Sponsored by Bertin Exensor
www.exensor.com
———————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————–
Military And Security Developments
Aug 29.
29 Aug 25. Israeli Airstrikes Kill Houthi Prime Minister in Yemen Capital. The prime minister of Yemen’s Iran-backed Houthi rebels was reportedly killed in Israeli airstrikes Thursday in the capital Sanaa, according to Yemeni media reports. Ahmed al-Rahawi reportedly died when Israeli strikes hit his apartment in Sanaa, Yemen’s Al-Jumhuriya channel and the Aden Al-Ghad newspaper reported. The Aden Al-Ghad said several of his associates were also reportedly killed in the same strike. There was no immediate confirmation from Israel or Houthi officials. The strikes also reportedly targeted Houthi Defense Minister Mohamed al-Atifi and Chief of Staff Muhammad Abd Al-Karim al-Ghamari during what Israeli sources described as a cabinet meeting of senior officials outside Sanaa, according to Israeli media reports. Al-Rahawi served as prime minister of the Houthi-led government from August 10, 2024. A member of the General People’s Congress party, he had previously served on the Supreme Political Council. The Israel Defense Forces confirmed striking “a Houthi terrorist regime military target in the area of Sanaa” on Thursday without providing additional details. (Source: https://www.sofx.com/)
Aug 28.
KEY DEVELOPMENTS
IRAN
- Despite further talks between the E3 (France, Germany and the UK) and Iran, tensions over Tehran’s nuclear programme and stalled engagement with the US will sustain risks of sanctions reapplication.
ISRAEL
- Increasing protest attendance in Israel will sustain risks of operational and supply chain disruption amid stalled ceasefire negotiations
PALESTINIAN TERRITORIES
- Israel continues to expand ground operations in northern Gaza; a double-tap strike targeting a hospital facility in Khan Yunis underscores critical threats to life for locally engaged staff.
- Famine conditions in Gaza will highly likely persist, compounding threats to locally engaged NGO staff, while broader tensions with Israel will drive regional tensions and risks of pro-Palestine protest activity and activism worldwide.
- In the West Bank, the IDF uprooted thousands of olive trees, increasing risks of further unrest and ethno-religious violence between Palestinians and Israeli settlers in the coming weeks.
IRAN
- Despite further talks between the E3 (France, Germany and the UK) and Iran, tensions over Tehran’s nuclear programme and stalled engagement with the US will sustain risks of sanctions reapplication. On 28 August, Reuters reported that the E3 have sent a letter to the UN Security Council (UNSC) initiating proceedings to trigger the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action’s (JCPOA’s) snapback clause; we are unable to independently verify this report at the time of writing. The E3 had repeatedly warned that it would trigger the snapback clause, launching a process to reinstitute UN sanctions on Iran, if the diplomatic deadlock in nuclear negotiations with the US persisted until the end of August. While Iran had held rounds of nuclear talks with the E3 and launched talks with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to restore its monitoring capabilities, Iran was seemingly maintaining maximalist negotiating positions regarding its nuclear programme. If the E3 does trigger the snapback clause in the coming days, this will highly likely cause a further devaluation of the Iranian rial (IRR), compounding socio-economic health concerns within Iran and increasing risks of goods shortages in the coming weeks. Iran is highly unlikely to demonstrate its continued compliance with the JCPOA, significantly increasing risks of sanctions reimplementation in the coming weeks. However, there is also a realistic possibility that triggering the snapback clause reflects increasing E3 brinkmanship and efforts to pressure Iran into resuming negotiations with the US in the immediate term. As such, if diplomatic contact resumes, the E3 will possibly opt to propose a resolution extending the snapback clause rather than completing the sanctions reimplementation process, moderating immediate risks of sanctions imposition on Iran.
ISRAEL
- Increasing protest attendance in Israel will sustain risks of operational and supply chain disruption amid stalled ceasefire negotiations. In the past week, protest activity has continued at pace throughout Israel, with numerous demonstrations in major cities and protests targeting key intersections on highways nationwide between 22 and 25 August. On 23 August, approximately 500,000 protesters attended rallies in Beersheva (Southern district), Caesarea and Haifa (both Haifa district), Jerusalem (Jerusalem district) and Tel Aviv (Tel Aviv district), restricting movement along several key highways. Protesters again mobilised mass demonstrations on 26 August, with approximately 350,000 civilians attending rallies, primarily in Jerusalem and Tel Aviv. Protesters blocked numerous thoroughfares, including Highways 1, 2 and 20, and lit fires, resulting in multi-hour traffic jams. The demonstrations coincided with a security cabinet meeting on 26 August, which failed to discuss the latest ceasefire proposal from mediators (see Sibylline Middle East Crisis Update – 18 August 2025). Amid increasing concerns that expanding ground operations in Gaza City (see below) will endanger the remaining hostages in Gaza, protest activity will almost certainly continue in the coming weeks. This will sustain risks of substantial operational and supply chain disruption, particularly for firms operating in Jerusalem and Tel Aviv. Although protester fatigue will likely undercut participation in the coming weeks, the risk of clashes with police attempting to disperse informal road blockades and sit-ins in public spaces will increase, moderately increasing risks of bystander exposure to tear gas and water cannons. If Israel does not reach a ceasefire agreement with Hamas in the coming weeks, mass anti-government demonstrations are highly likely to occur in early October to mark the two-year anniversary of the 7 October attacks. This will compound operational, supply chain and labour flexibility risks in the medium term.
PALESTINIAN TERRITORIES
- Israel continues to expand ground operations in northern Gaza; a double-tap strike targeting a hospital facility in Khan Yunis underscores critical threats to life for locally engaged staff. On 24 August, the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) killed at least 20 people, including five journalists, in two consecutive (double-tap) strikes targeting the Nasser Hospital complex in Khan Yunis area (southern Gaza). Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu subsequently referred to casualties as a ‘tragic mishap’; the IDF announced it would conduct an internal investigation. The IDF subsequently stated that the strikes targeted a Hamas camera attached to the hospital facility. The strike demonstrates Israel’s willingness to engage in strike action targeting key infrastructure it associates with militant activity, including medical centres and displacement camps. Such strikes will almost certainly continue in the coming weeks, sustaining critical threats to life for locally engaged staff and civilians accessing humanitarian services. In northern Gaza, regional media reported on 27 August that IDF ground forces had begun to move into the Ebad-Alrahman neighbourhood in northern Gaza City, underscoring the expanding scope of ground operations in the city’s eastern and northern neighbourhoods. Expanding ground operations will likely trigger further displacement from northern to southern Gaza, particularly the al Mawasi area. This will likely significantly increase demand for humanitarian and emergency services therein. Such pressure will likely further undermine humanitarian conditions in southern Gaza (see below), drawing further scrutiny of Israel and Israeli-linked entities worldwide.
- Famine conditions in Gaza will highly likely persist, compounding threats to locally engaged NGO staff, while broader tensions with Israel will drive regional tensions and risks of pro-Palestine protest activity and activism worldwide. On 22 August, the UN’s Integrated Food Security Phase Classification (IPC) published findings from its Famine Review Committee (FRC), which indicate that famine is currently occurring in northern Gaza and impacting over 514,000 civilians. The report also states that famine conditions will likely manifest in Deir al-Balah and Khan Yunis governorates in the coming weeks. Israel has rejected the IPC’s findings and formally requested the report’s withdrawal due to its alleged use of inaccurate data provided by Hamas. However, all of the UNSC’s members except the US have signed a statement supporting the IPC report, characterising famine conditions as man-made. The IPC report underscores critical food security conditions within Gaza, amid continued disruption to aid delivery and distribution efforts. Food security conditions are unlikely to demonstrably improve in the coming weeks, sustaining significant risks of organised and opportunistic looting targeting aid convoys, storage facilities and distribution points within Gaza. This trend underscores direct and incidental threats to staff. Deteriorating humanitarian conditions within Gaza will continue to exacerbate tensions between Israel and its major diplomatic and trade partners (such as the EU, EU member states and the UK). This will increase risks of arms export license reviews, sanctions on hard-right members of Israel’s government and trade agreement suspensions or modifications. Conditions in Gaza will likely drive pro-Palestine protests in the broader region, as well as in major cities in Australia, Belgium, Canada, France, Germany, the Netherlands, the UK and the US. Israeli-linked firms will likely be increasingly exposed to targeted protests and activism (including workforce activism) in the coming weeks. Such risks will be particularly acute for firms engaged in the defence, shipping and construction sectors, driving corporate governance, reputational and operational disruption risks.
- In the West Bank, the IDF uprooted thousands of olive trees, increasing risks of further unrest and ethno-religious violence between Palestinians and Israeli settlers in the coming weeks. The IDF reportedly uprooted thousands of olive trees in the village of Al-Mughayyir (Ramallah and al-Bireh governorate) on 24 August after a Palestinian conducted a small arms attack on a settler in the area. The destruction of the olive farms was coupled with the imposition of a three-day local curfew by the IDF. The IDF Central Command chief, Avi Bluth, subsequently warned that if such attacks persist, ‘every village … [will] pay a heavy price’, including similar curfews, clearing operations and damage to agriculture. Local media outlets subsequently stated that Bluth was implying that he intends to pursue a policy of collective punishment in the West Bank, triggering significant criticism. The IDF has rejected these allegations, stating that it engaged in the tree clearing to remove foliage facilitating militant activity. Regardless, any application of similar measures will highly likely trigger further unrest from affected Palestinian communities targeting proximate IDF installations and settlers. Protests will likely act as flashpoints for renewed ethno-religious violence in the central West Bank, increasing risks of disruption to overland movement along key thoroughfares. Additionally, the IDF conducted a 14-hour operation in central Nablus (Nablus governorate) overnight from 26 to 27 August, reportedly injuring over 55 individuals. In the coming weeks, the IDF will almost certainly continue engaging in raids targeting militant strongholds and cells throughout the West Bank (particularly northern governorates), increasing risks of operational disruption, localised curfews and exposure to crossfire for locally engaged staff.
RED SEA
- Israel-Yemen: The Houthis’ unprecedented use of a missile containing cluster munitions, prompting substantial IDF retaliatory strikes, will further undermine energy security in Yemen. On 22 August, the Houthis launched a missile towards Israel that contained cluster munitions for the first time. While the IDF failed to fully intercept the missile, which likely fragmented mid-air, the resultant damage was limited to small pieces of shrapnel falling in a residential garden in Ginaton (Central district). In response, on 25 August, the IDF conducted a series of airstrikes in the Yemeni capital Sanaa, targeting a Houthi military compound housing the presidential palace, two power plants (including the key Hizyaz plant), as well as a fuel storage site. The Houthi government claimed that these strikes killed six people and injured 86 others. The strikes will almost certainly augment the energy crisis in Yemen, compounding existing power supply challenges and disrupting NGO operations within Houthi-controlled territory. Such strikes will also possibly trigger knock-on deterioration in food security in north-western Yemen, as power outages will likely disrupt port operations, driving pressure on foreign aid resources. On 27 August, the Houthis launched another missile against Israel, but it was intercepted and triggered further IDF strikes in Sanaa on 28 August, underscoring the retaliatory nature of strike patterns. Further Houthi missile strikes against Israel are highly likely in the coming days, possibly including further usage of cluster munitions and targeting major population centres, including Haifa and Tel Aviv. While such strikes are unlikely to succeed, they will drive bystander exposure to shrapnel, especially for personnel in proximity to dual-use infrastructure, such as Ben Gurion Airport (TLV, Central district).
REGIONAL AND GLOBAL DEVELOPMENTS
- Israel-Lebanon: The US has continued efforts to facilitate the disarmament of Lebanese Hizballah by the Lebanese government, increasing risks of protests in the coming days. On 26 August, US Special Envoy Thomas Barrack announced that Lebanon’s government will propose a US-backed plan to disarm Lebanese Hizballah (LH) on 31 August and that Israel will subsequently commit to withdrawing its military from positions in southern Lebanon. Barrack emphasised that the disarmament process will be voluntary and will seek to address the socio-economic concerns of LH militants in order to incentivise demobilisation. The statement is highly likely to increase tensions with LH, which will almost certainly oppose efforts to disarm its militant factions in the short term; pro-LH protests will be highly likely following the government announcement. Protest activity will likely be particularly pronounced in the southern suburbs of the Lebanese capital Beirut, disrupting movement to and from Beirut-Rafic Hariri International Airport (BEY) and through the Dahieh area. Protests will also be highly likely in cities in Baalbek-Hermel, Beqaa, Nabatieh and South governorates, increasing risks of broader operational disruption. LH members will possibly attempt a show of force and demonstrate with small arms, increasing risks of altercations with the security forces and anti-LH factions, driving ethno-religious tensions and broader inter-communal clashes thereafter. There is a realistic possibility that Nabih Berri (the leader of the LH-aligned Amal Movement) will seek to mediate tensions between LH and the government, possibly resulting in broader negotiations and an extended timeline for implementing disarmament plans. Although such efforts will likely moderate tensions and risks of armed conflict within Lebanon, tensions with Israel will almost certainly remain elevated, sustaining cross-border tensions and broader border disputes through 2025.
- Israel-Syria: An uptick in Israeli military operations in Syria is unlikely to significantly impact ongoing security talks but will increase attack risks from militant groups. On 26 August, the Syrian government claimed that Israeli drone strikes on Syrian army positions near the city of al-Kiswah (Rif Dimashq governorate) killed six soldiers. This comes amid several other reported Israeli incursions over the past week, including an airborne landing at a former air defence base, airstrikes near Kiswah and Jabal Manea hill (Rif Dimashq) and the deployment of 60 IDF troops near the strategic Mount Heron (Quneitra governorate). We assess that the recent Israeli strikes and incursions are unlikely to prompt direct Syrian retaliation against IDF troops stationed in Daraa and Quneitra governorates or hinder the ongoing US-backed security talks. However, attacks by rogue Islamist factions, Palestinian militias and pro-Iran cells (driving clashes with IDF troops in southern Syria) remain a realistic possibility in the coming weeks. Such clashes would partially increase the risk of delays to Israel-Syria talks and the associated resolution of border disputes.
- Turkey-Israel: Turkey’s informal shipping restrictions on vessels linked to Israel will trigger compliance risks and operational disruption for various shipping and tourist cruise companies in the region. On 21 August, media outlets reported that the Turkish port authorities had begun informally requiring shipping agents to provide letters declaring that their vessels are not linked to Israel and not carrying military or hazardous cargo bound for Israeli ports. The same reports also mentioned that vessels arriving directly from Israel or departing to Israeli ports would no longer be permitted to dock at Turkish ports. While not confirmed, the possibility of such restrictions will likely drive significant compliance challenges and operational disruption for shipping companies operating in Israel, Turkey and the eastern Mediterranean region in general, including the shipping and tourism sectors. If these restrictions are enforced in the coming weeks, there is a possibility that Israel will retaliate with similar measures, creating barriers for shipping and the maritime tourism sector in the eastern Mediterranean.
- Norway-Israel: The divestment of Norway’s wealth fund from Israeli banks will increase compliance and reputational risks for global companies with a presence in the Israeli market. On 26 August, Norway’s wealth fund, the world’s largest, announced that it had divested from US construction equipment company Caterpillar and five Israeli banks on ethical grounds. The fund claimed there is an unacceptable risk that these six groups contribute to serious violations of the rights of individuals during war. This move follows similar divestiture measures by the fund over recent months, from Israel’s Paz Retail and Energy LTD and the Israeli telecommunications firm Bezeq. As such, we assess that Norway’s wealth fund will likely continue this trend, divesting from further Israeli and global entities (including banks) that deal with the IDF and Israeli settlers through H2 2025. There is also a realistic possibility that other European pension funds will implement similar measures, further exacerbating compliance risks for entities and individual investors engaged in Israel. These risks will remain elevated as long as the Israel-Hamas war protracts and humanitarian conditions in the Gaza Strip continue to deteriorate over the coming months.
- Australia-Iran: The expulsion of the Iranian ambassador following accusations of sponsoring antisemitic attacks underscores the persistent physical risks for Jewish individuals and entities globally. On 26 August, the Australian government accused Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) of carrying out two antisemitic arson attacks in 2024 and gave the Iranian ambassador and three other diplomatic staff seven days to leave Australia. The attacks had targeted a Jewish-owned restaurant in Sydney (New South Wales state) and the Adass Israel Synagogue in Melbourne (Victoria state). Notably, the Australian prime minister said that Iran had likely conducted further attacks and that the government will designate the IRGC as a terrorist organisation. The developments underscore the elevated risks of state-sponsored attacks against Jewish individuals, synagogues and businesses in Australia, Europe, the Gulf region and the US in H2 2025. Further investigations in Australia are underway; retaliatory attacks against Jewish assets and synagogues in the country will be possible in the coming days, particularly during pro-Palestine protests in major cities, given the persistent risks of Iranian infiltration of these events.
Executive summary
- Tensions between the US, Iran and Israel remain significantly elevated, as nuclear negotiations have failed to progress demonstrably since the conclusion of the Israel-Iran war.
- The E3 (France, Germany and the UK) have launched proceedings to trigger the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action’s (JCPOA) snapback clause. Maximalist negotiating positions from the US and Iran will continue to undermine prospects for the progress of substantive nuclear negotiations before mid-October, making it likely that UN sanctions against Iran will be reimplemented. However, there is a possibility (though it is currently unlikely) that the threat of sanctions will prompt Iran to make concessions on its nuclear programme and engage in meaningful talks; this would encourage a shift towards extending the snapback clause, rather than towards reimposing sanctions and jeopardising progress.
- Iran will likely seek to redevelop its nuclear capabilities and ballistic missile programme in the coming months amid broader efforts to deter further Israeli strike action and increase leverage in future negotiations with the US and the E3. These efforts will almost certainly compound tensions with Israel, the US and the E3, increasing risks of diplomatic breakdown, further sanctions and a resumption of Israeli strike action.
- We assess that if Iran demonstrably attempts to redevelop its nuclear and ballistic missile programmes, Israel’s most likely course of action will be to engage in limited strike action targeting nuclear facilities. In response, Iran will likely seek to de-escalate regional tensions and moderate risks of resumed conflict, decreasing risks of a sustained breakdown in the Israel-Iran ceasefire.
- There is also a realistic possibility that Israel will engage in broader strike action targeting military and nuclear facilities in Iran, significantly increasing pressure on government stability and security force capacity. Such conditions would likely undermine regional stability and trigger significant price volatility in global energy markets, amid an escalation in armed conflict.
- Although unlikely, Iran will possibly choose to forgo reconstituting its nuclear programme due to broader economic pressures. In this scenario, Iran will highly likely increase support for regional proxies and cyber threat activity, sustaining regional tensions and risks of instability in conflict-sensitive environments, particularly Iraq, Lebanon and Syria.
Context
While hostilities between Iran, Israel and the US have not resumed since the imposition of the Israel-Iran ceasefire on 25 June (see Sibylline Situation Update Brief – 24 June 2025), tensions over Iran’s nuclear programme remain elevated, sustaining the risk that strikes on Iran resume. In June, we assessed that Israel (which had broadly established aerial supremacy above Iran) had likely agreed to the ceasefire based on an assessment that US strikes on Iran’s nuclear facilities had degraded their threat and that a ceasefire would enable the resumption of nuclear talks in which the US could secure long-term concessions. However, nuclear negotiations have not resumed, while Iran has also suspended co-operation with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). As such, concerns that Iran is utilising the lack of oversight and diplomatic pressure to restore its nuclear capacities have escalated.
With no progress towards a resumption in nuclear negotiations with the US, despite numerous warnings, on 28 August, the E3 (France, Germany and the UK) launched proceedings to trigger the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action’s (JCPOA) snapback clause, ahead of its expiration on 18 October. This has initiated a 45-60 day process to reinstitute the pre-2015 UN sanctions; such reinstitution would follow a vote at the UN Security Council (UNSC) after Iran has submitted evidence that it has remained compliant with the JCPOA. We assess that, in the short term, the reimposition of UN sanctions would likely undercut Iranian willingness to comply with any monitoring or negotiations, thereby compounding anxiety about the status of Iran’s nuclear programme. Israel’s assessment of the state of Iran’s nuclear weapons programme, including the development of delivery systems, is likely the key factor in its decision on whether to launch further strikes. There is a possibility that Israel will identify a need to conduct strikes regardless of progress in negotiations; however, the status of nuclear negotiations with the US and the associated threat of UN sanctions will likely have a material impact on Israel’s strike decision. As such, this report will provide two sets of scenarios: firstly, for how we anticipate prospective negotiations with the US are most likely to proceed against the threat of UN sanctions reimposition, and secondly, regarding Iranian nuclear and weapons development and likely Israeli responses. The probabilities presented represent our current analysis for the likelihood of these scenarios developing over the short-medium term (within the next three to six months). However, continued stasis in the negotiation process and the reimposition of UN sanctions (SECTION ONE, Scenario 1) will further increase the risk of Israeli strike action (SECTION TWO, Sub-scenarios 1a and 1b). Contrastingly, meaningful progress towards an agreement will likely discourage overt Israeli action (SECTION TWO, Sub-scenario 1c). Currently, our strike assessments assume that Israel will be the first party to conduct offensive operations; this is based on Iran’s limited capacity to successfully conduct offensive operations against Israel and limited public appetite in the US for military engagement in the Middle East. There is a realistic possibility that the US will be drawn into conducting strikes on Iran, as in June 2025; however, this will be most likely if the US assesses that it is necessary to degrade a key nuclear threat, which it likely currently considers to be unnecessary.
- Iraq: Withdrawal of PMF bill will increase tensions ahead of November elections. On 27 August, Prime Minister Mohammad Shia al-Sudani withdrew the Popular Mobilization Authority bill from the parliament. The bill would have formalised key bureaucratic and security structures within the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF), an umbrella organisation of Iranian-backed militias broadly operating beyond the remit of the Iraqi security forces. Al-Sudani withdrew the bill amid increasing pressure from the US, which opposed the bill based on concerns that it would increase and institutionalise Iran’s influence in Iraq. Although the bill’s withdrawal will likely moderate tensions between the US and Iraq, it will also highly likely compound tensions between the Iraqi government and Iranian-backed militant groups, particularly ahead of the national legislative elections on 11 November. Increasing sectarian and factional tensions will likely exacerbate existing political rifts between Iraq’s numerous armed groups, including those within the PMF. We assess that violent confrontations between the state security forces and PMF factions are highly likely in the coming months, increasing security risks for locally engaged staff, including in the capital Baghdad.
- Turkey: Defence company executive arrests underscore sustained governance concerns. On 27 August, the authorities in Istanbul (Istanbul province) announced the arrests of the owner and general manager of Assan Group (a major defence and construction conglomerate) on suspicion of military espionage. The Istanbul prosecutor’s office stated that the two individuals are associates of Fethullah Gulen, whom Ankara has accused of orchestrating the 2016 coup attempt. The authorities have placed Assan Group and ten subsidiaries under the control of the Savings Deposit Insurance Fund of Turkey (TMSF), the government body which handles asset seizures and operates under the remit of the president’s office. The arrests come amid increasing scrutiny of Assan Group following allegations that it fraudulently obtained classified information regarding army procurements. In the coming days, we assess the investigation is highly likely to expand further, increasing the risk of asset seizures for associated firms and arrests targeting high- and mid-level executives. Politically motivated investigations into Turkish defence contractors will almost certainly continue at pace in the coming years, sustaining significant governance and compliance risks for associated entities, including subcontractors, subsidiaries and business service providers.
Aug 27.
- Iran: Diplomatic engagement will possibly delay sanctions implementation. On 26 August, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)’s director-general announced that several inspectors have returned to Iran as negotiations to restore their monitoring capabilities continue. The announcement comes after Iran and the E3 (France, Germany and the UK) concluded an additional round of nuclear talks in Switzerland, also on 26 August. Despite moderate diplomatic overtures, Iran is highly unlikely to restore IAEA monitoring capabilities unilaterally, with its maximalist negotiating position moderating the prospects for a major diplomatic breakthrough in the short term, particularly with the US. The E3 has repeatedly stated that it intends to trigger the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA)’s snapback clause and re-institute UN sanctions on Iran should diplomatic deadlock persist beyond the end of August. Even so, given the continued engagement, the E3 will possibly opt to extend rather than trigger the snapback clause in the coming weeks. While this approach would likely moderate sanctions-exposure risks and further devalue the Iranian rial (IRR) in the immediate term, we assess that persistent deadlock with the US will sustain the likelihood of sanctions being re-applied in the medium term.
- Israel-Syria: Strikes on Syrian army are unlikely to undermine ongoing security talks significantly. On 26 August, the Syrian government claimed that Israeli drone strikes on Syrian army positions near the city of al-Kiswah (Rif Dimashq governorate, Syria) killed six soldiers. The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) has not yet confirmed the strike. Notably, the strike comes days after Syria reported an incursion of nearly 60 IDF troops near the strategic Mount Heron (Quneitra governorate, Syria). Nevertheless, we assess that the recent Israeli strikes and incursions are unlikely to prompt direct Syrian retaliation against IDF troops stationed in Daraa and Quneitra governorates (both Syria) or hinder the ongoing US-backed security talks. Even so, retaliation by rogue Islamist factions and pro-Iran cells which subsequently drive clashes with IDF troops in southern Syria remains a realistic possibility in the coming weeks. We assess that such clashes would partially increase the risk of disruption to ongoing Israel-Syria talks and in turn delay the resolution of border disputes and Israel’s continued military presence in Syria. Similarly, a resumption of the ethno-religious conflict between Druze and government-aligned militias in Syria would also increase the risk of hindering the talks.
Aug 26.
- Israel-Yemen: Airstrikes will drive further local energy security risks, operational disruption for NGOs. On 25 August, the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) conducted a series of airstrikes in the Yemeni capital Sanaa, targeting a Houthi military compound housing the presidential palace, two power plants (including the key Hizyaz plant) and a fuel storage site. The Houthi government has claimed that the strikes killed six people and injured 86 others. The strikes will almost certainly augment the energy crisis in Yemen, compounding existing power supply challenges and driving operational risks for NGOs and their personnel within Houthi-controlled territory. We assess that these strikes will also possibly trigger the knock-on deterioration of food security in north-western Yemen, as power outages will likely disrupt port operations, increasing pressure on foreign aid resources. Furthermore, the Houthis will highly likely launch retaliatory attacks against Israel in the coming days, targeting major population centres including Tel Aviv (Tel Aviv district). While such strikes are unlikely to succeed, they will drive bystander exposure to shrapnel, especially for personnel in proximity to dual-use infrastructure, such as the central district’s Ben Gurion International Airport (TLV). (Source: Sibylline)
22 Aug 25. US Raid Kills Future ISIS Leader in Northwest Syria. The United States Central Command (CENTCOM) killed a senior ISIS commander, viewed as the group’s likely future leader, in a pre-dawn raid in Atmeh, near Syria’s border with Turkey, on Wednesday. The coalition targeted Abu Hafs al-Hashimi al-Qurashi, an Iraqi national. The Syrian Observatory for Human Rights said another Iraqi citizen was killed during the operation. No U.S. troops were killed or injured in the raid. A Syrian security source and state-owned Al-Ikhbariya reported the target was killed while attempting to flee. CENTCOM confirmed the strike and described al-Qurashi as a key financier behind planned attacks in Syria and Iraq. “He had relationships throughout the ISIS network in the region, posing a direct threat to U.S. and Coalition forces and the new Syrian Government,” CENTCOM said. A U.S. official told Fox News al-Qurashi was viewed as a strong candidate to become the ISIS Syria Emir, a role that would have posed a direct threat to U.S. and Coalition forces as well as the new Syrian government. This is the second U.S. operation in northern Syria since President Ahmed al-Sharaa replaced Bashar al-Assad. In July, U.S. forces killed ISIS leader Dhiya’ Zawba Muslih al-Hardani and his two sons in Aleppo’s al-Bab region.
“We will continue to pursue ISIS terrorists with unwavering determination, throughout the region.” CENTCOM Commander Adm. Brad Cooper said. Together with our partners and allies, CENTCOM remains steadfast in our commitment to ensuring the lasting defeat of ISIS and the protection of the U.S. homeland.” (Source: https://www.sofx.com/)
22 Aug 25. U.S., Saudi Arabia Strengthen Ties Through State Partnership Program. Saudi Arabia expanded its strategic ties with the United States by formally joining the Defense Department National Guard Bureau State Partnership Program during a ceremony in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, yesterday. Military leaders from both nations signed a declaration to integrate Saudi Arabia into the SPP, aligning the Saudi Arabian armed forces with the Indiana and Oklahoma National Guards in a trilateral partnership established last year. The 115-nation SPP strengthens strategic bonds through joint military training, exercises and exchanges to enhance collective readiness, reestablish deterrence and foster enduring relationships among troops.
“Today, we formalize a partnership that reflects the deep strategic relationship between our nations, built on a shared commitment to global security, trust and decades of cooperation,” said Air Force Gen. Steve Nordhaus, the 30th chief of the National Guard Bureau, during the signing ceremony.
The U.S.-Saudi alliance, rooted in economic and security cooperation since 1940, emphasizes counterterrorism and regional stability. Saudi Arabia’s strategic location, capable military and leadership in the Arab and Islamic worlds make it a vital global partner. Additionally, Saudi Arabia’s Vision 2030, an ambitious plan to diversify its economy and transform its society, includes significant investments in defense modernization and technology.
“With this signing, the Indiana and the Oklahoma National Guard embark on a journey with the Saudi Arabian armed forces to share expertise, promote mutual understanding and advance our shared commitment to global security,” Nordhaus said.
He was joined by Gen. Fayyad Al-Ruwaili, Saudi Arabia’s chief of general staff; Army Maj. Gen. Thomas Mancino, Oklahoma’s adjutant general; and Army Brig. Gen. Lawrence Muennich, Indiana’s adjutant general, in signing the declaration that will launch formalized joint training exchanges.
“The partnership with the United States National Guard marks a historic milestone in the trajectory of our defense cooperation,” Al-Ruwaili said. “It embodies our unwavering commitment to developing joint capabilities that strengthen regional security and stability, while firmly establishing the principles of combined military operations in pursuit of a more secure and prosperous future.”
The SPP agreement follows President Donald J. Trump’s May visit to Riyadh, where he announced $600 bn in Saudi investments in technology and defense, including a $142 bn defense sales deal — the largest in U.S. history. This deal will equip Saudi Arabia with advanced warfighting systems and services from over a dozen U.S. defense firms, reinforcing its regional security role. Saudi Arabia, the largest buyer of U.S. foreign military sales, allocates 8.1% of its gross domestic product to defense — more than any other Middle Eastern nation and among the highest globally. Elbridge Colby, undersecretary of defense for policy, welcomed Saudi Arabia’s efforts to strengthen its self-defense capabilities and to make greater contributions to achieving shared regional objectives in a readout from the July 29-30 U.S.-Saudi strategic joint planning committee. Vision 2030’s focus on modernizing the military, developing domestic defense industries and strengthening cybersecurity further enhances Saudi Arabia’s strategic importance. The SPP is a DOD program with a cost-effective model managed by the National Guard Bureau, guided by State Department foreign policy goals and executed by the state adjutants general in support of combatant commander and U.S. chief of mission security cooperation objectives and department policy goals. Through the SPP, the National Guard of every state, territory and the District of Columbia is partnered with nations on every continent but Antarctica. Last year, National Guard elements executed roughly 1,000 SPP engagements, at just 1% of the U.S. security cooperation budget. These engagements range from troop-to-troop best practice exchanges to unit-level training exercises, enabling guardsmen and their partner-nation counterparts to share and develop expertise, enhancing lethality and interoperability.
“Our ability to train and operate together is a decisive advantage as we share the burden of regional defense and global security with our allies and partners,” said Nordhaus, a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
The National Guard is the operational reserve of the Army and the Air Force. Its 433,000 soldiers and airmen bring significant experience in disaster relief, domestic operations, homeland defense, warfighting and partnerships — local to global.
“The SPP will enable Indiana and Oklahoma National Guard members to work side by side with our Saudi partners and learn from each other,” said Alison Dilworth, Chargé d’Affaires ad interim to Saudi Arabia. “The possibilities of what we can do together are endless.”
The Indiana and Oklahoma National Guard each offer unique capabilities in cybersecurity, disaster response, aviation maintenance, medical response and logistics — all of which provide avenues for exchange and collaborative training.
“The Oklahoma National Guard is proud to join forces with our partners in the Indiana National Guard to welcome the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia to the State Partnership Program,” Mancino said. “We are honored to stand alongside our new partners to share knowledge, foster long-term relationships and enhance capacity to respond to shared challenges.”
“I am extremely proud of the Indiana National Guard for being selected to partner with a strategic ally in the Middle East,” Muennich said. “The National Guard is a global force with local roots, and we’re excited for this new opportunity to learn alongside our Saudi partners and enhance our readiness.”
The Saudi-Indiana-Oklahoma partnership began last November with a cybersecurity, disaster response and critical infrastructure protection exchange in Riyadh. This April, joint training focused on counter-uncrewed aerial systems operations, border security and maritime domain awareness — critical to Saudi Arabia’s sovereignty over its coastal waters. The Saudi Arabian armed forces also seek to further develop its enlisted and noncommissioned officer corps. This January, a mobile training team of U.S. airmen assigned to Air Forces Central led the Royal Saudi Air Force in its inaugural chief leadership course. The course also featured discussions on the RSAF’s new partnership with Indiana and Oklahoma. While in Riyadh, Senior Enlisted Advisor John Raines, SEA to the CNGB, participated in a senior enlisted leader forum alongside Ahmed Al-Mutairi, the Saudi Arabian armed forces’ first senior enlisted advisor to underscore the critical contributions of the U.S. military’s enlisted corps.
“Our enlisted corps is the backbone of our military,” Raines said. “The character of warfare is changing rapidly, which will require speedy decisions at a much lower echelon.”
Across the State Partnership Program enterprise, National Guard troops have worked to develop and professionalize partner nation enlisted corps, which Al-Mutairi pointed to as another opportunity for collaboration.
“We are excited for this partnership,” he said. “You are our friends and our second country.”
Planning is already underway for future engagements, which will occur between troops from each country, both in Saudi Arabia and in the United States.
“We’re excited for this new partnership, which will boost our readiness in our core missions to support the warfighter, defend the homeland and build partnerships,” Nordhaus said. “This partnership is a force multiplier for security and stability that will make us stronger together and stronger tomorrow.” (Source: U.S. DoD)
—————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————-
Founded in 1987, Exensor Technology is a world leading supplier of Networked Unattended Ground Sensor (UGS) Systems providing tailored sensor solutions to customers all over the world. From our Headquarters in Lund Sweden, our centre of expertise in Network Communications at Communications Research Lab in Kalmar Sweden and our Production site outside of Basingstoke UK, we design, develop and produce latest state of the art rugged UGS solutions at the highest quality to meet the most stringent demands of our customers. Our systems are in operation and used in a wide number of Military as well as Home land Security applications worldwide. The modular nature of the system ensures any external sensor can be integrated, providing the user with a fully meshed “silent” network capable of self-healing. Exensor Technology will continue to lead the field in UGS technology, provide our customers with excellent customer service and a bespoke package able to meet every need.
A CNIM Group Company
————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————-