News in Brief

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04 Sep 25. Thailand: Long-term stability risks will persist despite likely formation of minority government. Thailand’s House of Representatives is set to vote for a new prime minister at around 1000hrs (local time) on 5 September. Security around Sappaya-Sapasathan (the meeting place of the National Assembly) in the capital Bangkok will likely be heightened, driving limited localised transport disruption. Ahead of the vote, the ruling Pheu Thai party announced it would nominate Chaikasem Nistiri for the role. This comes after Pheu Thai’s request to the king to dissolve the parliament was reportedly rejected earlier this week. We assess that the conservative opposition Bhumjaithai party’s leader, Anutin Charnvirakul, is most likely to prevail, even though the current coalition does not enjoy a majority. This is due to a confidence and supply agreement between Bhumjaithai and the People’s Party (PPLE) that was announced on 3 September (which includes a promise to hold elections within four months). Given the likely formation of a minority government and prospects for new elections, political uncertainty will highly likely persist.  (Source: Sibylline)

 

02 Sep 25. Iran says US missile demands block path to nuclear talks. The path to nuclear negotiations between Iran and the United States is not closed but U.S. demands for curbs on Iranian missiles are obstructing prospects for talks, a senior Iranian official said on Tuesday. A sixth round of Iran-U.S. talks was suspended after the start of a 12-day war in June, in which Israel and the U.S. struck Iranian nuclear facilities and Iran retaliated with waves of ballistic missiles against Israel.

“We indeed pursue rational negotiations. By raising unrealisable issues such as missile restrictions, they set a path that negates any talks,” the secretary of Iran’s Supreme National Security Council, Ali Larijani, said in a post on X.

Western countries fear Iran’s uranium enrichment programme could yield material for an atomic warhead and that it seeks to develop a ballistic missile to carry one. Iran says its nuclear programme is only for electricity generation and other civilian uses and that it is enriching uranium as fuel for these purposes. (Source: Reuters)

 

03 Sep 25. China’s Xi projects power at military parade with Putin and Kim.

• Summary
• Russia’s Putin, North Korea’s Kim join Xi Jinping in Beijing
• Tiananmen Square parade shows off latest military hardware
• Event marks anniversary of Japan’s defeat in World War Two
• Western leaders have largely shunned Beijing spectacle
• Xi said world faces peace or war in keynote speech

Chinese President Xi Jinping warned the world was facing a choice between peace or war at a massive military parade in Beijing on Wednesday, flanked by Russia’s Vladimir Putin and North Korea’s Kim Jong Un in an unprecedented show of force. The event to mark 80 years since Japan’s defeat at the end of World War Two was largely shunned by Western leaders, with Putin and Kim – pariahs in the West due to the Ukraine war and Kim’s nuclear ambitions – the guests of honour. (Source: Reuters)

 

02 Sep 25. China: Security measures will be heightened during landmark military parade in Beijing. On 3 September, China will hold its largest-ever military parade in the capital Beijing to mark the 80th anniversary of Japan’s surrender at the end of World War 2. The parade will begin at 0900hrs (local time) at Tiananmen Square and proceed along Chang’an Avenue. It is expected to last approximately 70 minutes. China’s People’s Liberation Army (PLA) will display its most advanced military hardware, including hypersonic weapons and unmanned underwater drones. Around 26 foreign heads of state, including Russian President Vladimir Putin and North Korean leader Kim Jong-un, will attend. There will be an elevated security force presence across the capital with additional checkpoints around the city centre, driving travel disruption. Road diversions and subway line closures will also be highly likely. We assess that the authorities will almost certainly increase content moderation and censorship online, while virtual private networks (VPNs) will likely be unreliable during this period. (Source: Sibylline)

 

29 Aug 25.  Mozambique, Rwanda sign Status of Forces agreement 4 years after first troop deployment.  Mozambique and Rwanda signed a Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) on Wednesday in Kigali, establishing the legal framework for the Rwandan troops deployed to support counter-terrorism operations in Cabo Delgado, the office of President Daniel Chapo announced in a statement. The agreement was signed by the defence ministers of the two countries, Juvenal Marizamunda of Rwanda and Cristóvão Chume of Mozambique, during President Chapo’s working visit to Rwanda, which began on Wednesday. The Head of State is accompanied by ministers from key sectors of his government, including Defence, Finance, Foreign Affairs, and Development. This is the first time the signing of a SOFA has been publicly announced to regulate the operations of Rwandan forces in Mozambique, who were first deployed to Cabo Delgado in July 2021. Initially, the contingent numbered around one thousand soldiers and police officers, but this has reportedly grown to about five thousand. A SOFA governs issues such as privileges and immunities, jurisdiction over offences committed by military personnel, customs duties, and administrative arrangements for bases. It does not grant foreign forces the right of presence but instead regulates their operations once a legal basis for their deployment has been established. The absence of a SOFA for more than four years of Rwandan military presence in Cabo Delgado – and in Nampula, where Mozambican Defence Forces receive training – exposes the secrecy surrounding the original agreement. Signed under former President Filipe Nyusi, the arrangement was never submitted to Parliament for ratification, and essential details, such as the duration of the deployment and terms of its renewal, remain undisclosed. Rwandan media cite President Paul Kagame as stressing that it is Africa’s mission to fight jihadist insurgencies on the continent, warning that outsourcing this responsibility to external actors would not build lasting peace or development. The stance reinforces Rwanda’s projection as a continental military power. The Status of Forces Agreement comes as insurgents linked to the Islamic State continue to stage attacks. On Monday 25 August, jihadist militants captured and killed two men in Uvilili village, about 30 kilometres south of TotalEnergies’ Afungi camp in Palma district. The renewed wave of attacks has prompted TotalEnergies to tighten security, instructing subcontractors to keep their staff within the camp perimeter. Mozambique’s Defence and Security Forces have deployed troops to the area, but Monday’s assault demonstrates that the insurgent threat remains active. According to local sources, the victims from Uvilili were found in the nearby bush while carrying out routine farming activities. The Islamic State claimed responsibility on Tuesday, stating via its propaganda channels that “caliphate soldiers captured and killed three Christians”. Unlike on previous occasions, the group did not publish images. There is no evidence that the victims were, in fact, Christians. Such claims form part of IS propaganda portraying itself as sparing Muslims.

“It is true they killed two people. The insurgents encountered them in the bush, while many others remained in the village, which is not far from the spot,” a local resident told MOZTIMES.

Another resident said the area where the victims were killed is a known insurgent corridor. “That forest has always been a preferred route for insurgents. They use it to reach the coast to collect fish and, on their return, pass through the same path inland.” Since August, insurgents have carried out raids on several Palma villages, including Maputo, Mute, Maganja and Pundanhar, targeting both civilians and military positions. Also on Monday, insurgents killed four civilians in the village of Mapate, Muidumbe district, Cabo Delgado. Between 20 July and 3 August 2025, intensified attacks by non-state armed groups in Muidumbe, Ancuabe and Chiure displaced about 57 000 people (13 300 families). (Source: https://www.defenceweb.co.za/)

 

29 Aug 25. Thailand: Removal of prime minister will drive political uncertainty in coming weeks. Earlier on 29 August, the Constitutional Court dismissed Paetongtarn Shinawatra as prime minister. It ruled that she had violated ethical standards in relation to a leaked call with the former Cambodian prime minister, Hun Sen. Paetongtarn has accepted the court’s decision, which will likely placate groups calling for her removal and reduce immediate unrest risks. The verdict, which we assessed as the most likely outcome , means that the House of Representatives (lower house) will have to elect a new prime minister. Paetongtarn’s Pheu Thai Party will likely nominate Chaikasem Nitisiri, while Anutin Charnvirakul from the opposition conservative Bhumjaithai Party will likely also try and secure enough support. The fragile nature of the current ruling coalition means the result of the election is uncertain. There is a realistic possibility that the next government will have a low level of stability, given the tense political environment, sustaining uncertainty and policy stagnation risks.  (Source: Sibylline)

 

29 Aug 25. India: Security will be significantly heightened in Bihar following militant alert. On 28 August, local media reported that security had been tightened across Bihar state after intelligence alleged that three Pakistani members of the Jaish-e-Mohammed (JeM) militant group had infiltrated the state through Nepal earlier this month. The police have issued photographs of the individuals and announced a reward for information leading to their capture. Over the coming months, senior politicians, including Prime Minister Narendra Modi, are set to campaign in Bihar ahead of the state’s legislative assembly elections, which are due to take place in October or November. There will almost certainly be a heightened security force presence at airports, border checkpoints, tourist sites and other transportation hubs. We assess that the security forces’ enhanced counter-terrorism capabilities will mitigate the risk of a mass-casualty attack. However, any such incident would substantially elevate tensions with Pakistan, which India typically blames for terrorist attacks in its territory, driving the risk of renewed hostilities. (Source: Sibylline)

 

28 Aug 25. Thriving Japan defence partnership boosting UK jobs and investment. The Defence Secretary met Japanese PM Ishiba and his counterpart, Minister Nakatani, while welcoming the Carrier Strike Group deployment to Tokyo. New figures reveal millions of pounds of investment and thousands of British jobs created through the UK-Japan defence relationship as Defence Secretary John Healey visits Japan for the first time.  The Defence Secretary announced today (29 August) that the UK’s Future Combat Air System programme supports over 4,500 British jobs across the UK, including in the South West, North West and Scotland. At the core of the programme is the trilateral Global Combat Air Programme (GCAP) partnership between the UK, Japan and Italy to deliver a next-generation combat aircraft. Industry research and development spending has also increased by more than £100 m to over £700 m, demonstrating how international partnerships drive UK investment and skilled employment.  The significant progress made by GCAP was acknowledged in a joint statement issued following a meeting between the Defence Secretary and his Japanese counterpart, Minister Nakatani. The defence partnership between the UK and Japan directly supports the government’s Plan for Change, kickstarting economic growth at home through defence.  The Defence Secretary also welcomed HMS Prince of Wales and the wider Carrier Strike Group into Tokyo and addressed its crew, strengthening the UK’s partnership with Japan and demonstrating the government’s commitment to keeping Britain secure at home and strong abroad.  The Royal Navy flagship is hosting the two-day Pacific Future Forum, an international summit bringing together defence and industry leaders to help shape responses to the defence challenges facing the UK and its allies.

Defence Secretary, John Healey MP said: “The UK-Japan partnership is one of the strongest in the Indo-Pacific and continues to deliver real benefits for both countries through programmes like GCAP.

It was a privilege to welcome the sailors, soldiers and aviators on board HMS Prince of Wales to Japan and thank them for their tireless work on this deployment.  The Carrier Strike Group helps the UK to strengthen alliances and cement new partnerships, ensuring the UK is secure at home and strong abroad. The visit by the Carrier Strike Group forms part of Operation Highmast, the UK’s largest naval deployment in a generation, starting over four months ago and involving nearly 4,000 personnel across the Royal Navy, British Army and Royal Air Force.” HMS Prince of Wales exemplifies British naval engineering excellence, carrying up to 24 F-35B Lightning II fighter jets in the largest concentration of fifth-generation aircraft ever deployed by the Royal Navy.   Operation Highmast showcases the UK’s enduring commitment to security of the Indo-Pacific and beyond, engaging with 30 countries through exercises, operations, and visits across the Mediterranean, Middle East, South East Asia, Japan, Republic of Korea, and Australia.  The visit builds on unprecedented military cooperation between Britain and Japan, with the UK being the first European partner to exercise bilaterally on Japanese soil through Exercise Vigilant Isles. RAF and Royal Navy personnel continue to strengthen interoperability with Japanese forces, including the historic first landing of a UK F-35B fighter on a Japanese ship earlier this month. (Source: https://www.gov.uk/)

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Military And Security Developments

Sep 05.

• Israel-Palestinian Territories: Settler attack will elevate ethno-religious tensions, risk of reprisals. On the night of 4-5 September, a group of Israeli settlers infiltrated the Palestinian village of Khallit al-Dabe’ (Hebron governorate), where they attacked civilians, vandalised cars and damaged a solar power system. Local residents claim that at least 20 individuals were injured in the incident, with three individuals hospitalised as a result. The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) and Israeli police later arrived at the village but did not identify any suspects. The incident highlights the increasing intensity of Israeli settler attacks against Palestinians and the expansion of these attacks into the southern West Bank. The attack will further elevate ethno-religious tensions and the likelihood of radicalisation, driving militant activity and terror risks in the area over the coming months. These risks will be particularly acute across Jerusalem (Jerusalem district) and the West Bank over the next two months amid the various upcoming Jewish holidays (22-24 September, 1-2 October and 6-14 October). We assess these risks will likely drive the Israeli security forces to adopt an augmented posture in the West Bank, increasing travel disruption.
• Iraq: Inspections by navy will elevate compliance risks for shipping companies. On 4 September, the Iraqi navy carried out inspection and protection operations for oil and commercial tankers before they docked at the Basra oil terminal. The operations included checking crew members, verifying official documents – including permits – and conducting comprehensive inspections of arriving tankers. The Iraqi authorities stated that the primary objective was to curb smuggling activities and establish full control over the port. We assess that the Iraqi navy will possibly conduct a series of similar inspections at Basra’s port over the coming weeks in a bid to address repeated US concerns regarding the smuggling of Iranian crude oil in the Gulf region. Such measures will elevate compliance risks for shipping and logistics companies operating at Basra’s port throughout H2 2025. We also assess that the navy will likely augment its presence in the Gulf by increasing the frequency and scope of its patrols, partially elevating the risk of clashes with fuel smugglers in Gulf waters.

Sep 04.
IRAN
• The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) updated its estimates of Iran’s pre-war uranium stockpiles, underscoring the likelihood of long-term regional tensions and the risk of Israeli airstrikes. On 3 September, the Associated Press published details of a confidential IAEA report estimating that Iran accrued an additional 32.3kg of 60% enriched uranium from 17 May to 13 June. This indicates that Iran possessed a 440.9kg stockpile of 60% enriched uranium before the start of the Iran-Israel war. If enriched to 90%, this stockpile would be sufficient to construct at least ten nuclear munitions. Iran’s uranium stockpiles remain unaccounted for following Israeli and US airstrikes on key nuclear facilities during the Iran-Israel war. Although the stockpile almost certainly remains intact, there is a realistic possibility that the extent of the destruction at the Isfahan (Isfahan province), Fordow (Qom province) and Natanz (Natanz province) facilities has rendered it inaccessible. More broadly, Iran likely remains unable to develop nuclear weapons rapidly due to substantial damage to its enrichment, weaponisation and missile development capabilities resulting from the Iran-Israel war (see Sibylline Special Report – 20 June 2025). Even so, demonstrable Iranian efforts to re-constitute these capabilities would increase the risk of Israeli strike action targeting nuclear facilities; covert operations to disrupt efforts to access buried stockpiles will also almost certainly continue in the coming months.
• Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian attended the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) summit in China, underscoring Iran’s deepening ties with China and Russia. Iran’s delegation also held bilateral meetings with Chinese and Russian officials in attendance. These discussions centred on advancing economic integration and diplomatic co-ordination, particularly on multilateral and nuclear issues. The meetings underscore Iran’s intensifying efforts to consolidate diplomatic support for its nuclear development programme, particularly following the E3’s (France, Germany and the UK) initiation of efforts to re-apply UN sanctions on Iran for violating its commitments under the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA; see Sibylline Middle East Crisis Update – 1 September 2025). Both China and Russia have repeatedly affirmed their support for Iran’s ‘right’ to develop its nuclear programme and will highly likely attempt to leverage their positions on the UN Security Council to delay the implementation of sanctions by calling for the unconditional extension of the JCPOA’s snapback clause. However, the E3 are unlikely to agree to an extension unless Iran engages in negotiations with the US, sustaining the risk of sanctions being re-implemented in the short-to-medium term. The meetings also underscore intensifying Iranian efforts to deepen military trade ties with Russia and China so as to reconstitute its security forces’ capacity following the Iran-Israel war (see Sibylline Special Report – 20 June 2025). Such efforts are highly unlikely to be effective in the short term, sustaining Iranian vulnerability to a resumption of Israeli strike action (see above).
ISRAEL
• Violent outbreaks at pro-ceasefire protests in Jerusalem (Jerusalem district) highlight the elevated security and travel risks in the coming days. On 3 September, the families of hostages in Gaza launched a protest campaign in Jerusalem; they also announced plans to continue demonstrations throughout the weekend (Friday-Saturday). During the demonstrations on 3 September, several protesters set fire to rubbish bins near the prime minister’s residence in the Rehavia and Givat Ram neighbourhoods (both Jerusalem). Throughout the day, protesters blocked key thoroughfares across Jerusalem, including the light railway. The Israeli police deployed mounted units; they used tear gas and water cannons to disperse protesters, and also made several arrests. Protests are likely to continue throughout the coming days, though with a lower intensity. Even so, travel disruption across the city is highly likely in the coming days. There is a realistic possibility that protesters will sporadically erect roadblocks, further elevating disruption and driving the likelihood of the police using excessive force. It is unlikely that the outbreak of violence on 3 September represents a decisive shift in protesters’ tactics; we also assess that such instances are unlikely to become a common occurrence. However, the risks facing assets will remain elevated, especially around Rehavia and Givat Ram, as well as along Jaffa Road and near the entrance to the city on Highway 1. The largest protest is planned for 6 September at around 2030hrs (local time) at the Paris Square (Jerusalem); the event is likely to elevate traffic disruption significantly. The timing will also exacerbate the risk of clashes with local ultra-Orthodox residents protesting against the breaking of the Shabbat, particularly in the event that demonstrators gather before 1936hrs (the end of Shabbat). There is a realistic possibility that following the conclusion of the main demonstration on 6 September, individual protester groups will move to block routes across the city and cause further disruption, elevating the risk of clashes between protesters and the police.
PALESTINIAN TERRITORIES
• Hamas’ continued visibility in Gaza’s governance – despite the escalating Israeli offensive – underscores the long-term challenges involved in securing a ceasefire and post-war governance structure. On 2 September, local media reported that the IDF had begun expanding ground operations into the Sheikh Radwan area, one of the most densely populated neighbourhoods in Gaza City. Intensifying operations will almost certainly continue in the coming week, sustaining critical threats to life for locally engaged staff and compounding international scrutiny of Israel and Israeli-linked companies. However, despite expanding IDF operations, Hamas continues to exercise significant control over Gaza’s social and economic governance. On 3 September, Hamas published footage allegedly showing its police forces in Khan Yunis (southern Gaza) assaulting numerous merchants and cash dealers who were allegedly charging civilians 50% commission to withdraw cash. Gaza faces a severe liquidity crisis due to its broad isolation from the international financial system, while the majority of banking facilities, ATMs and currency exchanges are non-operational due to the Israel-Hamas war. The incident underscores widespread price gauging in Gaza’s cash-based economy, as well as Hamas’ continued capacity to police commercial operations, particularly the sale of food and consumable goods. Such conditions underscore the long-term governance risks within Gaza, particularly given Israel’s conditioning of a permanent ceasefire on the demobilisation of Hamas and its removal from formal governance systems within Gaza.
• The upcoming UN General Assembly and UN General Debate will likely trigger increased hostility from the Israeli government towards the Palestinian Authority (PA), elevating socio-economic concerns in the West Bank. On 2 September, French President Emmanuel Macron announced that France and Saudi Arabia will co-chair a conference on advancing the Two-State Solution in New York (New York, US) on 22 September. The UN General Assembly will convene its General Debate the following day (23 September); numerous states, including Australia, Belgium, Canada, France and the UK, are slated to recognise an independent Palestinian state during the forum. In response, hard-right Israeli Finance Minister Bezalel Smotrich will likely attempt to increase pressure on the PA by delaying fiscal transfers and restricting the PA’s access to goods permits. Such measures would likely further undermine the PA’s financial stability and increase the risk of delayed payments to PA civil servants, driving the risk of industrial action, anti-government protests and broader socio-economic concerns in the West Bank. There is also a realistic possibility that hard-right members of the Israeli government will issue increasingly expansive calls for the annexation of the West Bank. Although annexation remains highly unlikely in the short term, such calls are likely to compound ethno-religious tensions within the West Bank and exacerbate regional tensions between Israel and its various partners vis-à-vis the Palestinian Territories.
• A plot to assassinate an Israeli minister in Hebron highlights the elevated security risks during Jewish holidays. On 3 September, Israel’s Shin Bet (internal security) revealed that it had arrested a terror cell planning to assassinate Israeli National Security Minister Itamar Ben Gvir during a planned visit to the Cave of the Patriarchs in Hebron over the Jewish holidays (22-24 September, 1-2 October and 6-14 October). The group of four individuals planned to use explosive-laden drones and firearms. Additionally, on 2 September, IDF troops raided the house of Hebron’s Palestinian mayor, Tayseer Abu Sneineh, whom they arrested on suspicion of incitement, as well as supporting Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ). The arrests and the assassination plot highlight the elevated ethno-religious tensions and risk of attacks across the West Bank and Jerusalem areas, particularly during the upcoming Jewish holidays. These risks will increase further in response to any attempts to disrupt the established status quo in Jerusalem by far-right Jewish elements (including government officials and ministers), such as organising prayers in the al-Aqsa compound. As such, the IDF is likely to augment its presence and operations across the West Bank in the coming weeks, including through the proliferation of checkpoints, driving transport disruption.
RED SEA
• Israel-Yemen: The Iranian-backed Houthis continue to launch missiles and drones against Israel on a near-daily basis, elevating the likelihood of further Israeli strikes targeting Yemen. Despite the latest Israeli strikes against Yemen, the Houthis continue to launch daily ordnance against Israel. Israel’s air defences remain highly capable, with most ordnance intercepted outside Israeli airspace (thereby moderating the risks facing Israeli population centres). Even so, operational and travel disruption risks due to Houthi launches remain elevated, particularly in the vicinity of Ben Gurion International Airport (TLV). This will likely result in sporadic fight disruption over the coming weeks. Continued Houthi launches targeting Israel over the coming days will increase the risk of further Israeli strikes against Houthi targets in Yemen. These strikes are also likely to target dual-use facilities and infrastructure such as logistical hubs, ports and power stations, increasing energy and food security risks in Houthi-held territory. Furthermore, Israeli strikes against Houthi targets will almost certainly take place in response to Houthi launches involving cluster munitions (see Sibylline Middle East Crisis Update – 28 August 2025). The further use of cluster munitions by the Houthis remains a realistic possibility. However, the group likely achieved its desired psychological impact when it last used these munitions. Due to both the Houthis’ likely limited arsenal and the superior capability of Israel’s air defences, we assess that the risk of cluster munitions targeting Israel more frequently in the coming weeks will be tempered.
REGIONAL AND GLOBAL DEVELOPMENTS
• Israel-Lebanon: An IDF strike near UN forces in Lebanon underscores the persistent threat of misfire; this will possibly undermine trilateral security co-ordination across Lebanon’s southern border regions. On 3 September, the UN Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) stated that IDF drones dropped four grenades near peacekeeping forces working to clear roadblocks hindering access to a UNIFIL position. UNIFIL described the incident as ‘one of the most serious attacks’ on its personnel since the Israel-Hizballah ceasefire came into force on 28 November 2024. In response, the IDF stated that it did not intentionally target peacekeepers in Lebanon, but rather potential threats nearby. Even so, the incident underscores the risk of misfire and clashes between the IDF, the Lebanese army and UNIFIL personnel, who all operate in close proximity to one another across the border regions of southern Lebanon. Incidents of misfire and misidentification will possibly aggravate tensions between the three entities, undermining trilateral security co-ordination amid broader disarmament operations in Lebanon.
• Limited clashes in a Palestinian refugee camp are unlikely to hinder disarmament measures significantly. On 3 September, heavy clashes broke out between two families within the Bourj el-Barajneh Palestinian refugee camp in Beirut, resulting in two injuries. Local media reported that both parties employed machine guns and rocket-propelled grenades (RPGs). The clashes came days after the Lebanese army launched a disarmament campaign targeting Palestinian refugee camps in Bourj el-Barajneh on 21 August. The incident underscores the broader security risks emanating from widespread weapons proliferation in refugee camps, which are not under the Lebanese government’s control or supervision. This dynamic will sustain the risk of further sporadic local clashes and collateral damage within these areas in the coming weeks. The Bourj el-Barajneh clashes were unlikely to have been politically motivated, as limited armed fights between Palestinian clans inside these camps are common. As such, the incident is unlikely to hinder the ongoing disarmament process; the Lebanese army is also highly likely to launch further disarmament raids targeting the Bourj el-Barajneh camp in co-ordination with the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO). Nevertheless, such raids will increase the risk of clashes between rogue groups (particularly Islamist factions) and the Lebanese and Palestinian authorities. The risk will be particularly acute in the Ain al-Hilweh (South governorate) and Nahr al-Bared (North governorate) camps, exacerbating exposure to crossfire for locally engaged staff, particularly NGO staff operating within the camps.
• Bahrain-Israel: Rare pro-Palestine protests underscore partially elevated security risks in Manama throughout September. On 1 September, dozens of Bahraini pro-Palestine activists conducted small-scale protests in Manama in response to the appointment of a new Israeli ambassador. The protests triggered limited altercations with the police, though local media reported no injuries or subsequent arrests. The Bahraini authorities have not commented on the protests. However, the security forces are highly likely to augment their presence in the streets of Manama in the coming days, particularly around the Israeli and US embassies. An elevated posture is also likely in major squares, public spaces and along the Manama waterfront. Nevertheless, these security measures are unlikely to trigger mobility disruption in the capital or augment traffic jams during peak hours. While the Bahraini security forces are unlikely to conduct reactionary mass arrest campaigns in the coming days, further limited pro-Palestine protests in the country would increase the likelihood of crackdowns. The risk of fresh local protests will increase if the IDF advances with its plans to occupy Gaza City; this would in turn elevate the risk of clashes and arrests during such demonstrations, raising the overall security risks in Manama throughout September.
• Israel-Turkey: A concert ban in Istanbul (Istanbul province, Turkey) underlines the increasing reputational and operational disruption risks facing event-management and tourism firms dealing with pro-Israel artists. On 3 September, Istanbul’s governor banned a performance by the prominent French singer Enrico Macias following local protests over his pro-Israel stance. The Jewish singer has repeatedly announced his support for Israel and the IDF, leading to a similar ban in Algeria (his birthplace). The ban also reflects the significant tensions that exist between Turkey and Israel, which culminated in the severance of trade ties and airspace restrictions (see Sibylline Middle East Crisis Update – 1 September 2025). The ban has also increased the reputational and operational disruption risks facing event-management and tourism companies with a presence in the Turkish market that deal with pro-Israel artists and influencers. We assess these risks would increase significantly if the IDF advances with its plans to occupy Gaza City in the coming weeks, as this would likely lead to a deterioration of humanitarian conditions in the strip.
• Israel-Spain: Pro-Palestine protesters disrupted the final stage of the Vuelta a Espana cycling race, underscoring sustained disruption risks facing high-profile events involving Israeli-linked entities. On 3 September, pro-Palestine protesters mobilised a demonstration surrounding the finish line of the 11th stage of the Vuelta a Espana in Bilbao (Basque Country autonomous community, Spain), leading organisers to end the stage approximately two miles (3km) early. Pro-Palestine demonstrators have frequently targeted the Vuelta given the participation of the Israeli-linked team (Israel-Premier Tech), disrupting the race at several stages. These incidents underscore the sustained risk of targeted protests and activism facing high-profile sports events involving Israeli athletes, delegations or teams, particularly those that take place in public spaces and along major roads. Pro-Palestine protest activity will also likely target football matches involving Maccabi Tel Aviv F.C. as part of the UEFA Europa League’s ‘league phase’ in the coming weeks. Matches will occur in Thessaloniki (Greece; 24 September), Backa Topola (Serbia; 2 and 23 October, 27 November), Birmingham (UK; 6 November) and Stuttgart (Germany; 11 December). The risk of protest-related unrest and harassment targeting Maccabi fans will remain elevated across this period. Such incidents would also increase reputational and exposure risks for firms associated with major events, particularly headline sponsors, security contractors and event-management firms.
• Syria: Detention of defence, interior ministry staff underscores prevalence of rogue elements. On 3 September, a committee investigating violence against civilians in Suwayda governorate announced it had interrogated and detained members of Syria’s defence and interior ministries. In mid-July, intercommunal clashes in Suwayda between Druze and Bedouin tribes prompted the intervention of government forces, who were later accused of engaging in violence against Druze communities, including the execution of civilians. While the government’s crackdown likely aims to project an image of reform to the international community, the arrests also highlight the prevalence of rogue elements within the government’s forces, underscoring the growing risk of similar incidents happening in the future. This will possibly drive caution among international investors and reduced political engagement in the short term (as key stakeholders will possibly worry about conflict escalation). Furthermore, we assess that the detention of security personnel will elevate the risk of splinter groups forming in opposition to the government, driving the likelihood of factional violence and increasing security risks for NGO and business personnel in Syria in the coming months.
• Lebanon: Clashes in Palestinian camp are unlikely to hinder disarmament measures. On 3 September, two people were injured in heavy clashes between two Palestinian clans in a Palestinian refugee camp called Bourj el-Barajneh (which is located in the capital Beirut). Both parties discharged small-arms and rocket-propelled grenades (RPGs). Notably, the clashes came days after the launch of the Lebanese army’s disarmament campaign across Palestinian camps, which started in Bourj el-Barajneh on 21 August. The incident underscores the security risks emanating from the proliferation of weapons in camps across Lebanon, sustaining the risk of sporadic local clashes and collateral damage. However, these recent clashes are unlikely to have been politically motivated; armed clashes between Palestinian clans in such camps are common. Therefore, we assess that the incident is unlikely to hinder the ongoing disarmament process. However, the Lebanese army is highly likely to launch further disarmament raids targeting Bourj el-Barajneh in co-ordination with the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), possibly driving clashes between the Lebanese and Palestinian authorities (as well as rogue groups, particularly Islamist elements).
Sep 03.
* Israel: Protests will elevate traffic disruption, drive bystander security risks. Earlier on 3 September, anti-government protesters set fire to bins and damaged cars near the prime minister’s residence in Jerusalem’s Rehavia neighbourhood (Jerusalem district) and burned tires near his office in the Givat Ram neighbourhood. The violence marks the start of three days of protest action in Jerusalem, organised by the families of the hostages in Gaza. A mass rally outside the prime minister’s residence is scheduled to take place later on 3 September; the largest protest is scheduled to take place in Paris Square (Jerusalem) in the evening of 6 September. Protest action will almost certainly drive traffic disruption in the city, leading to knock-on localised operational risks in the coming days. The authorities will likely adopt an enhanced security posture ahead of further planned demonstrations, elevating the risk of sporadic clashes and bystander exposure to tear gas, skunk water and arbitrary arrests. As the government expands the war in Gaza, we assess that protest activity across Israel will likely increase in the coming weeks, particularly near government buildings in Givat Ram (Jerusalem) and in Tel Aviv (Tel Aviv district).
• Bahrain: Rare pro-Palestine protests will partially elevate security risks in September. On 1 September, dozens of Bahraini pro-Palestine activists conducted small-scale protests in the capital Manama in response to the appointment of a new Israeli ambassador, resulting in limited altercations with the police. Local media reported no injuries or arrests. So far, the authorities have not commented on the protests, but the police are highly likely to augment their presence in the streets of Manama in the coming days, particularly around the Israeli and the US embassies, as well as in major squares. Nevertheless, these security measures are unlikely to trigger mobility disruption in the capital. While the Bahraini police are currently unlikely to conduct reactionary mass arrest campaigns in the coming days, this risk will increase in the event of further limited pro-Palestine protests. Further limited protests will be likely if the Israeli army advances with its plans to occupy Gaza City, increasing risks of clashes and arrests during these events and elevating overall security risks in Manama throughout September.
Sep 02.
• Libya: Eruption of widespread clashes in Tripoli will be possible in coming days. On 31 August, the UN Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL) warned that the current security situation in the capital Tripoli poses ‘potential harm’ to civilians, urging restraint and a return to dialogue. At the time of writing, tensions in Tripoli are elevated, with the Government of National Unity (GNU) ordering the Special Deterrence Forces (RADA) militia to hand over fugitives (including members of RADA and allied groups) wanted by the attorney general. Furthermore, local media has reported sporadic clashes between the government-affiliated militias and the RADA (and its allies) in Tripoli and Zawiya (Zawiya district) over the past 72 hours. As such, there is a realistic possibility that the increasing military buildup from all sides and persistent tensions will trigger a wider armed conflict in Tripoli in the coming days. This will significantly elevate physical security threats for expats and operational disruption risks for businesses across all sectors. Furthermore, resumption of conflict will elevate spillover risks beyond Tripoli, with militias highly likely to seek support from nearby cities in the west, such as Misrata (Misrata district), Zawiya and Zintan (Jabal al Gharbi district).
• Iraq-Syria: Major security operation underscores persistent risks of Islamic State resurgence. On 1 September, the Iraqi National Intelligence Service (INIS) announced the arrest of a network responsible for financing Islamic State (IS) and plotting large-scale terrorist attacks in European countries and against Iraqi interests abroad. The security authorities also arrested individuals facilitating the movement of IS fighters across regional borders. The operation underscores persistent attempts by IS and its affiliates to rebuild the group’s military capabilities and financing networks across Iraq, particularly in the rural areas of Kurdistan region and across the desert regions bordering Syria. These risks will increase amid the phased withdrawal of the US-led coalition forces from Iraq during the next six months. Simultaneously, IS is highly likely to continue its attempted resurgence in Syria, capitalising on the security vacuum and political instability in the country. As such, we assess that further attacks against government, military and religious buildings in Iraq and Syria will be likely in H2 2025, despite ongoing security operations.
• Tunisia: Calls for protests underscore operational, financial risks for Israeli-linked businesses. On 31 August, a Tunisian organisation affiliated with the Boycott, Divestment, Sanctions (BDS) movement called on citizens to escalate protests outside Carrefour branches and intensify the nationwide boycott of the French supermarket chain. The call to action followed violent clashes between pro-Palestine protesters and Carrefour employees at a store in La Marsa (Tunis governorate) on 30 August. Protesters allege that the chain’s Israeli franchise, Yeinot Bitan, has supplied care packages to the Israel Defense Forces (IDF). An increase in demonstrations will possibly cause transport disruption in and around commercial centres, creating additional supply chain risks. It will likely also heighten security risks for bystanders involved in routine activities, such as grocery shopping. If protests grow significantly, the security forces will almost certainly respond with heavy-handed tactics, increasing the risk of arbitrary detention for proximate personnel. Overall, we assess that escalating protest activity highlights threats to other businesses in Tunisia with alleged links to Israel, raising operational and financial risks for such companies.
Sep 01.
IRAN
• Following the E3’s (France, Germany and the UK) initiation of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action’s (JCPOA’s) snapback process, Iran will highly likely maintain strategic ambiguity regarding engagement with the US, increasing risks of sanctions application.
• Iran continues to identify and arrest individuals on suspicion of association with Israel, underscoring threats to locally engaged staff amid broader human rights concerns.
ISRAEL
• Scheduled protests in Jerusalem will elevate traffic disruption and security risks; protests will likely intensify in the coming week.
PALESTINIAN TERRITORIES
• The IDF has targeted and likely killed Hamas’ spokesperson Abu Obeida, amid broader preparations for further operations in Gaza City.
• The IDF has designated Gaza City as a combat zone, underscoring increasing preparations for a renewed offensive, despite a limited response to evacuation orders.
• Pro-Palestine activists have launched a fleet of small boats aiming to break Israel’s naval blockade of Gaza, which will almost certainly sustain international scrutiny of IDF operations in Gaza.
IRAN
• Following the E3’s (France, Germany and the UK) initiation of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action’s (JCPOA’s) snapback process, Iran will highly likely maintain strategic ambiguity regarding engagement with the US, increasing risks of sanctions application. On 28 August, Iranian parliamentarians introduced a three-part bill to the legislature that would withdraw Iran from the International Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) and its Additional Protocol. The bill would also terminate co-operation with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA; Iran suspended co-operation in July) and end diplomatic engagement with the US and the E3 on reaching a nuclear agreement. If adopted, the legislation would mark a major diplomatic escalation amid heightened regional tensions, underscoring escalating Iranian efforts to pressure the E3 into abandoning the re-implementation of UN sanctions. Contrastingly, Iran’s Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi sent a letter to the EU on 29 August stating that Tehran would be willing to resume ‘fair and balanced negotiations’. This came after the EU Foreign Policy Chief Kaja Kallas called for intensified diplomacy during the JCPOA’s 30-day review period.
• These approaches almost certainly reflect Iranian efforts to maintain strategic ambiguity regarding its nuclear programme and willingness to engage in negotiations with the US, given major incompatibilities relating to domestic uranium enrichment. Iran is unlikely to adopt the submitted legislation in the coming weeks; however, it will highly likely continue to threaten to withdraw from the NPT to pressure the E3 into supporting a UN Security Council (UNSC) resolution drafted by China and Russia that would unconditionally extend the snapback clause by six months. The E3 previously conditioned the snapback clause extension on Iran committing to renewed negotiations with the US and are highly unlikely to support an unconditional extension. Increasing diplomatic brinkmanship vis-à-vis sanctions implementation will likely continue to undermine investor confidence in the Iranian economy, triggering further devaluation of the Iranian rial (IRR); this will compound socio-economic health concerns and increase risks of commodity shortages in the coming weeks. Failure to reach a nuclear agreement with the US in the short term will almost certainly result in the re-implementation of UN sanctions, with Iran highly likely subsequently withdrawing from the NPT. In the medium-to-long term, concerns over a lack of monitoring protocols and international oversight will also bolster prospects for resumed Israeli strike action targeting Iranian nuclear facilities. This will sustain elevated regional tensions and risks of temporary operational disruption (see Sibylline Special Report – 28 August 2025).
• Iran continues to identify and arrest individuals on suspicion of association with Israel, underscoring threats to locally engaged staff amid broader human rights concerns. On 30 August, Iranian state media reported that the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) had arrested eight individuals on suspicion of passing sensitive information to Israel before the Israel-Iran war. Since the war concluded on 24 June, the Iranian authorities claim to have arrested over 21,000 individuals on suspicion of espionage and have executed at least eight individuals. The latest arrests underscore sustained risks of surveillance, harassment and detention for individuals accused of association with Israel. Such scrutiny will also almost certainly continue applying to individuals with tangential associations with anti-government activism, as well as those employed by international businesses or NGOs. Foreign and dual nationals will face particularly elevated risks of targeting from the security and police forces, underscoring threats to local staff amid broader human rights concerns. Despite Iran’s efforts to identify and eliminate Israeli intelligence assets within the government administration, nuclear programme and security forces, Israel will likely continue to penetrate Iran’s institutions, sustaining risks of further purges and crackdowns.
ISRAEL
• Scheduled protests in Jerusalem will elevate traffic disruption and security risks; protests will likely intensify in the coming week. The families of the hostages in Gaza have scheduled a day of protest action in Jerusalem (Jerusalem district) on 3 September. Protesters plan to demonstrate in front of the prime minister’s residence at 9 Smolenskin Street in Rehavia neighbourhood. Heavy traffic disruption will be likely both in the immediate vicinity and possibly across the neighbourhood. Traffic disruption is also likely throughout Jerusalem due to an uptick in protest participants travelling into the city, which will impact parking availability across the city. There is an elevated risk that the police use excessive force when dispersing protesters in front of the prime minister’s residence, possibly driving bystander exposure to tear gas, skunk water, horse charges and arrest. Further protests across Jerusalem are almost certain, particularly outside the Knesset building in Givat Ram neighbourhood. In addition, in the coming week, there will likely be an increase in protest activity across Israel and particularly in Tel Aviv. This follows the Israel Defense Forces’ (IDF) retrieval of two Israeli hostage bodies (Idan Shtivi and Ilan Weiss) in the past week and reports that Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu is avoiding a vote on Hamas’ partial ceasefire offer. Currently, Israeli decision makers assess that Hamas is under pressure to push for a deal and are likely waiting for Hamas to make further concessions. However, there is a realistic possibility that Hamas will try to compound domestic unrest in Israel, likely releasing further footage and news of hostages in the coming days. This will increase prospects for substantial attendance in pro-ceasefire protests during the week and particularly over the weekend. An increase in incidents of protesters blocking key thoroughfares, particularly Ayalon Highway (Highway 20), is also likely, and will drive the police’s likely use of excessive force when dispersing protesters. This will also drive exposure to the above-mentioned police dispersal tactics, elevating the threat of harm to proximate staff and assets.
PALESTINIAN TERRITORIES
• The IDF has targeted and likely killed Hamas’ spokesperson Abu Obeida, amid broader preparations for further operations in Gaza City. On 30 August, the IDF conducted a series of airstrikes on a building in the al-Rimal neighbourhood of Gaza City, targeting and likely killing the high-profile Hamas spokesperson, Hudayfa Samir Abdallah al-Kahlout (known as Abu Obeida). Local media reports indicate that the explosion dispersed thousands of banknotes (including USD and ILS) from the building; Hamas subsequently took possession of the cash, underscoring the group’s continued dominance of civil governance and local security structures within Gaza. In the coming days, the IDF will almost certainly continue to conduct intense airstrikes targeting Gaza City, with ground operations continuing in the Jabalia, Sabra and Zeitoun neighbourhoods. Such operations will almost certainly sustain critical threats to life for locally engaged staff and civilians, while compounding risks of disruption to aid supply chains (see below).
• The IDF has designated Gaza City as a combat zone, underscoring increasing preparations for a renewed offensive, despite a limited response to evacuation orders. On 29 August, the IDF designated Gaza City as a combat zone and announced that it would no longer conduct daily tactical pauses in the area to facilitate aid deliveries (see Sibylline Middle East Crisis Update – 28 July 2025). The announcements come amid the intensification of the IDF’s operations in eastern and north-eastern Gaza City, ahead of operations to take control of the entire city. The pause revocation will almost certainly disrupt the transport of aid to and via the city, critically disrupting humanitarian operations and increasing threats to life for locally engaged NGO staff. Although the IDF has repeatedly called on civilians to evacuate Gaza City, regional media reports indicate that civilians have not broadly adhered to these orders; Israel’s Channel 12 estimates that approximately 10,000 of Gaza City’s 1,000,000 residents have evacuated since 9 August. On 30 August, the head of the International Committee of the Red Cross characterised Israel’s plans to evacuate Gaza City as ‘impossible’, stating that no area of Gaza has the infrastructure or capacity to support displaced residents. Amid continued conflict, disruption to aid operations and critical pressure on emergency and humanitarian services, conditions in Gaza are highly unlikely to improve in the short term, compounding socio-economic and public health concerns therein.
• Pro-Palestine activists have launched a fleet of small boats aiming to break Israel’s naval blockade of Gaza, which will almost certainly sustain international scrutiny of IDF operations in Gaza. On 31 August, a fleet of 20 small boats carrying food, water and medical aid departed from Spain as part of the Global Sumud Flotilla, which aims to break the IDF’s naval blockade of Gaza. The fleet includes high-profile environmental activist Greta Thunberg, who participated in a similar attempt to break Israel’s naval blockade in June. The fleet will travel to Tunis (Tunisia) by 4 September to join other flotilla participants; the arrival will highly likely trigger pro-Palestine protest activity on the city’s waterfront and will increase risks of operational disruption at the Port of Tunis. The flotilla plans to dock in Gaza on 8 September. Before the flotilla approaches the immediate vicinity of Gaza’s coast, the Israeli authorities will almost certainly seize the vessels, detain crew members and deport all participating foreign nationals. Detentions and repatriations will likely moderately elevate diplomatic tensions between Israel and receiving countries, particularly Austria, France, Spain and Sweden. Although the flotilla will almost certainly fail to break the naval blockade, it will likely increase scrutiny of IDF operations in Gaza amid deteriorating humanitarian conditions (see above). This will almost certainly sustain elevated risks of pro-Palestine protests and activism targeting Israeli and Israeli-linked firms, increasing operational disruption risks and reputational concerns. Any incidents resulting in injuries or vessel sinking will also likely trigger broader criticism of Israel, increasing risks of pro-Palestine protest activity in major cities in Australia, Europe and North America in the coming weeks.
RED SEA
• Israel-Yemen: Threats to Red Sea shipping and foreign nationals in Houthi-held territory will likely increase following a high-profile Israeli strike. On 28 August, the IDF struck several targets in the Yemeni capital Sanaa, killing the Houthi Prime Minister Ahmed Ghalib al Rawahi along with several other ministers. Rawahi’s role was largely ceremonial, and at the time of writing, reports indicate that the strike failed to kill Houthi military leaders. In the days following the strike, the Houthis launched sporadic missile and drone strikes against Israel, though the IDF intercepted these without any damage reported.
• Even so, the Houthis will likely increase their attacks targeting Israel and shipping in the Red Sea in the coming weeks. On 31 August, the Houthis targeted the Liberian-flagged chemical tanker ‘Scarlet Ray’ approximately 40 nautical miles (74km) south-west of Yanbu (Yanbu governorate, Saudi Arabia). The captain reported that ordnance landed near the vessel but caused no damage. The vessel’s Singapore-based manager is owned by the Israeli businessman Idan Ofer, whose assets the Houthis have targeted multiple times in the past. The strike is outside the Houthis’ usual operating area and highlights a possible expansion of their threat to shipping in the Red and Arab Seas in the coming weeks. Even so, the Houthis are currently unlikely to strike assets within the territories of other Gulf countries.
• On 31 August, the Houthis also raided two UN facilities in Sanaa, detaining at least 11 employees. The incident highlights increasing scrutiny of foreign personnel by Houthi forces, likely due to concerns of espionage following the latest Israeli strikes in the city (on 24 and 28 August). As such, foreign employees and NGO staff will face an elevated risk of arbitrary detention in the coming days, driving threats to their physical and mental well-being due to detention conditions and possibly forceful interrogation methods.
REGIONAL AND GLOBAL DEVELOPMENTS
• Israel-Turkey: The closure of Turkish airspace to Israeli government flights and cargo planes tied to the IDF will exacerbate significant tensions between both countries, elevating risks of operational disruption for Israeli airlines in the coming months. On 29 August, Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan said that his country had decided to sever all economic and trade ties with Israel and close its airspace to Israeli aircraft, augmenting the ongoing bilateral tensions. However, later that day, Turkish officials clarified that the airspace restriction applies only to Israeli government flights and Israeli planes carrying weapons, not to commercial flights. Notably, these decisions come days after the Turkish port authorities began requiring shipping agents to provide letters declaring that their vessels are not linked to Israel and not carrying military cargo bound for Israeli ports (see Sibylline Middle East Crisis Update – 28 August 2025). As well as likely causing operational disruption for Turkish businesses dealing with Israeli clients, escalating tensions will increase physical threat risks to Jewish travellers in Turkey in the coming months and the likelihood of attacks against local synagogues. In the coming months, Ankara will possibly completely close its airspace to all Israeli flights in response to the further deterioration of humanitarian conditions amid the IDF’s plans to occupy Gaza City, disrupting Israeli airlines’ operations in the region. Relations between Israel and Turkey will highly likely deteriorate further if the ceasefire in southern Syria collapses and Israel resumes its military airstrikes on the Syrian government forces.
• Israel-Lebanon: A partial uptick in Israeli airstrikes is possibly linked to advances in the US-backed plan to disarm Lebanese Hizballah (LH). Between 29 and 31 August, the IDF conducted a series of airstrikes in southern Lebanon (mostly in Nabatieh governorate), targeting LH operatives and military infrastructure in the region. Affected areas included the Beaufort Ridge area (Nabatieh), where the IDF claimed that LH cells are active. Furthermore, on 31 August, Lebanon’s local media reported intense explosions in the forest areas of Ali al-Taher hill and Al-Debsha (both Nabaitieh), likely indicating the presence of weapon depots and/or underground military infrastructure. The slight uptick in Israeli strikes in southern Lebanon over recent days possibly underscores efforts to secure military goals ahead of a partial Israeli withdrawal from remaining positions in southern Lebanon in the coming months. This is a key condition of the US-backed plan to disarm LH, which the Lebanese army and government are in the process of implementing. Nevertheless, LH’s persistent refusal to disarm and the subsequent risks of Shia unrest will still pose major hurdles to any possible Israeli withdrawal plans from the country in H2 2025.
• Israel-Portugal: The cancellation of a music festival in Portugal highlights increased reputational and event management risks for Israeli-linked events. On 28 August, the organisers of Anta Gathering announced that the local police had cancelled the music festival following a boycott campaign from BDS Portugal, an affiliate of the pro-Palestine Boycott, Divestment, Sanctions (BDS) movement. BDS Portugal targeted the event as its organisers are two Israeli nationals, one of whom the movement alleges served in the IDF during the Israel-Hamas War. Police stated that the event was cancelled due to the risk of wildfires. The cancellation underscores significant risks of targeted activism campaigns impacting the reputation and continuity of events associated with Israeli nationals, particularly cultural events such as music festivals and art exhibitions, as well as high-profile events such as sports matches and competitions involving Israeli teams and athletes. Threats to boycott, protest or disrupt such events will sustain event management and reputational concerns for associated firms, while likely sustaining elevated contingency insurance premiums for event management firms and service providers.
• Iran: Disruptive cyber attack sustains security, operational risks from hacktivist groups. On 30 August, international news outlets reported that a suspected hacktivist group (‘Lab Dookhtegan’) has targeted around 60 Iranian ships in a cyber operation since at least March. The group infiltrated a satellite communications company before pivoting into the ships’ environments to disable their communications systems. Lab Dookhtegan reportedly maintained access to the company’s systems for five months before causing disruption, highlighting the premeditated and sophisticated nature of this attack. The group overwrote approximately six storage partitions and wiped core data to halt all ship-to-shore communications, underscoring the security and operational risks stemming from the operation. This operation also showcases the prolonged impact of such attacks, as remediation efforts will possibly take several weeks and/or months. Lab Dookhtegan already disrupted approximately 116 Iranian ships in March and typically conducts cyber attacks to protest against the Iranian government. We assess that this development highlights sustained security and disruption risks amid ongoing regional hostilities.
• Israel-Yemen: UN detentions underscore elevated risks to NGO personnel. On 31 August, the Iran-backed Houthi militia detained at least 11 UN personnel during raids on UN offices in Hudaydah (Al Hudaydah governorate, Yemen) and the Yemeni capital Sanaa. The raids came after Israel killed the prime minister of Yemen’s unrecognised, Houthi-led government in a strike on 28 August. These developments likely underscore Houthi efforts to uncover foreign intelligence assets and will almost certainly increase NGO personnel’s exposure to arbitrary detentions and stop-and-search practices in the coming days. In turn, this will elevate threats of harm and health risks for personnel, arising from poor detention conditions. If such actions continue, this will possibly hinder NGO operations on the ground, compounding health and food security risks. Earlier on 1 September, the Houthis also claimed to have targeted an Israeli-owned tanker in the Red Sea, reportedly missing the vessel; this nevertheless indicates an increasing risk to Israel-affiliated vessels traversing Yemeni waters over the coming weeks. These developments highlight escalating conflict risks between Israel and the Houthis in Yemen, possibly prompting reciprocal Israeli strikes on Houthi infrastructure in Yemen in the coming days. (Source: Sibylline)

29 Aug 25. Turkey bars Israeli ships from its ports, restricts airspace. Turkey has decided to bar Israeli vessels from using its ports, forbid Turkish ships from using Israeli ports and impose restrictions on some planes entering Turkish airspace, Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan said on Friday. He provided few details in comments to parliament which appeared to summarise steps that Turkey has already taken against Israel over the war in Gaza or has started to implement.
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Turkey has fiercely criticised Israel’s offensive in Gaza and accuses it of committing genocide in the Palestinian enclave, a charge that Israel denies. Ankara has halted all trade with Israel, called for international measures against it and urged world powers to stop supporting Israel.
Sources told Reuters last week that Turkish port authorities had also started informally requiring shipping agents to provide letters declaring that vessels are not linked to Israel and not carrying military or hazardous cargo bound for the country.
A source had also said that Turkish-flagged ships would be prohibited from calling at Israeli ports. (Source: Reuters)

 

03 Sep 25. Israel Says it Killed Top ISIS Commander in Gaza Strike. The Israeli military said it killed Muhammad Abd al-Aziz Abu Zubaida, the most senior Islamic State official in Gaza, in an airstrike in the Al-Bureij area of central Gaza last week.
In a statement, the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) said the operation was directed by Southern Command and guided by the Military Intelligence Directorate.
According to the IDF, Abu Zubaida was “responsible for determining policy, planning and overseeing the terrorist organization’s activities across Gaza, Judea and Samaria, and the Sinai Peninsula, and for transferring combat equipment and funds into Gaza.” (Source: https://www.sofx.com/)
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Military And Security Developments

Sep 04.

KEY DEVELOPMENTS  

• DONETSK: In recent days, localised Ukrainian counter-attacks have managed to liberate settlements around Pokrovsk (Donetsk oblast), including the tactically important satellite town of Novoekonomichne
• STRIKES: On 1 September, Russia launched a large-scale combined strike involving 502 drones, 16 Kalibr cruise missiles and eight Kh-101 cruise missiles
• NEGOTIATIONS: US President Donald Trump admitted that ending the Russo-Ukrainian war has been more challenging than he initially thought, as Putin calls for Ukraine to hold a territorial referendum
• FORECAST: French President Emmanuel Macron has stated that Ukraine’s European allies have finalised the preparation of post-war security guarantees ahead of a summit on the matter on 4 September
• BAKHMUT: On 2 September, Russia’s Ministry of Defence (MoD) claimed that its forces had seized the village of Fedorivka, located around ten miles (16km) to the north-east of Bakhmut (Donetsk oblast), though this has not yet been confirmed. Some Russian sources have since refuted the MoD’s claims, meaning it remains unclear whether an advance has indeed taken place.
• BAKHMUT: Meanwhile, further south, geolocated footage from 3 September indicates that Russian forces have taken Oleksandro-Shultyne, located just 3.5 miles (6km) to the south-east of Kostiantynivka (Donetsk oblast). This is the closest confirmed position to Kostiantynivka that the Russians are now operating within, indicating the pressure being slowly but steadily placed on the city’s southern flanks.
• DONETSK: In recent days, localised Ukrainian counter-attacks have managed to liberate settlements around Pokrovsk (Donetsk oblast), including the tactically important satellite town of Novoekonomichne. Geolocated footage released by Ukraine’s General Staff on 2 September shows that Ukrainian forces recently recaptured Udachne, which is located to the south-west of Pokrovsk. Additionally, reports from military spokesperson Viktor Trehubov on 3 September confirmed that Ukrainian troops regained control of Novoekonomichne, situated to the east of Pokrovsk; Russian forces likely took control of Novoekonomichne in July. These recent advances suggest that Russia has not solidified its hold on several settlements surrounding Pokrovsk and remain vulnerable to Ukrainian counter-attacks following the Dobropillia tactical penetration last month.
• KHARKIV: Geolocated footage published on 1 September indicates that Ukrainian forces have advanced in north-western Vovchansk (Kharkiv oblast) and have pushed the Russians back along the southern bank of the Vovcha River.
• KURSK-SUMY: Nothing significant to report
• OSKIL-KREMINNA: On 3 September, Russia’s MoD claimed that its forces had captured around half of the city of Kupiansk (Kharkiv oblast) and released footage of a soldier holding a flag as evidence. Geolocation of the video suggests that the soldiers were present at four locations in northern, north-western and central Kupiansk. However, Ukrainian military authorities have denied these claims, dismissing the video as staged propaganda and stating that the soldiers featured in the footage had been eliminated. We assess that a limited number of Russian elements had likely infiltrated the city. As previously reported, Russia has been conducting infiltration operations in recent weeks. However, the number of troops involved was likely insufficient to hold positions inside Kupiansk, mirroring the situation in Pokrovsk, where Russian forces have also managed to penetrate the city without consolidating control. The likely infiltration of Kupiansk nevertheless underscores vulnerabilities in the city’s defences against such tactics.
• OSKIL-KREMINNA: Russian forces made confirmed advances into central Moskovka (Myrne), located to the north-west of Kupiansk, as of 2 September. The advance likely indicates that the settlement is now under Russian control. Our previous report indicated that Ukrainian forces had managed to retake this settlement. However, recently reported Russian control over Moskovka (Myrne) likely helped facilitate the limited penetration of Kupiansk, as the settlement is located immediately north-west of the city. Meanwhile, at the southern end of the Oskil-Kreminna line, geolocated footage from 2 September shows recent Ukrainian advances in south-eastern Zarichne, located to the east of Lyman (Donetsk oblast).
• SOUTHERN: Russian forces continue to steadily advance towards the administrative border of Donetsk and Dnipropetrovsk oblasts, but progress remains slow amid Ukrainian counter-attacks. Geolocated footage from 1 September indicates that Russian forces have advanced into central Dachne, a village located on the northern banks of the Vovcha River inside Dnipropetrovsk oblast, around eight miles (13km) to the south of Novopavlivka. Russian forces likely controlled the majority of the village until relatively recently, when Ukrainian counter-attacks pushed them back, underscoring that the village remains highly contested.
• SOUTHERN: Along the Zaporizhzhia axis further to the south-west, geolocated footage from 1 September indicates that Russian forces have advanced north of Robotyne towards the southern outskirts of Orikhiv (both Zaporizhzhia oblast). Robotyne was the focal point of Ukraine’s failed 2023 counter-offensive, and the recent advances mean the Russian forces have essentially retaken all the territory Ukraine attempted to seize in 2023. A Ukrainian army corps fighting in the area posted footage on 3 September showing Ukrainian forces repelling a Russian mechanised assault south of Orikhiv. Nevertheless, Russian forces are now estimated to be around three miles (5km) to the south of Orikhiv.
• STRIKES: On 1 September, Russia launched a large-scale combined strike involving 502 drones, 16 Kalibr cruise missiles and eight Kh-101 cruise missiles. Ukrainian defence forces intercepted 430 unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), 14 Kalibr missiles and seven Kh-101 missiles. The Ukrainian authorities reported that the strikes hit civilian and transport infrastructure, as well as residential buildings in Chernihiv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Khmelnytskyi, Kirovohrad, Kyiv, Lviv and Sumy oblasts. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky emphasised that Russian forces are increasingly launching projectiles during the daytime and are heavily targeting energy infrastructure. These strikes are highly likely aimed at causing disruptions to energy networks in Ukraine ahead of the heating season. Strikes on other days during this monitoring period were relatively smaller.
• STRIKES: The Ukrainian authorities are attempting to improve the defences of military training centres, as Russia has recently intensified long-range attacks against these targets. On 3 September, Ukrainian Commander-in-Chief Oleksandr Syrskyi announced that he had instructed the rapid equipping of all training centres with underground shelters. However, he noted that this endeavour will take time. In June and July, Russia intensified attacks against these facilities, causing significant casualties. Given the likely lengthy process required to improve protection, we assess that these facilities will remain vulnerable to such attacks for the foreseeable future.

POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS

• NEGOTIATIONS: On 3 September, US President Donald Trump admitted that ending the Russo-Ukrainian war has been more challenging than he initially thought. Trump has sought to stop the conflict since resuming the presidency in January, though a major breakthrough in this regard remains elusive. Trump stated that his approach to many diplomatic negotiations is to bring together key leaders and have them broker an agreement but noted that this requires patience. Trump’s summit with Russian President Vladimir Putin in Alaska (US) did not yield a ceasefire, nor any tangible progress towards a peace settlement. Despite US efforts to organise a meeting between Putin and Zelensky, Moscow continues to stall on this; the prospect of such talks happening in the near term remains low.
• NEGOTIATIONS: Russian presidential aide Yuri Ushakov stated on 2 September that the Kremlin never agreed to a meeting between Putin and Zelensky, contradicting previous comments from Trump. On 19 August, Trump claimed that he had spoken with his Russian counterpart and that preparations were underway for Putin to meet the Ukrainian president. Afterwards, Trump said he expected a trilateral meeting to take place involving himself, Putin and Zelensky. On 3 September, Putin stated that Zelensky should come to Moscow for peace talks, which will almost certainly be a non-starter for Ukraine. Ultimately, such a bilateral meeting remains highly unlikely in the short term; during his recent trip to Beijing (China), Putin reiterated his long-standing line that Zelensky is an illegitimate president.
• NEGOTIATIONS: Separately, on 3 September, Putin claimed that Ukraine should organise a referendum on ceding territory to Russia. Putin cited the Ukrainian constitution, which states that changing the composition of Ukraine’s territory is to be resolved exclusively by referendum. If the Ukrainian authorities were to hold a referendum on ceding territory, organising a fair vote would face a myriad of challenges, given that thousands of Ukrainians are displaced internally or have fled abroad. Similarly, many Ukrainians remain in Russian occupation, where their ability to vote freely would almost certainly be restricted. Russia organised controlled referenda in September 2022 to annex four Ukrainian regions (Donetsk, Kherson, Luhansk and Zaporizhzhia oblasts); it also annexed Crimea in 2014 after a referendum. As such, Putin’s demand for a referendum (which would not realistically be possible under martial law without a ceasefire) highly likely aims to legalise and legitimise Russian claims to Ukrainian lands.
• NORTH KOREA: South Korean intelligence estimates that approximately 2,000 North Korean soldiers deployed to Russia have been killed. South Korean news agency Yonhap reported these figures on 2 September, noting that South Korean intelligence believes Pyongyang is prepared to send an additional 6,000 soldiers. South Korean lawmaker Lee Seong-kweun stated that Seoul had increased its estimated death toll to 2,000 after reviewing intelligence with other countries. Some estimates claim that North Korea has sent 15,000 troops to support Russia since October 2024, initially to aid Russian forces in expelling Ukrainian forces from Russia’s Kursk oblast. Ultimately, relations between Moscow and Pyongyang will highly likely remain strong over the medium-to-long term, especially as North Korea’s leadership remains willing to provide manpower and weapons to sustain Russia’s war effort. However, amid confirmation from Moscow that North Koreans will be deployed as engineers inside Kursk oblast, it remains unclear whether combat deployments to occupied Ukraine will take place in the future.

FORECAST

GUARANTEES: French President Emmanuel Macron disclosed on 3 September that Ukraine’s European allies have finalised the preparation of post-war security guarantees ahead of a summit on the matter on 4 September.  Macron offered limited details but stated that their plans are awaiting ‘political approval’. Meanwhile, two unspecified European officials said that the ‘technical’ elements of the proposed guarantees had been finished. Even if Ukraine’s allies have indeed finalised their plans, we assess that these will highly likely be subject to change depending on what partners are willing to contribute, as well as Russia’s position.

Despite statements claiming that work on possible post-war security arrangements is complete, the prospect of troop deployments to Ukraine (or on its behalf as a reassurance force) is likely still an issue of contention among Kyiv’s key European backers (namely Germany). On 1 September, German Defence Minister Boris Pistorius criticised European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen’s recent remarks that ‘precise plans’ were being outlined for a multinational deployment as part of security guarantees. Pistorius stated that publicly discussing such matters before negotiations between Russia and Ukraine was ‘completely wrong’. Meanwhile, German Chancellor Friedrich Merz said on 3 September that he would have considerable reservations about deploying German troops to Ukraine. Merz also said that the deployment of troops would depend on the type of agreement met to end the war; Russia will almost certainly continue to oppose the prospect of Western troops in Ukraine.

German apprehension about committing to a troop deployment will possibly moderately reduce confidence among other allies about committing military personnel to Ukraine as part of security guarantees. Germany is estimated to have 185,000 active personnel in its armed forces and 34,000 reserves. In comparison, the number of serving troops of countries leading discussions about sending troops to Ukraine as part of a so-called ‘coalition of the willing’, France and the UK, totals 204,000 and 138,000, respectively. As such, Berlin’s current non-commitment to sending forces to post-war Ukraine could realistically deter countries that are also undecided on the matter and have similarly sized or smaller armed forces from sending troops.

However, Germany is still reportedly planning to contribute to ensuring Ukraine’s post-war security through military aid and training for the Ukrainian military. According to a report by German media outlet Der Spiegel published earlier on 4 September, Germany will offer to strengthen Ukraine’s air defence, including by increasing such support by 20% per annum. Berlin will also pledge to enhance Ukraine’s long-range strike capabilities by supporting the production of cruise missiles. The German government is ready to arm four mechanised brigades; this would entail providing approximately 480 armoured personnel carriers and other infantry vehicles per year.

Reluctance among European allies to send troops will also realistically decrease the US’ confidence in committing to aiding Ukrainian security over the long term. According to an unspecified French insider earlier on 4 September, Ukraine’s partners involved in the security guarantee process are waiting for US confirmation that it will act as an ‘ultimate backstop’. Trump and Zelensky are expected to speak by phone later on 4 September after the summit. Trump’s intentions to discuss the summit’s outcome indicate that he and his administration are unlikely to withdraw from the peace process in the near term, despite recent reports suggesting they will. However, it remains unclear how far US commitments to support a potential European operation would go. For further analysis, see Sibylline Ukraine Update – 1 September 2025.

Sep 02.

• Critics of Russia face heightened espionage risks from Russian state-sponsored actors. On 1 September, international news outlets reported that a Russian state-sponsored group (‘APT29’) targeted academics and other individuals critical of Russia in a cyber espionage operation. The group conducted a watering hole attack, injecting multiple commonly-visited websites with malicious code, redirecting approximately 10% of targets to actor-crafted domains. APT29 then tricked users into authenticating malicious actor-controlled devices via Microsoft device authentication flow to deploy malware, harvest credentials and collect information. The malicious domains emulated authorised Cloudflare authentication services to enhance legitimacy. The group also quickly pivoted to new infrastructure if detected and used multiple other techniques to remain obfuscated, highlighting APT29’s operational resilience and detection evasion capabilities. This operation further showcases the continued expansion of the group’s operations beyond government and key sector targets. We assess that the increasingly opportunistic nature of APT29’s attacks will raise security and cyber espionage risks to strategic targets amid the ongoing development of Russia’s cyber strategy.

Sep 01.

KEY DEVELOPMENTS

• OFFENSIVES: Russia’s Chief of the General Staff has claimed that Russian forces have taken 1,351 square miles (3,500 sq km) of territory since March, though this is likely exaggerated
• STRIKES: Overnight on 29-30 August, Russia launched a high-intensity combined strike involving 537 Shahed-type drones, 37 cruise missiles and eight ballistic missiles, targeting a range of sites across the country
• EXERCISES: On 31 August, the Russia-led Collective Security Treaty Organisation (CSTO) military bloc began drills in Belarus, ahead of further drills on 12 September
• FORECAST: Several European countries are working on ‘precise plans’ for potential military deployments to Ukraine with US military backing, according to European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen
• OFFENSIVES: Russia’s Chief of the General Staff Valery Gerasimov claimed on 30 August that Russian forces have taken 1,351 square miles (3,500 sq km) of territory, including 149 settlements, since March. The Institute for the Study of War (ISW), by contrast, has assessed that Russian forces have only taken 906 square miles (2,346 sq km) since 1 March. Notably, several Russian milbloggers have since openly criticised Gerasimov’s claims, including that Russian forces control over 50% of Kupiansk (Kharkiv oblast), as exaggerated, which they likely are. Russia’s Minister of Defence Andrei Belousov gave a speech on 29 August claiming that Russian forces are currently seizing around 231-270 square miles (600-700 sq km) of territory per month. Belousov also emphasised that Russian industry is pivoting towards producing ever larger numbers of light vehicles, rather than heavy armoured vehicles and tanks, likely reflecting the shift in Russian tactics that we have been monitoring over the past 12 months.
• BAKHMUT: Along the Toretsk axis, geolocated footage from 31 August indicates that Russian forces have taken control of the remainder of Rusyn Yar, a village located around ten miles (16km) to the south-west of Kostiantynivka (Donetsk oblast). Footage also indicates that Russian forces have advanced to the north-west of the village; further such advances in this direction will likely mutually reinforce Russia’s ongoing efforts to consolidate its tactical penetration north-east of Pokrovsk from the east. Meanwhile, on 28 August, the Russian Ministry of Defence (MoD) claimed that its forces had taken Nelipivka, a village located around 3.5 miles (6km) to the north of Toretsk (Donetsk oblast). However, we cannot confirm this.
• DONETSK: On 30 August, Ukrainian Dnipro Group of Forces spokesperson Colonel Viktor Trehubov reported that Russia’s most advanced units in the Dobropillia penetration had been cut off from the main offensive grouping in the sector and surrounded. However, Trehubov also noted that Russian forces continue to attempt infiltrations of Pokrovsk (Donetsk oblast) with small infantry units approaching from multiple directions, particularly the south-west. Geolocated footage posted on 30 August shows recent Russian advances in south-eastern Novoekonomichne, located to the north-east of Pokrovsk. While Russian forces are encroaching on Pokrovsk’s south-western flank in particular, it remains unclear whether its tactical penetration to the north-east is truly cut off. If so, Russian forces are at risk of being surrounded and forced to surrender.
• KHARKIV: Nothing significant to report
• KURSK-SUMY: Nothing significant to report
• OSKIL-KREMINNA: In the Kupiansk sector, Russian forces are attempting to infiltrate in and around Kupiansk but have simultaneously ceded ground to recent Ukrainian forces. A Ukrainian commander operating in the Kupiansk sector reported that Russian attacks primarily rely on small infantry groups conducting infiltration tactics to direct drone strikes against Ukrainian positions and logistics. Such tactics also target Kupiansk itself by moving through sewers into the city. These operations reportedly utilise equipment to conceal personnel’s heat signatures in a bid to approach forward positions undetected.
• OSKIL-KREMINNA: On 30 August, Trehubov reported the recapture of Moskovka (Myrne), a settlement located to the north-west of Kupiansk. This likely means that Russian forces are not operating directly south of Myrne, in Sobolivka. Meanwhile, geolocated footage from 28 August shows recent Russian advances near Borivska Andriivka, located to the north-east of Borova (Kharkiv oblast). Gerasimov’s recent claim that Russian forces control 50% of Kupiansk is therefore likely inaccurate, as we have seen little evidence to support such an assessment.
• SOUTHERN: Along the Donetsk-Dnipropetrovsk oblast border, Ukrainian forces continue to counter-attack and have retaken territory at multiple points. Reports from 30 August indicate that Ukrainian forces have likely retaken Zelenyi Hai, located within Donetsk oblast, approximately 17 miles (27km) to the north-west of Velyka Novosilka. Russian forces originally took the village in July amid wider efforts to reach the Vovcha River (which is the administrative border in this area). Similarly, geolocated footage published by the Ukrainian General Staff on 31 August indicates that Ukrainian forces have retaken Dachne, a village located on the northern banks of the Vovcha River inside Dnipropetrovsk oblast, around eight miles (13km) to the south of Novopavlivka. However, further to the south, geolocated footage from 30 August indicates that Russian forces have advanced in eastern Komyshyvakha, located 11 miles (17km) to the north-west of Velyka Novosilka (Donetsk oblast).
• SOUTHERN: A spokesperson for a Ukrainian brigade operating on the Zaporizhzhia axis reported on 28 August that Russian forces are likely preparing for a new offensive. The spokesperson reported that Russian forces are accumulating forces and preparing reserves along the frontline, mostly moving in small teams at night, and have stepped up their use of unmanned systems. According to a German source cited by Reuters on 28 August, Ukrainian intelligence warned German officials on 13 August that Russia was using the Alaska summit to ‘play for time’ ahead of a potential renewed offensive in October or November. While this remains unconfirmed, it remains possible that Russian forces are preparing for renewed operations not only in Donetsk, but also along the Zaporizhzhia axis.
• SOUTHERN: Meanwhile, geolocated footage from 27 August and afterwards indicates that Russian forces have seized the village of Plavni, located around 16 miles (26km) to the south of Zaporizhzhia city (Zaporizhzhia oblast). The development follows earlier confirmation of Russian advances along the Prydniprovska railway south of Prymorske, located to the north-west of Plavni. As such, Russian forces are making efforts to consolidate their control over the region hugging the eastern bank of the Dnipro River in this area.
• STRIKES: Overnight on 29-30 August, Russia launched a high-intensity combined strike involving 537 Shahed-type drones, 37 cruise missiles (including Kh-101, Kalibr, Iskander-K and Kh-59 systems) and eight Iskandr-M/Kn-23 ballistic missiles. Ukraine’s Air Force (UAF) reported the interception of 510 unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), 32 cruise missiles and six ballistic missiles. According to Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky, the attack struck civilian infrastructure in Cherkasy, Chernihiv, Chernivtsi, Dnipropetrovsk, Donetsk, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Khmelnytskyi, Kyiv, Rivne, Sumy, Volyn, Zaporizhzhia and Zhytomyr oblasts. The attack also hit major urban centres like Dnipro (Dnipropetrovsk oblast) and Zaporizhzhia city. A prominent Russian milblogger claimed that the main targets of the attack were air bases, power supply hubs and other infrastructure.
• STRIKES: Meanwhile, Ukraine continued its drone strike campaign targeting Russian infrastructure. For instance, early on 1 September, a falling Ukrainian drone caused a fire at a power substation in Kropotkin (Krasnodar Krai). On 29 August, Ukrainian forces struck the Kuibyshev refinery, part of Rosneft’s Samara group, which was forced to halt operations.
• STRIKES: The possible transfer of US-made long-range projectiles will likely enhance the lethality of Ukrainian strikes, provided that Washington DC revises its policy limiting long-range strikes against Russian territory. On 28 August, the US State Department approved the possible sale of air-launched cruise missiles worth an estimated USD 825 m to Ukraine. The deal would involve the sale of 3,350 Extended Range Attack Munitions (ERAM), as well as associated guidance kits and electronic warfare defences for these missiles. According to sources familiar with the matter, the potential sale is being funded by Denmark, the Netherlands and Norway under the Jump Start programme, with additional funding via the US Foreign Military Financing programme. ERAM missiles have a range of 150-280 miles (240-450km) and would support medium-range missile strikes into Russia’s near rear.
• STRIKES: On 31 August, President Zelensky announced plans for new strikes deep into Russia. The Trump administration has not made any official announcement regarding long-range strike policies. Ultimately, even if the sale of ERAM missiles goes ahead, it remains uncertain whether US President Donald Trump will approve their use against Russian de jure territory, given that he has long opposed such attacks.

POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS

• EXERCISES: On 31 August, the Russia-led Collective Security Treaty Organisation (CSTO) military bloc began drills in Belarus; these will include nuclear weapons planning, though such arms will not actually be deployed. While this will likely elevate already-high regional tensions, the non-involvement of nuclear weapons will mitigate against the threat of a nuclear escalation (which is highly unlikely in any case). More than 2,000 troops from Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia and Tajikistan will take part in the CSTO exercises. These drills come ahead of the Zapad-2025 joint Belarusian-Russian military exercises in Belarus between 12 and 16 September.
• EXERCISES: The head of Ukraine’s military intelligence (GUR), Kyrylo Budanov, has assessed that the upcoming exercises will fuel disinformation campaigns aimed at increasing pressure on Ukraine and European countries. We continue to assess that Russia is highly unlikely to use the exercises to stage a renewed invasion into northern Ukraine (specifically targeting Chernihiv and Kyiv oblasts). Similarly, Belarus and/or Russia will be highly unlikely to directly attack a neighbouring NATO country (namely Latvia, Lithuania and Poland) during the drills. However, state-aligned Belarusian and Russian media will likely seek to amplify information campaigns aimed at fuelling Western concerns about the exercises over the coming days and weeks; increased GPS jamming and interference, as well as potential drone overflights, are a realistic possibility during the exercises.
• AID: Recent US approvals of military sales to Ukraine possibly indicate a potential willingness on the part of Washington DC to leverage arms sales to Kyiv to apply pressure on Moscow to end the war. This week, the US approved a possible foreign military sale worth USD 825 m of Extended-Range Attack Munition (ERAM) missiles to Ukraine. Meanwhile, on 29 August, the US State Department approved a possible sale to Ukraine worth USD 179.1 m for upkeeping Patriot air defence systems, which includes spare parts and maintenance support. Separately, Ukraine requested to buy an extension of satellite communications services for its Starlink terminals worth an estimated USD 150 m. Ukraine will likely hope that the recent uptick in approved arms sales reflects a growing readiness for the Trump administration to pivot towards increasing pressure on Russia amid stalled peace talks.

FORECAST

GUARANTEES: Several European countries are working on ‘precise plans’ for potential military deployments to Ukraine with US military backing as part of a post-war security guarantee, according to European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen. In an article published on 31 August, she stated that any such deployment will have ‘the full backing of US capabilities’. Von der Leyen stated that US President Donald Trump has reassured European partners that there will be a US presence as part of a backstop, a point which she said was ‘very clear and repeatedly reaffirmed’. For further analysis on what US assistance could possibly look like and what form a Europe-led post-war security force could take, see Sibylline Ukraine Update – 28 August 2025.

The EU will also possibly explore new funding mechanisms to finance Ukraine’s armed forces as part of security guarantees. Von der Leyen stated that this would include ensuring Ukrainian soldiers receive adequate salaries and that the military will be provided with modern equipment. According to her, the EU’s existing funding streams to Ukraine, including budgetary support, would need to continue during peacetime. The bloc will also maintain funding for training Ukrainian soldiers after a peace deal. At the same time, the EU is encouraging member states to either enter joint production agreements with Ukrainian defence companies or purchase weapons for Ukraine’s benefit. We assess that the Trump administration will likely welcome this clear commitment to at least fund the Ukrainian military, given the US belief that Europe should shoulder the main responsibility for Ukraine’s security. European leaders are expected to meet on 4 September in France, in the capital Paris, to further discuss security guarantees.

While the extent of US backing for a European force remains unclear, the Telegraph reported on 30 August that Trump is in discussions with European partners about US private military companies (PMCs) being sent to Ukraine. The PMCs would reportedly help rebuild frontline defences and new bases, as well as protect US businesses. While we cannot confirm the veracity of the report, if true, it could provide the Trump administration with an alternative option to support a post-war guarantee, given it has ruled out sending US troops to Ukraine. The presence of US private contractors in Ukraine would aim to deter Russia from reinvading and provide reassurance for US companies either in the country or those seeking to return or enter the Ukrainian market post-war. However, it remains unclear how acceptable even PMC deployments to Ukraine would be amongst Trump’s largely Ukraine-sceptic political base, who broadly oppose any long-term US embroilment in Ukraine.

Meanwhile, unconfirmed reports, which were refuted by a Trump administration official, claimed the US president has endorsed sending Chinese peacekeepers to Ukraine. The Financial Times reported on 29 August that Trump raised the suggestion of Beijing supplying peacekeepers to monitor a neutral zone along the frontlines as part of a peace settlement during a recent meeting with European leaders and Zelensky. Russia mentioned the use of Chinese peacekeepers as part of security guarantees during early negotiations aimed at ending the war in the early months of Russia’s full-scale invasion in 2022. For further analysis regarding the prospect, see Sibylline Ukraine Update – 21 August 2025.

Trump is reportedly ‘seriously considering’ stepping back from efforts to end the war until one or both sides begin to show more flexibility to cease hostilities. Axios reported this on 31 August, citing an unspecified senior White House official. White House Press Secretary Karoline Leavitt has made comments recently doubting whether both Ukraine and Russia are ready to end the war. Trump and some officials in his administration made similar comments earlier this year about withdrawing from the peace process; it remains unclear if and when Trump will pause efforts to reach a deal.

Amid stalled diplomatic efforts to make progress on peace, on 29 August, Zelensky outlined three key pillars he wants to see for security guarantees. The first concerns maintaining the existing size and strength of Ukraine’s armed forces, as well as ensuring consistent arms supplies from domestic, European and US manufacturers. The second component involves agreements with NATO member states concerning their readiness to support Ukraine in case of renewed Russian aggression. The last pillar focuses on sanctions against Russia and the use of frozen Russian assets to fund Ukraine’s post-war reconstruction. However, Zelensky’s vision will almost certainly clash with what Russia considers to be acceptable security guarantees. Points of contention will likely include the size and strength of Ukraine’s military post-war and the use of Russian assets for Ukraine’s reconstruction. It remains unclear whether Western stakeholders will be able or willing to commit to ensuring all three of Zelensky’s principles for security guarantees, particularly given growing EU statements underscoring the legal difficulties of seizing frozen Russian assets.

Recent polling shows that the overwhelming majority of Ukrainians (75%) believe that Ukraine should agree to a ceasefire only if Kyiv receives international security guarantees in return. According to a survey published on 31 August by the Rating Group, Zelensky’s key three pillars for security guarantees broadly align with what the Ukrainian public wants any such arrangement to contain. Over half of respondents (52%) named funding for the Ukrainian armed forces and continued weapons supplies from partners as crucial elements of a guarantee. Meanwhile, 48% listed an obligation from allies to enter the war in the event of renewed aggression as another key component; 44% spoke in favour of allies patrolling Ukraine’s airspace and maritime waters. In general, 59% of Ukrainians said they supported ceasing hostilities and searching for a compromise. We assess that the polling underscores a readiness in Ukrainian society to seek an end to the conflict. However, without robust security guarantees, the likelihood of Kyiv agreeing to a ceasefire and peace will remain low for as long as Ukrainian forces can contain Russian advances.

• Ukraine: Likely Russian-orchestrated killing of former parliament speaker reflects threat to officials. On 30 August, Ukrainian politician and former parliamentary speaker Andriy Parubiy was fatally shot by an attacker posing as a courier in the western city of Lviv (Lviv oblast). Ukrainian law enforcement detained the suspect. Head of the National Police, Ivan Vyhivskyi, alleged that there was a Russian link to the assassination. Parubiy was a nationalist politician who played an important role in Ukraine’s Euromaidan Revolution in 2013-2014. His assassination resembles that of former nationalist lawmaker Iryna Farion in Lviv in July 2024 and that of anti-Russian activist Demian Hanul in Odesa (Odesa oblast) in March. It also follows the killing of Colonel Ivan Voronych of Ukraine’s Security Service (SBU), reportedly carried out by Russian agents. We assess that, as with Farion and Hanul, Parubiy’s political work likely made him a target for Russian intelligence services. We assess that current and former Ukrainian politicians will very likely remain at elevated risk of assassination plots for the duration of the war, including those facilitated by Russia or pro-Russia individuals in Ukraine. (Source: Sibylline)

 

04 Sep 25.  Putin says any Western troops in Ukraine would be legitimate targets. Russian President Vladimir Putin said on Friday that any Western troops deployed to Ukraine would be legitimate targets for Moscow to attack. Putin was speaking a day after French President Emmanuel Macron said 26 countries had pledged to provide postwar security guarantees to Ukraine, including an international force on land, sea and in the air. Make sense of the latest ESG trends affecting companies and governments with the Reuters Sustainable Switch newsletter. Sign up here. Russia has long argued that one of its reasons for going to war in Ukraine was to prevent NATO from admitting Kyiv as a member and placing its forces in Ukraine.

“Therefore, if some troops appear there, especially now, during military operations, we proceed from the fact that these will be legitimate targets for destruction,” Putin told an economic forum in Vladivostok. “And if decisions are reached that lead to peace, to long-term peace, then I simply do not see any sense in their presence on the territory of Ukraine, full stop.” (Source: Reuters)

 

04 Sep 25. The Russia-Ukraine War has seen  an extensive proliferation of loitering munitions. Ukrainian FPV drones (First Person View) are an adaptation of commercial drones used for the sport of drone racing. They use a simplified optical sensor that has little or no traverse, keeping the price to a minimum. The FPV drone controller usually includes a face-mounted vision device that the operator uses to steer the drone in conjunction with the usual joystick controller. The Ukrainian armed forces have adapted these for combat use by fitting them with a warhead. The FPV drones are inexpensive, typically costing the Ukrainians about $350 each when locally assembled from sub-components from China. With a warhead, they are still inexpensive, costing about $500-$750. These are not drones in the usual sense of the word, but rather loitering munitions or missiles, based on drone technology. The Ukrainian effort to accelerate the acquisition of drones and expansion of the trained pool of drone operators effort is called the “Army of Drones”, a July 2022 initiative by the Ukrainian deputy prime minister and head of Ministry of Digital Transformation, Mykhailo Fedorov. The Army of Drones initiative is aiming at fielding about 60 assault drone companies, roughly one per maneuver brigade. These are intended to operate both FPV kamikaze drones as well as armed multicopter drones. Each company numbers about 65 troops. As of late July 2023, 16 companies had been formed with 6 more in the process of formation.  Besides the government funding, there has been a very extensive civilian volunteer effort including fundraising for individual combat units as well as nationwide fund-raising for weapons purchases such as the United-24 effort.  In March 2023, the Russian press complained that Ukraine had bought up “almost the entire market” for FPV drones in China, equivalent to 50,000 to 100,000 quadcopter drones. The British think tank RUSI stated in the summer of 2023 that Ukraine was expending 10,000 drones per month. When pressed on the issue, the RUSI analysts acknowledged that this was simply an estimate and was somewhere in the 5,000 to 10,000 range. In a press interview in late September 2023, Maria Berlinska, head of the “Aerial Intelligence Support Center” and the “Invisible Battalion” project outlined future Ukrainian drone requirements. According to Berlinska, Ukraine would like to manufacture 90,000 to 95,000 FPV drones per month. There has been a strong discrepancy between the reported number of monthly attacks and Ukrainian statements about monthly production. According to Ukrainian officials, production by early 2024 ramped up to about 100,000 FPV monthly. However, reported attacks were only about 1,000 monthly. The discrepancy may be explained by the difference between all attacks, and successful attacks. The reported number of attacks may refer to the number of sorties actually accomplished, suggesting an extremely high failure rate. This is entirely plausible for a variety of reasons. The FPVs are very cheap and probably have a high failure rate as a result. This includes simple mechanical failure due to poor construction as well as problems inherent in such weapons including a susceptibility to wind and crashes due to battery exhaustion prior to engagement. Another major factor in FPV failure has been Russian electronic jamming of the RF command link. One Ukrainian report in late 2024 indicated that Ukrainian forces were losing about 10,000 drones monthly to jamming, most of these the FPV drones.  Ukrainian sources have indicated that the first generation FPV drones have had a hit rate of 10%. The rate may have in fact been lower judging from the history of early anti-tank missiles, especially the manually-controlled types like the first generation FPV. For example, early MCLOS (Manual command line-of-sight) anti-tank missiles such as SS-11 had a demonstrated hit rate of 1:78 in Vietnam (1.3%) compared to SACLOS (semi-automatic command to line of sight) missiles such as the BGM-71 TOW that was about 1:2 in early versions (50%). The Ukrainians publicly acknowledged that they were attempting to integrate some form of semi-automatic command into their second-generation FPV drones to increase the hit rate to 20%. Sometimes this effort has been exaggerated as an attempt to incorporate AI into these weapons. Another significant change in 2023 was the introduction of FPV drones fitted with thermal imaging cameras to permit night attacks. Ukrainian drone expenditure in 2023 was probably on the order of 90,000 FPV kamikaze drones, probably increasing to about 150,000 in 2024.

 

03 Sep 25. £1bn of military support for Ukraine paid for using immobilised Russian assets as Defence Secretary visits Kyiv. Loan to Ukraine has enabled UK to deliver hundreds of thousands of rounds of artillery ammunition, hundreds of air defence missiles, and other essential equipment. Money raised from immobilised Russian assets has paid for more than £1bn of weapons and military support, purchased by the UK on behalf of Ukraine, the Defence Secretary, John Healey, announced during a visit to Kyiv today.   This has enabled the delivery of hundreds of thousands of rounds of artillery ammunition, hundreds of air defence missiles, spare parts, and new support contracts to help maintain and repair its equipment and vehicles.  From Kyiv, the Defence Secretary also co-chaired a Coalition of the Willing virtual meeting with representatives from more than 30 countries to cement further military contributions to a multinational force to be deployed to Ukraine in the event of a peace deal.   He told the meeting that the UK is reviewing readiness levels of UK Armed Forces and accelerating funding to be ready for any deployment to Ukraine. Ministers also discussed the composition of a multinational force, as well as tactical detail relating to how the deployment would be strengthened across the skies, seas, and land.  The Defence Secretary spoke with Minister of Defence, Denys Shmyhal, about a major boost in the UK’s direct military support for Ukraine in recent weeks – having urged allies and partners this summer to join a 50-day drive to step up delivery of vital weapons and munitions to put Ukraine in the strongest possible position.

UK support provided in the last 50 days includes:

• 4.7m rounds of small arms ammunition for Ukraine’s soldiers
• 60,000 artillery shells, rockets, and missiles
• More than 2,500 drones
• More than 200 electronic warfare systems
• 100 light weapons
• 30 vehicles
• Additional counter-drone and air defence equipment

The Prime Minister and Defence Secretary have both been clear that the UK’s national security – the foundation of the Government’s Plan for Change – starts in Ukraine. The UK remains committed to securing a just and lasting peace in Ukraine, with £4.5bn being spent on military support to Ukraine this year.

The Government has provided a £2.26bn loan by the UK to Ukraine through the Extraordinary Revenue Acceleration fund, which is being repaid using money raised from the proceeds from immobilised Russian assets.

Defence Secretary, John Healey MP, said: “The UK is stepping up our military support to help Ukraine defend itself in today’s fight against Putin’s illegal invasion, while working hard to secure peace tomorrow through the Coalition of the Willing.   More than £1bn of military support for Ukraine has now been paid for by immobilised Russian assets, while we have accelerated deliveries of vital kit and equipment over the last 50 days into the hands of Ukrainian warfighters. We are also deepening and expanding our cooperation with defence industry and learning valuable lessons from the battlefield.  On my fifth visit to Ukraine, it was an honour to meet Minister Shmyhal to stress our continued unity for Ukraine – both from the UK and across the Coalition of the Willing.”

The Defence Secretary hailed the growing ties between the UK and Ukraine’s defence industrial sectors during the visit. The growing collaboration between the UK and Ukraine’s defence sectors delivers on the 100-year partnership signed between the UK and Ukraine in January. It comes as the Foreign Secretary confirmed new sanctions targeting perpetrators of Russia’s heinous attempts to deport, indoctrinate and militarise Ukrainian children.  To date, more than 19,500 Ukrainian children have been forcibly transferred or deported by the Russian authorities to Russia and the temporarily occupied territories of Ukraine. (Source: https://www.gov.uk/)

 

02 Sep 25. UK prioritise British suppliers in UAV funds for Ukraine. More than 70% will be spent with domestic drone builders in this financial year.. British suppliers will build the majority of uncrewed aerial vehicles (UAVs) that the UK government will finance for Ukraine in this financial year.

“We are on track to spend over 70% through UK suppliers,” said Luke Pollard, the UK Minister of the Armed Forces, just five months into the forecast period.

This latest figure stems from the government’s promise to provide 100,000 drones in a £350m investment package to aid the beleaguered nation in its conflict against invading Russian forces before the end of 2025. If the UK meets this target, it would see a considerable uptick: ten times more systems than last year. But this leaves another 30% of UK-financed drones to come from other international suppliers.

Breakdown of Ukraine’s UAV supply

Army Technology contacted the Ministry of Defence (MoD) to find out which specific foreign drone-builders are financed by the UK government but the department declined to comment for security reasons. Nor did the MoD offer any information about the leading types of UAV sent to Ukraine. But it is believed that Ukraine’s global UAV supply chain covers a complicated industrial web from which the Western-backed country sources cheap components from China, one of Russia’s few strategic partners. Likewise, some Russian weapons systems obtained from the frontline were similarly powered by components sourced from the US companies such as Intel, a computer processor builder which the US government holds a 10% ownership stake.

Effect on the battlefield

UAVs have changed the modern threat landscape, accounting for the destruction of up to 70% of Russian systems. Particularly, UAVs have adjusted how units operate – experts have pointed to Russia’s revival of motorcycles, buggies, and ATVs to rapidly outmanoeuvre the stalking systems. According to GlobalData intelligence, the global drones market will reach $89.8bn by 2030, up from $32.2bn in 2024. Revenue from commercial drones will surpass military sales in 2025, driven by favourable regulations and an increase in beyond visual line of sight operations. Although one expert from the Royal United Services Institute in London advises that this should not lead to overreliance. It would be a mistake for Nato forces to rely heavily on massed small UAVs and long range one-way effectors to replace traditional weapons systems, such as artillery, in pursuit of improved lethality. (Source: army-technology.com)

 

03 Sep 25. EU Chief’s Plane Hit by Suspected Russian GPS Jamming Over Bulgaria. A plane carrying European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen experienced GPS jamming while approaching Plovdiv International Airport in Bulgaria on Sunday. The Bulgarian Air Traffic Services Authority said the GPS signal was “neutralized,” prompting air controllers to guide the flight using terrestrial tools. The plane landed safely despite circling the airport for nearly an hour. Bulgarian authorities suspect Russia was behind the incident. “We have received information from the Bulgarian authorities that they suspect that this was due to blatant interference by Russia,” European Commission Deputy Chief Spokesperson Arianna Podestà said.

The Kremlin denied the allegation, with spokesperson Dmitry Peskov telling the Financial Times: “Your information is incorrect.”

The disruption came as von der Leyen toured eastern EU states to discuss defense and support for Ukraine. Speaking in Bulgaria’s capital shortly after the incident, she urged Europe to “keep up the sense of urgency.”

“[Russian President Vladimir] Putin has not changed, and he will not change. He is a predator. He can only be kept in check through strong deterrence,” she said.

GPS jamming and spoofing have surged along Russia’s borders since its full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022. An internal EU report said Poland recorded 2,732 interference cases in January 2025, up from 1,908 in October 2023. Lithuania saw a similar increase, logging 1,185 cases in January compared with 556 in March 2024. Other officials have also been targeted. In March 2024, a UK military plane carrying then-Defence Secretary Grant Shapps was hit by GPS spoofing near Kaliningrad. (Source: https://www.sofx.com/)

 

29 Aug 25. US approves potential sale of Starlink services, Patriot equipment to Ukraine. The U.S. State Department has approved the potential sale of Starlink services and related equipment and Patriot air defense sustainment and related equipment to Ukraine, the Pentagon said on Friday. The transactions are worth $150m and $179m, respectively. On Thursday, the Pentagon announced U.S. approval for the sale of air-launched cruise missiles and related equipment to Ukraine for an estimated $825m. Make sense of the latest ESG trends affecting companies and governments with the Reuters Sustainable Switch newsletter. Sign up here. The Trump administration has agreed with European allies to step up military support for Kyiv as U.S. President Donald Trump seeks to pressure Russia into agreeing a peace deal to end its war in Ukraine. Under the agreement, European governments will pay for U.S. weapons on Ukraine’s behalf. (Source: Reuters)

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Founded in 1987, Exensor Technology is a world leading supplier of Networked Unattended Ground Sensor (UGS) Systems providing tailored sensor solutions to customers all over the world. From our Headquarters in Lund Sweden, our centre of expertise in Network Communications at Communications Research Lab in Kalmar Sweden and our Production site outside of Basingstoke UK, we design, develop and produce latest state of the art rugged UGS solutions at the highest quality to meet the most stringent demands of our customers. Our systems are in operation and used in a wide number of Military as well as Homeland Security applications worldwide. The modular nature of the system ensures any external sensor can be integrated, providing the user with a fully meshed “silent” network capable of self-healing. Exensor Technology will continue to lead the field in UGS technology, provide our customers with excellent customer service and a bespoke package able to meet every need.

A CNIM Group Company

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Sponsored by Bertin Exensor

 

www.exensor.com

 

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03 Sep 25.  Despite court ruling, military deployments to major urban centres will remain realistic possibility. On 2 September, a federal judge ruled that the Trump administration illegally used thousands of military troops in Los Angeles (California) to quell immigration-related protests in June. The judge specifically accused President Donald Trump of turning nearly 5,000 marines and National Guard soldiers into a ‘national police force’. However, the ruling only applies to California and allows time for the administration to appeal. On the same day, Trump stated that he was ‘going in’ to Chicago (Illinois) and would deploy National Guard troops; this will remain a realistic possibility in the coming days, despite the ruling. Any further use of the National Guard in major urban centres will significantly compound concerns that federal law prohibiting the use of the military for domestic law enforcement is being broken. If federal agents are deployed to Chicago, we assess that targeted activism and demonstrations against the security forces will be likely, increasing domestic unrest risks. Nevertheless, an augmented security forces presence would likely mitigate violent crime in Chicago in the short term, though long-term crime trends will be sustained. (Source: Sibylline)

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Founded in 1987, Exensor Technology is a world leading supplier of Networked Unattended Ground Sensor (UGS) Systems providing tailored sensor solutions to customers all over the world. From our Headquarters in Lund Sweden, our centre of expertise in Network Communications at Communications Research Lab in Kalmar Sweden and our Production site outside of Basingstoke UK, we design, develop and produce latest state of the art rugged UGS solutions at the highest quality to meet the most stringent demands of our customers. Our systems are in operation and used in a wide number of Military as well as Homeland Security applications worldwide. The modular nature of the system ensures any external sensor can be integrated, providing the user with a fully meshed “silent” network capable of self-healing. Exensor Technology will continue to lead the field in UGS technology, provide our customers with excellent customer service and a bespoke package able to meet every need. A CNIM Group Company

—————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————–

Sponsored by Bertin Exensor

 

www.exensor.com

 

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04 Sep 25. UK and Norway sign historic deal strengthening NATO’s northern flank and boosting jobs and growth. The Defence Secretary, John Healey, and his Norwegian counterpart, Tore O. Sandvik, today signed an historic agreement to enhance the strategic partnership between the UK and Norway

• Prime Minister visited BAE Scotstoun to meet the team who helped to land the biggest ever warship export deal worth £10bn – supporting over 4,000 UK jobs and delivering on the Government’s Plan for Change.
• Comes as the Defence Secretary and his Norwegian counterpart signed the deal today in Stavanger, Norway.
• Deal cements deep strategic partnership and will boost national defence through strengthened security in North Sea, Baltic Sea, and High North.

UK and European security was bolstered today following the signing of a new deal for Norway to purchase at least five Type 26 frigates from British shipbuilders, in a move that will create a combined fleet to better counter Russia on NATO’s northern flank.  Prime Minister Keir Starmer visited BAE Scotstoun to say thank you to the those who helped get this huge contract to build the cutting-edge vessels, which will support 4,000 jobs across the UK well into the next decade — including 2,000 in Scotland. The Defence Secretary, John Healey, and his Norwegian counterpart, Tore O. Sandvik, today signed the historic agreement to enhance the strategic partnership between the UK and Norway, strengthening NATO in the region and providing more opportunities for joint training and personnel exchanges between the two nations. At today’s signing in Norway, the Defence Secretary and the Norwegian Minister of Defence Tore O. Sandvik discussed further joint operations through this deepened partnership. The Defence Secretary also met Norwegian Navy recruits undergoing basic training who will in future likely serve on the Type 26 frigates built under this agreement.

Defence Secretary, John Healey MP, said: “This deal will support thousands of UK jobs for many years to come and boosts our strategic partnership with Norway. Our close bonds are built on a shared geography and history, and this deal will see our navies work as one, creating a combined fleet to defend NATO’s northern flank and strengthen our deterrence against Russian aggression. The programme is also expected to support 432 business, including 222 small and medium enterprises, across the UK.The £10bn deal delivers on the Government’s Plan for Change – creating jobs, driving growth and protecting national security for working people. It is a striking vote of confidence in the UK’s world-class shipbuilding industry.” (Source: https://www.gov.uk/)

 

02 Sep 25. Non-UK defence firms net higher average contract award from MoD. The average contract value awarded to non-UK defence companies was over 20% higher than deals given to UK firms. Contracts awarded to non-UK companies in the 12 months from July 2024 by the UK Ministry of Defence (MoD) were 23.1% higher on average compared to UK-based defence companies, according to official figures. Detailed in a 1 September UK parliamentary written response, UK Defence Procurement Minister Maria Eagle disclosed that between 1 July 2024 and 30 June 2025, 1,244 contracts valued at £17bn ($23.2bn) were awarded to suppliers based in the UK. By contrast, 174 contracts, worth £3bn, were awarded to suppliers located outside the UK. Extrapolating the median contract value from the number of contracts and combined amount, it can be determined that non-UK companies received an average slightly in excess of £17.2m per award, compared to just over £13.6m for UK-based companies. The contracts were among 2,674 awarded in the reporting period, with the remaining 1,256, representing £3bn, “currently under reconciliation” to determine the actual location of the supply base, Eagle stated. Further, Eagle said the while MoD records contract awards based on the administrative address provided in the supplier’s successful tender, actual delivery of goods or service “may be carried out by an international parent company”.

Where are the UK’s industrial strengths?

Analysing the UK’s defence industrial base finds severe capability gaps in the delivery of specific complex items, particularly in the land domain which is heavily reliant on overseas expertise to deliver upgrades and new vehicles into service. This is less apparent in the areas of the air and naval sectors, where UK companies still maintain, the ability to provide turnkey platform delivery to UK forces. However, recent decision to sideline UK equipment for overseas-origin platforms, such as the F-35, could weaken extant industrial capability. Some non-military SMEs in the UK have found success in entering the defence sector, although issues remain in better understanding the labyrinthine contractual corridors of Main Building.

UK wants to use defence to drive economic growth

Since coming to power in mid-2024, the new UK government has sought to leverage the country’s defence sector as a lever for economic growth, seeking to use it to create jobs and inward investment. To this end, the government has claimed an intention to increase defence spending to some 5% of GDP, although this is due to be delivered over a glacial decade-long roadmap. Previous analysis of defence funding increases by the UK government found that the budgets of non-military entities, such as the intelligence agencies’ Single Intelligence Account, will be included in overall defence spending for budgetary purposes. Of the intention to spend 5% of GDP on defence, some two-thirds of this could be claimed on investments into infrastructure that could have defence benefits, such as telecommunications and roads. (Source: army-technology.com)

 

02 Sep 25. EU sets military spending record, expects more growth in 2025. The European Union collectively spent €343bn ($402bn) on defense last year, exceeding projections and setting a new record, according to a new report by the European Defense Agency. The agency said it expected defense spending to increase further in 2025 to €381bn ($446bn). The bloc’s total defense spending in 2024 exceeds China’s by about one-and-a-half times, and is more than three times as high as Russia’s military budget. Only the United States has higher military expenditures. The figure represented 1.9% of the bloc’s GDP, and a 19% increase over the previous year. The high level of defense spending is driven primarily by countries’ purchasing of new equipment, as well as by increased research and development funding across the EU’s 27 members. Both combined are collectively referred to as “defense investments” in EU parlance, as opposed to the money spent on troop salaries or upkeep of facilities. Investment accounted for 31% of total defense spending, or €106 bn ($124bn), of which €13bn ($15bn) was used on R&D. Equipment purchases were up 39% year over year, the EDA calculated; research and development, meanwhile, grew 20%. The record spending is driven by growing budgets throughout the bloc, not just individual capitals’ aims to expand their militaries, with all but two countries growing their defense budgets in 2024. Of the 25 that increased defense expenditures in 2025, 16 capitals spent over 10% more in 2024 than they did in 2023. Among them are Germany, Poland, Spain, Sweden and the Netherlands. Only Portugal’s and Ireland’s military budgets decreased in 2024. European military spending has been growing exponentially since 2014, when Russia annexed the Crimean peninsula from Ukraine. At the time, defense expenditures across the bloc had reached their lowest levels since data collection began in 2005, at €189bn ($221bn), adjusted for inflation.

Although already on the rise, this trend was turbocharged by Russia’s intensified, full-scale assault in Ukraine, which began in February 2022. In fact, defense spending last year grew even faster than the EDA had expected, exceeding the agency’s predictions from late 2023 by €17bn ($20bn). Many of the EU’s largest defense spenders are in Russia’s immediate vicinity. Poland leads the pack, at close to 4% of GDP last year, followed by Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, each spending well over 3% of GDP on the military. The EU itself has played an increasingly active role in coordinating cross-national projects and mobilizing military funding that had previously been set aside for civilian purposes. Defense matters have long been jealously guarded as a national prerogative by many EU countries’ capitals, but many of those attitudes have recently softened in light of the threat from Russia and an increasingly icy United States, and eased by the promise of cheap money facilitated by Brussels. The 2025 edition of the annual report placed special emphasis on comparing European military capabilities to those of the U.S., including juxtaposing how many battle tanks and fighter jets they each have, and how effective their R&D investments were. The numbers show that the EU lags behind in air force numbers, while well exceeding American totals when it comes to infantry fighting vehicles and main battle tanks. Europe’s strength lies in cooperation across national borders, the EDA concluded, underscoring in its report the need for coordination in procurement, interoperability, and joint research and development.

“Europe is spending record amounts on defence to keep our people safe, and we will not stop there,” said Kaja Kallas, the European Union’s foreign policy chief. “Defense today is not a nice-to-have but fundamental for the protection of our citizens. This must be the era of European defense.” (Source: Defense News)

 

03 Sep 25. Report by the Comptroller and Auditor General. MoD does not know exact cost to date of Afghan data breach resettlement scheme

• MoD cannot calculate exactly how much it has spent on the ARR scheme because it did not separately identify the costs in its accounting system.
• Around £850m – MoD’s estimated cost to government for resettling people in the UK through the ARR scheme as a result of the February 2022 data breach, not including legal costs or compensation claims.
• 7,355 – estimated number of people who will be resettled through the ARR scheme in the UK as a direct result of the data breach.

The Ministry of Defence (MoD) cannot determine exactly how much it has spent on resettling people in the UK through the Afghanistan Response Route (ARR) scheme and to date has not provided enough evidence to give the National Audit Office (NAO) confidence in its estimate of £850m in relation to past and future costs, according to a new report.1,2

In April 2024, the government launched the ARR scheme specifically for those whose personal information was leaked in a February 2022 data breach, who were ineligible for any of the other government resettlement schemes in operation,3 and who were at significant risk of reprisal by the ruling Taliban regime in Afghanistan.

The MoD did not record exactly how much it had spent on resettling people through the ARR scheme because it did not separately identify these costs in its accounting system, instead including them within its total spending on Afghan resettlement activities. It has stated that it did this to maintain the secrecy of the ARR scheme while a super-injunction was in place preventing disclosure of both the data breach and the existence of the injunction itself.4

The MoD has estimated the total past and future costs of resettling individuals through the ARR scheme to be around £850m, of which it estimates it had spent around £400m by July 2025. However, at the time of the report’s publication, it had not provided sufficient evidence to give the NAO confidence regarding the completeness and accuracy of its estimates. The MoD will incur at least £2.5m in related legal costs. It does not yet know how much related compensation claims may cost.

The total cost to the MoD of all Afghan resettlement activity between 2021 and 2029 is forecast to exceed £2bn. Between 2021-22 and 2024-25, the MoD recorded spending a total of £563 m on Afghan resettlement schemes, including the ARR scheme. It expects to spend a further £1.5 bn by March 2029.5

In early July 2025, the government closed the ARR scheme to new applicants. At the end of the same month, the MoD estimated that 7,355 people would be eligible for resettlement in the UK through the scheme directly as a result of the data breach.6

1. The report will be available on the NAO website via the following link from 00:01 Wednesday 3 September: https://www.nao.org.uk/reports/the-afghanistan-response-route/
2. The report is a factual account of the ARR scheme which the NAO has prepared to support the Public Accounts Committee’s scrutiny of the MoD. The MoD set up the scheme to mitigate the security risks arising from a data protection breach and the unauthorised disclosure of personal information which occurred in February 2022. The report does not seek to evaluate the MoD’s management of or spending on the ARR scheme, nor does it assess the evidence which led to the super-injunction being issued, maintained and then lifted, or any other aspects of the legal process. The NAO has reviewed financial information on the costs of the ARR scheme, but it has not audited this information.
3. Figure 1 in the report lists the five Afghan resettlement routes established by the government between 2010 and 2025.
4. In reaching its decision to grant the super-injunction, the High Court accepted the MoD’s assessment that if the existence of the data loss became widely known, the Taliban would be highly likely to obtain the data, which would put the safety and lives of many individuals and their families at risk.
5. Figure 5 in the report sets out at a high level the MoD’s actual spending and future funding on Afghan resettlement schemes. The NAO is intending to perform further analysis of these costs in an upcoming report on Afghan resettlement schemes, which is due for publication in Spring 2026.
6. 1,531 individuals and an estimated 5,824 of their family members who were affected by the data breach.

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Founded in 1987, Exensor Technology is a world leading supplier of Networked Unattended Ground Sensor (UGS) Systems providing tailored sensor solutions to customers all over the world. From our Headquarters in Lund Sweden, our centre of expertise in Network Communications at Communications Research Lab in Kalmar Sweden and our Production site outside of Basingstoke UK, we design, develop and produce latest state of the art rugged UGS solutions at the highest quality to meet the most stringent demands of our customers. Our systems are in operation and used in a wide number of Military as well as Homeland Security applications worldwide. The modular nature of the system ensures any external sensor can be integrated, providing the user with a fully meshed “silent” network capable of self-healing. Exensor Technology will continue to lead the field in UGS technology, provide our customers with excellent customer service and a bespoke package able to meet every need.

A CNIM Group Company

——————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————-

Sponsored by Exensor

 

www.exensor.com

 

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29 Aug 25. Israel accuses UK of “discrimination” after DSEI decision. Israeli government and defence officials will not be permitted to attend the event, due to take place in September 2025. The Israeli Ministry of Defence (IMoD) has accused the UK government of “discrimination” after the imposition of “unilateral restrictions” on the official participation of Israeli government and military officials at the upcoming DSEI 2025 defence exhibition. The participation of Israeli officials in defence events in Europe has become a highly charged debate, as the war in Gaza rages amid a worsening humanitarian situation on the ground. Gaza’s Hamas-run health service says more than 62,000 Gazans have been killed in fighting, which erupted after a cross-border attack by Hamas in October 2023 which killed more than 1,200 Israeli citizens, with a further 251 civilians taken hostage. Earlier in 2025, organisers at the Paris Air Show erected black walls around the stands and exhibits of Israeli industry attending in a series of rows that dominated the headlines from the event. Detailing the move in a social media post on 28 August, IMOD said the UK move amounted “to a deliberate and regrettable act of discrimination” against the country’s intended participation.

“Accordingly, [IMOD] will withdraw from the exhibition and will not establish a national pavilion,” IMOD stated.

However, the IMOD said it would offer its “full support” to Israeli industries that chose to continue to participate in DSEI 2025. Continuing its response, IMOD said that the decision by the UK “grants legitimacy to terrorism and introduces political considerations wholly inappropriate for a professional defence industry exhibition”. The ability for Israeli defence companies and officials to attend industry events has come under increased scrutiny, as UK parliamentarians raise questions regarding arms sales to Israeli. Israeli industries in the UK have been subject to direct activism incidents, notably by the now banned Palestine Action group against an Elbit Systems site in Bristol. Army Technology has approached the organisers of the DSEI 2025 event and IMOD for comment into the announcement. At the time of publishing, neither had responded to requests for comment.(Source: naval-technology.com)

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Founded in 1987, Exensor Technology is a world leading supplier of Networked Unattended Ground Sensor (UGS) Systems providing tailored sensor solutions to customers all over the world. From our Headquarters in Lund Sweden, our centre of expertise in Network Communications at Communications Research Lab in Kalmar Sweden and our Production site outside of Basingstoke UK, we design, develop and produce latest state of the art rugged UGS solutions at the highest quality to meet the most stringent demands of our customers. Our systems are in operation and used in a wide number of Military as well as Homeland Security applications worldwide. The modular nature of the system ensures any external sensor can be integrated, providing the user with a fully meshed “silent” network capable of self-healing. Exensor Technology will continue to lead the field in UGS technology, provide our customers with excellent customer service and a bespoke package able to meet every need.

A CNIM Group Company

———————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————–

Sponsored by Exensor

 

www.exensor.com

 

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19 Aug 25. Leonardo DRS to Highlight Advanced Defense Solutions and Opportunities for Operational Success at DESI UK 2025. Leonardo DRS is set to showcase its latest advanced capabilities at this year’s DSEI UK show from September 9th – 12th at the ExCel Centre in London, England. We are located in the Leonardo stand S6-110.  From our advanced vehicle-based edge computing solutions to mobile counter-UAS capabilities, and advanced thermal targeting systems, the company will be highlighting its commitment to support the U.K.’s armed forces and allies across Europe with the latest in proven advanced battlespace solutions.

Subject Matter Experts are available for interviews for the below topics:

Advanced Tactical Radars:

Leonardo DRS’ Rada radars are driving the next generation of tactical radar systems—delivering combat-proven performance that is transforming how allied militaries detect, track, and defend against emerging counter-UAS and airborne threats.

With a sharp focus on ever-changing combat operations, these flexible radars are redefining how military forces detect, track, and cue to neutralize airborne threats—especially in the age of drones, loitering munitions, and hybrid warfare. Their radar platforms aren’t just built for today’s challenges—they’re engineered for tomorrow’s battlespace.

Mobile Counter-UAS Systems (Laser and Kinetic):

Leonardo DRS is a leader in the rapid development and fielding of vehicle-based Counter-UAS capabilities for U.S. Army mobile force protection.

Learn more about our latest Stryker-based C-UAS platforms, including a Directed Energy capability.

Enhancing Forward Air Controller Safety and Precision with Drone-Based Laser Designators

The ability to increase stand-off distance for Forward Air Controllers (FACs) while significantly enhancing targeting precision is no longer a future goal — it’s a current capability. Thanks to compact, high-performance laser designators that can be deployed on small drones and transported into forward positions, FACs can now call in air support from safer, more concealed locations.

These gimbal-stabilized systems must be exceptionally small, powerful, and precise, with industry-leading stability to ensure accurate target designation in dynamic combat environments. This is not off-the-shelf tech — it’s a highly specialized solution built for one of the military’s most critical and high-risk roles.

Leonardo DRS has subject-matter experts available to discuss how drone-based laser designators are transforming the FAC mission — making it safer, more effective, and more adaptable to the realities of modern warfare.

Tactical Liquid Immersion Computer Cooling:

Leonardo DRS’ IcePiercer™ liquid immersion cooling system is a revolutionary technology that redefines cooling efficiency and reliability for edge computing applications.

The digital era is driving rapid advancements in AI, machine learning, sensors, and unmanned vehicles—demanding significantly more computing power, density, and heat dissipation than traditional air cooling can handle. Advanced servers and GPUs generate heat levels that exceed fan-based cooling limits, creating a processing bottleneck. Tactical liquid immersion cooling offers a groundbreaking solution for computing across multiple domain combat platforms, delivering superior thermal performance and allowing more computing power into a smaller physical space.

Vehicle-Based Edge Computing:

Leonardo DRS is the largest world-wide supplier of rugged military computer systems and displays. As the battle management system supplier to the U.S. Army and the U.K. MoD, Leonardo DRS has delivered more than 200,000 battle-proven systems built to withstand harsh environments and rigorous military standards. With over 20 years of experience in designing, manufacturing, and supporting military computer systems, Leonardo DRS provides a broad range of rugged computing and display platforms for today’s complex requirements.

—————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————

Founded in 1987, Exensor Technology is a world leading supplier of Networked Unattended Ground Sensor (UGS) Systems providing tailored sensor solutions to customers all over the world. From our Headquarters in Lund Sweden, our centre of expertise in Network Communications at Communications Research Lab in Kalmar Sweden and our Production site outside of Basingstoke UK, we design, develop and produce latest state of the art rugged UGS solutions at the highest quality to meet the most stringent demands of our customers. Our systems are in operation and used in a wide number of Military as well as Homeland Security applications worldwide. The modular nature of the system ensures any external sensor can be integrated, providing the user with a fully meshed “silent” network capable of self-healing. Exensor Technology will continue to lead the field in UGS technology, provide our customers with excellent customer service and a bespoke package able to meet every need.

A CNIM Group Company

———————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————–

Sponsored by Exensor

 

www.exensor.com

 

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02 Sep 25. EU sets military spending record, expects more growth in 2025. The European Union collectively spent €343 bn ($402bn) on defense last year, exceeding projections and setting a new record, according to a new report by the European Defense Agency. The agency said it expected defense spending to increase further in 2025 to €381bn ($446bn). The bloc’s total defense spending in 2024 exceeds China’s by about one-and-a-half times, and is more than three times as high as Russia’s military budget. Only the United States has higher military expenditures. The figure represented 1.9% of the bloc’s GDP, and a 19% increase over the previous year. The high level of defense spending is driven primarily by countries’ purchasing of new equipment, as well as by increased research and development funding across the EU’s 27 members. Both combined are collectively referred to as “defense investments” in EU parlance, as opposed to the money spent on troop salaries or upkeep of facilities. Investment accounted for 31% of total defense spending, or €106bn ($124bn), of which €13bn ($15bn) was used on R&D. Equipment purchases were up 39% year over year, the EDA calculated; research and development, meanwhile, grew 20%. The record spending is driven by growing budgets throughout the bloc, not just individual capitals’ aims to expand their militaries, with all but two countries growing their defense budgets in 2024. Of the 25 that increased defense expenditures in 2025, 16 capitals spent over 10% more in 2024 than they did in 2023. Among them are Germany, Poland, Spain, Sweden and the Netherlands. Only Portugal’s and Ireland’s military budgets decreased in 2024. European military spending has been growing exponentially since 2014, when Russia annexed the Crimean peninsula from Ukraine. At the time, defense expenditures across the bloc had reached their lowest levels since data collection began in 2005, at €189bn ($221bn), adjusted for inflation. Although already on the rise, this trend was turbocharged by Russia’s intensified, full-scale assault in Ukraine, which began in February 2022. In fact, defense spending last year grew even faster than the EDA had expected, exceeding the agency’s predictions from late 2023 by €17bn ($20bn). Many of the EU’s largest defense spenders are in Russia’s immediate vicinity. Poland leads the pack, at close to 4% of GDP last year, followed by Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, each spending well over 3% of GDP on the military. The EU itself has played an increasingly active role in coordinating cross-national projects and mobilizing military funding that had previously been set aside for civilian purposes. Defense matters have long been jealously guarded as a national prerogative by many EU countries’ capitals, but many of those attitudes have recently softened in light of the threat from Russia and an increasingly icy United States, and eased by the promise of cheap money facilitated by Brussels. The 2025 edition of the annual report placed special emphasis on comparing European military capabilities to those of the U.S., including juxtaposing how many battle tanks and fighter jets they each have, and how effective their R&D investments were. The numbers show that the EU lags behind in air force numbers, while well exceeding American totals when it comes to infantry fighting vehicles and main battle tanks. Europe’s strength lies in cooperation across national borders, the EDA concluded, underscoring in its report the need for coordination in procurement, interoperability, and joint research and development.

“Europe is spending record amounts on defence to keep our people safe, and we will not stop there,” said Kaja Kallas, the European Union’s foreign policy chief. “Defense today is not a nice-to-have but fundamental for the protection of our citizens. This must be the era of European defense.” (Source: Defense News)

 

02 Sep 25. Non-UK defence firms net higher average contract award from MoD. The average contract value awarded to non-UK defence companies was over 20% higher than deals given to UK firms. Contracts awarded to non-UK companies in the 12 months from July 2024 by the UK Ministry of Defence (MoD) were 23.1% higher on average compared to UK-based defence companies, according to official figures. Detailed in a 1 September UK parliamentary written response, UK Defence Procurement Minister Maria Eagle disclosed that between 1 July 2024 and 30 June 2025, 1,244 contracts valued at £17bn ($23.2bn) were awarded to suppliers based in the UK. By contrast, 174 contracts, worth £3bn, were awarded to suppliers located outside the UK. Extrapolating the median contract value from the number of contracts and combined amount, it can be determined that non-UK companies received an average slightly in excess of £17.2m per award, compared to just over £13.6m for UK-based companies. The contracts were among 2,674 awarded in the reporting period, with the remaining 1,256, representing £3bn, “currently under reconciliation” to determine the actual location of the supply base, Eagle stated. Further, Eagle said the while MoD records contract awards based on the administrative address provided in the supplier’s successful tender, actual delivery of goods or service “may be carried out by an international parent company”.

Where are the UK’s industrial strengths?

Analysing the UK’s defence industrial base finds severe capability gaps in the delivery of specific complex items, particularly in the land domain which is heavily reliant on overseas expertise to deliver upgrades and new vehicles into service. This is less apparent in the areas of the air and naval sectors, where UK companies still maintain, the ability to provide turnkey platform delivery to UK forces. However, recent decision to sideline UK equipment for overseas-origin platforms, such as the F-35, could weaken extant industrial capability. Some non-military SMEs in the UK have found success in entering the defence sector, although issues remain in better understanding the labyrinthine contractual corridors of Main Building.

UK wants to use defence to drive economic growth

Since coming to power in mid-2024, the new UK government has sought to leverage the country’s defence sector as a lever for economic growth, seeking to use it to create jobs and inward investment. To this end, the government has claimed an intention to increase defence spending to some 5% of GDP, although this is due to be delivered over a glacial decade-long roadmap. Previous analysis of defence funding increases by the UK government found that the budgets of non-military entities, such as the intelligence agencies’ Single Intelligence Account, will be included in overall defence spending for budgetary purposes. Of the intention to spend 5% of GDP on defence, some two-thirds of this could be claimed on investments into infrastructure that could have defence benefits, such as telecommunications and roads. (Source: army-technology.com)

 

03 Sep 25. Report by the Comptroller and Auditor General

MoD does not know exact cost to date of Afghan data breach resettlement scheme

• MoD cannot calculate exactly how much it has spent on the ARR scheme because it did not separately identify the costs in its accounting system.
• Around £850m – MoD’s estimated cost to government for resettling people in the UK through the ARR scheme as a result of the February 2022 data breach, not including legal costs or compensation claims.
• 7,355 – estimated number of people who will be resettled through the ARR scheme in the UK as a direct result of the data breach.

The Ministry of Defence (MoD) cannot determine exactly how much it has spent on resettling people in the UK through the Afghanistan Response Route (ARR) scheme and to date has not provided enough evidence to give the National Audit Office (NAO) confidence in its estimate of £850m in relation to past and future costs, according to a new report.1,2.

In April 2024, the government launched the ARR scheme specifically for those whose personal information was leaked in a February 2022 data breach, who were ineligible for any of the other government resettlement schemes in operation,3 and who were at significant risk of reprisal by the ruling Taliban regime in Afghanistan. The MoD did not record exactly how much it had spent on resettling people through the ARR scheme because it did not separately identify these costs in its accounting system, instead including them within its total spending on Afghan resettlement activities. It has stated that it did this to maintain the secrecy of the ARR scheme while a super-injunction was in place preventing disclosure of both the data breach and the existence of the injunction itself.4

The MoD has estimated the total past and future costs of resettling individuals through the ARR scheme to be around £850m, of which it estimates it had spent around £400m by July 2025. However, at the time of the report’s publication, it had not provided sufficient evidence to give the NAO confidence regarding the completeness and accuracy of its estimates. The MoD will incur at least £2.5m in related legal costs. It does not yet know how much related compensation claims may cost.

The total cost to the MoD of all Afghan resettlement activity between 2021 and 2029 is forecast to exceed £2bn. Between 2021-22 and 2024-25, the MoD recorded spending a total of £563 m on Afghan resettlement schemes, including the ARR scheme. It expects to spend a further £1.5bn by March 2029.5

In early July 2025, the government closed the ARR scheme to new applicants. At the end of the same month, the MoD estimated that 7,355 people would be eligible for resettlement in the UK through the scheme directly as a result of the data breach.6

1. The report will be available on the NAO website via the following link from 00:01 Wednesday 3 September: https://www.nao.org.uk/reports/the-afghanistan-response-route/
2. The report is a factual account of the ARR scheme which the NAO has prepared to support the Public Accounts Committee’s scrutiny of the MoD. The MoD set up the scheme to mitigate the security risks arising from a data protection breach and the unauthorised disclosure of personal information which occurred in February 2022. The report does not seek to evaluate the MoD’s management of or spending on the ARR scheme, nor does it assess the evidence which led to the super-injunction being issued, maintained and then lifted, or any other aspects of the legal process. The NAO has reviewed financial information on the costs of the ARR scheme, but it has not audited this information.
3. Figure 1 in the report lists the five Afghan resettlement routes established by the government between 2010 and 2025.
4. In reaching its decision to grant the super-injunction, the High Court accepted the MoD’s assessment that if the existence of the data loss became widely known, the Taliban would be highly likely to obtain the data, which would put the safety and lives of many individuals and their families at risk.
5. Figure 5 in the report sets out at a high level the MoD’s actual spending and future funding on Afghan resettlement schemes. The NAO is intending to perform further analysis of these costs in an upcoming report on Afghan resettlement schemes, which is due for publication in Spring 2026.
6. 1,531 individuals and an estimated 5,824 of their family members who were affected by the data breach.

 

31 Aug 25. Boost for UK Growth and Security as Norway Selects UK Warships in £10bn partnership. Billions of pounds will be pumped into the UK economy following Norway’s decision to select British warships for their Armed Forces – securing thousands of jobs in Britain for years to come.

• Major export deal sustains 4,000 UK jobs including more than 2,000 in Scotland.
• £10bn boost to UK economy is expected to support more than 400 British companies, delivering on the Government’s Plan for Change.
• Norway’s biggest ever defence procurement deal will see a combined fleet of 13 Anti-Submarine Warfare frigates – eight British and at least five Norwegian – operate jointly in Northern Europe, significantly strengthening NATO’s northern flank.

The UK, in its biggest ever warship export deal by value, will supply Norway with Type 26 frigates designed for anti-submarine warfare in the deal worth £10bn announced today, a clear example of this Government is delivering on its Plan for Change.

The deal will support 4,000 jobs across the UK supply chain until well into the 2030s, including more than 2,000 at BAE Systems’ Glasgow shipyards. The programme is also expected to support 432 business, including 222 small and medium enterprises, across the UK including 103 in Scotland, 47 in the North West of England and 35 in the West Midlands.  Norway’s selection of the UK’s world leading Type 26 frigates builds on decades of close cooperation between close NATO allies and strengthens both nations’ strategic partnership and maritime security in the face of increasing Russian threats in northern Europe. Both Australia and Canada have also selected the design for Type 26 for their Navies.

Prime Minister Keir Starmer said: “This £10bn deal is what our Plan for Change is about – creating jobs, driving growth and protecting national security for working people. This Government has forged new partnerships across the world to deliver for people at home and the export of our world leading Type 26 frigates to Norway will do exactly that, supporting well-paid jobs up and down the United Kingdom, from apprentices to engineers.  This success is testament to the thousands of people across the country who are not just delivering this next generation capabilities for our Armed Forces but also national security for the UK, our Norwegian partners and NATO for years to come.”

Norwegian Prime Minister Jonas Støre said: “Norway and the United Kingdom are close allies, with common interests and strong bilateral ties. I am confident that the strategic partnership with the UK for purchasing, developing and operating frigates is the right decision. This partnership enables Norway to reach the strategic objectives our Parliament set out in the current Long-Term Plan on Defence. The decision comes ahead of a new UK-Norway defence agreement that will strengthen Euro-Atlantic security while bringing the two countries’ defence industries closer together to boost jobs, growth, and innovation.   Norway’s operation of identical Type 26 ships alongside the Royal Navy hails the deepening of a long term-strategic relationship that will see a combined fleet of 13 Anti-Submarine Warfare frigates – eight British and at least five Norwegian – to detect, classify, track and defeat hostile submarines – significantly reinforcing NATO’s northern flank.  This ambitious partnership will also cover shared maintenance, extensive crew training, in-service support and personnel exchanges.   As outlined in this year’s Strategic Defence Review, Norway remains one of the United Kingdom’s most valued strategic allies, serving as the only nation participating in the UK Carrier Strike Group’s complete 2025 deployment whilst also collaborating with the UK and NATO partners in safeguarding critical undersea infrastructure in Northern Europe.”

Defence Secretary, John Healey MP said: “For over 75 years, Britain and Norway have stood together on NATO’s northern and north-eastern frontiers, keeping the UK and Europe safe. This historic defence deal deepens our strategic partnership. With Norway, we will train, operate, deter, and – if necessary – fight together. Our navies will work as one, leading the way in NATO, with this deal putting more world-class warships in the North Atlantic to hunt Russian submarines, protect our critical infrastructure, and keep both our nations secure. This deal confirms Britain’s defence industry as world-leading. It will support thousands of high-skilled jobs for the next 15 years and beyond, driving forward this Government’s Plan for Change and making defence an engine for growth.

On behalf of Team UK industry partners, Charles Woodburn, Chief Executive of BAE Systems, said: “The Norwegian Government’s decision reflects its confidence in British industry’s ability to deliver a superior anti-submarine warfare platform, together with systems and equipment, that will support its future maritime security and reinforce its position within NATO. We look forward to playing our part in further strengthening the strategic partnership between the UK and Norway, as we work together with Norwegian industry to deliver this important capability to the Royal Norwegian Navy.The Type 26 features sophisticated weapons, advanced sensors, and cutting-edge communications, with a flexible design that enables future upgrades to counter emerging threats. (Source: https://www.gov.uk/)

 

31 Aug 25. The Norwegian Government has selected the United Kingdom as a strategic partner for the acquisition of new frigates. The purchase of British frigates will be the largest Norwegian defence capability investment to date.

“Norway and the United Kingdom are close allies, with common interests and strong bilateral ties. I am confident that the strategic partnership with the UK for purchasing, developing and operating frigates is the right decision. This partnership enables Norway to reach the strategic objectives our Parliament set out in the current Long-Term Plan on Defence,” said Prime Minister Jonas Gahr Støre.

In connection with the Norwegian defence pledge, the Parliament decided that Norway should select a strategic partner for the acquisition of new frigates, as quickly as possible. This is now being followed up by the Norwegian Government. The Storting has been consulted through the expanded Committee on Foreign Affairs and Defence. Delivery of the British Type-26 frigates to Norway will start in 2030.

“Selecting the United Kingdom as a strategic partner for frigates was also recommended by the Chief of Defence. The choice represents a historic strengthening of the defence cooperation between our two countries,” said Støre.

Since November last year, Norwegian authorities have considered France, Germany, USA and UK as a strategic partner on frigates.

“It has been a difficult choice. The four candidates, France, Germany, USA and the UK, have provided strong and competitive proposals. They are all close allies, and I wish to express my appreciation for a constructive process and dialogue. All four allies are strategic partners for Norway. The extensive cooperation on security and defence policy will continue at full strength with all of them,” said Støre.

A stronger strategic partnership: A long-term, strategic partnership on frigates requires deepened and strengthened cooperation in the time to come.

“Together we will acquire frigates to the British Royal Navy and the Royal Norwegian Navy. We will operate and develop the frigates for the coming decades. This will strengthen our and NATO’s ability to patrol and protect the maritime areas in the High North. This is of great importance to Norwegian, British and allied security in these times of global instability,” said Støre.

Norway and the United Kingdom have long lasting, close ties. After having operated British vessels during World War II, the post war navy was largely built on British doctrines, tactics and operational concepts.

“We have strong shared interests in the North Atlantic. Our Armed Forces maintains a close cooperation, and with a joint frigate program, we will be able to operate seamlessly and integrated in our joint areas of interest,” said Defence Minister Tore O. Sandvik.

Extensive industrial cooperation: The strategic partnership with the United Kingdom will be accompanied by extensive industrial cooperation. In the draft agreement the United Kingdom has guaranteed for industrial cooperation with Norwegian industry equivalent to the total value of the acquisition.

“This is positive for Norwegian industry and Norwegian jobs. The industry will play a vital role especially in maintaining and keeping the vessels up to date. We have identified a wide range of industrial and technological areas of cooperation where Norwegian industry can compete for contracts,” says Støre.

Ships for anti-submarine operations: The British Type 26 frigates are warships specifically designed to detect, track down and combat submarines. The Norwegian and British vessels will be as identical as possible, and have the same technical specifications.

“Having identical vessels will enable us to operate even more efficiently together on challenging missions. It will also reduce costs and make joint maintenance easier. Additionally, it opens up the possibility for us to perform joint training of personnel, and perhaps even use Norwegian and British crew interchangeably. This is something we will look into further within the framework of the strategic partnership,” said Sandvik.

The Norwegian frigates will be equipped with anti-submarine capable helicopters. A decision on what type of helicopter the Norwegian frigates will be operating has not yet been made.

“The Norwegian frigates will be equipped with helicopters with anti-submarine capability. At the same time, it is important that we consider the rapid technological developments, and explore the possibilities for utilising unmanned platforms. This is something we will look further into together with British partners,” said Sandvik.

Separate government agreement: The Norwegian and British governments will soon finalise a binding agreement which sets the framework for the strategic partnership. Once the agreement is signed, the two parties will enter into contract negotiations with the main British supplier, BAE Systems. In parallel, Norwegian and British authorities will negotiate separate industrial cooperation agreements for various collaborative projects with relevant industrial partners.

“Our first goal is to finalise the Government agreement shortly. Then we will move into contract negotiations. We will negotiate, among other things, the price and delivery schedule for the vessels, before returning to the Parliament with an investment decision,” said Sandvik. (Source: joint-forces.com)

 

19 Aug 25. Cohort plc, the independent defence technology group, will be showcasing the latest innovative technology from its seven specialist businesses at DSEI UK, 9 – 12 September 2025. Located on stand N6-120, the Group’s subsidiaries will be demonstrating a variety of defence solutions across areas including electronic warfare, communications, and anti-submarine warfare.

Andy Thomis, Chief Executive of Cohort plc said: “We’re excited to again be part of one of the largest defence and security events in the calendar, where we can demonstrate how Cohort and its subsidiaries are driving innovation across defence and security domains. DSEI offers a vital platform to showcase our cutting-edge solutions, from advanced communications and electronic warfare training to next-generation sonar, satellite communications, and unmanned systems, that address the complex and evolving challenges faced by armed forces worldwide. By leveraging the combined expertise of our diverse portfolio and working closely with our customers, Cohort remains committed to enhancing the operational capabilities and resilience of the UK and its allies’ armed forces.”

Maritime & Naval Operations

ELAC SONAR brings its comprehensive suite of advanced sonar capabilities for submarine operations and surface vessels, Sphere® – the surveillance, mine and collision avoidance, underwater communication and measurement system. The company is also unveiling a next-generation all-in-one system for seabed warfare, combining advanced sonar processing with fibre-optic technology for superior underwater detection and deterrence.

SEA presents its ship and fleet protection and undersea surveillance capabilities, headlined by KraitSense – a comprehensive ASW, ISR and MSA sonar solution featuring the innovative low size, weight and power, miniaturised KraitArray, and intelligent processing software. Also on display: the Ancilia trainable decoy launcher, selected by the Royal Navy for its Maritime Electronic Warfare Programme (EWCM1A), and the latest Torpedo Launcher Systems, integral to the Royal Navy’s Type 23 frigate upgrade.

Advanced Communications & Satellite Technology

EID showcases its full range of communication solutions: OCEANEX, the advanced shipborne C4I solution offering secure, reliable naval communications; TERRANEX, a versatile tactical communication system designed to perform across all terrains; and EIDNEX, EID’s innovative system integration platform tailored for defence, security, and critical sectors.

EM Solutions, the newest member of the Cohort Group, highlights its maritime satellite communications capabilities, with specialists on hand to discuss the King Cobra satellite-on-the-move (SOTM) terminal. King Cobra offers high-capacity, resilient, multiband communication and has been selected by the Royal Australian Navy for fleet-wide SATCOM modernisation. The EM Solutions team will be displaying the compact Cobra terminal – a lighter SOTM solution for smaller vessels, known for its multiband flexibility and robust tracking.

Electronic Warfare & Surveillance Systems

MASS demonstrates its cutting-edge Electronic Warfare (EW) capabilities and training solutions designed for today’s complex multi-threat environments. Its immersive EW and Cyber Electromagnetic Activity (CEMA) training combines real-world military experience with MASS’s software-based Networked Electronic Warfare Training Simulator (NEWTS). MASS will also spotlight its new JCAST training solution, developed in partnership with Hadean, delivering a highly realistic, simulated environment for the UK Ministry of Defence’s Joint Command and Staff Training programme.

MCL presents several key innovations, including its hyperspectral imagery camera technology – a defence industry first that detects subtle variations invisible to the human eye and conventional cameras, enabling identification of ‘cold’ objects. The company will also showcase its new flight and speed controller for FPV drone use, alongside its advanced communications, surveillance, and hearing protection systems.

Fire Control & AI Target Detection and Tracking

Chess Dynamics demonstrates its next generation naval fire control systems – SeaEagle FCEO-D (Fire Control Optical Digital) and SeaEagle FCRO (Fire Control Radar Optical) – alongside its Hawkeye AD ground-based air defence (GBAD) solution. Chess’ Vision4ce brand will highlight AI-enabled video and image processing, target detection and tracking, including its DEFT CORE video tracking capability and CHARM 150AGX image processor.

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29 Aug 25. Japan looks to build drone ‘shield’ in record defense budget request. Tokyo is seeking another record-busting defense budget — including spending to build a drone “shield” to defend Japan’s southwestern periphery — amid rising concerns over the Chinese military’s moves near and inside the country’s waters and airspace. The Defense Ministry said Friday that it is seeking a budget exceeding ¥8.8trn ($60bn) for fiscal 2026, up 4.4% from last year’s record ¥8.5trn initial request. The budget is the fourth in a five-year spending plan of around ¥43trn, as Japan zeroes in on its target of spending 2% of gross domestic product on defense by 2027. Most prominent in this year’s request is a ¥128.7bn plan to build a multilayered coastal defense system covering the air, sea, and waters that incorporates unmanned assets as well as strengthened standoff defense capabilities to attack from outside an enemy’s range. Employing large numbers of “inexpensive unmanned aerial, surface and underwater vehicles” — for both reconnaissance and attack purposes — the so-called Synchronized, Hybrid, Integrated and Enhanced Littoral Defense (SHIELD) drone system is due to be put in place by the end of fiscal 2027, according to the ministry.

“As seen in recent conflicts like Ukraine, tactics involving unmanned assets … are becoming prevalent,” a Defense Ministry official told reporters this week. “Recognizing this as an urgent priority, Japan must swiftly establish an asymmetrical, multilayered defense posture. This will be achieved by leveraging not only manned assets, but also inexpensive, mass-produced unmanned assets, and combining them effectively.”

Meanwhile, Japan’s counterstrike capabilities are also expected to get a big boost, with a total of ¥1.25trn requested for standoff weapons, including ¥180bn for an improved, longer-range version of the domestically made Type 12 ground-launched anti-ship missile. Deployments of those weapons in Japan are planned to begin before the current fiscal year concludes at the end of next March. More than ¥30bn for the acquisition of hypersonic missiles — which can travel at least five times the speed of sound — and 74bn for the development of the weapons is also being requested, with an aim of beginning production in fiscal 2026. These capabilities theoretically allow Japan to hit far-away enemy bases and other sites, though the government has focused on the weapons’ deterrent effects. Both the drone systems and the standoff missiles are especially important for deterring and defending Okinawa Prefecture’s far-flung southwestern islands, including those near democratic Taiwan. Japanese officials have called drones “game-changers,” signaling that the country’s defense establishment is well aware of how they are transforming warfare, which is why Tokyo is planning to give unmanned systems an outsized role in the Self-Defense Forces as quickly as possible.

The unmanned assets, in particular, are also seen as a “trump card” against population decline and recruitment woes faced by the SDF, the ministry has said.

Total expenditures on drones is expected to hit nearly ¥312.8bn. For the near-term, Japan is pursuing a policy of quantity over quality in procuring drones, amid what it says is an increasingly harsh regional security environment. China’s increasingly assertive moves in the air and waters around the country have triggered calls from lawmakers to employ drones to better respond and deter incursions into its airspace and territorial waters. In order to quickly introduce air, sea and underwater drones into the SDF, Japan is looking at potentially purchasing the unmanned assets from Turkey, Australia, the United States and others. Stockpiling drones — quickly — has been a key target for the ministry, a push that was highlighted in Japan’s 2022 Defense Buildup Program. According to the program, the SDF will “expeditiously procure various types of unmanned assets.” As part of the program, Japan is aiming to spend some ¥1trn on drone procurement and research and development costs by 2027. In terms of even longer-term goals, Japanese defense officials have emphasized the need to develop and nurture a domestic drone industry, with a special focus on “high-end” systems.

“While Japan may be significantly behind the U.S. in some areas, compared with others, I believe we are still in a position where we can compete. For this segment, the key investment focus should be on research projects and nurturing domestic companies,” one official said, adding that this includes “substantial funding” for areas like artificial intelligence and flight control systems.

“I believe we still have a fighting chance here,” the official said.

But, the official added: “It’s undoubtedly preferable to have more domestic products.”

For smaller drones, officials believe that while the core technology exists domestically, business model issues have proven to be challenges for Japan’s heavy industry manufacturers. The Defense Ministry is working with the trade ministry and others to tackle these issues. Japan’s focus on drones has echoes of the United States’ Replicator program, which is focused on fielding thousands of cheap, smart and autonomous drones across multiple domains to counter China’s military advantage in personnel and manned equipment. Indeed, moves by the Chinese military in the airspace and waters around Japan have been a driving factor in the push to spend more on defense. In a defense white paper released last month, Tokyo noted that the Chinese military is “stepping up its activities throughout areas surrounding Japan, including the East China Sea around the Senkaku Islands, the Sea of ​​Japan and the western Pacific Ocean, beyond the so-called first-island chain and extending to the second-island chain.” It cites several recent incidents, including the China Coast Guard’s deployment of a helicopter in Japan’s territorial airspace around the Japanese-controlled, Chinese-claimed Senkakus in May. The white paper also noted a Chinese military aircraft’s incursion into Japanese airspace last August and a Chinese aircraft carrier sailing close to Japan’s territorial waters the following month — both firsts. Beijing has continued to chip away at precedent in recent months, dispatching both of its active aircraft carriers deep into the western Pacific last month and sending its warplanes near Japanese aircraft multiple times in recent weeks, moves that Tokyo said risked collisions. These attempts to punch even further into the Pacific have proven particularly unnerving for Japan, with the ministry also announcing in its budget request plans to create a new office focused on “Pacific defense initiatives” that will “examine how to proceed with systems such as surveillance and monitoring” along the nation’s periphery and how to cooperate with countries in the region.

“On the Pacific side (of Japan,) we’re seeing activities like the simultaneous operations of two or more aircraft carriers and aircraft being launched from them,” a defense official said. “And there’s a growing concern: Is our current surveillance and monitoring system on the Pacific side truly sufficient?”

Japan’s defense-related spending in fiscal 2025 reached 1.8% of gross domestic product, according to the Defense Ministry, zeroing in on its 2%, the gold standard targeted by many Western nations. Although Tokyo has touted the spending hikes as a tremendous breakthrough for the ostensibly pacifist nation as it seeks to contend with a number of growing regional threats, the U.S., Japan’s top security ally, has demanded it cough up even more cash and take on more responsibility for its defense. The Pentagon in June confirmed that it had set a “global standard” for Japan and other U.S. allies to spend 5% GDP as soon as possible — a figure that would likely be both politically unpalatable and economically unfeasible for Tokyo, especially as it grapples with rising inflation and a weak yen. (Source: News Now/https://www.japantimes.co.jp/)

 

28 Aug 25. “The spectrum of Russian threats to the UK is evolving … It is vital that an IAMD [Integrated Air and Missile Defence] system be developed in a way that does not render it an opportunity cost to the UK’s ability to project power but instead renders it additive to the UK’s credibility.” This is the view expressed in a new research report by the Royal United Services Institute subtitled, Options to Defend the UK from the Russian Missile Threat, by Dr Sidharth Kaushal, which evaluates the intensifying threat posed by Russia’s long-range precision strike capabilities and how the UK should best defend itself against them. The research says the threat to the homeland – ranging from Russian cruise missiles, ballistic weapons to hypersonic glide vehicles – is increasing and requires a carefully sequenced, scalable and resource-appropriate response. The research recognises that simulations, which have shown Russian missiles would penetrate existing UK defences, have heightened the awareness of current vulnerabilities. The report also considers missile defence solutions adopted by Ukraine, Israel and the United States. The research indicates the benefits of a missile defence ‘dome’ solution tailored for the UK, which enhances deterrence and does not detract from the UK’s broader expeditionary and NATO commitments. It recommends a three-phase approach to better defend the UK to 2040: first, addressing subsonic cruise missile defences; second, building limited ballistic missile defences (BMD); and third, developing capability to counter hypersonic threats. This program would involve some form of long-range land-based missile defence system.

Key Findings

• The threat to the UK from Russian long-range precision strikes is real and will evolve over time. The report says: “The spectrum of Russian threats to the UK is evolving from a single vector cruise missile threat into one which involves a broader spectrum of capabilities with different altitudes and speed regimes.”
• The most immediate danger comes from cruise missile attacks, especially those launched from Russian submarines. “From positions in the Norwegian Sea or Atlantic a Yasen class SSGN [nuclear-powered cruise missile-armed submarine] could deliver 40 cruise missiles against a fixed target with relatively low warning.”
• Ballistic and hypersonic threats will become more acute beyond the mid-2030s. “By the late 2030s, assuming that Russia achieves production rates comparable to the USSR, Russia may have a number of IRBMs [Intermediate Range Ballistic Missiles] sufficient to enable conventional targeting at scale within Europe.”
• The UK’s current IAMD capability is limited and spread thinly across services. “The most pressing challenge faced by the UK is one of capacity in key areas which would force trade-offs between deploying capabilities in alignment with the NATO force model and national defence.”

Key Recommendations

• Adopt a phased response, aligned with the evolving threat. “A sequenced approach which emphasises incremental improvements to national defences against air breathing [low altitude] targets out to 2035 followed by a pivot to defences against ballistic targets … can mitigate risks to the homeland.”
• Improve cruise missile detection. “The most immediate challenge… is the paucity of elevated L Band sensors that can detect cruise missiles skimming over the sea over long distances.”
• Invest in ground-based long-range air defences to create a multi-layered protection system. “There will likely be a requirement for some form of surface based inner layer of defence.”
• Enhance command and control systems. “The ability to build a system with an open architecture capable of integrating capabilities held across the joint force will serve both the immediate aim of better employing available data… and create an architecture capable of absorbing new systems.”

Conclusion

This report provides a strategic roadmap for enhancing the UK’s homeland defences against an evolving spectrum of missile threats from Russia. It recognises that the UK cannot and should not replicate other nations’ IAMD models wholesale. Instead, it must develop an architecture that suits its specific geography, threat environment and alliance commitments. A phased, intelligence-led and affordable approach is vital to ensure readiness across multiple time horizons while preserving the UK’s broader military effectiveness. The report notes that the objective is not merely to defend the homeland but to strengthen deterrence and strategic credibility.

 

27 Aug 25. Colombia: Kidnapping of military personnel underscores physical security, organised crime risks. On 26 August, Defence Minister Pedro Sánchez stated that armed civilians had kidnapped 34 soldiers in El Retorno municipality (Guaviare department). The civilians allegedly kidnapped the soldiers following pressure from the Central General Staff (EMC)’s Iván Mordisco faction. Before the kidnapping, armed clashes between military personnel and the Iván Mordisco faction killed 11 EMC members (including one commander) and one civilian. The recent kidnappings mark the 20th such incident involving the EMC in 2025. In June, the Carlos Patiño faction of the EMC allegedly pressured civilians to kidnap 57 soldiers for 48 hours in El Plateado (Cauca department). The Iván Mordisco faction highly likely coerced civilians to carry out the kidnappings, underscoring the elevated extortion and organised crime risks in EMC-controlled areas (such as Cauca, Guaviare and Valle del Cauca departments). In the short-to-medium term, we assess that kidnapping risks will remain elevated for security force personnel. The authorities will likely continue to deploy reinforcements to deter any expansion attempts by EMC factions. Further deployments and armed clashes will elevate supply chain disruption risks in the area, in addition to physical security risks for bystanders. (Source: Sibylline)

 

26 Aug 25. Hegseth Anticipates Full Review of Kabul Airport Attack Circumstances by Mid-2026. Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth said he anticipates that a Defense Department special review panel looking into the circumstances surrounding the Aug. 26, 2021, suicide bombing attack in Kabul, Afghanistan, should be ready to present its findings by sometime in mid-2026. The attack, carried out by a bomber affiliated with ISIS-K and wearing an improvised explosive device, killed 13 U.S. service members and roughly 170 Afghan civilians at Hamid Karzai International Airport’s Abbey Gate.  Hegseth spoke of the investigation yesterday in the White House’s Oval Office, shortly after President Donald J. Trump signed a proclamation commemorating the fourth anniversary of the attack while surrounded by Gold Star family members of the victims.

“On behalf of this beautiful group, on behalf of these families on behalf of your loved ones who fought for our nation, America deserves answers as far as what happened in Afghanistan; the military needs to answer for what happened in Afghanistan,” Hegseth told the group.

The secretary went on to say that Chief Pentagon Spokesman and Senior Advisor Sean Parnell — himself a veteran of the war in Afghanistan — is leading the Trump and Hegseth-ordered special review panel and that the review is taking place “on behalf of the American people.”

“The special review panel at the department continues its vital work to investigate the botched withdrawal, ensuring that the pursuit of accountability and transparency does not waver,” reads a DOD statement released today on honoring fallen heroes during the fourth anniversary of the attack.

“While the review is ongoing, the effort to uncover the full truth behind the decisions made during this period has not stopped and will not stop until every aspect is examined and those responsible are held to account,” the statement continues.

The work of the current special review panel follows a multi-month supplemental review of the original Abbey Gate investigation that began almost two years prior.   Ordered by U.S. Central Command in September 2023, the supplemental review reaffirmed the military’s finding of the initial investigation that the Abbey Gate attack could not have been preventable at the tactical level.

“Justice for the families of the 13 fallen service members is an essential priority,” Hegseth said via the aforementioned DOD statement, adding that the victims’ sacrifice is “the driving force” behind the special review panel.

“We owe it to them, to the American people, and to all who wear the uniform to comb through every detail of what happened, delivering full accountability and restoring trust,” he concluded. (Source: U.S. DoD)

 

26 Aug 25. US-Venezuela-Trinidad and Tobago: US military deployments will increase regional tensions. According to reports on 25 August, the US will deploy a guided missile cruiser and a nuclear-powered fast attack submarine to the southern Caribbean Sea. The authorities have not specified which mission the Ticonderoga-class USS Lake Erie cruiser and the Los Angeles-class USS Newport News submarine will carry out. That said, on 18 August, the US deployed three Arleigh Burke-class Aegis guided missile destroyers, the Iwo Jima Amphibious Ready Group and multiple Boeing P-8 Poseidon maritime patrol aircraft to combat drug trafficking in the region; the deployment carried a total of 4,500 service members (including 2,200 marines). Furthermore, Trinidad and Tobago Prime Minister Kamla Persad-Bissessar granted her verbal support for the US’s ongoing efforts to combat drug trafficking in the southern Caribbean Sea. Additionally, she stated that if Venezuela were to invade Guyana, she would grant access to the US military upon request to assist in defending the latter. The heightened US military deployments and Persad-Bissessar’s comments will escalate regional tensions with Venezuela. However, we assess that US military action against Venezuela is a remote possibility in the near term. (Source: Sibylline)

 

23 Aug 25. FARC Splinter Group Downs Colombian Black Hawk With Explosive FPV Drone. A Colombian National Police ‘Black Hawk helicopter’ was destroyed Thursday when an explosive-laden drone struck the aircraft over northern Antioquia, killing at least 13 officers, according to Colombian authorities.  Officials said the helicopter was operating near the rural town of Amalfi during a coca eradication mission when the drone struck. Video shared online, recorded from long range with limited clarity, appeared to capture the moment of impact and later showed black smoke rising from the site. A second unverified video appears to show the helicopter being targeted as it landed in the mountainous region. President Gustavo Petro said in a statement on X that the attack was carried out by the 36th Front of the Estado Mayor Central (EMC), a dissident faction of the former Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC). The EMC is one of several groups that rejected the 2016 peace accord and continues to operate in cocaine-producing regions. Authorities initially considered whether the powerful Gulf Clan, Colombia’s largest drug cartel, was responsible, especially after the seizure of 1.5 tons of cocaine in Urabá earlier in the week. (Source: https://www.sofx.com/)

 

22 Aug 25. Cote d’Ivoire displays new equipment during independence day parade.   Cote d’Ivoire’s military has displayed some of its recently acquired military hardware during its independence day parade, including Shrek, Puma M36 and Ural armoured personnel carriers as well as unmanned aerial vehicles. The country held its independence day parade on 7 August, which included hundreds of vehicles operated by the military and gendarmerie, including a number not publicly seen before. Of note were South African Puma M36 and DCD Springbuck SD armoured personnel carriers (APCs), Chinese made WZ-551 APCs and DongFeng EQ2050 light tactical vehicles, Turkish Ural and Cobra II APCs, and Emirati Shrek APCs, built by Streit. The United States was originally going to supply 36 US-built Puma M36s to Niger, but after Niger ended military cooperation with the United States and American forces withdrew from that country, these were sent to Benin, Ghana, and Cote d’Ivoire. A dozen were officially handed over to Cote d’Ivoire’s armed forces on 10 April this year. The US Embassy at the time said the handover was accompanied by extensive training and ongoing support.

“These vehicles will strengthen Cote d’Ivoire’s ability to secure its borders and combat terrorism, while advancing American interests in regional stability. A stronger Côte d’Ivoire means a safer West Africa — and a more secure future for our two nations,” the US Embassy said.

The Springbuck SD vehicles were also seen at last year’s independence day parade, along with Husky route clearance vehicles. According to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute’s (SIPRI’s) Arms Transfers database, Cote d’Ivoire received 79 Springbuck SDs from South Africa. Also delivered within the last couple of years were 17 Norinco VP11 mine-resistant, ambush-protected (MRAP) vehicles, and nine VN-22B wheeled armoured fire support vehicles, from China, SIPRI reported. The latest equipment acquisitions indicate a substantial amount of new hardware has been delivered since 2022, when Cote d’Ivoire first displayed International Armoured Group (IAG) Jaws armoured personnel carriers, WZ-551 6×6 infantry fighting vehicles from China, and Nurol Makina Ilgaz-II armoured vehicles from Turkey. The Armoured Group (TAG) has also supplied BATT UMG and Terrier LT-79 armoured vehicles to Cote d’Ivoire while Turkey has delivered at least 20 Otokar Cobra II APCs. New to the country’s military are Otokar Ural 4x4s, which appear to be in service with the Gendarmerie. Cote d’Ivoire’s army previously was known to only operate handfuls of AML-60, AML-90, BRDM-2, ERC-90F4 Sagaie, BMP-1/2, VAB, M-3 Panhard, Mamba and BTR 80 armoured vehicles. These were in 2018 supplemented with second hand BTR-70 and Kaiman armoured vehicles from Belarus and Bastion APCs from France. (Source: https://www.defenceweb.co.za/)

 

25 Aug 25. South Korea tells China it wants to normalise ties, upgrade economic relations. South Korea hopes to normalise relations with China that have been strained in recent years, a special envoy from Seoul told Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi on Sunday, and agreed to boost economic cooperation, Seoul’s foreign ministry said. South Korean President Lee Jae Myung sent a special delegation led by former parliament speaker Park Byeong-seug to his country’s main trading partner as he travels to Washington to meet U.S. President Donald Trump. (Source: Reuters)

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Military And Security Developments

Aug 29.

 

29 Aug 25. Israeli Airstrikes Kill Houthi Prime Minister in Yemen Capital. The prime minister of Yemen’s Iran-backed Houthi rebels was reportedly killed in Israeli airstrikes Thursday in the capital Sanaa, according to Yemeni media reports. Ahmed al-Rahawi reportedly died when Israeli strikes hit his apartment in Sanaa, Yemen’s Al-Jumhuriya channel and the Aden Al-Ghad newspaper reported. The Aden Al-Ghad said several of his associates were also reportedly killed in the same strike. There was no immediate confirmation from Israel or Houthi officials. The strikes also reportedly targeted Houthi Defense Minister Mohamed al-Atifi and Chief of Staff Muhammad Abd Al-Karim al-Ghamari during what Israeli sources described as a cabinet meeting of senior officials outside Sanaa, according to Israeli media reports. Al-Rahawi served as prime minister of the Houthi-led government from August 10, 2024. A member of the General People’s Congress party, he had previously served on the Supreme Political Council. The Israel Defense Forces confirmed striking “a Houthi terrorist regime military target in the area of Sanaa” on Thursday without providing additional details. (Source: https://www.sofx.com/)

 

Aug 28.

KEY DEVELOPMENTS

IRAN

• Despite further talks between the E3 (France, Germany and the UK) and Iran, tensions over Tehran’s nuclear programme and stalled engagement with the US will sustain risks of sanctions reapplication.

ISRAEL

• Increasing protest attendance in Israel will sustain risks of operational and supply chain disruption amid stalled ceasefire negotiations

PALESTINIAN TERRITORIES

• Israel continues to expand ground operations in northern Gaza; a double-tap strike targeting a hospital facility in Khan Yunis underscores critical threats to life for locally engaged staff.
• Famine conditions in Gaza will highly likely persist, compounding threats to locally engaged NGO staff, while broader tensions with Israel will drive regional tensions and risks of pro-Palestine protest activity and activism worldwide.
• In the West Bank, the IDF uprooted thousands of olive trees, increasing risks of further unrest and ethno-religious violence between Palestinians and Israeli settlers in the coming weeks.

IRAN

• Despite further talks between the E3 (France, Germany and the UK) and Iran, tensions over Tehran’s nuclear programme and stalled engagement with the US will sustain risks of sanctions reapplication. On 28 August, Reuters reported that the E3 have sent a letter to the UN Security Council (UNSC) initiating proceedings to trigger the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action’s (JCPOA’s) snapback clause; we are unable to independently verify this report at the time of writing. The E3 had repeatedly warned that it would trigger the snapback clause, launching a process to reinstitute UN sanctions on Iran, if the diplomatic deadlock in nuclear negotiations with the US persisted until the end of August. While Iran had held rounds of nuclear talks with the E3 and launched talks with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to restore its monitoring capabilities, Iran was seemingly maintaining maximalist negotiating positions regarding its nuclear programme. If the E3 does trigger the snapback clause in the coming days, this will highly likely cause a further devaluation of the Iranian rial (IRR), compounding socio-economic health concerns within Iran and increasing risks of goods shortages in the coming weeks. Iran is highly unlikely to demonstrate its continued compliance with the JCPOA, significantly increasing risks of sanctions reimplementation in the coming weeks. However, there is also a realistic possibility that triggering the snapback clause reflects increasing E3 brinkmanship and efforts to pressure Iran into resuming negotiations with the US in the immediate term. As such, if diplomatic contact resumes, the E3 will possibly opt to propose a resolution extending the snapback clause rather than completing the sanctions reimplementation process, moderating immediate risks of sanctions imposition on Iran.

ISRAEL 

• Increasing protest attendance in Israel will sustain risks of operational and supply chain disruption amid stalled ceasefire negotiations. In the past week, protest activity has continued at pace throughout Israel, with numerous demonstrations in major cities and protests targeting key intersections on highways nationwide between 22 and 25 August. On 23 August, approximately 500,000 protesters attended rallies in Beersheva (Southern district), Caesarea and Haifa (both Haifa district), Jerusalem (Jerusalem district) and Tel Aviv (Tel Aviv district), restricting movement along several key highways. Protesters again mobilised mass demonstrations on 26 August, with approximately 350,000 civilians attending rallies, primarily in Jerusalem and Tel Aviv. Protesters blocked numerous thoroughfares, including Highways 1, 2 and 20, and lit fires, resulting in multi-hour traffic jams. The demonstrations coincided with a security cabinet meeting on 26 August, which failed to discuss the latest ceasefire proposal from mediators (see Sibylline Middle East Crisis Update – 18 August 2025). Amid increasing concerns that expanding ground operations in Gaza City (see below) will endanger the remaining hostages in Gaza, protest activity will almost certainly continue in the coming weeks. This will sustain risks of substantial operational and supply chain disruption, particularly for firms operating in Jerusalem and Tel Aviv. Although protester fatigue will likely undercut participation in the coming weeks, the risk of clashes with police attempting to disperse informal road blockades and sit-ins in public spaces will increase, moderately increasing risks of bystander exposure to tear gas and water cannons. If Israel does not reach a ceasefire agreement with Hamas in the coming weeks, mass anti-government demonstrations are highly likely to occur in early October to mark the two-year anniversary of the 7 October attacks. This will compound operational, supply chain and labour flexibility risks in the medium term.

PALESTINIAN TERRITORIES

• Israel continues to expand ground operations in northern Gaza; a double-tap strike targeting a hospital facility in Khan Yunis underscores critical threats to life for locally engaged staff. On 24 August, the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) killed at least 20 people, including five journalists, in two consecutive (double-tap) strikes targeting the Nasser Hospital complex in Khan Yunis area (southern Gaza). Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu subsequently referred to casualties as a ‘tragic mishap’; the IDF announced it would conduct an internal investigation. The IDF subsequently stated that the strikes targeted a Hamas camera attached to the hospital facility. The strike demonstrates Israel’s willingness to engage in strike action targeting key infrastructure it associates with militant activity, including medical centres and displacement camps. Such strikes will almost certainly continue in the coming weeks, sustaining critical threats to life for locally engaged staff and civilians accessing humanitarian services. In northern Gaza, regional media reported on 27 August that IDF ground forces had begun to move into the Ebad-Alrahman neighbourhood in northern Gaza City, underscoring the expanding scope of ground operations in the city’s eastern and northern neighbourhoods. Expanding ground operations will likely trigger further displacement from northern to southern Gaza, particularly the al Mawasi area. This will likely significantly increase demand for humanitarian and emergency services therein. Such pressure will likely further undermine humanitarian conditions in southern Gaza (see below), drawing further scrutiny of Israel and Israeli-linked entities worldwide.
• Famine conditions in Gaza will highly likely persist, compounding threats to locally engaged NGO staff, while broader tensions with Israel will drive regional tensions and risks of pro-Palestine protest activity and activism worldwide. On 22 August, the UN’s Integrated Food Security Phase Classification (IPC) published findings from its Famine Review Committee (FRC), which indicate that famine is currently occurring in northern Gaza and impacting over 514,000 civilians. The report also states that famine conditions will likely manifest in Deir al-Balah and Khan Yunis governorates in the coming weeks. Israel has rejected the IPC’s findings and formally requested the report’s withdrawal due to its alleged use of inaccurate data provided by Hamas. However, all of the UNSC’s members except the US have signed a statement supporting the IPC report, characterising famine conditions as man-made. The IPC report underscores critical food security conditions within Gaza, amid continued disruption to aid delivery and distribution efforts. Food security conditions are unlikely to demonstrably improve in the coming weeks, sustaining significant risks of organised and opportunistic looting targeting aid convoys, storage facilities and distribution points within Gaza. This trend underscores direct and incidental threats to staff. Deteriorating humanitarian conditions within Gaza will continue to exacerbate tensions between Israel and its major diplomatic and trade partners (such as the EU, EU member states and the UK). This will increase risks of arms export license reviews, sanctions on hard-right members of Israel’s government and trade agreement suspensions or modifications. Conditions in Gaza will likely drive pro-Palestine protests in the broader region, as well as in major cities in Australia, Belgium, Canada, France, Germany, the Netherlands, the UK and the US. Israeli-linked firms will likely be increasingly exposed to targeted protests and activism (including workforce activism) in the coming weeks. Such risks will be particularly acute for firms engaged in the defence, shipping and construction sectors, driving corporate governance, reputational and operational disruption risks.
• In the West Bank, the IDF uprooted thousands of olive trees, increasing risks of further unrest and ethno-religious violence between Palestinians and Israeli settlers in the coming weeks. The IDF reportedly uprooted thousands of olive trees in the village of Al-Mughayyir (Ramallah and al-Bireh governorate) on 24 August after a Palestinian conducted a small arms attack on a settler in the area. The destruction of the olive farms was coupled with the imposition of a three-day local curfew by the IDF. The IDF Central Command chief, Avi Bluth, subsequently warned that if such attacks persist, ‘every village … [will] pay a heavy price’, including similar curfews, clearing operations and damage to agriculture. Local media outlets subsequently stated that Bluth was implying that he intends to pursue a policy of collective punishment in the West Bank, triggering significant criticism. The IDF has rejected these allegations, stating that it engaged in the tree clearing to remove foliage facilitating militant activity. Regardless, any application of similar measures will highly likely trigger further unrest from affected Palestinian communities targeting proximate IDF installations and settlers. Protests will likely act as flashpoints for renewed ethno-religious violence in the central West Bank, increasing risks of disruption to overland movement along key thoroughfares. Additionally, the IDF conducted a 14-hour operation in central Nablus (Nablus governorate) overnight from 26 to 27 August, reportedly injuring over 55 individuals. In the coming weeks, the IDF will almost certainly continue engaging in raids targeting militant strongholds and cells throughout the West Bank (particularly northern governorates), increasing risks of operational disruption, localised curfews and exposure to crossfire for locally engaged staff.

RED SEA

• Israel-Yemen: The Houthis’ unprecedented use of a missile containing cluster munitions, prompting substantial IDF retaliatory strikes, will further undermine energy security in Yemen. On 22 August, the Houthis launched a missile towards Israel that contained cluster munitions for the first time. While the IDF failed to fully intercept the missile, which likely fragmented mid-air, the resultant damage was limited to small pieces of shrapnel falling in a residential garden in Ginaton (Central district). In response, on 25 August, the IDF conducted a series of airstrikes in the Yemeni capital Sanaa, targeting a Houthi military compound housing the presidential palace, two power plants (including the key Hizyaz plant), as well as a fuel storage site. The Houthi government claimed that these strikes killed six people and injured 86 others. The strikes will almost certainly augment the energy crisis in Yemen, compounding existing power supply challenges and disrupting NGO operations within Houthi-controlled territory. Such strikes will also possibly trigger knock-on deterioration in food security in north-western Yemen, as power outages will likely disrupt port operations, driving pressure on foreign aid resources. On 27 August, the Houthis launched another missile against Israel, but it was intercepted and triggered further IDF strikes in Sanaa on 28 August, underscoring the retaliatory nature of strike patterns. Further Houthi missile strikes against Israel are highly likely in the coming days, possibly including further usage of cluster munitions and targeting major population centres, including Haifa and Tel Aviv. While such strikes are unlikely to succeed, they will drive bystander exposure to shrapnel, especially for personnel in proximity to dual-use infrastructure, such as Ben Gurion Airport (TLV, Central district).

REGIONAL AND GLOBAL DEVELOPMENTS

• Israel-Lebanon: The US has continued efforts to facilitate the disarmament of Lebanese Hizballah by the Lebanese government, increasing risks of protests in the coming days. On 26 August, US Special Envoy Thomas Barrack announced that Lebanon’s government will propose a US-backed plan to disarm Lebanese Hizballah (LH) on 31 August and that Israel will subsequently commit to withdrawing its military from positions in southern Lebanon. Barrack emphasised that the disarmament process will be voluntary and will seek to address the socio-economic concerns of LH militants in order to incentivise demobilisation. The statement is highly likely to increase tensions with LH, which will almost certainly oppose efforts to disarm its militant factions in the short term; pro-LH protests will be highly likely following the government announcement. Protest activity will likely be particularly pronounced in the southern suburbs of the Lebanese capital Beirut, disrupting movement to and from Beirut-Rafic Hariri International Airport (BEY) and through the Dahieh area. Protests will also be highly likely in cities in Baalbek-Hermel, Beqaa, Nabatieh and South governorates, increasing risks of broader operational disruption. LH members will possibly attempt a show of force and demonstrate with small arms, increasing risks of altercations with the security forces and anti-LH factions, driving ethno-religious tensions and broader inter-communal clashes thereafter. There is a realistic possibility that Nabih Berri (the leader of the LH-aligned Amal Movement) will seek to mediate tensions between LH and the government, possibly resulting in broader negotiations and an extended timeline for implementing disarmament plans. Although such efforts will likely moderate tensions and risks of armed conflict within Lebanon, tensions with Israel will almost certainly remain elevated, sustaining cross-border tensions and broader border disputes through 2025.
• Israel-Syria: An uptick in Israeli military operations in Syria is unlikely to significantly impact ongoing security talks but will increase attack risks from militant groups. On 26 August, the Syrian government claimed that Israeli drone strikes on Syrian army positions near the city of al-Kiswah (Rif Dimashq governorate) killed six soldiers. This comes amid several other reported Israeli incursions over the past week, including an airborne landing at a former air defence base, airstrikes near Kiswah and Jabal Manea hill (Rif Dimashq) and the deployment of 60 IDF troops near the strategic Mount Heron (Quneitra governorate). We assess that the recent Israeli strikes and incursions are unlikely to prompt direct Syrian retaliation against IDF troops stationed in Daraa and Quneitra governorates or hinder the ongoing US-backed security talks. However, attacks by rogue Islamist factions, Palestinian militias and pro-Iran cells (driving clashes with IDF troops in southern Syria) remain a realistic possibility in the coming weeks. Such clashes would partially increase the risk of delays to Israel-Syria talks and the associated resolution of border disputes.
• Turkey-Israel: Turkey’s informal shipping restrictions on vessels linked to Israel will trigger compliance risks and operational disruption for various shipping and tourist cruise companies in the region. On 21 August, media outlets reported that the Turkish port authorities had begun informally requiring shipping agents to provide letters declaring that their vessels are not linked to Israel and not carrying military or hazardous cargo bound for Israeli ports. The same reports also mentioned that vessels arriving directly from Israel or departing to Israeli ports would no longer be permitted to dock at Turkish ports. While not confirmed, the possibility of such restrictions will likely drive significant compliance challenges and operational disruption for shipping companies operating in Israel, Turkey and the eastern Mediterranean region in general, including the shipping and tourism sectors. If these restrictions are enforced in the coming weeks, there is a possibility that Israel will retaliate with similar measures, creating barriers for shipping and the maritime tourism sector in the eastern Mediterranean.
• Norway-Israel: The divestment of Norway’s wealth fund from Israeli banks will increase compliance and reputational risks for global companies with a presence in the Israeli market. On 26 August, Norway’s wealth fund, the world’s largest, announced that it had divested from US construction equipment company Caterpillar and five Israeli banks on ethical grounds. The fund claimed there is an unacceptable risk that these six groups contribute to serious violations of the rights of individuals during war. This move follows similar divestiture measures by the fund over recent months, from Israel’s Paz Retail and Energy LTD and the Israeli telecommunications firm Bezeq. As such, we assess that Norway’s wealth fund will likely continue this trend, divesting from further Israeli and global entities (including banks) that deal with the IDF and Israeli settlers through H2 2025. There is also a realistic possibility that other European pension funds will implement similar measures, further exacerbating compliance risks for entities and individual investors engaged in Israel. These risks will remain elevated as long as the Israel-Hamas war protracts and humanitarian conditions in the Gaza Strip continue to deteriorate over the coming months.
• Australia-Iran: The expulsion of the Iranian ambassador following accusations of sponsoring antisemitic attacks underscores the persistent physical risks for Jewish individuals and entities globally. On 26 August, the Australian government accused Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) of carrying out two antisemitic arson attacks in 2024 and gave the Iranian ambassador and three other diplomatic staff seven days to leave Australia. The attacks had targeted a Jewish-owned restaurant in Sydney (New South Wales state) and the Adass Israel Synagogue in Melbourne (Victoria state). Notably, the Australian prime minister said that Iran had likely conducted further attacks and that the government will designate the IRGC as a terrorist organisation. The developments underscore the elevated risks of state-sponsored attacks against Jewish individuals, synagogues and businesses in Australia, Europe, the Gulf region and the US in H2 2025. Further investigations in Australia are underway; retaliatory attacks against Jewish assets and synagogues in the country will be possible in the coming days, particularly during pro-Palestine protests in major cities, given the persistent risks of Iranian infiltration of these events.

Executive summary

• Tensions between the US, Iran and Israel remain significantly elevated, as nuclear negotiations have failed to progress demonstrably since the conclusion of the Israel-Iran war.
• The E3 (France, Germany and the UK) have launched proceedings to trigger the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action’s (JCPOA) snapback clause. Maximalist negotiating positions from the US and Iran will continue to undermine prospects for the progress of substantive nuclear negotiations before mid-October, making it likely that UN sanctions against Iran will be reimplemented. However, there is a possibility (though it is currently unlikely) that the threat of sanctions will prompt Iran to make concessions on its nuclear programme and engage in meaningful talks; this would encourage a shift towards extending the snapback clause, rather than towards reimposing sanctions and jeopardising progress.
• Iran will likely seek to redevelop its nuclear capabilities and ballistic missile programme in the coming months amid broader efforts to deter further Israeli strike action and increase leverage in future negotiations with the US and the E3. These efforts will almost certainly compound tensions with Israel, the US and the E3, increasing risks of diplomatic breakdown, further sanctions and a resumption of Israeli strike action.
• We assess that if Iran demonstrably attempts to redevelop its nuclear and ballistic missile programmes, Israel’s most likely course of action will be to engage in limited strike action targeting nuclear facilities. In response, Iran will likely seek to de-escalate regional tensions and moderate risks of resumed conflict, decreasing risks of a sustained breakdown in the Israel-Iran ceasefire.
• There is also a realistic possibility that Israel will engage in broader strike action targeting military and nuclear facilities in Iran, significantly increasing pressure on government stability and security force capacity. Such conditions would likely undermine regional stability and trigger significant price volatility in global energy markets, amid an escalation in armed conflict.
• Although unlikely, Iran will possibly choose to forgo reconstituting its nuclear programme due to broader economic pressures. In this scenario, Iran will highly likely increase support for regional proxies and cyber threat activity, sustaining regional tensions and risks of instability in conflict-sensitive environments, particularly Iraq, Lebanon and Syria.

Context

While hostilities between Iran, Israel and the US have not resumed since the imposition of the Israel-Iran ceasefire on 25 June (see Sibylline Situation Update Brief – 24 June 2025), tensions over Iran’s nuclear programme remain elevated, sustaining the risk that strikes on Iran resume. In June, we assessed that Israel (which had broadly established aerial supremacy above Iran) had likely agreed to the ceasefire based on an assessment that US strikes on Iran’s nuclear facilities had degraded their threat and that a ceasefire would enable the resumption of nuclear talks in which the US could secure long-term concessions. However, nuclear negotiations have not resumed, while Iran has also suspended co-operation with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). As such, concerns that Iran is utilising the lack of oversight and diplomatic pressure to restore its nuclear capacities have escalated.

With no progress towards a resumption in nuclear negotiations with the US, despite numerous warnings, on 28 August, the E3 (France, Germany and the UK) launched proceedings to trigger the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action’s (JCPOA) snapback clause, ahead of its expiration on 18 October. This has initiated a 45-60 day process to reinstitute the pre-2015 UN sanctions; such reinstitution would follow a vote at the UN Security Council (UNSC) after Iran has submitted evidence that it has remained compliant with the JCPOA. We assess that, in the short term, the reimposition of UN sanctions would likely undercut Iranian willingness to comply with any monitoring or negotiations, thereby compounding anxiety about the status of Iran’s nuclear programme. Israel’s assessment of the state of Iran’s nuclear weapons programme, including the development of delivery systems, is likely the key factor in its decision on whether to launch further strikes. There is a possibility that Israel will identify a need to conduct strikes regardless of progress in negotiations; however, the status of nuclear negotiations with the US and the associated threat of UN sanctions will likely have a material impact on Israel’s strike decision. As such, this report will provide two sets of scenarios: firstly, for how we anticipate prospective negotiations with the US are most likely to proceed against the threat of UN sanctions reimposition, and secondly, regarding Iranian nuclear and weapons development and likely Israeli responses. The probabilities presented represent our current analysis for the likelihood of these scenarios developing over the short-medium term (within the next three to six months). However, continued stasis in the negotiation process and the reimposition of UN sanctions (SECTION ONE, Scenario 1) will further increase the risk of Israeli strike action (SECTION TWO, Sub-scenarios 1a and 1b). Contrastingly, meaningful progress towards an agreement will likely discourage overt Israeli action (SECTION TWO, Sub-scenario 1c). Currently, our strike assessments assume that Israel will be the first party to conduct offensive operations; this is based on Iran’s limited capacity to successfully conduct offensive operations against Israel and limited public appetite in the US for military engagement in the Middle East. There is a realistic possibility that the US will be drawn into conducting strikes on Iran, as in June 2025; however, this will be most likely if the US assesses that it is necessary to degrade a key nuclear threat, which it likely currently considers to be unnecessary.

• Iraq: Withdrawal of PMF bill will increase tensions ahead of November elections. On 27 August, Prime Minister Mohammad Shia al-Sudani withdrew the Popular Mobilization Authority bill from the parliament. The bill would have formalised key bureaucratic and security structures within the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF), an umbrella organisation of Iranian-backed militias broadly operating beyond the remit of the Iraqi security forces. Al-Sudani withdrew the bill amid increasing pressure from the US, which opposed the bill based on concerns that it would increase and institutionalise Iran’s influence in Iraq. Although the bill’s withdrawal will likely moderate tensions between the US and Iraq, it will also highly likely compound tensions between the Iraqi government and Iranian-backed militant groups, particularly ahead of the national legislative elections on 11 November. Increasing sectarian and factional tensions will likely exacerbate existing political rifts between Iraq’s numerous armed groups, including those within the PMF. We assess that violent confrontations between the state security forces and PMF factions are highly likely in the coming months, increasing security risks for locally engaged staff, including in the capital Baghdad.
• Turkey: Defence company executive arrests underscore sustained governance concerns. On 27 August, the authorities in Istanbul (Istanbul province) announced the arrests of the owner and general manager of Assan Group (a major defence and construction conglomerate) on suspicion of military espionage. The Istanbul prosecutor’s office stated that the two individuals are associates of Fethullah Gulen, whom Ankara has accused of orchestrating the 2016 coup attempt. The authorities have placed Assan Group and ten subsidiaries under the control of the Savings Deposit Insurance Fund of Turkey (TMSF), the government body which handles asset seizures and operates under the remit of the president’s office. The arrests come amid increasing scrutiny of Assan Group following allegations that it fraudulently obtained classified information regarding army procurements. In the coming days, we assess the investigation is highly likely to expand further, increasing the risk of asset seizures for associated firms and arrests targeting high- and mid-level executives. Politically motivated investigations into Turkish defence contractors will almost certainly continue at pace in the coming years, sustaining significant governance and compliance risks for associated entities, including subcontractors, subsidiaries and business service providers.

Aug 27.

• Iran: Diplomatic engagement will possibly delay sanctions implementation. On 26 August, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)’s director-general announced that several inspectors have returned to Iran as negotiations to restore their monitoring capabilities continue. The announcement comes after Iran and the E3 (France, Germany and the UK) concluded an additional round of nuclear talks in Switzerland, also on 26 August. Despite moderate diplomatic overtures, Iran is highly unlikely to restore IAEA monitoring capabilities unilaterally, with its maximalist negotiating position moderating the prospects for a major diplomatic breakthrough in the short term, particularly with the US. The E3 has repeatedly stated that it intends to trigger the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA)’s snapback clause and re-institute UN sanctions on Iran should diplomatic deadlock persist beyond the end of August. Even so, given the continued engagement, the E3 will possibly opt to extend rather than trigger the snapback clause in the coming weeks. While this approach would likely moderate sanctions-exposure risks and further devalue the Iranian rial (IRR) in the immediate term, we assess that persistent deadlock with the US will sustain the likelihood of sanctions being re-applied in the medium term.
• Israel-Syria: Strikes on Syrian army are unlikely to undermine ongoing security talks significantly. On 26 August, the Syrian government claimed that Israeli drone strikes on Syrian army positions near the city of al-Kiswah (Rif Dimashq governorate, Syria) killed six soldiers. The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) has not yet confirmed the strike. Notably, the strike comes days after Syria reported an incursion of nearly 60 IDF troops near the strategic Mount Heron (Quneitra governorate, Syria). Nevertheless, we assess that the recent Israeli strikes and incursions are unlikely to prompt direct Syrian retaliation against IDF troops stationed in Daraa and Quneitra governorates (both Syria) or hinder the ongoing US-backed security talks. Even so, retaliation by rogue Islamist factions and pro-Iran cells which subsequently drive clashes with IDF troops in southern Syria remains a realistic possibility in the coming weeks. We assess that such clashes would partially increase the risk of disruption to ongoing Israel-Syria talks and in turn delay the resolution of border disputes and Israel’s continued military presence in Syria. Similarly, a resumption of the ethno-religious conflict between Druze and government-aligned militias in Syria would also increase the risk of hindering the talks.

Aug 26.

• Israel-Yemen: Airstrikes will drive further local energy security risks, operational disruption for NGOs. On 25 August, the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) conducted a series of airstrikes in the Yemeni capital Sanaa, targeting a Houthi military compound housing the presidential palace, two power plants (including the key Hizyaz plant) and a fuel storage site. The Houthi government has claimed that the strikes killed six people and injured 86 others. The strikes will almost certainly augment the energy crisis in Yemen, compounding existing power supply challenges and driving operational risks for NGOs and their personnel within Houthi-controlled territory. We assess that these strikes will also possibly trigger the knock-on deterioration of food security in north-western Yemen, as power outages will likely disrupt port operations, increasing pressure on foreign aid resources. Furthermore, the Houthis will highly likely launch retaliatory attacks against Israel in the coming days, targeting major population centres including Tel Aviv (Tel Aviv district). While such strikes are unlikely to succeed, they will drive bystander exposure to shrapnel, especially for personnel in proximity to dual-use infrastructure, such as the central district’s Ben Gurion International Airport (TLV). (Source: Sibylline)

 

22 Aug 25. US Raid Kills Future ISIS Leader in Northwest Syria. The United States Central Command (CENTCOM) killed a senior ISIS commander, viewed as the group’s likely future leader, in a pre-dawn raid in Atmeh, near Syria’s border with Turkey, on Wednesday. The coalition targeted Abu Hafs al-Hashimi al-Qurashi, an Iraqi national. The Syrian Observatory for Human Rights said another Iraqi citizen was killed during the operation. No U.S. troops were killed or injured in the raid. A Syrian security source and state-owned Al-Ikhbariya reported the target was killed while attempting to flee.  CENTCOM confirmed the strike and described al-Qurashi as a key financier behind planned attacks in Syria and Iraq. “He had relationships throughout the ISIS network in the region, posing a direct threat to U.S. and Coalition forces and the new Syrian Government,” CENTCOM said.  A U.S. official told Fox News al-Qurashi was viewed as a strong candidate to become the ISIS Syria Emir, a role that would have posed a direct threat to U.S. and Coalition forces as well as the new Syrian government. This is the second U.S. operation in northern Syria since President Ahmed al-Sharaa replaced Bashar al-Assad. In July, U.S. forces killed ISIS leader Dhiya’ Zawba Muslih al-Hardani and his two sons in Aleppo’s al-Bab region.

“We will continue to pursue ISIS terrorists with unwavering determination, throughout the region.” CENTCOM Commander Adm. Brad Cooper said. Together with our partners and allies, CENTCOM remains steadfast in our commitment to ensuring the lasting defeat of ISIS and the protection of the U.S. homeland.” (Source: https://www.sofx.com/)

 

22 Aug 25. U.S., Saudi Arabia Strengthen Ties Through State Partnership Program. Saudi Arabia expanded its strategic ties with the United States by formally joining the Defense Department National Guard Bureau State Partnership Program during a ceremony in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, yesterday.  Military leaders from both nations signed a declaration to integrate Saudi Arabia into the SPP, aligning the Saudi Arabian armed forces with the Indiana and Oklahoma National Guards in a trilateral partnership established last year.  The 115-nation SPP strengthens strategic bonds through joint military training, exercises and exchanges to enhance collective readiness, reestablish deterrence and foster enduring relationships among troops.

“Today, we formalize a partnership that reflects the deep strategic relationship between our nations, built on a shared commitment to global security, trust and decades of cooperation,” said Air Force Gen. Steve Nordhaus, the 30th chief of the National Guard Bureau, during the signing ceremony.

The U.S.-Saudi alliance, rooted in economic and security cooperation since 1940, emphasizes counterterrorism and regional stability. Saudi Arabia’s strategic location, capable military and leadership in the Arab and Islamic worlds make it a vital global partner.  Additionally, Saudi Arabia’s Vision 2030, an ambitious plan to diversify its economy and transform its society, includes significant investments in defense modernization and technology.

“With this signing, the Indiana and the Oklahoma National Guard embark on a journey with the Saudi Arabian armed forces to share expertise, promote mutual understanding and advance our shared commitment to global security,” Nordhaus said.

He was joined by Gen. Fayyad Al-Ruwaili, Saudi Arabia’s chief of general staff; Army Maj. Gen. Thomas Mancino, Oklahoma’s adjutant general; and Army Brig. Gen. Lawrence Muennich, Indiana’s adjutant general, in signing the declaration that will launch formalized joint training exchanges.

“The partnership with the United States National Guard marks a historic milestone in the trajectory of our defense cooperation,” Al-Ruwaili said. “It embodies our unwavering commitment to developing joint capabilities that strengthen regional security and stability, while firmly establishing the principles of combined military operations in pursuit of a more secure and prosperous future.”

The SPP agreement follows President Donald J. Trump’s May visit to Riyadh, where he announced $600 bn in Saudi investments in technology and defense, including a $142 bn defense sales deal — the largest in U.S. history. This deal will equip Saudi Arabia with advanced warfighting systems and services from over a dozen U.S. defense firms, reinforcing its regional security role. Saudi Arabia, the largest buyer of U.S. foreign military sales, allocates 8.1% of its gross domestic product to defense — more than any other Middle Eastern nation and among the highest globally.  Elbridge Colby, undersecretary of defense for policy, welcomed Saudi Arabia’s efforts to strengthen its self-defense capabilities and to make greater contributions to achieving shared regional objectives in a readout from the July 29-30 U.S.-Saudi strategic joint planning committee.  Vision 2030’s focus on modernizing the military, developing domestic defense industries and strengthening cybersecurity further enhances Saudi Arabia’s strategic importance.  The SPP is a DOD program with a cost-effective model managed by the National Guard Bureau, guided by State Department foreign policy goals and executed by the state adjutants general in support of combatant commander and U.S. chief of mission security cooperation objectives and department policy goals.  Through the SPP, the National Guard of every state, territory and the District of Columbia is partnered with nations on every continent but Antarctica. Last year, National Guard elements executed roughly 1,000 SPP engagements, at just 1% of the U.S. security cooperation budget. These engagements range from troop-to-troop best practice exchanges to unit-level training exercises, enabling guardsmen and their partner-nation counterparts to share and develop expertise, enhancing lethality and interoperability.

“Our ability to train and operate together is a decisive advantage as we share the burden of regional defense and global security with our allies and partners,” said Nordhaus, a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

The National Guard is the operational reserve of the Army and the Air Force. Its 433,000 soldiers and airmen bring significant experience in disaster relief, domestic operations, homeland defense, warfighting and partnerships — local to global.

“The SPP will enable Indiana and Oklahoma National Guard members to work side by side with our Saudi partners and learn from each other,” said Alison Dilworth, Chargé d’Affaires ad interim to Saudi Arabia. “The possibilities of what we can do together are endless.”

The Indiana and Oklahoma National Guard each offer unique capabilities in cybersecurity, disaster response, aviation maintenance, medical response and logistics — all of which provide avenues for exchange and collaborative training.

“The Oklahoma National Guard is proud to join forces with our partners in the Indiana National Guard to welcome the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia to the State Partnership Program,” Mancino said. “We are honored to stand alongside our new partners to share knowledge, foster long-term relationships and enhance capacity to respond to shared challenges.”

“I am extremely proud of the Indiana National Guard for being selected to partner with a strategic ally in the Middle East,” Muennich said. “The National Guard is a global force with local roots, and we’re excited for this new opportunity to learn alongside our Saudi partners and enhance our readiness.”

The Saudi-Indiana-Oklahoma partnership began last November with a cybersecurity, disaster response and critical infrastructure protection exchange in Riyadh. This April, joint training focused on counter-uncrewed aerial systems operations, border security and maritime domain awareness — critical to Saudi Arabia’s sovereignty over its coastal waters.  The Saudi Arabian armed forces also seek to further develop its enlisted and noncommissioned officer corps.  This January, a mobile training team of U.S. airmen assigned to Air Forces Central led the Royal Saudi Air Force in its inaugural chief leadership course. The course also featured discussions on the RSAF’s new partnership with Indiana and Oklahoma.  While in Riyadh, Senior Enlisted Advisor John Raines, SEA to the CNGB, participated in a senior enlisted leader forum alongside Ahmed Al-Mutairi, the Saudi Arabian armed forces’ first senior enlisted advisor to underscore the critical contributions of the U.S. military’s enlisted corps.

“Our enlisted corps is the backbone of our military,” Raines said. “The character of warfare is changing rapidly, which will require speedy decisions at a much lower echelon.”

Across the State Partnership Program enterprise, National Guard troops have worked to develop and professionalize partner nation enlisted corps, which Al-Mutairi pointed to as another opportunity for collaboration.

“We are excited for this partnership,” he said. “You are our friends and our second country.”

Planning is already underway for future engagements, which will occur between troops from each country, both in Saudi Arabia and in the United States.

“We’re excited for this new partnership, which will boost our readiness in our core missions to support the warfighter, defend the homeland and build partnerships,” Nordhaus said. “This partnership is a force multiplier for security and stability that will make us stronger together and stronger tomorrow.” (Source: U.S. DoD)

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Military And Security Developments

Apr. 29.

• Russia: Frequent Ukrainian drone strikes on oil infrastructure will drive socio-economic health risk. On 28 August, Reuters reported that Russia’s Ust-Luga oil export terminal (Leningrad oblast) will operate at half capacity in September due to Ukrainian drone strikes against pipeline infrastructure. Earlier in August, drone attacks targeted the Unecha pumping station in Russia’s Bryansk oblast, an important transit point for crude oil destined for Ust-Luga. The Ust-Luga facility plays a critical role in Russian exports to global markets. The latest developments underscore the increasing efficacy of Ukrainian drone attacks against Russian oil infrastructure. Such strikes have noticeably intensified over the past month, targeting depots, pipelines and oil refineries. This has resulted in growing disruption to domestic oil supplies, with some Russian regions and Russian-occupied territories experiencing fuel shortages. We assess that Kyiv’s current strike strategy, which involves heavily targeting Russian oil infrastructure, will sustain supply disruptions and place increasing pressure on Russian oil exports. Russia will highly likely retaliate with intense strikes against Ukraine’s critical infrastructure, including energy facilities.
• Germany: Drone flights over US weapon transit routes underscore Russian espionage risk. On 28 August, The New York Times cited unnamed US and Western officials who believe that Russia and/or Russian proxies have conducted surveillance drone operations over US weapons transit routes in eastern Germany. The officials reportedly suspect that the drones are collecting intelligence on logistical corridors (primarily in Thuringia state) used to channel military aid to Ukraine, which could be used to inform future sabotage operations. The report adds to the mounting evidence that Russia has been carrying out drone espionage in Germany since its invasion of Ukraine. Earlier in August, Germany’s Federal Criminal Police Office (BKA) reported that there have been 270 cases involving 536 drone flights in Q1 2025 alone (though these are highly unlikely all attributable to Russia). We have repeatedly assessed that Russia is likely responsible for a portion of the drone activity recorded near sensitive Bundeswehr (military) facilities, defence companies and critical national infrastructure (including liquefied natural gas (LNG) terminals, railways and port facilities. These drone flights will likely persist, given the difficulties the German authorities have faced in tracing and counteracting them.

Aug 28.

KEY DEVELOPMENTS

• SOUTHERN: Ukraine’s General Staff have acknowledged for the first time that Russian forces are now operating inside Dnipropetrovsk oblast, though we have assessed this for many weeks
• STRIKES: On 28 August, Russia launched one of the largest combined strikes of the war, with a missile strike causing severe (and possibly deliberate) collateral damage to the British Council building in the capital Kyiv
• BORDER: Ukrainian men aged 18 to 22 are now allowed to leave the country after the government revised travel rules, with an expansion of conscription unlikely in the short term
• FORECAST: The US is reportedly prepared to provide significant intelligence and air support to a Europe-led post-war security force in Ukraine, though it remains unclear if the Trump administration will commit to such a plan
• BAKHMUT: Russian forces are making slow progress to the west of Chasiv Yar, which will slowly facilitate future advances towards the eastern outskirts of Kostiantynivka (both Donetsk oblast). Geolocated footage from 21 August onwards confirms that the Russians have successfully pushed west of the Siverskyi-Donets-Donbas Canal, which runs south from Chasiv Yar. Russian forces have likely consolidated their presence on the western bank of the canal and are slowly pushing west towards Kostiantynivka. Geolocated footage from 22 August also indicates that Russian forces have advanced to the north-west of Chasiv Yar.
• BAKHMUT: A commander of a Ukrainian drone battalion currently fighting in Chasiv Yar stated on 22 August that Russian forces have recently changed their tactics and are now using uncrewed ground vehicles (UGVs) to resupply their forces operating close to the frontline. Ukrainian forces already make use of UGVs to facilitate logistical support and limit casualties during dangerous resupply missions.
• BAKHMUT: Over the last week, the Russian Ministry of Defence (MoD) has made various claims of advances to the north of Toretsk, though only some of them have been confirmed. Claims on 21 August that Russian forces had seized Oleksandro-Shultyne, located around 3.5 miles (5.5km) to the south-east of Kostiantynivka, have not been confirmed. Various Russian sources have refuted this claim, and, while geolocated footage from 25 August confirms a Russian presence in the south of the village, the settlement likely remains contested. Nevertheless, further south, the Russian MoD claimed on 22 August that its forces had taken Katerynivka and the nearby village of Kleban-Byk, located over five miles (8km) to the south-west. Geolocated footage from 26 August has since confirmed the seizure of Katerynivka, but not Kleban-Byk.
• DONETSK: Over the past week, Ukrainian forces have continued counter-attacking to contest Russian positions east and north-east of Dobropillia (Donetsk oblast). A prominent Ukrainian military observer reported on 25 August that Ukrainian forces had captured several settlements east and south-east of Dobropillia and cleared Russian positions near the T-0514 Dobropillia-Kramatorsk highway and south of Vesele, located to the north-east of Dobropillia. The success of these counter-attacks underscores Russia’s failure to exploit its penetration, with infiltration tactics proving insufficient to translate the breach into an operational breakthrough.
• DONETSK: The Ukrainian source further assessed that the command of the 51st Combined Arms Army (CAA) has created assault groups aimed at preventing the encirclement of the most advanced Russian elements. The 51st CAA is also reportedly consolidating the base of the Russian penetration near Zapvidne, while showing indications that it is abandoning plans to expand the breach and is instead refocusing on operations against Pokrovsk (Donetsk oblast) and Myrnohrad, which is located to the east of Pokrovsk.
• DONETSK: Meanwhile, both sides have made gains around Pokrovsk over the past week, highlighting the dynamic nature of the frontline in this sector. Geolocated footage from 22 August shows Ukrainian advances in western Udachne, located to the south-west of Pokrovsk. As of 24 August, Ukrainian forces have also made confirmed gains in southern Pokrovsk, on the northern outskirts, and north-east of Leontovychi, located to the south-west of Pokrovsk. To the east of Pokrovsk, Ukraine has captured Mykhailivka and advanced south of Myrne, located to the north-east of Mykhailivka. Meanwhile, Russian forces advanced north of Myrnohrad and north of Hrodivka, located to the south-east of Pokrovsk, as of 26 August.
• KHARKIV: Nothing significant to report
• KURSK-SUMY: Both sides have continued to launch attacks and counter-attacks and have made limited advances in northern Sumy oblast. Geolocated footage from 21 and 26 August indicates limited Russian advances in Yunakivka and nearby Loknya, located around 16 miles (25km) to the north-east of Sumy city (Sumy oblast). Meanwhile, footage from 25 August indicates that Ukrainian forces have advanced near Bezsalivka, located just south of the international border inside Sumy oblast. Notably, a spokesperson for a Ukrainian detachment fighting in Sumy oblast stated on 21 August that Russian forces have only conducted one infiltration attempt in the Sumy direction so far in August; he assessed this was due to Ukrainian fortifications in the area. While the spokesperson nevertheless reported that standard, small-scale assaults are launched five times per day, this overall aligns with our assessment that Russian forces have deprioritised the Sumy axis in recent months.
• OSKIL-KREMINNA: Over the past week, both sides have made gains across the Oskil-Kreminna frontline. Geolocated footage from 24 August shows recent Russian advances within northern Kupiansk (Kharkiv oblast), amid broader attempts to encircle the city. However, according to a Russian milblogger, the elevation of Kupiansk is slowing Russia’s progress in the area. Ukrainian military sources have claimed that Russian forces are facing difficulties in moving equipment or motorcycles across the Oskil River due to Ukrainian drone strikes.
• OSKIL-KREMINNA: Meanwhile, further south, Ukrainian forces made confirmed advances north of Novoyehorivka, located to the south-east of Borova (Kharkiv oblast), as of 25 August. To the north-east of Borova, Russian forces progressed north of Borivska Andriivka, according to geolocated footage from 27 August. Ukraine have also made confirmed advances in the Lyman direction over the past week. Footage from 25 August shows Ukrainian forces likely recapturing Novomykhailivka, located to the north of Lyman (Donetsk oblast), and Novyi Myr, located to the north-west of Novomykhailivka.
• SOUTHERN: Ukraine’s General Staff acknowledged for the first time on 26 August that Russian forces have penetrated the Donetsk oblast border and are now operating inside Dnipropetrovsk oblast. We have assessed for many weeks that Russian forces have been operating in the area.
• SOUTHERN: Geolocated footage from 24 August indicates that Russian forces have taken Yalta and have advanced across the Vovcha River (which marks the boundary between Donetsk and Dnipropetrovsk oblasts) into the southern sector of Filiya, located over 16 miles (26km) to the north of Velyka Novosilka (Donetsk). While the Russian MoD has claimed its forces have taken Filiya, we cannot confirm this. Further to the south-west, geolocated footage from 25 August indicates that Russian forces have taken Zaporizka, located 13 miles (21km) to the west of Velyka Novosilka, inside Dnipropetrovsk oblast; however, the Ukrainian General Staff have refuted this as of 26 August.
• SOUTHERN: Ukrainian forces have nevertheless pushed the Russians back at various points along the border region in recent days and weeks, though Russian counter-attacks are contesting the area and making further gains. Geolocated footage from 21 and 22 August shows Ukrainian forces raising flags in the centre of Tolstoi and Zelenyi Hai, villages located 14 miles (23km) and 17 miles (28km) to the north-west of Velyka Novosilka inside Donetsk oblast, respectively. However, subsequent Russian claims from 26 August suggest that a Russian counter-attack may have retaken many such villages and positions, though this cannot be confirmed.
• SOUTHERN: Along the western-most flank of the southern Zaporizhzhia frontline, Russian forces have advanced along the Prydniprovska railway south of Prymorske, around 14 miles (23km) to the south of Zaporizhzhia city (Zaporizhzhia oblast). The railway runs close to the eastern shores of the Dnipro River and marks the closest point to Zaporizhzhia city that Russian forces are now operating.
• STRIKES: Early on 28 August, Russia launched one of the largest combined strikes of the war, involving 598 Shahed-type drones and 31 missiles. The missile mix included 20 Kh-101 cruise missiles, nine Iskandr-M/KN-23 ballistic missiles and two Kh-47 Kinzhal ballistic missiles. The Ukrainian air force intercepted 563 unmanned aerial vehicles and 26 missiles (18 cruise missiles, seven Iskandr-M ballistic missiles and one Kh-47 ballistic missile).
• STRIKES: The attack heavily targeted the capital Kyiv, which suffered multiple hits and at least 15 deaths, and resulted in severe damage to the British Council and the EU delegation buildings. Kyiv Mayor Vitaliy Klitschko described it as one of the largest strikes on the city in recent months. Nearly 100 buildings in 20 locations across seven urban districts were damaged. Damage was also reported in four districts of Kyiv oblast: Brovary, Fastiv, Obukhiv and Vyshhorod. Russia struck the Intercity+ high-speed train depot in the town of Koziatyn (Vinnytsia oblast), while damage to critical and energy infrastructure left 60,000 residents without power across the country.
• STRIKES: Available footage suggests that two missiles likely struck a building facing the British Council, appearing to constitute a double-tap strike. The significant blast of the strike indicates that the projectiles were likely ballistic missiles, with the shockwave likely reaching the European delegation around the corner.
• STRIKES: While the strike’s intended target remains unclear, the proximity of the strike clearly highlights Moscow’s willingness to conduct missile attacks near Western facilities; this could realistically be a deliberate strategy to intimidate and test responses. In June, Russia designated the British Council as an undesirable organisation, with the Federal Security Service (FSB) alleging that it was used by British intelligence for activities threatening Russian interests. While there is no indication that the recent strike was linked to this designation, the development underscores the likelihood that Russia is, at the least, willing to accept collateral damage when conducting strikes near British or other Western facilities in Ukraine.
• STRIKES: We have previously assessed that UK-owned and -linked assets face the highest threats of foreign assets in Kyiv. Russia has long considered that London is the most significant driver of the West’s efforts to contain Russia and support Ukraine. In any case, the substantial damage caused underscores the growing threat to Western assets in Ukraine more broadly, as Russia continues its intense long-range strike campaign.
• STRIKES: Other strikes during the monitoring period were smaller in scale, though they still inflicted damage, including against energy infrastructure. For instance, on 27 August, a Russian attack caused power outages in Chernihiv, Poltava and Sumy oblasts. Energy operators have reported attacks against various facilities in previous days. This likely indicates that Russia is resuming frequent attacks against Ukraine’s energy infrastructure ahead of the heating season.
• STRIKES: Earlier on 28 August, Kremlin spokesperson Dmitry Peskov stated that Russia has not reached any agreements with Kyiv regarding a moratorium on long-range strikes. On 22 August, Belarusian President Alyaksandr Lukashenko suggested that an air truce could be the first step towards a broader settlement between the two countries. We previously assessed that a temporary moratorium would more likely remain a ‘concession’ to which Moscow is willing to agree in a bid to prevent US secondary sanctions. However, given the increase in strikes since the Alaska summit, it is clear that, in the absence of US sanctions, it suits Russia’s military strategy to continue such strikes for the foreseeable future, particularly ahead of the winter.
• STRIKES: Meanwhile, Ukraine has continued its long-range strike campaign, heavily targeting Russian oil infrastructure as well as defence facilities. For example, overnight on 27-28 August, Ukraine reportedly struck an oil facility in Russia’s Krasnodar Krai that supplies Russian forces. It also targeted an oil refinery in Russia’s Samara oblast, as well as ammunition storage sites and logistical facilities elsewhere in Russia and Russian-occupied Ukraine. On 25 August, Reuters reported that Ukrainian strikes against ten Russian oil refineries had disrupted at least 17% of Russia’s refining capacity, representing approximately 1.1 million barrels per day, and caused A-95 (premium) gasoline shortages in parts of occupied Ukraine, southern Russia and Russia’s Far East.
• STRIKES: On 24 August, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stated that Ukraine uses domestically produced weapons to carry out long-range strikes against Russia and does not co-ordinate such targets with the US. His comments came shortly after the Wall Street Journal reported that the US has effectively barred Ukrainian long-range strikes inside Russia using US-supplied missiles since late spring. On 20 August, Zelensky announced that the country will begin mass-producing its own long-range Flamingo cruise missile this winter. Ukrainian efforts to boost domestic production of native missiles and deep-strike capabilities underscore attempts to reduce reliance on Western missiles, the provision of which has become increasingly uncertain.

 POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS

• SANCTIONS: The EU is reportedly considering leveraging secondary sanctions to prevent third countries from facilitating Russian efforts to evade the bloc’s existing punitive measures. EU foreign ministers are expected to discuss the use of a so-called anti-circumvention tool when they gather on 29 and 30 August in Denmark, in the capital Copenhagen. Despite being adopted in 2023, this mechanism has not been used yet; it can prohibit the export, supply or transfer of certain goods to third countries that are considered to facilitate the bypassing of sanctions by Russia. Although the bloc has historically opposed the imposition of secondary sanctions, it is becoming more likely that the EU will use elements of this tool to increase sanctions pressure on Moscow. For further analysis on which countries could be targeted and how secondary sanctions work, see Sibylline Special Report – 6 July 2023.
• SANCTIONS: Most US citizens support sanctioning Russia’s trading partners as a way to pressure Moscow to end the war, according to recent polling. The poll by Reuters and market research firm Ipsos, which ended on 24 August, found that 62% of US respondents agree with Washington DC taking such action. The US has already imposed punitive measures against India, a key trading partner of Russia, in the form of an additional 25% tariff for New Delhi’s purchases of Russian oil. Republicans were more likely to support imposing sanctions on Russia’s trade partners than Democrats (levels of support stand at 76% and 58%, respectively).
• SANCTIONS: As per a report from Bloomberg on 26 August, India is planning to reduce its purchases of Russian oil in the coming weeks. State-run and private Indian refiners are expected to buy between 1.4 million to 1.6 million barrels per day (bpd) for October loading and beyond, compared to approximately 1.8 million bpd in H1 2025. The size of purchases may possibly change if India reaches a trade deal with the US and Washington DC eases pressure on New Delhi for its trade relations with Moscow. This modest reduction, however, possibly indicates that threats of tariffs and/or other economic penalties will unlikely fully deter countries from engaging in trade with Moscow in the near term. For further analysis on Indian and Russian relations, see Sibylline Situation Update Brief – 18 August 2025.
• BORDER: Ukrainian men aged 18 to 22 are now allowed to leave the country after the government revised travel rules. On 26 August, Ukrainian Prime Minister Yulia Svyrydenko confirmed the decision, which applies to periods when martial law is in effect. Ukrainian men aged 18 to 60 have been prohibited from leaving the country since February 2022 after Russia launched its full-scale invasion, with limited exceptions. Men aged 25 and above can be conscripted. However, the decision is not indicative of intentions to relax travel restrictions for Ukrainian men more broadly. For instance, on 21 August, a bill was submitted to Ukraine’s parliament, which proposes introducing criminal liability for illegally crossing the border during martial law. It envisions a fine of between UAH 119,000 and UAH 170,000 (approximately USD 2,885 to USD 4,122) or imprisonment for up to three years. If passed, such punishment is unlikely to significantly deter men from attempting to leave Ukraine, however.

FORECAST

GUARANTEES: The US is reportedly prepared to provide significant intelligence and air support to a Europe-led post-war security force in Ukraine. According to unspecified European and Ukrainian officials cited by the Financial Times (FT) on 26 August, the US would be willing to contribute strategic enabling capabilities. This includes intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance assistance, as well as command and control and air defence assets. The US contributions with regard to air support would reportedly involve US aircraft, ground-based radar and logistics enabling a European-enforced no-fly zone and air shield for Ukraine.   We cannot confirm the veracity of the report, but it sets out a potential US readiness to commit enabling capabilities that would make the European-led post-war security guarantees for Ukraine much more credible and viable. It comes after earlier reports claimed that the US would play a minimal role in any such efforts, and as such, it remains unclear if the Trump administration would indeed commit itself to such a plan. The FT article indicates that Washington DC’s contributions would be centred on co-ordinating and facilitating European efforts, rather than a model where the US was the principal security guarantor. US support is contingent on commitments from European governments to deploy ‘tens of thousands’ of troops to Ukraine, underscoring that the US perceives that the onus is on Europe to provide the necessary manpower. As such, even if an agreement is reached, serious questions around European capability (including the nominally most capable forces of the UK and France) mean US support could realistically fall through if a coalition of the willing later fails to supply and sustain an adequate number of troops.  Discussions of what post-war security guarantees for Ukraine could look like and the different roles of various stakeholders are still in their early stages; plans will highly likely be subject to change over time. Notably, the unspecified officials who spoke to the FT claimed that US offers of support could still be rescinded. The possibility of the US changing the scope of its involvement or refusing to support security plans entirely will likely sustain concerns in Europe regarding the viability and feasibility of a European-led post-war reassurance force, as well as such a force’s credibility to deter further Russian military operations in the future.

Meanwhile, unspecified Western capitals have reportedly outlined a preliminary three-tier plan for Ukraine’s post-war defence, according to the FT. The first element would involve a demilitarised zone that is possibly patrolled by a neutral force of peacekeeping troops agreed by both Russia and Ukraine. Ukrainian troops armed and trained by NATO would guard a second line of defence behind this area; simultaneously, a European-led deterrence force would be stationed deeper in Ukraine and supported by US assets from the rear. This likely seeks to balance Russian and Ukrainian stances on post-war security arrangements, though the presence of European troops (including from NATO states) in Ukraine will almost certainly remain a non-starter for Russia. A realistic European ‘reassurance force’ would much more likely be deployed outside of Ukraine if part of a peace agreement with Russia.

China, which has become an increasingly important partner to Russia following the full-scale invasion, has reportedly signalled its willingness to participate in peacekeeping efforts in Ukraine. According to reports in German media on 23 August, unspecified Chinese government insiders said Beijing would only be willing to do so if the peacekeeping forces were deployed under a UN mandate. China has been a large contributor to UN peacekeeping missions. However, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky has previously raised doubts about the ability of UN peacekeepers to deter renewed Russian aggression. UN peacekeeping operations are deployed with the consent of the main parties of a conflict, are expected to be impartial and guided by the principle of the non-use of force except in self-defence. As we have previously assessed, it remains highly unlikely that the UN would be able to marshal sufficient troops to sustain a long-term and credible peacekeeping force over what would likely be an extremely long demilitarised zone.

Amid a lack of progress towards a bilateral Russia-Ukraine summit, US President Donald Trump has renewed threats of economic penalties in the case of no ceasefire. On 26 August, Trump threatened to start an economic war, which he claimed would ‘be bad for Russia’. At the same time, the US president hinted that Ukraine could also face economic penalties in the form of sanctions and/or tariffs. Since resuming the presidency, Trump has repeatedly threatened to impose sanctions or tariffs on Russia if no ceasefire is reached and has set deadlines which have passed with no new punitive measures against Moscow. Nevertheless, Trump’s apparent readiness to target Kyiv with economic penalties suggests that he sees both countries as being responsible for the lack of peace progress.

US Vice President JD Vance claimed on 24 August that Russia has made ‘significant concessions’ during negotiations to end the war, though we have seen little indication to suggest this is the case. Vance opined that the Russian side has shown willingness to be flexible on some of its core demands, including alleged acknowledgement that there is ‘going to be some security guarantee’ to ensure Ukraine’s territorial integrity. However, as we have previously assessed, this is not a shift in the Russian position, given they set out their own proposals for Ukrainian ‘guarantees’ in 2022. Additionally, Vance claimed that Moscow has conceded that it will not be able to install a puppet government in Kyiv without providing further comment.

However, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov’s recent statements questioning Zelensky’s legitimacy indicate that Moscow has not abandoned its ultimate objective to push for regime change in Ukraine. In an interview aired on 24 August, Lavrov stated that Russia regards Zelensky as the ‘de facto head’ of Ukraine rather than the legitimate leader of the country. Lavrov also questioned Zelensky’s legitimacy in the context of signing documents to end the war and claimed that, at present, Zelensky is illegitimate based on the Ukrainian constitution (of which Lavrov gave a distorted interpretation). Under Ukrainian law, elections cannot be held while martial law is in effect; Ukraine will almost certainly continue to enforce martial law while Russia continues its war. On 26 August, Trump rejected Lavrov’s questioning of Zelensky’s legitimacy, describing it as ‘posturing’. While this may well be the case, at present, Russia has given little indication that its demands have substantively changed from 2022. Until this changes, or a major breakthrough on the battlefield occurs, it remains highly unlikely that a peace agreement will be reached in the short-to-medium term.

Aug 27.

Executive summary

• In our updated Strategic Risk Forecast, we put forward various scenarios in which we hypothesise the trajectory of the Russo-Ukrainian war in the next 12 months. Our baseline scenario is that the war will likely continue in some form without a definitive resolution; there is also a realistic possibility of a fragile ceasefire that will fail to stop the fighting entirely.
• On 15 August, Russian President Vladimir Putin and US President Donald Trump convened for a summit in Alaska (US). The meeting was followed by a summit on 18 August in Washington DC (US) involving Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky and numerous European leaders. While neither summit achieved a tangible breakthrough, they have likely set the course for further (albeit modest) progress in the nascent peace process. While talks concerning security guarantees (specifically what can and cannot be provided) are ongoing, Russia has maintained its position that it will not allow any NATO troops inside Ukraine.
• Following the Alaska summit, the White House claimed that Putin agreed to hold bilateral or trilateral talks with Zelensky. The US is pushing for such a meeting in the coming weeks. However, it remains unlikely that Putin will meet with Zelensky directly in this timeframe. If such a meeting were to take place, it would represent a notable shift in the Russian position; it would likely indicate increased Russian readiness to discuss more serious terms (there has been little variation in the original demands that Russia set out in 2022, when its forces were marching on Kyiv).
• On the battlefield, Russian forces have continued to advance steadily over the past month. While they successfully penetrated Ukraine’s defences to the north-east of Pokrovsk near Dobropillia (Donetsk oblast), it appears at the time of writing that Russia has struggled to exploit this opportunity; Ukrainian counter-attacks have curtailed Russia’s ability to translate this penetration into a breakthrough.
• Key triggers, warnings and indicators (TWIs) to watch for in September include Trump’s ever-extending deadline for Russia to reach a peace deal. Trump threatened ‘very severe consequences’ if Putin refuses to agree to a deal; if no such agreement is reached (which we assess remains highly likely), fresh sanctions and/or tariffs are possible. If these do not come, Russia will only feel encouraged to continue delaying negotiations while its forces advance. (Source: Sibylline)

 

28 Aug 25. Ukraine sees ‘priceless’ digital battlefield data trove as key to West’s support.

• Summary
• Ukraine holds vast trove of wartime data
• Kyiv using AI for reconnaissance, pattern recognition
• Minister says up to 90% of battlefield kills done with drones

Ukraine is looking at how to share battlefield data with allies, the country’s deputy prime minister said, calling the vast trove of stored information one of Kyiv’s “cards” to strengthen its position as it negotiates support from friendly countries.

“The data we have is priceless for any country,” Mykhailo Fedorov, who heads Ukraine’s digitalisation ministry, told Reuters in an interview, adding that Ukraine is currently “very careful” about sharing it. (Source: Reuters)

 

27 Aug 25. Cuashub.com said today that Ukraine and Canada sign drone-focused defense production deal. Ukraine and Canada have signed an agreement to expand joint defense production, with a focus on manufacturing drones and counter-drone systems. The deal was formalized on August 24 by Ukrainian Prime Minister Denys Shmyhal and Canadian Defense Minister David McGuinty in the presence of President Volodymyr Zelenskyy and Prime Minister Mark Carney. Shmyhal said the initiative aims to deepen defense-industrial cooperation, create new production facilities in both countries and strengthen supply chain resilience. He added that the agreement will enable the establishment of Ukrainian companies in Canada, support technology exchange and secure long-term supplies of modern weapons for Ukraine’s armed forces. Zelenskyy highlighted drone production as a priority area, pointing to shortages of unmanned systems at the front. and noting that Ukraine requires expanded production to meet frontline demand. The Canadian government has allocated initial funding to support the program. Discussions between Shmyhal and McGuinty also addressed investment in drone projects and the expansion of broader defense-industrial cooperation. The agreement comes alongside a wider Canadian military aid package announced the same day. Carney pledged $1.5 bn in support, including funding for drones, armored vehicles, electronic warfare systems and joint defense projects. The package forms part of Canada’s $2 bn commitment made at the G7 summit earlier this year. https://cuashub.com/en/content/ukraine-and-canada-sign-drone-focused-defense-production-deal/ (Source: https://cuashub.com/)

 

27 Aug 25. Russia’s Leading Drone Maker Nears Bankruptcy. One of Russia’s largest drone manufacturers, AO Kronstadt, is on the verge of bankruptcy after months of financial turmoil and mounting lawsuits, Russian media reported. According to CNews, the company has faced dozens of debt claims in recent months, with more than 600m rubles ($7m) sought since the beginning of summer. The largest cases involve lawsuits from LLC Innovative Technologies and Materials for 151.1 million rubles and AO Research Institute of Modern Telecommunications Technologies for 220.6 million rubles. By May, total claims against the company had already reached one bn rubles, highlighting the growing financial pressure on the manufacturer of the “Orion” and “Inokhodets” drones—systems often compared to the American MQ-9 Reaper. Industry sources told CNews that Kronstadt has been in difficulty for two years, with the problems traced to the 2022 exit of its key shareholder, AFK Sistema. Without that support, debt levels escalated rapidly. Sanctions imposed by the United States and the European Union have further strained the company, cutting access to critical foreign-made components and inflating costs. At the same time, large state contracts placed heavy production demands on Kronstadt at a moment when supply chains were already under stress. Nikolai Ryashin, general director of Rusdronport, suggested the company is headed toward collapse.

“The company will go the way of bankruptcy, so subcontractors are now rushing to file claims and get closer to the front of the line,” Ryashin said.

The report noted that Ukrainian strikes on Kronstadt’s production facilities added to the difficulties. The company, known for supplying drones widely used in Russia’s war against Ukraine, has seen its manufacturing plants targeted by Ukrainian forces. The combination of sanctions, battlefield strikes, and debt obligations has put the enterprise in what observers describe as its most precarious position since its founding. The case is emblematic of broader challenges facing Russia’s defense-industrial base under wartime pressure. The Kremlin has leaned heavily on unmanned systems to sustain its operations in Ukraine, and Kronstadt was central to that strategy. Its “Orion” and “Inokhodets” drones were intended to provide long-endurance surveillance and strike capabilities, giving Russia a domestic alternative to Western armed UAVs. Despite heavy government investment, the challenges appear insurmountable. Sanctions cut off key technologies, subcontractors are pushing claims in court, and financial liabilities have grown past the point of sustainability. Whether the company can be restructured or absorbed into another defense conglomerate remains uncertain, but for now Kronstadt is facing what many in the industry describe as an inevitable path toward bankruptcy. (Source: UAS VISION/Defence Blog)

 

26 Aug 25. Zelenskyy urges Canada to send troops to Ukraine. This would strengthen the force presence commitment from European leaders to safeguard Ukraine’s territory after a potential peace deal. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy called on Canada to reinforce European security guarantees for the war torn country by sending troops to Ukraine.

“We are counting on the presence of Canadian forces in Ukraine,” beseeched the wartime leader, “this is important for us,” he emphasised in a joint press conference in Kyiv alongside the Canadian Prime Minister Mark Carney on 24 August 2025.

This prospect builds on recent commitments from European leaders, particularly the British Prime Minister Keir Starmer, who floated the notion of sending a force presence to secure Ukraine’s territorial integrity after a prospective peace deal. It is not certain what this potential force presence would look like but it is certain that the British Army will be unable to undertake a high-intensity conflict in the conventional sense. This leaves the guarantor with little option other than a peacekeeping mission similar to its deployment in Kosovo during the late-1990s. No doubt aware of the limited deterrence of this solution against Russia, a hardened peer adversary, Zelenskyy understandably wants to bolster the combined Nato presence on the border with Russia. The president took the opportunity to discuss this move with Carney during his visit to Kyiv last week to iron out details of a new security cooperation deal. This deal is the latest bilateral arrangement with Ukraine – others include Denmark, Sweden and the UK – in which countries are tapping into Ukraine’s battlefield experience and industrial innovation. While the Canadian government has not offered any response to the prospect of inserting troops on the ground in Ukraine, according to Zelenksyy’s office Canada is considering the possibility.

Canadian strategy

In Canada’s strategic assessment, enshrined in Our North, Strong and Free, the Nato member does not underestimate the wider, strategic threat posed by Russian forces. The adversary’s reach is not limited to the regional conflict in Ukraine but also across Europe and in their own sphere of influence in the Arctic region. To that end, the Ministry of National Defence (MND) has increased defence spending by C$9bn ($6.5bn) for fiscal year 2025-26. But in a more sobering context, Canada currently spends just 1.37% of its gross domestic product on defence with an ambition to reach 2%, Nato’s old baseline target, by 2032. These funds will focus on increasing the number of personnel in a combined force of 71,500 troops by 2030, new military infrastructure and capabilities with a focus on the High North.  GlobalData, a leading data and analytics consultancy, list the major projects contributing to this increased spending, such as the procurement of 88 F-35A multirole fighters, the construction of a new fleet of multi-purpose frigates to replace ageing warships, Arctic and Offshore Patrol Ships (AOPS), new ice-breaking patrol vessels for both the Navy and Coast Guard, and an ongoing search for an optionally armed Remotely Piloted Aircraft System.

In this spirit, during Carney’s visit to Kyiv, the Royal Canadian Navy inducted its sixth and final AOPS.

What can Canada provide?

This strategic context leaves Canadian officials with tough decisions when it comes to allocating units to the appropriate theatres. But with substantial work ongoing in the naval industry for the High North, it would be more suitable to provide Ukraine with troops and capabilities on the ground and in the air. Canada has contributed to deployments in Afghanistan, Syria, and Liby (Source: army-technology.com)

 

25 Aug 25. Canada to fund $500m PURL package for Ukraine. Canada announced today (24 August 2025) that it will fund a $500m package of military equipment and munitions for Ukraine sourced from the United States, under NATO’s new Prioritised Ukraine Requirements List (PURL) initiative. NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte welcomed the announcement as a strong demonstration of Canada’s enduring commitment to Ukraine’s defence.

“I commend Canada for stepping up to fund this package of US military equipment for Ukraine. NATO Allies continue to deliver essential equipment and supplies, making sure Ukraine gets what it needs to defend itself as it works towards a just and lasting peace,” said the Secretary General.

Canada’s contribution under the PURL initiative follows earlier announcements by the Netherlands, Germany, and a joint pledge from Denmark, Norway and Sweden. Each package is valued at around $500 million,and is designed to meet Ukraine’s most urgent operational requirements with equipment and munitions sourced from U.S. stockpiles. (Source: ASD Network)

 

25 Aug 25. Norway to provide Ukraine with air defence systems worth about $700m. Norway’s government said on Sunday that it will contribute approximately 7bn Norwegian crowns ($696.12m) of air defence systems to Ukraine.

“Together with Germany, we are now ensuring that Ukraine receives powerful air defence systems,” Norwegian Prime Minister Jonas Gahr Store said in the statement.

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“Germany and Norway are working very closely together to support Ukraine in its fight to defend the country and protect the civilian population against Russian air attacks.” (Source: Reuters)

 

25 Aug 25. Russia Develops Fiber-Optic Drone Launch Vehicle. Russian engineers have developed a new unmanned ground platform designed to deliver and launch drones using a fiber-optic control link, according to the Scientific and Technical Center (STC) ‘Kornei.’ The system, presented at the ‘Unmanned Systems: Technologies of the Future’ forum, is intended to expand operational flexibility in contested electronic warfare environments. The platform, known as the Dronobus, integrates a software and hardware package that allows it to transport and launch unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) without relying on traditional radio control. Instead, both the platform and the drones are managed through a fiber-optic cable, reducing susceptibility to jamming. According to STC ‘Kornei’, the unmanned vehicle can travel up to 10 kilometers before deploying its drones, which can then operate at ranges of up to 15 kilometers from the launch point. In addition to UAV deployment, the Dronobus can transport cargo weighing up to 150 kilograms. The platform is built for year-round operation, capable of functioning in temperatures ranging from -20°C to +40°C.

“The robotic hardware and software complex ‘Dronobus’ is designed for the delivery and launch of unmanned aerial vehicles using fiber-optic communication or for the delivery of cargo weighing less than 150 kg,”

The use of fiber-optic tethering in UAV operations is not new, but its integration into a mobile ground launch system could offer advantages in environments saturated with electronic warfare. By maintaining a hardwired control link to both the vehicle and the drones, the system may avoid some of the vulnerabilities that have plagued Russian and Ukrainian UAV operations in the current conflict, where GPS spoofing and radio-frequency jamming have become routine. (Source: UAS VISION/Defence Blog)

 

22 Aug 25. Zelensky confirms Flamingo cruise missile tests and production plans. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky confirmed to journalists in Kyiv on 20 August that the Flamingo cruise missile has been tested, and said it was planned to enter mass production by February 2026. Asked about the Flamingo, he said, “There were successful tests of this missile. And so far, the missile is the most successful that we have – it flies 3,000 km, this is important. I believe that we cannot talk much about this until we have the possibility of using hundreds of missiles.

“By the end of December or in January/February, there should be mass production. We need to look at the success of the tests and at the financing of this programme,” Zelensky added.

Ukraine’s Ministry of Defence told Janes on 20 August that it could not make public any technical details of the Flamingo, but highlighted the comments of Minister of Defence of Ukraine Denys Shmyhal who said on 18 August that “this is a very powerful weapon, long range, and it exists. These are key details. We will find out the rest when the right moment comes”.

Iryna Terekh, chief technical officer at Fire Point, the Ukrainian company making the Flamingo, told journalists on 14 August that it has a circular area probable (CEP) of 14 m and a 1,150 kg warhead. She added that the company is currently producing roughly one Flamingo per day, and by October they hope to be making seven per day. (Source: Janes)

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28 Aug 25. Officials Aim to Field Critical Technologies Rapidly, at Quantity. A panel of experts at the National Defense Industrial Association’s 2025 Emerging Technologies for Defense Conference and Exhibition in Washington today addressed the need to field critical systems to warfighters at speed and scale.

“We can’t let perfection be the enemy of good enough. And I don’t say that as a means to say that we’re willing to take risks and put our uniformed men and women at risk,” said Justin McRoberts, program manager for the DOD Manufacturing Science and Technology Program.

He added that Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth made it very clear during a Pentagon town hall held Feb. 7 when he said: “We’re going to move fast, think outside the box be disruptive — on purpose — to create a sense of urgency that I want to make sure exists inside this department.”

Building on that, McRoberts said, “we’re going to go faster, and we are going to break things, but we’re going to learn lessons and we’re going to put things into the hands of the warfighter faster. We have to think in days and weeks and months instead of years and years and years — that we’ve done for too long.”

Carbon deposits and carbon manufacturing will be important materials, as will metal alloys, said McRoberts, who specializes in advanced hypersonic materials needed for vehicles to travel at very high speeds.  The panel also discussed directed energy, which includes high-powered microwaves and energy laser systems.  Directed energy is a DOD priority as it can be used to defeat drone attacks and will be an important feature of Golden Dome, noted Timothy White, the director of the Army Manufacturing Technology program in the Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Army for Acquisition, Logistics and Technology.

“We have to make sure that we have a supply chain that is ready to support those systems as we begin to move towards production,” he added.

White said the systems are composed of intricate components that sometimes require specialized manufacturing processes, and part of the manufacturing challenge is determining how to produce those parts at scale and at an acceptable cost.

The ultimate goal is to ensure DOD is ready to have the supply chain to make those parts and scale them up, White said.

The panel also addressed advanced materials, including new alloys, polymers, ceramics and composites, multispectral materials, advanced coatings, electronic photonics and advanced electronics for sensor power and communications.

Alan Albert, the acting chief of the Air Force Research Laboratory’s Manufacturing, Industrial Technologies and Energy Division, said the goal of manufacturing advanced materials is to accelerate the discovery, development and delivery of sustainable and affordable materials through a modernized science and technology infrastructure.

He added that it also includes materials for extreme environments and advanced energetic materials, and that some of these materials may not have dual civilian and military use. (Source: U.S. DoD)

 

27 Aug 25. DOD Official Says AI, Other Innovations Will Transform Future Warfighting.  In a conflict scenario, artificial intelligence can assist the warfighter in discerning what is happening in the environment and better understand the tactics the adversary might use, thereby improving decision-making, said Emil Michael, undersecretary of defense for research and engineering. Michael provided the keynote address at the National Defense Industrial Association in Washington today. He also held a media roundtable immediately after the address.  AI takes language or equations, synthesizes the information and can provide answers that are beyond the computational power of the human brain in a short time frame, he explained.  Uses for AI are endless and include creating new materials, assisting Defense Department employees and contractors, modeling and simulation, and the Golden Dome, Michael said.  Private industry is investing hundreds of bns of dollars each year into AI for things like software development, chips, data centers and so on, he said. Besides AI, another dual-use technology with both military and civilian applications is space-launched technology, such as satellites, he said, noting that private industry has footed most of the bill.  Other nascent critical areas for DOD are hypersonics, directed energy, unmanned aerial vehicles and critical minerals, he said, highlighting that the importance of UAVs on the battlefield was demonstrated in the recent Israel-Iran conflict, as well as in Ukraine.  UAVs can go from start to prototype in 18 months, something that can’t be done with manned aircraft, Michael said, adding that the systems can be user tested by warfighters, and the best ones can be quickly fielded.  As for enemy drones such as those used by the Houthis, it doesn’t make sense to shoot them down with missiles that cost millions, he said. This is where directed energy can be used to good effect.  Michael said to get all these innovations moving, industry needs to share risk with the department.   “It’s a balance,” he said. “When there’s more shared risk, both sides can take more risks, and that will lead to speed, that will lead to invention and so on.” (Source: U.S. DoD)

 

26 Aug 25. Readout of U.S.-India 2+2 Intersessional Dialogue. Yesterday, Acting Assistant Secretary of Defense for Indo-Pacific Security Affairs Jedidiah P. Royal and State Department Senior Bureau Official for the Bureau of South and Central Asian Affairs Bethany P. Morrison co-chaired the virtual U.S.-India 2+2 Intersessional Dialogue alongside Indian Ministry of External Affairs Additional Secretary Nagaraj Naidu Kakanur and Indian Ministry of Defense Joint Secretary Vishwesh Negi. Through this dialogue, officials advanced bilateral initiatives, discussed regional security developments, and exchanged perspectives on a number of shared strategic priorities. They discussed trade and investment; energy security, including strengthening civil-nuclear cooperation; critical minerals exploration; counternarcotics and counterterrorism cooperation; and more. Both sides looked forward to increasing defense cooperation, including signing a new ten-year Framework for the U.S. India Major Defense Partnership, as well as advancing defense industrial, science, and technology cooperation; operational coordination; regional cooperation; and information-sharing. Participants agreed to build upon the progress made in these areas under the auspices of the U.S.-India COMPACT (Catalyzing Opportunities for Military Partnership, Accelerated Commerce & Technology) for the 21st Century and beyond. The chairs reaffirmed their commitment to promoting a safer, stronger, and more prosperous Indo-Pacific region through the Quad. The dialogue concluded with the chairs expressing their appreciation for the productive meeting and eagerness to continue enhancing the breadth and depth of the bilateral relationship in a manner that benefits the people of America and India. (Source: U.S. DoD)

 

27 Aug 25. Potential government ownership in defence firms would raise compliance risks for sector. On 26 August, Commerce Secretary Howard Lutnick stated that the Trump administration is ‘thinking about’ taking ownership of stakes in defence contractors. Lutnick highlighted that the US government is interested in owning equity in firms that it utilises, specifically Palantir, Boeing and Lockheed Martin. Any such move would likely replicate the Trump administration’s recent deal with the tech giant Intel. On 22 August, Intel agreed to sell the US government a 10% stake in the company. Lutnick’s confirmation of a ‘monstrous discussion’ around the defence sector indicates that such firms will likely come under greater federal scrutiny in the near term. This will likely precipitate higher compliance and regulatory risks. Furthermore, the federal government’s increasing inclination to own shares of firms (largely in critical sectors) has elevated internal disagreements within the Republican Party over government overreach into the private sector. As such, we assess that any moves to purchase shares of firms will likely spark backlash from lawmakers in Congress, raising policy stagnation and supervision quality risks. (Source: Sibylline)

 

26 Aug 25. Threat to deploy National Guard across US raises federal-state tensions, domestic unrest risks. On 25 August, President Donald Trump stated that the US military ‘might’ deploy to Chicago (Illinois) and is ready to go anywhere at short notice to crack down on crime. On the same day, Trump signed an executive order formalising the creation in all 50 states of specially trained National Guard units that could be mobilised quickly to ‘ensure public safety and order’. While the creation of such units would likely only come to fruition in the longer term, the move underscores Trump’s inclination to use the military on domestic soil for traditional law enforcement duties. Any use of the military specifically to quell protests will increase concerns that the constitutional rights of free speech and assembly are being infringed upon. In the interim, the threat to deploy troops to Chicago, as well as other Democratic-led cities, will put pressure on city and state leaders to take a more assertive stance on crime, raising federal-state tensions. Should troops be deployed to Chicago, we assess that targeted activism and demonstrations against the security forces will be likely, increasing domestic unrest risks. (Source: Sibylline)

 

25 Aug 25. DOD Systems Bolster Border Security Operations. Along the rugged terrain of the southern border, the Defense Department deploys optic systems to enhance detection and monitoring capabilities in support of U.S. Customs and Border Protection. The ground-based operational surveillance system — expeditionary, the long-range advanced scout surveillance system, and the common remotely operated weapon station are advanced tools and unique military capabilities used by service members assigned to Joint Task Force Southern Border to monitor large areas, detect illegal crossings and strengthen perimeter security in coordination with CBP agents.  Whether elevated on towers, deployed from concealed positions or mounted on armored vehicles, these systems provide persistent coverage across challenging and often inaccessible landscapes. Each platform offers a unique capability, contributing to the multilayered detection and monitoring strategy in place along the southern border. The ground-based operational surveillance system — expeditionary, is an advanced fixed-position monitoring asset. Mounted on telescoping masts or permanent towers, GBOSS-E integrates electro-optical and infrared cameras, laser rangefinders and ground radar to enable nonstop observation across large sectors of terrain.  From its elevated position, the system allows operators to detect, identify and geolocate movement in open desert and rugged terrain — critical for tracking groups attempting to cross into the U.S. without authorization. What makes the system unique is that it is an organic asset to military police units.   By employing it in this mission, soldiers are not only enhancing border security but also building readiness by training with and refining the use of their equipment in a real-world environment.

“Integrating the GBOSS-E system into our mission set has enhanced our soldiers’ ability to detect threats from a distance. These systems allow our soldiers to pick up on movement and heat signatures through radar and camera capabilities that enhance monitoring efforts, especially at night and from a distance,” said Army Sgt. 1st Class Sean Marshall, Headquarters and Headquarters Detachment, 759th Military Police Battalion. “In an austere environment like Yuma, where the desert extends for miles, the GBOSS-E is a force multiplier that enables us to use the terrain to our advantage.”

Long-Range Target Detection From Concealed Positions

The long-range advanced scout surveillance system provides high-fidelity visual monitoring and long-range target detection from mobile platforms such as the Stryker armored vehicle. By combining thermal imaging, day cameras, GPS, and a laser rangefinder, LRAS3 enables soldiers to observe and identify subjects from several kilometers away while remaining protected under armor and out of sight.  Originally designed as a cavalry asset for reconnaissance teams in forward-deployed environments, the LRAS3 has been in use for decades. With the integration of cavalry elements into infantry formations, the system has transitioned from a specialized tool to one now available at the company level.   Along the southern border, LRAS3 has found a new purpose, providing personnel with long-range detection capabilities to discreetly monitor trails, canyons and key terrain features from standoff positions. Repurposed for homeland security, the system continues to prove its value by supporting CBP operations.

“This system allows a Stryker with a mounted LRAS3 to provide U.S. Border Patrol with the information and location needed to interdict suspected illegal aliens,” said Army 1st Lt. Elias Stephenson, 2nd Battalion, 12th Infantry Regiment, 2nd Brigade Combat Team, 4th Infantry Division. “It’s used in areas that have substantial observation capabilities to support the detection capabilities of the system and enable U.S. Border Patrol interdiction.”

Remote Observation With Defensive Capability

The common remotely operated weapon station provides operators with long-range observation capabilities. Mounted on Stryker armored vehicles, CROWS allows soldiers to detect and track activity while remaining protected inside the vehicle.  Equipped with stabilized optics, thermal and day cameras and a laser rangefinder, the system is now employed along the southern border strictly as a detection and monitoring asset.   Originally designed to integrate with crew-served weapons in combat zones, the system has been repurposed for homeland security missions to provide personnel with long-range observation capability without its traditional armament. This adaptation highlights its versatility — enabling soldiers and Department of Homeland Security personnel to maintain persistent watch over high-risk border sectors while remaining protected inside their vehicles.  The common remotely operated weapon station is a remote camera system on the Stryker that is normally used for the Stryker’s mounted machine gun for targeting in combat.

“For the southern border mission, we don’t have weapons mounted. So, it’s been repurposed to extend our duration for detection and monitoring capabilities. This allows our vehicle commanders to detect individuals at greater distances and enable border apprehensions,” Stephenson said.

Integrated Systems, Unified Mission

Together, GBOSS-E, LRAS3 and CROWS demonstrate the unique military capabilities that DOD contributes to border security operations. By combining advanced surveillance platforms, specialized training and the ability to operate in austere environments, these systems strengthen detection and monitoring efforts across the southern border.   Their integration also reflects the close partnership between DOD and DHS in protecting national sovereignty and disrupting illicit activity.  As the mission continues, these systems remain vital to detecting movement, monitoring critical areas and supporting soldiers and law enforcement personnel working together to secure the southern border, Stephenson said. (Source: U.S. DoD)

 

25 Aug 25. Report to Congress on US Army’s Small UAS Program. The U.S. Army has requested Fiscal Year 2026 funding for small uncrewed aircraft systems (sUAS, commonly referred to as drones). These systems support intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR); target acquisition and strike; electronic warfare operations; and other missions. Congress has expressed an interest in the U.S. military’s UAS capabilities and in the Department of Defense’s (DOD’s) ability to develop, acquire, and integrate such systems into tactical units. In proposed FY 2026 defense authorization and appropriations legislation, Congress is considering whether to approve, modify or deny the Army’s requested funding and its plans for incorporating these systems into Army units. This product primarily covers Group 1 and 2 UAS — that is, those sUAS that weigh less than 55 pounds and fly at or below 3,500 feet above ground level. In 1988, at the direction of Congress (see P.L. 100-202, 101 Stat. 1329-60), DOD published its first “Master Plan” for uncrewed aircraft, establishing requirements and an acquisition strategy for UAS. The plan recommended a “close range” UAS for “lower level tactical units,” one that could be acquired in large numbers and at low cost. Beginning in the 2000s, the AeroVironment RQ-11 Raven, a 4-pound fixed-wing aircraft, largely filled this role for the Army. By 2010, the Army reportedly fielded close to 4,000 Raven aircraft. The Marine Corps, Special Operations Command, and the Air Force also adopted the Raven. In February 2024, then-Secretary of the Army Christine Wormuth and Army Chief of Staff General Randy George announced plans to phase the RQ-11 Raven out of service as part of a broader “rebalance” of the Army’s aviation investments and to “increase investments in research and development to expand and accelerate the Army’s unmanned aerial reconnaissance capability.” Under the ongoing Transformation in Contact (TiC) initiative, first revealed by General George in December 2023, the Army is evaluating various types of sUAS and the potential force structure requirements that may accompany the integration of these systems into ground units. The second Trump Administration has sought to encourage the Army’s adoption of drones and reduce perceived barriers to the development and procurement of sUAS within DOD. In an April 30, 2025, memorandum, Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth directed the Army to implement a comprehensive transformation strategy, including by fielding unmanned systems and ground/air launched effects “in every Division by the end of 2026.” In a July 16, 2025, press release, DOD stated that Secretary Hegseth had issued a second, department-wide memorandum, “rescinding restrictive policies that hindered drone production.” The full 3-page report can be accessed here: chrome-extension://efaidnbmnnnibpcajpcglclefindmkaj/https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/IF/PDF/IF12668/IF12668.3.pdf (Source: UAS VISION/CONGRESS.GOV)

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Founded in 1987, Exensor Technology is a world leading supplier of Networked Unattended Ground Sensor (UGS) Systems providing tailored sensor solutions to customers all over the world. From our Headquarters in Lund Sweden, our centre of expertise in Network Communications at Communications Research Lab in Kalmar Sweden and our Production site outside of Basingstoke UK, we design, develop and produce latest state of the art rugged UGS solutions at the highest quality to meet the most stringent demands of our customers. Our systems are in operation and used in a wide number of Military as well as Homeland Security applications worldwide. The modular nature of the system ensures any external sensor can be integrated, providing the user with a fully meshed “silent” network capable of self-healing. Exensor Technology will continue to lead the field in UGS technology, provide our customers with excellent customer service and a bespoke package able to meet every need.

A CNIM Group Company

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Sponsored by Bertin Exensor

www.exensor.com

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28 Aug 25. Eucom Commander Discusses NATO Spending, Ukraine Assistance. The commitment that all 32 NATO nations spend 5% of gross domestic product on their militaries is going to make a big difference, said Air Force Gen. Alexus Grynkewich, supreme allied commander Europe and commander of U.S. European Command, who spoke virtually today from Mons, Belgium, to the National Defense Industrial Association in Washington.
“My job, I think, is going to be to hold nations to account, to be their conscience, if you will, so that that 5% gets spent in the right places,” he said, adding that each nation’s military spending will be based on its capability needs.
The 5% includes spending 3.5% on “hard” military defense. The other 1.5% can be spent on other elements that support defense, such as logistics and infrastructure improvements, the general said.
A lot of that spending will also benefit civilians, including those in defense industrial bases, Grynkewich added.
Nations in NATO are seeking digital transformation that ties everyone together, ensuring each has command and control systems in place with a common operating picture, a common intelligence picture, and all the pathways in which data flows, he said.
The Eucom commander said international companies are figuring out how to plug into the Ukrainian industrial base in a mutually beneficial way. The requirements each company has to support are validated by Eucom and a NATO working group.
Besides the requirements, decisions are made about what items should be sourced from what countries, Grynkewich said.
One of the important capabilities for Ukraine is drones, he added. A drone might work one day and not work the next because of interference from Russia.
At the brigade level, industry partners are helping Ukraine rapidly innovate and change drone parameters to make them effective again, he said, adding that artificial intelligence also helps in that regard. That level of autonomous drone capability is everywhere in Ukraine, Grynkewich said, noting that unmanned aerial systems are the future of warfare, but manned aircraft will always have a place on the battlefield. (Source: U.S. DoD)

 

28 Aug 25. All NATO members hit old spending target, only three meet new goal. All NATO members will hit a longstanding target of spending 2% of GDP on defence this year but only three currently reach a new, higher goal set by alliance leaders in June, NATO data released on Thursday showed. Many NATO countries have substantially increased military spending in recent years, following Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine and demands by U.S. President Donald Trump for European allies to invest more in their own defence.
Estimates from the alliance on Thursday showed that as recently as last year, more than 10 of NATO’s 32 members fell short of the 2% goal, which was agreed in 2014. Figures for 2025 showed all allies meeting that target, with seven at the minimum of 2.0% and several others only marginally higher. Poland is the NATO member spending the most on defence as a share of its economy, at 4.48%, followed by Lithuania at 4% and Latvia with 3.73%, according to the data. Those were the only alliance members who currently exceed the new defence spending target of 3.5% of GDP agreed by NATO leaders at a summit in The Hague in June. The leaders agreed to hit that target by 2035 as part of a broader goal of spending 5% of GDP on defence and security-related investments, to include items such as cybersecurity and upgrading roads and ports to handle heavy military equipment. Speaking at the opening of an ammunition factory in Germany on Wednesday, NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte praised higher defence spending by alliance members but said it was important to turn the extra money into military capabilities.
“Cash alone doesn’t provide security,” he said at the factory in the town of Unterluess owned by German arms firm Rheinmetall. “Deterrence doesn’t come from 5%. Deterrence comes from the capability to … fight potential enemies.” (Source: Reuters)

 

27 Aug 25. UK: Vehicle-ramming, roof-scaling at defence firm points to elevated Palestine Action spin-off risks. On 26 August, the police arrested four pro-Palestine activists following direct action targeting a defence manufacturer. Activists from the newly established ‘Palestinian Martyrs for Justice’ group reportedly drove a car through the entrance gates of the Moog Aircraft Group factory in Wolverhampton (West Midlands county). The assailants subsequently climbed onto the roof of the site and caused damage to skylights and solar panels. Video footage of the attack emerged on social media; it featured activists claiming that the company supplies the Israeli firm Elbit Systems with military aircraft parts. The group does not have a history of carrying out such action. Its tactics, techniques and procedures (TTPs) closely mirror those of the now proscribed Palestine Action (PA) activist group. We assess that PA members and supporters have almost certainly continued to operate under new names and groups (as well as in a personal capacity) since the proscription of PA in July under the Terrorism Act 2000. As such, we assess that radical activism risks facing defence, insurance and other such companies with perceived ties to Israel will persist in the coming months. (Source: Sibylline)

 

26 Aug 25. Today, the Canadian Prime Minister, Mark Carney, arrived in Latvia, where he will focus on strengthening transatlantic security and NATO efforts to deter Russian aggression on the Eastern Flank. In Riga, Prime Minister Carney met with the Prime Minister of Latvia, Evika Siliņa, and announced Canada’s renewal of Operation REASSURANCE for another three years. Canada launched Operation REASSURANCE in 2014 following Russia’s initial invasion of Ukraine. More than a decade later, it remains the Canadian Armed Forces’ largest overseas mission, with approximately 2,000 troops currently deployed to deter Russian aggression and defend NATO territory. This renewal will sustain the Brigade’s personnel and military capabilities in Latvia – reinforcing our collective defence, strengthening co-operative security, and keeping NATO presence strong on the Eastern Flank. As Framework Nation, Canada leads the NATO Multinational Brigade in Latvia, a formation of approximately 3,000 personnel from 14 NATO Allies. During their meeting, the prime ministers underscored the importance of NATO, of ending Russia’s war of aggression, and of securing a just and lasting peace for Ukraine. They focused on the need for robust security guarantees for durable, lasting peace. The leaders also discussed the importance of peace and security to economic growth and to advancing Canada’s economic partnership with Europe through trade and defence.
“To secure lasting peace in Ukraine and Europe, we must deter and fortify. For over a decade, Canadian troops have played an indispensable role in deterring Russian aggression on NATO’s Eastern Flank and fortifying our shared defence. Canadians can be proud that our troops will continue to lead Operation REASSURANCE in this critical mission – for greater security, stability, and prosperity in Europe and around the world.”
— The Rt. Hon. Mark Carney, Prime Minister of Canada
“Through Operation REASSURANCE, Canada’s Armed Forces members are on the front lines, working alongside our NATO Allies to strengthen defence on Europe’s Eastern Flank. Their dedication and professionalism help deter threats, protect the region, and uphold the democratic values that sustain peace and stability at home and abroad. Canada is proud to stand with its Allies and contribute to this vital mission.”
— The Hon. David J. McGuinty, Minister of National Defence
Quick facts
• During his visit to Latvia, Prime Minister Carney was accompanied by the Minister of National Defence, David J. McGuinty.
• Canada will complete the full implementation of persistently deployed Brigade capabilities to Latvia by 2026, at which point the Brigade will have up to 2,200 Canadian Armed Forces (CAF) members as part of NATO’s Forward Land Forces and supporting elements in Latvia.
• In June, the Prime Minister announced that Canada’s defence investments for 2025-26 will be over $9 bn, helping strengthen the CAF’s capabilities and readiness while bringing Canada to NATO’s 2% defence spending goal this year.
• At the 2025 NATO Summit in The Hague, Canada agreed to a new Defence Investment Pledge to invest 3.5% of annual GDP on core defence investments as well as 1.5% on defence and security relation investments by 2035 to ensure our individual and collective security.
• Earlier this month, Prime Minister Carney announced the largest pay raise for CAF members in a generation.
Aug. 26, 2025 /CNW/ – Today, the Prime Minister, Mark Carney, arrived in Latvia, where he will focus on strengthening transatlantic security and NATO efforts to deter Russian aggression on the Eastern Flank.
In Riga, Prime Minister Carney met with the Prime Minister of Latvia, Evika Siliņa, and announced Canada’s renewal of Operation REASSURANCE for another three years.
Canada launched Operation REASSURANCE in 2014 following Russia’s initial invasion of Ukraine. More than a decade later, it remains the Canadian Armed Forces’ largest overseas mission, with approximately 2,000 troops currently deployed to deter Russian aggression and defend NATO territory.
This renewal will sustain the Brigade’s personnel and military capabilities in Latvia – reinforcing our collective defence, strengthening co-operative security, and keeping NATO presence strong on the Eastern Flank. As Framework Nation, Canada leads the NATO Multinational Brigade in Latvia, a formation of approximately 3,000 personnel from 14 NATO Allies.
During their meeting, the prime ministers underscored the importance of NATO, of ending Russia’s war of aggression, and of securing a just and lasting peace for Ukraine. They focused on the need for robust security guarantees for durable, lasting peace. The leaders also discussed the importance of peace and security to economic growth and to advancing Canada’s economic partnership with Europe through trade and defence.
“To secure lasting peace in Ukraine and Europe, we must deter and fortify. For over a decade, Canadian troops have played an indispensable role in deterring Russian aggression on NATO’s Eastern Flank and fortifying our shared defence. Canadians can be proud that our troops will continue to lead Operation REASSURANCE in this critical mission – for greater security, stability, and prosperity in Europe and around the world.”
— The Rt. Hon. Mark Carney, Prime Minister of Canada
“Through Operation REASSURANCE, Canada’s Armed Forces members are on the front lines, working alongside our NATO Allies to strengthen defence on Europe’s Eastern Flank. Their dedication and professionalism help deter threats, protect the region, and uphold the democratic values that sustain peace and stability at home and abroad. Canada is proud to stand with its Allies and contribute to this vital mission.”
— The Hon. David J. McGuinty, Minister of National Defence
• During his visit to Latvia, Prime Minister Carney was accompanied by the Minister of National Defence, David J. McGuinty.
• Canada will complete the full implementation of persistently deployed Brigade capabilities to Latvia by 2026, at which point the Brigade will have up to 2,200 Canadian Armed Forces (CAF) members as part of NATO’s Forward Land Forces and supporting elements in Latvia.
• In June, the Prime Minister announced that Canada’s defence investments for 2025-26 will be over $9 bn, helping strengthen the CAF’s capabilities and readiness while bringing Canada to NATO’s 2% defence spending goal this year.
• At the 2025 NATO Summit in The Hague, Canada agreed to a new Defence Investment Pledge to invest 3.5% of annual GDP on core defence investments as well as 1.5% on defence and security relation investments by 2035 to ensure our individual and collective security.
• Earlier this month, Prime Minister Carney announced the largest pay raise for CAF members in a generation.
(Source: PR Newswire)

 

25 Aug 25. U.S., Allied Aircraft Demonstrate Readiness, Unity Over Latvia. Air Force B-1B Lancer aircraft and allied fighter jets flew in formation over the Monument of Freedom in Riga, Latvia, Aug. 19 as part of Bomber Task Force Europe, demonstrating NATO air forces’ ability to operate together anywhere, anytime. The Lancers flew in formation with two Hungarian and two Swedish air force JAS 39 Gripen fighter jets, demonstrating allied integration fostered during an ongoing training deployment. The Hungarian Gripens are deployed to Šiauliai Air Base, Lithuania, in support of NATO’s air policing mission.
“The security of the Baltic states and NATO’s eastern flank is the cornerstone of the security of the entire Euro-Atlantic region,” Latvian Minister of Defense Andris Sprūds said. “Such U.S. and allied flyover maneuvers clearly demonstrate NATO’s presence in the region, transatlantic unity, and commitment to collectively strengthen the security of the Baltic state region.”
During the deployment, U.S. bombers integrated with Norwegian and other allied air forces to rehearse advanced tactics, share threat information in real time, and ensure the ability to maneuver freely even when access is contested. Each combined mission reinforces the coalition’s capacity to operate effectively in dynamic and high-threat environments.
Bomber Task Force Europe is part of a regular series of deployments that strengthen allied readiness, deepen integration, and demonstrate credible, combat-ready airpower in support of the collective defense of the homeland and the Euro-Atlantic region. (Source: U.S. DoD)

 

25 Aug 25. German agency says arms companies at risk of property attacks. German arms manufacturers face risks of property attacks from mounting protests, federal criminal investigators warned in a document seen by Reuters on Monday, ahead of an action targeting Rheinmetall (RHMG.DE), this week. In a memo by the Federal Criminal Police Office, the agency said “Rheinmetall entwaffnen” or “Disarm Rheinmetall” protest could lead to property-related offences, as seen at similar events in previous years.
Protesters plan to protest at Rheinmetall’s site in Cologne from Tuesday through Sunday, calling for a rejection of the “war regime”.
In an emailed statement to Reuters, a Rheinmetall spokesperson said the company was in touch with security authorities and had taken appropriate precautions, without giving details. (Source: Reuters)
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Founded in 1987, Exensor Technology is a world leading supplier of Networked Unattended Ground Sensor (UGS) Systems providing tailored sensor solutions to customers all over the world. From our Headquarters in Lund Sweden, our centre of expertise in Network Communications at Communications Research Lab in Kalmar Sweden and our Production site outside of Basingstoke UK, we design, develop and produce latest state of the art rugged UGS solutions at the highest quality to meet the most stringent demands of our customers. Our systems are in operation and used in a wide number of Military as well as Homeland Security applications worldwide. The modular nature of the system ensures any external sensor can be integrated, providing the user with a fully meshed “silent” network capable of self-healing. Exensor Technology will continue to lead the field in UGS technology, provide our customers with excellent customer service and a bespoke package able to meet every need.

A CNIM Group Company
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Sponsored by Bertin Exensor

 

www.exensor.com

 

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21 Aug 25. Taiwan: Proposed defence budget will face challenges to secure legislative backing. Earlier on 21 August, Taiwan’s Cabinet announced plans to spend approximately NTD 949.5bn (USD 31.1bn) on defence in 2026, which amounts to 3.32% of GDP. This would represent an approximately 23% increase relative to 2025; it would also include investments in fighter jets and naval assets. The announcement comes as China has stepped up military pressure on the island in recent years. However, the budget would need to be passed by the opposition-controlled Legislative Yuan (LY; unicameral legislature). We assess that the proposed budget is unlikely to pass in its current form, and that there is a realistic possibility of substantial cuts and/or delays. Earlier this year, opposition lawmakers blocked parts of the 2025 budget. Regardless, China’s armed forces dwarf those of Taiwan; furthermore, the US will remain the main node of deterrence in the Taiwan Strait (see Sibylline Strategic Risk Forecast – 24 March 2025). However, if Taiwan is unable to boost military spending significantly, we assess this would drive tensions with Washington DC, with which the island still hopes to achieve a better trade deal. (Source: Sibylline)

 

21 Aug 25. Sudan: Increasing US engagement is unlikely to facilitate peace agreement, sustaining conflict risks. On 20 August, a team of US-led mediators claimed they were ‘appalled’ by the deteriorating humanitarian situation in Sudan and called for urgent de-escalatory measures amid increasing US engagement in peace negotiation efforts. This follows talks between US Senior Advisor for Africa, Massad Boulos, and the head of the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF), General Abdel al-Burhan, in Zurich (Switzerland) on 11 August. No substantive peace talks have taken place since the start of the conflict in April 2023, despite efforts by other regional mediators such as Saudi Arabia and Turkey. Regardless of increasing US efforts, neither side is likely to commit to negotiations until it is satisfied that it has achieved an optimal military position in the conflict. With the SAF looking to build on its capture of the capital Khartoum and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) entrenched across the Darfur region, we assess that mediators are highly unlikely to devise a lasting peace agreement, sustaining the risk of protracted armed conflict into 2026 and driving the likelihood of further US-imposed sanctions. (Source: Sibylline)

 

21 Aug 25. Russia needs a nuclear shield update to due to ‘colossal threats’, nuclear chief says. Russia’s nuclear shield should be strengthened in coming years due to the “colossal threats” facing the world’s biggest nuclear power, the head of Russia’s state nuclear corporation said on Thursday. Russia and the United States are upgrading their nuclear arsenals – including the systems used to detect and intercept incoming nuclear-armed missiles – just as China ramps up its own nuclear capability far beyond those of Britain and France. (Source: Reuters)

 

20 Aug 25. Congo (DRC): Contentious terms will likely prolong negotiation process, drive conflict, unrest risks. On 19 August, Qatari mediators confirmed that, despite the Congolese government and the M23 rebel group missing the 18 August deadline for a peace agreement, the two sides remain committed to the negotiation process. The M23 have confirmed it will send a team to the Qatari capital Doha in the coming days. However, progress is likely to remain slow, with both sides indicating dissatisfaction with a draft proposal. The draft envisions the creation of an interim special force to manage the area currently controlled by the M23, with 50% of the force comprising M23 members and the remainder filled by the Congolese police and local civilians. Despite current protestation by the Congolese state, an agreement that does not incorporate M23 personnel in the continued management of the territory is highly unlikely. Such an agreement will likely be subject to further delays, sustaining the risk of clashes between M23 forces and local pro-government militia and driving threats to life for locally engaged staff. We assess that agreement to such terms would likely be politically contentious, raising the risk of protests in the capital Kinshasa. (Source: Sibylline)

 

20 Aug 25.  Mali: Likely jihadist attacks proximate to capital will increase threats to staff, government stability. Late on 19 August, reports claimed that the al-Qaeda-aligned Jama’at Nasr al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM) attacked Kassela (Koulikoro region), approximately 31 miles (50km) to the east of the capital Bamako. While details of the attack are limited, JNIM has significantly expanded its presence in central and southern Mali in recent months; the attack underscores elevated jihadist threats around Bamako and the limited capacity of the Malian military (FAMa) to respond to such attacks. This is compounded by JNIM’s evolving capabilities, including the increased deployment of drones and sophisticated IEDs during attacks. While a high-capacity assault on Bamako remains unlikely in the short term, intensifying jihadist activity proximate to the city will increase risks of attacks targeting FAMa bases and checkpoints on the city’s outskirts. This will also likely elevate kidnap-for-ransom (KFR) risks during overland movement along highways connected to the city. We assess that further attacks proximate to Bamako will exacerbate anti-junta sentiment within the FAMa, thereby increasing the threat of internal challenges to President Assimi Goïta’s leadership. (Source: Sibylline)

 

18 Aug 25. Venezuela-US: Naval deployment will significantly increase regional tensions. According to reports on 18 August, the US will deploy three Arleigh Burke-class Aegis guided missile destroyers off the coast of Venezuela in the next 36 hours. The USS Gravely, USS Jason Dunham and USS Sampson will reportedly seek to counter threats from Latin American cartels designated as foreign terrorist organisations (FTOs). Reports also indicate that the Iwo Jima Amphibious Ready Group, the 22nd Marine Expeditionary Group and multiple Boeing P-8 Poseidon maritime patrol aircraft will join the destroyers. In total, around 4,000 sailors and marines will participate in the months-long deployment in international airspace and waters. A US official told Reuters, under conditions of anonymity, that in addition to intelligence and surveillance operations, the deployment will possibly also operate as a launching pad for targeted strikes in the event that any such decision is made. In response, Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro announced the deployment of 4.5 m militia members across Venezuela. We assess there is a remote chance of US military action in Venezuela during the deployment. However, a heightened US military presence off the Venezuelan coast will significantly increase regional tensions. (Source: Sibylline)

 

18 Aug 25. South Korea-North Korea: Conciliatory gestures will have limited impact on tensions. Earlier on 18 August, South Korean President Lee Jae-myung instructed government ministries to pursue the ‘phased implementation of existing inter-Korean agreements’. Lee recently indicated that he would revive the landmark 2018 Comprehensive Military Agreement (CMA), which aimed to reduce military activity near the border. North Korean Supreme Leader Kim Jong-un and Lee’s predecessor, Yoon Suk-yeol, withdrew from the agreement in 2023 and 2024, respectively. We assess that Lee (who came to office in June) will pursue diplomatic engagement to deter aggressive behaviour from North Korea, in contrast to Yoon’s more confrontational approach. For example, Seoul suspended cross-border loudspeaker broadcasts earlier this month. However, this strategy is highly unlikely to herald a major diplomatic breakthrough in the short term; North Korea is emboldened by its growing ties with Russia and has described efforts to improve ties as a ‘foolish dream’. As such, we assess that further flare-ups in tensions due to North Korean missile tests and joint US-South Korea military drills will be likely. (Source: Sibylline)

 

18 Aug 25. Congo (DRC): Further ADF attacks will be likely in short term amid rise in violence targeting civilians. On 17 August, the Islamic State (IS)-aligned Allied Democratic Forces (ADF) killed nine civilians in an overnight raid in Oicha (North Kivu province), during which at least 20 homes were destroyed. The incident comes amid an upsurge in ADF attacks against civilians in recent weeks; 47 people were killed in the Lubero territory (North Kivu) and another four were killed across a series of attacks in the Banyari-Tchabi area (Ituri province) over the past week. The attacks come despite the active joint Congolese and Ugandan operations in the region. Over the coming weeks, further ADF attacks will be likely across southern Ituri and northern North Kivu provinces. This will elevate threats to local staff, particularly those based within rural communities and during overland movement, but also those based in the region’s larger towns and cities, within which the ADF has demonstrated capacity to conduct hit-and-run and bombing attacks. We assess there is a realistic possibility that Congolese and Ugandan forces will escalate operations in response, increasing exposure to artillery fire and small-arms crossfire; a possible proliferation of security checks would slow overland movement. (Source: Sibylline)

 

18 Aug 25. Bolivia: Domestic unrest risks will be sustained ahead of second-round election. On 17 August, Bolivia held elections to choose a president, vice president, all 130 deputies and 36 senators. According to preliminary results, centrist Senator Rodrigo Paz received 31.7% of the vote for the presidency. Paz’s popularity surprised many, given that he was polling at approximately 6.4% voter intention prior to the election. Paz will face the right-wing former president Jorge ‘Tuto’ Quiroga (2001–2002) in the second round of the presidential election on 19 October; Quiroga received 27.2% of the vote. Incumbent President Luis Arce (2019–present) celebrated the results, stating that ‘democracy has triumphed’, despite his left-wing Movement Towards Socialism (MAS) facing defeat after 19 years in power. The MAS presidential candidate garnered 3.2% of the vote. Reports indicate that approximately 19.1% of the ballots were null and void; influential former president Evo Morales (2006–2019) called on his supporters to vote null after his disqualification from running in the election. Ahead of the second-round vote, we assess that domestic unrest risks will be sustained as Morales’ supporters continue to protest, but government stability risks will decrease. (Source: Sibylline)

 

15 Aug 25. US-Caribbean: US deployment of naval, air forces to Caribbean Sea will increase regional tensions. According to reports on 14 August, the US has ordered the deployment of naval and air forces to the southern Caribbean Sea. The deployment will seek to counter threats from Latin American cartels designated as foreign terrorist organisations (FTOs). The several-month-long deployment will reportedly involve multiple Boeing P-8 Poseidon maritime patrol aircraft, at least one warship and at least one attack submarine. Reports indicate that the deployment will facilitate surveillance and intelligence operations. The deployment comes amid increasing US military involvement in combatting cartels under the Trump administration. On 13 August, a US Air Force drone conducted a two-hour reconnaissance flight over México state (Mexico) at the request of the Mexican authorities. Meanwhile, on 22 March, US Northern Command deployed the USS Spruance Arleigh Burke-class guided missile destroyer to secure the US-Mexico border on the Pacific coast. The latest deployment will marginally decrease organised crime risks in the event of significant drug seizures and interceptions. Additionally, a heightened US military presence in the southern Caribbean Sea will increase regional tensions with Nicaragua and Venezuela. (Source: Sibylline)

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Founded in 1987, Exensor Technology is a world leading supplier of Networked Unattended Ground Sensor (UGS) Systems providing tailored sensor solutions to customers all over the world. From our Headquarters in Lund Sweden, our centre of expertise in Network Communications at Communications Research Lab in Kalmar Sweden and our Production site outside of Basingstoke UK, we design, develop and produce latest state of the art rugged UGS solutions at the highest quality to meet the most stringent demands of our customers. Our systems are in operation and used in a wide number of Military as well as Homeland Security applications worldwide. The modular nature of the system ensures any external sensor can be integrated, providing the user with a fully meshed “silent” network capable of self-healing. Exensor Technology will continue to lead the field in UGS technology, provide our customers with excellent customer service and a bespoke package able to meet every need.

A CNIM Group Company

———————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————-

Sponsored by Bertin Exensor

www.exensor.com

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Military And Security Developments
Aug 21.
KEY DEVELOPMENTS
IRAN
• The continued failure to relaunch Iran-US nuclear talks will sustain the risk of UN sanctions and military strikes.
• An Iranian military drill has underscored the ongoing elevated regional tensions; it will likely drive limited disruption for shipping operations in the Gulf of Oman and Arabian Sea.
ISRAEL
• The arrest of two US residents who allegedly took photos of a sensitive security facility highlights the augmented state of alertness across Israel and the risk of arbitrary arrests.
• On 21 August, Israel’s Settlement Subcommittee of the Civil Administration approved the E1 plan in the West Bank, elevating the risk of international backlash (including sanctions).
PALESTINIAN TERRITORIES
• A peace agreement between Israel and Hamas is highly unlikely in the coming weeks as Israel calls up thousands of reservists ahead of its occupation of Gaza City.
• Hamas’ attack on an IDF outpost in Khan Yunis (southern Gaza) underscores increasing conflict-escalation risks in Gaza as Israel prepares to occupy Gaza City.
• The prevalence of informal shelters is set to increase in line with mass displacement from Gaza City, driving the threat of physical harm to NGO personnel.
IRAN
• The continued failure to relaunch Iran-US nuclear talks will sustain the risk of UN sanctions and military strikes. On 20 August, Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi claimed that the time for meaningful nuclear talks with the US had not yet arrived, but that Tehran would not fully sever its co-operation with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). His comments follow Iran’s suspension of IAEA inspectors’ access to nuclear facilities in June, after US and Israeli military strikes against Iranian nuclear infrastructure. Araghchi reaffirmed earlier reports that a meeting between Iran and the IAEA is likely in the coming days, though he clarified that a basis for further negotiations has not yet been established. While the Supreme National Security Council (SNSC) will possibly approve future IAEA inspections, talks involving the IAEA are likely to take several weeks. Regardless of any progress with the IAEA (which is likely to be limited), the E3 (France, Germany and the UK) have stated that their decision to activate the JCPOA’s snapback clause and move to restore UN sanctions on Iran is dependent on progress during talks between Iran and the US. As there is no indication of progress towards Iran-US negotiations, and considering details regarding Iran’s nuclear programme are unlikely to emerge for several weeks, international concern will almost certainly escalate. Snapback sanctions would likely exert significant economic pressure on Iran, increasing regulatory and compliance risks for local and regionally engaged businesses. A complete breakdown in negotiations following the reimposition of sanctions would almost certainly heighten international concerns over nuclear oversight and increase the risk of further Israeli (and possibly US) strikes on Iranian nuclear and military sites.
• An Iranian military drill has underscored the ongoing elevated regional tensions; it will likely drive limited disruption for shipping operations in the Gulf of Oman and Arabian Sea. Earlier on 21 August, Iranian state media announced the launch of Iran’s first military exercise since the Iran-Israel war in June. The two-day exercise will include the participation of Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) naval, ground and air force units, as well as coastal and sea-based missile launch platforms and electronic warfare (EW) units. Reports indicate that naval vessels have already launched missiles at targets in the Gulf of Oman and Indian Ocean. The exercise is possibly in direct response to an increased and sustained Israeli naval presence in the Red Sea (see Sibylline Middle East Crisis Update – 18 August 2025). The move also underscores elevated regional tensions; we assess that armed conflict escalation is a realistic possibility in the coming weeks (see above). In the short term, the military drill will likely drive temporary maritime disruption due to physical navigation restrictions, aggressive manoeuvring in proximity to exercise zones and the knock-on effects of testing EW devices, including GPS spoofing and signal jamming.
ISRAEL
The arrest of two US residents who allegedly took photos of a sensitive security facility highlights the augmented state of alertness across Israel and the risk of arbitrary arrests. Earlier on 21 August, the Israeli police arrested two US residents studying in Jerusalem (Jerusalem district) on suspicion of filming a sensitive security facility at the entrance to the city. The incident reflects rising levels of Israeli alertness tied to concerns that Iran and Iranian-affiliated entities will attempt to redress the current power imbalance by escalating espionage and sabotage campaigns against Israeli targets and interests. The Israeli security forces are likely to remain on heightened alert in the coming months, elevating the risk of arbitrary arrest for local and international personnel. We assess this risk is highest around sensitive areas such as military and security facilities, as well as government buildings and symbols; it is particularly acute for international personnel, who also face the risk of deportation. Furthermore, there is a realistic possibility that international companies employing arrested or deported individuals will be subject to increased scrutiny, exacerbating the risk of the Israeli border authorities rejecting visa requests for other employees of said firms.
• On 21 August, Israel’s Settlement Subcommittee of the Civil Administration approved the E1 plan in the West Bank, elevating the risk of international backlash (including sanctions). The plan features the construction of approximately 3,400 new housing units in the West Bank in a manner that will disrupt Palestinian territorial continuity between Bethlehem and Ramallah and al-Bireh governorates. Several international organisations and states claim the plan significantly sabotages efforts to form a viable Palestinian state. Israeli Finance Minister Bezalel Smotrich stated that undermining Palestinian statehood was his reason for supporting for the plan. The official approval of the plan and efforts to proceed with construction will elevate the likelihood of governments imposing sanctions on the parties involved, such as construction firms, as well as civil servants, Israeli ministers and Knesset members. Furthermore, there is a realistic possibility that several countries will introduce legislation targeting Israeli produce and commodities originating in the West Bank, driving financial and compliance risks for international businesses with operations therein. Companies operating in the West Bank will also be exposed to elevated risks of international public backlash, driving reputational risks and possible boycott campaigns.
PALESTINIAN TERRITORIES
• A peace agreement between Israel and Hamas is highly unlikely in the coming weeks as Israel calls up thousands of reservists ahead of its occupation of Gaza City. On 19 August, Israeli officials stated that the government was studying Hamas’ response to a ceasefire proposal submitted by Egyptian and Qatari mediators on 18 August (see Sibylline Middle East Crisis Update – 18 August 2025). While Qatar’s foreign ministry claims that the ceasefire proposal agreed by Hamas was almost identical to an earlier plan for a temporary ceasefire put forward by US Special Envoy Steve Witkoff, Israel has subsequently moved away from this position and is now seeking the release of all hostages for a permanent agreement. Hamas’ willingness to accept an offer that it previously rejected likely underscores the group’s degraded military capacity and its fears over the looming Israeli ground operation in Gaza City. On 20 August, the IDF began calling up 60,000 reservists in preparation for the expansion of offensive military operations in Gaza City, almost certainly indicating its intent to push forward with its takeover plan and rendering Israel’s acceptance of the mediators’ proposal increasingly unlikely. Even if Israel responds to the proposal, negotiations would likely take weeks, in which time the IDF would almost certainly proceed with its ground offensive, which would in turn further complicate efforts to finalise a negotiated settlement.
• Hamas’ attack on an IDF outpost in Khan Yunis (southern Gaza) underscores increasing conflict-escalation risks in Gaza as Israel prepares to occupy Gaza City. On 20 August, at least 15 of Hamas’ al-Qassam brigade operatives launched a raid in an attempt to abduct soldiers stationed at an Israeli military outpost in Khan Yunis. The militants reportedly emerged from a tunnel located around 50m from the encampment and opened fire with small arms and rocket-propelled grenades (RPGs). Hamas claimed that the assault also involved a suicide bombing. Three IDF personnel were wounded and approximately ten militants were killed during the clashes (and also in targeted airstrikes following the attack). The incident comes amid rising Israeli military pressure in Gaza ahead of its planned ground offensive, the first stages of which officially began on 20 August. As such, there is a realistic possibility that the attack reflects Hamas’ efforts to redirect resources southwards and to escalate its operations in areas where the IDF’s presence is less pronounced. This will compound the IDF’s concern regarding the (almost certain) displacement of militants from Gaza City to humanitarian areas, particularly al-Mawasi (southern Gaza), elevating the likelihood of IDF strikes in these areas. This will in turn drive crossfire and misidentification risks for NGO personnel, medical staff and journalists in southern Gaza, while also exacerbating already-critical humanitarian conditions in the strip.
• The prevalence of informal shelters is set to increase in line with mass displacement from Gaza City, driving the threat of physical harm to NGO personnel. On 20 August, several aid groups stated that shelter materials had still not entered Gaza despite Israel’s announcement on 16 August that such deliveries would be permitted via the Kerem Shalom border crossing (pending security inspections). An estimated 1.3 m Gazans lack tents, which has forced many to take up informal shelter in buildings with poor structural integrity, increasing the risk of collapse and serious physical harm. Amid the launch of Israeli offensive operations in Gaza City, we assess that mass displacement will almost certainly worsen, accelerating the use of informal shelters in southern Gaza. This will likely drive an increase in the prevalence of infectious diseases and exposure to crossfire for civilians and NGO personnel who are servicing civilian needs. On 19 August, the UN stated that the killing of aid workers has surged to a record high during the war in Gaza, underscoring these persistent and critical security risks for on-the-ground personnel. More broadly, the humanitarian crisis in Gaza will likely worsen in the coming weeks, exacerbating energy, food and water security risks for on-the-ground personnel.
• Israel-Palestinian Territories: Hamas attack on IDF outpost points to conflict-escalation risks in Gaza. On 20 August, operatives from Hamas’ military wing, the al-Qassam Brigades, launched a raid on an Israeli military outpost in Khan Yunis, reportedly in an attempt to abduct soldiers. Three Israel Defense Forces (IDF) personnel were wounded, while at least ten militants were killed. According to the IDF, the militants emerged from a tunnel near the encampment; they reportedly opened fire with small arms and launched rocket-propelled grenades (RPG). The attack comes amid the launch of IDF operations to occupy Gaza City and underscores the heightened efforts by Hamas militants to kidnap soldiers in Gaza (as well as elevated conflict-escalation risks ahead of Israel’s planned operation). This will drive critical bystander risks for NGO personnel, medical staff and journalists who remain in Gaza City stemming from cross-fire and misidentification. We assess that the operation itself will highly likely exacerbate already-critical humanitarian conditions in the strip, especially in the north, driving energy, food and water security risks.
• Syria: US raid highlights growing counter-IS efforts along border with Turkey, elevated security risks. On 20 August, a US raid in Atme (Idlib governorate) killed a senior Islamic State (IS) member who was a candidate to be IS’ leader in Syria. The operation was conducted in co-operation with local Syrian forces who cordoned off the area. On 7 August, Syrian forces arrested nine IS cell members in Harem (Idlib). These operations come amid ongoing counter-IS efforts in northern Syria near the Syria-Turkey border. Additionally, on 19 and 20 August, two US military convoys comprising at least 130 trucks carrying logistical supplies, including fuel, soldiers and ammunition, crossed from Iraq into al-Hasakah governorate (Syria). There is a realistic possibility this forms part of a gradual US withdrawal from Iraq and repositioning in Syria. As such, we assess there is also a realistic possibility of increasing US military operations in northern Syria, particularly along the Syria-Turkey and Syria-Iraq borders, elevating the risks of armed clashes and travel disruption in these border areas in the coming months.
Aug 20.
• Armenia-Iran: Yerevan will unlikely placate Tehran’s concerns over US involvement in transit corridor. On 19 August, Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan announced that Armenia and Iran plan to construct a second bridge across their shared border. The announcement followed Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian’s visit to Armenia on 18-19 August. During the visit, both leaders signed co-operation agreements and declared that bilateral relations would be elevated to the level of a strategic partnership. Pezeshkian’s visit comes shortly after Armenia agreed to open a US-operated transport route along the Armenian-Iranian border through the Zangezur Corridor, linking mainland Azerbaijan to its Nakhichevan exclave. The transit corridor, named the Trump Route for International Peace and Prosperity (TRIPP), will be operated by the US under a 99-year lease granted by Armenia. Iran has expressed opposition to any US involvement in the corridor. During the meeting, Pashinyan sought to placate Tehran’s concerns, explaining that the corridor would remain under Yerevan’s exclusive jurisdiction. While we assess that Iran will likely continue to resist US participation, it is unlikely to jeopardise the Armenian-Iranian relationship in the short-to-medium term, limiting the scope for major regional tensions.
• Israel: Reserve duty recruitment will elevate socio-economic risks, impact hospitality sector. Earlier on 20 August, the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) began calling up 60,000 reservists in preparation for the expansion of military operations in Gaza City. The recruitment orders are likely to come into force in early September. The IDF and the government are still discussing final details of the plan, named ‘Gideon’s Chariots B’. However, early reports indicate that, in total, the plan will involve the recruitment of 110,000 to 130,000 reservists across three recruitment waves over the coming months, likely extending into 2026. Furthermore, the IDF has decided to differentially extend current active reservist orders (Tsav 8) by another 40 days. The recruitment plans and the extension of current orders are likely to increase business disruption risks due to labour shortages in the coming months. Furthermore, the call to arms will likely impact consumerism in Israel, reducing households’ spending, particularly on leisure activities. This will likely particularly impact the hospitality industry, including restaurants and hotels, elevating financial and socio economic risks in Israel during Q4 2025 and H1 2026.
Aug 19.
• Israel-Palestinian Territories: Limited negotiation progress is likely; truce in two weeks is unlikely. On 18 August, Hamas accepted Egypt’s and Qatar’s ceasefire/hostage-release proposal. According to local reports, the proposal includes a 60-day truce, as well as the release of ten living Israeli hostages and (likely) over 150 Palestinian prisoners. Hamas’ announcement comes as Israel prepares to intensify its military operations in Gaza (Palestinian Territories) amid its plans to occupy Gaza City in the coming two months. The proposal is similar to that of US Special Envoy Steve Witkoff (which Hamas rejected last month). Since then, Israel’s negotiation stance has shifted. In recent weeks, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has pushed for a complete deal that includes the release of all the hostages for a long-term ceasefire. As such, there is a realistic possibility that Israel will reject the latest proposal, though it is possible the pitch will be used as the framework for broader negotiations and that ceasefire negotiations will advance in the coming weeks. As such, while a ceasefire is unlikely in the coming two weeks, we assess that a deal is possible in the coming two months.
• Israel-Palestinian Territories: Limited negotiation progress is likely; truce in two weeks is unlikely. On 18 August, Hamas accepted Egypt’s and Qatar’s ceasefire/hostage-release proposal. According to local reports, the proposal includes a 60-day truce, as well as the release of ten living Israeli hostages and (likely) over 150 Palestinian prisoners. Hamas’ announcement comes as Israel prepares to intensify its military operations in Gaza (Palestinian Territories) amid its plans to occupy Gaza City in the coming two months. The proposal is similar to that of US Special Envoy Steve Witkoff (which Hamas rejected last month). Since then, Israel’s negotiation stance has shifted. In recent weeks, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has pushed for a complete deal that includes the release of all the hostages for a long-term ceasefire. As such, there is a realistic possibility that Israel will reject the latest proposal, though it is possible the pitch will be used as the framework for broader negotiations and that ceasefire negotiations will advance in the coming weeks. As such, while a ceasefire is unlikely in the coming two weeks, we assess that a deal is possible in the coming two months.
Aug 18.
IRAN
• Talks involving the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) are likely to take several weeks, sustaining short-term nuclear safety risks and the threat of snapback sanctions.
• Iran’s alleged possession of a leaked document containing the names of UK intelligence operatives will likely drive diplomatic tensions and elevate arbitrary detention risks.
ISRAEL
• Nationwide demonstrations and strikes on 17 August have underscored the elevated risk of transit and operational disruption in the coming weeks.
PALESTINIAN TERRITORIES
• Israeli plans to build hospitals in Gaza are unlikely to moderate the humanitarian crisis significantly.
• Airdrops will moderately reduce food security risks, though on-the-ground personnel and civilians face an increased risk of crushes and stampedes.
• The latest Gaza ceasefire proposal, which Hamas currently supports, is unlikely to secure a peace agreement, though further negotiations are possible in the coming weeks.
IRAN 
• Talks involving the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) are likely to take several weeks, sustaining short-term nuclear safety risks and the threat of snapback sanctions. Earlier on 18 August, Iran stated that it would continue talking with the IAEA and that it expected a further round of negotiations to take place in the coming days. The announcement follows a visit by the IAEA’s deputy head, Massimo Aparo, to Iran on 11 August to negotiate re-establishing co-operation. This comes after Iran suspended IAEA inspectors’ access to nuclear facilities following US and Israeli military strikes in June. Negotiations between the IAEA and Iran will likely take at least several weeks, sustaining reduced international oversight of the country’s nuclear programme, as well as nuclear safety risks in the short term. Oversight constraints, coupled with limited progress in resuming talks between the US and Iran, will sustain the risk of the E3 (France, Germany and the UK) triggering the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA)’s snapback clause and reimposing UN sanctions on Iran. The reapplication of UN sanctions would highly likely drive significant economic pressure on Iran and exacerbate regulatory and compliance risks for regionally engaged businesses. Additionally, the reimposition of UN sanctions would increase the risk of Iran breaking off talks with the IAEA; this would in turn compound international anxiety over a lack of nuclear oversight, raising the risk of further Israeli strikes against Iran.
• Iran’s alleged possession of a leaked document containing the names of UK intelligence operatives will likely drive diplomatic tensions and elevate arbitrary detention risks. Earlier on 18 August, UK media reported that, according to senior Iranian and Afghan sources, a group of Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) officials visited Kabul (Afghanistan) last week to discuss a co-operation deal with the Taliban authorities. The officials sought access to the Taliban’s ‘kill list’, a leaked UK Ministry of Defence (MoD) spreadsheet containing the details of thousands of Afghan asylum seekers, as well as UK intelligence operatives and special forces personnel. In return, the IRGC is reportedly pressuring the government in Tehran to expedite its recognition of the Taliban as the legitimate government of Afghanistan. Reports indicate that Iranian border forces have already arrested several individuals whose names appear on the leaked list in recent days. Iran likely intends to use the ‘kill list’ to apprehend UK security personnel so as to exert diplomatic pressure on the E3 in the run-up to the deadline for triggering the snapback clause (3 September). The move has significantly increased the risks facing foreign nationals in Iran, as well as those in neighbouring states with significant Iranian proxy elements (such as Iraq and Yemen), in the coming months. Personnel perceived to be associated with European and/or US intelligence services/armed forces will face a heightened risk of arbitrary detention. Furthermore, the authorities are highly liable to employ aggressive interrogation techniques, compounding broader human rights concerns for targeted individuals. The latest reports are likely to degrade diplomatic relations between the UK and Iran, possibly stalling ongoing nuclear discussions. In the long-term, this would increase the risk of intensified sanctions and reduced nuclear oversight in Iran.
ISRAEL
• Nationwide demonstrations and strikes on 17 August have underscored the elevated risk of transit and operational disruption in the coming weeks. Numerous unions, private businesses and public authorities conducted a large-scale nationwide strike in favour of ending the Israel-Hamas war and securing the release of the hostages in Gaza. The action was accompanied by large demonstrations across Israel, including at highway junctions (see the demonstration spots in the map above). Demonstrators blocked key thoroughfares at protest hotspots, particularly in Jerusalem (Jerusalem district) and Tel Aviv (Tel Aviv district), causing substantial congestion. Further demonstrations are scheduled to take place between 18 and 23 August (mainly in Tel Aviv), driving the risk of work stoppages, localised travel disruption and broader business disruption in the coming days. While such demonstrations are likely to remain peaceful, sporadic altercations involving demonstrators and drivers, as well as the security forces, remain possible. This will elevate the security risks in the vicinity of protest locations. While another general strike remains unlikely in the coming days, the widespread coverage of (and nationwide participation during) the events on 17 August have underscored increasing anti-war sentiment. This will drive the possibility of demonstrations growing in size and frequency, as well as the risk of further strikes in the coming weeks (sustaining the likelihood of operational disruption).
PALESTINIAN TERRITORIES
• Israeli plans to build hospitals in Gaza are unlikely to moderate the humanitarian crisis significantly. Earlier on 18 August, Israeli media reported that the IDF is preparing to establish medical centres for Gazans as part of its plan to occupy Gaza City. Additional field hospitals will likely moderately improve the IDF’s capacity to treat visible injuries such as amputations, burns and wounds. However, they are unlikely to mitigate against the humanitarian and healthcare risks that will almost certainly result from the months-long planned evacuation of northern Gaza, including Gaza City, to southern Gaza. There is no clear indication that the move is a pretence to eject private entities or NGOs from Gaza. Nevertheless, most major NGOs and humanitarian entities, including UN agencies, have already been sidelined. The majority of aid is passing through private channels such as the Gaza Humanitarian Foundation (GHF). As IDF operations continue in Gaza, widespread food insecurity, reliance on informal housing, the prevalence of infectious diseases and exposure to crossfire will almost certainly persist.
• Airdrops will moderately reduce food security risks, though on-the-ground personnel and civilians face an increased risk of crushes and stampedes. Earlier on 18 August, aircraft from Belgium, France, Germany, Indonesia, Italy, Jordan, the Netherlands, Singapore and the UAE airdropped 180 tonnes of humanitarian aid into Gaza. This comes after Israel reauthorised airdrops by third-party countries on 26 July amid growing international criticism of the humanitarian crisis in Gaza. While the resumption of airdrops will somewhat mitigate against food security risks, accessing pallets remains dangerous for on-the-ground civilians and personnel. Pallets will possibly land on top of individuals seeking to reach them first, while crushes and stampedes are also likely in the vicinity of pallets which land successfully due to dense concentrations of individuals attempting to access the limited supply of aid. Structural collapses are also possible as and when pallets land on buildings, or when large crowds gather to collect aid from structures that cannot support their collective weight. Furthermore, a BBC Verify investigation on 17 August revealed that in ten separate cases, pallets were airdropped into areas designated by the IDF as danger zones. This underscores the elevated risk of harm (including exposure to crossfire and misidentification) facing individuals on the ground who attempt to access aid drops, especially those moving into active conflict areas to retrieve goods.
• The latest Gaza ceasefire proposal, which Hamas currently supports, is unlikely to secure a peace agreement, though further negotiations are possible in the coming weeks. Earlier on 18 August, Hamas stated that it had approved the latest Gaza ceasefire proposal put forward by Egyptian and Qatari mediators. While the full terms of the agreement remain unclear, reports indicate the proposal is a reversion to previous ceasefire ideas; it specifies securing the suspension of military operations for 60 days and the release of ten living Israeli hostages (likely in exchange for over 150 Palestinian prisoners). There remains a realistic possibility that Israel will accept the proposal as a framework for further negotiations with Hamas in the coming days. However, over the past few weeks, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has pushed for the release of all hostages in exchange for a full ceasefire. The current proposal also likely falls short of addressing other Israeli security concerns, including Hamas’ disarmament and the civil administration of Gaza. This will sustain the prospects for deadlocked talks, ensuring the IDF proceeds with its plans to capture Gaza City.
• Israel: General, nationwide strike highlights increasing anti-war sentiment, elevated operational risks. On 17 August, numerous unions, private businesses and public authorities conducted a large-scale nationwide strike in favour of ending the Israel-Hamas war and the release of the hostages in Gaza. The day was accompanied by large demonstrations across Israel, including at highway junctions; this caused substantial congestion. Jerusalem (Jerusalem district) and Tel Aviv (Tel Aviv district) were primary protest hotspots; demonstrations blocked key throughfares. Further demonstrations and actions are scheduled to take place between 18 and 23 August (mainly in Tel Aviv), driving risks of work stoppages and broader business disruption in the coming days. While demonstrations will likely remain peaceful, sporadic altercations involving demonstrators and drivers, as well as the security forces, remain a realistic possibility. This will elevate security risks in proximity to protest locations. While another general strike remains unlikely in the coming days, we assess that widespread coverage and nationwide participation highlight increasing anti-war sentiment and risks of further strikes in the coming weeks, sustaining operational disruption risks.
• Jordan: Reintroduction of national service will drive labour flexibility, operational risks. On 17 August, Jordanian Crown Prince Hussein bin Abdullah announced plans to reintroduce national military service, though no date for such a move has yet been set. The decision highlights concerns regarding national security (especially given Jordan’s heavy reliance on the US for defence), possible Islamic State (IS) expansion in Syria and increasing organised criminal activity in border regions. Additionally, this development likely reflects growing concerns over internal dissent, amid a crackdown on political groups, including the Islamic Action Front (IAF, see Sibylline Situation Update Brief – 7 August 2025). The reintroduction of national service will almost certainly increase labour flexibility risks, raising operational risks for businesses and NGOs. This will be particularly acute for small and medium enterprises, which will likely find it harder to fill positions. To address talent shortages, wages will possibly rise across the market, pushing some businesses to rely on informal labour practices and driving compliance and regulatory risks for associated businesses. Due to the unpredictable labour market, we assess that investors will be disincentivised to invest in the country, hindering long-term growth.
(Source: Sibylline)

 

21 Aug 25. Israel says it has taken first steps of military operation in Gaza City.
• Summary
• Israel plans gradual, targeted operation in Gaza City
• Israeli troops clash with Hamas near Khan Younis
• Smotrich approves West Bank settlement project assailed abroad
Israel’s military announced the first steps of an operation to take over Gaza City on Wednesday and called up tens of thousands of reservists while the government considered a new ceasefire proposal to pause nearly two years of war.
“We have begun the preliminary operations and the first stages of the attack on Gaza City, and already now IDF forces are holding the outskirts of Gaza City,” Brigadier General Effie Defrin, Israel’s military spokesperson, told reporters.
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A military official briefing reporters earlier on Wednesday said reserve soldiers would not report for duty until September, an interval that gives mediators some time to bridge gaps between Hamas and Israel over truce terms. (Source: Reuters)
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Military And Security Developments
Aug 21.
KEY DEVELOPMENTS
• DONETSK: Ukrainian forces are continuing stabilisation operations in the Dobropillia sector, located to the north-west of Pokrovsk (Donetsk oblast), where Russian forces recently penetrated Ukrainian defences
• STRIKES: After scaling back its strikes in recent weeks, particularly in the run-up to the Alaska summit, Russia has resumed launching significantly larger attacks, with a high-intensity missile strike targeting western Ukraine
• DIPLOMACY: Despite growing expectations of a Putin-Zelensky summit, such a meeting remains unlikely in the short term, though various credible venues have been posited for a future meeting
• FORECAST: Competing interpretations, misunderstandings and contradictory proposals of possible ‘security guarantees’ for Ukraine will highly likely prevent a major breakthrough being reached to end the war in the short term
• BAKHMUT: Russian sources have claimed that their forces have advanced west of Chasiv Yar and have now reached the south-eastern outskirts of Kostiantynivka itself (both Donetsk oblast), though this remains unconfirmed. According to Russian claims, Russian forces have advanced along the T-0504 highway to the outskirts of the town, which remains a principal Russian objective in the region. So far, Russian operations have only been confirmed in the village of Stupochky, located around three miles (5km) to the east of Kostiantynivka along the T-0504. Meanwhile, Ukrainian sources reported on 18 August that Russian forces have advanced to the south-east of Stupochky and have likely consolidated control of the eastern bank of the Siverskyi-Donets-Donbas Canal, which runs south-east from Chasiv Yar. Ultimately, further advances towards Kostiantynivka remain a possibility in the coming days, particularly if Ukrainian forces have had to shift forces westward to help plug the Dobropillia penetration (see DONETSK below).
• BAKHMUT: Meanwhile, further south, Russian forces have continued to advance both to the north-east and north-west of Toretsk (Donetsk oblast), amid wider efforts to steadily advance towards Kostiantynivka’s southern outskirts. Geolocated footage from 17 and 19 August indicates advances in northern Yablunivka and to the south of Oleksandro-Shultyne, located around seven miles (11km) to the south-west and four miles (6km) to the south-east of Kostiantynivka, respectively.
• DONETSK: Ukrainian forces are continuing stabilisation operations in the Dobropillia sector, located to the north-west of Pokrovsk (Donetsk oblast), where Russian forces recently penetrated Ukrainian defences. Ukrainian troops have likely succeeded in isolating the most advanced Russian infiltration groups from their main forces, effectively preventing the Russians from supplying these advanced units and further exploiting their advances in the area. Geolocated footage from 20 August confirms Ukrainian control over Petrivka, located to the north of Dobropillia. Ukrainian forces had claimed the capture of the settlement on 15 August.
• DONETSK: Ukrainian sources indicate that their forces have counter-attacked and narrowed the area through which Russian forces can funnel troops and supplies to support their penetration to the north, threatening the viability of Russia’s position east of Dobropillia. Ukrainian forces have seemingly taken the village of Zapovidne, located less than six miles (10km) to the south-east of Dobropollia. If Ukrainian forces hold this position, or even expand further to the east, this would threaten the viability of Russia’s positions to the north. It therefore remains unclear whether Russian forces will be able to consolidate control of their recent penetration, or whether Ukrainian forces will successfully repel these Russian efforts – albeit at the expense of weakening another part of the frontline following the redeployment of reinforcements. Elsewhere, to the east of Pokrovsk, Ukrainian forces recently advanced north of Hrodivka as of 18 August.
• KHARKIV: Nothing significant to report
• KURSK-SUMY: Russian forces have advanced at multiple points in northern Sumy oblast in recent days. Geolocated footage published on 20 August indicates advances in Oleksiivka, a village located around 14 miles (23km) to the north-east of Sumy city (Sumy oblast). Meanwhile, further to the west, footage published on 19 August shows Russian forces raising a flag in southern Bezsalivka, a settlement located just south of the international border and over 28 miles (45km) to the north-west of Sumy city. This north-western section of the Sumy border region has been relatively quiet for several months, following Russia’s expulsion of Ukrainian forces from the nearby town of Tetkino, located inside Russia’s Kursk oblast.
• OSKIL-KREMINNA: Russian forces have continued to make gains in the Lyman direction through frequent small-scale infantry group assaults. Geolocated footage from 18 August shows Russian forces advancing in south-western Ridkodub, located to the north of Lyman (Donetsk oblast). Most significantly, as of 20 August, Russian forces have also made confirmed advances in southern Zarichne, a key town that sits just five miles (8km) to the east of Lyman. If Russian forces successfully consolidate control over the town, they will be in a position to exert pressure to the west and threaten the eastern flank of Lyman itself – an important logistics hub point to the north-east of Sloviansk (Donetsk oblast). Various Ukrainian military sources operating in the Lyman area report that Russia’s offensive operations are characterised by frequent assaults conducted by small infantry groups. However, the poor quality of personnel is likely limiting Russia’s scope for major advances at this stage.
• SOUTHERN: Both Russian and Ukrainian forces have made advances along the Donetsk-Dnipropetrovsk oblast border, though momentum remains with the Russians. Geolocated footage published on 20 August indicates that Russian forces have seized Novoheoriivka, located just inside Dnipropetrovsk oblast, around 12 miles (19km) to the west of Velyka Novosilka (Donetsk oblast). Meanwhile, a credible Ukrainian source reported on 20 August that Russian forces have taken the nearby village of Maliivka, located around four miles (6km) to the north-east. However, Ukrainian forces have also continued to counter-attack in the area, with geolocated footage from 18 August indicating they have successfully retaken Oleksandrohrad, located just inside Donetsk oblast, around 13 miles (21km) to the north-west of Velyka Novosilka.
• SOUTHERN: Ukrainian Southern Defence Forces spokesperson Vladyslav Voloshyn reported on 18 August that Russian forces have stepped up their use of drones and artillery across the Zaporizhzhia axis in recent months, though we assess that overall Russian advances have remained limited. Voloshyn stated that Russian forces are now using between 600 and 700 first-person view (FPV) drones and have increased their use of artillery by 54% (from 12,000 monthly rounds to 19,000). This indicates that Russian forces are seeking to increase pressure across the full breadth of the frontline. However, it remains unclear whether a concerted offensive effort will follow, given that Russian priorities remain in Donetsk oblast to the east.
• STRIKES: After having scaled back its strikes in recent weeks, particularly in the run-up to the Alaska summit, Russia has resumed launching significantly larger attacks. The recent strike on 21 August involved 574 Shahed-type drones, 19 Kh-101 cruise missiles, 14 Kalibr cruise missiles, four Kh-47M2 ballistic missiles, two Iskander-M ballistic missiles and one unidentified missile. In total, Ukrainian forces intercepted 546 unmanned aerial vehicles, 30 cruise missiles and one Kh-47M2 ballistic missile.
• STRIKES: The attack was the largest in weeks and primarily targeted central and western Ukraine. Air defences were active in the capital Kyiv, while explosions were reported in Lviv (Lviv oblast) and Rivne oblast. The Ukrainian authorities indicated that a large electronics plant operated by a US firm sustained damage in Mukachevo, located in Ukraine’s Zakarpattia oblast (bordering Hungary and Romania). The facility was reportedly struck by cruise missiles, though it remains uncertain whether it was deliberately targeted. Previously, a building associated with a US aerospace company had been damaged by a missile in Kyiv. However, after assessing the surrounding area, we identified facilities likely used for defensive purposes nearby, leading us to conclude that the damage to the US company was likely not intentional but rather the result of a miscalculation. A similar miscalculation could realistically have occurred in Zakarpattia this week.
• STRIKES: In recent days, Ukraine has continued to target Russian oil facilities, a trend that has intensified in recent weeks. On 19 August, the authorities in Volgograd oblast (Russia) reported that a Ukrainian drone attack struck an oil refinery in the region. This refinery, operated by Lukoil, had already been targeted on 13-14 August. Earlier on 21 August, Ukraine’s General Staff confirmed another strike against a refinery in Russia’s Rostov oblast. Ukrainian attacks have escalated over the past month. Since the beginning of the month, Russia is said to have lost approximately 13% of its oil refining capacity, likely in part due to Ukrainian drone assaults on oil infrastructure. For further analysis on Russian oil exports, see INDIA below.
POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS
• DIPLOMACY: On 20 August, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky called on the US to react with a ‘strong response’ if Russian President Vladimir Putin fails to meet with him for a bilateral summit. Although US President Donald Trump stated on 18 August that he had begun arranging for such a meeting to take place, we assess that a bilateral meeting between Putin and Zelensky remains unlikely in the short term. A meeting between Putin and Zelensky would undermine Russia’s long-standing narrative questioning Zelensky’s legitimacy as the president of Ukraine. As such, Putin will likely seek to avoid meeting Zelensky until the very end phases of the war to finalise a peace agreement. In the meantime, Moscow will realistically find or fabricate excuses to postpone a Putin-Zelensky summit and emphasise the existing Istanbul bilateral format of negotiations (headed by respective delegations rather than national leaders).
• DIPLOMACY: While we assess that a Putin-Zelensky meeting is unlikely in the short term, different countries have been floated as possible venues for a meeting between the two leaders; both sides will likely prefer jurisdictions which they perceive to be ‘neutral’ or ‘friendly’. Reports from 19 August claim that Putin offered to meet Zelensky in Moscow, which the Ukrainian president declined; we assess that this was not a sincere offer, given Zelensky could realistically never accept this venue. Meanwhile, Zelensky has voiced a preference for Austria, Turkey or Switzerland.
• DIPLOMACY: Switzerland has confirmed that it is prepared to grant Putin immunity from arrest, positioning itself as a potential summit location. The country is a signatory to the International Criminal Court (ICC), which issued an arrest warrant for Putin in March 2023 (see Sibylline Ukraine Daily Update – 20 March 2023). If Switzerland was selected as the venue for a presidential summit, it would almost certainly reinforce perceptions within Russia’s leadership that the ICC’s warrant is of little meaning. Additionally, Moscow likely perceives that the prospect of European countries being willing to facilitate Putin’s visit indicates that Western efforts to isolate Russia diplomatically are weakening following the Putin-Trump summit in Alaska (US).
• INDIA: Bloomberg reported on 20 August that India’s state-owned refiners have resumed buying Russian oil, despite the US’ recent executive order to impose additional tariffs for such purchases. According to unspecified traders familiar with the matter, Bharat Petroleum Corporation and Indian Oil Corporation have purchased Russian Urals crude over the past two days. The cargo will reportedly be ready for loading in September and October. While we cannot confirm the development, if true, continued Indian purchases of Russian oil will likely provide a considerable stream of revenue for Moscow, offsetting the squeeze on the federal budget.
FORECAST
GUARANTEES: Competing interpretations, misunderstandings and contradictory proposals of possible ‘security guarantees’ for Ukraine will highly likely prevent a major breakthrough from being reached to end the Russo-Ukrainian war in the short term. On 20 August, President Zelensky stated that Kyiv wishes to have an understanding of the ‘architecture’ of possible guarantees within the coming seven to ten days. However, reports indicate clear divisions between potential future stakeholders concerning what role they are willing to play and what assets they are prepared to commit. This will highly likely delay the timeline Zelensky has envisioned.
US President Donald Trump has indicated a possible ‘co-ordinating’ role for the US regarding security guarantees for Ukraine, which could include air support; however, unconfirmed reports indicate that the US seeks to play a ‘minimal role’ in such efforts. A Politico report from 20 August based this claim on conversations between Pentagon Under Secretary of Defense for Policy Elbridge Colby and European military leaders on 19 August.
Similarly, US Vice President JD Vance voiced expectations on 20 August that European countries will have to take the ‘lion’s share of the burden’ in security guarantees. While we cannot confirm what precisely Colby told European partners, the Politico report and Vance’s statement align with our assessment that the US likely seeks to reduce its long-term commitment to Ukraine, not increase it. In turn, perceptions in Europe that the US is not willing to substantively support a European reassurance force (which would possibly form the backbone of a security guarantee for Ukraine) will drive tensions and questions about European capacity to deliver a credible, long-term deterrence force.
On 19 August, Trump ruled out the possibility of US troops deploying to Ukrainian soil (which we assessed was highly unlikely in any case). However, Trump did not exclude the prospect of offering aerial support, which White House Press Secretary Karoline Leavitt later stated was ‘an option and a possibility’. At this stage, it remains uncertain what form air support could take, though European countries have reportedly urged Trump to deploy US F-35s to Romania to deter Russia from invading Ukraine in the future.
Aside from proactive air support, potential European members of a Coalition of the Willing likely seek continued access to US intelligence and satellites for GPS and reconnaissance in Ukraine, as well as a pledge from Washington DC to supply Kyiv with Patriot and NASAMS air defence systems. While the abovementioned options are possible, the provision of air defence equipment and reconnaissance support would be more likely as the US seeks to balance competing theatres of interest, such as the Middle East and Indo-Pacific. Any decision on the type and extent of air support will also likely largely hinge on the terms (or lack thereof) regarding any potential end to the war.
Although the US has ruled out sending troops to Ukraine, a coalition of around ten countries is reportedly prepared to deploy on Ukrainian soil as part of a peace agreement, though it remains our assessment that Russia will not accept any such deployment as part of a deal. According to a report from Bloomberg on 19 August, which cited unspecified people familiar with the matter, discussions regarding a possible deployment centred on the size and position of any prospective force. The first stage of the proposed support would focus on strengthening the Ukrainian military through training and personnel reinforcement. A multinational group, comprising mostly European troops, would be responsible for supporting this, with France and the UK said to be ready to send hundreds of troops to Ukraine, far behind the frontline. These two countries have been leading efforts of a so-called Coalition of the Willing in recent months and are the two leading states which are the most likely to commit troops to form a reassurance force (whether inside Ukraine or in a neighbouring NATO country).
Russia has consistently opposed the presence of NATO troops in Ukraine and is highly unlikely to change its stance as part of a peace agreement. Russia has long regarded the enlargement of the military alliance close to its borders as a threat to its security and a ‘root cause’ of the invasion in the first place. Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov stated earlier on 21 August that Russia opposes European troops being sent to Ukraine and that this would amount to a ‘foreign military intervention’. Lavrov’s statement comes after Trump claimed on 19 August that he did not think that Moscow would have a problem with European deployments.
Lavrov stated on 20 August that discussing security guarantees without Russia is ‘a road to nowhere’ and that China, France, the UK and the US could provide equal security guarantees for Ukraine. This is not a new Russian proposal; rather, it reflects earlier demands made under the Istanbul format in 2022, which envisaged new ‘security guarantees’ for Ukraine that would essentially provide Russia with a veto. Lavrov’s preference for China’s involvement in security guarantees is likely connected to Beijing and Moscow’s shared view that security decisions should not be dominated by the US or Western interests and would effectively replicate the UN Security Council veto both countries enjoy.
Russia’s proposal for ‘security guarantees’ at present is highly likely a non-starter, given that such guarantees would effectively provide Moscow (and Beijing) with a veto that could prevent a coherent response to future Russian aggression. Instead, proposals to deploy a European reassurance force outside Ukraine are more likely to facilitate progress towards a deal. Nevertheless, serious questions will remain around the credibility of such a force, particularly without US support. In any case, one of Russia’s core objectives is to push back NATO; as such, it remains our assessment that any official deployment of a European reassurance force inside Ukraine would reflect the absence of a strategic settlement with Russia, rather than form part of a compromise deal agreed by all sides (including Russia).
• Russian state-sponsored group poses long-term security, espionage risks to global firms. On 20 August, the technology company Cisco Talos reported that a Russian state-sponsored group, ‘Static Tundra’, has been actively exploiting a seven-year-old software vulnerability (CVE-2018-0171) in a cyber espionage campaign. The campaign targets the higher education, manufacturing and telecommunications sectors in Africa, Asia, Europe and North America. Once the threat group establishes a foothold in the targeted network (after exploiting CVE-2018-0171 for initial access), they conduct reconnaissance in the system to collect configuration files and other strategic data to facilitate unauthorised access. This underscores long-term espionage and security risks to firms. Reportedly, Static Tundra aims to establish a long-term foothold in strategic networks, propagate to other devices in a network and facilitate secondary future operations, underscoring the prolonged data theft and cyber espionage risks to the aforementioned entities. Additionally, this software vulnerability was reportedly exploited by Chinese state-sponsored actors to target US telecommunications entities. We assess that this highlights the necessity for robust patch management policies.
Aug 19.
• Russia-Ukraine: Competing security guarantee notions will likely prevent breakthrough to end war. On 18 August, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky met his US counterpart, Donald Trump, in Washington DC (US) alongside several European leaders to discuss ending the war in Ukraine. The negotiations followed a meeting on 15 August between Trump and Russian President Vladimir Putin. Reports claim that Ukraine has promised to buy USD 100bn worth of US weapons with the hope of obtaining post-war security guarantees from Washington DC. While it ultimately remains uncertain what form these guarantees might take, Trump stated that he has not ruled out US troop deployments. Yet while this marks a notable shift in rhetoric, there is no evidence that Trump is committed to such a plan. Although Putin stated during the recent summit with Trump that he supports security guarantees for Ukraine, Russia’s idea of how any such arrangement should work is likely to differ significantly from that of Kyiv and its Western partners. Competing visions for possible security guarantees will likely represent yet another obstacle towards ending the Russo-Ukrainian war in the near term, despite the possibility of a bilateral Russia-Ukraine summit in the coming weeks.
• Russia: Foiled attack underscores persistent international terrorism risks. Earlier on 19 August, Russia’s Federal Security Service (FSB) reported the detention of an individual who was allegedly planning a terrorist attack against a train in the Udmurt Republic. The suspect, who originates from an unspecified Central Asian country, allegedly supports an unnamed international terrorist organisation; they also justified (on social media) the March 2024 Moscow oblast terrorist attack perpetrated by members of Islamic State Khorasan (IS-K). We assess that the individual highly likely adheres to a radical Islamist ideology. Searches at the location where they were detained led to the discovery of components needed for building an incendiary device, as well as a mobile phone containing instructions, a diagram marking the intended targets and correspondence with members of the unnamed international terrorist organisation. On 12 August, the Chairman of Russia’s National Anti-Terrorism Committee, Alexander Bortnikov, reported that 18 terrorist attacks involving migrants had been foiled since the start of the year. We assess the development underscores that Russia remains a priority target for Islamist terrorist networks, which continue to focus their recruitment campaigns on migrant populations from Central Asia.
Aug 18.
KEY DEVELOPMENTS
• DONETSK: Ukraine’s General Staff has reported that its forces have retaken several villages in the Dobropillia area (Donetsk oblast) as part of ongoing efforts to stabilise the frontline following Russia’s recent penetration
• STRIKES: Civilian casualties from Russian strikes have steadily increased in recent months, reaching the highest levels since the early phase of the war in 2022
• GAS: Ukraine’s Ministry of Energy has announced that Norway has allocated almost USD 100m for Kyiv to purchase imports of natural gas, further boosting Ukrainian preparations for winter
• FORECAST: On 15 August, Russian President Vladimir Putin and US President Donald Trump convened for a summit in Alaska (US), which did not result in tangible progress towards ending the Russo-Ukrainian War, nor a ceasefire
• BAKHMUT: The Russian Ministry of Defence (MoD) claimed on 14 August that its forces had taken Shcherbynivka, a heavily contested town located to the west of Toretsk (Donetsk oblast). While we cannot confirm this, the town has been heavily fought over in recent months, with geolocated footage indicating that the town may have exchanged hands multiple times. It therefore remains unclear whether Russian forces will be able to consolidate control of the area definitively, which would allow them to push north towards Kostiantynivka (Donetsk). Nevertheless, the MoD’s official claim is significant and indicates the Russian forces’ level of confidence that they are in control of the area.
• BAKHMUT: Geolocated footage published on 16 August indicates that Russian forces have seized the town of Serebryanka, located around 2.5 miles (4km) to the north-east of Siversk (Donetsk oblast). The town is the last significant settlement east of Siversk that had remained in Ukrainian hands. As such, if Russian forces are able to consolidate control of the town, they will be in a position to increase pressure on Siversk from the north (as well as the east), though overall progress on this axis remains very slow. Nevertheless, Ukraine’s 11th Army Corps spokesperson Dmytro Zaporozhets assessed on 16 August that Russian forces have increased the number of assaults in the Siversk direction and are likely accumulating forces to the east of Siversk in preparation for renewed ‘mass assaults’ toward the town; Zaporozhets anticipates these will be launched before the end of August.
• DONETSK: On 17 August, Ukraine’s General Staff reported that its forces had retaken several villages in the Dobropillia area (Donetsk oblast) as part of ongoing efforts to stabilise the frontline following Russia’s recent penetration. Ukrainian troops reportedly succeeded in clearing several settlements that had been occupied by Russian forces. DeepState, a prominent Ukrainian open-source intelligence (OSINT) analytical group, indicated that Ukrainian forces had effectively severed two Russian prongs, to the east and north-east of Dobropillia. In response to Russia’s incursion, the Ukrainian authorities redeployed reserves to the region, including the 1st Corps of the National Guard of Ukraine, known as ‘Azov’. This mobilisation has helped stabilise the front and prevent Russia from taking advantage of the penetration. However, committing reserves to this sector has likely weakened Ukrainian defences in other areas. Ultimately, the so-far successful stabilisation of the frontline in this region suggests that Russian operations are still constrained by personnel and material limitations that prevent them from achieving operational breakthroughs and rapidly seizing fortified or urban areas. For further analysis on Russia’s penetration near Dobropillia, see Sibylline Ukraine Update – 14 August 2025.
• DONETSK: Meanwhile, Russian forces continued to advance in the Pokrovsk sector as part of an ongoing effort to encircle the logistical hub; however, it remains possible they are no longer operating within the city. On August 15, Ukrainian military sources reported that Ukrainian forces had cleared Pokrovsk (Donetsk oblast) of Russian infiltration groups that had previously penetrated the city. However, Russian operations were still making gains around the settlement; geolocated footage from 15-16 August indicates recent Russian advances west of Novoekonomichne, located to the north-east of Pokrovsk.
• KHARKIV: Nothing significant to report
• KURSK-SUMY: Russian security agency sources quoted by TASS earlier on 18 August assessed that Ukraine’s High Command have committed ‘all its resources’ in Sumy oblast to attacking the flanks of Russian positions in Yunakivka, located around 16 miles (25km) to the north-east of Sumy city. On 17 August, Ukraine’s General Staff claimed that its forces had advanced 1.2 miles (2km) in northern Sumy oblast in recent days. Meanwhile, geolocated footage published on 16 August confirms that Ukrainian forces have advanced east of Novomykolaivka, located around 15 miles (24km) to the north of Sumy city.
• KURSK-SUMY: Yunakivka has been heavily fought over in recent months, and Ukrainian forces have indeed managed to push the Russians back at multiple points across the Sumy frontline. It remains a realistic possibility that the Ukrainian High Command is prioritising counter attacking in northern Sumy in a bid to take Russia’s current territory in Sumy oblast; it would thereby deprive Russia of another bargaining chip in potential territorial exchanges as negotiations progress (see FORECAST below).
• OSKIL-KREMINNA: Nothing significant to report
• SOUTHERN: Geolocated footage published on 14 August initially indicated that Russian forces had taken Andriivka-Klevstove, located around 17 miles (28km) to the north-west of Velyka Novosilka, a town located on the eastern Donetsk-Dnipropetrovsk oblast border on the banks of the Vovcha River. However, geolocated footage from 16 August indicates that Ukrainian forces remain in control of the town. Ukraine’s military intelligence (GUR) claimed that Russian forces had advanced using small infantry units to bypass Ukrainian defences and film themselves raising flags in the town centre, before withdrawing. While this remains plausible, the fact that Russian forces are increasingly able to circumvent Ukrainian defences (even temporarily) with reconnaissance and sabotage units reflects the growing pressure on Ukrainian forces across the frontline.
• SOUTHERN: Meanwhile, geolocated footage published on 15 August indicates Russian forces have advanced and secured control over the villages of Oleksandrohrad and Voskresenka. These are located just inside Donetsk oblast, over ten miles (17km) to the north-west of Velyka Novosilka.
• STRIKES: In recent days, Russian strikes have continued to include relatively smaller drone attacks, but each attack has also involved a limited number of Iskandr-M ballistic missiles. Russian forces have consistently struck civilian areas as part of their strike strategy. For instance, the attack on 15 August, which involved 97 drones and two Iskandr-M ballistic missiles, hit the central market in Sumy city (Sumy oblast), among other targets across the country. The strike earlier on 18 August killed at least three people and injured 23 others in Zaporizhzhia city (Zaporizhzhia oblast). Other oblasts that have sustained strikes in recent days include Dnipropetrovsk, Kharkiv, Kyiv and Odesa.
• STRIKES: Civilian casualties from Russian strikes have steadily increased in recent months, reaching levels similar to the early stages of the war. On 13 August, the UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) reported that civilian casualties in July reached a three-year high, with 286 civilians killed and 1,388 injured. In June, the UN OHCHR recorded 232 deaths and 1,343 injuries, which had been the previous three-year record. According to the UN body, 40% of civilian casualties in July were caused by Russian long-range strikes and loitering munitions. In July, Russian short-range drone strikes accounted for 24% of civilian casualties. The overall increase in July compared to June mainly occurred in Ukrainian-controlled frontline territory, likely reflecting the intensification of Russian military operations aimed at expanding territorial control. More broadly, casualty rates since the start of the year have increased by 48% compared to the same period in 2024.
• STRIKES: The Ukrainian authorities in Odesa oblast reported that Russian strikes launched in the early hours of 18 August hit fuel and energy infrastructure in the region. Local media outlets reported that drones struck a terminal operated by the Azerbaijani state oil and gas company SOCAR. The attack reportedly inflicted severe damage to the facility, marking the second such incident against SOCAR-operated infrastructure in the past ten days. Moscow is likely deliberately targeting SOCAR assets in Ukraine in retaliation for the recent rapprochement between Azerbaijan and Ukraine, with Kyiv having recently reached a deal to import Azerbaijani oil (see Sibylline Ukraine Update – 11 August 2025).
• STRIKES: Meanwhile, Ukraine continues efforts to develop its own range of missiles, likely as part of broader attempts to reduce reliance on Western-supplied equipment. On 17 August, the Associated Press (AP) reported that Ukraine’s domestically developed long-range Flamingo cruise missile had entered serial production. The system is reported to have a range of 1,864 miles (3,000 km). In June, Ukrainian media announced that the Sapsan short-range ballistic missile (also known as Hrim-2) had completed combat testing and had also entered serial production. In response, Russia will highly likely seek to undermine Ukraine’s ability to mass-produce such systems by targeting production facilities with long-range strikes. Notably, on 17 August, Russia’s MoD claimed that its forces had struck a storage site for Ukrainian Sapsan short-range ballistic missiles. On 14 August, Russia’s Federal Security Service (FSB) claimed that it had taken part in a joint operation with military forces that resulted in a strike on production plants for such missiles in Dnipropetrovsk and Sumy oblasts.
• SABOTAGE: On 18 August, the FSB reported that it had foiled a Ukrainian sabotage operation targeting the Kerch Bridge, which connects occupied Crimea to mainland Russia. According to the FSB, its forces prevented a car loaded with explosives from reaching the bridge after it had crossed into Russia’s North Caucasus from Georgia. The security service did not disclose the identities of the suspects driving the vehicle. The car was reportedly due to be delivered to Krasnodar krai. The Russian authorities stated that this was Ukraine’s second attempt to sabotage the bridge in 2025; an earlier plot allegedly thwarted in April also involved an explosives-laden vehicle intercepted on the Belarus-Poland border.
POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS
• HUNGARY: A Ukrainian long-range strike which hit Russian energy infrastructure has reportedly significantly disrupted oil supplies to Hungary and Slovakia. According to reports from 17 August, a Ukrainian drone and missile attack on the Uniecha pumping station (Bryansk oblast, Russia) on 13 August halted Russian oil transit to Hungary for four days. Slovak pipeline operator Transpetrol also confirmed that oil supplies to Slovakia through the Druzhba pipeline had stopped. However, Hungarian oil company MOL stated earlier on 18 August that regional supplies of oil are guaranteed, despite the halt in Russian oil deliveries. This will likely mitigate against significant energy insecurity within Hungary and Slovakia in the near term.
• GAS: Ukraine’s Ministry of Energy announced on 15 August that Norway has allocated almost USD 100m for Kyiv to purchase imports of natural gas, further boosting Ukrainian preparations for winter. According to the ministry, the funds will be used to build sufficient reserves of gas ahead of the ‘heating season’. Russia has traditionally intensified long-range strikes ahead of and during the winter months to degrade Ukraine’s energy infrastructure. Ultimately, Norwegian assistance will likely alleviate pressure on the Ukrainian government to fund energy purchases and aid with purchasing gas supplies. However, energy insecurity will almost certainly persist in the coming winter, which will likely sustain the risks of periodic blackouts and restrictions on energy usage for domestic and business clients.
FORECAST
NEGOTIATIONS: On 15 August, Russian President Vladimir Putin and US President Donald Trump convened for a summit in Alaska (US), which did not result in tangible progress towards ending the Russo-Ukrainian War, nor a ceasefire. Despite this, the two leaders largely described the talks positively, with Trump stating that the two sides had agreed on ‘many points’ (without elaborating).
Although it remains unknown what the two presidents agreed upon, Trump now appears to be more aligned with Russia in how it perceives the war should end. The US president said that ‘it was determined by all that the best way’ to end the war would be to reach a peace agreement directly, rather than a temporary ceasefire first. This marks a notable shift from Trump, who had previously advocated for an immediate cessation of hostilities, which he argued would then facilitate peace talks. Ukraine and its European allies are also of the opinion that a pause in fighting is needed before concluding a peace deal. Meanwhile, Russia has long pushed for a ‘peace’ deal with wide-ranging terms that would essentially amount to Ukraine’s capitulation. We assess that pushing ahead of protracted peace talks (rather than agreeing to a ceasefire initially) would highly likely be preferential to Russia, as this would allow Russian forces to push for further advances in Ukraine, increasing its potential leverage.
Trump’s comments following the summit imply that he considers the onus to be on Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky to end the war; this indicates that his administration will increase pressure on Kyiv in the near term. Trump claimed on 17 August that Zelensky could end the war ‘almost immediately’ if he wanted to, echoing similar comments on 15 August that it was ‘really up to [him] to get it done’. Such comments have almost certainly reignited concerns that the Trump administration will pressure Ukraine to agree to a quick peace deal which disproportionately benefits Russia and requires Kyiv to make considerable concessions to Moscow. This is despite the fact that US Secretary of State Marco Rubio said on 17 August that both sides will have to make concessions to reach a peace deal.
It remains unclear what concessions (if any) Putin said Russia was prepared to make to end the war, though we see no genuine signs that Moscow has substantively reduced its demands. The New York Times (NYT) reported on 16 August that Putin outlined a plan to end the war that would involve Ukraine ceding the entirety of Donbas (meaning Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts) to Russia. Russia is estimated to control about 88% of this region. Ukraine controls around 30% of Donetsk oblast, including key cities such as Kostiantynivka, Kramatorsk and Sloviansk, which make up the so-called ‘fortress belt’. In return, Russia would freeze the current frontlines elsewhere (likely in Kherson and Zaporizhzhia oblasts). In addition, some reports indicate a Russian willingness to discuss possible Russian withdrawals from Kharkiv and Sumy oblasts.
The prospect of Ukraine withdrawing from Donetsk oblast (which boasts the most heavily fortified cities in the entire country) in exchange for much smaller and militarily and strategically less significant territories in Kharkiv and Sumy oblasts would represent a painful concession for Ukraine, and would be demonstrably in Russia’s favour. Ukraine’s withdrawal from Ukraine’s most defensible terrain would also significantly increase Russia’s offensive potential thereafter, given that the border region of Donetsk oblast remains highly indefensible by contrast.
Amid discussions of territorial concessions, Russia is reportedly willing to offer a written promise that it will not attack Ukraine again or any European country; however, it remains our assessment that this will not be sufficient to prevent further Russian aggression against Ukraine (or other countries). US Special Envoy Steve Witkoff, who took part in the Alaska talks, stated on 17 August that Putin agreed to ‘legislatively enshrine’ such promises into Russian law. However, this will almost certainly provide little confidence, given Russia’s proven record of reneging on international law and multilateral agreements. This records includes the previous Minsk Accords, which had sought to end the first phase of the war in Ukraine before the full-scale invasion.
While we cannot confirm whether the Russian side did offer any ‘compromises’, Putin’s apparent demands largely align with other reports from before and after the summit and are consistent with Moscow’s long-standing war objectives. That said, the Ukrainian government has reiterated its objection to territorial concessions as of 18 August, with Zelensky also insisting that the current frontlines should be the basis for peace talks. This clearly indicates that Zelensky will lobby for a return to Trump’s previous position, which argued for a ceasefire before a peace deal. According to UK Defence Intelligence assessments as of 15 August, it would take Russian forces 4.4 more years to fully capture the Ukrainian regions that it has formally annexed (Donetsk, Kherson, Luhansk and Zaporizhzhia oblasts). Even still, Ukraine almost certainly views an arrangement that would merely freeze the frontlines as not removing the threat of a renewed attack from Russia in the future. As such, Ukraine will highly unlikely agree to such an arrangement in the near term, even if pressure from the US does ramp up notably for Kyiv to do so.
To that end, Zelensky and several of his European allies will meet with Trump later on 18 August in the capital Washington DC, likely to reiterate the terms that Kyiv believes are acceptable to end the war. The reactions of leaders who will be present at the talks to the Alaska summit are notably varied. For instance, UK Prime Minister Sir Keir Starmer claimed that Trump’s diplomatic efforts have brought the war’s end closer. Meanwhile, French President Emmanuel Macron stated that he does not believe Putin wants peace; rather, that the Russian leader seeks Ukraine’s surrender. European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen emphasised on 17 August that international borders cannot be changed by force and that decisions concerning Ukrainian territory require Ukraine’s involvement. As European and Ukrainian input was absent from the Alaska summit, the upcoming negotiations also seek to prevent their security interests from being sidelined and the prospect of Zelensky being pressured into unfavourable conditions to end the war. However, it remains to be seen whether their presence will alter Trump’s position on key issues (specifically territory) and the Russian push for a peace deal before a ceasefire.
Possible security guarantees will almost certainly be amongst the most significant elements of the Washington DC talks; however, it remains unclear how far these will assuage Ukrainian (and European) concerns about further Russian military operations. Prior to the upcoming summit, Trump once again ruled out NATO membership for Ukraine as part of a peace deal, which would represent a significant concession for Russia. Even prior to the full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, Moscow had demanded a ban on Ukraine’s accession into NATO, among other contentious security guarantees.
Trump’s special envoy Steve Witkoff, who has travelled to Russia on multiple occasions this year as part of US efforts to end the war, specified on 17 August that ‘Article 5-like’ protections are possible for Ukraine. This refers to NATO’s principle that an attack on one member represents an attack against the entire alliance. However, it remains unclear how this would work in practice, what would constitute an attack that warrants intervention and the form of such a response. These are likely details Ukraine and its allies will seek to establish in the near term, particularly given that Russia’s own proposals for security guarantees for Ukraine in 2022 involved Russia being a guarantor itself. Given that Putin has repeatedly stated that his demands have not changed since 2022, this indicates that Putin has likely agreed only to his own definition of a security guarantee, which would essentially provide Russia (or its ally China) with an effective veto.
Lastly, we continue to assess that the prospect of a Putin-Trump-Zelensky summit remains unlikely in the near term despite reports suggesting such a meeting could be possible in the coming days. Axios reported on 16 August that Trump told his Ukrainian counterpart he wanted to hold trilateral negotiations as early as 22 August. Putin has not publicly committed to holding such a meeting. The Alaska summit is unlikely to have made Putin more willing to participate in this form of meeting in the near term, either. Although Zelensky has pushed to meet Putin in person, should the Ukrainian leadership perceive that Trump is further aligning with Russia’s vision of ‘peace’, Zelensky’s desire to engage in such talks will possibly decrease. (Source: Sibylline)

 

22 Aug 25. Putin’s demand to Ukraine: give up Donbas, no NATO and no Western troops, sources say.
• Summary
• Putin demands Ukraine cede Donbas region, Russian sources say
• Russia could freeze front lines in Zaporizhzhia and Kherson
• Russia won’t countenance Western peacekeeping troops in Ukraine
• Source close to Kremlin: if Kyiv refuses deal, war will go on
Vladimir Putin is demanding that Ukraine give up all of the eastern Donbas region, renounce ambitions to join NATO, remain neutral and keep Western troops out of the country, three sources familiar with top-level Kremlin thinking told Reuters.
The Russian president met Donald Trump in Alaska on Friday for the first Russia-U.S. summit in more than four years and spent almost all of their three-hour closed meeting discussing what a compromise on Ukraine might look like, according to the sources who requested anonymity to discuss sensitive matters. (Source: Reuters)

 

20 Aug 25. Around 10 European countries are ready to send forces to Ukraine as part of security guarantees for the country following a peace deal, according to reports.
European officials on Tuesday fleshed out the plan to send a multinational “reassurance force” to deter future Russian aggression and now await Donald Trump’s approval, Bloomberg reported, citing people familiar with the matter.
The first stage would allegedly include European troops – including hundreds of British and French soldiers – being stationed in Ukraine, away from the frontline, to help its military with training and reinforcements.
A later stage of the plan calls for a US backstop to contribute to intelligence sharing, border surveillance, weapons supplies and possibly air defence.
The overall size and the role the European force will play is still unclear, however details are expected to be agreed in the coming days.
Mr Trump on Tuesday ruled out putting American boots on the ground once a peace deal is signed but instead suggested the US is prepared to air support to police Ukraine’s skies.
“When it comes to security, they’re willing to put people on the ground,” Mr Trump told Fox News. We’re willing to help them with things, especially — probably you could talk about by air, because there’s nobody that has the kind of stuff we have.”
The extent of US assistance remains murky, but at a minimum European officials expect Washington to provide intelligence and weaponry through European partners, Bloomberg reported. (Source: Daily Telegraph)

 

19 Aug 25. Cuashub.com said today that Ukrainian strike temporarily halts Russian oil transit to Hungary. A Ukrainian drone and missile strike on Russia’s Unecha pumping station in Bryansk Oblast briefly disrupted oil flows to Hungary last week. According to Ukraine’s General Staff, the Aug. 13 attack, carried out jointly by the Rocket Forces and Artillery, the Armed Forces’ Unmanned Systems branch, and the Defense Ministry’s HUR intelligence agency, resulted in direct hits and a fire near the station’s booster pump building.
The Unecha facility is a key node on the southern branch of the Druzhba pipeline, which transports Russian oil through Ukraine to Central Europe.
Hungarian Foreign Minister Péter Szijjártó condemned the strike, calling the pumping station “critically important” to Hungary’s energy security. In a Facebook post, he accused Kyiv of undermining European stability, stressing that Hungary currently supplies Ukraine with electricity.
However, sources in the oil and gas sector stated that the attack coincided with a scheduled maintenance shutdown on the Russian side of the pipeline. They suggested the timing pointed to a political signal directed at Budapest rather than an effort to cause lasting supply disruptions.
Oil transit resumes, but at lower levels
Oil deliveries to Hungary resumed on Aug. 15 via a bypass route, though volumes were reduced by roughly one-third while repairs continue. Russia’s Transneft and Ukraine’s Ukrtransnafta manage the transit under an agreement valid until 2030.
Data from NV Business and Argus Media shows Russia shipped more than 11 m metric tons of crude through Ukraine in 2024, including 4.8 m tons to Hungarian refineries. That represents just a fraction of Russia’s total crude exports of 202 m tons. With the Czech Republic no longer importing Russian oil, the southern Druzhba corridor now accounts for about 4.5 percent of Moscow’s exports.
The temporary halt comes as Hungary explores options to diversify away from Russian crude. Industry sources said talks are underway with Kazakh suppliers, with some shipments already reaching Hungary via Ukraine. Budapest is also considering access to the Odesa-Brody pipeline as an alternative supply route.
While Ukraine is bound by international agreements to continue facilitating oil transit, it has raised tariffs for Russian crude since the start of the full-scale invasion. The European Commission has previously stated that Kyiv may suspend flows on security grounds without breaching EU trade obligations, despite repeated complaints from Hungary and Slovakia.
https://cuashub.com/en/content/ukrainian-strike-temporarily-halts-russian-oil-transit-to-hungary/: https://cuashub.com/)

 

19 Aug 25. Auterion to Deliver 33,000 Skynode Drone Strike Kits to Ukraine. Auterion, the international defence software company and provider of AI-powered drone software solutions, has announced a landmark commitment to deliver 33,000 artificial intelligence-driven drone ‘strike kits’ to Ukraine. The initiative, backed by a $50m Pentagon contract, represents a major step forward in supporting Ukraine’s defense capabilities.
Auterion’s CEO Lorenz Meier highlighted the unprecedented scale of this commitment: “We have previously shipped thousands of our AI strike systems to Ukraine, but this new deployment increases our support more than tenfold. This is not only significant for Ukraine’s defense but also represents a substantial advancement in drone warfare technology.”
Auterion’s ‘strike kits,’ powered by the company’s advanced Skynode technology, transform manually-operated drones into autonomous weapons systems capable of AI-driven targeting. Once activated, the drones become resistant to electronic jamming and can reliably track and engage moving targets from distances of up to one kilometer.
Already extensively proven in combat scenarios across Ukraine, Auterion’s Skynode Strike Kit ensures precision targeting in complex operational environments, significantly increasing mission effectiveness while reducing vulnerability to electronic warfare. The contract highlights Auterion’s strategic role in bolstering autonomous defense capabilities, and underscores the United States’ enhanced commitment to autonomy-focused defense initiatives.
“Our technology provides allies and partners with advanced capabilities that they can integrate into their existing industry, enhancing their defensive capabilities while leveraging the manufacturing prowess of high volume drone manufacturers,” Meier explained. Auterion has a pioneering role in U.S.-Ukrainian co-production. Battle-hardened drone technology proven in Ukraine has become highly sought after by NATO members and in the Indo-Pacific.
Auterion expects this landmark contract to pave the way for further engagements with NATO and European countries, many of which are seeking advanced drone technologies proven under combat conditions in Ukraine. With offices in Arlington, VA, and Munich, Germany, Auterion is positioned to support defense initiatives on both sides of the Atlantic and committed to the transatlantic partnership.
The same robust Skynode technology has also been successfully integrated and adopted by Taiwan, underlining its global relevance in modern warfare scenarios. With the rapid escalation in the global deployment of autonomous defense technologies, Auterion continues to position itself as an indispensable partner to allied nations, supporting strategic deterrence initiatives against evolving threats. Shipments under this new contract are scheduled to commence within 2025, ensuring rapid deployment and immediate operational impact. (Source: UAS VISION)

 

18 Aug 25. Ukraine’s AI-Powered ‘Pavuk Dopkhina’ Drone has 50 km Deep-Strike Capability. The ‘Pavuk Dopkhina’ (Dophin Spider) drone, is cutting-edge technology developed by the 3rd Assault Brigade and Omnitech, with support from Brave1, according to a post on the official Telegram channel of Mykhailo Fedorov, Ukraine’s Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Digital Transformation. The name “Dophin” honours a fallen Ukrainian soldier. It now serves as a powerful tool in striking enemy targets. The drone, capable of targeting over 50 kilometers, uses artificial intelligence algorithms to autonomously map and lock onto terrain, surpassing foreign counterparts in key performance metrics.
The drone’s primary function is to provide reliable communication for strike UAVs deep behind enemy lines. Thanks to Pavuk Dopkhina, Ukrainian drones can destroy surface-to-air missile systems, logistics, and other critical targets.
The 3rd Assault Brigade of Ukrainian Armed Forces is already carrying out missions with Dophin Spider, this innovation is already contributing to significant losses for Russian forces, Fedorov states.
Previously, it was reported that a Ukrainian ground-based robotic platform operated by the National Guard of Ukraine’s 13th Brigade “Khartia” has successfully completed a dual mission, delivering supplies to the front line and evacuating a wounded soldier over a 34-kilometer route. (Source: UAS VISION/UNITED24MEDIA)

 

16 Aug 25. Ukraine’s Defence Procurement Agency names FPV suppliers via new online marketplace. Ukraine’s Defence Procurement Agency (DPA) has revealed five unmanned aircraft system (UAS) manufacturers who delivered orders of first-person view (FPV) UASs via the new online DOT-Chain Defence weapons marketplace, a representative from the agency confirmed to Janes on 15 August. The Armed Forces of Ukraine (AFU) operating in the Donetsk, Zaporizhzhia, Kharkiv, and Kherson regions received 1,000 UASs that were ordered through the marketplace, according to a 14 August DPA press release. Some of the Ukrainian manufacturers who produced the FPV UASs are Escadrone, General Cherry, Gryph Dron, TAF Drones, and Vyriy Drone, the DPA representative added.
The DOT-Chain Defence weapons marketplace currently offers 138 FPV or bomber UAS models from 15 Ukrainian manufacturers, although the representative did not reveal their names.
The overall procurement process took less than two weeks, according to the DPA, with the first few orders placed on 31 July via the digital platform. Twelve AFU brigades “engaged in the most intense combat” are currently using the marketplace, it added.
The main aim of DOT-Chain Defence is to streamline the delivery of various equipment, including for unmanned operations, electronic warfare (EW), signals intelligence (SIGINT), and ammunition. If approved for procurement on the platform, AFU units are able to select the types of UASs needed and their quantity before placing an order and using Ukraine’s state funds to pay for the hardware. (Source: Janes)
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Founded in 1987, Exensor Technology is a world leading supplier of Networked Unattended Ground Sensor (UGS) Systems providing tailored sensor solutions to customers all over the world. From our Headquarters in Lund Sweden, our centre of expertise in Network Communications at Communications Research Lab in Kalmar Sweden and our Production site outside of Basingstoke UK, we design, develop and produce latest state of the art rugged UGS solutions at the highest quality to meet the most stringent demands of our customers. Our systems are in operation and used in a wide number of Military as well as Homeland Security applications worldwide. The modular nature of the system ensures any external sensor can be integrated, providing the user with a fully meshed “silent” network capable of self-healing. Exensor Technology will continue to lead the field in UGS technology, provide our customers with excellent customer service and a bespoke package able to meet every need.

A CNIM Group Company
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Sponsored by Bertin Exensor

 

www.exensor.com

 

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18 Aug 25. America’s Rapid Response Force Deploys for Global Operations. Sailors and Marines assigned to the Iwo Jima Amphibious Ready Group – 22nd Marine Expeditionary Unit (Special Operations Capable) departed for a regularly scheduled deployment, Aug. 14, 2025.  The Amphibious Ready Group’s primary mission is to conduct presence operations and safely embark Marines ashore to conduct a wide variety of contingency missions worldwide.  The Iwo Jima Amphibious Ready Group – 22nd Marine Expeditionary Unit (Special Operations Capable) also provides a flexible, forward naval presence by operating close to shore, allowing this specialized Navy-Marine Corps team to conduct missions, unique to the amphibious Navy, at a moment’s notice.

“The Iwo Jima Amphibious Ready Group – 22nd Marine Expeditionary Unit (Special Operations Capable) is an integral part of advancing our nation’s interests abroad and is a dynamic representation of our Navy’s 250 years of lethality and warfighting excellence,” said Navy Capt. Chris Farricker, commodore of Amphibious Squadron 8. “Our integrated Navy-Marine Corps warfighters are ready to execute the nation’s business and deliver quick and decisive combat power, no matter where we are tasked in today’s complex global environment.”

This deployment follows the Amphibious Ready Group – Marine Expeditionary Unit’s final certification event, the Composite Training Unit Exercise, the Navy’s most demanding predeployment assessment that concluded July 11, 2025. More than 4,500 sailors and Marines assigned to the 22nd MEU comprise the force aboard the Amphibious Ready Group’s three amphibious ships: flagship USS Iwo Jima, and the San Antonio-class amphibious transport dock ships USS San Antonio and USS Fort Lauderdale.

“The Iwo Jima Amphibious Ready Group – 22nd Marine Expeditionary Unit (Special Operations Capable) is ready to serve as the nation’s force of choice, prepared to decisively respond to any crisis in support of our national interests,” said Marine Col. Tom Trimble, commanding officer of 22nd MEU (Special Operations Capable). “We are warfighters, manned, trained and equipped to win — anywhere, anytime.” (Source: U.S. DoD)

 

18 Aug 25.  Further deployment of National Guard in capital will increase domestic unrest risks. On 16 August, three Republican governors deployed hundreds of National Guard troops in the capital Washington DC at the request of the Trump administration. The troops are being deployed from Ohio, South Carolina and West Virginia to improve public safety and promote regional co-operation in the city. Notably, Washington DC Mayor Muriel Bowser’s appointed police chief will remain in charge of the police department.  This development will likely sustain federal-state tensions, as other cities raise concerns as to whether the federal government will continue deployments to address crime and homelessness. Furthermore, Attorney General Pam Bondi stated that, as of 16 August, over 300 people have been arrested in Washington since the administration deployed the National Guard. These have included the arrests of drug traffickers and homicide suspects, as well as the seizure of illegal firearms. Also on 16 August, hundreds of demonstrators protested against the deployment in Washington DC. The demonstrations remained peaceful, with no reports of clashes with the security forces. During the 30-day period in which the National Guard will remain operational in Washington, domestic unrest risks will almost certainly increase. (Source: Sibylline)

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Founded in 1987, Exensor Technology is a world leading supplier of Networked Unattended Ground Sensor (UGS) Systems providing tailored sensor solutions to customers all over the world. From our Headquarters in Lund Sweden, our centre of expertise in Network Communications at Communications Research Lab in Kalmar Sweden and our Production site outside of Basingstoke UK, we design, develop and produce latest state of the art rugged UGS solutions at the highest quality to meet the most stringent demands of our customers. Our systems are in operation and used in a wide number of Military as well as Homeland Security applications worldwide. The modular nature of the system ensures any external sensor can be integrated, providing the user with a fully meshed “silent” network capable of self-healing. Exensor Technology will continue to lead the field in UGS technology, provide our customers with excellent customer service and a bespoke package able to meet every need.

A CNIM Group Company

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Sponsored by Bertin Exensor

 

www.exensor.com

 

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20 Aug 25. Poland: Suspected Russian drone crash is unlikely to represent deliberate airspace incursion. Earlier on 21 August, a regional prosecutor stated that there is a ‘high probability’ that a drone which crashed into a field near Lublin (Lublin voivodeship) overnight on 19-20 August was launched from Belarus. On 20 August, a Polish foreign ministry spokesperson stated that preliminary investigations suggested the drone was possibly a Shahed variant. The effective operational range of a Shahed 136/131 drone is approximately 559 miles (900km) and electronic warfare (EW) measures can render these drones virtually uncontrollable. This means there is a realistic possibility that the drone (if confirmed to be a Shahed) entered Polish airspace accidentally. In July, at least two suspected Russian drones entered Lithuanian airspace via Belarus; these were also unlikely to be deliberate airspace incursions. In light of the upcoming Zapad 2025 Russian-Belarussian joint military exercise in Belarus between 12 and 16 September, an uptick in drone activity (including near the Polish border) is possible in the coming weeks; this will sustain regional tensions. (Source: Sibylline)

 

18 Aug 25. Serbia: Continued violent anti-government unrest will likely trigger augmented security in major cities. Violent anti-government unrest continued in cities across Serbia through the weekend of 15-17 August (see Sibylline Alert – 15 August 2025). In the city of Valjevo (Šumadija and Western Serbia province), a group of anti-government protesters set fire to the local office of the ruling Serbian Progressive Party (SNS) and broke windows at the city hall and local judicial buildings. Protesters also vandalised the offices of SNS coalition partners in the capital Belgrade, Novi Sad (Vojvodina province) and Valjevo. In both Belgrade and Valjevo, the police deployed tear gas to disperse protesters. On 17 August, President Aleksandr Vučić pledged to restore law and order in the coming days, adding that it would take the government an unspecified number of days to prepare the legal framework to facilitate this (no further details were given). We continue to assess that the government is highly unlikely to call a snap election. It is therefore likely that the government will further augment security across major cities in the coming days. As the protests currently show no signs of slowing down, this will raise the risk of further clashes in major urban centres.(Source: Sibylline)

 

15 Aug 25. Lithuania unveils plans for multi-layer border defense line. Lithuania has announced that it is establishing a multi-layered defensive line composed in part of anti-tank obstacles, drainage ditches, minefields and more to fortify its borders. The Lithuanian Ministry of Defense declared this week that the Baltic state has opted to create a three-level defensive border intended to delay or stop enemy movement in the event of a potential attack. The first level, measuring five kilometers, would be located behind the country’s border control point and would consist of anti-tank ditches and obstacles, minefields, fortified points with trenches and secondary positions with trenches. The second tier, stretching 15 kilometers, would include drainage ditches, engineer equipment parks, bridges prepared for demolition and blocked bridgeheads. The ultimate echelon would have a similar layout but with additional roadside trees ready to be cut down, according to the picture shared. Felled trees can be useful to delay or restrict the movements of an adversary along roads, specifically in forested environments. Lithuania shares a border with Russia, known as the Kaliningrad Oblast, which measures roughly 275 kilometers. The Baltic state shares an even longer frontier with Belarus, of approximately 679 kilometers. The development of the border defense line comes a few weeks after an unidentified drone was reported to have entered Lithuanian airspace on July 28. Following this, the Lithuanian military announced it would reinforce air defenses surrounding the country’s border with Belarus. The European Union has severely condemned and sanctioned Minsk’s involvement in Russia’s military aggression against Ukraine. (Source: Defense News)

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Founded in 1987, Exensor Technology is a world leading supplier of Networked Unattended Ground Sensor (UGS) Systems providing tailored sensor solutions to customers all over the world. From our Headquarters in Lund Sweden, our centre of expertise in Network Communications at Communications Research Lab in Kalmar Sweden and our Production site outside of Basingstoke UK, we design, develop and produce latest state of the art rugged UGS solutions at the highest quality to meet the most stringent demands of our customers. Our systems are in operation and used in a wide number of Military as well as Homeland Security applications worldwide. The modular nature of the system ensures any external sensor can be integrated, providing the user with a fully meshed “silent” network capable of self-healing. Exensor Technology will continue to lead the field in UGS technology, provide our customers with excellent customer service and a bespoke package able to meet every need.

A CNIM Group Company

——————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————

Sponsored by Bertin Exensor

www.exensor.com

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15 Aug 25. South Korea to restore pact curbing military activity on North Korean border. South Korea intends to restore an agreement to suspend some military activity along the border with North Korea, President Lee Jae Myung said on Friday, as his government seeks to improve relations between neighbours still technically at war.
The 2018 military accord was designed to curb the risk of inadvertent clashes, but broke down after a spike in tensions.
WHAT HAPPENED IN 2018?
The so-called Comprehensive Military Agreement (CMA) signed between the two Koreas was the most substantive deal to result from months of historic meetings between leader Kim Jong Un and then-South Korean President Moon Jae-in.
On September 19, 2018, South Korea’s defence minister and his North Korean counterpart signed the CMA in the North’s capital, Pyongyang, accompanied by polite applause from the onlooking leaders. (Source: Reuters)

 

13 Aug 25. Congo (DRC)-Rwanda: Renewed clashes with M23 rebels will undercut peace agreement efforts. On 12 August, the Congolese military (FARDC) accused the Rwanda-backed M23 rebels of conducting multiple attacks across North Kivu and South Kivu provinces. This includes an attack on Walungu town, likely aimed at capturing a major FARDC logistics hub in Nzibira locality (both South Kivu). The FARDC claimed that this violated the US-brokered peace agreement (see Sibylline Situation Update Brief – 7 July 2025) and the Qatar-brokered declaration of principles. The accusations come amid delays in formalising the declaration of principles into a peace agreement with the M23, with both sides trading accusations of non-compliance. As such, it is highly unlikely that the agreement will be completed by the 18 August deadline, and the group remains highly unlikely to either withdraw from occupied territory or substantially moderate its activity therein. As such, this will sustain the risk of clashes between the FARDC, M23 and decentralised ethno-religious militias in the coming weeks. We assess that this will sustain staff exposure to crossfire from small arms and mortar fire across the line of contact in North Kivu and South Kivu, particularly for NGOs. (Source: Sibylline)

 

11 Aug 25. Nigeria: Military operation is unlikely to moderate critical security risks in Zamfara state. On 11 August, the Nigerian military targeted a concentration of 400 armed gunmen (known locally as bandits) during a joint air and ground operation in Bukuyum council area (Zamfara state). Military officials claim the operations killed over 100 bandits, including ‘several notorious kingpins’. The operation comes after a July report found that Zamfara was the most insecure state in Nigeria, with 6,800 deaths and 5,400 abductions reported in H1 2025; these figures mark increases of 14% and 19% from H1 2024, respectively. In the coming days, further airstrikes and ground operations targeting local bandit groups are likely, sustaining collateral and crossfire risks for staff and assets engaged in agriculture, mining, logistics and humanitarian operations across Zamfara. However, we assess that such operations are ultimately highly unlikely to deter or significantly undercut the capacity of bandit groups to conduct further attacks. As such, the risk of attacks, kidnap-for-ransom (KFR) and extortion will remain elevated into 2026, sustaining substantial security risks for locally engaged staff, particularly during overland movement. (Source: Sibylline)

 

12 Aug 25. “Russian nuclear strategy is at an inflexion point…The counterforce threat creates strong incentives [for Russia] to employ nuclear weapons at a larger scale.”
This is the view expressed in a new Royal United Services Institute (RUSI) research report, The Evolution of Russian Nuclear Doctrine, by Dr Sidharth Kaushal and Dr Darya Dolzikova, which says that Russia’s nuclear policy has reached a point where it may have to undergo a significant shift from limited or scaled use of nuclear weapons towards more rigid and high-threshold policies of large scale retaliation, increasing the risk of rapid escalation in the event of conflict.
The research says that while Russia has historically relied on sub-strategic nuclear weapons to offset NATO’s conventional superiority, this approach is now threatened by what Russian planners perceive as the potential emergence of more credible Western capabilities, including an ability to conduct a disarming first strike. This longstanding perception may have been exacerbated by Russia’s experience in the war in Ukraine. Factors such as improvements to NATO’s integrated air and missile defence systems, the fielding of more US theatre range systems after the dissolution of the INF Treaty (Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty), and further US deployments of low-yield submarine-launched ballistic missiles are among the variables which the authors assess would further constrain Russian planning.
The report highlights a paradox facing Western policymakers that while evolving conventional and missile defence capabilities may deter Russian aggression, they may also narrow Moscow’s perceived options for controlled or scaled escalation, leading to a more brittle strategic environment. The report notes that Russia retains some options to mitigate these pressures, including new theatre-range systems and counter-space capabilities – but says its ability to employ nuclear coercion in a graduated fashion is being eroded.
Key Findings
• Russia’s nuclear strategy is being shaped by a growing perception of US counterforce capability. The report says: “Russian authors have long acknowledged that nuclear use in a regional war or largescale war would be necessary…A series of strategic, technological, and geopolitical developments – many of which are interpreted in Moscow as indicators of a potential US counterforce posture – have altered the calculus underpinning Russian deterrence strategy.”
• Improved Western capabilities limit Russia’s use of nuclear weapons in a calibrated manner. “Improved theatre-level air and missile defences in Europe could problematise pre-war [in Ukraine] Russian concepts for using nuclear weapons in a calibrated or dosed way…Linking investments in IAMD [integrated air and missile defence] and deep strike capabilities to Russian concerns in an explicit manner can constrain Russia’s freedom to employ nuclear weapons as a coercive tool.”
• Russia’s shift from flexible doctrine use towards large-scale retaliation is driven more by vulnerability than strategy. “The measures they took had the impact of reducing the room to use nuclear weapons flexibly…The performance of Russian theatre-level missiles in Ukraine, and the demonstrated vulnerabilities of some of its existing launch platforms, suggest that the fielding of credible theatre-level IAMD [integrated air and missile defence] in Europe further constrain Russia’s flexibility in a regional war.”
Key Recommendations
• The risk of crisis instability should be recognised. “Constraining Russia has a cost: developments which limit Russia’s perceived freedom of action before a conflict can also make escalation control within a conflict more difficult … Escalation cannot be presented as being both controllable – and thus tailored to the situation – and unpredictable.”
• Allied messaging about counterforce capabilities can be more measured. “Given the limited avenues for arms control, manipulating counterforce concerns may, then, be a viable pathway towards shrinking the space for theatre-level use by Russia at a level consistent with a political objective. Should longer-term stabilising measures be deemed desirable, this could be linked to mutual arms reductions in the future.”
Conclusion
Russia’s nuclear doctrine is undergoing a subtle but significant change, driven by perceptions of US counterforce advantage and the growing capabilities of Western conventional strike and missile defence systems. The net result is a narrowing of Moscow’s perceived space for coercive, limited nuclear use and a shifting in its doctrine toward large-scale retaliation and a resultant reduction in the predictability of future escalation in a crisis. This transformation is not necessarily irreversible, but it demands careful attention from NATO planners and should inform the reshaping of deterrence dynamics in the Euro-Atlantic region. Western capability development, while necessary for deterrence, must be accompanied by strategic messaging and crisis management mechanisms.
Dr Sidharth Kaushal is a Research Fellow in Sea Power at the Royal United Services Institute, specialising in military strategy and deterrence. Darya Dolzikova is a Research Fellow in Proliferation and Nuclear Policy at RUSI, with a focus on nuclear doctrine and arms control. This report draws on Russian primary-source military literature, doctrinal documents, post-2020 declaratory policy changes. Where direct evidence is unavailable, the authors apply structured inference from observable patterns and pre-war Russian assumptions. The findings reflect a combination of doctrinal analysis and expert interviews with former Western defence officials and analysts.

 

11 Aug 25. Armenia-Azerbaijan: Significant obstacles remain for conclusion of peace treaty. On 8 August, Armenia and Azerbaijan signed a peace declaration and agreements on trade and security during a US-brokered summit in the US capital Washington DC. Armenia agreed to open a US-operated transport route across the Zangezur Corridor in its territory, which will link mainland Azerbaijan to its Nakhichevan exclave. The corridor will be named the Trump Route for International Peace and Prosperity (TRIPP) and will be operated by the US under a 99-year lease granted by Armenia. US President Donald Trump claimed that the meeting represented a significant diplomatic breakthrough towards the pacification of bilateral relations between both countries. However, the final signing of a peace deal remains contingent upon Yerevan fulfilling the conditions required by Baku. In addition to the dissolution of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) Minsk Group, Azerbaijan demands that Armenia amend its constitution to remove alleged irredentist claims over the formerly breakaway Nagorno-Karabakh, which has fallen under Azerbaijani control. Meeting this latter condition would require Armenia to organise a referendum and will likely face significant opposition within Armenian society. Ultimately, however, we assess that the deal underscores progress towards a stable peace and a lowering of tensions. Source: Sibylline)

 

11 Aug 25. Mali: Crackdown will likely disrupt movement, undermine security capabilities; coup risks will persist. On 10 August, the authorities reportedly arrested up to 50 soldiers for allegedly plotting a coup. Among those arrested is General Abass Dembélé, the former governor of Mopti region. The possible coup attempt comes amid mounting insecurity and an uptick in attacks, particularly by the regional al-Qaeda-aligned Jama’at Nasr al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM). The security forces will highly likely maintain an elevated posture in the capital Bamako over the coming days. This will likely include an increase in the prevalence of road checkpoints and the use of stop-and-search operations, disrupting citywide movement and increasing staff exposure to petty corruption. The incident will highly likely increase the junta’s concerns over its stability, thereby increasing the risk of further purges targeting other high-ranking individuals perceived as sources of dissent in the coming months. However, while this will possibly moderate short-term government stability risks, it is ultimately likely to compound the Malian military’s (FAMa) limited capacity to combat jihadist groups. As such, we assess that security conditions will highly likely continue deteriorating, driving risks of further coup attempts in 2025. (Source: Sibylline)

 

11 Aug 25. US-Mexico: Potential US military action against drug cartels will increase regional tensions. On 8 August, White House officials stated that US President Donald Trump had signed a directive authorising the use of military force against Latin American drug cartels that have been designated as foreign terrorist organisations (FTOs). Reports indicate that the directive has authorised the Pentagon to prepare military options. On 7 August, Secretary of State Marco Rubio also indicated that the administration could use the military to target cartels. The FBI has asked the local police to submit the names of individuals tied to drug cartels and gangs to be added to the terror watch list. In February, the US administration designated six Mexican cartels (including the Jalisco New Generation Cartel and Sinaloa Cartel) and two transnational organised crime groups as FTOs. Reports indicate that military action is unlikely to take place imminently. In the short term, we assess that the US will continue to increase its airborne surveillance of Mexican drug cartels for intelligence gathering. In the coming months, potential military operations would likely include naval drug interdiction operations or targeted military raids. Mexican President Claudia Sheinbaum has stated that the US military will not enter Mexican territory; however, any US military action will significantly increase regional tensions. (Source: Sibylline)

 

11 Aug 25. Philippines-China: Increased maritime activity in South China Sea will be possible following collision. Earlier on 11 August, a significant collision between two Chinese vessels was reported in the disputed South China Sea. According to a social media post by Philippine Coast Guard (PCG) officer, Jay Tarriela, the PCG deployed several vessels to accompany Philippine fishing vessels near the disputed Scarborough Shoal (which is effectively controlled by China via constant coast guard presence). Tarriela claimed that, during the operation, a China Coast Guard (CCG) vessel hit a People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) vessel while pursuing one of the PCG vessels. Footage reportedly from the incident shows the alleged heavy collision and notable damage to both Chinese vessels in the aftermath. In response, Chinese state media reported that PCG vessels were ‘intruding’ in the waters and were driven away by the CCG, with no mention of a collision. We assess that there is a realistic possibility of increased maritime activity in disputed waters from both sides following the incident. However, this is highly unlikely to result in material disruption to regional shipping lanes. (Source: Sibylline)

 

08 Aug 25. Congo (DRC)-Rwanda: Potential delay to peace talks will undercut prospects of agreement. On 7 August, the Rwanda-backed M23 rebels claimed they had not received an invitation to peace talks with the Congolese government, which are due to begin later on 8 August. This date marks a self-imposed deadline by which Qatar-brokered talks must commence ahead of the planned finalisation of an agreement by 18 August. The statement likely reflects an M23 tactic to delay and obfuscate peace talks in order to consolidate its control over occupied territory (and critical mineral supply routes) in eastern DRC. The M23 will highly likely refuse to withdraw from eastern DRC without significant political concessions from the Congolese government, which has signalled its own unwillingness to compromise on territorial integrity. As such, we assess it is highly unlikely that the two sides will be able to finalise a viable peace agreement by the 18 August deadline. The presence of the M23 in eastern DRC will sustain the risk of armed conflict between the group and government-aligned local militia forces (known as Wazalendo), while also sustaining critical security and human rights risks. (Source: Sibylline)

 

08 Aug 25. US moves to condition military and economic support in Africa. On 1 August, US Senate Foreign Relations Committee Chairman Jim Risch introduced key amendments to the 2026 National Defence Authorisation Act, signalling a major shift in US policy toward Africa. Risch aims to ensure that US military and financial ties with African nations clearly align with American interests.
At the centre of this shift is S.Amdmt.3628, a call for review of Kenya’s designation as a Major Non-NATO Ally (MNNA). Under the amendment, the US President must submit a report to Congress evaluating whether Kenya’s policies remain aligned with US national security goals. This assessment is expected to scrutinise not only Kenya’s bilateral military cooperation with the United States but also its growing entanglements with China and Russia. Washington’s patience appears to be waning as Nairobi engages in multipolar balancing. MNNA status is more than ceremonial; it comes with real defence benefits. Risch’s amendments signal that these benefits may now be conditional.
Next is S.Amdt.3627, addressing Ghana, where the issue is not military conduct but financial governance. Risch’s amendment prohibits America from supporting Ghana’s access to International Monetary Fund (IMF) resources unless and until Ghana resolves long-standing commercial debts owed to American companies. This places US commercial interests squarely into the diplomatic equation. Ghana, currently in the midst of a complex IMF-backed economic recovery programme, must now reckon with a new requirement; honouring international obligations to American firms before enjoying multilateral financial support backed by Washington.
A third amendment (S.Amdt.3626) calling for an assessment of whether M23 and Sudan’s Rapid Support Forces (RSF) should be designated as Foreign Terrorist Organizations (FTOs) introduces a decisive turn in US counterterrorism posture. The RSF has been responsible for egregious human rights violations in Sudan’s ongoing civil war. Meanwhile, the Allied Democratic Forces (ISIS-DRC) is already designated an FTO, raising the question: if ISIS-DRC meets the threshold, why not M23?
M23—specifically, the armed coalition known as AFC-M23—is no longer a small-scale rebel outfit confined to skirmishes in the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo. Since late 2024 and throughout 2025, AFC-M23 has exhibited a dangerous evolution in both tactics and organisational structure. M23 has deployed increasingly sophisticated heavy weapon systems, coordinated cross-regional offensives, and made verified public claims of territorial control over major cities such as Goma and Bukavu, and more than six territories in the last few years. These actions are not incidental or improvised; they reflect strategic planning, military logistics, and political ambition.
Under the United States Code, terrorism is defined as “premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against noncombatant targets by subnational groups or clandestine agents.” By this standard, AFC-M23’s activities meet—and in fact exemplify—that definition. Their calculated use of force against civilian populations and local governance structures is neither random nor reactive. In statements to international media, AFC-M23 (aka M23) spokespeople have claimed credit for these assaults and justified them as necessary steps toward their broader political goals. This is not a rogue faction; it is a structured rebel formation with distinct political and military wings, akin to other hybrid armed organisations seen across the globe.
In proposing this FTO assessment, Risch is making an argument that US policy has lagged behind the on-ground reality in Central Africa. Designating AFC-M23 and RSF as FTOs would not only limit their international financial and logistical mobility but would also send a message to regional governments that harbouring or negotiating with such groups carries international legal and diplomatic consequences.
A fourth amendment (S.Amdt.3626) addresses the African Union Support and Stabilisation Mission in Somalia (AUSSOM), where Risch seeks to limit US financial involvement in African Union-led peace operations in Somalia via UN-assessed contributions, unless stringent conditions are met.
Risch, alongside Senators Ted Cruz (R-TX) and Rick Scott (R-FL), introduced the AUSSOM Funding Restriction Act of 2025 to restrict the use of United States Assessed Contributions to the United Nations under United Nations Security Council Resolution 2719 (2023) “to safeguard US taxpayer funds and hold the UN and African Union (AU) accountable in African peace operations.” In other words, the senators’ concern is not about all US funding to Africa. It is specifically about how American taxpayer money sent through the UN might be used to support an AU-linked institution without clear safeguards. The senators argue that the AU has not met the eligibility and funding conditions expected by the US government, stating bluntly, “The AU’s inability to meet the eligibility criteria and funding conditions asked of the US shows a disregard for the American taxpayer’s money.” This amendment calls for temporarily blocking such funds unless the State Department certifies that AUSSOM is not promoting anti-democratic or anti-American values. The amendment pushes for greater accountability, burden-sharing, and alternative funding models for such missions.
For African policymakers, the message is clear. US support is not disappearing, but it is changing. Access to defence privileges, financial backing, and counterterrorism partnership will increasingly depend on tangible alignment with US strategic objectives—and demonstrable distance from behaviours that violate human rights, undermine, or obstruct American commercial and national interests.
Pearl Matibe is a Washington, DC-based geopolitical analyst and correspondent with expertise in foreign policy and international security, regularly covering the Pentagon and White House. Follow her on X (Twitter): @PearlMatibe. (Source: https://www.defenceweb.co.za/)
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Military And Security Developments

Aug 15.

• Turkey: Detentions underscore opposition crackdown; unrest will be possible, despite protest fatigue. Earlier on 15 August, the Turkish authorities detained 40 individuals linked to the Istanbul Metropolitan Municipality on corruption charges, including the mayor of Istanbul’s Beyoğlu district (Istanbul province). These developments come amid President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s widespread crackdown on his political opposition, likely aiming to consolidate power and extend his presidency beyond its current legal limit (see Sibylline Situation Update Brief – 23 July 2025). The crackdown highlights persistent significant democratic backsliding and worsening human rights conditions in Turkey. The detentions will possibly drive demonstrations and increase domestic unrest risks in Istanbul, particularly in Beyoğlu district, raising the threat of arbitrary arrests and sporadic clashes between protesters and the authorities. However, incidents of large-scale protests have decreased since the arrest of Istanbul mayor Ekrem İmamoğlu in March, possibly indicating a reduced appetite for widespread mobilisation due to the government’s heavy-handed tactics. We assess that there will likely be further opposition detentions, along with additional restrictions on expression and heightened political repression in the coming months, ahead of proposed constitutional changes.
• Syria: Attack on convoy will elevate security risks for NGOs, humanitarian organisations. On 14 August, Syrian sources told Arab media that an unknown group abducted five aid workers while delivering supplies to the besieged Suwayda city (Suwayda governorate) on 11 August. Several people on motorbikes surrounded the aid convoy, looting its shipments, except for one vehicle that managed to reach the city. There is a possibility that radical elements within the government-aligned Sunni tribal forces besieging the city attacked the convoy, which was organised by Druze groups in the capital Damascus, underscoring persistent ethno-religious tensions. However, physical security risks will likely remain very high for all aid convoys and NGOs travelling to the city through the government-approved humanitarian corridor. This is primarily due to the high military tensions between Druze militias and tribal forces, as well as the general state of security instability in Suwayda, as the city and its suburbs are run locally by residents, increasing the risks of ceasefire collapse in the coming weeks.

Aug 14.
KEY DEVELOPMENTS
IRAN
• A letter from the E3 (France, Germany and the UK) detailing rising concerns over diplomatic deadlock with Iran underscores the risk of the UN re-implementing sanctions.
• The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)’s deputy head visited Iran to begin negotiating a ‘co-operation framework’, though a lack of continuous monitoring will almost certainly sustain regional tensions.
• Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu acknowledged that Iran likely retains stockpiles of enriched uranium, underscoring the risk of further Israeli strike action in the coming months.
ISRAEL
• The Airports Authority Workers’ Committee will allow workers to strike on 17 August, highlighting elevated business disruption risks amid the nationwide general strike effort.
• A meeting between Israel’s Mossad chief, David Barnea, and Qatari Prime Minister Mohammed bin Abdulrahman bin Jassim al-Thani possibly signals incremental progression in negotiations, though a ceasefire remains unlikely in the coming two weeks.
PALESTINIAN TERRITORIES
• Significant Israeli regulatory scrutiny of NGO operations in Gaza will likely continue disrupting aid delivery and distribution efforts, sustaining critical humanitarian concerns.
• Possible settlement plans risk exacerbating protest movements and international condemnation, elevating reputational risks.
IRAN
• A letter from the E3 (France, Germany and the UK) detailing rising concerns over diplomatic deadlock with Iran underscores the risk of the UN re-implementing sanctions. The E3 published a joint statement notifying the UN Security Council (UNSC) that it remains ‘ready’ to trigger the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA)’s snapback clause and to re-institute UN sanctions on Iran should diplomatic deadlock persist beyond the end of August. The statement also indicates that Iran has not responded to an offer from the E3 to extend the JCPOA clauses in exchange for commitments to re-engage in negotiations with the US and address international concerns regarding oversight of nuclear facilities. The letter underscores continued international diplomatic deadlock as the deadline for triggering the snapback clause (3 September) approaches (see Sibylline Middle East Crisis Update – 17 July 2025). Unless Iran credibly commits to engage in negotiations with the US and E3 in the coming weeks, the latter will likely move to trigger the JCPOA snapback clause, highly likely resulting in the re-institution of UN sanctions on Iran. Should Iran engage in negotiations in the coming two weeks, the E3 will likely propose a resolution to the UNSC to extend the JCPOA’s snapback clause, though international diplomatic tensions are unlikely to de-escalate substantially unless the US, Iran and the E3 reach a nuclear agreement in the short-to-medium term.
• The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)’s deputy head visited Iran to begin negotiating a ‘co-operation framework’, though a lack of continuous monitoring will almost certainly sustain regional tensions. On 11 August, the IAEA’s deputy head arrived in the capital Tehran for negotiations on re-establishing co-operation with Iran. The visit comes after Iran suspended formal co-operation with the IAEA in July, with the IAEA subsequently evacuating all remaining staff due to safety concerns (see Sibylline Middle East Crisis Update – 7 July 2025). Negotiations with the IAEA will likely take several weeks, with international parties almost certainly continuing to rely on covert surveillance and espionage to monitor nuclear activity, increasing verification and misidentification risks. The visit is highly unlikely to result in the immediate resumption of IAEA monitoring capabilities in Iran, with Tehran likely hoping to leverage existing restrictions on oversight during possible negotiations with the US and/or E3. This approach is highly likely to sustain elevated diplomatic tensions and further hamper prospects for productive nuclear negotiations in the coming week. Even if it unilaterally re-authorises IAEA access to declared nuclear facilities in the short term, Iran has routinely engaged in nuclear research and development activity at undisclosed sites in recent years. Consequently, elevated international concerns related to oversight of Iranian nuclear activity are unlikely to subside, further hampering prospects for successful negotiations in the coming weeks.
• Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu acknowledged that Iran likely retains stockpiles of enriched uranium, underscoring the risk of further Israeli strike action in the coming months. During an interview with the i24News outlet, Netanyahu stated that airstrikes on Iranian nuclear facilities during the Iran-Israel war had not ‘damaged’ Iran’s stockpiles of enriched uranium, including the 400kg of uranium enriched up to 60%. Although Netanyahu emphasised that critical damage to nuclear facilities had severely degraded Iran’s capacity to develop nuclear weapons rapidly, he also emphasised Israel’s ‘preparation’ for possible Iranian efforts to redevelop its nuclear programme. In the coming months, demonstrable Iranian efforts to re-develop its uranium enrichment capabilities and/or weapons production facilities will increase the risk of limited Israeli airstrikes targeting nuclear facilities (and possibly adjacent military facilities). We assess there is a realistic possibility of such strikes occurring in the coming months, particularly if nuclear negotiations between the US and Iran do not resume. Such strikes would almost certainly compound regional tensions and possibly trigger retaliatory Iranian missile and drone attacks targeting Israel, undermining security conditions and operational continuity within Israel, as well as likely temporarily disrupting regional airline activity. Although rapid and uncontrolled escalation into sustained armed conflict remains unlikely, military exchanges between Iran and Israel would likely trigger broader regional operational disruption as well as bouts of price volatility on international oil and energy markets.
ISRAEL
• The Airports Authority Workers’ Committee will allow workers to strike on 17 August, highlighting elevated business disruption risks amid the nationwide general strike effort. According to the announcement, the committee will allow its workers to strike in exchange for sacrificing a day of annual leave, elevating the risk of flight disruption and delays on 17 August. The announcement comes amid a series of statements by public authorities and private businesses that intend to participate in a general nationwide strike on 17 August in support of hostage releases. Several regional councils and municipalities have already approved their participation, including Israel’s bar association, elevating the risk of service disruption. In the coming days, additional municipalities, worker unions and private businesses are likely to join the strike, further compounding business disruption risks. Even so, the strike is likely to remain limited to 17 August; there is currently no indication that any action will continue into 18 August and the following days.
• A meeting between Israel’s Mossad chief, David Barnea, and Qatari Prime Minister Mohammed bin Abdulrahman bin Jassim Al Thani possibly signals incremental progression in negotiations, though a ceasefire remains unlikely in the coming two weeks. Barnea’s return to Qatar signals that possible preparations are being made for the relaunch of ceasefire talks with Hamas. Currently, Israel does not have negotiating teams present in Qatar and has been engaging in limited talks with the organisation through Egypt since 12 August. According to Egyptian reports, negotiations currently revolve around a new proposal and complete deal to end the war and retrieve all hostages held in Gaza. However, there is also a realistic possibility that both sides will pursue maximalist goals, especially given that they both appear to have forgone the prospects for partial hostage releases in exchange for incremental agreements. As such, we assess that negotiations are likely to advance slowly and are unlikely to materialise into a ceasefire in the coming 14 days.
PALESTINIAN TERRITORIES
• Significant Israeli regulatory scrutiny of NGO operations in Gaza will likely continue disrupting aid delivery and distribution efforts, sustaining critical humanitarian concerns. On 13 August, over 100 aid agencies signed a declaration alleging that Israel is ‘intentionally’ restricting humanitarian access to Gaza and routinely rejecting NGOs’ applications to deliver aid. Israel implemented new regulations on aid deliveries in March as part of a broader effort to prevent Hamas militants from intercepting or diverting aid deliveries within Gaza. The declaration alleges that NGOs risk blanket rejections of applications to deliver aid if they ‘delegitimise’ Israel and that the regulations require agencies to disclose sensitive personal information about Palestinian staff. The agencies also allege that these practices have prevented dozens of NGOs from delivering aid since March, exacerbating critical food insecurity and humanitarian conditions within Gaza. Israel has denied these allegations, stating that over 20 organisations are currently delivering an average of 300 trucks of aid into Gaza per day. Even so, on 14 August, the IDF announced that it had conducted an airstrike targeting five unidentified militants posing as employees of the World Central Kitchen (WCK) NGO; the organisation subsequently confirmed that the individuals were not affiliated with the group. The strike underscores the continued risk of militant groups co-opting NGO vehicles, uniforms and aid supplies within Gaza, despite increased regulatory scrutiny of NGO operations. In the coming weeks, Israel will likely continue intensely scrutinising NGO deliveries into Gaza, sustaining the risk of critical operational and supply chain disruption amid deteriorating humanitarian conditions. Such scrutiny will also highly likely sustain international condemnation of Israel and Israeli-linked entities from pro-Palestine activists, prolonging reputational concerns for associated firms.
• Possible settlement plans risk exacerbating protest movements and international condemnation, elevating reputational risks. On 13 August, Israeli Finance Minister Bezalel Smotrich allegedly approved plans for a settlement that would separate East Jerusalem from the West Bank (though official confirmation has not yet been issued). The ‘E1 project’ would involve building over 3,400 housing units and creating territorial continuity with the existing settlement of Ma’ale Adumim (Jerusalem governorate). Smotrich stated that the approval ‘buries the idea of a Palestinian state’, which will highly likely prompt international backlash in the coming days. As such, escalating diplomatic tensions between Israel and the West will likely persist, driving the risk of further sanctions on individuals and entities servicing and funding settlements, as well as government ministers. This is likely to exacerbate compliance and reputational risks for firms associated with (or doing business in) Israel. The announcement comes ahead of the UN General Assembly meeting in September, at which several countries, including Australia, Canada and the UK, have conditionally pledged to recognise a Palestinian state. There is a realistic possibility that the approval of the settlement plans will compound public pressure on additional states to commit to recognising Palestinian statehood. In response to the announcement, Hamas has called for a ‘Day of Rage’ on 15 August. The call has elevated the likelihood of labour strikes in the West Bank, as well as localised demonstrations, driving disruption risks for business operations and travel.
• Israel-Palestinian Territories: Settlement plans will sustain diplomatic tensions, compliance risks. On 13 August, Israel’s Finance Minister Bezalel Smotrich allegedly approved plans for a settlement that would separate East Jerusalem from the West Bank (official confirmation has not yet been issued). The E1 project would involve building over 3,400 housing units and would create territorial continuity with the existing settlement of Ma’ale Adumim (Jerusalem governorate). Smotrich said the approval ‘buries the idea of a Palestinian state’, a statement which will highly likely face international backlash in the coming days. As such, escalating diplomatic tensions between Israel and the West will likely persist, driving the risk of further sanctions on individuals and entities servicing and funding settlements, as well as government ministers. This would likely exacerbate compliance and reputational risks to firms associated with or doing business in Israel, and particularly the West Bank. The announcement comes ahead of the UN General Assembly in September, at which several countries, including Australia, Canada and the UK, have conditionally pledged to recognise a Palestinian state. There is a realistic possibility that the approval of the settlement plans will compound public pressure for additional states to commit to recognising Palestinian statehood.
• Turkey-Syria: New military deal will likely exacerbate tensions with Kurds. On 13 August, Syria and Turkey signed a military co-operation deal that includes exchanging personnel for specialised skills training and a series of programmes in counter-terrorism, cyber defence, logistics, military engineering, mine clearance and peacekeeping operations. The deal underscores Turkey’s growing influence in post-Assad Syria and comes amid military tensions between Damascus and the Kurdish-led Syria Democratic Forces (SDF). As such, we assess that the deal will likely exacerbate the current deadlock in negotiations to integrate the SDF into the new Syrian army; Syria and Turkey are adamant on expelling the People’s Defense Units (YPG) and the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) forces from SDF ranks. Furthermore, in the coming weeks, it is unlikely that Syria and Turkey will accept SDF integration as a block inside the new army, adding to the risks that talks will collapse. The new deal with Turkey will likely increase the risks of a military confrontation with the Kurds in northern Syria in the coming months, should the deadlock in talks persist.
• Aug 13.
• Syria: Ceasefire collapse in northern Syria will remain realistic possibility in coming weeks. On 12 August, the Ministry of Defence (MoD) said that the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) had infiltrated Syrian army positions in the Tell Maaz area (Aleppo governorate) and killed one MoD serviceman in heavy clashes. The clashes occurred days after similar bouts of fighting between the two parties near Dayr Hafir and Manbij (both Aleppo). While hostilities have now ceased, tensions along the lines of control in northern Syria remain very high, underscoring the fragility of the current ceasefire. As such, we assess there is a realistic possibility that armed clashes between the Kurds and several Turkish-backed factions within the army will resume in the coming weeks in the Aleppo countryside region. The clashes will also likely augment the ongoing rifts and deadlock in talks between the SDF and Damascus over the integration of the Kurdish forces into the new Syrian army, exacerbating political and security instability in the country.
• Israel-Palestinian Territories: Foreign ministers’ statement will drive sanctions, regulatory risks. On 12 August, the foreign ministers of 24 Western countries, including Australia, Canada and the UK, issued a statement claiming that the humanitarian crisis in Gaza has reached ‘unimaginable levels’ and calling on Israel’s government to allow unrestricted aid into the strip. The statement follows Israel’s decision to take over Gaza City and organise the mass evacuation of all Palestinian civilians from northern Gaza to southern Gaza; the move will almost certainly exacerbate dire humanitarian conditions on the ground, including from reduced energy, food and water security. Although immediate action against Israel remains unlikely, the move signals an increased risk of sanctions against Israel if it goes ahead with its operation in Gaza; this would highly likely increase regulatory and business operational risks for international companies operating in the country. The statement will also likely elevate diplomatic tensions, driving reputational risks for companies in Israel and projects involving Israeli companies. It is highly unlikely that Israel will provide authorisation for all international aid shipments into Gaza; this will sustain the ongoing crisis and critical security threats to NGO personnel near aid distribution sites.
Aug 11.
IRAN
• Despite the re-organisation of Iran’s security governance structure, the prospects for negotiations with the US are unlikely to improve significantly.
• The US announced it would sanction numerous Iranian financial entities, underscoring broader economic pressure amid stalled nuclear negotiations.
• Iran announced the seizure of a vessel on suspicion of oil smuggling, underscoring the risk of detention facing vessels and crews traversing the Strait of Hormuz.
ISRAEL
• Despite uncertainty over the scale of Israel’s impending military operation, the risk of international backlash remains elevated.
• Calls to shut down the economy will likely drive operational disruption, though the Histadrut will not participate.
PALESTINIAN TERRITORIES
• Israel has intensified its airstrikes in the Gaza City area in recent days, underscoring the growing threats to life in central Gaza.
• Australia announced that it will recognise an independent Palestinian state in the coming weeks, though this is unlikely to impact security and governance conditions demonstrably within the Palestinian Territories.
IRAN
• Despite the re-organisation of Iran’s security governance structure, the prospects for negotiations with the US are unlikely to improve significantly. On 11 August, the newly appointed leader of the Supreme National Security Council (SNSC), Ali Larijani, began a three-day visit to Iraq and Lebanon to meet with ‘key political figures’. This almost certainly refers to representatives of Iran’s various proxies, namely the Islamic Resistance in Iraq (IRI) and Lebanese Hizballah (LH). The visit underscores broad policy continuity among Iran’s high-ranking security officials, despite a moderate re-organisation of Iran’s security governance structure and several high-ranking personnel changes following the recent Iran-Israel war. This continuity is also highly likely to extend to Iran’s stance vis-à-vis nuclear negotiations with the US; senior Iranian national security and foreign policy personnel recently stated that Iran has an ‘inalienable right’ to enrich uranium domestically and will not negotiate this principle. Contrastingly, the US has repeatedly stated that Iran cannot maintain domestic enrichment capabilities under a nuclear agreement. This has resulted in diplomatic deadlock, with senior Iranian officials claiming on 10 August that the US and Iran have not agreed on a location or timeline for further negotiations. Continued deadlock will undermine prospects for an agreement between the US and Iran in the coming months, in turn increasing the risk of the E3 (France, Germany and the UK) initiating proceedings to re-implement UN sanctions on Iran for violating the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) by early September (see Sibylline Middle East Crisis Update – 28 July 2025).
• The US announced it would sanction numerous Iranian financial entities, underscoring broader economic pressure amid stalled nuclear negotiations. On 7 August, the US sanctioned seven individuals and 11 entities associated with Iran’s financial system, including several banks created by the Central Bank of Iran to evade existing sanctions (such as the Cyrus Offshore Bank) and the RUNC Exchange System Company. The sanctions underscore ongoing US efforts to expand and enforce measures to isolate Iran from international financial markets as part of the ‘Maximum Pressure’ campaign. These measures will increase compliance concerns and sanction-exposure risks for regionally engaged firms, particularly financial entities providing banking services for Iranian nationals or facilitating payments for Iranian-linked companies. The sanctions will likely sustain substantial economic pressure on Iran, compounding broader socio-economic concerns and the risk of financially motivated cyber attacks carried out by Iranian-linked threat actors in the coming months.
• Iran announced the seizure of a vessel on suspicion of oil smuggling, underscoring the risk of detention facing vessels and crews traversing the Strait of Hormuz. On 11 August, Iran’s border police and naval forces claimed to have detained an oil tanker 23 miles (37km) off the coast of Jask county (Hormozgan province) for allegedly attempting to smuggle approximately 2 m litres of fuel out of Iran. The authorities also claim to have detained 17 crew members (who are all foreign nationals of unspecified origin); these claims cannot be verified at the time of writing. Amid broader economic pressure linked to US sanctions (see above), the Iranian authorities will likely intensify their efforts to crack down on illicit oil smuggling in the coming months, increasing the risk of detention facing vessels and their crews. The high volume of international shipping traffic passing through the Strait of Hormuz also underscores the increased risk of vessel misidentification and detention, exacerbating the threats to staff, vessels and supply chain continuity for regionally engaged firms. Although Iran is unlikely to conduct numerous seizures of oil tankers engaged in legitimate shipping operations in the short term, we assess that rising bilateral tensions with the US will increase the risk of such detentions in the coming months as Iran attempts to maximise its leverage and secure partial sanctions relief.
ISRAEL
• Despite uncertainty over the scale of Israel’s impending military operation, the risk of international backlash remains elevated. On 8 August, the Israeli security cabinet approved a plan to ‘Occupy Gaza’. However, the details of the plan itself more closely resemble those favoured by senior military officials; they involve large military cordons and airstrikes to enable the capture of specific areas rather than a complete military occupation of all of Gaza (see Sibylline Middle East Crisis Update – 7 August 2025). The current plan focuses on the cordoning off and capture of Gaza City and specifies the symbolic date of 7 October as the deadline for the evacuation of all Palestinian civilians from northern Gaza to southern Gaza. As Israeli operations are most likely to escalate once the evacuation has been completed, the plan’s execution is likely to progress gradually, providing opportunities for negotiations before it is fully implemented.
• However, negotiations are unlikely to progress significantly in the coming weeks. Israel’s cabinet has, for the first time, officially approved five principles for ending the war:
1. Hamas’ disarmament
2. The return of all hostages (both living and dead)
3. The demilitarisation of the Gaza Strip
4. Israeli security control in Gaza
5. A civil administration comprising neither Hamas nor the Palestinian Authority (PA)
• While there are suggestions that Hamas will possibly agree to elements of these terms, we assess there is likely to be significant resistance. This is particularly likely to be the case if Israel insists on maximalist goals to end the conflict. Furthermore, Hamas is unlikely to make concessions ahead of the UN General Assembly in September, during which several states have suggested they will possibly recognise a Palestinian state.
• Regardless of the actual scale of the operation (which will likely focus on northern Gaza as opposed to the entire strip), its approval and the gradual intensification of IDF operations in Gaza City will further undercut humanitarian conditions, driving elevated anti-Israel sentiment internationally. This will likely prompt further countries to cancel deals and joint projects with Israel (as well as entities considered to contribute directly to Israel’s military industry) in the coming months. Sanctions against Israel also remain possible, especially sanctions against individuals such as right-wing ministers and political figures. In addition, the operation will likely prompt further social media campaigns and/or consumer boycotts targeting Israel and businesses affiliated with (or perceived as supporting) that country. This will sustain elevated reputational and financial risks for businesses engaging either in or with Israel in the coming months.
• Calls to shut down the economy will likely drive operational disruption, though the Histadrut will not participate. Earlier on 11 August, the Histadrut Labour Federation’s chairman, Arnon Bar David, and senior business sector officials announced they would support (but not join) a planned national strike on 17 August. The announcement comes amid increasing calls by pro-ceasefire and hostage-release groups to facilitate a nationwide strike on 17 August following the Israeli government’s decision to expand its military operations in Gaza (see above). Calls for a nationwide strike and public demands to shut down economic activity will likely increase over the coming days, significantly elevating the likelihood of widespread operational and supply chain disruption on 17 August. Additionally, and in the following weeks, there is a realistic possibility that any such strike action will be repeated on a more frequent basis, further elevating disruption risks for business operations and subsequently undercutting revenues.
PALESTINIAN TERRITORIES
• Israel has intensified its airstrikes in the Gaza City area in recent days, underscoring the growing threats to life in central Gaza. On 10 August, Al Jazeera (a media outlet) announced that an IDF airstrike killed five of its staff members in Gaza, including Anas al-Sharif; the IDF subsequently stated that it targeted al-Sharif, who it claims led a Hamas ‘terror cell’. The strike targeted the journalists’ tent outside the al-Shifa hospital complex in Gaza City, underscoring the sustained risks of airstrikes in the immediate vicinity of medical and humanitarian infrastructure throughout Gaza. Also in the Gaza City area, the IDF has intensified its airstrikes targeting locations in the Shuja’iyya and al-Zaytoun areas; heavy airstrikes were reported overnight on 9-10 August. Such operations are highly likely to continue at pace in the coming days amid broader preparations for the expansion of ground operations into the city in line with the ‘occupation’ plan (see above). Such operations will almost certainly sustain critical threats to life for individuals within Gaza City, triggering further civilian displacement towards the al-Mawasi area in southern Gaza and significantly increasing demand for humanitarian services therein. Increasing pressure on already-strained humanitarian resources will drive the risk of critical food insecurity, as well as clashes in areas surrounding aid distribution points and medical facilities, while limited access to sanitation facilities will increase the risk of communicable disease outbreaks, particularly among minors. Such conditions will almost certainly compound humanitarian concerns over conditions in Gaza, triggering further condemnation of Israel by international partners and scrutiny over Israeli-linked entities by pro-Palestine activists.
• Australia announced that it will recognise an independent Palestinian state in the coming weeks, though this is unlikely to impact security and governance conditions demonstrably within the Palestinian Territories. On 11 August, Australian Prime Minister Anthony Albanese announced that Australia will recognise an independent Palestinian state at the upcoming UN General Assembly meeting on 9 September. Albanese stated that the recognition is ‘predicated’ on commitments from the PA to hold elections, to exclude Hamas from any potential Palestinian government and to demilitarise Gaza. The announcement comes after Canada, France, Malta, Portugal and the UK announced similar plans, exacerbating increasing bilateral tensions between Israel and numerous Western states (see Sibylline Middle East Crisis Update – 31 July 2025). Australia’s recognition is highly unlikely to improve security conditions within Gaza notably in the short term or to trigger a broader shift in IDF operations therein. Additionally, the PA is unlikely to make significant improvements to its governance conditions in the West Bank by 9 September, moderating the prospects for broader improvements in the medium-term. In the long term, ongoing tensions between the PA and Israel will likely undermine international efforts to establish the PA as the post-war governing authority in Gaza, underscoring critical governance risks throughout the Palestinian Territories.
REGIONAL AND GLOBAL DEVELOPMENTS
• A deadly explosion at one of LH’s depots underscores the significant physical security risks during disarmament and clearing operations in Lebanon. On 9 August, a major explosion killed six Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) soldiers while they were inspecting and dismantling an LH weapons depot in Majdal Zoun (South governorate). The cause of the explosion is still under investigation. However, local reports claim the troops were removing unexploded ordnance left over from the Israel-Hizballah war. The incident comes shortly after the Lebanese parliament approved plans to disarm LH on 7 August and tasked the LAF with securing the state’s monopoly on the use of force on 5 August. In the coming months, efforts to clear unexploded ordnance will significantly elevate physical security risks for proximate staff, particularly in Beqaa, Nabatieh and South governorates, as well as the southern suburbs of the capital Beirut. Furthermore, given the ongoing tensions between the government and LH, the risk of domestic unrest within Shia communities in the aforementioned locations will increase during these clearing and disarmament campaigns in the coming months, in turn exacerbating the risk of sporadic clashes between LH militants and the security forces. However, the army is unlikely to implement full disarmament across Lebanon before the end of 2025, allowing more time for further negotiations with LH and offsetting direct military confrontation with the organisation.
• The UK authorities arrested hundreds of pro-Palestine protesters, which will likely fuel further reactionary demonstrations in the coming weeks. As of 10 August, the UK’s security authorities had arrested 532 individuals following a large-scale demonstration on 9 August against the proscription of the radical group Palestine Action (PA) under the Terrorism Act 2000. According to the Metropolitan Police, 521 people were arrested for displaying placards supporting PA at Parliament Square in the capital London. Although the demonstration remained largely peaceful, the authorities arrested six people for assaulting police officers and one for a racially aggravated public order offence. No serious injuries were reported. The recent protests marked the largest mobilisation of support since PA was banned in July, resulting in the UK’s largest single-day arrest operation in over a decade and underscoring ongoing domestic unrest risks linked to radical pro-Palestine activism. We assess that these large-scale arrests are likely to trigger further reactionary protests by PA supporters, possibly targeting UK and international corporations in London that deal with the Israeli government and/or related entities. This will, in turn, increase the likelihood of low-level scuffles in central areas of the capital in the coming weeks. Protesters are also likely to prioritise targeting the UK offices of the Israeli defence company Elbit Systems, as well as its UK-based supply chain and production facilities. Furthermore, PA activists are likely to sustain operations via proxy groups, and to infiltrate legitimate protest movements to radicalise participants therein, increasing security and bystander risks during pro-Palestine marches in the UK.
• Syria: Deadlock in integration talks will raise risk of domestic unrest, armed conflict. On 9 August, the Syrian government announced it would not participate in the planned 10 August meeting with the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) in the French capital Paris. The decision was highly likely a response to an SDF-organised conference in Al-Hasakah (Al-Hasakah governorate) on 8 August, attended by Druze and Alawite figures who criticised the constitutional declaration and government policies. This ongoing deadlock in integration talks between the Kurds and the government will likely persist in the coming two weeks, exacerbating political uncertainty in Syria. Stalled integration will elevate the risk of domestic unrest among Arab communities in the Kurdish regions, driving the risk of mutiny among Arab elements within the SDF. Such mutinies would, in turn, increase the risk of clashes within SDF-held cities, including Al-Hasakah and Raqqa city (Raqqa governorate), as well as bouts of intercommunal violence. Furthermore, tensions along the line of control in northern Syria will remain elevated, increasing the risk of a resumption in armed conflict between the Kurds and Turkish-backed factions within the Syrian army in the coming weeks.
• Lebanon: Explosion during disarmament process highlights elevated security risks. On 9 August, six Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) soldiers died in an explosion while inspecting and dismantling a Lebanese Hizballah (LH) weapon depot in Majdal Zoun (South governorate). The cause of the explosion is still under investigation; however, local reports claim the troops were removing unexploded ordnance left from the LH war with Israel. The incident comes after the Lebanese parliament approved plans to disarm LH on 7 August and tasked the LAF with securing the state’s monopoly on the use of force on 5 August (see Sibylline Middle East Crisis Update – 7 August 2025). In the coming months, efforts to remove unexploded ordnance from the Israel-LH war, particularly those close to LH weapon depots, will elevate incidental risks to proximate staff, assets and infrastructure, particularly in the southern governorates. Furthermore, we assess that efforts to disarm LH and other militant organisations will likely increase risks of sporadic clashes between militants and the security forces, elevating security risks across the country. (Source: Sibylline)
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Founded in 1987, Exensor Technology is a world leading supplier of Networked Unattended Ground Sensor (UGS) Systems providing tailored sensor solutions to customers all over the world. From our Headquarters in Lund Sweden, our centre of expertise in Network Communications at Communications Research Lab in Kalmar Sweden and our Production site outside of Basingstoke UK, we design, develop and produce latest state of the art rugged UGS solutions at the highest quality to meet the most stringent demands of our customers. Our systems are in operation and used in a wide number of Military as well as Home land Security applications worldwide. The modular nature of the system ensures any external sensor can be integrated, providing the user with a fully meshed “silent” network capable of self-healing. Exensor Technology will continue to lead the field in UGS technology, provide our customers with excellent customer service and a bespoke package able to meet every need.

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