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NEWS IN BRIEF – MIDDLE EAST CONFLICT

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Military And Security Developments

Sep. 12.

KEY DEVELOPMENTS

IRAN

  • Despite Iran’s engagement with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), the E3 are unlikely to delay their re-implementation of UN sanctions (unless Iran agrees to negotiate with the US in the coming days).
  • Iran will likely continue to increase defence spending in the coming month, undermining broader efforts to improve economic resilience and elevating the risk of protests.

ISRAEL

  • The recent Israeli airstrike in Qatar has undercut the prospects for a ceasefire, driving the risk of armed conflict.
  • The strike in Qatar has increased the risk of attacks by Hamas and Hamas affiliates against Israeli targets in the coming weeks.

PALESTINIAN TERRITORIES

  • Despite the ramping up of evacuation operations in Gaza City, the risk of further civilian casualties will increase scrutiny of Israel and Israeli-linked firms in the coming months.
  • Israeli military operations and security deployments in the West Bank have increased following a shooting in Jerusalem (and in preparation for the recognition of a Palestinian state).

IRAN

  • Despite Iran’s engagement with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), the E3 are unlikely to delay their re-implementation of UN sanctions (unless Iran agrees to negotiate with the US in the coming days). On 9 September, Iran reached an agreement with the IAEA on nominally resuming inspections of Iranian nuclear facilities. The agreement comes amid increasing tensions between Iran and the E3 (France, Germany and the UK) after the latter initiated the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA)’s snapback process (see Sibylline Special Report – 28 August 2025). Although the agreement underscores partial Iranian engagement with the E3’s conditions for extending the snapback process, it has not been finalised. Furthermore, a key condition – the restoration of nuclear negotiations with the US – has not been met. In addition, Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Argachi has stated that all instances of co-operation will require approval from Iran’s Supreme National Security Council (SNSC) and that the agreement will be void if ‘hostile action’ is perpetrated against Iran, including the re-imposition of UN sanctions. The agreement underscores Iran’s efforts to leverage strategic ambiguity regarding its nuclear programme so as to delay the re-imposition of sanctions. The agreement is insufficient alone to delay the snapback process, though there is a low-level possibility that Iran will seek to engage with the US on nuclear negotiations in the coming days. This would increase the likelihood of the E3 extending the snapback clause deadline (currently 18 October) instead of re-imposing sanctions.
  • Iran will likely continue to increase defence spending in the coming month, undermining broader efforts to improve economic resilience and elevating the risk of protests. Late on 7 September, Iran’s Parliamentary National Security and Foreign Policy Committee approved a six-point bill increasing funding for the security forces and guaranteeing the delivery of annual budget allocations. The bill also earmarks over USD 2.3 bn for ‘foreign purchases of major defence items’ and increases funding for the Artesh (Iranian army) to improve its air defence systems. The bill’s approval underscores continuous Iranian efforts to re-constitute its security forces’ capacity through purchases of likely Chinese and/or Russian air defence systems and missile production components following the Iran-Israel war. However, the purchases will likely exacerbate socio-economic health concerns within Iran by limiting available capital for investment in infrastructure and economic diversification. Reflecting broader socio-economic concerns, on 7 September, Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei called for the government to engage in greater market regulation so as to ‘discipline the market’ by building up reserves of key commodities to protect civilians from price hikes and economic precarity. However, these measures are highly unlikely to address the institutional factors that undermine Iran’s economic resilience and productivity, including broad international sanctions, a lack of economic transparency and entrenched corruption and patronage networks. Pressure on the economic conditions within Iran will likely continue to mount in the coming months, particularly if the E3 proceed with measures to re-implement UN sanctions (see above). Further currency devaluations, price hikes and goods shortages will increase the risk of anti-government protests over this period, in turn elevating the risk of security force crackdowns targeting activists, foreign nationals and individuals associated with demonstrations.

ISRAEL 

  • The recent Israeli airstrike in Qatar has undercut the prospects for a ceasefire, driving the risk of armed conflict. On 9 September, an Israeli airstrike hit Hamas’ headquarters in the Katara district of Doha (Qatar) during a meeting of the group’s political leadership. Hamas confirmed that the strike killed five members but denied that any of these individuals were leadership figures (the group notably claimed that leadership figures were in attendance at the meeting). Comments by Israeli officials also indicate that the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) possibly failed to assassinate the targeted Hamas leadership figures. As such, further Israeli airstrikes or assassination attempts in Doha remain a low-level possibility in the coming weeks. While Qatari officials have already confirmed the indefinite suspension of mediated ceasefire negotiations, we assess that the move against Hamas’ leadership renders a resumption in ceasefire negotiations a remote chance in the coming weeks; this will severely undercut the prospects for a ceasefire in the coming month. As such, Israeli efforts to capture Gaza City (Palestinian Territories) will likely escalate in the coming weeks (see below).
  • The strike in Qatar has increased the risk of attacks by Hamas and Hamas affiliates against Israeli targets in the coming weeks. In Gaza, Hamas’ rocket launching capabilities have been severely curtailed; such ordnance is unlikely to travel further than the borders of the strip (which presents limited security risks). However, it is possible that Hamas will increase its efforts to kidnap Israeli soldiers operating in Gaza. Any such attempt, if successful, would likely increase domestic opposition to the war in Israel, while also possibly prompting a significant intensification of Israeli military operations in Gaza (particularly clearing operations designed to occupy terrain that could be used for surprise attacks). In the West Bank (Palestinian Territories), Hamas is likely to increase its mobilisation and radicalisation campaigns, driving the risk of attacks (primarily those involving small-arms and/or bladed weapons) against Israeli targets throughout the West Bank and Israel, particularly Jerusalem (Jerusalem district). Threats by Hamas and Hamas affiliates against Israeli nationals, officials and assets will also increase globally over the coming weeks. The risk of attacks will be particularly elevated around areas with large Jewish communities and around symbolic Jewish facilities. Reports also indicate that Israeli security officials are increasingly concerned about the rising likelihood of attempted attacks and/or sabotage targeting Israeli aviation assets outside Israel; they are taking steps to bolster security, accordingly. The Iranian-backed Houthis are also likely to increase the frequency and scale of their strikes on Israel. This underscores the elevated security and operational disruption risks across the country, though we assess these will be moderated by the sustained capacity of Israeli air defences to intercept most ordnance. Further Houthi attacks in the Red Sea against Israeli-affiliated vessels are also likely, driving risks for non-affiliated vessels due to misidentification.

PALESTINIAN TERRITORIES 

  • Despite the ramping up of evacuation operations in Gaza City, the risk of further civilian casualties will increase scrutiny of Israel and Israeli-linked firms in the coming months. On 11 September, the IDF released an assessment in which it stated that approximately 200,000 civilians have been evacuated from Gaza City ahead of the planned ground operations to take control of the city; international aid agencies estimate that approximately 1 m civilians reside in the city, many of whom have been repeatedly displaced during the Israel-Hamas war. The IDF also announced it had established a public phone line for civilians to report instances of Hamas militants preventing evacuations from the city. Despite these measures, the rapid and total evacuation of Gaza City remains unlikely in the short term, increasing the likelihood of civilian casualties amid intensifying preparations for the impeding ground offensive. Mass-casualty incidents will likely attract further scrutiny of Israel from international partners, particularly EU member states and the UK, increasing the risk of sanctions targeting members of the coalition government, as well as suspended arms export licenses and reduced co-operation under bi/multi-lateral frameworks. Private-sector entities will likely face increasing scrutiny from pro-Palestine activists and consumers due to their potential links to Israeli entities, particularly technology firms, weapons contractors and agricultural collectives sourcing goods from Israeli settlements in the West Bank (see below).
  • Israeli military operations and security deployments in the West Bank have increased following a shooting in Jerusalem (and in preparation for the recognition of a Palestinian state). Over the past week, the IDF has intensified its military operations throughout the West Bank following a shooting attack in Jerusalem (Jerusalem district) on 8 September (see Sibylline Middle East Crisis Update – 8 September). This was matched by an augmentation of the IDF’s on-the-ground presence and operational preparedness in the West Bank due to an assessment concluding that the scheduled recognition of a Palestinian state by several countries during the UN General Assembly (UNGA) on 9-23 September will increase the risk of unrest and attacks. These conditions are likely to compound the already growing risk of attacks ahead of the Jewish holidays, such as Rosh Hashanah (22-24 September). The risk of attacks will be most pronounced around Israeli settlements, major transit nodes, Jewish religious sites and Jerusalem’s Old City.

REGIONAL AND GLOBAL DEVELOPMENTS

Developments

  • Europe-Israel: The Dutch government’s plan to ban imports from Israeli settlements will drive further compliance risks for local retailers, supermarkets and shipping companies in the coming weeks. On 10 September, European Commission (EC) President Ursula von der Leyen stated that the organisation will propose sanctioning extremist Israeli ministers and violent settlers as well as suspending trade ties with Israel. Although the mentioned proposals are unlikely to pass in the coming weeks due to the need for unanimous support among EU members, Von der Leyen’s statement underscores the growing tensions between the EU and Israel. Tensions were also evident in the Dutch government’s plan (announced earlier on 11 September) to ban imports of goods produced in Israeli settlements in the West Bank in response to Israel’s reported plans to annex these areas and advance its military offensive in Gaza. These decisions will drive further compliance risks for Dutch companies and local retailers importing goods from Israel, particularly fresh produce. This will entail knock-on impacts for shipping and logistics firms operating between the two countries in the coming weeks. Furthermore, we assess that additional European states will likely review and amend their trading relationships with Israel, widening the scope of these compliance risks for more companies and retailers across the continent. However, we assess that substantial and prolonged operational disruption risks for European retailers and supermarkets will not materialise, as several entities in the sector have already shifted to alternative fresh produce markets (such as Egypt and Morocco).
  • Israel-Tunisia: Two consecutive attacks against Gaza-bound vessels have elevated security and bystander risks in the vicinity of Sidi Bou Said port (Tunis governorate, Tunisia); further attacks are likely in the coming days. On 10 September, the Global Sumud Flotilla (GSF) claimed that a drone attacked one of its Gaza-bound vessels; the asset is currently docked at the port of Sidi Bou Said. This comes one day after a similar attack on the flotilla’s lead vessel. Both attacks resulted in minor fires on the vessels’ decks; neither attack led to any deaths or injuries. Notably, the Tunisian authorities disputed that a drone was involved in the first attack and stated that an initial inspection indicated that the explosion originated in or on the vessel. However, the authorities are yet to comment on the second claimed attack. Meanwhile, security camera footage released by the GSF showed that an ordnance struck the vessels from above in both attacks. We assess there is a realistic possibility the ordnance was an incendiary or smoke grenade carried by a drone or a flare shot from a distance. Despite the uncertainty concerning the exact mode or motive of the attack, we assess that heightened security and bystander risks in and around Sidi Bou Said port will persist in the coming days, or until the flotilla leaves the facility. Furthermore, large pro-Palestine protests in support of the flotilla are likely to break out in the capital Tunis and other major Tunisian cities, elevating the risk of mobility disruption therein over the coming days.

Key points

  • Over September, there is a realistic possibility that militias affiliated with the Government of National Unity (GNU) in the capital Tripoli will launch a major offensive against the rival Special Deterrence Forces (RADA), triggering a large-scale armed conflict.
  • In such a scenario, both parties will almost certainly seek to control the Central Bank of Libya (CBL) and state-owned companies in the capital, triggering wide operational disruptions across all business sectors, basic amenities and government services.
  • Given that Libya’s major oil fields are controlled by the Libyan National Army (LNA) and not the GNU, impacts on the energy sector will likely be limited to the country’s north-western region.
  • However, a protracted armed conflict in Tripoli will raise the possibility of our most dangerous scenario, the GNU’s collapse and subsequent attempts by the LNA to take over the capital, which would expand the scope of the conflict.

Context

As of 12 September, large deployments of GNU-affiliated militias, mainly from Misrata (Misrata district), remain encamped across Tripoli in support of government forces, amid persistent tensions with the RADA militia. Both parties’ military presence in the city has substantially increased since 30 August, when the GNU ordered the RADA militia to hand over fugitives (including members of RADA and allied groups) wanted by the attorney general. Tensions in the capital have been rising since the assassination of the leader of the now-dissolved Stability Support Apparatus (SSA) militia (an ally to RADA), which resulted in major clashes between pro and anti-GNU armed factions in May. Despite a ceasefire, which resolved these clashes, RADA and other anti-GNU groups have continued to act as de facto autonomous organisations in Tripoli, exerting control over western areas of the city.

As such, the mobilisation of both sides’ forces over recent days has exacerbated already-heightened tensions, resulting in numerous sporadic bouts of violence across the capital and aggravating the fragile security environment. Notably, on 3 September, the government-aligned 444 Brigade militia said that a vehicle-borne IED (VBIED) targeted its headquarters in the town of Bani Walid, located 105 miles (170km) south-east of Tripoli, signalling a possible extension of the conflict beyond the capital if wider clashes erupt.

Sep 11.

  • Iran: Agreement with UN watchdog is unlikely to stop process to re-impose international sanctions. On 9 September, Iran reached an agreement with the UN’s International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to resume inspections in Iran. The government had banned IAEA inspectors from visiting its nuclear facilities since the Iran-Israel war in June. The agreement comes amid increasing tensions between Iran and the international community over its nuclear programme. In August, the E3 countries (France, Germany and the UK) warned Iran that they will move to re-impose UN sanctions unless Iran resumes nuclear negotiations with the US, complies with its obligations to the IAEA and initiates steps to address international concerns over its highly enriched uranium stockpile. Following limited engagement from Iran, on 28 August, the E3 initiated the snapback process. The new agreement partially improves prospects for further nuclear negotiations, but it is insufficient alone to stop the snapback process. However, there is a low-level possibility that Iran will seek to engage with the US on nuclear negotiations in the coming days. This would increase the likelihood that the E3 will extend the snapback clause deadline (currently 18 October) instead of re-imposing sanctions.
  • Israel-Qatar: Strike will likely undermine prospects of ceasefire deal in coming weeks. On 9 September, an Israeli airstrike targeting high-ranking members of Hamas’ political bureau, including its leader Khalil al-Hayya, Khaled Mashal, Muhammad Darwish, Nizar Awadallah and Zaher Jabarin, hit Hamas’ headquarters in the Qatari capital Doha. The status of these individuals remains unclear at the time of writing; Hamas has claimed that Israel failed to assassinate its political leaders, but has admitted the death of five members, including al-Hayya’s son. Additionally, Qatar announced that the strike killed an internal security officer at the scene. We assess that the strike will likely undermine prospects for a resumption in ceasefire negotiations in the coming weeks. As such, Israel will likely proceed with its plan to occupy Gaza City, further elevating regional tensions, as humanitarian conditions in the enclave will likely deteriorate. Meanwhile, we assess that Hamas will likely attempt to escalate attacks in the West Bank and inside Israeli cities in the coming weeks, sustaining heightened security risks.

Sep 09.

  • Israel-Syria: Fresh airstrikes will sustain bystander risks in vicinity of military sites across Syria. On 8 September, Syrian state media reported that Israel struck several locations in the vicinity of Homs (Homs governorate), Latakia (Latakia governorate) and Palmyra (Homs, all Syria). The Syrian government condemned the airstrikes and described them as a ‘blatant infringement’ of its sovereignty and regional stability. Israel has not confirmed responsibility for the strikes. However, given its modus operandi in Syria over the past nine months, we assess that Israel likely targeted former military bases and weapons depots. As such, further strikes targeting military locations across Syria (including airports and camps situated inside urban centres) in the coming weeks remain likely, sustaining proximate bystander risks. Even so, we assess that such strikes are unlikely to prompt Syrian retaliation against Israeli troops stationed in Daraa and Quneitra governorates (both Syria) or hinder the ongoing security talks. However, retaliation by rogue Islamist factions that drives clashes with Israeli troops in southern Syria remains a realistic possibility in the coming weeks.

EVENT

The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) conducted an airstrike targeting Hamas’ headquarters in the Katara district of Doha (Qatar). Preliminary reporting indicates that the strike targeted numerous high-ranking members of Hamas’ political bureau, including Khaled Mashal, Khalil al-Hayya, Muhammad Darwish, Nizar Awadallah and Zaher Jabarina. The status of these individuals remains unclear at the time of writing.

SIGNIFICANCE

  • Ceasefire negotiations between Israel and Hamas have stalled in recent weeks as the IDF prepares to expand its ground operations into Gaza City (Gaza Strip, Palestinian Territories). On 7 September, US President Donald Trump issued a ‘last warning’ to Hamas to accept a US-backed ceasefire proposal and release all remaining Israeli hostages in Gaza (see Sibylline Middle East Crisis Update – 8 September 2025).
  • Following the airstrike, Qatar announced the indefinite suspension of mediated ceasefire negotiations.
  • The US embassy in Doha has issued shelter-in-place orders for its facilities; it has also advised all US citizens to shelter-in-place until further notice. However, Qatari airspace remains open at the time of writing.

FORECAST

Mobility disruption across Doha is likely in the coming hours, though flights are unlikely to be impacted; there remains an unlikely but low-level possibility of further airstrikes in Doha in the coming weeks. In the coming hours, mobility disruption in Doha is likely, particularly in the areas around Katara. Road closures and an augmented security presence are also likely to impact travel along highways connecting downtown areas to Hamad International Airport (DOH). However, the strike is unlikely to disrupt operations at DOH significantly in the next 24 hours; Qatar’s airspace will also likely remain open. While further imminent Israeli airstrikes against Hamas and/or Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) members in Doha are unlikely in our assessment, such action remains a low-level possibility in the coming weeks, sustaining heightened security risks across Doha.

The airstrike and subsequent suspension of ceasefire negotiations come ahead of an almost certain intensification of Israeli military operations in Gaza (and associated international backlash). The Israeli airstrike, if successful, will likely have severely undercut the prospects for a resumption in ceasefire negotiations in the coming weeks, due to both a reduced willingness from Hamas to engage in talks and the group’s weakened capabilities (senior personnel are likely to go into hiding). In the absence of negotiations, Israel is highly likely to proceed with its plans to take over Gaza City. We assess that IDF military operations will intensify further in the coming days, including in areas from which civilians have not been evacuated. This is likely to compound international backlash against Israel in the coming days, elevating reputational risks for companies working with the Israeli government, as well as divestment risks and restrictions imposed on the movement of defence goods to Israel. This will possibly further undercut joint initiatives between Israel and various European states.

The risk of retaliatory attacks by Hamas and its supporters against Israeli targets will increase in the coming days. Following the strike, there is now an elevated risk of the Yemen-based Houthis increasing the frequency of their strikes against Israel and Israeli-affiliated vessels in the Red Sea in the coming days. Furthermore, the risk of attacks targeting Israeli nationals across the region will also be heightened, including efforts to lure specific targets to vulnerable locations (known as ‘honey traps’). A slight uptick in rocket launches from Gaza targeting Israel is also a realistic possibility. However, Hamas’ capabilities remain very limited; such attacks are therefore likely to be sporadic, mitigating against central and northern Israel’s exposure to launches. More concerning will be any attempts by Hamas to escalate attacks from the West Bank; any such attempts would drive the risk of small-arms and stabbing attacks across Israel in the coming weeks, particularly in and around Jerusalem (Jerusalem district).

 IRAN

  • Despite its continued engagement with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), Iran’s unwillingness to commit to negotiations with the US will sustain the risk of sanctions being re-imposed.
  • Media outlets affiliated with the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) continue to call for increased economic self-sufficiency and reforms to the governance of the security forces; however, broad reforms remain unlikely.

ISRAEL

  • A successful Houthi attack against Ramon Airport (ETM, Southern district) has underscored the elevated security risks facing southern Israel.

PALESTINIAN TERRITORIES

  • Airstrikes targeting high-rise buildings in Gaza City highlight that Israel has launched its occupation plan for Gaza, as well as the elevated risks facing personnel and residents of the city.
  • Despite increasing pressure from the US, ceasefire negotiations between Israel and Hamas have not demonstrably progressed, underscoring sustained armed conflict risks in Gaza.
  • A recent shooting will likely prompt an intensification of military operations in the West Bank over the coming days, as well as elevated ethno-religious tensions and an increased risk of attacks.

IRAN 

  • Despite its continued engagement with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), Iran’s unwillingness to commit to negotiations with the US will sustain the risk of sanctions being re-imposed. On 5 September, Iranian representatives met with the IAEA in Austria to discuss the possibility of resuming co-operation (see Sibylline Middle East Crisis Update – 7 July 2025). The meeting almost certainly forms part of Iran’s efforts to demonstrate its willingness to engage with international monitors and avoid the re-imposition of UN sanctions following the E3’s (France, Germany and the UK) triggering of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA)’s snapback clause (see Sibylline Middle East Crisis Update – 1 September 2025). However, the meeting is highly unlikely to result in the immediate resumption of co-operation or the continuous and universal monitoring of Iranian nuclear facilities by international observers. As such, the E3 are unlikely to support a temporary extension of the snapback clause, unless Iran agrees to the immediate resumption of nuclear negotiations with the US. In the long term, continued restrictions to IAEA monitoring practices will also sustain significant concern regarding oversight of Iran’s nuclear programme, as well as the risk of resumed Israeli strike action targeting Iran’s research and enrichment facilities (see Sibylline Special Report – 28 August 2025).
  • Media outlets affiliated with the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) continue to call for increased economic self-sufficiency and reforms to the governance of the security forces; however, broad reforms remain unlikely. On 3 September, the IRGC-aligned Tasnim news outlet published an op-ed calling for a substantial re-orientation of Iran’s political, economic and security structures to address a state of ‘no war and no peace’ with ‘the enemy’, a reference to Israel and the US. The op-ed primarily calls for greater flexibility to confront hybrid security threats; it criticises the highly centralised structure of Iran’s security forces. Its demands also include nuclear energy development, increased media censorship (including of online platforms), economic diversification away from crude oil and increased governmental scrutiny of exports. Subsequently, on 7 September, Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei stated that ‘the enemy’ aims to establish conditions of ‘no war, no peace’ with reference to the US-brokered Iran-Israel ceasefire. The rhetorical alignment of these statements underscores Khamenei’s likely support of such measures as part of his and the IRGC’s broader efforts to project an image of engaging in institutional reforms following the Iran-Israel war. However, these efforts likely primarily seek to moderate and deter domestic criticism of the government and security forces rather than to initiate broader reform efforts. As such, wide-ranging shifts across the operational environment within Iran remain unlikely. However, the Iranian authorities will almost certainly continue with their efforts to re-develop the country’s nuclear capabilities in the coming months, while also continuing to monitor, censor and limit media coverage of domestic and international developments intensely. Amid mounting economic pressure, there is also a realistic possibility that the government will further augment export controls and scrutiny of exported products in general, increasing operational disruption, corruption exposure and compliance risks for locally engaged firms.

ISRAEL 

  • A successful Houthi attack against Ramon Airport (ETM, Southern district) has underscored the elevated security risks facing southern Israel. On 7 September, an Iranian-backed Houthi drone directly struck ETM in southern Israel, damaging the arrivals terminal and lightly injuring five individuals; no sirens were triggered. The airport resumed operations two hours after the attack. According to investigations, the drone was part of a swarm of at least four drones, three of which were intercepted by the Israel Defense Forces (IDF); the fourth was mistakenly classified as non-hostile. This is likely due to the proximity of the airport to the Jordanian border and highlights the risk of the Houthis exploiting neighbouring territories to mask their attacks. Given the success of this attack, the Houthis are likely to continue targeting the area, elevating operational disruption risks in southern Israel. Furthermore, Israel is likely to increase its sensitivity vis-à-vis flying ordnance, increasing the risk of Israeli interception operations taking place in the airspace of neighbouring countries. This will increase the risk of debris and shrapnel falling within these neighbouring states’ territories, particularly Jordan, slightly elevating the security risks facing personnel and assets in the vicinity of Israeli interceptions. Despite the successful attack and the likely increase in the Houthis’ targeting of Israeli airports in the coming days, Israel’s air defence capabilities will continue to moderate these risks (broadly). It is likely that Ben Gurion International Airport (TLV) is better protected than ETM due to its location in central Israel and proximity to numerous population centres. We assess that the successful strike on ETM does not indicate that such strikes are equally likely to hit TLV. Even so, there is a realistic possibility that airlines flying to and from Israel will cancel or reduce their operations from ETM and TLV in the coming weeks, elevating the risk of travel disruption.

PALESTINIAN TERRITORIES

  • Airstrikes targeting high-rise buildings in Gaza City highlight that Israel has launched its occupation plan for Gaza, as well as the elevated risks facing personnel and residents of the city. These airstrikes are likely designed to prepare the area for ground operations, which are likely to escalate gradually in the coming two weeks; the IDF will possibly reach full mobilisation levels for the operation within four weeks. The IDF will also possibly attempt to divide the city via military cordons in order to tackle areas therein systematically, limiting the movement of individuals between these areas. However, such a plan will significantly increase the threats to civilians and personnel inhabiting these areas. As such, there is a realistic possibility that the IDF will facilitate limited evacuation corridors in the coming days. However, during the intensification of Israel’s operations, there will also be an elevated risk of IDF strikes against humanitarian-designated areas due to suspected infiltration by militants during evacuations (see Sibylline Middle East Crisis Update – 7 August 2025).
  • Despite increasing pressure from the US, ceasefire negotiations between Israel and Hamas have not demonstrably progressed, underscoring sustained armed conflict risks in Gaza. On 7 September, US President Donald Trump issued a statement calling on Hamas to release all remaining hostages in Gaza, characterising the demand as his ‘last warning’. Trump also stated that Israel had accepted a US-backed ceasefire proposal, likely in reference to a renewed US proposal that would establish a permanent ceasefire in Gaza in exchange for the immediate release of all remaining hostages and Hamas’ eventual disarmament and possible exile from Gaza. Hamas has repeatedly rejected these proposals and subsequently re-iterated its support for the so-called Witkoff proposal, which would establish a temporary ceasefire in Gaza in exchange for the release of several living and deceased hostages. The contrasting statements underscore the persistent deadlock in ceasefire negotiations as Israel continues to intensify its operations in Gaza City (see above). Consequently, the immediate implementation of a ceasefire remains unlikely. However, diplomatic engagement will likely continue in the coming weeks, with the US likely intensifying diplomatic pressure on Hamas through mediators to secure further concessions towards Israel’s negotiating positions.
  • A recent shooting will likely prompt an intensification of military operations in the West Bank over the coming days, as well as elevated ethno-religious tensions and an increased risk of attacks. Earlier on 8 September, two Palestinian gunmen killed at least six people and injured over 20 others in a small arms attack against a bus station and two stationary buses at the Ramot Junction in Jerusalem (Jerusalem district). An armed civilian and a soldier shot and killed the assailants at the scene. No group has claimed responsibility for the incident. According to the initial investigation, the two assailants entered Israel through a gap in the West Bank’s barrier fence. Following the attack, the Israeli security forces closed all the crossings between Israel and the West Bank in the Jerusalem area. Furthermore, the IDF established military cordons around the villages of al-Qubeiba and Qatanna (both Jerusalem governorate, West Bank), where the gunmen were residents. The IDF has also begun to search for suspected collaborators. At the time of writing, the Shin Bet, Israel’s internal security agency, announced that it had detained a suspect in East Jerusalem. The attack highlights the elevated security risks across Israel – particularly in Jerusalem and the West Bank – ahead of the Jewish holidays (22-24 September, 1-2 October and 6-14 October; see Sibylline Middle East Crisis Update – 4 September 2025).

In the coming hours and days, the IDF is likely to intensify its military operations across the West Bank, particularly near Ramallah (Ramallah and al-Bireh governorate). This will likely include an increased proliferation of checkpoints across the territory, driving travel disruption and the risk of arbitrary arrest and detention. Furthermore, the IDF is likely to carry out raids in villages and cities across the West Bank; associated armed clashes with militants are possible, driving crossfire risks for proximate personnel and assets. Such operations are also likely to drive radicalisation among Palestinian residents, increasing the risk of attacks taking place in the following weeks and months.

In response to the incident, Israeli settlers and extremists are highly likely to launch retaliatory attacks on Palestinian villages, particularly those around al-Qubeiba and Qatanna. Such attacks would significantly elevate ethno-religious tensions in the West Bank, driving further cycles of violence between Palestinians and Israelis, including around religious sites, such as the Cave of the Patriarchs in Hebron (Hebron governorate). Additionally, there is a realistic possibility that Israel’s security agencies will restrict Israelis’ ability to enter religious places within the West Bank, elevating the risk of civil disobedience. We assess that attacks on Palestinian villages and restrictions around religious sites would increase the risk of clashes between the Israeli security forces and Israeli extremists, driving security risks around IDF bases.

RED SEA

  • Israel-Yemen: Israeli airstrikes against Houthi targets in Yemen are likely to increase in frequency and intensity following the Houthi drone attack on ETM (see above). Targets will likely include dual-use infrastructure such as electric power stations, logistical hubs and ports, as well as (possibly) governmental buildings, institutions and symbolic centres. There is also a realistic possibility that Israel will attempt to increase its interception of weapons being smuggled to the Houthis, including through strikes on suspected vessels. However, any such operations are unlikely to impact the Houthis’ capabilities significantly, sustaining the threat posed by the group in the Red Sea and across Israel in the coming weeks.

REGIONAL AND GLOBAL DEVELOPMENTS

Developments

  • Israel-UK: Large-scale arrests of pro-Palestine activists will highly likely prompt further protests, elevating the risk of clashes with the security forces in the coming weeks. On 7 September, the Metropolitan Police arrested 890 protesters at a demonstration in London (UK) against the ban on the Palestine Action (PA) group. The authorities announced that 857 people were arrested under the Terrorism Act for showing support for a proscribed group, while 33 people were arrested for other offences, including 17 for assaults on police officers. The protest organisers claim that the demonstration was peaceful. Nevertheless, we assess that the arrests are highly likely to trigger further reactionary protests by the pro-Palestine group in the coming days, particularly during the expected visit to London by Israeli President Isaac Herzog on 10-11 September. We assess that PA activists are likely to continue operating via proxy groups, as well as by infiltrating legitimate protest movements to radicalise participants, likely increasing the severity of policing around pro-Palestine marches in the UK. Protests by PA and affiliated groups are likely to target the London offices of UK and international corporations that work with the Israeli government and related entities. This will increase the risk of further altercations in central areas of London in the coming weeks. Activists are also likely to target the UK offices and production facilities of the Israeli defence company Elbit Systems.
  • Israel-Spain: The closure of Spanish ports and airspace to vessels and aircraft transporting arms to Israel will raise compliance risks for shipping and logistics companies with a presence in both countries. Earlier on 8 September, the Spanish government stated it would ban Israel-bound ships and aircraft carrying weapons from docking at Spanish ports or entering Spanish airspace. The government added that it will also increase aid to the Palestinian Authority and the UN Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA) and impose an embargo on goods made in Israeli settlements in the West Bank. In response, Israel banned Spanish Labour Minister Yolanda Diaz and Youth Minister Sira Rego from entering Israel. Meanwhile, at the time of writing, Spain officially recalled its ambassador from Israel. We assess that the Spanish measures will almost certainly increase compliance risks for shipping, logistics, tourism and airline companies with a presence in both countries, driving operational disruption risks through H2 2025. We also assess these risks are liable to increase significantly if the IDF advances its plans to occupy Gaza City in the coming weeks (which would likely lead to a deterioration of humanitarian conditions in the strip). Notably, the Spanish measures also came a day after a pro-Palestine activist caused a minor crash during Stage 15 of the Vuelta a España cycling race. The incident underscores the sustained physical security risks facing Israeli tourists and athletes in Spain and other European countries with significant pro-Palestine movements during such events (see Sibylline Middle East Crisis Update – 4 September 2025).

Sep 08.

  • Israel: Shooting will drive further ethno-religious violence in West Bank. Earlier on 8 September, two gunmen killed at least five people and injured over 20 others in a small arms attack on bus passengers at the Ramot Junction in Jerusalem (Jerusalem district). An armed civilian and a soldier shot and killed the gunmen on the scene. No group has claimed responsibility, but Hamas hailed the attack and called on West Bank Palestinians to escalate the confrontation with the Israelis. Meanwhile, the Israeli security forces are conducting searches for other suspects while also surrounding villages near Ramallah. The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) will almost certainly increase the scope and frequency of its operations around the Ramallah area, elevating risks of retaliatory attacks from radical Palestinian cells. We further assess that the attack will almost certainly prompt radical settlers in the West Bank to conduct retaliatory attacks against Palestinians in the coming days, fuelling the existing cycle of ethno-religious violence. Risks of mutual attacks against religious sites, farms and business assets in the West Bank, as well as further shootings, will increase in the coming days.
  • Turkey: Protest risks will increase following court ruling against provincial opposition leader. Late on 7 September, the authorities in Istanbul (Istanbul province) imposed a temporary ban on public gatherings in the city’s Beşiktaş, Beyoğlu, Eyüpsultan, Kağıthane, Sarıyer and Şişli districts. The police also barricaded areas around the opposition Republican People’s Party (CHP) headquarters in Sarıyer. Access to online platforms, including Facebook, Instagram, TikTok, WhatsApp and YouTube, has also been restricted across the country. These measures follow the CHP’s call for demonstrations in protest against a court ruling appointing trustees to the party’s provincial administration in Istanbul. The internet restrictions highlight ongoing threats to freedom of expression in Turkey and underline the increased regulatory and operational risks for technology firms operating in the country. We assess that, despite the restrictions, large gatherings will remain a realistic possibility, particularly near the CHP office in Sarıyer and possibly close to the Istanbul Metropolitan Municipality building in Fatih district. This will elevate risks of sporadic clashes between protesters and the authorities. In the event of clashes, the security forces will likely use water cannons, tear gas and rubber bullets to disperse crowds and employ arbitrary stop-and-search practices, elevating security risks for personnel and assets. (Source: Sibylline)

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Founded in 1987, Exensor Technology is a world leading supplier of Networked Unattended Ground Sensor (UGS) Systems providing tailored sensor solutions to customers all over the world. From our Headquarters in Lund Sweden, our centre of expertise in Network Communications at Communications Research Lab in Kalmar Sweden and our Production site outside of Basingstoke UK, we design, develop and produce latest state of the art rugged UGS solutions at the highest quality to meet the most stringent demands of our customers. Our systems are in operation and used in a wide number of Military as well as Home land Security applications worldwide. The modular nature of the system ensures any external sensor can be integrated, providing the user with a fully meshed “silent” network capable of self-healing. Exensor Technology will continue to lead the field in UGS technology, provide our customers with excellent customer service and a bespoke package able to meet every need.

A CNIM Group Company

 

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