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15 Aug 25. South Korea to restore pact curbing military activity on North Korean border. South Korea intends to restore an agreement to suspend some military activity along the border with North Korea, President Lee Jae Myung said on Friday, as his government seeks to improve relations between neighbours still technically at war.
The 2018 military accord was designed to curb the risk of inadvertent clashes, but broke down after a spike in tensions.
WHAT HAPPENED IN 2018?
The so-called Comprehensive Military Agreement (CMA) signed between the two Koreas was the most substantive deal to result from months of historic meetings between leader Kim Jong Un and then-South Korean President Moon Jae-in.
On September 19, 2018, South Korea’s defence minister and his North Korean counterpart signed the CMA in the North’s capital, Pyongyang, accompanied by polite applause from the onlooking leaders. (Source: Reuters)
13 Aug 25. Congo (DRC)-Rwanda: Renewed clashes with M23 rebels will undercut peace agreement efforts. On 12 August, the Congolese military (FARDC) accused the Rwanda-backed M23 rebels of conducting multiple attacks across North Kivu and South Kivu provinces. This includes an attack on Walungu town, likely aimed at capturing a major FARDC logistics hub in Nzibira locality (both South Kivu). The FARDC claimed that this violated the US-brokered peace agreement (see Sibylline Situation Update Brief – 7 July 2025) and the Qatar-brokered declaration of principles. The accusations come amid delays in formalising the declaration of principles into a peace agreement with the M23, with both sides trading accusations of non-compliance. As such, it is highly unlikely that the agreement will be completed by the 18 August deadline, and the group remains highly unlikely to either withdraw from occupied territory or substantially moderate its activity therein. As such, this will sustain the risk of clashes between the FARDC, M23 and decentralised ethno-religious militias in the coming weeks. We assess that this will sustain staff exposure to crossfire from small arms and mortar fire across the line of contact in North Kivu and South Kivu, particularly for NGOs. (Source: Sibylline)
11 Aug 25. Nigeria: Military operation is unlikely to moderate critical security risks in Zamfara state. On 11 August, the Nigerian military targeted a concentration of 400 armed gunmen (known locally as bandits) during a joint air and ground operation in Bukuyum council area (Zamfara state). Military officials claim the operations killed over 100 bandits, including ‘several notorious kingpins’. The operation comes after a July report found that Zamfara was the most insecure state in Nigeria, with 6,800 deaths and 5,400 abductions reported in H1 2025; these figures mark increases of 14% and 19% from H1 2024, respectively. In the coming days, further airstrikes and ground operations targeting local bandit groups are likely, sustaining collateral and crossfire risks for staff and assets engaged in agriculture, mining, logistics and humanitarian operations across Zamfara. However, we assess that such operations are ultimately highly unlikely to deter or significantly undercut the capacity of bandit groups to conduct further attacks. As such, the risk of attacks, kidnap-for-ransom (KFR) and extortion will remain elevated into 2026, sustaining substantial security risks for locally engaged staff, particularly during overland movement. (Source: Sibylline)
12 Aug 25. “Russian nuclear strategy is at an inflexion point…The counterforce threat creates strong incentives [for Russia] to employ nuclear weapons at a larger scale.”
This is the view expressed in a new Royal United Services Institute (RUSI) research report, The Evolution of Russian Nuclear Doctrine, by Dr Sidharth Kaushal and Dr Darya Dolzikova, which says that Russia’s nuclear policy has reached a point where it may have to undergo a significant shift from limited or scaled use of nuclear weapons towards more rigid and high-threshold policies of large scale retaliation, increasing the risk of rapid escalation in the event of conflict.
The research says that while Russia has historically relied on sub-strategic nuclear weapons to offset NATO’s conventional superiority, this approach is now threatened by what Russian planners perceive as the potential emergence of more credible Western capabilities, including an ability to conduct a disarming first strike. This longstanding perception may have been exacerbated by Russia’s experience in the war in Ukraine. Factors such as improvements to NATO’s integrated air and missile defence systems, the fielding of more US theatre range systems after the dissolution of the INF Treaty (Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty), and further US deployments of low-yield submarine-launched ballistic missiles are among the variables which the authors assess would further constrain Russian planning.
The report highlights a paradox facing Western policymakers that while evolving conventional and missile defence capabilities may deter Russian aggression, they may also narrow Moscow’s perceived options for controlled or scaled escalation, leading to a more brittle strategic environment. The report notes that Russia retains some options to mitigate these pressures, including new theatre-range systems and counter-space capabilities – but says its ability to employ nuclear coercion in a graduated fashion is being eroded.
Key Findings
• Russia’s nuclear strategy is being shaped by a growing perception of US counterforce capability. The report says: “Russian authors have long acknowledged that nuclear use in a regional war or largescale war would be necessary…A series of strategic, technological, and geopolitical developments – many of which are interpreted in Moscow as indicators of a potential US counterforce posture – have altered the calculus underpinning Russian deterrence strategy.”
• Improved Western capabilities limit Russia’s use of nuclear weapons in a calibrated manner. “Improved theatre-level air and missile defences in Europe could problematise pre-war [in Ukraine] Russian concepts for using nuclear weapons in a calibrated or dosed way…Linking investments in IAMD [integrated air and missile defence] and deep strike capabilities to Russian concerns in an explicit manner can constrain Russia’s freedom to employ nuclear weapons as a coercive tool.”
• Russia’s shift from flexible doctrine use towards large-scale retaliation is driven more by vulnerability than strategy. “The measures they took had the impact of reducing the room to use nuclear weapons flexibly…The performance of Russian theatre-level missiles in Ukraine, and the demonstrated vulnerabilities of some of its existing launch platforms, suggest that the fielding of credible theatre-level IAMD [integrated air and missile defence] in Europe further constrain Russia’s flexibility in a regional war.”
Key Recommendations
• The risk of crisis instability should be recognised. “Constraining Russia has a cost: developments which limit Russia’s perceived freedom of action before a conflict can also make escalation control within a conflict more difficult … Escalation cannot be presented as being both controllable – and thus tailored to the situation – and unpredictable.”
• Allied messaging about counterforce capabilities can be more measured. “Given the limited avenues for arms control, manipulating counterforce concerns may, then, be a viable pathway towards shrinking the space for theatre-level use by Russia at a level consistent with a political objective. Should longer-term stabilising measures be deemed desirable, this could be linked to mutual arms reductions in the future.”
Conclusion
Russia’s nuclear doctrine is undergoing a subtle but significant change, driven by perceptions of US counterforce advantage and the growing capabilities of Western conventional strike and missile defence systems. The net result is a narrowing of Moscow’s perceived space for coercive, limited nuclear use and a shifting in its doctrine toward large-scale retaliation and a resultant reduction in the predictability of future escalation in a crisis. This transformation is not necessarily irreversible, but it demands careful attention from NATO planners and should inform the reshaping of deterrence dynamics in the Euro-Atlantic region. Western capability development, while necessary for deterrence, must be accompanied by strategic messaging and crisis management mechanisms.
Dr Sidharth Kaushal is a Research Fellow in Sea Power at the Royal United Services Institute, specialising in military strategy and deterrence. Darya Dolzikova is a Research Fellow in Proliferation and Nuclear Policy at RUSI, with a focus on nuclear doctrine and arms control. This report draws on Russian primary-source military literature, doctrinal documents, post-2020 declaratory policy changes. Where direct evidence is unavailable, the authors apply structured inference from observable patterns and pre-war Russian assumptions. The findings reflect a combination of doctrinal analysis and expert interviews with former Western defence officials and analysts.
11 Aug 25. Armenia-Azerbaijan: Significant obstacles remain for conclusion of peace treaty. On 8 August, Armenia and Azerbaijan signed a peace declaration and agreements on trade and security during a US-brokered summit in the US capital Washington DC. Armenia agreed to open a US-operated transport route across the Zangezur Corridor in its territory, which will link mainland Azerbaijan to its Nakhichevan exclave. The corridor will be named the Trump Route for International Peace and Prosperity (TRIPP) and will be operated by the US under a 99-year lease granted by Armenia. US President Donald Trump claimed that the meeting represented a significant diplomatic breakthrough towards the pacification of bilateral relations between both countries. However, the final signing of a peace deal remains contingent upon Yerevan fulfilling the conditions required by Baku. In addition to the dissolution of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) Minsk Group, Azerbaijan demands that Armenia amend its constitution to remove alleged irredentist claims over the formerly breakaway Nagorno-Karabakh, which has fallen under Azerbaijani control. Meeting this latter condition would require Armenia to organise a referendum and will likely face significant opposition within Armenian society. Ultimately, however, we assess that the deal underscores progress towards a stable peace and a lowering of tensions. Source: Sibylline)
11 Aug 25. Mali: Crackdown will likely disrupt movement, undermine security capabilities; coup risks will persist. On 10 August, the authorities reportedly arrested up to 50 soldiers for allegedly plotting a coup. Among those arrested is General Abass Dembélé, the former governor of Mopti region. The possible coup attempt comes amid mounting insecurity and an uptick in attacks, particularly by the regional al-Qaeda-aligned Jama’at Nasr al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM). The security forces will highly likely maintain an elevated posture in the capital Bamako over the coming days. This will likely include an increase in the prevalence of road checkpoints and the use of stop-and-search operations, disrupting citywide movement and increasing staff exposure to petty corruption. The incident will highly likely increase the junta’s concerns over its stability, thereby increasing the risk of further purges targeting other high-ranking individuals perceived as sources of dissent in the coming months. However, while this will possibly moderate short-term government stability risks, it is ultimately likely to compound the Malian military’s (FAMa) limited capacity to combat jihadist groups. As such, we assess that security conditions will highly likely continue deteriorating, driving risks of further coup attempts in 2025. (Source: Sibylline)
11 Aug 25. US-Mexico: Potential US military action against drug cartels will increase regional tensions. On 8 August, White House officials stated that US President Donald Trump had signed a directive authorising the use of military force against Latin American drug cartels that have been designated as foreign terrorist organisations (FTOs). Reports indicate that the directive has authorised the Pentagon to prepare military options. On 7 August, Secretary of State Marco Rubio also indicated that the administration could use the military to target cartels. The FBI has asked the local police to submit the names of individuals tied to drug cartels and gangs to be added to the terror watch list. In February, the US administration designated six Mexican cartels (including the Jalisco New Generation Cartel and Sinaloa Cartel) and two transnational organised crime groups as FTOs. Reports indicate that military action is unlikely to take place imminently. In the short term, we assess that the US will continue to increase its airborne surveillance of Mexican drug cartels for intelligence gathering. In the coming months, potential military operations would likely include naval drug interdiction operations or targeted military raids. Mexican President Claudia Sheinbaum has stated that the US military will not enter Mexican territory; however, any US military action will significantly increase regional tensions. (Source: Sibylline)
11 Aug 25. Philippines-China: Increased maritime activity in South China Sea will be possible following collision. Earlier on 11 August, a significant collision between two Chinese vessels was reported in the disputed South China Sea. According to a social media post by Philippine Coast Guard (PCG) officer, Jay Tarriela, the PCG deployed several vessels to accompany Philippine fishing vessels near the disputed Scarborough Shoal (which is effectively controlled by China via constant coast guard presence). Tarriela claimed that, during the operation, a China Coast Guard (CCG) vessel hit a People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) vessel while pursuing one of the PCG vessels. Footage reportedly from the incident shows the alleged heavy collision and notable damage to both Chinese vessels in the aftermath. In response, Chinese state media reported that PCG vessels were ‘intruding’ in the waters and were driven away by the CCG, with no mention of a collision. We assess that there is a realistic possibility of increased maritime activity in disputed waters from both sides following the incident. However, this is highly unlikely to result in material disruption to regional shipping lanes. (Source: Sibylline)
08 Aug 25. Congo (DRC)-Rwanda: Potential delay to peace talks will undercut prospects of agreement. On 7 August, the Rwanda-backed M23 rebels claimed they had not received an invitation to peace talks with the Congolese government, which are due to begin later on 8 August. This date marks a self-imposed deadline by which Qatar-brokered talks must commence ahead of the planned finalisation of an agreement by 18 August. The statement likely reflects an M23 tactic to delay and obfuscate peace talks in order to consolidate its control over occupied territory (and critical mineral supply routes) in eastern DRC. The M23 will highly likely refuse to withdraw from eastern DRC without significant political concessions from the Congolese government, which has signalled its own unwillingness to compromise on territorial integrity. As such, we assess it is highly unlikely that the two sides will be able to finalise a viable peace agreement by the 18 August deadline. The presence of the M23 in eastern DRC will sustain the risk of armed conflict between the group and government-aligned local militia forces (known as Wazalendo), while also sustaining critical security and human rights risks. (Source: Sibylline)
08 Aug 25. US moves to condition military and economic support in Africa. On 1 August, US Senate Foreign Relations Committee Chairman Jim Risch introduced key amendments to the 2026 National Defence Authorisation Act, signalling a major shift in US policy toward Africa. Risch aims to ensure that US military and financial ties with African nations clearly align with American interests.
At the centre of this shift is S.Amdmt.3628, a call for review of Kenya’s designation as a Major Non-NATO Ally (MNNA). Under the amendment, the US President must submit a report to Congress evaluating whether Kenya’s policies remain aligned with US national security goals. This assessment is expected to scrutinise not only Kenya’s bilateral military cooperation with the United States but also its growing entanglements with China and Russia. Washington’s patience appears to be waning as Nairobi engages in multipolar balancing. MNNA status is more than ceremonial; it comes with real defence benefits. Risch’s amendments signal that these benefits may now be conditional.
Next is S.Amdt.3627, addressing Ghana, where the issue is not military conduct but financial governance. Risch’s amendment prohibits America from supporting Ghana’s access to International Monetary Fund (IMF) resources unless and until Ghana resolves long-standing commercial debts owed to American companies. This places US commercial interests squarely into the diplomatic equation. Ghana, currently in the midst of a complex IMF-backed economic recovery programme, must now reckon with a new requirement; honouring international obligations to American firms before enjoying multilateral financial support backed by Washington.
A third amendment (S.Amdt.3626) calling for an assessment of whether M23 and Sudan’s Rapid Support Forces (RSF) should be designated as Foreign Terrorist Organizations (FTOs) introduces a decisive turn in US counterterrorism posture. The RSF has been responsible for egregious human rights violations in Sudan’s ongoing civil war. Meanwhile, the Allied Democratic Forces (ISIS-DRC) is already designated an FTO, raising the question: if ISIS-DRC meets the threshold, why not M23?
M23—specifically, the armed coalition known as AFC-M23—is no longer a small-scale rebel outfit confined to skirmishes in the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo. Since late 2024 and throughout 2025, AFC-M23 has exhibited a dangerous evolution in both tactics and organisational structure. M23 has deployed increasingly sophisticated heavy weapon systems, coordinated cross-regional offensives, and made verified public claims of territorial control over major cities such as Goma and Bukavu, and more than six territories in the last few years. These actions are not incidental or improvised; they reflect strategic planning, military logistics, and political ambition.
Under the United States Code, terrorism is defined as “premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against noncombatant targets by subnational groups or clandestine agents.” By this standard, AFC-M23’s activities meet—and in fact exemplify—that definition. Their calculated use of force against civilian populations and local governance structures is neither random nor reactive. In statements to international media, AFC-M23 (aka M23) spokespeople have claimed credit for these assaults and justified them as necessary steps toward their broader political goals. This is not a rogue faction; it is a structured rebel formation with distinct political and military wings, akin to other hybrid armed organisations seen across the globe.
In proposing this FTO assessment, Risch is making an argument that US policy has lagged behind the on-ground reality in Central Africa. Designating AFC-M23 and RSF as FTOs would not only limit their international financial and logistical mobility but would also send a message to regional governments that harbouring or negotiating with such groups carries international legal and diplomatic consequences.
A fourth amendment (S.Amdt.3626) addresses the African Union Support and Stabilisation Mission in Somalia (AUSSOM), where Risch seeks to limit US financial involvement in African Union-led peace operations in Somalia via UN-assessed contributions, unless stringent conditions are met.
Risch, alongside Senators Ted Cruz (R-TX) and Rick Scott (R-FL), introduced the AUSSOM Funding Restriction Act of 2025 to restrict the use of United States Assessed Contributions to the United Nations under United Nations Security Council Resolution 2719 (2023) “to safeguard US taxpayer funds and hold the UN and African Union (AU) accountable in African peace operations.” In other words, the senators’ concern is not about all US funding to Africa. It is specifically about how American taxpayer money sent through the UN might be used to support an AU-linked institution without clear safeguards. The senators argue that the AU has not met the eligibility and funding conditions expected by the US government, stating bluntly, “The AU’s inability to meet the eligibility criteria and funding conditions asked of the US shows a disregard for the American taxpayer’s money.” This amendment calls for temporarily blocking such funds unless the State Department certifies that AUSSOM is not promoting anti-democratic or anti-American values. The amendment pushes for greater accountability, burden-sharing, and alternative funding models for such missions.
For African policymakers, the message is clear. US support is not disappearing, but it is changing. Access to defence privileges, financial backing, and counterterrorism partnership will increasingly depend on tangible alignment with US strategic objectives—and demonstrable distance from behaviours that violate human rights, undermine, or obstruct American commercial and national interests.
Pearl Matibe is a Washington, DC-based geopolitical analyst and correspondent with expertise in foreign policy and international security, regularly covering the Pentagon and White House. Follow her on X (Twitter): @PearlMatibe. (Source: https://www.defenceweb.co.za/)
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