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23 Sep 25. S. Africa – Increasing defence spending to 1.5% of GDP will take many years – Motshekga. Increasing South Africa’s defence budget to 1.5% of GDP as recommended by the South African National Defence Force’s (SANDF’s) Journey to Greatness plan will take many years, and spending will only reach over 2% of GDP in 30 years’ time. This is according to Defence and Military Veterans Minister Angie Motshekga, who was answering a parliamentary question on 11 July. Maliyakhe Shelembe of the Democratic Alliance wanted to know over what time frame is the 1.5% increase anticipated. Motshekga replied that “the incremental growth of the defence funding will happen over six multi Medium Term Strategic Framework Periods.” Each of these is five years long. The Minister added that defence spending would grow from the 0.67% at present to 1.35% over a period of six years and hit 2.40% on year 30. When asked how the increase is reconciled with the current budget ceilings confirmed by the National Treasury, Motshekga said an increase would “require a strategic decision leading to a government policy resolution on the new defence funding model that will allow an injection on the current budget ceilings by National Treasury.”
“The 1.5% defence funding is viewed as an intervention towards incremental allocation that will allow implementation of reconfiguration and future force phases of the SA National Defence Force,” Motshekga concluded.
There has been much talk of increasing defence spending to 1.5% of GDP in recent times, particularly since President Cyril Ramaphosa issued such a directive in 2023. Motshekga has also been pushing for this, particularly after the July defence budget vote debate. According to the Department of Defence, it is underfunded by at least 50%. Deputy Defence Minister Bantu Holomisa earlier this year complained that “Every minister I can think of has been complaining since time immemorial that defence is declining. They have even ignored the president in 2023 who said the budget of defence must move from 0.75% of the GDP to 1.5% of the GDP. What have they done?” He said Parliament and the Government of National Unity must establish a structured, accountable process to implement resolutions, especially those related to defence and oversight bodies. Chief of the South African Navy, Vice Admiral Monde Lobese, is another vocal critic of defence underfunding, accusing National Treasury of sabotaging the SANDF by refusing to release sufficient funds. Answering another question in July from Shelembe, Motshekga revealed that the Journey to Greatness plan is unfunded, although some objectives have been prioritised and included in the Medium Term Development Plan (MTDP). The Journey to Greatness plan was developed in 2022 and approved for promulgation in 2023, she said but “is yet to be scheduled for the Cabinet consumption.” (Source: https://www.defenceweb.co.za/)
23 Sep 25. “The war in Ukraine has diverted Russian resources and attention away from critical domestic security problems, creating a vulnerability to terrorism, corruption, regional instability and post-war social challenges.” This is the view expressed in How Russia’s War in Ukraine is Creating Domestic Security Gaps, a new RUSI research report by Emily Ferris, which says that Russia’s preoccupation with its war in Ukraine is undermining its ability to manage urgent domestic security challenges. The research said that by focusing the Kremlin’s political, financial, and human resources on the war, domestic terrorism has been deprioritised, Chechnya risks instability with the uncertain health of its leader, systemic corruption has hollowed out border defences, and the return of hundreds of thousands of veterans presents future social and political challenges that Moscow may not be able to control. The report says the war has deepened pre-existing weaknesses in Russia’s security system and these vulnerabilities risk becoming more destabilising if left unaddressed. The research concludes that the war has become the “entire organisational logic” of President Putin’s governing system, fixated on demonising the West, and absorbing resources and attention in ways that leave Russia dangerously exposed to long-term domestic fragility.
Key Findings
- Counterterrorism failures expose blind spots. The report notes the increased politicisation of the Federal Security Service (FSB) in service of identifying political opponents rather than investigating terrorism. It says the Crocus City Hall attack in Moscow in 2024, by gunmen pledging allegiance to the Islamic State in Khorasan, should have been anticipated. The report says: “The FSB’s focus on targeting political opponents and those critical of the war has sidelined the investigation of domestic terrorism…A series of fatal terrorist attacks within Russia since the war began have highlighted intelligence failures across the board, a deep distrust of the West, and the Kremlin’s greater interest in the pursuit of Russia’s political opponents than the investigation of terrorist threats…The resurgence of terrorism in Russia since the war began is one of the starkest reminders of the consequences of ignoring intelligence assessments.”
- Demobilised veterans could fuel political instability in future. The report says: “There is a risk that demobilised veterans, potentially dissatisfied with the outcome of the war, might be able to translate their grievances into a political organisation…The Kremlin has anticipated this threat and has set up several initiatives to contain it, absorb the veterans and neutralise them in advance…however, the Kremlin’s fixes are not failsafe…The question remains as to whether the veterans as a group could pose a longer-term political problem for Russia.”
- Chechnya’s uncertain succession poses risks. The report considers the complex and dynamic relationship between President Putin and Chechen leader Ramzan Kadyrov: “It is likely that frequent rumours about the ill-health of Chechen strongman Ramzan Kadyrov will force the Kremlin to revisit succession plans for the region sooner than expected, with potentially far-reaching political and security consequences for stability in the North Caucasus if they are not handled with care…Kadyrov’s attempts in the past year to move his close family out of political power in Chechnya, seek refuge abroad and broker relationships of his own in the Gulf indicate a growing overreach of his position that suggest his actions are only partially under the Kremlin’s control.”
- Corruption has undermined border security. The report says: “The Ukrainian armed forces’ incursions into Kursk, on Russia’s southern border, meant that for several months in 2024 Russia was not in control of its own borders. This was a vulnerability that emerged as a direct result of a corrupt system in which Russia’s regional elites have enriched themselves at the expense of national security. The corruption networks around the then-regional governor of Kursk, and in procurement and construction that failed to shore up Russia’s civilian defences, had security consequences for the war…Roman Starovoit, the then-regional governor [and future Transport Minister]…and his associates had embezzled bns in kickbacks from construction companies hired to deal with Kursk’s defences…The Kursk incursions and Russia’s vulnerable border with Ukraine have also demonstrated an interesting new political dimension, as it has delineated more clearly the limits of elite patronage networks. Corrupt practices that had led to weak border defences and a resulting security problem meant that high-level officials were dismissed despite their strong personal connections to powerful oligarchs, who are themselves close to Putin.”
Conclusion
With Russian State Duma 2026 elections looming, the research illustrates how Russia’s priorities and decision-making have shifted since the war against Ukraine began. It concludes that it would be premature to suggest that the potential weaknesses identified are a sign of imminent regime fragility, but they do reflect an ongoing struggle for limited resources. As the war has become the entire organisational logic of the political system, it will necessarily continue to be the priority for attention and funding. It is likely that the longer the war goes on, additional security gaps will emerge – either politically or practically – and the Kremlin’s resources will be spread even more thinly. While the Kremlin has shown that it can suppress dissent and neutralise immediate crises, its solutions are often temporary, reactive, and politicised. The report warns that if its domestic vulnerabilities are not carefully managed, they could undermine the very stability that Putin has sought to guarantee, with consequences that will be felt well beyond Russia’s borders. (Source:: RUSI)
22 Sep 25. US-Venezuela: Military strikes on suspected drug traffickers will sustain elevated regional tensions. On 19 September, US President Donald Trump announced that a military strike on a suspected drug trafficking vessel killed three people in the Caribbean Sea. The attack marks the third US strike on suspected drug traffickers in the region since 2 September. The US currently has a significant military deployment operating in the Caribbean Sea, composed of at least eight warships and various aerial assets based in Puerto Rico. On 20 September, President Trump called on the Venezuelan government to accept deported prisoners (without providing any details on their identities), warning Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro that ‘the price you pay will be incalculable’ if he refused the US request. Reports on 20 September indicated that President Maduro had offered to engage in direct talks with US Special Presidential Envoy Richard Grenell, aiming to improve bilateral relations. We assess that President Maduro’s offer indicates his willingness to discuss possible concessions (such as accepting deportation flights) in exchange for a US military drawdown in the short-to-medium term. However, if bilateral negotiations fail, further US strikes on suspected drug trafficking vessels are highly likely. Nevertheless, armed conflict risks remain low. (Source: Sibylline)
22 Sep 25. Afghanistan-US: Demands to regain air base will drive bilateral tensions. On 21 September, the Taliban government stated that ‘Afghanistan’s independence and territorial integrity are of the utmost importance’, encouraging the US to uphold past agreements. This comes in response to US President Donald Trump’s interest in reacquiring the Bagram Air Base, coupled with comments stating that ‘bad things’ will happen if the US is unable to do so. This airfield is located 31 miles (50km) north of the capital Kabul and was the US’ largest military site in Afghanistan; the Taliban government took over the base in 2021 following the US’ withdrawal. Afghan officials have rejected President Trump’s demands and criticised his interest in renewing US presence in the country. The Taliban government will be highly likely reluctant to comply with such demands, while China (which has worked to foster ties with the Taliban government since 2021) has also criticised the demands, stating that it would be invested in not allowing the US to retake control of the Bagram Air Base. We assess that continued US demands to regain the air base will drive bilateral tensions, possible jeopardising future prisoner exchanges. (Source: Sibylline)
22 Sep 25. South Sudan: Vice president’s trial, escalating clashes will increase armed conflict risks. On 22 September, Vice President Riek Machar and seven co-defendants from his Sudan People’s Liberation Movement – In Opposition (SPLM-IO) party will appear in court in the capital Juba. Machar faces multiple charges for his alleged involvement in attacks against the South Sudanese armed forces (SSPDF) in March (see Sibylline Special Report – 8 April 2025). Machar’s court appearance comes amid escalating clashes between the SSPDF and SPLM-IO-affiliated militias, which killed at least 48 people in Nasir county (Upper Nile state) on 20 September. Developments in Machar’s case and proliferating clashes will increase the risk of broader SPLM-IO and affiliate mobilisation in the coming weeks. Such mobilisation is highly likely to trigger escalatory clashes with SSPDF units, particularly in Jonglei and Upper Nile states, compounding nationwide conflict escalation risks. Such conditions will increase the risk of a broader deterioration in security conditions, and exacerbate the threat to life for NGO staff, including in Juba. We assess that the SSPDF will likely adopt an elevated posture in the city and will possibly establish movement restrictions, limiting the feasibility of staff evacuation. (Source: Sibylline)
19 Sep 25. Department of War and Mongolian Ministry of Defense Conduct Bilateral Defense Framework. Mr. Alvaro Smith, Deputy Assistant Secretary of War (DASW) for China, Taiwan, and Mongolia and Major General Gankhuyag Davagdorj, State Secretary of the Ministry of Defense of Mongolia (MOD) conducted the annual U.S.-Mongolia Bilateral Defense Forum (BDF) meeting on September 19, 2025. The two officials affirmed their commitment to deepening bilateral defense relations based on mutual interest and a common-sense approach to security and prosperity in the Asia-Pacific region. They discussed regional security matters as well as concrete opportunities to further enhance security cooperation, including through exercises, training, security assistance, and defense equipment sales. They also discussed areas where additional defense expenditure by Mongolia could significantly improve the Mongolian Armed Forces’ capabilities and readiness. DASW Smith commended Mongolia for its embodiment of the warrior ethos and its engagement in peacekeeping operations. Mongolia and the United States emphasized the importance of their Strategic Third Neighbor Partnership in advancing the security and economic prosperity of both countries. (Source: U.S. DoD)
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