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Military And Security Developments
Sep 05.
- Israel-Palestinian Territories: Settler attack will elevate ethno-religious tensions, risk of reprisals. On the night of 4-5 September, a group of Israeli settlers infiltrated the Palestinian village of Khallit al-Dabe’ (Hebron governorate), where they attacked civilians, vandalised cars and damaged a solar power system. Local residents claim that at least 20 individuals were injured in the incident, with three individuals hospitalised as a result. The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) and Israeli police later arrived at the village but did not identify any suspects. The incident highlights the increasing intensity of Israeli settler attacks against Palestinians and the expansion of these attacks into the southern West Bank. The attack will further elevate ethno-religious tensions and the likelihood of radicalisation, driving militant activity and terror risks in the area over the coming months. These risks will be particularly acute across Jerusalem (Jerusalem district) and the West Bank over the next two months amid the various upcoming Jewish holidays (22-24 September, 1-2 October and 6-14 October). We assess these risks will likely drive the Israeli security forces to adopt an augmented posture in the West Bank, increasing travel disruption.
- Iraq: Inspections by navy will elevate compliance risks for shipping companies. On 4 September, the Iraqi navy carried out inspection and protection operations for oil and commercial tankers before they docked at the Basra oil terminal. The operations included checking crew members, verifying official documents – including permits – and conducting comprehensive inspections of arriving tankers. The Iraqi authorities stated that the primary objective was to curb smuggling activities and establish full control over the port. We assess that the Iraqi navy will possibly conduct a series of similar inspections at Basra’s port over the coming weeks in a bid to address repeated US concerns regarding the smuggling of Iranian crude oil in the Gulf region. Such measures will elevate compliance risks for shipping and logistics companies operating at Basra’s port throughout H2 2025. We also assess that the navy will likely augment its presence in the Gulf by increasing the frequency and scope of its patrols, partially elevating the risk of clashes with fuel smugglers in Gulf waters.
Sep 04.
IRAN
• The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) updated its estimates of Iran’s pre-war uranium stockpiles, underscoring the likelihood of long-term regional tensions and the risk of Israeli airstrikes. On 3 September, the Associated Press published details of a confidential IAEA report estimating that Iran accrued an additional 32.3kg of 60% enriched uranium from 17 May to 13 June. This indicates that Iran possessed a 440.9kg stockpile of 60% enriched uranium before the start of the Iran-Israel war. If enriched to 90%, this stockpile would be sufficient to construct at least ten nuclear munitions. Iran’s uranium stockpiles remain unaccounted for following Israeli and US airstrikes on key nuclear facilities during the Iran-Israel war. Although the stockpile almost certainly remains intact, there is a realistic possibility that the extent of the destruction at the Isfahan (Isfahan province), Fordow (Qom province) and Natanz (Natanz province) facilities has rendered it inaccessible. More broadly, Iran likely remains unable to develop nuclear weapons rapidly due to substantial damage to its enrichment, weaponisation and missile development capabilities resulting from the Iran-Israel war (see Sibylline Special Report – 20 June 2025). Even so, demonstrable Iranian efforts to re-constitute these capabilities would increase the risk of Israeli strike action targeting nuclear facilities; covert operations to disrupt efforts to access buried stockpiles will also almost certainly continue in the coming months.
• Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian attended the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) summit in China, underscoring Iran’s deepening ties with China and Russia. Iran’s delegation also held bilateral meetings with Chinese and Russian officials in attendance. These discussions centred on advancing economic integration and diplomatic co-ordination, particularly on multilateral and nuclear issues. The meetings underscore Iran’s intensifying efforts to consolidate diplomatic support for its nuclear development programme, particularly following the E3’s (France, Germany and the UK) initiation of efforts to re-apply UN sanctions on Iran for violating its commitments under the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA; see Sibylline Middle East Crisis Update – 1 September 2025). Both China and Russia have repeatedly affirmed their support for Iran’s ‘right’ to develop its nuclear programme and will highly likely attempt to leverage their positions on the UN Security Council to delay the implementation of sanctions by calling for the unconditional extension of the JCPOA’s snapback clause. However, the E3 are unlikely to agree to an extension unless Iran engages in negotiations with the US, sustaining the risk of sanctions being re-implemented in the short-to-medium term. The meetings also underscore intensifying Iranian efforts to deepen military trade ties with Russia and China so as to reconstitute its security forces’ capacity following the Iran-Israel war (see Sibylline Special Report – 20 June 2025). Such efforts are highly unlikely to be effective in the short term, sustaining Iranian vulnerability to a resumption of Israeli strike action (see above).
ISRAEL
• Violent outbreaks at pro-ceasefire protests in Jerusalem (Jerusalem district) highlight the elevated security and travel risks in the coming days. On 3 September, the families of hostages in Gaza launched a protest campaign in Jerusalem; they also announced plans to continue demonstrations throughout the weekend (Friday-Saturday). During the demonstrations on 3 September, several protesters set fire to rubbish bins near the prime minister’s residence in the Rehavia and Givat Ram neighbourhoods (both Jerusalem). Throughout the day, protesters blocked key thoroughfares across Jerusalem, including the light railway. The Israeli police deployed mounted units; they used tear gas and water cannons to disperse protesters, and also made several arrests. Protests are likely to continue throughout the coming days, though with a lower intensity. Even so, travel disruption across the city is highly likely in the coming days. There is a realistic possibility that protesters will sporadically erect roadblocks, further elevating disruption and driving the likelihood of the police using excessive force. It is unlikely that the outbreak of violence on 3 September represents a decisive shift in protesters’ tactics; we also assess that such instances are unlikely to become a common occurrence. However, the risks facing assets will remain elevated, especially around Rehavia and Givat Ram, as well as along Jaffa Road and near the entrance to the city on Highway 1. The largest protest is planned for 6 September at around 2030hrs (local time) at the Paris Square (Jerusalem); the event is likely to elevate traffic disruption significantly. The timing will also exacerbate the risk of clashes with local ultra-Orthodox residents protesting against the breaking of the Shabbat, particularly in the event that demonstrators gather before 1936hrs (the end of Shabbat). There is a realistic possibility that following the conclusion of the main demonstration on 6 September, individual protester groups will move to block routes across the city and cause further disruption, elevating the risk of clashes between protesters and the police.
PALESTINIAN TERRITORIES
• Hamas’ continued visibility in Gaza’s governance – despite the escalating Israeli offensive – underscores the long-term challenges involved in securing a ceasefire and post-war governance structure. On 2 September, local media reported that the IDF had begun expanding ground operations into the Sheikh Radwan area, one of the most densely populated neighbourhoods in Gaza City. Intensifying operations will almost certainly continue in the coming week, sustaining critical threats to life for locally engaged staff and compounding international scrutiny of Israel and Israeli-linked companies. However, despite expanding IDF operations, Hamas continues to exercise significant control over Gaza’s social and economic governance. On 3 September, Hamas published footage allegedly showing its police forces in Khan Yunis (southern Gaza) assaulting numerous merchants and cash dealers who were allegedly charging civilians 50% commission to withdraw cash. Gaza faces a severe liquidity crisis due to its broad isolation from the international financial system, while the majority of banking facilities, ATMs and currency exchanges are non-operational due to the Israel-Hamas war. The incident underscores widespread price gauging in Gaza’s cash-based economy, as well as Hamas’ continued capacity to police commercial operations, particularly the sale of food and consumable goods. Such conditions underscore the long-term governance risks within Gaza, particularly given Israel’s conditioning of a permanent ceasefire on the demobilisation of Hamas and its removal from formal governance systems within Gaza.
• The upcoming UN General Assembly and UN General Debate will likely trigger increased hostility from the Israeli government towards the Palestinian Authority (PA), elevating socio-economic concerns in the West Bank. On 2 September, French President Emmanuel Macron announced that France and Saudi Arabia will co-chair a conference on advancing the Two-State Solution in New York (New York, US) on 22 September. The UN General Assembly will convene its General Debate the following day (23 September); numerous states, including Australia, Belgium, Canada, France and the UK, are slated to recognise an independent Palestinian state during the forum. In response, hard-right Israeli Finance Minister Bezalel Smotrich will likely attempt to increase pressure on the PA by delaying fiscal transfers and restricting the PA’s access to goods permits. Such measures would likely further undermine the PA’s financial stability and increase the risk of delayed payments to PA civil servants, driving the risk of industrial action, anti-government protests and broader socio-economic concerns in the West Bank. There is also a realistic possibility that hard-right members of the Israeli government will issue increasingly expansive calls for the annexation of the West Bank. Although annexation remains highly unlikely in the short term, such calls are likely to compound ethno-religious tensions within the West Bank and exacerbate regional tensions between Israel and its various partners vis-à-vis the Palestinian Territories.
• A plot to assassinate an Israeli minister in Hebron highlights the elevated security risks during Jewish holidays. On 3 September, Israel’s Shin Bet (internal security) revealed that it had arrested a terror cell planning to assassinate Israeli National Security Minister Itamar Ben Gvir during a planned visit to the Cave of the Patriarchs in Hebron over the Jewish holidays (22-24 September, 1-2 October and 6-14 October). The group of four individuals planned to use explosive-laden drones and firearms. Additionally, on 2 September, IDF troops raided the house of Hebron’s Palestinian mayor, Tayseer Abu Sneineh, whom they arrested on suspicion of incitement, as well as supporting Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ). The arrests and the assassination plot highlight the elevated ethno-religious tensions and risk of attacks across the West Bank and Jerusalem areas, particularly during the upcoming Jewish holidays. These risks will increase further in response to any attempts to disrupt the established status quo in Jerusalem by far-right Jewish elements (including government officials and ministers), such as organising prayers in the al-Aqsa compound. As such, the IDF is likely to augment its presence and operations across the West Bank in the coming weeks, including through the proliferation of checkpoints, driving transport disruption.
RED SEA
• Israel-Yemen: The Iranian-backed Houthis continue to launch missiles and drones against Israel on a near-daily basis, elevating the likelihood of further Israeli strikes targeting Yemen. Despite the latest Israeli strikes against Yemen, the Houthis continue to launch daily ordnance against Israel. Israel’s air defences remain highly capable, with most ordnance intercepted outside Israeli airspace (thereby moderating the risks facing Israeli population centres). Even so, operational and travel disruption risks due to Houthi launches remain elevated, particularly in the vicinity of Ben Gurion International Airport (TLV). This will likely result in sporadic fight disruption over the coming weeks. Continued Houthi launches targeting Israel over the coming days will increase the risk of further Israeli strikes against Houthi targets in Yemen. These strikes are also likely to target dual-use facilities and infrastructure such as logistical hubs, ports and power stations, increasing energy and food security risks in Houthi-held territory. Furthermore, Israeli strikes against Houthi targets will almost certainly take place in response to Houthi launches involving cluster munitions (see Sibylline Middle East Crisis Update – 28 August 2025). The further use of cluster munitions by the Houthis remains a realistic possibility. However, the group likely achieved its desired psychological impact when it last used these munitions. Due to both the Houthis’ likely limited arsenal and the superior capability of Israel’s air defences, we assess that the risk of cluster munitions targeting Israel more frequently in the coming weeks will be tempered.
REGIONAL AND GLOBAL DEVELOPMENTS
• Israel-Lebanon: An IDF strike near UN forces in Lebanon underscores the persistent threat of misfire; this will possibly undermine trilateral security co-ordination across Lebanon’s southern border regions. On 3 September, the UN Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) stated that IDF drones dropped four grenades near peacekeeping forces working to clear roadblocks hindering access to a UNIFIL position. UNIFIL described the incident as ‘one of the most serious attacks’ on its personnel since the Israel-Hizballah ceasefire came into force on 28 November 2024. In response, the IDF stated that it did not intentionally target peacekeepers in Lebanon, but rather potential threats nearby. Even so, the incident underscores the risk of misfire and clashes between the IDF, the Lebanese army and UNIFIL personnel, who all operate in close proximity to one another across the border regions of southern Lebanon. Incidents of misfire and misidentification will possibly aggravate tensions between the three entities, undermining trilateral security co-ordination amid broader disarmament operations in Lebanon.
• Limited clashes in a Palestinian refugee camp are unlikely to hinder disarmament measures significantly. On 3 September, heavy clashes broke out between two families within the Bourj el-Barajneh Palestinian refugee camp in Beirut, resulting in two injuries. Local media reported that both parties employed machine guns and rocket-propelled grenades (RPGs). The clashes came days after the Lebanese army launched a disarmament campaign targeting Palestinian refugee camps in Bourj el-Barajneh on 21 August. The incident underscores the broader security risks emanating from widespread weapons proliferation in refugee camps, which are not under the Lebanese government’s control or supervision. This dynamic will sustain the risk of further sporadic local clashes and collateral damage within these areas in the coming weeks. The Bourj el-Barajneh clashes were unlikely to have been politically motivated, as limited armed fights between Palestinian clans inside these camps are common. As such, the incident is unlikely to hinder the ongoing disarmament process; the Lebanese army is also highly likely to launch further disarmament raids targeting the Bourj el-Barajneh camp in co-ordination with the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO). Nevertheless, such raids will increase the risk of clashes between rogue groups (particularly Islamist factions) and the Lebanese and Palestinian authorities. The risk will be particularly acute in the Ain al-Hilweh (South governorate) and Nahr al-Bared (North governorate) camps, exacerbating exposure to crossfire for locally engaged staff, particularly NGO staff operating within the camps.
• Bahrain-Israel: Rare pro-Palestine protests underscore partially elevated security risks in Manama throughout September. On 1 September, dozens of Bahraini pro-Palestine activists conducted small-scale protests in Manama in response to the appointment of a new Israeli ambassador. The protests triggered limited altercations with the police, though local media reported no injuries or subsequent arrests. The Bahraini authorities have not commented on the protests. However, the security forces are highly likely to augment their presence in the streets of Manama in the coming days, particularly around the Israeli and US embassies. An elevated posture is also likely in major squares, public spaces and along the Manama waterfront. Nevertheless, these security measures are unlikely to trigger mobility disruption in the capital or augment traffic jams during peak hours. While the Bahraini security forces are unlikely to conduct reactionary mass arrest campaigns in the coming days, further limited pro-Palestine protests in the country would increase the likelihood of crackdowns. The risk of fresh local protests will increase if the IDF advances with its plans to occupy Gaza City; this would in turn elevate the risk of clashes and arrests during such demonstrations, raising the overall security risks in Manama throughout September.
• Israel-Turkey: A concert ban in Istanbul (Istanbul province, Turkey) underlines the increasing reputational and operational disruption risks facing event-management and tourism firms dealing with pro-Israel artists. On 3 September, Istanbul’s governor banned a performance by the prominent French singer Enrico Macias following local protests over his pro-Israel stance. The Jewish singer has repeatedly announced his support for Israel and the IDF, leading to a similar ban in Algeria (his birthplace). The ban also reflects the significant tensions that exist between Turkey and Israel, which culminated in the severance of trade ties and airspace restrictions (see Sibylline Middle East Crisis Update – 1 September 2025). The ban has also increased the reputational and operational disruption risks facing event-management and tourism companies with a presence in the Turkish market that deal with pro-Israel artists and influencers. We assess these risks would increase significantly if the IDF advances with its plans to occupy Gaza City in the coming weeks, as this would likely lead to a deterioration of humanitarian conditions in the strip.
• Israel-Spain: Pro-Palestine protesters disrupted the final stage of the Vuelta a Espana cycling race, underscoring sustained disruption risks facing high-profile events involving Israeli-linked entities. On 3 September, pro-Palestine protesters mobilised a demonstration surrounding the finish line of the 11th stage of the Vuelta a Espana in Bilbao (Basque Country autonomous community, Spain), leading organisers to end the stage approximately two miles (3km) early. Pro-Palestine demonstrators have frequently targeted the Vuelta given the participation of the Israeli-linked team (Israel-Premier Tech), disrupting the race at several stages. These incidents underscore the sustained risk of targeted protests and activism facing high-profile sports events involving Israeli athletes, delegations or teams, particularly those that take place in public spaces and along major roads. Pro-Palestine protest activity will also likely target football matches involving Maccabi Tel Aviv F.C. as part of the UEFA Europa League’s ‘league phase’ in the coming weeks. Matches will occur in Thessaloniki (Greece; 24 September), Backa Topola (Serbia; 2 and 23 October, 27 November), Birmingham (UK; 6 November) and Stuttgart (Germany; 11 December). The risk of protest-related unrest and harassment targeting Maccabi fans will remain elevated across this period. Such incidents would also increase reputational and exposure risks for firms associated with major events, particularly headline sponsors, security contractors and event-management firms.
• Syria: Detention of defence, interior ministry staff underscores prevalence of rogue elements. On 3 September, a committee investigating violence against civilians in Suwayda governorate announced it had interrogated and detained members of Syria’s defence and interior ministries. In mid-July, intercommunal clashes in Suwayda between Druze and Bedouin tribes prompted the intervention of government forces, who were later accused of engaging in violence against Druze communities, including the execution of civilians. While the government’s crackdown likely aims to project an image of reform to the international community, the arrests also highlight the prevalence of rogue elements within the government’s forces, underscoring the growing risk of similar incidents happening in the future. This will possibly drive caution among international investors and reduced political engagement in the short term (as key stakeholders will possibly worry about conflict escalation). Furthermore, we assess that the detention of security personnel will elevate the risk of splinter groups forming in opposition to the government, driving the likelihood of factional violence and increasing security risks for NGO and business personnel in Syria in the coming months.
• Lebanon: Clashes in Palestinian camp are unlikely to hinder disarmament measures. On 3 September, two people were injured in heavy clashes between two Palestinian clans in a Palestinian refugee camp called Bourj el-Barajneh (which is located in the capital Beirut). Both parties discharged small-arms and rocket-propelled grenades (RPGs). Notably, the clashes came days after the launch of the Lebanese army’s disarmament campaign across Palestinian camps, which started in Bourj el-Barajneh on 21 August. The incident underscores the security risks emanating from the proliferation of weapons in camps across Lebanon, sustaining the risk of sporadic local clashes and collateral damage. However, these recent clashes are unlikely to have been politically motivated; armed clashes between Palestinian clans in such camps are common. Therefore, we assess that the incident is unlikely to hinder the ongoing disarmament process. However, the Lebanese army is highly likely to launch further disarmament raids targeting Bourj el-Barajneh in co-ordination with the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), possibly driving clashes between the Lebanese and Palestinian authorities (as well as rogue groups, particularly Islamist elements).
Sep 03.
* Israel: Protests will elevate traffic disruption, drive bystander security risks. Earlier on 3 September, anti-government protesters set fire to bins and damaged cars near the prime minister’s residence in Jerusalem’s Rehavia neighbourhood (Jerusalem district) and burned tires near his office in the Givat Ram neighbourhood. The violence marks the start of three days of protest action in Jerusalem, organised by the families of the hostages in Gaza. A mass rally outside the prime minister’s residence is scheduled to take place later on 3 September; the largest protest is scheduled to take place in Paris Square (Jerusalem) in the evening of 6 September. Protest action will almost certainly drive traffic disruption in the city, leading to knock-on localised operational risks in the coming days. The authorities will likely adopt an enhanced security posture ahead of further planned demonstrations, elevating the risk of sporadic clashes and bystander exposure to tear gas, skunk water and arbitrary arrests. As the government expands the war in Gaza, we assess that protest activity across Israel will likely increase in the coming weeks, particularly near government buildings in Givat Ram (Jerusalem) and in Tel Aviv (Tel Aviv district).
• Bahrain: Rare pro-Palestine protests will partially elevate security risks in September. On 1 September, dozens of Bahraini pro-Palestine activists conducted small-scale protests in the capital Manama in response to the appointment of a new Israeli ambassador, resulting in limited altercations with the police. Local media reported no injuries or arrests. So far, the authorities have not commented on the protests, but the police are highly likely to augment their presence in the streets of Manama in the coming days, particularly around the Israeli and the US embassies, as well as in major squares. Nevertheless, these security measures are unlikely to trigger mobility disruption in the capital. While the Bahraini police are currently unlikely to conduct reactionary mass arrest campaigns in the coming days, this risk will increase in the event of further limited pro-Palestine protests. Further limited protests will be likely if the Israeli army advances with its plans to occupy Gaza City, increasing risks of clashes and arrests during these events and elevating overall security risks in Manama throughout September.
Sep 02.
• Libya: Eruption of widespread clashes in Tripoli will be possible in coming days. On 31 August, the UN Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL) warned that the current security situation in the capital Tripoli poses ‘potential harm’ to civilians, urging restraint and a return to dialogue. At the time of writing, tensions in Tripoli are elevated, with the Government of National Unity (GNU) ordering the Special Deterrence Forces (RADA) militia to hand over fugitives (including members of RADA and allied groups) wanted by the attorney general. Furthermore, local media has reported sporadic clashes between the government-affiliated militias and the RADA (and its allies) in Tripoli and Zawiya (Zawiya district) over the past 72 hours. As such, there is a realistic possibility that the increasing military buildup from all sides and persistent tensions will trigger a wider armed conflict in Tripoli in the coming days. This will significantly elevate physical security threats for expats and operational disruption risks for businesses across all sectors. Furthermore, resumption of conflict will elevate spillover risks beyond Tripoli, with militias highly likely to seek support from nearby cities in the west, such as Misrata (Misrata district), Zawiya and Zintan (Jabal al Gharbi district).
• Iraq-Syria: Major security operation underscores persistent risks of Islamic State resurgence. On 1 September, the Iraqi National Intelligence Service (INIS) announced the arrest of a network responsible for financing Islamic State (IS) and plotting large-scale terrorist attacks in European countries and against Iraqi interests abroad. The security authorities also arrested individuals facilitating the movement of IS fighters across regional borders. The operation underscores persistent attempts by IS and its affiliates to rebuild the group’s military capabilities and financing networks across Iraq, particularly in the rural areas of Kurdistan region and across the desert regions bordering Syria. These risks will increase amid the phased withdrawal of the US-led coalition forces from Iraq during the next six months. Simultaneously, IS is highly likely to continue its attempted resurgence in Syria, capitalising on the security vacuum and political instability in the country. As such, we assess that further attacks against government, military and religious buildings in Iraq and Syria will be likely in H2 2025, despite ongoing security operations.
• Tunisia: Calls for protests underscore operational, financial risks for Israeli-linked businesses. On 31 August, a Tunisian organisation affiliated with the Boycott, Divestment, Sanctions (BDS) movement called on citizens to escalate protests outside Carrefour branches and intensify the nationwide boycott of the French supermarket chain. The call to action followed violent clashes between pro-Palestine protesters and Carrefour employees at a store in La Marsa (Tunis governorate) on 30 August. Protesters allege that the chain’s Israeli franchise, Yeinot Bitan, has supplied care packages to the Israel Defense Forces (IDF). An increase in demonstrations will possibly cause transport disruption in and around commercial centres, creating additional supply chain risks. It will likely also heighten security risks for bystanders involved in routine activities, such as grocery shopping. If protests grow significantly, the security forces will almost certainly respond with heavy-handed tactics, increasing the risk of arbitrary detention for proximate personnel. Overall, we assess that escalating protest activity highlights threats to other businesses in Tunisia with alleged links to Israel, raising operational and financial risks for such companies.
Sep 01.
IRAN
• Following the E3’s (France, Germany and the UK) initiation of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action’s (JCPOA’s) snapback process, Iran will highly likely maintain strategic ambiguity regarding engagement with the US, increasing risks of sanctions application.
• Iran continues to identify and arrest individuals on suspicion of association with Israel, underscoring threats to locally engaged staff amid broader human rights concerns.
ISRAEL
• Scheduled protests in Jerusalem will elevate traffic disruption and security risks; protests will likely intensify in the coming week.
PALESTINIAN TERRITORIES
• The IDF has targeted and likely killed Hamas’ spokesperson Abu Obeida, amid broader preparations for further operations in Gaza City.
• The IDF has designated Gaza City as a combat zone, underscoring increasing preparations for a renewed offensive, despite a limited response to evacuation orders.
• Pro-Palestine activists have launched a fleet of small boats aiming to break Israel’s naval blockade of Gaza, which will almost certainly sustain international scrutiny of IDF operations in Gaza.
IRAN
• Following the E3’s (France, Germany and the UK) initiation of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action’s (JCPOA’s) snapback process, Iran will highly likely maintain strategic ambiguity regarding engagement with the US, increasing risks of sanctions application. On 28 August, Iranian parliamentarians introduced a three-part bill to the legislature that would withdraw Iran from the International Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) and its Additional Protocol. The bill would also terminate co-operation with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA; Iran suspended co-operation in July) and end diplomatic engagement with the US and the E3 on reaching a nuclear agreement. If adopted, the legislation would mark a major diplomatic escalation amid heightened regional tensions, underscoring escalating Iranian efforts to pressure the E3 into abandoning the re-implementation of UN sanctions. Contrastingly, Iran’s Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi sent a letter to the EU on 29 August stating that Tehran would be willing to resume ‘fair and balanced negotiations’. This came after the EU Foreign Policy Chief Kaja Kallas called for intensified diplomacy during the JCPOA’s 30-day review period.
• These approaches almost certainly reflect Iranian efforts to maintain strategic ambiguity regarding its nuclear programme and willingness to engage in negotiations with the US, given major incompatibilities relating to domestic uranium enrichment. Iran is unlikely to adopt the submitted legislation in the coming weeks; however, it will highly likely continue to threaten to withdraw from the NPT to pressure the E3 into supporting a UN Security Council (UNSC) resolution drafted by China and Russia that would unconditionally extend the snapback clause by six months. The E3 previously conditioned the snapback clause extension on Iran committing to renewed negotiations with the US and are highly unlikely to support an unconditional extension. Increasing diplomatic brinkmanship vis-à-vis sanctions implementation will likely continue to undermine investor confidence in the Iranian economy, triggering further devaluation of the Iranian rial (IRR); this will compound socio-economic health concerns and increase risks of commodity shortages in the coming weeks. Failure to reach a nuclear agreement with the US in the short term will almost certainly result in the re-implementation of UN sanctions, with Iran highly likely subsequently withdrawing from the NPT. In the medium-to-long term, concerns over a lack of monitoring protocols and international oversight will also bolster prospects for resumed Israeli strike action targeting Iranian nuclear facilities. This will sustain elevated regional tensions and risks of temporary operational disruption (see Sibylline Special Report – 28 August 2025).
• Iran continues to identify and arrest individuals on suspicion of association with Israel, underscoring threats to locally engaged staff amid broader human rights concerns. On 30 August, Iranian state media reported that the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) had arrested eight individuals on suspicion of passing sensitive information to Israel before the Israel-Iran war. Since the war concluded on 24 June, the Iranian authorities claim to have arrested over 21,000 individuals on suspicion of espionage and have executed at least eight individuals. The latest arrests underscore sustained risks of surveillance, harassment and detention for individuals accused of association with Israel. Such scrutiny will also almost certainly continue applying to individuals with tangential associations with anti-government activism, as well as those employed by international businesses or NGOs. Foreign and dual nationals will face particularly elevated risks of targeting from the security and police forces, underscoring threats to local staff amid broader human rights concerns. Despite Iran’s efforts to identify and eliminate Israeli intelligence assets within the government administration, nuclear programme and security forces, Israel will likely continue to penetrate Iran’s institutions, sustaining risks of further purges and crackdowns.
ISRAEL
• Scheduled protests in Jerusalem will elevate traffic disruption and security risks; protests will likely intensify in the coming week. The families of the hostages in Gaza have scheduled a day of protest action in Jerusalem (Jerusalem district) on 3 September. Protesters plan to demonstrate in front of the prime minister’s residence at 9 Smolenskin Street in Rehavia neighbourhood. Heavy traffic disruption will be likely both in the immediate vicinity and possibly across the neighbourhood. Traffic disruption is also likely throughout Jerusalem due to an uptick in protest participants travelling into the city, which will impact parking availability across the city. There is an elevated risk that the police use excessive force when dispersing protesters in front of the prime minister’s residence, possibly driving bystander exposure to tear gas, skunk water, horse charges and arrest. Further protests across Jerusalem are almost certain, particularly outside the Knesset building in Givat Ram neighbourhood. In addition, in the coming week, there will likely be an increase in protest activity across Israel and particularly in Tel Aviv. This follows the Israel Defense Forces’ (IDF) retrieval of two Israeli hostage bodies (Idan Shtivi and Ilan Weiss) in the past week and reports that Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu is avoiding a vote on Hamas’ partial ceasefire offer. Currently, Israeli decision makers assess that Hamas is under pressure to push for a deal and are likely waiting for Hamas to make further concessions. However, there is a realistic possibility that Hamas will try to compound domestic unrest in Israel, likely releasing further footage and news of hostages in the coming days. This will increase prospects for substantial attendance in pro-ceasefire protests during the week and particularly over the weekend. An increase in incidents of protesters blocking key thoroughfares, particularly Ayalon Highway (Highway 20), is also likely, and will drive the police’s likely use of excessive force when dispersing protesters. This will also drive exposure to the above-mentioned police dispersal tactics, elevating the threat of harm to proximate staff and assets.
PALESTINIAN TERRITORIES
• The IDF has targeted and likely killed Hamas’ spokesperson Abu Obeida, amid broader preparations for further operations in Gaza City. On 30 August, the IDF conducted a series of airstrikes on a building in the al-Rimal neighbourhood of Gaza City, targeting and likely killing the high-profile Hamas spokesperson, Hudayfa Samir Abdallah al-Kahlout (known as Abu Obeida). Local media reports indicate that the explosion dispersed thousands of banknotes (including USD and ILS) from the building; Hamas subsequently took possession of the cash, underscoring the group’s continued dominance of civil governance and local security structures within Gaza. In the coming days, the IDF will almost certainly continue to conduct intense airstrikes targeting Gaza City, with ground operations continuing in the Jabalia, Sabra and Zeitoun neighbourhoods. Such operations will almost certainly sustain critical threats to life for locally engaged staff and civilians, while compounding risks of disruption to aid supply chains (see below).
• The IDF has designated Gaza City as a combat zone, underscoring increasing preparations for a renewed offensive, despite a limited response to evacuation orders. On 29 August, the IDF designated Gaza City as a combat zone and announced that it would no longer conduct daily tactical pauses in the area to facilitate aid deliveries (see Sibylline Middle East Crisis Update – 28 July 2025). The announcements come amid the intensification of the IDF’s operations in eastern and north-eastern Gaza City, ahead of operations to take control of the entire city. The pause revocation will almost certainly disrupt the transport of aid to and via the city, critically disrupting humanitarian operations and increasing threats to life for locally engaged NGO staff. Although the IDF has repeatedly called on civilians to evacuate Gaza City, regional media reports indicate that civilians have not broadly adhered to these orders; Israel’s Channel 12 estimates that approximately 10,000 of Gaza City’s 1,000,000 residents have evacuated since 9 August. On 30 August, the head of the International Committee of the Red Cross characterised Israel’s plans to evacuate Gaza City as ‘impossible’, stating that no area of Gaza has the infrastructure or capacity to support displaced residents. Amid continued conflict, disruption to aid operations and critical pressure on emergency and humanitarian services, conditions in Gaza are highly unlikely to improve in the short term, compounding socio-economic and public health concerns therein.
• Pro-Palestine activists have launched a fleet of small boats aiming to break Israel’s naval blockade of Gaza, which will almost certainly sustain international scrutiny of IDF operations in Gaza. On 31 August, a fleet of 20 small boats carrying food, water and medical aid departed from Spain as part of the Global Sumud Flotilla, which aims to break the IDF’s naval blockade of Gaza. The fleet includes high-profile environmental activist Greta Thunberg, who participated in a similar attempt to break Israel’s naval blockade in June. The fleet will travel to Tunis (Tunisia) by 4 September to join other flotilla participants; the arrival will highly likely trigger pro-Palestine protest activity on the city’s waterfront and will increase risks of operational disruption at the Port of Tunis. The flotilla plans to dock in Gaza on 8 September. Before the flotilla approaches the immediate vicinity of Gaza’s coast, the Israeli authorities will almost certainly seize the vessels, detain crew members and deport all participating foreign nationals. Detentions and repatriations will likely moderately elevate diplomatic tensions between Israel and receiving countries, particularly Austria, France, Spain and Sweden. Although the flotilla will almost certainly fail to break the naval blockade, it will likely increase scrutiny of IDF operations in Gaza amid deteriorating humanitarian conditions (see above). This will almost certainly sustain elevated risks of pro-Palestine protests and activism targeting Israeli and Israeli-linked firms, increasing operational disruption risks and reputational concerns. Any incidents resulting in injuries or vessel sinking will also likely trigger broader criticism of Israel, increasing risks of pro-Palestine protest activity in major cities in Australia, Europe and North America in the coming weeks.
RED SEA
• Israel-Yemen: Threats to Red Sea shipping and foreign nationals in Houthi-held territory will likely increase following a high-profile Israeli strike. On 28 August, the IDF struck several targets in the Yemeni capital Sanaa, killing the Houthi Prime Minister Ahmed Ghalib al Rawahi along with several other ministers. Rawahi’s role was largely ceremonial, and at the time of writing, reports indicate that the strike failed to kill Houthi military leaders. In the days following the strike, the Houthis launched sporadic missile and drone strikes against Israel, though the IDF intercepted these without any damage reported.
• Even so, the Houthis will likely increase their attacks targeting Israel and shipping in the Red Sea in the coming weeks. On 31 August, the Houthis targeted the Liberian-flagged chemical tanker ‘Scarlet Ray’ approximately 40 nautical miles (74km) south-west of Yanbu (Yanbu governorate, Saudi Arabia). The captain reported that ordnance landed near the vessel but caused no damage. The vessel’s Singapore-based manager is owned by the Israeli businessman Idan Ofer, whose assets the Houthis have targeted multiple times in the past. The strike is outside the Houthis’ usual operating area and highlights a possible expansion of their threat to shipping in the Red and Arab Seas in the coming weeks. Even so, the Houthis are currently unlikely to strike assets within the territories of other Gulf countries.
• On 31 August, the Houthis also raided two UN facilities in Sanaa, detaining at least 11 employees. The incident highlights increasing scrutiny of foreign personnel by Houthi forces, likely due to concerns of espionage following the latest Israeli strikes in the city (on 24 and 28 August). As such, foreign employees and NGO staff will face an elevated risk of arbitrary detention in the coming days, driving threats to their physical and mental well-being due to detention conditions and possibly forceful interrogation methods.
REGIONAL AND GLOBAL DEVELOPMENTS
• Israel-Turkey: The closure of Turkish airspace to Israeli government flights and cargo planes tied to the IDF will exacerbate significant tensions between both countries, elevating risks of operational disruption for Israeli airlines in the coming months. On 29 August, Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan said that his country had decided to sever all economic and trade ties with Israel and close its airspace to Israeli aircraft, augmenting the ongoing bilateral tensions. However, later that day, Turkish officials clarified that the airspace restriction applies only to Israeli government flights and Israeli planes carrying weapons, not to commercial flights. Notably, these decisions come days after the Turkish port authorities began requiring shipping agents to provide letters declaring that their vessels are not linked to Israel and not carrying military cargo bound for Israeli ports (see Sibylline Middle East Crisis Update – 28 August 2025). As well as likely causing operational disruption for Turkish businesses dealing with Israeli clients, escalating tensions will increase physical threat risks to Jewish travellers in Turkey in the coming months and the likelihood of attacks against local synagogues. In the coming months, Ankara will possibly completely close its airspace to all Israeli flights in response to the further deterioration of humanitarian conditions amid the IDF’s plans to occupy Gaza City, disrupting Israeli airlines’ operations in the region. Relations between Israel and Turkey will highly likely deteriorate further if the ceasefire in southern Syria collapses and Israel resumes its military airstrikes on the Syrian government forces.
• Israel-Lebanon: A partial uptick in Israeli airstrikes is possibly linked to advances in the US-backed plan to disarm Lebanese Hizballah (LH). Between 29 and 31 August, the IDF conducted a series of airstrikes in southern Lebanon (mostly in Nabatieh governorate), targeting LH operatives and military infrastructure in the region. Affected areas included the Beaufort Ridge area (Nabatieh), where the IDF claimed that LH cells are active. Furthermore, on 31 August, Lebanon’s local media reported intense explosions in the forest areas of Ali al-Taher hill and Al-Debsha (both Nabaitieh), likely indicating the presence of weapon depots and/or underground military infrastructure. The slight uptick in Israeli strikes in southern Lebanon over recent days possibly underscores efforts to secure military goals ahead of a partial Israeli withdrawal from remaining positions in southern Lebanon in the coming months. This is a key condition of the US-backed plan to disarm LH, which the Lebanese army and government are in the process of implementing. Nevertheless, LH’s persistent refusal to disarm and the subsequent risks of Shia unrest will still pose major hurdles to any possible Israeli withdrawal plans from the country in H2 2025.
• Israel-Portugal: The cancellation of a music festival in Portugal highlights increased reputational and event management risks for Israeli-linked events. On 28 August, the organisers of Anta Gathering announced that the local police had cancelled the music festival following a boycott campaign from BDS Portugal, an affiliate of the pro-Palestine Boycott, Divestment, Sanctions (BDS) movement. BDS Portugal targeted the event as its organisers are two Israeli nationals, one of whom the movement alleges served in the IDF during the Israel-Hamas War. Police stated that the event was cancelled due to the risk of wildfires. The cancellation underscores significant risks of targeted activism campaigns impacting the reputation and continuity of events associated with Israeli nationals, particularly cultural events such as music festivals and art exhibitions, as well as high-profile events such as sports matches and competitions involving Israeli teams and athletes. Threats to boycott, protest or disrupt such events will sustain event management and reputational concerns for associated firms, while likely sustaining elevated contingency insurance premiums for event management firms and service providers.
• Iran: Disruptive cyber attack sustains security, operational risks from hacktivist groups. On 30 August, international news outlets reported that a suspected hacktivist group (‘Lab Dookhtegan’) has targeted around 60 Iranian ships in a cyber operation since at least March. The group infiltrated a satellite communications company before pivoting into the ships’ environments to disable their communications systems. Lab Dookhtegan reportedly maintained access to the company’s systems for five months before causing disruption, highlighting the premeditated and sophisticated nature of this attack. The group overwrote approximately six storage partitions and wiped core data to halt all ship-to-shore communications, underscoring the security and operational risks stemming from the operation. This operation also showcases the prolonged impact of such attacks, as remediation efforts will possibly take several weeks and/or months. Lab Dookhtegan already disrupted approximately 116 Iranian ships in March and typically conducts cyber attacks to protest against the Iranian government. We assess that this development highlights sustained security and disruption risks amid ongoing regional hostilities.
• Israel-Yemen: UN detentions underscore elevated risks to NGO personnel. On 31 August, the Iran-backed Houthi militia detained at least 11 UN personnel during raids on UN offices in Hudaydah (Al Hudaydah governorate, Yemen) and the Yemeni capital Sanaa. The raids came after Israel killed the prime minister of Yemen’s unrecognised, Houthi-led government in a strike on 28 August. These developments likely underscore Houthi efforts to uncover foreign intelligence assets and will almost certainly increase NGO personnel’s exposure to arbitrary detentions and stop-and-search practices in the coming days. In turn, this will elevate threats of harm and health risks for personnel, arising from poor detention conditions. If such actions continue, this will possibly hinder NGO operations on the ground, compounding health and food security risks. Earlier on 1 September, the Houthis also claimed to have targeted an Israeli-owned tanker in the Red Sea, reportedly missing the vessel; this nevertheless indicates an increasing risk to Israel-affiliated vessels traversing Yemeni waters over the coming weeks. These developments highlight escalating conflict risks between Israel and the Houthis in Yemen, possibly prompting reciprocal Israeli strikes on Houthi infrastructure in Yemen in the coming days. (Source: Sibylline)
29 Aug 25. Turkey bars Israeli ships from its ports, restricts airspace. Turkey has decided to bar Israeli vessels from using its ports, forbid Turkish ships from using Israeli ports and impose restrictions on some planes entering Turkish airspace, Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan said on Friday. He provided few details in comments to parliament which appeared to summarise steps that Turkey has already taken against Israel over the war in Gaza or has started to implement.
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Turkey has fiercely criticised Israel’s offensive in Gaza and accuses it of committing genocide in the Palestinian enclave, a charge that Israel denies. Ankara has halted all trade with Israel, called for international measures against it and urged world powers to stop supporting Israel.
Sources told Reuters last week that Turkish port authorities had also started informally requiring shipping agents to provide letters declaring that vessels are not linked to Israel and not carrying military or hazardous cargo bound for the country.
A source had also said that Turkish-flagged ships would be prohibited from calling at Israeli ports. (Source: Reuters)
03 Sep 25. Israel Says it Killed Top ISIS Commander in Gaza Strike. The Israeli military said it killed Muhammad Abd al-Aziz Abu Zubaida, the most senior Islamic State official in Gaza, in an airstrike in the Al-Bureij area of central Gaza last week.
In a statement, the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) said the operation was directed by Southern Command and guided by the Military Intelligence Directorate.
According to the IDF, Abu Zubaida was “responsible for determining policy, planning and overseeing the terrorist organization’s activities across Gaza, Judea and Samaria, and the Sinai Peninsula, and for transferring combat equipment and funds into Gaza.” (Source: https://www.sofx.com/)
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