that consumers will likely avoid non-essential travel; this will likely result in economic losses for businesses in the hospitality, culture and retail industries. (Source: Sibylline)

 

09 Sep 25. New Defence Growth Deals Created to Boost Local Economies Under Major Sector Plan. Working families across the country will be provided opportunities through the Defence Industrial Strategy, from highly skilled engineering positions to apprenticeships for young people starting their careers, ensuring that the defence dividend is felt in communities from Cornwall to the Highlands.

• Defence Industrial Strategy launched by Defence Secretary on visit to Veteran-founded, high-tech UK firm.
• Additional £250m to unleash the potential of local authorities, businesses and research institutions to support UK defence while boosting economic benefits.
• UK to be the best place in the world to start and grow a defence firm, better equipping the Armed Forces and driving economic growth under the Plan for Change.

Working families across the country will be provided opportunities through the Defence Industrial Strategy, from highly skilled engineering positions to apprenticeships for young people starting their careers, ensuring that the defence dividend is felt in communities from Cornwall to the Highlands.  Defence Secretary John Healey will launch the Defence Industrial Strategy (DIS) on a visit to defence technology firm Rowden, in Bristol, where he will open the firm’s new facility. Veteran-founded firm Rowden produce critical sensing and decision-making capabilities for the Armed Forces and significant growth in recent years means they now boast an engineering and production footprint of more than 20,000 sq ft in Bristol.  Central to the DIS, local economies will be boosted through the launch of a £250m fund for Defence Growth Deals – which will improve collaboration, foster innovation and create jobs in areas with untapped potential.   Five initial Defence Growth Deals will be created across England, Scotland, Wales, and Northern Ireland. Building on the success of the Team Barrow approach at the home of nuclear submarine building in Barrow-in-Furness, Defence Growth Deals will identify areas with high growth potential, and bring together industry, local and national government and academia to make sure that potential is realised.   Each Defence Growth Deal will combine defence and wider government investment to harness local sub-sector strengths, drive innovation, and deliver tailored support where needed, such as in skills, housing, and planning, to boost local economies, attract private investment, and ensure long-term sustainability.   Initial ADS analysis indicates there could be an additional demand of up to 50,000 defence jobs by 2034/35 with increases in defence spending. Defence Growth Deals will play an important role in capitalising on that skilled employment potential for communities across the UK.

The five deals will be backed by a total of £250m of defence spending over the next five years, underpinned by this Government’s historic increase in defence spending to 2.6% of GDP by 2027 and the ambition to hit 3% in the next Parliament.

They will forge long-term partnerships between national, devolved and local government, uniting businesses and research institutions to harness local expertise and resources in defence and the dual-use sectors. They will support the UK Armed Forces and deliver benefits for working people through the government’s Plan for Change.

Defence Secretary, John Healey MP said: “The Defence Industrial Strategy will make defence an engine for growth across the UK, backing British jobs, British industry and British innovators.  Defence Growth Deals offer a new partnership with UK Defence to build on industrial and innovation strengths that regions already hold. Together we aim to drive an increase in defence skills, SMEs and jobs across all four nations.

We want to make the UK the best place in the world to start and grow a defence firm and will put Britain at the leading edge of innovation.”

Chancellor Rachel Reeves said: “This is a plan for good jobs paying decent wages in Cardiff, Belfast, Glasgow, Sheffield, Plymouth and beyond.  Through Defence Growth Deals we will unleash the power of local economies while securing our country – building an economy that works for working people, in every part of this country, just as our Plan for Change promised. Innovation and industrial power are central to deterrence and decisive factors in war. The conflict in Ukraine provides a stark reminder of the imperative of the necessity for fast replenishment and resupply by industry, and a rapid, continual cycle of innovation between industry and the front line.”

The first Defence Growth Deals will be in:

• Plymouth – Home to the largest naval base in Western Europe, which will see £4bn of investment over a 10-year period, the city has recently been designated as the national centre for marine autonomy to drive further innovation in the crucial maritime autonomous systems sector.
• South Yorkshire – A key region for the research, development and engineering of high-grade components and materials critical to the next generation of maritime, land and air capabilities. This includes specialist steel for gun barrels and nuclear submarines.
• Wales – The country is becoming a leader in UAV development and testing, from companies such as Tekever in Pembrokeshire, to testing sites including the Snowdonia Aerospace Centre, and academic institutions including the Welsh Centre for Defence Autonomy.
• Scotland – Home to a dynamic mix of growth industries, from a rapidly advancing space sector, to next generation maritime innovation centred around the Clyde and Rosyth, and critical technology superclusters anchored by world-class academic institutions.
• Northern Ireland – Home to a diverse range of defence and dual use SMEs, the country is recognised as a leading cyber security hub, boosted by Queen’s University Belfast’s Centre for Secure Information Technologies and Momentum One Zero. It is also home to Thales and Harland & Wolff, companies that are critical to our support to Ukraine and our maritime strength.

The DIS is a long-term investment in both security and high-growth economy – by strengthening the industrial base and preparing for future challenges, it will unlock defence’s potential as an engine for growth under the Government’s Plan for Change. (Source: https://www.gov.uk/)

 

06 Sep 25. Major skills boost at the heart of transformative new Defence Industrial Strategy. UK jobs and skills will be the driving force behind making the country a defence industrial leader under a transformative new strategy to be launched next week.

• £182m boost for defence talent pipeline, delivering on economic growth through the Plan for Change.
• In-demand defence technical skills to be boosted through five Defence Technical Excellence Colleges, offering new opportunities into defence jobs.
• Landmark Defence Industrial Strategy set to back British business and adopt innovation lessons from Ukraine.

UK jobs and skills will be the driving force behind making the country a defence industrial leader under a transformative new strategy to be launched next week [Monday 8 September], including the creation of five defence-focused Technical Excellence Colleges to ensure industry has the workforce needed for the future.

It follows Prime Minister Keir Starmer’s visit to BAE Scotstoun where he met shipyard workers to celebrate the UK securing a £10 billion deal with Norway for Type 26 frigates, which will support 4,000 British jobs well into the next decade. The deal highlights the government’s work to back British companies on the global stage and secure working people’s futures. The Defence Industrial Strategy (DIS) will further back British businesses, putting the UK at the leading edge of defence innovation in NATO and ensuring this government’s record uplift in defence spending delivers a lasting dividend for people in every nation and region. It will deliver a more integrated, innovative, and resilient defence sector and better equipped Armed Forces – supported by the historic increase in defence spending to 2.6% of GDP by 2027 and the ambition to hit 3% in the next Parliament. New funding of £182m will support a comprehensive package aimed at harnessing the skills needed for the future, from submarine engineers to specialist welders, and the cyber warfare specialists defence will need in the years to come. Defence is the engine room of national renewal, and this investment is focused on the future of the people who will be driving that work. The DIS will support more opportunities for young people, help our Veterans into employment and equip the UK workforce with the expertise needed to meet the new era of threat set out in the Strategic Defence Review (SDR), and the demands of a rapidly evolving defence sector to innovate at a wartime pace.

Defence Secretary, John Healey MP said: “It’s British workers who gave UK companies the leading edge in defence innovation and industry.  Our Defence Industrial Strategy puts skills at the heart of the Government’s plans to make the country safer and boost jobs across the UK. This is the biggest defence skills plan in decades, a plan to boost Britain’s security and create well paid, high-skilled jobs for young people for generations to come.”

Education Secretary Bridget Phillipson said: “The defence sector doesn’t just keep the British people safe; it drives growth and unlocks opportunities for young people to learn pioneering skills and pursue a great career. This investment and our new Defence Technical Excellence Colleges will break down barriers to opportunity for people in every corner of our country, drive economic growth as part of our Plan for Change and secure the UK’s place in the world, putting us at the cutting edge of innovation and new technology. The Government’s comprehensive defence skills package centres on establishing five Defence Technical Excellence Colleges, training people in the skills needed to secure new defence jobs in this growing industry, with applications to go live by the end of this calendar year, and successful TECs to be launched in 2026.”

The package will fund thousands of short courses so that defence employers can upskill new hires and existing staff more quickly. Investing £80 m in our world leading universities will mean they can invest in cutting edge facilities and expand places for more people to study subjects like engineering and computer science that are critical to defence innovation.”

This flagship initiative is complemented by ambitious regional STEM programmes designed to engage thousands of school-age students across four years, actively encouraging them to pursue defence careers. Retention and career mobility are addressed through a new apprenticeship and graduate clearing system launching in 2026, plus scoping an innovative Defence Skills Passport which could facilitate smoother transitions for mid-career professionals between the Armed Forces, defence industry, and related sectors.

The package is a strong demonstration of making defence an engine for growth, delivering on the Government’s Plan for Change.

Background

The skills package includes:

• Establishing five Defence Technical Excellence Colleges with applications to go live by the end of this calendar year, and with successful TECs to be launched in 2026.
• Regional STEM initiatives to engage thousands of school-age students over the next four years to pursue careers in defence.
• Targeted short courses for people working in specific defence industries looking to progress their careers by boosting their skills.
• Investing in the higher education sector to boost places on defence-related courses.
• Establishing a Defence Universities Alliance, which will support and encourage defence sector careers and ethical defence research.
• Explore working with partners, such as UCAS, to provide a wealth of online information, advice, and guidance for prospective students interested in a career in the defence sector.
• A new apprenticeship and graduate clearing-style system to help support career opportunities across the defence supply-chain.
• Helping retain our people by scoping a Defence Skills Passport that could enable smoother transfer of mid-career professionals between the Armed Forces, the defence industry and those looking to re-enter from neighbouring industries.
• Launching a new Destination Defence campaign, working with industry to promote the breadth of exciting roles available across the sector and the opportunities for people to keep our nation safe.

(Source: https://www.gov.uk/)

 

04 Sep 25. U.S. troops will stay in Poland, Trump assures Polish leader. President Donald Trump affirmed that the United States will keep a robust military presence in Poland as he had a warm meeting Wednesday with the country’s new president, Karol Nawrocki. Trump had taken the unusual step of endorsing Nawrocki in the Polish elections earlier this year, and as the leaders sat side by side in the White House, Trump said the U.S.-Polish relationship has always been strong but “now it’s better than ever.” When asked by a reporter whether the U.S. planned to continue placing troops in Poland, Trump said the U.S. would and “we’ll put more there if they want.”

“We’ll be staying in Poland. We’re very much aligned with Poland,” Trump said.

The visit to Washington is Nawrocki’s first overseas trip since taking office last month. The former amateur boxer and historian, who was backed by the conservative Law and Justice party, was hoping to deepen his relationship with Trump at a fraught moment for Warsaw. Nawrocki thanked Trump for his support and, in a nod to the bonds between their countries, gave a shout out to the ms of Polish Americans in the U.S.

“Those relations for me, for Poland, for Poles, are very important,” Nawrocki said.

He added that those bonds are based on shared values of independence and democracy. In a news conference after his meeting, Nawrocki said he and Trump discussed expanding the U.S. military presence in Poland.

“There were specific discussions regarding this project,” he said.

He also said he considered it “a major success” that Trump provided a guarantee of Poland’s security. At the White House, Trump said he was proud to have endorsed Nawrocki and lauded him for winning his election.

“It was a pretty tough race, pretty nasty race, and he beat them all. And he beat them all very easily, and now he’s become even more popular as they got to know him and know him better,” Trump said.

Trump is increasingly frustrated by his inability to get Russian President Vladimir Putin and Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy to sit down for direct talks aimed at ending the war between Poland’s neighbors. Trump last month met with Putin in Alaska and then with Zelenskyy and several European leaders at the White House. The Republican president emerged from those engagements confident that he would be able to quickly arrange direct talks between Putin and Zelenskyy and perhaps three-way talks in which he would participate. But his optimism in hatching an agreement to end the war has dimmed as Putin has yet to signal an interest in sitting down with Zelenskyy.

“Maybe they have to fight a little longer,” Trump said in an interview with the conservative Daily Caller published over the weekend. “You know, just keep fighting — stupidly, keep fighting.”

Trump and Zelenskyy are scheduled to speak Thursday, according to a White House official. The official requested anonymity to discuss the yet to be formally announced call. The call comes as Zelenskyy is in Paris to meet with European allies on Thursday to discuss postwar security guarantees they might be able to provide with the United States. There is also heightened anxiety in Poland, and across Europe, about Trump’s long-term commitment to a strong U.S. force posture on the continent — an essential deterrent to Russia. Some key advisers in his administration have advocated for shifting U.S. troops and military from Europe to the Indo-Pacific with China’s lock as the United States’ most significant strategic and economic competitor. Currently, there are about 8,200 American troops stationed in Poland, but the force level regularly fluctuates, according to the Pentagon. When Nawrocki arrived at the White House, Trump gave him a hearty slap on the shoulder and stood with him as they watched U.S. military jets soaring over the South Lawn. A group of F-16s flew in a missing man formation as a tribute to a Polish Air Force F-16 pilot, Maj. Maciej “Slab” Krakowian, who died in a crash in Poland on Aug. 28.

“Thank you for this gesture,” Nawrocki later told Trump.

Trump made clear before Poland’s election this spring he wanted Nawrocki to win, dangling the prospect of closer military ties if the Poles elected Nawrocki. Trump even hosted him at the White House before the vote.

Homeland Security Secretary Kristi Noem also traveled to Poland shortly before its May election to tell Poles if they elected Nawrocki and other conservatives they would have a strong ally in Trump, who would “ensure that you will be able to fight off enemies that do not share your values.”

Ultimately, Polish voters went with Nawrocki in a tight election over liberal Warsaw Mayor Rafał Trzaskowski.

Most of the power in Poland’s parliamentary system rests with an elected parliament and a government chosen by the parliament. The president can veto legislation and represents the country abroad. Nawrocki has tense relations with the government of Prime Minister Donald Tusk, an ally of Trzaskowski. Nawrocki has echoed some of Trump’s language on Ukraine. He promises to continue Poland’s support for Ukraine but has been critical of Zelenskyy, accusing him of taking advantage of allies. Nawrocki has accused Ukrainian refugees of taking advantage of Polish generosity and vowed to prioritize Poles for social services such as health care and schooling. At the same time, Nawrocki aimed to stress to Trump that Russian aggression in Ukraine underscores that Putin can’t be trusted and that a strong U.S. presence in Poland remains an essential deterrent. Russia and its ally Belarus are set to hold joint military exercises this month in Belarus, unnerving Poland as well as fellow NATO members Latvia and Lithuania. (Source: Defense News)

 

05 Sep 25. DSEI UK to show war’s tech revolution, military adviser Waterfall says. As geopolitical tensions surge and drones and artificial intelligence continue to reshape warfare, the 2025 DSEI UK show in London is set to highlight the technological advancements that are transforming the battlefield. This year’s show will focus on how countries such as the U.K. can make sure their armed forces are ready for the evolving nature of warfare, retired Air Vice-Marshal Gary Waterfall, the event’s senior military adviser, told Defense News. Unconventional warfare has surged in the past year, from cyber and information warfare to the use of unmanned vehicles across air, land and sea, with a “dramatic uptick” in drone and counter-drone technology across all theaters, according to Waterfall, who helped develop the DSEI 2025 core theme of “Preparing the Future Force” in consultation with the U.K. Ministry of Defence.

“We’re in this midst of this technological revolution, and technologies are just rolling out at such a rapid pace, and it’s really important for all militaries to get to grips with it as soon as they can,” said Waterfall. “The real growth area is in the tech, and that tech will permeate throughout the show.”

This year’s edition of the show will feature an expanded tech zone, and organizer Clarion says DSEI UK 2025 will be the biggest yet, with 654 new exhibitors signed up and more than 45 countries represented. The four-day show will kick off on Tuesday, Sept. 9, with a greater presence from countries including Czechia and Lithuania, as well as more exhibitors from the United States and Canada. The show’s focus on “future-proofing” the armed forces goes beyond just upgrading weapon systems to rethinking the entire defense ecosystem, from industrial production to military readiness, according to Waterfall.

“It’s much, much broader than thinking about the soldier, the sailor, the airman, and making sure they’re appropriately equipped,” Waterfall said. “It’s all well and good having the most effective military fighting force, but if your supply chain is wafer thin and you don’t have the resilience and that capability to sustain your military readiness, then you’re going nowhere quite quickly.”

The DSEI adviser highlighted the key role of small and medium-sized enterprises, with innovation often coming from smaller companies rather than big defense contractors. Waterfall cited Formula One industry spin-offs applying their AI and machine-learning skills to defense, and who will be among the exhibitor companies in the tech zone alongside the likes of Hadean and Palantir.

“Everyone would agree that the answer isn’t always provided by the prime contractor,” Waterfall said. “A lot of times it’s going to be the small, medium enterprises that have got the agility, from a financial and also people perspective, to rise to the challenge.”

The show’s sub themes of “Securing advantage,” “Driving advantage” and “Maintaining advantage” will each focus on a different aspect of defense readiness. Securing advantage involves agile acquisition and supply-chain security, with Waterfall saying that even the most advanced military force would become ineffective without a resilient supply chain. Driving advantage will look at the digital transformation of defense, with AI, cyber security and data analytics acting as force multipliers. Waterfall said the goal is not to replace human decision-making but to enhance it, and enable military leaders to make quicker, more informed decisions on the battlefield. “We need to work quicker and act quicker than our potential adversaries. Which comes back to AI, machine learning, being able to decide and act quicker than those that you’re going up against,” Waterfall told Defense News. (Source: Defense News)

 

03 Sep 25. Who to see at DSEI 2025.

Details are provided below:

• Advanced Navigation at Booth S2-116: ITAR free Position, Navigation and Timing (PNT) solutions for Sea, Land & Air applications
• Aitech at Booth N11-110: Industry-Leading Rugged Embedded Computing Solutions for Harsh Military & Aerospace Applications
• Allen Vanguard at Booth S5–540: Electronic Countermeasures (ECM) & RF Jamming Technology for Protection from RCIED and Drone Threats
• Antillion: Edge Computing Solutions for Mission-Critical Defense, First Responder & Security Applications
• Atrenne Computing Solutions: Rugged Electronic Enclosures, VPX Chassis & Backplanes for Military and Defense Applications
• Creomagic at Booth N7-164: Intelligent MANET Communication Solutions for the Warfighter and Mission-Critical Defense & Government Operations
• Cubert: State-Of-The-Art Hyperspectral Imaging Cameras for Mission-Critical Applications
• Dantherm Group at Booth N3-200: Military Air Conditioners, HVAC & Environmental Control Units for Tents, Containers and Temporary Buildings
• Denchi: Advanced Mission-Critical Battery Solutions for Demanding Military & Aerospace Applications
• Echodyne at Booth H8-301: Radars for Counter-UAS, Base & Asset Security, and Portable ISR
• EIZO Rugged Solutions at Booth N4-215: High-Performance Video Graphics, GPGPU, AI/ML Processing & Display Solutions for Mission Critical Environments
• Elistair at Booth S7-202: Cutting-Edge Tethered Drone Solutions for Mission-Critical Defense & Security Applications
• EMCORE Corporation at Booth N5-320: High-Performance Fiber Optic, Ring Laser Gyro and MEMS Inertial Sensors & Navigation Systems
• Flyber: Robust Propeller Solutions for Military & Government UAVs
• Greensea IQ: Autonomous Military Robotics and Technologies | Amphibious Tracked Vehicles
• Honeywell Aerospace Technologies at Booth S5-533: Propulsion, Sensors, Communication & Augmented Reality Systems
• Inertial Labs, a VIAVI Solutions Company at Booth S5-142: Tactical Grade IMU, GPS/INS, Weapon Orientation Solutions
• LCR Embedded Systems at Booth S5-215: Mission-Critical Integrated Systems, Chassis & Backplanes For Military Systems Operating In All Domains
• Micropol Fiberoptic: State-Of-The-Art Passive Fiber Optics Technologies for the Military, Defense & Security Industries
• MilDef Group at Booth N7-130: WE ARMOR IT. MilSpec Electronics & Rugged IT Equipment for Military, Government & Critical Infrastructure
• MKS | Ophir: Thermal Imaging Optics: Powering Defense EO Systems Excellence
• Omnetics Connector Corporation at Booth S4–114: MIL-Spec Connectors for Military & Army Applications – MIL-STD Electrical Connectors
• Oscilloquartz at Booth S5–271: Network Synchronization Technology & Assured PNT Solutions for Defense Systems & Mission-Critical Infrastructure
• Performance Drone Works (PDW) at Booth N5-260: Tactical UAS Platforms for Mission-Critical Military, Defense & Law Enforcement Applications
• Red Cat Holdings at Booth S4–240: Advanced American-Made Drone Technologies for Aerial ISR (Intelligence, Surveillance & Reconnaissance)
• Reventec at Booth N5-155: Ruggedized Solid-state Liquid Level, Temperature and Position Sensors for Military Applications
• RIPEnergy: Field-Proven Rugged Power Conversion Products for Military & Defense Applications
• Rotron Aerospace at Booth C-05: Rugged VTOL UAVs & High-Performance Propulsion Systems
• Sierra-Olympia Technologies: Cutting-Edge Infrared Imaging Solutions for The Defense & Security Industries
• SightLine Applications at Booth S5–133: Powerful Edge Video Processing – Essential functionality for a wide range of ISR applications
• Sky Power International: Heavy Fuel and Gasoline Engines for Unmanned Aerial Systems
• Systel at Booth S5–263: Rugged Mission-Critical Computing Solutions for Defense & Government Applications: Air, Land & Sea
• Teledyne FLIR OEM at Booth S3-110: Thermal Imaging Solutions Featuring Cutting-Edge Intelligent Sensing & Threat Detection Technologies
• Textron Systems at Booth S4–205: Cutting-Edge Defense Technologies Empowering The Warfighter On The Modern Battlefield
• Triad RF Systems at Booth N2-335: Integrated Radio MIMO Systems, RF Power Amplifiers for C-UAS, Electronic Warfare & ISR Data Links
• Trillium Engineering at Booth S4–207: Cutting-Edge Visible & Thermal Imaging Camera Gimbal Payloads for Mission-Critical Applications
• UAV Propulsion Tech: Cutting-Edge UAV Technologies for Defense Primes, Drone OEMs and Systems Integrators
• Venturetec Rotating Systems at Booth S9-260: Custom Slip Ring & Rotary Joint Solutions for Demanding Military Power & Data Transmission Applications
• WOLF Advanced Technology at Booth S5-215: Rugged High Performance Computing & Video I/O Modules: 6U and 3U VPX, and XMC for Defense Applications
• Z3 Technology: NDAA & TAA Compliant Video Encoding & IP Camera Solutions for Mission-Critical Applications
• ZeroAlpha Solutions at Booth N3-110: Mission-Critical Power & Lighting Solutions for Sustainable Military Operations (Source: https://www.defenseadvancement.com/)

 

04 Sep 25. UK and Norway sign historic deal strengthening NATO’s northern flank and boosting jobs and growth. The Defence Secretary, John Healey, and his Norwegian counterpart, Tore O. Sandvik, today signed an historic agreement to enhance the strategic partnership between the UK and Norway

• Prime Minister visited BAE Scotstoun to meet the team who helped to land the biggest ever warship export deal worth £10bn – supporting over 4,000 UK jobs and delivering on the Government’s Plan for Change.
• Comes as the Defence Secretary and his Norwegian counterpart signed the deal today in Stavanger, Norway.
• Deal cements deep strategic partnership and will boost national defence through strengthened security in North Sea, Baltic Sea, and High North.

UK and European security was bolstered today following the signing of a new deal for Norway to purchase at least five Type 26 frigates from British shipbuilders, in a move that will create a combined fleet to better counter Russia on NATO’s northern flank.

Prime Minister Keir Starmer visited BAE Scotstoun to say thank you to the those who helped get this huge contract to build the cutting-edge vessels, which will support 4,000 jobs across the UK well into the next decade — including 2,000 in Scotland. The Defence Secretary, John Healey, and his Norwegian counterpart, Tore O. Sandvik, today signed the historic agreement to enhance the strategic partnership between the UK and Norway, strengthening NATO in the region and providing more opportunities for joint training and personnel exchanges between the two nations. At today’s signing in Norway, the Defence Secretary and the Norwegian Minister of Defence Tore O. Sandvik discussed further joint operations through this deepened partnership. The Defence Secretary also met Norwegian Navy recruits undergoing basic training who will in future likely serve on the Type 26 frigates built under this agreement.

Defence Secretary, John Healey MP, said: “This deal will support thousands of UK jobs for many years to come and boosts our strategic partnership with Norway. Our close bonds are built on a shared geography and history, and this deal will see our navies work as one, creating a combined fleet to defend NATO’s northern flank and strengthen our deterrence against Russian aggression. The programme is also expected to support 432 business, including 222 small and medium enterprises, across the UK. The £10bn deal delivers on the Government’s Plan for Change – creating jobs, driving growth and protecting national security for working people. It is a striking vote of confidence in the UK’s world-class shipbuilding industry.” (Source: https://www.gov.uk/)

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Founded in 1987, Exensor Technology is a world leading supplier of Networked Unattended Ground Sensor (UGS) Systems providing tailored sensor solutions to customers all over the world. From our Headquarters in Lund Sweden, our centre of expertise in Network Communications at Communications Research Lab in Kalmar Sweden and our Production site outside of Basingstoke UK, we design, develop and produce latest state of the art rugged UGS solutions at the highest quality to meet the most stringent demands of our customers. Our systems are in operation and used in a wide number of Military as well as Homeland Security applications worldwide. The modular nature of the system ensures any external sensor can be integrated, providing the user with a fully meshed “silent” network capable of self-healing. Exensor Technology will continue to lead the field in UGS technology, provide our customers with excellent customer service and a bespoke package able to meet every need.

A CNIM Group Company

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Sponsored by Exensor

 

www.exensor.com

 

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05 Sep 25.  Military deployments to other cities remain possible, despite lawsuit. On 4 September, the capital Washington DC sued the Trump administration over the deployment of National Guard troops to the city. DC Attorney General Brian Schwalb is seeking a court order to block the deployment on the grounds that it violates the Constitution; the lawsuit describes the presence of troops as a ‘military occupation’. On the same day, reports indicated that the House of Representatives’ leadership does not plan to hold a vote to extend President Donald Trump’s takeover of the capital’s police before it expires next week. However, DC Mayor Muriel Bowser will likely co-ordinate with federal law enforcement on an indefinite basis going forward. Nonetheless, the lawsuit will increase supervision quality risks related to Trump’s growing tendency to deploy the US military on domestic soil. While the case proceeds, we assess that military deployments to address crime in New Orleans (Louisiana) and/or Chicago (Illinois) remain possible in the short term. Any such deployment would likely be met with targeted activism and demonstrations in these cities, exacerbating domestic unrest risks. (Source: Sibylline)

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Founded in 1987, Exensor Technology is a world leading supplier of Networked Unattended Ground Sensor (UGS) Systems providing tailored sensor solutions to customers all over the world. From our Headquarters in Lund Sweden, our centre of expertise in Network Communications at Communications Research Lab in Kalmar Sweden and our Production site outside of Basingstoke UK, we design, develop and produce latest state of the art rugged UGS solutions at the highest quality to meet the most stringent demands of our customers. Our systems are in operation and used in a wide number of Military as well as Homeland Security applications worldwide. The modular nature of the system ensures any external sensor can be integrated, providing the user with a fully meshed “silent” network capable of self-healing. Exensor Technology will continue to lead the field in UGS technology, provide our customers with excellent customer service and a bespoke package able to meet every need.

A CNIM Group Company

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www.exensor.com

 

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05 Sep 25. Belarus: Upcoming military drills will exacerbate risk of arrest facing certain nationals. On 4 September, reports emerged across Belarusian media claiming that the authorities had arrested a Polish citizen on suspicion of espionage in Lepel (Vitebsk region). The Belarusian state news agency Belta reported that the man – whom it described as being an agent of Poland’s special services – was in possession of ‘secret’ documents concerning upcoming joint Belarusian-Russian military drills (ZAPAD). The authorities also arrested a Belarusian citizen. The joint military exercises will run from 12 to 16 September; they will be the first of their kind since Russia launched its full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022. Our assessment remains that a Russian invasion into northern Ukraine from Belarus is highly unlikely during these exercises, as is an attack against a neighbouring NATO country (namely Latvia, Lithuania and Poland). Nevertheless, given the heightened tensions, we assess that the risk of arbitrary arrest and interrogation of nationals from the abovementioned countries by the Belarusian authorities will be elevated over the coming weeks. (Source: Sibylline)

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Founded in 1987, Exensor Technology is a world leading supplier of Networked Unattended Ground Sensor (UGS) Systems providing tailored sensor solutions to customers all over the world. From our Headquarters in Lund Sweden, our centre of expertise in Network Communications at Communications Research Lab in Kalmar Sweden and our Production site outside of Basingstoke UK, we design, develop and produce latest state of the art rugged UGS solutions at the highest quality to meet the most stringent demands of our customers. Our systems are in operation and used in a wide number of Military as well as Homeland Security applications worldwide. The modular nature of the system ensures any external sensor can be integrated, providing the user with a fully meshed “silent” network capable of self-healing. Exensor Technology will continue to lead the field in UGS technology, provide our customers with excellent customer service and a bespoke package able to meet every need.

A CNIM Group Company

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