News in Brief

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10 Mar 26. Taiwan: Arms agreements will ease tensions with US; defence budget dispute remains. Earlier on 12 March, Taiwan’s three main political parties agreed to allow the government to sign agreements for four US arms packages before their deadlines on 15 and 26 March. These agreements are part of eight US arms packages to Taiwan, totalling USD 11 billion, that were approved in December 2025. The first batch included weapons such as self-propelled howitzers and HIMARS multiple rocket launcher systems, which will improve Taiwan’s asymmetric combat capabilities. This followed months of legislative deadlock over passing the procurement funding, as the government included it in a controversial USD 40 billion special defence budget bill that also covers indigenous arms development. In February, a bipartisan group of US lawmakers expressed concern to their Taiwanese counterparts over the potential payment delays. We assess that Taipei signing the offer letters in time is likely to ease tensions with Washington DC in the short term. The three parties will likely approve the necessary funds to the US before the first payment deadline on 31 March. Regardless, the opposition will highly likely continue advocating for slashing budgets on domestic arms development, which will slow Taiwan’s military modernisation. (Source: Sibylline)

10 Mar 26. Pakistan-Afghanistan: Airstrikes targeting Afghan capital Kabul underscore risk of sustained conflict. Earlier on 13 March, Pakistani news outlets citing security sources stated that Pakistan has conducted airstrikes inside Afghanistan, targeting the capital Kabul. The strikes reportedly targeted the headquarters of the Afghan Taliban’s 313 Corps and an ammunition depot in Kabul, while also targeting an oil storage facility and militant hideouts in Kandahar and Paktia provinces. Afghan Taliban spokesperson Zabihullah Mujahid has stated that Pakistan targeted fuel depots belonging to private Afghan airline Kam Air near Kandahar International Airport (KDH; Kandahar province). The airstrike on Kabul, which underscores elevated tensions and escalation risks, follows sporadic border clashes and Pakistani airstrikes in border regions in recent weeks. It also comes after Afghanistan launched an offensive against Pakistan on 26 February. Furthermore, the latest airstrikes on Kabul follow Pakistan’s refusal to hold talks with Afghanistan, amid reports of Chinese mediation attempts. We assess there is a realistic possibility of further, deeper airstrikes targeting Kabul, which would increase the risks of a prolonged conflict and of more intense clashes along the border. This would also increase the risk of Afghan drone attacks along the border and revenge attacks by Taliban militant groups within Pakistan, particularly Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP). (Source: Sibylline)

25 Mar 26.  Kenya: Further fuel shortages likely in coming weeks, elevating supply chain disruption, unrest risks. On 24 March, the head of Petroleum Outlets Association of Kenya (POAK) stated that approximately 20% of nationwide petrol outlets are affected by shortages, triggered by the Israel-US-Iran war. Kenya is particularly exposed to the ongoing war’s disruption, as it receives all its fuel supplies from Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states, whose exports transit through the Strait of Hormuz (currently under de facto closure). In response to the fuel price shock, the Energy and Petroleum Regulatory Authority (EPRA) has frozen petrol prices until 13 April. However, several dealers are allegedly stockpiling petroleum products in anticipation of a price increase in the coming weeks, compounding supply constraints. Shortages will severely disrupt overland supply chains, including from neighbouring states dependent on export via the port of Mombasa (Mombasa county). Moreover, with fuel prices likely to continue rising, government efforts to subsidise the price freeze will compound financial pressure on state revenues, increasing the likelihood of tax rises when the government presents the 2026/27 budget (which will likely be in June). We assess that this is likely to drive unrest and associated security risks in major cities across Kenya.

25 Mar 26.  Sudan: Escalating clashes in Blue Nile will increase tensions with Ethiopia, conflict spillover risks. On 23 March, Sudan accused Ethiopia of supporting the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF) amid escalating violence in Blue Nile state (Sudan). Since mid-March, the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) have repeatedly clashed with the RSF and the allied Sudan People’s Liberation Movement – North (SPLM-N) in Al Kurumik (Blue Nile), particularly in areas along the Ethiopia-Sudan border. The RSF and SPLM-N claim that this new joint offensive has captured Deim Mansour, Jurut and Kurmuk (all Blue Nile). The Sudanese government alleges that the Ethiopian authorities have supported the offensive by allowing RSF and SPLM-N militants to operate in nearby Assosa (Benishangul-Gumuz region; Ethiopia). The Sudanese government has repeatedly accused Ethiopia of supporting the RSF; in February, Reuters reported that the RSF is operating a training camp in Benishangul-Gumuz. Clashes in Blue Nile are highly likely to continue in the coming weeks, sustaining threats to locally engaged staff, including NGO personnel. Clashes along the Ethiopia-Sudan border will also increase the risk of conflict spillover into adjacent Ethiopian localities, possibly triggering restrictions to cross-border movement, including for refugees. (Source: Sibylline)

10 Mar 26. Ecuador: Upcoming security operations against armed groups will heighten physical safety risks.  On 11 March, Ecuador’s Interior Minister John Reimberg announced an upcoming major security force offensive against organised crime groups (OCGs) in the coming days across multiple provinces. Reimberg also announced that an associated curfew will be in place between 2300hrs and 0500hrs (local time) between 15 and 30 March in  El Oro, Guayas, Los Ríos and Santo Domingo de los Tsáchilas provinces. The authorities stated that the curfew will facilitate security force operations against OCGs in these areas, which official data indicates account for approximately 84% of national crime and 91% of ‘violent deaths’. In February, violence notably escalated in El Oro amid an ongoing territorial dispute between the Los Lobos OCG and the offshoot Los Lobos Box; gang-related violence increased by approximately 71% in the province compared to the previous month. We assess that the authorities will likely establish checkpoints and stop-and-search measures for civilians during curfew hours, elevating supply chain and transit disruption risks in the affected provinces. The security force operations will likely precipitate armed clashes with OCGs, increasing physical safety risks in El Oro, Guayas, Los Ríos and Santo Domingo de los Tsáchilas in the short term, particularly during curfew hours.

26 Mar 26. Mexico: Rejection of electoral reform is unlikely to increase policy risk in short term,  On 11 March, lawmakers in the Chamber of Deputies rejected President Claudia Sheinbaum’s proposed electoral reform bill. The proposal received 259 votes in favour and 234 against. Given that the electoral reform implied changes to the constitution, it required a two-thirds majority (i.e. 334 votes in favour) for approval, rather than a simple majority. Sheinbaum’s National Regeneration Movement (MORENA) party largely voted in favour, while coalition allies in the Ecologist Green Party of Mexico (PVEM) and Worker’s Party (PT) voted against the bill. This marks Sheinbaum’s first major legislative defeat since she was elected in 2024 and a rare split in the ruling coalition. Sheinbaum suggested that a ‘Plan B’ was being drafted to enact electoral reforms that would not require constitutional amendments and consequently could be approved with a simple legislative majority. If Sheinbaum proposes such a bill, we assess that the Chamber of Deputies will likely approve the reform, sustaining low policy stagnation risks. However, this will highly likely attract criticism from opposition parties and possibly PVEM and PT lawmakers over concerns that the measure seeks to cement MORENA’s political power, increasing polarisation risks. (Source: Sibylline)

 

10 Mar 26. Paraguay: Security agreement with US government will reduce regional tensions. On 10 March, 53 out of 80 lawmakers in Paraguay’s Chamber of Deputies approved a status of forces agreement (SOFA) with the US government. President Santiago Peña will almost certainly ratify the agreement in the coming days. The SOFA establishes a legal framework for US military personnel to provide training, joint exercises and humanitarian assistance in Paraguay. The agreement also establishes that the US will have criminal jurisdiction over its personnel operating in the country. However, Paraguay’s Minister of Foreign Affairs Rubén Ramírez Lezcano stated that ‘there is no possibility of installing US military bases’ in Paraguay. The agreement comes amid the US’ deepening of bilateral and multilateral relations across Latin America and the Caribbean to support tackling organised crime groups (OCGs). We assess that the agreement will likely bolster anti-OCG capabilities in Paraguay and serve as a legal framework to expand co-operation with the US in the future. Security forces risks and bilateral tensions will decrease in the medium term. However, opposition lawmakers have argued that the SOFA reduces Paraguay’s sovereignty, increasing the risk of associated protests in the capital Asunción (particularly near the US embassy) in the coming days. (Source: Sibylline)

10 Mar 26. Congo (DRC): Further drone strikes are likely across Goma, eastern DRC in coming months. Earlier on 11 March, two explosive-laden drones killed at least three people, including a French UNICEF aid worker, in a strike on a residential area in Goma (North Kivu province) which is currently occupied by the Rwandan-backed M23 rebel group. M23 officials claim the strike was conducted by the Congolese government. Given recent drone strikes by the M23 on Kisangani Bangoka International Airport (FKI, Tshopo province), there is a realistic possibility that the government conducted a retaliatory strike. However, given the targeting of residential areas, it is also possible that the strike was conducted by a government-aligned militia (known as Wazalendo) which have been more actively involved in conflict with the M23 throughout North Kivu and South Kivu over recent months. Regardless, there is a realistic possibility of further drone strikes in Goma over the coming months, substantially elevating physical security threats to staff throughout the city and possibly targeting major transit infrastructure such as Goma International Airport (GOM). Such strikes will increase the risk of broader M23 drone warfare, compounding threats to regional transit hubs across eastern areas of Congo (DRC). (Source: Sibylline)

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Military And Security Developments

 

March 25 .

• Middle East, North Africa and Turkey region: Hormuz passage is likely to remain limited, sustaining market disruption. On 24 March, Iran informed members of the International Maritime Organisation (IMO) that it will allow ‘non-hostile vessels’ to transit through the Strait of Hormuz. Tehran also conditioned these vessels’ passage on co-ordination with the Iranian authorities. Iran’s announcement comes amid growing international tensions and pressure to facilitate safe passage to vessels in the strait. However, Iran has already been providing passage to ships in the strait on a case-by-case basis, often in exchange for facilitation payments. Furthermore, Iran is highly likely to classify vessels transporting oil, gas and commodities from Gulf states hosting US military installations as hostile and prevent their transit. As such, Iran’s announcement is unlikely to signal a significant change to the state of passage through the strait and the threat environment surrounding the waterway. Furthermore, we assess that shipping companies are likely to remain wary of poor co-ordination, misfire and the overall targeting of their ships and crews, driving them to continue avoiding the strait in the coming days and weeks, and therefore sustaining supply chain disruption and pressure on oil and energy markets.
• Middle East, North Africa and Turkey region: Severe weather will exacerbate existing risks stemming from conflict.On 26 March, strong to severe thunderstorms, damaging winds and hail are forecast across much of the Gulf, with a rare but credible risk of desert tornadoes in Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the UAE, as well as parts of southern Iran. Some areas, including the UAE, will possibly experience up to a year’s worth of rainfall, increasing the risk of significant flooding. This is likely to impact low-lying, desert and urban areas, causing disruption to overland movement and increasing staff exposure to injury or death caused by debris from damaged infrastructure, collisions along highways and drowning. Severe weather conditions will possibly degrade the effectiveness of air defence and early warning systems, raising the likelihood of successful Iranian strikes against military, dual-use and energy infrastructure, therefore compounding elevated on-the-ground personnel security risks. We assess that successful targeting, combined with hazardous flying conditions, will likely exacerbate disruption to civilian air travel, leading to flight delays and diversions. Off-shore thunderstorms will possibly generate waterspouts and rough sea conditions, exacerbating regional risks to maritime operations and commercial shipping.
• Iran: Ongoing war will elevate security risks for linked organisations from cyber activiOn 24 March, international news outlets reported on a potential uptick in cyber operations targeting Iranian entities since the onset of the Iran-US-Israel war. Israel reportedly infiltrated Tehran’s surveillance camera system ahead of the initial airstrikes on 28 February. It subsequently used intelligence gathered through compromised cameras to locate and assassinate the then supreme leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei. Earlier in March, the Israeli cyber security company Check Point highlighted an increase in Iran-led cyber attacks on internet protocol (IP) cameras across the Middle East used to inform retaliatory strikes, illustrating the widespread exploitation of surveillance equipment by all parties. Also on 24 March, a financially motivated threat group (‘TeamPCP’) reportedly attempted to wipe data from compromised machines located in Iran, highlighting the possible influence of the war on broader malicious cyber activity. We assess that Iran-linked entities will face elevated security risks amid the ongoing war and the subsequent escalation in cyber activity.

Mar 17.

• IRAN-US-GULF: Iranian strikes against Gulf energy infrastructure remain likely in the coming days despite the US’ announcement of postponed attacks.
• ISRAEL: The increased usage of medium-range interceptors elevates security risks from cluster munitions and reflects efforts to negate shortages amid prospective conflict protraction.
• ISRAEL-LEBANON: Sustained Israeli targeting of bridges over the Litani River indicates that the IDF will likely launch ground operations south of the river in the coming days and weeks, driving conflict escalation risks in the area.
• IRAN-STRAIT OF HORMUZ: Amid increasing speculation that the US will attempt to seize Iranian islands in the Persian Gulf, Iran will possibly increase restrictions on vessel movement through the Strait of Hormuz.
• ISRAEL-US-IRAN: The US and Israel will likely continue to launch airstrikes targeting security and police facilities and telecommunications infrastructure in Iran, sustaining threats to life in major cities. In the past 24 hours, the US and Israel have continued to engage in airstrikes throughout Iran, with explosions reported in cities including Bushehr (Bushehr province), Dezful (Khuzestan province), Isfahan (Isfahan province), Jam (Bushehr province), Tabriz (East Azerbaijan province), the capital Tehran, Urmia (West Azerbaijan province) and Yazd (Yazd province). Airstrikes have been particularly intense in Tehran, with the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) announcing several rounds of airstrikes targeting missile facilities, military bases and security installations in the city. Earlier on 23 March, Iranian state media announced that airstrikes had damaged a transmission tower linked to Iran’s state broadcaster in the Bandar Abbas area (Hormozgan province). In the coming days, airstrikes targeting Iran’s security forces, as well as state-linked media and telecommunications installations, are highly likely to continue. Risks of exposure to airstrikes, secondary explosions, shrapnel and cascading infrastructure failures will remain acute across Iran’s major cities. However, the Iranian security forces are highly likely to retain the capacity to continue engaging in retaliatory attacks targeting Israel, US military installations in the region and other locations in the Gulf, sustaining risks of armed conflict (see below).
• IRAN-US-GULF: Iranian strikes against Gulf energy infrastructure remain likely in the coming days despite the US’ announcement of postponed attacks. Earlier on 23 March, US President Donald Trump announced that military strikes against Iranian energy infrastructure would be postponed for five days (to 28 March) following ‘productive conversations’ between Iran and the US. The post follows escalatory back-and-forth exchanges in recent days, with the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) stating it would strike regional energy facilities supplying US bases in the Gulf if Trump followed through on threats to strike Iran’s power infrastructure. This will somewhat moderate the threat of imminent uncontrolled escalation against regional critical infrastructure (President Trump’s previous deadline for reopening the Strait of Hormuz was due to expire at 2345hrs GMT on 23 March). However, Iran’s foreign ministry has denied that negotiations with the US took place. Over the past 24 hours, Iran has continued to pursue its campaign of regional economic disruption; it has conducted several strikes (some of which were successfully intercepted) against Bahrain, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and the UAE. Given that the US will almost certainly continue to strike military targets within Iran in the coming days, this established strike and interception pattern is likely to continue, especially in the vicinity of major urban areas, airports, military bases and industrial and energy infrastructure sites (see Sibylline Middle East Crisis Update – 20 March 2026). The risk is elevated for those sites Iran previously identified as legitimate targets, including Saudi Arabia’s Jubail Industrial Complex (Eastern province) and SAMREF refinery (Medina province), Qatar’s Laffan refineries 1 and 2 in Ras Laffan and the Qatar Petrochemical Company plant in Mesaieed (al-Wakrah municipality), as well as the UAE’s Shah gas field (Abu Dhabi emirate). Any attacks resulting in significant damage or casualties will increase the risk of escalation and possibly even direct retaliation by Gulf states. Furthermore, Trump’s statement does not account for Israeli actions, sustaining the risk of Israel conducting attacks on Iranian energy infrastructure in the coming days, in turn raising the likelihood of Iranian retaliatory attacks against high-value energy assets in the Gulf. Moreover, contrasting US and Iranian statements regarding the status of diplomatic engagement underscore the limited prospect of a diplomatic de-escalation in the coming days.
• ISRAEL: The increased usage of medium-range interceptors elevates security risks from cluster munitions; it also reflects efforts to negate shortages amid prospective conflict protraction. In the past week, Israeli news outlets have reported the increased usage of medium-range interceptor systems (also known as David’s Sling) to intercept Iranian cluster munitions. This system intercepts ordnance within Earth’s atmosphere rather than outside it and consequently does not fully destroy all submunitions in a cluster warhead. The increased usage of David’s Sling over the Arrow 2 and Arrow 3 systems (which can intercept outside Earth’s atmosphere) highlights Israel’s likely effort to conserve interceptors, amid risks of conflict protraction and associated shortages. This practice will likely increase the number of incidents of submunitions from a cluster warhead penetrating Israeli air defences and hitting targets within the country. In the coming days and weeks, this threat will compound elevated security risks across Israel from damage from Iranian cluster munitions.
• ISRAEL-LEBANON: Sustained Israeli targeting of bridges over the Litani River indicates that the IDF will likely launch ground operations south of the river in the coming days and weeks, driving conflict escalation risks in the area. Over the past 24 hours, hostilities have continued, with Israel maintaining a tempo of frequent strikes against bridges over the Litani in southern Lebanon. The sustained pressure on infrastructure (particularly transport infrastructure), indicates that the IDF is likely preparing for a broad ground operation south of the river in the coming days and weeks. Israel will likely continue targeting such infrastructure, as well as targets between the Litani and the Zahrani rivers, to create a buffer zone for its forces when they eventually expand their operations up to the Litani. Israel is likely to first expand its targeted raids deeper into Lebanon and follow up with a broader operation involving substantial infantry and armoured forces.
• IRAQ: Despite a notable reduction in militant activity, physical security threats near military installations, airports and diplomatic missions will remain very high this week. On 22 March, the prominent Iran-backed group Kata’ib Hezbollah (KH) announced that it would continue to refrain from targeting the US embassy in the capital Baghdad for a further five days. The group had originally declared this temporary truce on 19 March, if certain conditions were met (see Sibylline Middle East Crisis Update – 19 March 2026). Notwithstanding this pause, rogue Iran-backed factions continued to launch sporadic drone attacks over the last five days, primarily targeting the Baghdad Diplomatic Support Centre (BDSC), Baghdad International Airport (BWG) and the Iraqi National Intelligence Service (INIS). However, notably, over the last 24 hours, militant activity has decreased across Iraq; one drone struck a Kurdish Peshmerga headquarters in Nineveh governorate, and at least one other drone targeted the BDSC in the capital. Separately, on 22 March, joint Israeli-US airstrikes continued to target several Popular Mobilisation Forces (PMF) positions in Al-Anbar and Babylon governorates, though the strike frequency declined marginally compared to the previous week. Despite this temporary reduction of militant activity driven by the KH truce, we assess that physical security threats will remain significantly elevated near military installations, energy infrastructure, airports, government facilities, major hotels and telecommunications infrastructure across Iraq. This is primarily attributable to the absence of a unified command over tens of smaller Iran-backed Shia factions operating under the Islamic Resistance in Iraq (IRI) umbrella network. These groups retain the capacity to act semi-autonomously against Iraqi, Kurdish and US assets.

POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS

• IRAN-STRAIT OF HORMUZ: Amid increasing speculation that the US will attempt to seize Iranian islands in the Persian Gulf, Iran will possibly increase restrictions on vessel movement through the Strait of Hormuz. Earlier on 23 March, the Iranian Defence Council issued a statement indicating that Iran would mine the Strait of Hormuz if the US attempts to seize Iranian territory, namely its islands or coastal regions. This is highly likely a reference to increasing concerns over the potential for US ground operations amid additional US Marine Corps deployments to the region (see Sibylline Middle East Crisis Update – 21 March 2026). Although US ground operations to seize Iranian territory remain highly unlikely in the coming days due to deployment lead times, Iran is highly likely to escalate hostilities, targeting Israel, Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries and commercial vessels in the Persian Gulf in the event of any such operation in the coming weeks. Concerns that Iran will move to deploy sea mines in the Persian Gulf and/or Strait of Hormuz will likely sustain perceived transit risks for commercial vessels, with war-risk premiums and insurance costs likely to remain high for tanker operators in the coming weeks. More broadly, Iran’s de facto closure of the Strait of Hormuz remains in place. Although Iran’s President Masoud Pezeshkian stated on 22 March that that the strait is open to vessels that ‘do not violate Iran’s territory’, this statement is highly unlikely to indicate that the waterway is open to commercial shipping. Rather, it likely reflects Iran’s efforts to moderate bilateral tensions with trade partners such as China, India and Pakistan, while negotiating passage for select vessels on a case-by-case basis. Earlier on 23 March, Lloyd’s List reported that a Chinese-owned feeder tanker had transited the Strait of Hormuz after making an unspecified payment to the Iranian authorities. In the coming days, Iran is highly likely to continue granting ad hoc permission for vessel passage in exchange for facilitation payments; entities making or processing such payments will face substantial risks of sanctions exposure amid broader corporate governance risks linked to engaging with the Iranian authorities.
• IRAN-UK: Ongoing Iranian espionage campaigns within the UK are likely to continue over the coming weeks, driving risks of site infiltration for defence contractors. On 21 March, Police Scotland stated that it had arrested an Iranian national and a Romanian national after they attempted to enter HM Naval Base Clyde (Scotland, UK) on 19 March. The base houses Trident-armed submarines as well as Astute-class nuclear-powered attack submarines. The attempted infiltration possibly reflects Iran-linked espionage operations in the UK, particularly targeting defence sites amid the Israel-US-Iran war. In the coming weeks, Iran is highly likely to continue pursuing espionage and harassment campaigns within the UK, with these campaigns likely escalating in the event of increasing UK involvement in the Israel-US-Iran war (see Sibylline Middle East Crisis Update – 21 March 2026). Iranian espionage campaigns will also drive risks of site infiltration attempts and cyber-attacks targeting UK- and Israeli-linked defence contractors, as well as their respective subsidiaries, sub-contractors and service providers. Associated businesses will face elevated risks of operational disruption over the coming weeks at least.
• IRAN-UK-EUROPE: The risk of attacks targeting Jewish and Israeli communities will remain elevated across Europe as the war continues, increasing pressure on counter-terrorism capabilities. Earlier on 23 March, four ambulances belonging to Hatzola (a Jewish emergency medical response NGO) that were parked outside a synagogue in the Golders Green area of London (UK) were set on fire. The police are treating this incident as an antisemitic hate crime; counter-terrorism police are investigating the incident at the time of writing. Harakat Ashab al-Yamin al-Islamiya claimed responsibility for the attack, though the UK authorities have neither confirmed nor denied this attribution at the time of writing. Harakat Ashab al-Yamin al-Islamiya is a newly formed threat group that has claimed responsibility for several arson attacks and explosions in Europe, including those targeting a synagogue in Liège (Belgium) on 9 March, a synagogue in Rotterdam (the Netherlands) on 13 March and a Jewish school in Amsterdam (the Netherlands) on 14 March. Although the relationship between Iran and Harakat Ashab al-Yamin al-Islamiya remains unclear, the risk of further hostilities targeting Israeli and Jewish communities in the UK will remain elevated as the Israel-US-Iran war continues. While robust policing capabilities will moderate the risk of successful high-capacity attacks, the risk of opportunistic and low-capacity attacks, including stabbings, car rammings and arson, will remain elevated, particularly in cities with substantial Jewish and Israeli communities.

Mar 11.

• STRAIT OF HORMUZ: Iran has likely conducted three attacks targeting vessels in the Persian Gulf, underscoring critical threats to vessel safety regardless of mounting military pressure.
• IRAN-STRAIT OF HORMUZ: Concerns that Iran has begun to mine the Strait of Hormuz will likely trigger an intensification of strikes on naval facilities and port infrastructure on Iran’s southern coast.
• ISRAEL-LEBANON: A second strike in a central area of the Lebanese capital Beirut highlights the elevated risk of Israel Defense Forces (IDF) attacks expanding beyond Beirut’s Dahieh suburb.
• US-IRAN: Continued ambiguity regarding the US’ war goals and the conflict’s duration is unlikely to trigger
• ISRAEL-US-IRAN: Airstrikes have continued to target locations throughout Iran, with further airstrikes and Iranian retaliation remaining likely in the coming hours. Recent airstrikes have primarily targeted locations associated with Iran’s military-industrial complex, particularly installations near Isfahan (Isfahan province), Shiraz (Fars province) and the capital Tehran. On 10 March, Iranian state media issued funeral announcements confirming the deaths of several mid-to-high-ranking commanders within the General Staff of the Armed Forces (AFGS) and the Law Enforcement Command (LEC). In the coming hours, the US and Israel are highly likely to continue targeting installations and individuals associated with Iran’s security forces, including with domestic policing and repression. This will sustain pressure on Iran’s security capabilities, though the country is highly likely to retain the capacity to conduct further missile and drone attacks targeting Israel, US military installations and the Gulf region in the immediate term, sustaining acute regional security concerns. There is also a realistic possibility that Iran will expand its current hostilities to include the routine targeting of US- and Israel-linked financial institutions in the Gulf region in the coming days, after the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) characterised these as ‘Iran’s new targets’. Any such attacks will increase substantial economic disruption risks in targeted locations, while also driving the risk of conflict escalation in the immediate term.
• STRAIT OF HORMUZ: Iran has likely conducted three attacks targeting vessels in the Persian Gulf, underscoring critical threats to vessel safety regardless of mounting military pressure. In the past 24 hours, the UK Maritime Trade Operations (UKMTO) has reported three incidents of ‘unknown projectiles’ hitting vessels in the Persian Gulf. At approximately 1200hrs (local time) on 10 March, an unspecified bulk carrier reported a projectile in its vicinity while moored 36 nautical miles (67km) north of the UAE’s capital Abu Dhabi. At approximately 0605 hrs (local time) on 11 March, a projectile hit a cargo vessel approximately 50 nautical miles (93km) north-west of Dubai (Dubai emirate, UAE), though did not result in major damage. Finally, at approximately 0835 hrs (local time), an unidentified projectile hit a cargo vessel approximately 11 nautical miles (20km) north of Oman, triggering a fire which is ongoing at the time of writing. Also on 11 March, Thailand’s transport ​ministry announced that unidentified projectiles had hit a Thai-flagged vessel in the Strait of Hormuz, with three crew members still missing at the time of writing. Since 28 February, the UKMTO has received reports of 17 incidents impacting vessels in the Persian Gulf, Strait of Hormuz and Arabian Sea, including 14 kinetic attacks targeting vessels, likely conducted by Iran. The occurrence of multiple such incidents in 24 hours underscores the increasing threats to vessels, crew and cargo located in the region. Regardless of US and Israeli efforts to escalate their airstrike pressure, Iran is highly likely to continue targeting vessels in the region, critically disrupting maritime supply chains and sustaining price volatility on international energy markets.
• IRAN-STRAIT OF HORMUZ: Concerns that Iran has begun to mine the Strait of Hormuz will likely trigger an intensification of strikes on naval facilities and port infrastructure on Iran’s southern coast. On 11 March, CNN reported assessments by unnamed US intelligence sources that the IRGC has begun mining the Strait of Hormuz and has already deployed ‘a few dozen’ explosives. Although US President Donald Trump subsequently issued a statement saying there are ‘no reports’ of the IRGC mining the waterway, US Central Command (CENTCOM) subsequently announced that it had destroyed numerous Iranian naval vessels overnight from 10 to 11 March, including 16 ‘mine-layers’. The operations almost certainly reflect substantial concerns that Iran will shift focus to enforcing its de facto closure of the waterway with deep-sea mines, amid mounting pressure on its missile launch capabilities. Such a move would substantially increase security risks for vessels attempting to transit the Strait of Hormuz, particularly without a naval escort. We assess that there is a realistic possibility that the IRGC will partially mine areas of the Strait of Hormuz in order to deter efforts to bypass the blockade (including by covert means; see Sibylline Middle East Crisis Update – 10 March 2026). Even so, Iran remains unlikely to engage imminently in a comprehensive barrier mining campaign across the Strait of Hormuz, given the indiscriminate nature of sea mine detonations and the likely disruption this would trigger for Iran’s own crude exports. Nevertheless, US and Israeli escalation will increase the risk of such a campaign in the short term. This is particularly the case if airstrikes begin to routinely target Iranian energy infrastructure or if the US launches ground operations to secure locations, such as Iran’s primary nuclear facilities and/or oil infrastructure, including Kharg Island (Bushehr province). To mitigate this risk, the US is likely to intensify airstrikes targeting Iranian naval and port facilities in the coming days, with resulting damage to dual-use and commercial port facilities compounding supply chain disruption within Iran.
• ISRAEL-LEBANON: A second strike in a central area of the Lebanese capital Beirut highlights elevated risks of Israel Defense Forces (IDF) attacks expanding beyond Beirut’s Dahieh suburb. Earlier on 11 March, the IDF conducted a strike on a residential apartment building in the Aisha Bakkar neighbourhood of Beirut. According to news channels affiliated with Lebanese Hizballah (LH), the strike killed at least four individuals and targeted a senior Hamas member, though his status remains unknown at the time of writing. Israeli strikes in Lebanon, including Beirut, have significantly escalated since 2 March. IDF strikes in Beirut have mainly been limited to Dahieh and accompanied by evacuation warnings. However, the IDF did not issue an evacuation warning for this strike, which marks the second Israeli strike in central Beirut since the intensification of hostilities, following a strike on 8 March in Raouché neighbourhood (see Sibylline Middle East Crisis Update – 8 March 2026). The strike highlights the elevated risk that the IDF will gradually expand its targets in Beirut beyond Dahieh, further increasing security risks across the capital. This will particularly elevate security risks in areas near the port of Beirut and Beirut-Rafic Hariri International Airport (BEY), as well as hospitality venues and roads across the city.
• GULF-IRAN: Iranian attacks against Gulf states continue, though they are unlikely to prompt immediate military retaliation due to conflict escalation concerns. Since our last report, Iranian missile and drone attacks have continued to target states across the Gulf region hosting US assets, namely Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the UAE. Earlier on 11 March, drones were intercepted over Saudi Arabia; they were en route to strike Saudi Aramco’s Shaybah oil field (Eastern province). Air defences also reportedly intercepted ballistic missiles targeting Prince Sultan air base (Riyadh province), while further interceptions were reported elsewhere in Eastern (province), including Hafar al-Batin. No casualties or damage were reported. Earlier on 11 March, the UAE’s defence ministry stated that debris from two intercepted drones in the vicinity of Dubai International Airport (DXB, Dubai emirate) caused several injuries, though no casualties. In Bahrain, the civil aviation authorities stated that several passenger and cargo aircraft from the national airline Gulf Air were relocated from Bahrain International Airport (BAH, al-Muharraq governorate) to other airports as part of the measures to enhance operational readiness. Earlier on 11 March, explosions likely linked to interceptions of Iranian ordnance were reported in Manama (Bahrain), with similar explosions reported in Doha (Qatar). Also on 11 March, Iran claimed to have fired missiles towards a US military installation at Kuwait’s Camp Arifjan (al-Ahmadi governorate), though neither the US nor Kuwaiti authorities have confirmed the attack. Despite continued Iranian attacks against Gulf states, it is currently unlikely that the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) will respond with collective military force in the coming days, amid efforts to moderate escalation risks. However, the sustained pace of Iranian strikes across the Gulf, including multiple successful attacks on key targets in Bahrain, Kuwait and the UAE in recent days, possibly indicates early signs of interceptor stockpile depletion. While Bahrain is currently the most exposed state, stockpile depletion poses a mounting risk across the GCC. This threatens to increase the success rate of Iranian strikes in the coming weeks and presents critical threats to energy and water infrastructure. Any substantial damage to key infrastructure would increase the risk of GCC states joining the conflict in an attempt to degrade Iran’s strike capacity and enforce deterrence. This risk will further increase in the event that the IRGC follows through on threats to target US- and Israeli-linked financial institutions in the Gulf in the coming days.
• IRAQ: Iran-backed militants’ attacks against US assets are set to continue in the coming days, sustaining proximate personnel security risks and underscoring communications vulnerabilities. On 10 March, six drones were launched toward the US Baghdad Diplomatic Support Centre near the capital’s Baghdad International Airport (BGW). Five drones were reportedly intercepted, while one struck the compound, causing a small fire and power disruption but no reported injuries. The attack was likely conducted by the Islamic Resistance in Iraq (IRI), a broad collection of Iran-backed Shia militias. In Erbil (Erbil governorate), a drone was intercepted near the US consulate earlier on 11 March. The IRI’s targeting of the diplomatic facility near Baghdad Airport underscores persistent threats to civil aviation and airspace security in Iraq and the wider region. The targeting of urban and heavily staffed areas also sustains the risk of personnel exposure to direct strikes or shrapnel from interceptions. The reported power outage further highlights vulnerabilities affecting communications infrastructure within US-linked government facilities, which will possibly affect operational continuity during periods of heightened threat. Meanwhile, earlier on 11 March, airstrikes, which were likely conducted by the US, targeted the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) headquarters in Al Anbar governorate, while several PMF members were reportedly wounded in another strike on a PMF facility in Wasit governorate. Such strikes will almost certainly continue in the coming days, particularly in rural areas of Al Anbar, Kirkuk, Nineveh, Saladin and Wasit governorates, in response to ongoing IRI and PMF attacks against US regional military assets.
• US-IRAN: Continued ambiguity regarding the US’ war goals and the conflict’s duration is unlikely to trigger the immediate resumption of pre-conflict import–export activity in the Gulf. On 11 March, US President Donald Trump stated that the Israel-US-Iran war will end ‘soon’, as there is ‘practically nothing left to target’ within Iran. Despite this characterisation, however, we assess that Iran likely retains the capacity to launch missile and drone strikes against Israel, US military installations and other targets in the Gulf, and will likely continue to do so in the coming 24 hours (at least). Even so, Trump’s statement underscores the US’ increasing strategic ambiguity regarding the likely duration of combat operations against Iran. In the coming days, the Trump administration is highly likely to continue issuing statements with varying indications of the US’ war goals, amid broader efforts to moderate price volatility on global energy and commodity markets. Despite these efforts, however, tensions between the US and Iran are highly likely to remain elevated, sustaining armed conflict risks. This dynamic is highly likely to continue disrupting maritime supply chains in the Persian Gulf in the coming hours and days, reducing the prospect of a rapid resumption of regional import–export activity.
• ISRAEL-LEBANON: Israel’s emphasis on negotiations under fire and the redeployment of IDF troops from Gaza to Lebanon highlight the risk of a protracted conflict. Earlier on 11 March, the IDF’s Chief of the General Staff ordered the reinforcement of the Northern Command and transferred the Golani Brigade combat team from Gaza to Lebanon. The order comes amid reports by international media that Israel has rejected diplomatic overtures from Lebanon requesting that Israel halt its offensive against LH as a precursor to further negotiations. By contrast, Israel has stated that any and all negotiations will be held while combat operations are ongoing. Israel’s demand is consistent with its previously established negotiating tactics and practices, wherein it has sought to apply continuous pressure on both the Lebanese government and LH to secure the most favourable terms, sustaining armed conflict risks through the coming 14 days (at least).
• Qatar: Military, energy sectors face heightened security risks from Chinese state-sponsored groups. On 9 March, cyber security company Check Point reported that a Chinese state-sponsored threat group (‘Camaro Dragon’) is targeting Qatari military and energy sectors in a cyber operation. Reportedly, Camaro Dragon distributes artificial intelligence (AI)-generated attachments purporting to provide information on the ongoing Israel-US-Iran war, in order to trick users into executing malicious code onto their systems. This highlights threat actors’ ability to capitalise quickly on ongoing geopolitical events. Camaro Dragon then uses dynamic-link library (DLL) sideloading techniques to deploy and conceal malicious payloads within legitimate programmes, enhancing detection evasion. The malicious payloads include a known backdoor (‘PlugX’) to maintain long-term access, as well as ‘Cobalt Strike’ to conduct extensive reconnaissance, likely to enable additional malicious activities. We assess that China will likely seek to continue gathering intelligence on the military and energy sectors in the Middle East region amid growing regional instability. Consequently, Middle East-based organisations will face heightened security risks in the short term.
• Iran-region: Targeting of financial, tech organisations will elevate security, socio-economic health risks. On 11 March, officials affiliated with the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) threatened to target economic centres and banks affiliated with Israel and the US. The threat comes following a strike against an Iranian bank earlier that day; it also follows reported cyber attacks on IRGC-affiliated financial institutions earlier this week (see Sibylline Middle East Crisis Update – 10 March 2026). Additionally, on 11 March, the IRGC-affiliated Tasnim news agency published a list of offices and infrastructure of US companies (mainly in the tech sector) in the region that are Israel-linked, characterising them as ‘potential targets’. As such, we assess there is a realistic possibility that Iran will expand its kinetic activity across the Middle East to target banks, economic centres and US- and/or Israel-affiliated businesses in the coming days. We also assess that Iranian cyber attacks against these institutions are likely. Such attacks will elevate security and socio-economic health risks for civilian populations in the region, while also increasing the risk of further armed escalation in the ongoing conflict.
• Iraq-region: Attacks on oil tankers underscore regional threat to maritime safety, supply chain risks. On 11 March, two explosive-laden vessels struck the Marshall Islands-flagged Safesea Vishnu and the Malta-flagged Zefyros oil tankers in a ship-to-ship transfer area, located in Iraqi waters near Basra (Basra governorate). The resulting explosions set both tankers ablaze, killing at least one crew member. The vessels had loaded fuel cargoes in Iraq, with the Safesea Vishnu chartered by an Iraqi state-linked company. The Iraqi authorities have subsequently suspended operations across the country’s oil terminals. The incident underscores critical threats to maritime navigation and offshore oil operations in Iraqi waters, while the closure of oil terminals will almost certainly disrupt exports and increase financial pressure on the Iraqi state. The attack came after Iran struck four merchant vessels in Gulf waters also on 11 March, underscoring the broader regional threat to maritime supply chains and global tanker supply. This will increase operational risks for international businesses and exacerbate price volatility in international energy and commodity markets. Attacks on shipping in the Persian Gulf will almost certainly continue in the coming days as US and Israeli strikes on Iran continue.
• Iraq-region: Attacks on oil tankers underscore regional threat to maritime safety, supply chain risks. On 11 March, two explosive-laden vessels struck the Marshall Islands-flagged Safesea Vishnu and the Malta-flagged Zefyros oil tankers in a ship-to-ship transfer area, located in Iraqi waters near Basra (Basra governorate). The resulting explosions set both tankers ablaze, killing at least one crew member. The vessels had loaded fuel cargoes in Iraq, with the Safesea Vishnu chartered by an Iraqi state-linked company. The Iraqi authorities have subsequently suspended operations across the country’s oil terminals. The incident underscores critical threats to maritime navigation and offshore oil operations in Iraqi waters, while the closure of oil terminals will almost certainly disrupt exports and increase financial pressure on the Iraqi state. The attack came after Iran struck four merchant vessels in Gulf waters also on 11 March, underscoring the broader regional threat to maritime supply chains and global tanker supply. This will increase operational risks for international businesses and exacerbate price volatility in international energy and commodity markets. Attacks on shipping in the Persian Gulf will almost certainly continue in the coming days as US and Israeli strikes on Iran continue.
• Israel-Lebanon: Strike in central area of capital Beirut elevates target expansion, security risks. Earlier on 11 March, the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) conducted a strike on a residential apartment building in the Aisha Bakkar neighbourhood of the Lebanese capital Beirut. At the time of writing, there are no reports of casualties, though these are highly likely. Israeli strikes in Lebanon, including Beirut, have significantly escalated since 2 March. IDF strikes in Beirut have mainly been limited to the Dahieh suburb and accompanied by an earlier evacuation warning. However, the IDF did not issue an evacuation warning for this strike, which marks the second Israeli strike in central Beirut since the intensification of hostilities (see Sibylline Middle East Crisis Update – 8 March 2026). The strike highlights the elevated risk that the IDF will gradually expand its targets in Beirut beyond Dahieh, further increasing security risks across the capital. This will particularly elevate security risks in areas near the port of Beirut and Beirut-Rafic Hariri International Airport (BEY), as well as hospitality venues and roads across the city. (Source: Sibylline)

 

26 Mar 26.. Israel Ministry of Defense Spokesperson’s Statement.  Operation Roaring Lion – Israel MOD Announces 200th Aircraft in Operational Airlift of Military Equipment and Munitions has Landed in Israel. As part of the ongoing procurement and shipping effort throughout Operation Roaring Lion, the Israel Ministry of Defense (IMOD) and the IDF’s air and sea bridge operations have marked the landing of the 200th cargo aircraft. Since the start of the operation, over 200 aircraft and ships have arrived in Israel carrying approximately 8,000 tons of military equipment, weaponry, and munitions. Led by Defense Minister Israel Katz and IMOD Director General Maj. Gen. (Res.) Amir Baram, the effort to expand Israel’s defense industrial base and accelerate production rates across Israeli defense industries remains ongoing. The air and sea bridge serves as a critical component in this effort, strengthening operational continuity, supporting the full range of IDF needs, and enhancing readiness and stockpiles.

The air and sea bridge, which has been running continuously throughout the campaign, is led by the IMOD Defense Procurement Directorate (DPD), through its International Shipping Division, the IMOD Missions to the United States and Germany, and the IDF’s Planning Directorate. The Israel Airports Authority and the Israel Civil Aviation Authority are also partners in the operation.

 

26 Mar 26. C-UAS Hub said today that UK considers Ukraine-developed Octopus drones to secure Strait of Hormuz. The United Kingdom is reviewing the potential deployment of Ukraine-developed Octopus interceptor drones to help secure the Strait of Hormuz as allies work to reopen the critical maritime corridor.

According to reports, British officials are assessing a range of options, including autonomous mine-countermeasure platforms and the Octopus drones developed through cooperation between Ukraine and the UK. The move comes as the UK looks to support maritime security operations without committing additional warships to the region.

The Octopus interceptor drones are designed to counter aerial threats, including Shahed-type drones, while mine-hunting platforms could be used to clear explosive hazards from one of the world’s most important energy routes.

Roughly one-fifth of global oil shipments pass through the Strait of Hormuz, making its security a priority for Western governments.

Officials are reportedly exploring the use of interceptor drones alongside mine-clearing technologies as an alternative to a larger naval deployment, offering a more flexible and potentially less escalatory response.

The debate over British involvement has intensified following calls from the United States for allied support in securing the waterway.

Military planners are now weighing whether autonomous systems could provide a more politically and operationally viable solution compared to sending additional naval assets into the region.

Expanding UK-Ukraine defense collaboration

The Octopus system is the product of a growing defense cooperation between Ukraine and the UK, with technologies developed during the war in Ukraine increasingly influencing security planning beyond Europe.

Systems originally designed to counter Russian and Iranian drone threats on the battlefield could now be adapted to protect commercial shipping lanes in the Gulf.

Britain has already taken steps to address the rising drone threat in the Middle East by deploying counter-drone specialists to the region, drawing on operational experience gained through cooperation with Ukraine.

The development also builds on the growing ties between the UK and Ukraine in the defense industrial sector.

A Ukrainian defense manufacturer has recently established a presence in the UK, bringing drone technologies shaped by frontline combat experience as Kyiv continues to grow its defense industry footprint abroad.

As ties between the two nations grow, Ukrainian defense leaders including Colonel Valentyn Kuianovof the Ukrainian Air Force and Colonel (Ret.) Vadym Slyusar of the Ukrainian Armed Forces will travel to London in April to address attendees at SAE Media Group’s Counter UAS Technology Europe conference, to share insights on the counter-drone tactics being deployed in Ukraine. The defense industry will also be present with Myroslav Popovych speaking on behalf of the Ukrainian Council of Defence Industry.

UK considers Ukraine-developed Octopus drones to secure Strait of Hormuz – cuashub.com

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Military And Security Developments

Mar 25.

*Baltic region: Drone incursions underscore Russo-Ukrainian war spillover risks. Earlier on 25 March, a drone entered Estonian airspace and struck a chimney at the Auvere power station (Ida-Viru county). The authorities believe that the drone entered from Russian airspace by accident and was not directed to target Estonia. There were no injuries and no immediate damage to the power plant. Also on 25 March, another drone entered Latvian airspace from Russia and crashed in Dobročina village (Krāslava region). There were no injuries. Latvian Prime Minister Evika Siliņa stated that initial information indicates that the drone was Ukrainian. Both incidents reportedly took place during a Ukrainian attack on Russia’s Ust-Luga port, located on the Baltic coast near the Estonian border. On 23 March, a drone entered Lithuania’s airspace and crashed into a frozen lake near the border with Belarus. The authorities believe that this drone was also part of a Ukrainian attack on the Russian Primorsk oil-loading terminal; it was highly likely sent off course by Russian jamming. We assess that the incidents underscore persistent regional tensions and the risk of ‘spillover effects’ stemming from the Russo-Ukrainian war, as well as potential air defence gaps over the Baltic region.

Mar 17.

Ukraine: Russia-linked operations sustain long-term security, cyber espionage risks to firms. On 13 March, the cyber security company S2 Grupo reported that a cyber espionage operation had targeted Ukrainian entities throughout February. There were two observed versions of the campaign. Both campaigns used phishing emails containing charity- and judicial-themed lures to trick users into deploying an LNK file. This ultimately executed an HTML file via the browser that deployed a JavaScript-based backdoor (‘DRILLAPP’), granting access to local file systems, camera, microphone as well as screen capture without user interaction. The second version of the campaign used a similar infection chain; however, DRILLAPP had added features including file enumeration, batch file uploads and arbitrary file downloads, highlighting its continuous development. Researchers noted that these operations have overlaps with a campaign in January conducted by Russian state-sponsored threat group ‘Laundry Bear’ (also known as ‘Void Blizzard’), underscoring the long-term security and cyber espionage risks Ukrainian entities face from Russia-aligned groups as Russia continues to evolve its cyber strategy.

Mar 15.

KEY DEVELOPMENTS 

• OFFENSIVES: Over the past few days, Russian forces have intensified their assaults across multiple fronts, likely signalling the start of their spring offensive
• STRIKES: Ukraine continues to target Russia’s oil infrastructure intensely as part of its ongoing efforts to reduce Russian hydrocarbon revenues, but amid the global energy crisis, this will likely drive tensions
• AID: The EU’s failure to overcome Hungary’s block on a EUR 90 billion (approximately USD 104 billion) loan at a summit on 19 March, combined with parliamentary infighting jeopardising the unlocking of IMF funding, will sustain budgetary pressures for Ukraine
• FORECAST: Recent talks between Ukraine and the US were highly likely aimed at maintaining dialogue as the Israel-US-Iran war otherwise stalls trilateral peace negotiations with Russia
• OFFENSIVES: Over the past few days, Russian forces have intensified their assaults across multiple fronts, likely signalling the start of their spring offensive. On 23 March, Ukraine’s Commander-in-Chief Oleksandr Syrskyi reported that between 17 and 20 March, Russia launched 619 assaults across multiple points on the frontline. The Pokrovsk sector and Oleksandrivka area (both Donetsk oblast; the latter situated at the intersection of Donetsk, Dnipropetrovsk and Zaporizhzhia oblasts), have reportedly recorded the largest number of Russian assaults. Russian forces are likely focusing efforts on Ukraine’s so-called ‘fortress belt of cities’ in Donetsk oblast (namely Druzhkivka, Kostiantynivka, Kramatorsk and Slovyansk), with attacks particularly intense in the Kostiantynivka and Lyman directions. Syrskyi noted that Russia is attempting to take advantage of deteriorating weather conditions to intensify its offensive operations, expecting that this will reduce the effectiveness of Ukrainian reconnaissance, drone and artillery strikes. Reports also confirm ongoing Russian troop movements and an escalation in battlefield air interdiction activities, including artillery, drone and aviation strikes across several areas.
• OFFENSIVES: Russia has resumed mechanised assaults, which are causing significant losses. According to Ukrainian OSINT group DeepState, Russian forces have advanced in several small villages, albeit at a high cost. Syrskyi recently claimed that Russia lost 8,710 soldiers (killed or seriously wounded) between 17 and 20 March alone; he also stated that Russian forces are currently losing more than 1,000 soldiers per day. While we are unable to corroborate this figure, it aligns with our assessment that Russian offensive tactics are highly attritional in nature, particularly as Moscow has resorted to mechanised assaults that increase troops’ exposure to Ukrainian strikes. For instance, on 19 March Russian forces launched a roughly battalion-sized mechanised assault in the Lyman direction, involving around 500 troops and dozens of vehicles.
• OFFENSIVES: We assess that Russia is unlikely to take control of Ukraine’s ‘fortress belt’ cities in 2026, though the sustained intensification of its offensive operations across the frontline will likely add significant pressure to Ukrainian defences. We continue to assess that recent Ukrainian counter-attacks in the direction of Huliapole (Zaporizhzhia oblast) and in the Oleksandrivka direction have likely forced the Russian command to deploy additional personnel to counter localised Ukrainian advances. This has likely weakened Russia’s ability to concentrate offensive efforts elsewhere, especially as Russia is suffering high personnel losses due to the attritional nature of its assaults. However, we continue to assess that these losses are relatively sustainable. Reports from Ukrainian military sources indicate that Russian forces continue to rely on poorly trained personnel in their current offensives. Nevertheless, if Russia is able to maintain its current tempo across various frontline points in the coming months, it will likely increasingly pressure Ukrainian forces, which are facing an even more difficult personnel situation.
• STRIKES: Russia continues to launch semi-regular, high-intensity combined strikes, as evidenced by an attack earlier on 24 March. This latest assault involved 392 drones, seven Iskandr-M/S-400 ballistic missiles, 18 Kh-101 cruise missiles, five Iskandr-K cruise missiles and four Kh-59/69/31 cruise missiles. Ukrainian forces have reported intercepting 365 unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) and 25 cruise missiles. The attack caused damage to 11 Ukrainian oblasts, with neighbouring Moldova reporting that a key power line linking it to Europe was damaged (see Sibylline Daily Analytical Update – 24 March 2026). Power outages were also reported in Kharkiv, Kherson, Odesa, Poltava, Sumy and Zaporizhzhia oblasts. We assess that Russian strikes will likely become increasingly destructive due to the worsening situation of Ukraine’s air defences, which are caused partly by the declining availability of interceptors due to the Israel-US-Iran war.
• STRIKES: Ukraine continues to target Russia’s oil infrastructure intensely as part of its ongoing efforts to reduce Russian hydrocarbon revenues. Ukraine’s General Staff confirmed that drone strikes took place against key fuel and energy facilities at the Russian oil port of Primorsk (Leningrad oblast) on 23 March. Satellite imagery shows fires near both crude and product loading terminals; shipping information quoted by Bloomberg indicates a halt in operations at both facilities. Primorsk is an essential oil export hub, processing around 1 million barrels of crude oil and diesel per day. Separately, the Ukrainian General Staff reported a strike against the Bashneft-Ufaneftekhim oil refinery in Russia’s Republic of Bashkortostan. The facility has an oil processing capacity of approximately 6-8 million tonnes per year and is located roughly 870 miles (1,400km) from the Ukrainian border. While the extent of the damage is currently being assessed, if it is confirmed, the wide dispersion of these targets would underscore Ukraine’s expanding long-range drone capabilities. Nevertheless, while they are a core part of Ukraine’s strategy against Russia, attacks against hydrocarbon infrastructure are likely to spark an increase in tensions amid significant oil price volatility due to the Israel-US-Iran war, which has disrupted global oil flows, particularly via the Strait of Hormuz.

POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS

• AID: The EU’s failure to overcome Hungary’s blocking of a EUR 90 billion (approximately USD 104 billion) loan at a summit on 19 March, combined with parliamentary infighting’s impact on unlocking IMF funding, will sustain budgetary pressures for Ukraine in the near term. Kyiv has until the end of March to pass unpopular tax increases, which are required to unlock funding as part of an USD 8 billion IMF programme. This week is the Ukrainian parliament’s last plenary week for March. According to lawmaker Yaroslav Zheleznyak, the likelihood of a legislative breakthrough on either 25 or 26 March is limited, despite the urgency to unlock funding. We assess that Kyiv will possibly seek to renegotiate or extend the deadline with the IMF in case the parliament fails to pass the tax reforms by the end of the month, which is becoming an increasingly realistic prospect.
• ENERGY: Reuters reported earlier on 24 March that the European Commission will no longer present a proposal to permanently ban imports of Russian oil on 15 April as previously planned, likely due to oil market volatility amid the Israel-US-Iran war. The proposal would enshrine into law a full phase-out of Russian oil imports by the end of 2027. However, an unnamed EU official said the proposal has not been cancelled, adding that it would instead be published at a later date. Since the beginning of 2022, when Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine began, EU imports of Russian oil have decreased from 27% to 2% (as per figures provided by the European Commission in February 2026). As such, the development is highly unlikely to represent a significant shift in the EU’s policy as it seeks to phase out Russian energy over the longer term.

FORECAST

NEGOTIATIONS: The recent talks between Ukraine and the US highly likely aimed to maintain a dialogue, as the Israel-US-Iran war has stalled trilateral peace negotiations with Russia. Between 21 and 22 March, Ukrainian and US negotiators held talks in Miami (US). According to Secretary of National Security and Defence Council of Ukraine Rustem Umerov, the talks focused on security guarantees and humanitarian issues, namely exchanges of prisoners of war (POWs). Meanwhile, following the first day of negotiations, US special envoy Steve Witkoff stated that discussions centred on ‘narrowing and resolving’ remaining issues to move towards a peace agreement.

Despite such positive public assessments of the talks, we assess that a major breakthrough towards peace remains unlikely in the coming weeks and months. In the short-to-medium term, a prolonged Israel-US-Iran war will highly likely continue to divert the US’ attention away from efforts to broker an end to the Russo-Ukrainian war. Although trilateral negotiations have failed to yield tangible progress thus far, they were held relatively regularly since late January, with the last round taking place in mid-February. While the recent US-Ukraine talks show that the Trump administration is willing (for now) to continue engaging in the peace process, we assess that bilateral talks will unlikely bridge the gap between the positions of the warring parties.

In this vein, reports following the recent Ukraine-US negotiations indicate that the Trump administration will possibly increase pressure on Ukraine to make significant territorial concessions, in order to expedite an end to the Russo-Ukrainian war. Earlier on 24 March, an unspecified insider close to Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky warned that the US may abandon the peace process if there is no substantial progress. The source stated that this would enable the Trump administration to focus on hostilities in the Middle East and the November midterm elections. We assess that these are higher priorities for the US; as such, the Israel-US-Iran war’s continuation will increase the likelihood of the Trump administration disengaging from efforts to end the Russo-Ukrainian war in the coming weeks and months. Simultaneously, the US is reportedly pushing Ukraine to withdraw from areas of the Donbas region (i.e. Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts) that are currently under Ukrainian control. This is both a key issue in peace negotiations and a long-standing Russian war objective. According to an unspecified Ukrainian insider close to the negotiations, Ukraine’s team has proposed alternatives, such as creating a demilitarised economic zone. However, the Trump administration reportedly continues to favour Ukraine’s withdrawal from the area.

Ceding Ukrainian-controlled territory in Donetsk oblast (which forms part of Donbas) will highly likely remain deeply unpopular within Ukrainian society and a non-starter for Kyiv over the coming months. We continue to assess that the future status of Donbas is one of, if not the, thorniest issues in peace talks. As such, an agreement on the matter is highly unlikely in the near term. Notably, reports claim that the US negotiating team is referring to vague agreements reached at a summit between Russian President Vladimir Putin and US President Donald Trump in Alaska (US) in August 2025. While it remains unknown what precisely was agreed, Russian officials have often mentioned the ‘spirit of Anchorage’ to imply mutual understanding with the US on key issues. As such, apparent Russia-US alignment on the issue of Donbas will likely maintain pressure on Kyiv to agree to this concession. However, without serious security guarantees (or, in the most dangerous scenario, a Ukrainian military collapse), this is unlikely in the short term.

Russia and Ukraine will likely continue their efforts to gain favour with the Trump administration amid the Israel-US-Iran war, to improve their respective negotiating positions; as seen with Kyiv’s offers to share drone expertise. On 20 March, Politico reported that Russia proposed to halt intelligence sharing with Iran (including providing the co-ordinates of US military assets in the Middle East region) if the US ceased supplying Ukraine with intelligence. The outlet claimed that the US rejected the proposal after Russian envoy Kirill Dmitriev floated it during talks in Miami earlier in March. Dmitriev, however, denied Politico’s report. US intelligence has helped Ukraine to conduct long-range strikes against Russian energy facilities in recent months. However, the US has previously temporarily suspended intelligence sharing with Ukraine (see Sibylline Ukraine Update – 6 March 2025). We assess that a continuation or escalation of the Israel-US-Iran war will increase the likelihood of the Trump administration agreeing to a similar Russian proposal, especially if progress towards resolving the Russo-Ukrainian war remains limited.

Mar 13.

• Russia: Alleged Ukrainian strikes against gas infrastructure will likely heighten regional tensions. On 11 March, Russia’s state-owned gas company Gazprom claimed that Ukrainian drones had targeted its facilities in southern Russia connected to the TurkStream and Blue Stream pipelines. According to Gazprom, the attacks were thwarted but the sites have been targeted 12 times over the past two weeks. These claims have not been visually verified by independent sources; the Ukranian authorities have not commented on them. Nevertheless, energy infrastructure remains a priority target of Kyiv’s long-range strike campaign. Hungary, Serbia, Slovakia and Turkey continue to receive energy supplies via TurkStream. Slovakia and Hungary have already been affected by the disruption of Russian oil exports via the Druzhba pipeline, which passes through Ukraine, and both governments accuse Kyiv of deliberately failing to restore oil flows. Even if unconfirmed, the latest alleged incident is highly likely to exacerbate tensions with Slovakia and Hungary, both of which have adopted increasingly vocal anti-Ukraine positions, as well as Turkey and Serbia. Additionally, real or alleged Ukrainian strikes against Russian energy sites amid the war in the Middle East, will possibly harm Ukrainian relations with the White House, which is determined to contain energy price rises.

* Armenia: Pro-Russia destabilisation campaigns will highly likely increase ahead of election  On 11 March, a member of an Armenian independent election observation group claimed that an unspecified opposition party has reserved a ‘large number’ of buses to transport voters (mostly from Russia) to participate in the upcoming parliamentary elections. According to the election observation group Independent Observer, the buses have been booked for the end of May and the beginning of the following month ahead of the elections on 7 June. While we cannot confirm this, we assess the report is highly likely credible. Strained relations between Armenia and Russia in recent years have decreased the latter’s influence in Yerevan, though Armenia still remains largely dependent on Russia (specifically for trade). Russia will almost certainly support pro-Moscow forces ahead of the elections, as well as exploit vulnerabilities in Armenian domestic politics and society in an attempt to influence the vote . Aside from attempts to influence the vote on polling day, Russia will likely intensify its mal-, mis- and dis-information campaigns over the coming months in a bid to shape the outcome. (Source: Sibylline)

19 Mar 26. Leaders Address War in Ukraine, Russia Threat. President Donald J. Trump’s administration is negotiating with Russia and Ukraine to secure a durable peace based on credible security guarantees, beginning with a strong Ukraine and Europe, said Daniel L. Zimmerman, assistant secretary of war for international security affairs, during a House Armed Services Committee hearing today. It is important that allies act urgently to provide Ukraine with the necessary resources for deterrence and defense. Over 20 European nations have pledged more than $4 billion to the Pearl Initiative so far, he said.

Building on this support, Zimmerman highlighted that the Pearl Initiative, which was launched last year, enables European countries to jointly procure and transfer weapons to Ukraine.

“Russia still retains deep reservoirs of military and industrial power and the national resolve to sustain protracted war. Moreover, Russia has the world’s largest nuclear arsenal and invests in capabilities, which could be used coercively just short of nuclear confrontation,” Zimmerman said.

“The U.S. stands with NATO, but if burden sharing becomes misaligned or thinly spread, this is not healthy for an alliance, and we want NATO to be as strong as it can be for the long term,” he said.

Expanding on these concerns, Air Force Gen. Alexus G. Grynkewich, commander, U.S. European Command and NATO supreme allied commander Europe, testified that the United States faces a complex and evolving global security environment.

“Growing cooperation between Russia, North Korea, Iran and the People’s Republic of China has increased military risk across multiple theaters and domains,” Grynkewich said.

In Europe, North Korean troops and materiel, Iranian drone technology and Chinese economic support enable Moscow to sustain its war in Ukraine, the general added.

“Despite significant losses in Ukraine, Russia retains the capability and the capacity to threaten U.S. interests with its large and increasingly diverse nuclear stockpile, asymmetric capabilities and competent ground, air and maritime forces,” Grynkewich said.

(Source: U.S. DoD)

12 Mar 26: European countries mull alternatives to EUR90bn EU loan for Ukraine. European countries are considering alternative ways to provide Ukraine with much-needed funds to support its war effort amid continued blocking of a EUR90 billion EU loan by Hungary and Slovakia. Politico reports that the Baltic and Nordic countries have a backup plan to support Ukraine in the short-term, with the EU’s Economy Commissioner Valdis Dombrovskis stating: “We will deliver on this loan one way or another.”

In other news, Ukraine is sending teams of counter-UAS experts to the Middle East to aid Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE with their efforts to combat Iranian Shahed drones. It comes as Gulf countries used more advanced US-made Patriot interceptors in the first days of the Iran conflict than Ukraine has managed to acquire over four years of conflict. ​​​​​

 

23 Mar 26. In alignment with the defence priorities set out by the Ukrainian Government, Quantum Systems has been tasked by the Security and Defence Forces of Ukraine to deliver 15,000 interceptor drones. This follows the investment in Ukrainian unmanned systems manufacturer WIY Drones, which will produce and service its combat-proven interceptor technologies in the country. Ukraine, 23 March 2026: Drone interceptors (c-UAS) have become an essential capability for Ukraine in countering Russian attack drones. As part of Ukraine’s priority to close its sky and to achieve effective air defence, Quantum Systems has been tasked to provide 15,000 interceptor drones to the National Guard of Ukraine.

This follows Quantum Systems’ investment in the Ukrainian unmanned systems manufacturer WIY Drones, a company specializing in the development and production of interceptor drones, reconnaissance and strike UAVs, as well as ground control stations and related systems.

The company’s production of the STRILA interceptor drone (Ukrainian for arrow), which is specifically designed to intercept fast and maneuvering aerial targets, will be scaled through the combined effort of both companies. Production of the STRILA system will initially be expanded in Ukraine to address the urgent operational demand, with future exports of surplus production being a possibility.

Further information on STRILA and upcoming plans for joint interceptor development and production between Quantum Systems and WIY Drones will be published shortly.

Sven Kruck, Co-CEO of Quantum Systems, said: “Ukrainian engineers have developed some of the most effective counter-drone technologies in the world. Quantum Systems brings these solutions to industrial scale and helps Ukraine close its sky.”

The partnership reflects Quantum Systems’ broader strategy of supporting combat-proven Ukrainian innovation and bringing it to scale for both Ukraine and international partners. (Source: Clarion)

 

23 Mar 26. Ukraine Receives High-Speed JEDI Drones to Intercept Shaheds. The Ukrainian Ministry of Defence has codified and approved for operation the JEDI Shahed Hunter unmanned aerial vehicle complex of Ukrainian production. The high-speed interceptor drones included in this complex successfully destroy Russian attack drones of the Shahed, Geran, and Gerbera types.

Characteristics

JEDI Shahed Hunter is a copter-type aerial drone with vertical take-off. Equipped with a lightweight and durable frame, four high-performance electric motors and a capacitive battery.

With a total weight of just over 4 kg, the drone carries up to 500 grams of payload. This is enough to destroy a strike drone. And the power of its engines is enough to accelerate the drone to over 350 km/h and rise to an altitude of up to 6 km.

Target Location

JEDI Shahed Hunter receives data from radar stations automatically. This allows interceptor drones to enter the target area more quickly and destroy it quickly.

The drone receives target designations from radar stations and can automatically lock onto targets.

The system is capable of covering an airspace within a radius of up to 40 km, strengthening countermeasures against Russian drones.

The ground control station ensures the coordination of the flight of this copter, stable communication and accuracy of use. JEDI Shahed Hunter can automatically acquire and aim at the target. In addition, it is equipped with day and thermal imaging cameras, which allows it to perform tasks day and night.

Technical Specifications

• Vertical takeoff
• Weight — 4 kg
• Speed up to over 350 km/h
• Capable of reaching an altitude of up to 6 km
• Day and thermal imaging cameras for round-the-clock operation

As a reminder, sky protection is a top priority of Ukraine’s War Plan . The goal is to identify 100% of air threats in real time and intercept at least 95% of missiles and drones.

Sources: Ministry of Defence, Ukraine; MILITARNYI

(Source: UAS VISION)

 

26 Mar 26. C-UAS Hub said today that Germany to fund 15,000 Ukrainian STRILA interceptor drones for air defense. Germany has agreed to finance the production of 15,000 Ukrainian-made STRILA interceptor drones for Ukraine’s National Guard, in a move aimed at strengthening the country’s defenses against persistent aerial threats. The agreement, reported March 23, includes not only the drones themselves but also training, logistics support and continued development of unmanned systems. According to Ukrainian and European reporting citing the German Embassy in Kyiv, the systems will be produced domestically in Ukraine to speed delivery to frontline units.

STRILA interceptor drones are designed to engage fast-moving aerial targets, including Iranian-designed Shahed-type drones that Russia has used extensively in strikes on Ukrainian cities and infrastructure.

Production will be carried out through cooperation between German firm Quantum Systems and Ukrainian manufacturer WIY Drones. The partnership is intended to scale output quickly while leveraging Ukraine’s existing drone manufacturing base.

Officials have emphasized that local production is key to ensuring faster deployment, particularly as Ukraine continues to face large-scale drone attacks.

Interceptor drones playing growing role

The investment comes as interceptor drones have become an increasingly important part of Ukraine’s layered air defense. Ukrainian military officials have reported that such systems are already responsible for a significant share of successful interceptions.

In February alone, Ukrainian interceptor drones destroyed more than 1,500 Russian drones, according to Commander-in-Chief Oleksandr Syrskyi. He said interceptor crews conducted roughly 6,300 sorties during the month, maintaining effectiveness despite harsh weather conditions and ongoing equipment shortages.

In and around Kyiv, interceptor drones accounted for more than 70 percent of successful engagements against incoming Shahed-type drones during that period, underscoring their growing role in Ukraine’s air defense network.

The German-funded program reflects a broader effort by Kyiv’s partners to support scalable, lower-cost solutions to counter mass drone attacks, which have strained traditional air defense systems reliant on expensive missile interceptors.

Germany to fund 15,000 Ukrainian STRILA interceptor drones for air defense – cuashub.com

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Founded in 1987, Exensor Technology is a world leading supplier of Networked Unattended Ground Sensor (UGS) Systems providing tailored sensor solutions to customers all over the world. From our Headquarters in Lund Sweden, our centre of expertise in Network Communications at Communications Research Lab in Kalmar Sweden and our Production site outside of Basingstoke UK, we design, develop and produce latest state of the art rugged UGS solutions at the highest quality to meet the most stringent demands of our customers. Our systems are in operation and used in a wide number of Military as well as Homeland Security applications worldwide. The modular nature of the system ensures any external sensor can be integrated, providing the user with a fully meshed “silent” network capable of self-healing. Exensor Technology will continue to lead the field in UGS technology, provide our customers with excellent customer service and a bespoke package able to meet every need.

A CNIM Group Company

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Sponsored by Bertin Exensor

 

www.exensor.com

 

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19 Mar 26. Department Leader Says Nuclear Triad Must Be Upgraded to Meet Dual Threat. With soon to be two near-peer nuclear-armed competitors to deter, the U.S. must upgrade its nuclear forces, which serve as a backdrop to conventional capabilities that must also be robust, War Department leaders told lawmakers March 17.

“U.S. strategy is at a critical inflection point,” said Robert Kadlec, assistant secretary of war for nuclear deterrence, chemical and biological defense policy and programs, while testifying before the House Armed Services Committee’s strategic forces subcommittee.

China’s strategic nuclear “breakout,” Kadlec said — an unprecedented, major increase in bolstering their nuclear capability — means that the U.S. nuclear arsenal must deter both China and Russia.

Compounding that problem, he said, are the budgetary, industrial and programmatic strains of modernizing all three legs of the nuclear triad at once — land, sea and air. An additional factor is that the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty with Russia expired in February. That treaty limited the number of strategic warheads for both the U.S. and Russia.

Kadlec told lawmakers the U.S. must plan for conflict or aggression in more than one theater — possibly coordinated by adversaries who hope to test U.S. capabilities or stretch them thin.

“Our force structure posture and nuclear strategy must be robust enough to deter both peers simultaneously, even if we were to be engaged in a major conventional conflict with one,” he said.

The U.S., Kadlec said, doesn’t have to have the same number of nuclear weapons as both adversaries combined, but it must have a sufficient capability to maintain credible deterrence.

“It means we require a nuclear force sufficient to inflict unacceptable costs on both adversaries under any contingency — ensuring that neither believes that they can exploit a crisis elsewhere for their own gain,” he said.

Kadlec said the U.S. nuclear triad must be upgraded to achieve this.

“Our modernization programs are an urgent necessity,” he added. “The transition from our legacy systems to a modernized triad occurs during a period of maximum geopolitical risk. There is no room for error.”

The U.S. must fully fund or accelerate programs like the Sentinel, a land-based intercontinental ballistic missile that will replace the Minuteman III as the ground component of the U.S. nuclear triad, Kadlec said. He also called for funding of the Columbia-class submarine, the B-21 Raider bomber, the long-range standoff cruise missile and the nuclear-armed, sea-launched cruise missile.

“We’re entering into a new, more dangerous era,” Kadlec said. “The luxury of assuming a single major adversary is gone. The cost of modernizing our nuclear deterrent is significant, but the cost of failing to do so is immeasurably greater. Congress’ continued support is essential to ensure we have the deterrent we need to preserve peace, protect our nation and our freedom.” (Source: U.S. DoD)

 

20 Mar 26. Joint Statement Reaffirming a Shared Commitment to Defense Industrial Resilience. We, the National Armaments Directors and senior government officials of the member nations of the Partnership for Indo-Pacific Industrial Resilience (PIPIR), convened for our 2nd Annual Plenary meeting, virtually, on March 18, 2026, to reaffirm our commitment to accelerating defense industrial cooperation.

We reaffirmed the PIPIR Statement of Core Vision and Terms of Reference, discussed the collective challenges and opportunities to defense industrial cooperation in the Indo-Pacific, and endorsed the 2026 roadmap for PIPIR workstream initiatives.

We also endorsed the accession of Thailand and the United Kingdom to PIPIR, welcoming them as the 15th and 16th members, respectively, to join our Indo-Pacific and Euro-Atlantic partnership. Collectively, we are committed to strengthening defense industrial resilience to promote the continued regional security, economic security, and prosperity of the Indo-Pacific.

We discussed current capacity shortfalls and resilience challenges in the global defense industrial base that impede our ability to meet combined operational needs but acknowledged positive momentum through PIPIR in addressing barriers to increased armaments cooperation. We further reaffirmed our commitment to exploring avenues across the Partnership to strengthen defense industrial base integration to de-risk supply chains, expand forward sustainment capacity, remove policy and regulatory impediments to cooperation, and accelerate production of key systems and components.

We discussed the significant progress that has been achieved through PIPIR since its establishment, recalling the announcement of two marquee initiatives by the U.S. Secretary of War at the Shangri-La Dialogue in May 2025, including the development of a forward repair capability for P-8 radar systems in Australia and the development of standards for small unmanned aerial systems across the Indo-Pacific. We agreed to the following next steps for these marquee initiatives:

• Expanding the scope of the regional sustainment hub in Australia to support additional P-8 operators in the Indo-Pacific, a project recently announced at the Shangri-La Dialogue in May 2025.
• Endorsing four Statements of Intent to foster cooperation on small unmanned aerial systems’ battery and small motor development through executing an industry survey and sharing results among participants, pursuing reciprocal standards and a common procurement policy, and identifying efforts towards a future battery project.

We agreed that PIPIR continues to make tangible progress toward addressing barriers and accelerating defense industrial collaboration to promote a stronger, more resilient, more integrated, defense industrial base. We also reaffirmed the importance of multilateral frameworks such as PIPIR to help facilitate the rapid delivery of relevant capabilities to our combined defense forces. In doing so, we took measure of the progress made since our last plenary on these efforts:

• Building on the success of the Multinational Armaments Resilience Seminar, the first Indo-Pacific focused multinational armaments cooperation course, to be executed on a yearly basis, and co-hosted by the Department of War’s Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies and rotating PIPIR members.
• Continuing our campaign of learning through multiple industrial base-focused subject-matter expert exchanges, tabletop exercises, and collaborative learning events.

We also discussed and endorsed several new lines of effort that will strengthen the Partnership by creating more opportunities for collaboration and will advance defense industrial resilience in the Indo-Pacific and globally:

• Committing to a project that will explore feasibility and opportunity to establish a forward-deployed F100/F110 engine repair hub in Japan, which, will support regional sustainment for F-15 and F-16 platforms operated by the United States Air Force and partner nations.
• Progressing the effort to establish a CH-47 Chinook T-55 engine repair hub in the Republic of Korea, a project recently announced at the US-ROK Logistics Cooperations Committee in July 2025.
• Establishment of a new Solid Rocket Motor (SRM) production initiative between the US and Japan, chaired by Japan.
• Expanding energetics and munitions development by assessing the potential for interest and funding for the 30mm-by-173mm ammunition load, assemble, and pack line effort with the Philippines.
• Supporting regional co-production opportunities by exploring modular UAV projects across many mission sets. (Source: U.S. DoD)

 

18 Mar 26. War Department Senior Leaders Prioritize Western Hemispheric Security.

The War Department is prioritizing security in the Western Hemisphere, which is integral to U.S. homeland defense, said Joseph M. Humire, performing the duties of assistant secretary of war for homeland defense and Americas security affairs, who spoke today during a House Armed Services Committee hearing in Washington.

Joint Task Force Southern Border helped seal the Southwest border in record time through deterrence and close partnership with federal law enforcement, he said, adding that “border security is national security.”

The department has deployed more than 12,000 service members along the border and has established six national defense areas covering 845 miles, or 42% of the border across Arizona, California, New Mexico and Texas.

Border security is augmented by cutting-edge technology and infrastructure, including counter-unmanned aerial systems and additional miles of border barrier.

Over the last 14 months the department has helped reverse record illegal mass migration into the lowest recorded border encounters in history, Humire said.

“This past January marked the fourth consecutive month decline in border apprehensions, with figures 93% below the historic average,” he added.

The department is also focused on issues beyond the border.

“For the first time in history, the department is going on the offense against designated terrorist organizations and other major cartels in our hemisphere,” he said.

Operation Southern Spear is providing deterrence against narco-terrorism threats in the Americas. Since the operation began, there has been a 30% reduction of drug vessel movements in the Caribbean and a 25% reduction in the Eastern Pacific.

Flows of fentanyl, which Humire called a “weapon of mass destruction,” have dropped by 56% and cocaine flows by 20%.

“That means there are less Americans dying from deadly drugs that have been poisoning our communities and our children for years. In fact, overall, inside the United States, we’ve seen a 20% decline in U.S. drug overdoses in the last year,” he said.

The Americas Counter Cartel Coalition, a partnership of South American and Caribbean nations formed earlier this month, is aimed at rooting out narco-terrorism threats through deterrence-focused operations, Humire said.

As of last week, Chile became the 18th member of that coalition.

This month, Ecuador became the first country to conduct joint land strikes in Latin America against cartel infrastructure, bringing collective hard power against cartels and increasing burden sharing.

The department is also securing “key terrain, from Alaska to Greenland in the Arctic to the Gulf of America and the Panama Canal and surrounding countries,” Humire said.

During the hearing, Air Force Gen. Gregory M. Guillot, commander of U.S. Northern Command and the North American Aerospace Defense Command, said NORAD and Northcom are taking on new missions and rapidly implementing innovative approaches to safeguard North America.

That approach includes deterring adversaries and defending against all threats in all domains, from intercepting long-range bombers off the coasts of Alaska and Canada, tracking advanced maritime platforms in the approaches to North America, and standing ready to defend against long-range missile attacks, the general said, providing some examples of Northcom’s focus:

• The stand-up of Joint Task Force Gold to address security posed by unmanned aerial systems.
• The command is designated as the department synchronizer for counter-small UAS activities in the continental U.S.
• Developed a rapidly deployable counter-small UAS fly-away kit to defend critical installations and employ innovative technologies to protect U.S. personnel.
• Accelerated the development of new counter-small UAS technologies in partnership with industry, with the aim of providing security in the Arctic.

The general said that Northcom and NORAD are participating in joint and combined exercises with allies and partners, such as Arctic Edge and Noble Defender.

“Trusted relationships are a cornerstone of regional security and homeland defense,” he added.

Marine Corps Gen. Francis L. Donovan, commander of U.S. Southern Command, spoke during the hearing about his command’s development of four imperatives:

• Strengthening hemispheric command and control by redesigning Southcom headquarters for strategic level operations at range, speed and scale.
• Imposing total systemic friction on drug cartels and terrorist networks with the help of partner nations.
• Developing and fielding cost-effective technology for warfighters, who are aided by autonomous systems, human machine teaming and all-domain awareness and data sharing for U.S. and partner forces.
• Denying adversarial footholds and undoing influence in the hemisphere, including preventing their ability to position forces or other capabilities that threaten the homeland or regional partners and challenge access to key terrain like the Panama Canal and its approaches. (Source: U.S. DoD)

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Founded in 1987, Exensor Technology is a world leading supplier of Networked Unattended Ground Sensor (UGS) Systems providing tailored sensor solutions to customers all over the world. From our Headquarters in Lund Sweden, our centre of expertise in Network Communications at Communications Research Lab in Kalmar Sweden and our Production site outside of Basingstoke UK, we design, develop and produce latest state of the art rugged UGS solutions at the highest quality to meet the most stringent demands of our customers. Our systems are in operation and used in a wide number of Military as well as Homeland Security applications worldwide. The modular nature of the system ensures any external sensor can be integrated, providing the user with a fully meshed “silent” network capable of self-healing. Exensor Technology will continue to lead the field in UGS technology, provide our customers with excellent customer service and a bespoke package able to meet every need.

A CNIM Group Company

———————————————————————————————————————-

Sponsored by Bertin Exensor

 

www.exensor.com

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18 Mar 26. Report by the Comptroller and Auditor General.

Improvements needed to ensure successful completion of Afghan resettlement programme

• 37,950 people arrived in the UK under Afghan resettlement schemes between April 2021 and December 2025.
• Government expects to spend a total of £5.7 billion on Afghan resettlement up to 2032-33, of which £2.6 billion has yet to be incurred.
• The resettlement programme needs to urgently complete the key elements of effective programme management, including having better cross-government management information.
• Download the embargoed report (PDF)
• Download the embargoed press notice (PDF)
• Download the embargoed statement from the Chair of the Public Accounts Committee (PDF)

The government must overcome ongoing challenges including a lack of available housing and poor data to ensure its programme to resettle thousands of Afghan citizens in the UK is successfully completed, according to a new National Audit Office (NAO) report.1

Since 2010, the government has offered resettlement in the UK to certain groups of Afghan citizens,2 including people who worked with the UK government in some capacity during its military presence in Afghanistan. This work sometimes came with significant risk to those Afghan citizens and their families, who feared reprisals from the Taliban.

Although the schemes closed to new applicants in July 2025, thousands of Afghans are still being processed for resettlement.3 As at November 2025, 29,655 people were waiting to hear the results of their eligibility assessments.

Between April 2021 and December 2025, 37,950 people arrived in the UK under the schemes and, as at February 2025, the government estimated it would ultimately resettle around 9,000 more. Of those resettled, as at December 2025, 80% were living in settled accommodation.4

The government anticipates that its work to resettle and integrate people will continue until 2032-33, costing a total of £5.7 billion. It spent £3.1 billion on the schemes between April 2021 and December 2025, meaning a significant proportion of the costs have not yet been incurred.5

Several government departments worked at pace under complex and demanding circumstances when establishing the schemes,6 especially after the Taliban takeover resulted in a far greater number of people applying and becoming eligible for resettlement than had originally been envisaged.7

The need to respond quickly, coupled with departments being responsible for different groups of people and resettlement stages, meant that the schemes became complex and inefficient. This is likely to have led to higher costs and worse outcomes for resettled people.8

To address these challenges, in December 2024 the government merged the resettlement schemes into a combined Afghan Resettlement Programme (ARP), which aims to bring all eligible Afghan citizens to the UK by March 2029 and to have moved those citizens out of transitional accommodation by December 2029.

Although the creation of the ARP has led to some improvements,9 significant risks remain. These include poor data on the people to be resettled and their needs, and a lack of available housing, resulting in greater than anticipated levels of resettled people becoming homeless.

To ensure the successful completion of the ARP, the NAO recommends that the government:

• urgently completes the outstanding elements of effective programme management
• undertakes scenario analysis to understand the potential barriers to completing the resettlement of all eligible people to the UK, and how these can be overcome
• monitors the effect of the changes under the ARP, particularly the introduction of a nine-month limit for transitional accommodation
• uses the results of pilot programmes involving local authorities and community organisations to identify innovative approaches and spread good practice
• identifies measures of successful integration for Afghan resettled people and uses these to assess outcomes

Gareth Davies, head of the NAO, said:

“Government departments have worked together in challenging conditions to resettle thousands of Afghan citizens who were at risk of reprisals from the Taliban.

“Although progress has been made under the new Afghan Resettlement Programme, the government has more to do to successfully resettle the affected people in the UK.”

 

24 Mar 26. Shipbuilding unions have backed a call for the Government to bring forward defence spending, changing the fiscal rules if necessary to do so.

The Confederation of Shipbuilding and Engineering Unions (CSEU – made up of GMB, Community, Prospect and Unite – has thrown its weight behind a report by the Alex Ferry Foundation ‘Defending the Nation, Growing the Economy’ [see notes for link to the report].

The report calls on Ministers to tweak the Government’s fiscal rules in order to bring forward the proposed increase in defence spending.

A Defence Commission, made up of defence companies, unions, and other experts, must also be established to ensure money spent defends the nation while growing the sector, the paper argues.

Matt Roberts, GMB National Officer and Confederation of Shipbuilding and Engineering Unions (CSEU) President, said:

“Defence spending is at its best when it delivers good-quality union jobs across the country.

“This report sets out a vital blueprint on how to create this long-term security for our defence manufacturing sector.

“Having a clear sighted Defence Commission – linking together trade unions, skills policy, employers and government procurement – would help us to meet the Government’s ambition of strengthening the economy while defending the nation.

“But, vitally, the Government must bring forward the planned increase to the defence budget, before it’s too late for the sector.

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Founded in 1987, Exensor Technology is a world leading supplier of Networked Unattended Ground Sensor (UGS) Systems providing tailored sensor solutions to customers all over the world. From our Headquarters in Lund Sweden, our centre of expertise in Network Communications at Communications Research Lab in Kalmar Sweden and our Production site outside of Basingstoke UK, we design, develop and produce latest state of the art rugged UGS solutions at the highest quality to meet the most stringent demands of our customers. Our systems are in operation and used in a wide number of Military as well as Homeland Security applications worldwide. The modular nature of the system ensures any external sensor can be integrated, providing the user with a fully meshed “silent” network capable of self-healing. Exensor Technology will continue to lead the field in UGS technology, provide our customers with excellent customer service and a bespoke package able to meet every need.

A CNIM Group Company

——————————————————————————————————————-

Sponsored by Bertin Exensor

 

www.exensor.com

 

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10 Mar 26. Bangladesh: Joint security operation will drive security risks in Chattogram district. Earlier on 9 March, a joint security operation was launched in the Jungle Salimpur area of Sitakunda upazila (Chattogram division) involving 4,000 officers from the Bangladesh Army, the Bangladesh Police, the Border Guard Bangladesh (BGB) and the Rapid Action Battalion (RAB). Security force personnel have established checkpoints along Jungle Salimpur’s exit and entry to prevent individuals from fleeing. The operation follows the killing of a RAB officer in January during a security operation in the area. Jungle Salimpur has traditionally been a safe haven for armed criminal groups involved in drug trafficking and illegal hill cutting. The authorities stated that they have detained 15 people and seized five firearms since the operation began. However, given the hilly terrain and the persistent lack of law enforcement presence in Jungle Salimpur, it is unlikely that this operation will fully resolve the above-mentioned issues in the short term. In addition to an elevated risk of clashes between criminal groups and the security forces while the operation is ongoing, the authorities’ increased pressure will increase the risk of spillover criminal activity impacting Chattogram metropolitan area.n (Source: Sibylline)

 

09 Marm 26.  Today, the Honourable Mélanie Joly, Minister of Industry and Minister responsible for Canada Economic Development for Quebec Regions, together with the Honourable David J. McGuinty, Minister of National Defence, and the Honourable Stephen Fuhr, Secretary of State (Defence Procurement), announced that the National Research Council of Canada (NRC) will invest over $900 million under Canada’s Defence Industrial Strategy, a long-term plan to support national prosperity and build a resilient domestic defence economy. Through the strategy, the Government of Canada is accelerating the development of defence and dual-use technologies to ensure Canada meets our defence needs and to build a globally competitive Canadian defence sector.

Building on its long-standing collaboration with the Department of National Defence (DND) and industry partners, the NRC will:

• Grow domestic capacity in drone and aerospace technologies, including the creation of the Drone Innovation Hub, and acquire a new Canadian-built Bombardier Global 6500 aircraft that will be used for defence-related technology development with industry and academia
• Support Canadian businesses developing dual-use technology through Defence Industry Assist (DI Assist), a new stream under the NRC’s Industrial Research Assistance Program
• Accelerate research and development in biomedical countermeasures
• Reinforce Canada’s edge in quantum technologies for defence applications

Through this investment, the NRC will collaborate with businesses and research institutions to advance Canada’s Defence Industrial Strategy, strengthening national security, fostering economic prosperity and reinforcing key industrial capabilities. These initiatives will help the NRC to drive innovation that protects Canadians and keeps Canadian businesses at the forefront of defence technology.

Today’s announcement reflects the Government of Canada’s sustained action to strengthen the industrial foundations that support Canada’s security and economic resilience. By aligning long-term defence investments with industrial capability, Canada’s Defence Industrial Strategy will create high-quality jobs and new opportunities for Canadians across the country, strengthen domestic supply chains, position Canada’s defence sector for long-term growth and reinforce Canada as a trusted partner to its allies.

The Government of Canada is pursuing a long-term, whole-of-government approach to strengthening the defence industrial base as a pillar of national security, economic resilience and prosperity.

Quotes

“The world is becoming more complex, and at the same time, the global economy is shifting. Canada’s Defence Industrial Strategy will strengthen our domestic industrial base, create high‑quality jobs across the country and help Canadian companies compete and win globally. The NRC investments announced today will advance cutting‑edge dual‑use technologies and deliver world‑class capabilities for the Canadian Armed Forces. Our government is meeting the moment so Canadians benefit from a stronger, more resilient defence economy.”

— The Honourable Mélanie Joly, Minister of Industry and Minister responsible for Canada Economic Development for Quebec Regions

“Canada’s security depends on our ability to innovate at home. Through the Defence Industrial Strategy, we are strengthening our sovereign capabilities and supporting Canadian companies in the development of next-generation aerospace, drone, quantum and biomedical technologies. This investment will help to advance defence and dual-use technologies to equip the Canadian Armed Forces with cutting-edge solutions while reinforcing a resilient, globally competitive defence industrial base.”

— The Honourable David J. McGuinty, Minister of National Defence

“Today’s investments will give Canadian industry the opportunity to deliver for the Canadian Armed Forces by innovating, competing and creating good-paying jobs for Canadians. Together with the Defence Investment Agency, we will move cutting-edge capabilities into the hands of our forces faster, build a more resilient supply chain and grow Canada’s defence industrial base.”

— The Honourable Stephen Fuhr, Secretary of State (Defence Procurement)

“For over a century, the National Research Council of Canada has advanced research and innovation that strengthen our nation’s defence and security. Building on the depth of our expertise, extensive partnerships with research institutions, and connections to ambitious Canadian businesses, we remain committed to advancing sovereign defence technologies that enhance security, create prosperity and reinforce Canada’s strategic economic position for the future.”

— Mitch Davies, President, National Research Council of Canada

Quick facts

• Initial investments under the Defence Industrial Strategy contribute to Canada spending 2% of gross domestic product (GDP) on defence in 2025–2026.
• Increasing investments in core military capabilities, building up Canadian industry and investing in dual-use technologies are putting Canada on a pathway to meet the new North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Defence Investment Pledge to invest 5% of GDP by 2035.
• The Canadian defence industry contributes nearly $10 billion to Canada’s GDP and supports over 81,000 jobs.
• The National Research Council of Canada was established by the Government of Canada during the First World War to coordinate and promote scientific research that could contribute to the national war effort. The NRC has evolved into Canada’s leading research and innovation organization, supporting science and technology across a wide range of fields–including aerospace, engineering, life sciences and digital technologies–and leveraging these capabilities for defence priorities.
• The NRC’s new programs in support of Canada’s Defence Industrial Strategy reinforce its long-standing partnership with the Department of National Defence (DND) and the Canadian Armed Forces. This enduring collaboration represents the single largest client relationship of the NRC today.
• Since 2021, the NRC has delivered more than 975 joint projects with DND, advancing aerospace, sensors, marine and biosecurity technologies.
• The NRC’s Challenge programs have provided more than $240 million in joint research and development funding since 2018. They have produced 2,600 technologies and tools and nine spin-off companies.
• (Source: PR Newswire)

 

10 Mar 26.  Japan: Missile deployment will sustain regional tensions, Chinese economic retaliation. On 9 March, the Japan Ministry of Defence (MOD) announced that it will deploy its upgraded Type-12 surface-to-ship extended-range missiles for the first time in Kumamoto prefecture (Kyushu region) on 31 March. The deployment is one year ahead of initial plans. The MOD believes this will strengthen Japan’s ‘counter-strike capability’ against armed attacks. With a reported range of over 620 miles (1,000km), the missiles can reach mainland China, the East China Sea and nearly all of North Korea. This follows an MOD announcement that it will deploy mid-range surface-to-air missiles on Yonaguni Island (Okinawa prefecture), just east of Taiwan, by 2031. Relations between China and Japan have remained tense since November 2025, after Japanese Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi stated that Japan could respond militarily to Chinese military action against Taiwan. Bilateral ties are highly unlikely to improve in the short-to-medium term, as both countries continue their arms build-up and refuse to compromise on their political stances. China will likely continue to impose travel boycotts and export restrictions on dual-use items to Japan, driving economic pressure and supply chain disruption (Source: Sibylline)

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Military And Security Developments

Mar 10

KEY DEVELOPMENTS 

• BAHRAIN-UAE: Iranian drone attacks on the Gulf region have continued; the rate of direct hits in Bahrain underscores the growing risks that possibly dwindling interceptor stockpiles will pose during the next two weeks.
• ISRAEL-LEBANON: Further armed escalation is likely in the coming days following Lebanese Hizballah (LH)’s strikes on central Israel.
• US-IRAN-ISRAEL: The US’ strategic ambiguity regarding its war goals possibly indicates plans to declare total victory over Iran in the coming days.
• STRAIT OF HORMUZ: Despite anecdotal evidence suggesting that an oil tanker successfully transited the Strait of Hormuz in recent days, broad resumption of shipping remains unlikely as the Israel-US-Iran conflict continues.
• ISRAEL-US-IRAN: The US’ and Israel’s airstrikes against Iran are highly likely to continue in the coming 24 hours, with their possible intensification increasing threats to security and infrastructure resilience. Israeli and US airstrikes across Iran have continued since our last report, with local media noting particularly intense bombardment in Behbahan (Khuzestan province), Karaj (Alborz province), Kerman (Kerman province), Shokohieh (Qom province), Tabriz (East Azerbaijan province) and the capital Tehran. Airstrikes are highly likely to continue, targeting locations associated with Iran’s security forces and particularly with the production, storage and launch of missiles and drones. In the past 24 hours, local media have also reported numerous explosions near port infrastructure in Bandar Abbas, Bandar Lengeh (both Hormozgan province), Bushehr (Bushehr province) and Chabahar (Sistan and Baluchestan province). These reports likely reflect continued US and Israeli efforts to negate Iranian naval assets, in order to curtail the authorities’ capacity to restrict the navigability of the Strait of Hormuz. However, strikes targeting port facilities (particularly in Chabahar) are highly likely to disrupt Iranian import and export activity, including of agricultural staples, oil products and medical supplies. Such conditions are highly likely to compound socio-economic pressure on Iran, amid broad conflict-related economic disruption. Earlier on 10 March, US Secretary of War Pete Hegseth announced that the US plans to escalate airstrikes targeting Iran imminently. This likely indicates that airstrikes’ frequency and intensity is highly likely to increase in the coming hours, particularly near Isfahan (Isfahan province), Karaj, Tehran and Tabriz. Rolling airstrikes will likely restrict civilian access to evacuation routes; they will also increase the risk of cascading infrastructure failures, further undermining food, energy and water security conditions within Iran.
• IRAN: Possible cyber attacks targeting Iranian financial institutions will likely compound socio-economic pressure, though high-level security force defections remain unlikely. Earlier on 10 March, several state-linked media outlets in Iran reported that financial institutions associated with the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) are facing substantial service disruption. Bank Melli and Bank Sepah have both reported outages, including to mobile banking services and ATMs. Although the Iranian authorities have not attributed the outages to any specific incident, we assess that there is a realistic possibility that the service disruption results from a cyber attack conducted by the US and/or Israel. If the outage results from hostile cyber activity, this would likely reflect efforts to restrict IRGC and conventional security force personnel’s access to banking facilities and savings in order to incentivise defections. Even so, there is also a realistic possibility that the service outage results from conflict-related damage to Iran’s telecommunications infrastructure; throughout the conflict, US and Israeli strikes have routinely targeted elements of Iran’s telecoms infrastructure, including the digital police (FAJAR) and the Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcasting (IRIB) corporation. The Iranian authorities have instituted an internet blackout since 1 March, which has partially restricted civilian access to banking facilities and online payment systems. In the coming days, restricted online and physical banking is highly likely to build pressure on socio-economic health conditions, particularly amid increasing conflict-related displacement. If sustained, restricted banking access will also increase the likelihood of low-level defections within Iran’s security forces, particularly the conventional army (Artesh). However, high-level defections among the IRGC remain unlikely, particularly due to long-standing IRGC efforts to develop alternative and informal financial networks, including crypto-currency channels.
• BAHRAIN-UAE: Iranian drone attacks on the Gulf region have continued; the rate of direct hits in Bahrain underscores the growing risks that possibly dwindling interceptor stockpiles will pose during the next two weeks. Between 9 and 10 March, Iran continued to launch a steady rate of drone salvos targeting Gulf countries (though fewer barrages than last week). On 9 March in Bahrain, a drone strike on a high-rise residential building in the capital Manama killed one civilian and injured eight others. The attack comes a day after a major attack on Bahrain’s main refinery and a separate attack on a nearby residential area, resulting in several fatalities (see Sibylline Middle East Crisis Update – 9 March 2026). Earlier on 10 March in the UAE, a drone struck a facility in the Ruwais industrial complex (Abu Dhabi emirate), causing a fire and material damage. The complex houses state-owned Abu Dhabi National Oil Company (ADNOC) facilities. The attack comes hours after the UAE’s authorities confirmed the deaths of two armed forces personnel in a helicopter crash caused by a technical malfunction, which likely occurred while intercepting Iranian drones. The rate of successful strikes in Bahrain over the past 48 hours possibly indicates early signs of interceptor stockpile exhaustion, a growing risk for all Gulf countries should the Israel-US-Iran war extend into late March. In our most dangerous scenario, the partial depletion of interceptors almost certainly prompts a spike in successful Iranian strikes against key infrastructure, likely triggering major economic disruption in the Gulf. These risks will remain most acute for Bahrain and Kuwait, as limited stockpiling and poor infrastructure resiliency make these states the most vulnerable to any direct hits, including those causing temporary disruption to infrastructure tied to energy or water security.
• ISRAEL-LEBANON: Further armed escalation is likely in the coming days following Lebanese Hizballah (LH)’s strikes on central Israel. On 9 March, LH lightly injured 18 people and caused damage to military and communications infrastructure in strikes on central Israel, which utilised long-range precision missiles. According to local reports, the missile barrage did not activate early warning sirens. Additionally, according to footage, the barrage caused severe damage to the satellite communication farm in the Valley of Elah (located near Beit Shemesh; Jerusalem district). The damage will elevate risks of communications and broadband disruption in Israel, possibly also impacting broadcasting by international outlets. Furthermore, there is a realistic possibility that the complex also housed antennas used by the military, possibly undermining Israel’s early alert systems, compounding security risks nationwide. There is a realistic possibility that LH used an Iranian surface-to-surface Fateh-110 missile, which allegedly has an operational range of up to 186 miles (about 300km) and the ability to carry a heavy warhead of around 500kg. Such missiles significantly increase the damage potential of LH strikes and are among the organisation’s most advanced weapons. LH will likely use more such weapons and further intensify its attacks against Israel in the coming days. This will increase physical security risks and disruption across Israel, particularly in northern and central areas. In return, Israel is likely to escalate strikes and ground operations against Lebanon. However, we assess that the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) will prioritise establishing an initial buffer zone in southern Lebanon before expanding ground operations northwards.
• LEBANON-SYRIA: LH artillery shelling into Syria elevates risk of armed escalation along border areas. Earlier on 10 March, the Syrian army claimed that LH fired artillery shells into Syrian territory overnight, landing near Serghaya (Rif Dimashq governorate). The army also accused LH of targeting Syrian military positions in the area and said it had observed LH reinforcements along the Lebanon-Syria border. The incident follows Syrian President Ahmed al-Sharaa’s declaration of support for Lebanon’s efforts to disarm LH on 9 March. The incident highlights the elevated tensions between LH and regional governments, amid a significant escalation in Israel’s attacks on the group since 2 March (see Sibylline Middle East Crisis Update as of 1200hrs GMT – 2 March 2026). In the coming days, there is a realistic possibility that LH will attempt to secure or reinforce land crossings along the Lebanon-Syria border, elevating risks of sporadic armed clashes with Syrian military personnel along border areas. Currently, a Syrian ground incursion into Lebanon remains unlikely; however, further LH targeting of Syrian forces would elevate risks of limited Syrian military ground operations along the border.
• IRAQ: Attacks by Iran-backed groups against US and Kurdish assets continue; physical security threats will be most acute around military facilities and telecommunication towers. Since our last report, Iran-backed militias have continued to launch missile and drone attacks against various US and Kurdish assets in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI). Local air forces intercepted several drones over Erbil (Erbil governorate), likely targeting the US consulate in the city. Separately, a drone struck a house in the Jian residential district of central Erbil, without triggering an explosion but causing a minor fire. In Sulaymaniyah (Sulaymaniyah governorate), a drone struck the former UN compound next to the Titanic Hotel for the second time in three days. Local media have also reported that nine drones struck telecommunications towers located between the Darbandikhan and Garmian border regions (also Sulaymaniyah). These attacks reflect a persistent trend of Iran-backed groups targeting telecommunications infrastructure used by US, Iraqi and Kurdish forces, likely intended to disrupt drone interceptions. As such, physical security threats near telecommunication towers and military facilities will remain very high. Meanwhile, joint Israeli-US strikes have continued to target Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) positions in Al Anbar, Kirkuk, Nineveh and Saladin governorates, killing at least five militia members. Such strikes will almost certainly persist through the coming days (particularly in rural areas of the mentioned governorates) in response to proxy group attacks.

POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS

• US-IRAN-ISRAEL: The US’ strategic ambiguity regarding its war goals possibly indicates plans to declare total victory over Iran in the coming days. On 9 March, US President Donald Trump issued various statements regarding the progress of the US airstrike campaign targeting Iran and the potential duration of US engagement in the region. Although Trump characterised the conflict as ‘very complete, pretty much’ in an interview with CBS, he later stated in public engagement that while the US has ‘won in many ways’, it has not ‘won enough’ vis-à-vis Iran. Trump’s statements likely reflect increasing concerns regarding conflict-related disruption to operational conditions in the Gulf and supply chain continuity through the Strait of Hormuz, which have triggered significant volatility on international energy and commodity markets. Trump’s statements are unlikely to indicate that the US plans to disengage from Iran unilaterally in the coming 24 hours. However, escalating ambiguity regarding the US’ war goals in Iran will increase the likelihood of the US announcing a symbolic victory in the coming days, given the significant damage to its conventional security forces and the successful targeting of several high-ranking regime and security force figures. If the US announces the end of combat operations in Iran, regional operational conditions will likely stabilise thereafter, facilitating a progressive resumption of key economic activity, particularly in the shipping, aviation and energy sectors. However, we assess that damage to energy facilities resulting from Iranian attacks, supply chain backlogs and concerns regarding possible conflict re-escalation will possibly delay efforts to return to pre-conflict operational levels, sustaining broader economic pressure in the coming days.
• STRAIT OF HORMUZ: Despite reports suggesting that an oil tanker successfully transited the Strait of Hormuz in recent days, a broad resumption of shipping remains unlikely as the Israel-US-Iran conflict continues. On 10 March, Bloomberg reported that a Greek-flagged oil tanker successfully transited the Strait of Hormuz after turning off its transponder on 4 March. The vessel had loaded approximately 1 million barrels of crude from the Ras Tanura port facility (Eastern province, Saudi Arabia) before the Israel-US-Iran war; after turning off its transponder for five days, the vessel subsequently began signalling near India’s coastline on 9 March. This report comes amid increasing speculation that commercial vessels in the Persian Gulf are attempting to break Iran’s de facto closure of the Strait of Hormuz by turning off location systems or re-flagging themselves in order to secure passage. Although there is a realistic possibility that further covert transit will take place in the coming days, vessels traversing the waterway will remain acutely exposed to Iranian missile and drone attacks. This will highly likely continue to deter any broad resumption of shipping activity in the Gulf in the immediate term, critically disrupting import and export activity in the coming days. Covert efforts to transit through the Strait of Hormuz will also increase the likelihood of vessel collisions and major hazards resulting from cargo ignition or spills, increasing hazard risks for nearby vessels.

* Lebanon-Syria: LH artillery shelling into Syria elevates risk of armed escalation along border areas. Earlier on 10 March, the Syrian Army claimed that Lebanese Hizballah (LH) fired artillery shells into Syrian territory overnight, landing near Serghaya (Rif Dimashq governorate). The army also accused LH of targeting Syrian military positions in the area and stated that it had observed LH reinforcements along the Lebanon-Syria border. The incident follows Syrian President Ahmed al-Sharaa’s declaration of support for Lebanon’s efforts to disarm LH on 9 March. The incident highlights the elevated tensions between LH and regional governments, amid a significant escalation in Israel’s attacks on the organisation since 2 March (see Sibylline Middle East Crisis Update as of 1200hrs GMT – 2 March 2026). In the coming days, there is a realistic possibility that LH will attempt to secure or reinforce land crossings along the Lebanon-Syria border, elevating risks of sporadic armed clashes with Syrian military personnel along border areas. Currently, a Syrian ground incursion into Lebanon remains unlikely; however, further LH targeting of Syrian forces would elevate risks of a limited Syrian military ground operations along the border.

Azerbaijan-Iran: War spillover, Iran-linked plots risks sustain tensions despite de-escalation attempts . On 6 March, Azerbaijan’s State Security Service (DTX) claimed that it had thwarted what it called ‘terror and sabotage plots’ allegedly planned by Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC). The alleged targets included the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan oil pipeline, the Israeli embassy in Azerbaijan, the leader of a Jewish community in Azerbaijan (known as Mountain Jews) and an Ashkenazi synagogue. While we cannot confirm this information, would-be terrorists have previously targeted the Israeli embassy in Azerbaijan’s capital Baku. The reported foiling of IRGC-linked plots follows a likely Iranian drone attack in Azerbaijan’s Nakhchivan exclave (see Sibylline Situation Update Brief – 5 March 2026). Despite these recent developments, Azerbaijan and Iran are both attempting to decrease tensions. On 8 March, President Ilham Aliyev and Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian spoke via telephone; while earlier on 9 March, Azerbaijan resumed cargo transportation across the border with Iran. However, we assess that the continuation of the Israel-US-Iran war and IRGC-related plots facing Azerbaijan (potentially without central Tehran authorisation) over the coming weeks will likely drive bilateral tensions periodically and increase the risk of Azerbaijan’s entry into the war.

Iran: Election of new supreme leader likely to centralise IRGC power, elevate prolonged conflict risks. On 8 March, Iran’s Assembly of Experts elected Mojtaba Khamenei as the country’s new supreme leader, succeeding his father the late supreme leader Ali Khamenei, who was killed in recent US-Israeli strikes (see Sibylline Middle East Crisis Update – 1 March 2026). Khamenei is a hardline conservative and has long maintained close relations with the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC); his accession will likely centralise the IRGC’s role in executive decision-making amid the ongoing Israel-US-Iran war. Such hardline influence will increase the likelihood of Iranian escalation against civilian infrastructure in Gulf states, compounding energy, food and water security risks across the region. In addition, the US and Israel are unlikely to welcome Khamenei’s election and are highly likely to target him in additional strikes in the coming days. These dynamics will likely reduce the prospects for an Iranian compromise with the US and Israel in the coming weeks, elevating the risk of prolonging the war.

Mar 08.

KEY DEVELOPMENTS

• BAHRAIN-KUWAIT-UAE: Retaliatory Iranian attacks against energy and water infrastructure in the Gulf region are likely in the coming days.
• IRAQ: Recent waves of attacks by Iran-backed militias underscore persistent threats to US government and commercial staff and assets nationwide.
• ISRAEL-LEBANON: A strike on a hotel in the Lebanese capital Beirut highlights the extension of conflict risks to hospitality venues across Lebanon, including in central Beirut.
• IRAN: The Assembly of Experts will likely announce Iran’s next supreme leader in the coming hours, though threats to government stability are unlikely to decrease substantially.
• ISRAEL-US-IRAN: US and Israeli airstrikes targeting airports and dual-use transport infrastructure will almost certainly continue in the coming days.  In the past 24 hours, the US and Israel have continued to engage in airstrikes throughout Iran, with repeated strikes reported in Isfahan (Isfahan province), Hamadan (Hamadan province), the capital Tehran and Yazd (Yazd province). In Isfahan, the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) have destroyed an unspecified number of Iranian F-14s in strikes on the city’s Isfahan Shahid Beheshti International Airport (IFN); this follows the IDF’s destruction of several military aircraft in strikes targeting Tehran’s Mehrabad International Airport (THR) on 6 March. The strikes underscore increasing pressure on Iran’s conventional aerial resources, with further strikes increasing the Iranian authorities’ dependence on non-conventional capabilities, particularly unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs; i.e. drones) and unmanned surface vehicles (USVs; i.e. drone boats). Airstrikes targeting airport facilities and dual-use transport infrastructure (including port facilities) will almost certainly continue in the coming days, further restricting access to evacuation routes within Iran.
• IRAN-REGION: US and Israeli airstrikes targeting Iranian oil and water infrastructure will almost certainly trigger a reciprocal targeting of facilities in the Gulf region in the coming days. Overnight on 7-8 March, airstrikes targeted four oil depots and a petroleum products transport centre across Alborz and Tehran provinces, all of which service Tehran; the resultant fires are ongoing at the time of writing. In the coming days, strikes targeting Iranian oil facilities are highly likely to continue, particularly those related to domestic energy infrastructure. The targeting of oil extraction, refinery, transport and storage facilities will significantly increase the risk of rolling power outages in Iran’s major cities. In the coming days, risks of exposure to fires, explosions and heavy air pollution will remain acute for individuals and assets near oil and energy facilities, while petrol shortages and official rationing will become increasingly likely. Additionally, on 7 March, Iran’s Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi stated that the US had attacked water desalination facilities on Qeshm Island (Hormozgan province), impacting the supply of fresh water to 30 coastal population centres. In the coming days, US and Israeli airstrikes targeting water infrastructure will likely continue, with targets including desalination facilities, water treatment plants and sewage management systems. Similarly, earlier on 8 March, Israeli media reported that the UAE launched strikes on an unspecified Iranian water desalination facility; however, these reports cannot be verified at the time of writing. Such strikes are highly likely to compound long-standing water security concerns within Iran, while increasing broader pressure on infrastructure and essential services. In response to deteriorating energy and water security conditions, Iran will likely increase the intensity of attacks targeting similar infrastructure in the Gulf region (particularly the UAE, if its strike is confirmed), exacerbating risks of cross-sector operational disruption (see below).
• BAHRAIN-KUWAIT-UAE: Retaliatory Iranian attacks against energy and water infrastructure in the Gulf region are likely in the coming days. As we previously assessed, since our last report, Iranian drone and missile strikes against Gulf countries have continued despite recent de-escalatory statements from Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian (see Sibylline Middle East Crisis Update – 7 March 2026). In the UAE, debris from an intercepted drone killed the driver of a vehicle in the Al Barsha district of Dubai (Dubai emirate), while a separate interception caused structural damage to the facade of a tower in the city’s Dubai Marina district. In Bahrain, drones and missiles targeted the capital Manama, with debris impacting residential properties in Juffair district and near the Salman port, sparking localised fires and material damage. Additionally, the Bahraini authorities have confirmed that an Iranian strike damaged a critical desalination plant in Manama, though water supplies and network capacity remain unaffected. Meanwhile, in Kuwait, a drone strike triggered a major fire at the Public Institution for Social Security headquarters in the capital, Kuwait City. The authorities also confirmed the death of two officers ​while performing duties, without disclosing further details. Another wave of drone attacks struck two fuel storage tanks at the capital’s Kuwait International Airport (KWI). We assess that Iran’s intensified targeting of Gulf infrastructure over the past 24 hours is likely a direct response to recent US and Israeli strikes on Iranian oil infrastructure. Accordingly, further Iranian attacks against energy, power and water facilities in the above-mentioned countries are likely to continue for as long as joint US-Israeli strikes persist. Specifically, any strikes on desalination infrastructure in Kuwait and Bahrain would almost certainly trigger significant business disruption, raising the risk of broader economic shock in both states. Similarly, while the UAE’s infrastructure is generally more resilient than Bahrain’s and Kuwait’s, any Iranian strike on the country’s desalination plants would trigger reduced water supply and possible water rationing across the affected emirate, accelerating capital and labour flight. We also assess that such an attack would significantly raise the likelihood of the UAE conducting direct military retaliation against Iran, including airstrikes on nearby coastal energy and water facilities.
• IRAQ: Iran-backed militias’ recent waves of attacks underscore persistent threats to US government and commercial staff and assets nationwide. On 7 March, three Katyusha rockets targeted the US embassy in the capital Baghdad’s Green Zone; the embassy’s C‑RAM system intercepted all projectiles. The Iraqi authorities have attributed the launch to unidentified groups operating from eastern Baghdad’s Canal Street area. Later on 7 March, Iraqi air defences intercepted multiple drones approaching the Baghdad Diplomatic Support Center (BDSC), located on the western edge of the capital’s Baghdad International Airport (BGW). Additionally, a drone struck the Al Dora power plant in southern Baghdad, causing a localised fire. Meanwhile, for the second consecutive day, a drone struck the Burjesia oil complex in Basra (Basra governorate) on 7 March, causing a major fire. The complex is home to several facilities belonging to US and Western energy companies. In the Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI), a drone struck the vicinity of Erbil International Airport (EBL; Erbil governorate), killing a security force member and wounding another, while a second drone hit a nearby warehouse. Notably, a day after a drone attack on a hotel in Erbil on 6 March, Iran-backed groups issued an explicit warning across the KRI which named all hotels used by US personnel as potential targets. Earlier on 8 March, a drone struck the vicinity of Titanic Hotel, located near the UN’s office in Sulaymaniyah (Sulaymaniyah governorate), causing material damage. These attacks reflect a pattern whereby Iran-backed militias increasingly target US commercial interests across Iraq. This pattern will likely persist in the coming days, increasing the risk of attacks against US staff and assets across all business sectors in Iraq (not only limited to energy), as we previously assessed (see Sibylline Middle East Crisis Update – 7 March 2026).
• ISRAEL-LEBANON: A strike on a hotel in the capital Beirut highlights the extension of conflict risks to hospitality venues across Lebanon, including in central Beirut. Earlier on 8 March, the IDF conducted a targeted strike against an apartment in the Ramada Hotel of Beirut’s upmarket Raouché neighbourhood, killing at least four individuals and injuring at least ten others. The IDF has claimed that it targeted Iranian Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) Quds Force commanders. In contrast to recent Israeli strikes conducted in civilian areas of Lebanon, the IDF did not issue an evacuation warning prior to this strike. The incident underlines the IDF’s willingness to view hospitality venues across Lebanon (including in central Beirut) as legitimate targets in their pursuit of strikes on high-value individuals affiliated with Lebanese Hizballah (LH) and Iran. This will elevate the risk of strikes on hotels, particularly in Beirut, with a possibility of such targeted operations happening with little to no notice. In addition, IDF strikes across Lebanon are highly likely to continue over the coming days, sustaining elevated security risks, particularly in Beirut, eastern and southern Lebanon, as well as in areas along the borders with Israel and Syria.

POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS 

• IRAN: The Assembly of Experts will likely announce Iran’s next supreme leader in the coming hours, though threats to government stability are unlikely to decrease substantially. Earlier on 8 March, the state-aligned Mehr news agency reported that the Assembly of Experts had reached a consensus on Iran’s next supreme leader, indicating that a succession announcement is likely imminent. We assess that the assembly will likely elect either Mojtaba Khamenei (the son of deceased supreme leader Ali Khamenei) or Alireza Arafi (a member of the Assembly of Experts, the Guardian Council and the Interim Leadership Council). Both candidates are associated with Iran’s hardline conservative movements, with Khamenei maintaining particularly close ties with the IRGC. Khamenei’s election would likely centralise the IRGC’s role in executive decision-making amid the ongoing Israel-US-Iran war. In contrast, despite Arafi’s ideological alignment with the IRGC, his election would likely result in the IRGC operating as an increasingly autonomous force with parallel decision-making independent of the executive. The US and Israel are not likely to welcome either Arafi or Khamenei’s election; they are highly likely to target both individuals in airstrikes in the coming days. We assess that the successful, repeated targeting of high-ranking government and religious officials within Iran will likely compound threats to government stability amid an intensifying leadership vacuum. If sustained, the IRGC will likely capitalise on this dynamic to assume de facto control of Iran’s government, increasing the likelihood of a protracted conflict with the US and Israel while significantly undermining prospects for diplomatic de-escalation.
• IRAN-IRAQ-US: Despite the Trump administration’s decreasing public support for an Iranian Kurdish insurgency, we continue to assess that covert support remains a realistic possibility. On 7 March, US President Donald Trump stated that he does not ‘want the Kurds to go into Iran’, amid increasing speculation that Iranian Kurdish forces based in the KRI plan to launch an imminent ground offensive (see Sibylline Middle East Crisis Update – 5 March 2026). Trump claimed that Kurdish involvement would render the conflict ‘too complicated’. The statement underscores the decreasing prospects for overt US support for a Kurdish insurgency in Iran’s Kurdish-majority regions. However, Trump’s statement contrasts with claims from several figures associated with the Coalition of Political Forces of Iranian Kurdistan (CPFIK; a coalition of six Iranian Kurdish armed groups based in Iraq) that the US has communicated offers of air and logistical support for any such offensive. We continue to assess that there is a realistic possibility of covert US support for the mobilisation of Kurdish separatist forces along the northern Iran-Iraq border, as part of broader efforts to intensify pressure on Iran’s security apparatus. In the event of Iranian Kurdish mobilisation, security conditions in north-western Iran are highly likely to deteriorate further, while tensions between Iran, Iraq, Turkey and the US are highly likely to increase.
• Mar 09.
• BAHRAIN-SAUDI ARABIA-REGION: Iranian attacks on regional energy infrastructure will compound existing disruption to fuel supply chains in the coming days, with knock-on effects across other economic sectors.
• TURKEY-NATO-IRAN: NATO’s interception of a second Iranian missile in Turkish airspace within a week will increase the risk of Turkey’s involvement in the conflict if aerial hostilities persist.
• IRAN: The Assembly of Experts selected Mojtaba Khamenei to serve as supreme leader, sustaining conflict protraction risks.
• US-STRAIT OF HORMUZ: Despite US efforts to moderate investor concerns regarding the safety of vessels in the Persian Gulf, traffic through the Strait of Hormuz is highly unlikely to resume in the coming days.
• EUROPE: Explosions in Belgium and Norway underscore the rising risk of attacks targeting Jewish, Israeli and US-linked entities in Europe amid conflict escalation.
• ISRAEL-US-IRAN: US and Israeli airstrikes continue to target locations throughout Iran, sustaining critical threats to life in major cities. On 8 March, the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) announced that they had targeted the headquarters of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) Aerospace Force in the capital Tehran. Airstrikes have also targeted missile production, storage and launch facilities in the vicinity of Garmdarreh (Alborz province), Jam (Bushehr province), Isfahan (Isfahan province), Shahrud (Semnan province), Shiraz (Fars province) and Tehran. On 9 March, an airstrike also targeted Bandar Abbas International Airport (BND; Hormozgan province), underscoring broad risks of airstrikes targeting commercial aviation installations and disrupting access to aerial evacuation routes. Local media reports indicate that airstrikes have also targeted numerous Basij militia facilities and Law Enforcement Command (LEC) installations in Alborz, Ilam, Kermanshah, Lorestan and Tehran provinces, underscoring US and Israeli efforts to undermine Iran’s domestic security capabilities and capacity to repress anti-government protests and unrest. Airstrikes targeting Iran’s conventional, non-conventional and domestic-focused security forces are highly likely to continue in the coming days, sustaining critical threats to life within Iran. Airstrikes targeting water, energy and transport infrastructure are also highly likely, critically disrupting operational continuity and compounding pressure on socio-economic conditions. If sustained, such conditions are likely to progressively undermine government stability and security force capacity within Iran, increasing the risk of internal instability. Even so, the IRGC are highly likely to sustain missile and drone strikes targeting Israel, the Gulf and US military installations across the region, sustaining risks of conflict protraction into the coming weeks.
• BAHRAIN-SAUDI ARABIA-REGION: Iranian attacks on regional energy infrastructure will compound existing disruption to fuel supply chains in the coming days, with knock-on effects across other economic sectors. On 8 March, several Iranian drones struck the refinery complex of state-owned Bahrain Petroleum Company (Bapco) at Sitra (Southern governorate), causing a major fire. In the same area, falling debris from intercepted drones and missiles fell on nearby homes, injuring at least 32 people and causing substantial damage, according to the authorities. However, there is also a possibility that a malfunctioning interception missile caused this incident. This is the second major Iranian attack on Bahrain’s only refinery since the Israel-US-Iran war’s onset; it prompted Bapco to declare force majeure on its group operations at the site hours later. Also on 8 March, in Saudi Arabia, the authorities confirmed that an Iranian projectile fell in a residential area in Al Kharj (Riyadh province), killing two people and injuring 12 others. The intended target was likely either local energy infrastructure or the nearby Prince Sultan Air Base; this comes a day after an Iranian drone was intercepted over central Riyadh (Riyadh province). Notably, earlier on 9 March, international media reported that oil company Saudi Aramco has began cutting output at two ​oilfields, citing ongoing security threats and the Strait of Hormuz’s de facto closure. However, at the time of writing, no data indicates which fields have been affected and by ‌how ⁠much production has been curtailed. Nevertheless, this development, in addition to Bapco’s force majeure, is highly likely to compound disruption to regional fuel supply chains this week, even if domestic needs remain met. Moreover, additional operational disruption in other economic sectors across the region is likely in the coming days, including logistics and the petrochemical industry (such as plastics, solvents and other chemicals). Bapco’s and Aramco’s decisions, which follow similar moves by Kuwait and Qatar on oil and gas production, underscore the substantial and persistent physical security threat facing all energy companies operating in the Gulf region and Iraq. This will increase the risk of labour flight from the Gulf region and likely lead to an uptick in evacuations of foreign staff working in the energy sector if the Israel-US-Iran war continues into late March.
• ISRAEL-LEBANON: Strikes against a Lebanese Hizballah (LH)-affiliated financial institution highlight elevated risks across Lebanon and possible future targeting of assets in the capital Beirut outside the Dahieh suburb. Earlier on 9 March, the IDF conducted strikes across Beirut, targeting branches of the Al-Qard Al-Hasan Association, a financial institution affiliated with LH. The strikes come amid ongoing intensification of IDF military operations against LH and are consistent with our earlier assessment that financial institutions affiliated with LH would likely be targeted (see Sibylline Middle East Crisis Update – 3 March 2026). Before the strikes, the IDF issued an evacuation warning and named the intended target. We assess that IDF strikes against assets of the Al-Qard Al-Hasan Association, as well as other LH-affiliated financial assets, are likely to continue in the coming days across Lebanon, including in Beirut. Furthermore, there is a realistic possibility that in the coming days the IDF will target branches of the association or other LH-affiliated institutions in Beirut, including those outside the Dahieh suburb. This will elevate security risks across the capital in addition to the already elevated risks near hospitality venues (see Sibylline Middle East Crisis Update – 8 March 2026).
• ISRAEL-LEBANON: The IDF’s ground operations in villages along the Israel-Lebanon border highlight heightened security risks in frontier areas; the further expansion of such operations across southern Lebanon remains a realistic possibility. Overnight on 8-9 March, the IDF conducted focused ground raids in Lebanese villages opposite the Israeli population centres of Kfar Giladi and Margaliot (both Northern district, Israel). The operations highlight persistently elevated security risks across southern Lebanon and particularly those close to the Israel-Lebanon border. The IDF is likely to further such operations in the coming days in pursuit of establishing a buffer zone in southern Lebanon. There is also a realistic possibility that ground operations will expand deeper into Lebanese territory in the coming weeks, particularly if LH attacks continue after the establishment of said buffer zone.
• TURKEY-NATO-IRAN: NATO’s interception of a second Iranian missile in Turkish airspace within a week will increase the risk of Turkey’s involvement in the conflict should the aerial hostilities persist. Earlier on 9 March, NATO’s air defences in ​the eastern Mediterranean ‌shot down a ballistic missile that was ​fired from Iran ​and entered Turkey’s airspace. The ⁠Turkish defence ministry stated that ammunition parts ​had ​fallen ⁠in south-eastern areas of Gaziantep ​province and that there were ​no ⁠casualties as a result of the incident. The ministry added that it will take all necessary measures against similar threats. This marks the ​second Iranian ballistic missile ​to be shot down over ‌Turkey within a week. However, similar to the first ballistic incident, it is possible the missile was aimed at the UK’s Royal Air Force (RAF) Akrotiri base in Cyprus, rather than assets in Turkey. Nevertheless, the incident underscores the growing risk of conflict spillover and the possibility of Turkey being drawn into the confrontation. The risk of Turkey’s involvement would also increase if strikes against Cyprus overshoot or undershoot their intended target, particularly if intercepted debris or ordnance falls within the self-declared Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC, recognised only by Turkey), which hosts a substantial Turkish military presence.

POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS 

• IRAN: The Assembly of Experts selected Mojtaba Khamenei to serve as supreme leader, sustaining conflict protraction risks. On 8 March, the Assembly of Experts appointed Mojtaba Khamenei to serve as Iran’s supreme leader; Mojtaba is the son of deceased supreme leader Ali Khamenei. Given Mojtaba Khamenei’s close ties to the IRGC, his accession will likely centralise the IRGC’s role in executive decision-making amid the ongoing Israel-US-Iran war. Khamenei is also associated with Iran’s hardline conservative political factions and supports adherence to the 1979 Islamic Revolution’s principles. Consequently, Khamenei’s appointment indicates that Iran is highly unlikely to seek conflict de-escalation or diplomatic engagement with the US in the coming days. Rather, the IRGC is highly likely to continue engaging in attacks targeting Israel and US military installations throughout the Middle East, sustaining risks of exposure to munitions, explosions and shrapnel for locally engaged assets and personnel. The IRGC is also likely to continue escalating attacks targeting dual-use and civilian infrastructure in Gulf states, including water desalination plants, energy infrastructure and hospitality venues. Continued Iranian attacks will likely compound energy, food and water security concerns, while sustaining risks of cross-sector operational disruption. More broadly, the US and Israel are unlikely to welcome Khamenei’s appointment; as such, attempts to target him and other high-profile regime figures are highly likely to continue in the coming days. If successful, the routine targeting of regime figures will increase the likelihood of a protracted leadership vacuum emerging within Iran in the coming weeks, undermining the prospects for domestic stabilisation and conflict de-escalation.
• US-STRAIT OF HORMUZ: Despite US efforts to moderate investor concerns regarding the safety of vessels in the Persian Gulf, traffic through the Strait of Hormuz is highly unlikely to resume in the coming days. On 6 March, the US International Development Finance Corporation (IDFC) announced that it had finalised plans to establish a USD 20 billion reinsurance programme for vessels attempting to transit the Strait of Hormuz. Since the Israel-US-Iran war began on 28 February, the majority of carriers and underwriters have implemented significant war risk premium loadings or suspended war risk cover for vessels attempting to transit the waterway. Coupled with acute threats to vessel security stemming from Iranian drone and missile attacks, maritime traffic has broadly ceased. This dynamic has critically disrupted oil, gas and commodity exports from the Gulf to global markets, triggering price hikes; on 9 March, Brent crude traded at over USD 100 per barrel, compared to USD 68 per barrel on 23-26 February. The IDFC programme is highly unlikely to trigger the immediate and full-scale resumption of maritime activity in the Strait of Hormuz. Vessel operators will likely remain reluctant to transit the waterway given acute security concerns stemming from risks of vessel, crew and cargo exposure to Iranian hostilities. Although the US will possibly offer to provide naval escorts for affected vessels in the coming days, traffic will likely be slow to resume and is highly unlikely to reach pre-conflict levels in the short term. Additionally, the reinsurance programme is highly unlikely to mitigate against supply issues stemming from the suspension of operations at oil refineries, LNG facilities and export terminals in the region, amid ongoing Iranian attacks targeting energy infrastructure and storage backlogs (see above). Consequently, the rollout of the IDFC reinsurance programme is unlikely to address critical supply chain disruption the in Gulf imminently, sustaining upwards pressure on oil and gas prices in the coming days.
• IRAN-US: Despite speculation regarding potential US special operations within Iran, large-scale deployments of US service personnel remain unlikely in the short term. On 8 March, Bloomberg reported that US President Donald Trump is ‘weighing the option’ of deploying US special forces personnel to secure Iran’s stockpiles of medium-enriched uranium. Although no other major media outlet has verified this report, we assess there is a realistic possibility that the US will deploy a small number of specialised personnel to conduct commando missions within Iran to secure specified Iranian assets, such as nuclear material. Any such operations will almost certainly be covert; a public confirmation of ground operations within Iran remains unlikely in the short term. Nevertheless, large-scale deployments of US personnel remain unlikely in the immediate term, moderating the risk of the Israel-US-Iran war evolving into widespread ground engagements between the Iranian and US security forces.
• EUROPE: Explosions in Belgium and Norway underscore rising risk of attacks targeting Jewish, Israeli and US-linked entities in Europe amid conflict escalation. At approximately 0400hrs (local time) earlier on 9 March, an explosion at a synagogue in Liège (Wallonia region, Belgium) resulted in limited material damage but no reported injuries. The Federal Prosecutor’s Office subsequently launched an investigation into the case, with Belgium’s interior minister characterising the incident as an ‘antisemitic act’. The incident followed a small explosion at the US embassy in Norway’s capital Oslo at approximately 0100hrs (local time) on 8 March; this incident also resulted minor damage and no reported injuries. The authorities are investigating it as a possible terrorist attack, though Norway’s terrorism threat level remains unchanged at the time of writing. These incidents reflect increasing risks of low-capacity attacks targeting locations associated with Jewish communities, Israel and the US following the outbreak of the Israel-US-Iran war on 28 February (see Sibylline Situation Update Brief – 3 March 2026). Robust European counter-terrorism capabilities and augmented security postures are likely to disrupt complex co-ordinated plots, such as those organised by Iran-backed proxies or organised criminal elements. However, the risk of rudimentary attacks including sole-perpetrator attacks and those employing small explosives will remain elevated in the coming weeks. Risks of further attacks will become particularly acute in the event of direct European intervention in the Israel-US-Iran war, including in a defensive capacity. (Source: Sibylline)

 

10 Mar 26. Hegseth Says U.S. Attacks Intensify Under Epic Fury, While Iranian Responses Slow. The U.S. launched strikes on Iran last week to stop the terrorist-run state from its continued and ill-advised pursuit of nuclear weapons it hopes to use to threaten the American homeland.

Nearly 11 days into Operation Epic Fury, Secretary of War Pete Hegseth says the U.S attacks continue to be strong while Iranian responses wane.

“Today will be, yet again, our most intense day of strikes inside Iran,” Hegseth said during a press briefing today at the Pentagon. “The most fighters, the most bombers, the most strikes; intelligence more refined and better than ever. So, that’s on one hand. On the other hand, the last 24 hours have seen Iran fire the lowest number of missiles they’ve been capable of firing yet.”

The secretary told journalists that much of what the Iranians are doing is lobbing missiles at their neighbors in the Middle East, making enemies of what may have once been bystanders, and launching those missiles from near their own schools and hospitals, putting innocent civilians at risk from retaliatory strikes.

“The [Iranians] are desperate and scrambling. Like the terrorist cowards they are, they fire missiles from schools and hospitals … deliberately targeting innocents … because they know their military is being systematically degraded and annihilated,” Hegseth said. “Iran’s neighbors and in some cases former allies in the [Persian] Gulf — they’ve abandoned them.”

Iranian proxy groups like Hezbollah, the Houthis and Hamas are also broken, ineffective, or on the sidelines now, Hegseth said.

“Iran stands alone, and they are badly losing,” the secretary said. “On day 10 of Operation Epic Fury, we are winning with an overwhelming and unrelenting focus on our objectives.”

The secretary said that, surprisingly, Iran’s response after the initial U.S. assault was to attack its neighbors. The result of that, he said, has not been good for Iran.

“The big mistake by the Iranian regime was to start targeting its neighbors,” Hegseth said. “I think it was a demonstration of the desperation of that regime … that they still think their pathway out is to try to alienate their Arab partners even more.”

Those neighbors, Hegseth said, have decided instead to side with the U.S.

“[They have] instead decided to come to us and have been willing to go on the offense, have been giving us access, basing and overflight in a new partnership that will continue to remake the region,” Hegseth said.

The U.S. has short-term, clearly defined goals in Iran. First, destroying Iranian missile stockpiles, missile launchers and their defense industrial base. Second, destroy the Iranian navy. And finally, permanently deny Iran the ability to have nuclear weapons.

“It’s a laser-focused maximum authority mission delivered with overwhelming and unrelenting precision,” he said.

Air Force Gen. Dan Caine, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, shared the latest tactical details of Operation Epic Fury.

“To date, [U.S. Central Command has] struck more than 5,000 targets,” Caine said. “[U.S.] Strategic Command bombers recently dropped dozens of 2,000-pound GPS penetrating weapons on deeply buried missile launchers across the southern flank.”

Also, Caine said, the U.S. struck several factories the Iranians use to make one-way attack drones.

“Alongside our regional partners along the southern flank, [we] continue to execute intercepts against one-way attack drones, using fighters and attack helicopters,” he said. “Our strikes mean we’ve made significant progress in reducing the number of missile and drone attacks out of Iran. Ballistic missile attacks continue to trend downward, 90% from where they started. And one-way attack drone [attacks] have decreased 83% since the beginning of the operation — a testament to our air defenders and our air defense systems.”

When it comes to taking out the Iranian navy, Caine said the joint force is making “substantial progress.” So far, he said, the joint force has taken out more than 50 Iranian naval ships using artillery, fighters, bombers and sea-launched missiles.

“We struck and sank an Iranian drone carrier ship, and U.S. Centcom continues today to hunt and strike mine-laying vessels and mine storage facilities,” Caine said. “This work will continue.”

The secretary and President Donald J. Trump have said Operation Epic Fury will not be a long-term, nation-building endeavor, and the secretary reiterated that today.

“This is not [an] endless nation-building … quagmire — it’s not even close,” Hegseth said. “Our generation of soldiers will not let that happen again, and nor will this president — who very clearly ran against … never-ending, nebulously scoped missions; those days are dead. Instead, we’re winning decisively with brutal efficiency, total air dominance and an unbreakable will to accomplish the president’s objectives on our timeline.”  (Source: U.S. DoD)

 

10 Mar 26. Iran begins laying mines in Strait of Hormuz, sources say. Luojiashan tanker sits anchored in Muscat, as Iran vows to close the Strait of Hormuz, amid the U.S.-Israeli conflict with Iran, in Muscat, Oman, on March 7.

Iran has begun laying mines in the Strait of Hormuz, the world’s most important energy chokepoint that carries about one-fifth of all crude oil, according to two people familiar with US intelligence reporting on the issue.

The mining is not extensive yet, with a few dozen having been laid in recent days, the sources said. But Iran still retains upward of 80% to 90% of its small boats and mine layers, one of the sources said, so its forces could feasibly lay hundreds of mines in the waterway.

Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, which now effectively controls the strait along with Iran’s traditional navy, has the capability to deploy a “gauntlet” of dispersed mine-laying craft, explosive-laden boats and shore-based missile batteries, CNN has reported.

President Donald Trump said in a post on Truth Social on Tuesday that “if Iran has put out any mines in the Hormuz Strait, and we have no reports of them doing so, we want them removed, IMMEDIATELY!”

He added that if mines were placed and they are not removed, Iran will face consequences “at a level never before seen.” He said, however, that if Tehran removes “what may have been placed, it will be a giant step in the right direction!”

Following Trump’s post, Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth posted on X that at Trump’s direction, US Central Command “has been eliminating inactive mine-laying vessels in the Strait of Hormuz—wiping them out with ruthless precision. We will not allow terrorists to hold the Strait of Hormuz hostage.”

US Central Command said in a social media post later Tuesday that the military destroyed multiple Iranian naval ships — including 16 minelayers — near the Strait of Hormuz. (Source: CNN)

 

06 Mar 26.  Israel Ministry of Defense Spokesperson’s Statement‫: Operation Roaring Lion – Israel MOD Aerial Airlift Expands: 50 Cargo Aircraft Have Landed in Israel Since the Start of the Campaign

As part of the procurement and shipping effort in support of the evolving operations in Iran and Lebanon, the Israel Ministry of Defense (IMOD) is reporting the scope of the aerial airlift underway since the launch of the operation: approximately 50 cargo aircraft carrying over 1,000 tons of weaponry, military equipment, and various types of munitions have landed in Israel over the past ten days and have been transferred to the IDF.

This is a large-scale shipping operation, conducted under fire and in parallel with the advancement of Operation Roaring Lion and preparations for the next phases of the campaign. The airlift is expected to scale up in the coming period, as directed by Defense Minister Israel Katz and IMOD Director General, Maj. Gen. (Res.) Amir Baram.

The aerial airlift is led by the IMOD Defense Procurement Directorate (DPD), through its International Shipping Division, the IMOD Missions to the United States and Germany, and the IDF’s Planning Directorate. The Israel Airports Authority and the Israel Civil Aviation Authority are also partners in the operation.

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Military And Security Developments

Mar 11.

KEY DEVELOPMENTS 

• OFFENSIVES: Ukraine’s Commander-in-Chief has stated that his forces are continuing counter-offensive operations along the southern frontline, though we assess that these are counter-attacks, rather than a large offensive
• MARITIME: We assess that the threshold for attacks at sea is lowering across European waters (including outside the Black Sea) amid the Israel-US-Iran war, which both Russia and Ukraine will possibly exploit, likely further driving already-rising insurance premiums
• DRONES: Ukraine’s willingness to assist the US and its Middle Eastern partners in countering Iranian aerial threats such as Shahed drones is likely aimed at retaining Western support, particularly from Washington DC
• FORECAST: Russia will highly likely be a net beneficiary of higher oil prices as a result of a protracted Israel-US-Iran war, which would bolster its ability to sustain its war in Ukraine in the medium-to-long term.
• OFFENSIVES: On 9 March, Ukrainian Commander-in-Chief Oleksandr Syrskyi stated that Ukrainian forces are continuing counter-offensive operations along the southern frontline, though we continue to assess that these are counter-attacks, rather than a large offensive effort. Previously on 8 March, President Volodymyr Zelensky claimed that Ukraine’s efforts on the southern front had liberated around 168 square miles (435 sq km) in eastern Zaporizhzhia and Dnipropetrovsk oblasts, though this figure remains unverified. However, a Ukrainian regiment commander has downplayed the scale of these operations, arguing that Ukrainian actions do not constitute a full counter-offensive. This assessment aligns with our understanding of the situation; since late 2025, Ukrainian forces have conducted various successful localised counter-attacks aimed at improving tactical positions and stabilising the frontline in areas where Russian forces had previously made rapid gains, particularly towards Huliapole (Zaporizhzhia; see Sibylline Ukraine Update – 6 January 2026). According to the Ukrainian commander, Russia’s objective during this period has involved advancing to a position from which its artillery can strike Zaporizhzhia City more effectively, though this has likely stalled.
• OFFENSIVES: There are growing indications that these Ukrainian counter-attacks are forcing Russia to redeploy units in Zaporizhzhia and Dnipropetrovsk oblasts, likely placing additional pressure on the Kremlin’s spring offensive preparations. Recent reports from open-source intelligence (OSINT) sources suggest that the Russian command has likely relocated elite units from the Russian Airborne Forces (VDV) and elements from the Russian Naval Infantry from Pokrovsk and Dobropillia (both Donetsk oblast) to Zaporizhzhia. If confirmed, this would likely aim to stabilise the southern front, strengthen offensive capabilities and regain offensive momentum in the area. According to a prominent Ukrainian military observer, Ukraine’s recent actions have compelled Russian forces to slow the pace of their offensive and, in some areas, shift to an active defensive posture. The observer noted that Ukrainian operations are designed less to achieve a breakthrough and more to disrupt Russia’s planned summer offensive.
• OFFENSIVES: Continued Ukrainian pressure through localised counter-attacks is likely forcing Russia to reprioritise competing operational objectives in Zaporizhzhia oblast. According to the above-mentioned Ukrainian military observer, due to the limited availability of reserves, Moscow remains unable to pursue a large-scale effort to encircle Orikhiv, located in south-eastern Zaporizhzhia oblast and one of Russia’s key objectives. We assess that Russia will likely prioritise smaller tactical advances towards nearby settlements like Novopavlivka and Chervona Krynytsia (both Zaporizhzhia oblast), located to the west and north-east of Orikhiv, respectively.
• STRIKES: Russia continued its daily strike campaign during our reporting period, along with semiregular large-scale, high-intensity aerial assaults such as overnight on 6-7 March. The attack involved 13 Iskander-M/S-400 ballistic missiles, two Tsirkon cruise missiles, four Kalibr cruise missiles and 480 Shahed-type drones. The strikes heavily targeted residential, energy, port and rail infrastructure nationwide. We assess that Russia’s ability to maintain its current pace of aerial strikes is placing significant pressure on Ukraine’s air defence resources, particularly amid the uncertain resupply of air defence systems and interceptors from Western countries due to the ongoing Middle East conflict. We assess that the Israel-US-Iran war will have little impact on Russia’s ability to maintain this strike campaign, given that it has long been self-sufficient in both missile and Shahed-type drone production, so that transfers from Iran are no longer necessary.
• STRIKES: According to German media outlets, the German Federal Ministry of Defence has assembled a package of 30 Patriot system interceptors (PAC-3) for Ukraine sourced from European partners, alongside a further five interceptors from German military stockpiles. The German authorities have not confirmed these figures. The delivery is expected to take place in the coming weeks. While this move will slightly alleviate the ongoing pressure on Ukraine’s air defences, the numbers remain relatively limited. Russia’s increasingly frequent missile launches (particularly ballistic missiles) will continue to place significant strain on interceptor stockpiles, including PAC-3.
• MARITIME: We assess that the threshold for attacks at sea is lowering across European waters amid the Israel-US-Iran war, which both Russia and Ukraine will possibly exploit, likely further driving already-rising insurance premiums. On the evening of 4 March, the Ukrainian authorities reported a Russian drone attack against a civilian cargo ship in Ukraine’s Black Sea port of Chornomorsk (Odesa oblast). This came after a Russia-flagged liquefied natural gas (LNG) tanker caught fire in the Mediterranean Sea on 3 March, with Moscow accusing Kyiv of carrying out a naval drone attack against the vessel. Ukrainian forces have also continued targeting Russian military naval assets. For instance, overnight on 1-2 March, Ukrainian forces conducted a large-scale drone strike (involving around 200 drones) against the Russian Black Sea port of Novorossiysk (Krasnodar krai). The attack damaged various naval vessels and oil facilities.
• MARITIME: The latest incidents clearly underscore not only an uptick in hostilities in the Black Sea, but also the potential for further military action in the Mediterranean Sea amid the ongoing Middle East conflict. We assess that attacks against military and civilian naval assets are likely to increase in the coming weeks, particularly as the Israel-US-Iran war has diverted Western attention, thereby lowering the threshold for such attacks. We assess that Russia and Ukraine will likely target civilian commercial ships heading towards each other’s ports in retaliation for strikes against military and civilian naval assets. We also assess that Ukraine is more likely than Russia to attack vessels in the Mediterranean Sea at present – meaning that Russian ‘shadow fleet’ vessels are much more vulnerable than Western-linked shipping. The latest incidents will likely raise risk assessments for ships sailing to Ukrainian and Russian port terminals, driving up war insurance costs particularly for vessels operating in the Black Sea. This is highly likely to affect the crucial shipment of grain, oil and oil products.

POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS

• EU: Politico reported on 5 March that unspecified EU ambassadors recently pushed back against a proposal to fast-track Ukraine’s accession to the bloc, further supporting our assessment that Kyiv’s membership remains highly unlikely in the long term. The proposal outlines replacing the EU’s current accession framework with a two-tier membership model that would accelerate Ukraine’s path to joining the EU. In late January, Zelensky set the ambitious target of 2027 for Ukraine’s entry into the bloc. Kyiv is also seeking to enshrine a date for EU membership as part of a potential peace deal, likely as a post-war security guarantee (see Sibylline Special Report – 5 February 2026). Although the EU’s enlargement commissioner Marta Kos has expressed support for amending existing accession rules, we assess that a consensus on fast-tracking Ukraine’s EU membership is highly unlikely in the coming weeks and months.
• DRONES: Ukraine’s willingness to assist the US and its Middle Eastern partners in countering Iranian aerial threats such as Shahed drones is likely aimed at retaining Western support, particularly from Washington DC. President Zelensky told The New York Times that Ukraine sent interceptor drones and a team of anti-drone specialists to help protect US bases in Jordan after a request from Washington DC. The US has not officially confirmed Zelensky’s statements. Zelensky said 11 nations, including European and Middle Eastern states, have sought co-operation on Ukraine’s interceptor technologies, electronic warfare (EW) systems and training. Ukrainian forces have gained significant experience in countering cost-effective drones such as the Iranian Shahed models, which Russia produces and uses extensively in its own strikes.
• DRONES: That said, we assess that Ukraine is likely to have limited resources to redeploy to the Middle East due to its current focus on countering Russia’s daily strikes. The latest move is highly likely part of Kyiv’s diplomatic effort aimed at retaining Western support, particularly that of the US, especially given that the Middle East crisis has likely further threatened already faltering US support for Ukraine (including on air defences – see Sibylline Ukraine Update – 3 March 2026). However, this is unlikely to result in a significant policy shift in Ukraine’s favour from the US in the near term. The move also aims to bolster support from countries in the region that have traditionally maintained cordial ties with Russia, further boosting Ukraine’s diplomatic position vis-à-vis Abu Dhabi-hosted talks, for example.
• For further analysis and scenario planning around how the war will evolve in 2026 and beyond, see our updated Sibylline Strategic Risk Forecast – 6 January 2026 and Sibylline Ukraine Monthly Forecast – 26 February 2026.

Global: Adversarial entities face heightened cyber espionage risks from Russian state actors. On 9 March, the Dutch security services reported that unnamed Russian state-sponsored actors are targeting global military and government officials in a large-scale cyber espionage operation. The threat actors use social engineering techniques on the popular messaging platforms Signal and WhatsApp to infiltrate targeted systems. Some attacks reportedly distribute a fake chat bot that requests a unique verification code under the pretence of blocking suspicious activity. The code then enables threat actors to covertly hijack user accounts and monitor confidential communications. Alternatively, the threat actors exploit the ‘linked devices’ feature to trick users into scanning a QR code, which subsequently logs into a user account on a new device, providing threat actors with monitoring capabilities. Russian threat actors often abuse legitimate messaging applications to obtain strategic intelligence from high-interest individuals. This latest campaign highlights the expansion of Moscow’s targets and capabilities, heightening security and cyber espionage risks to global, adversarial entities. (Source: Sibylline)

 

07 Mar 26. UK reveals military maintenance facilities in Ukraine for first time. The UK has revealed for the first time its maintenance, repair and overhaul systems (MRO) facilities in Ukraine, with four operational and a fifth planned.

• The UK has revealed for the first time its maintenance, repair and overhaul facilities in Ukraine.
• UK Defence Minister meets staff getting battle-damaged fighting vehicles back to the frontline faster.
• Largest ever UK-led international trade mission with a record 35 British firms.

Operated under MOD contracts by UK companies with British and Ukrainian workforces, these facilities repair armoured vehicles and equipment – including UK-gifted CVR-T armoured vehicles, Husky support vehicles, L119 light guns and former Soviet-era kit, returning them to Ukrainian forces faster. It includes all AS-90 artillery systems donated by the UK, and our collaboration with Swedish partners means we are also able to support the Swedish Archer artillery systems.

The UK has been working since Russia’s illegal full-scale invasion in 2022 to establish engineering sites in Ukraine, operated under MOD contracts by UK companies with a skilled UK and Ukrainian workforce.

Locating these facilities in Ukraine ensures that armoured vehicles and equipment are repaired quickly and returned to Ukrainian forces faster, bolstering Ukraine’s Armed Forces – providing highly-skilled, well-paid jobs for Ukrainians.

British engineers are on the ground in Ukraine, working side-by-side with Ukrainian counterparts to service and repair military vehicles. Minister for Defence Readiness and Industry, Luke Pollard, visited one of the sites in Ukraine this week, speaking with those working around the clock to help keep Ukraine in the fight.

Minister for Defence Readiness and Industry, Luke Pollard MP, said:

While the world’s attention is focussed on conflict across the Middle East, the UK is standing firmer with our friends in Ukraine. Visits to Ukraine have always been deeply poignant for me – the UK will never waver in our support for Ukraine and we are clear that Ukraine’s security is Britain’s security.

From the factory floor to the frontline, the UK is standing with Ukraine. Our pioneering facilities are helping keep Ukraine’s defiant Armed Forces in the fight against Putin’s brutal attacks, and British firms are boosting long term industrial production in Ukraine and partnering with Ukrainian companies to benefit both our nations.

As part of his visit, Defence Minister Pollard led the seventh Trade Mission to Ukraine, the largest in the series, with five international partners, over 80 delegates and 55 companies – including a record 35 British firms. The trade mission was run by ADS Group, the trade association for the UK’s aerospace, defence, security, and space industries.

This highlights the UK’s continued support for Ukraine as the Minister met with Ukrainian counterparts as well as UK and international partners’ defence industry leaders in Kyiv.

The UK and Ukraine signed an agreement for the latest project under Programme Lyra, the unique UK/Ukraine technology exchange agreed by the Prime Minister and President Zelenskyy in June 2025. An agreement was also signed that will see the UK and Ukraine collaborating on sophisticated UK electronic warfare technology, combining it with Ukrainian platforms to improve Ukraine’s military capability.

The trade mission marks the UK’s move to a permanent presence to support UK industry in Ukraine. It was the largest mission of the series, with the UK welcoming five international partners including Estonia, Finland, Netherlands, Norway and Sweden, over 80 delegates and 55 companies. This number included a record 35 UK companies from primes to SMEs, offering a range of innovative solutions. Discussions at the Trade Mission around inward investment and mobilising private capital will further strengthen our ability to support Ukraine.

The trade missions have successfully deepened ties between British companies and their Ukrainian counterparts, securing contracts and helping build lasting sovereign production in Ukraine. That success has been underpinned by significant growth which will be supported by a new British Business Centre opening in Kyiv.

Since Russia’s illegal full-scale invasion in February 2022, the UK has committed over £21.8 billion for Ukraine, making the UK one of Ukraine’s largest bilateral donors. (Source: https://www.gov.uk/)

 

09 Mar 26.  Ukrainian Troops Halt use of AtlasPro Recon Drones. A dispute over Western-supplied unmanned aerial systems resurfaced in Ukraine on March 5 after Ukrainian military expert Taras Chmut publicly criticized Latvian-made AtlasPro reconnaissance drones previously delivered to Ukrainian forces.

Chmut accused the manufacturer Atlas Aerospace and Ukrainian officials involved in procurement of supplying systems that he said failed to meet battlefield requirements.

The criticism appeared in comments responding to news that soldiers of the National Army of Moldova had received Latvian Atlas reconnaissance unmanned aerial vehicles. Chmut, head of the Come Back Alive, used the occasion to describe Ukraine’s earlier experience with the same drones.

In a public statement, Chmut sharply criticized both the manufacturer and Ukrainian officers involved in the acquisition process.

“An absolutely shameful story and experience of working with the Latvian manufacturer Atlas. In fact, fraud initiated by one of the officers of the Special Operations Forces of Ukraine, Dmytro ‘Driker’, including pushing these useless drones into service,” Chmut wrote.

Following the remarks, Defence Blog spoke with Ukrainian military personnel who had operational experience with the Atlas drones. According to those interviewed, Ukraine received a batch of the systems in 2022 during the early months of the full-scale war

Soldiers said trial operations showed the drones did not meet the requirements of modern combat conditions. The systems are reportedly unused and have been placed in storage due to limitations identified during testing.

One serviceman involved in the evaluation said the drones were too immature for frontline use.

“The drones are too raw and their software constantly produces errors, making them impossible to use on the battlefield because they simply do not work,” he said.

The AtlasPro system is produced by Atlas Aerospace and marketed as a reconnaissance platform designed to operate in environments with heavy electronic warfare and GPS interference. The company has said the drone was tested under combat conditions in Ukraine and demonstrated resistance to jamming.

The controversy reflects broader debates within Ukraine’s defence community about procurement oversight and the effectiveness of some foreign-supplied drone systems.

(Source: UAS VISION/)Defence Blog

 

02 Mar 26. Ukrainian C-UAS intercept drones “will protect US military bases in Jordan.”

Ukraine has sent interceptor drones and experts to protect US military bases in Jordan, according to Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy in an interview with The New York Times.

According to the president, the USA asked Kyiv for help on March 5, and the Ukrainian team departed the next day.

“The deployment highlights Kyiv’s growing role in countering Iranian-designed drones — a capability Ukraine has developed during Russia’s full-scale invasion — while also underscoring the challenge of balancing support for partners abroad with Ukraine’s own wartime defence needs,” said a March 9 report in the New Voice of Ukraine news outlet. The president added that while Ukraine wants to help countries in the Middle East, it must also balance those requests against its own military needs. In the first days of the war in Iran, the Office of the President was receiving calls from leaders of Bahrain, the United Arab Emirates, Jordan, Kuwait, Qatar and Saudi Arabia requesting air defence support.

For more information

https://www.nytimes.com/2026/03/09/world/middleeast/ukraine-shahed-drone-middle-east.html?unlocked_article_code=1.R1A.0Ju0.DWXKHGhAWE_v&smid=url-share

https://english.nv.ua/nation/ukraine-sends-drone-experts-and-interceptor (Source: www.unmannedairspace.info)

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Founded in 1987, Exensor Technology is a world leading supplier of Networked Unattended Ground Sensor (UGS) Systems providing tailored sensor solutions to customers all over the world. From our Headquarters in Lund Sweden, our centre of expertise in Network Communications at Communications Research Lab in Kalmar Sweden and our Production site outside of Basingstoke UK, we design, develop and produce latest state of the art rugged UGS solutions at the highest quality to meet the most stringent demands of our customers. Our systems are in operation and used in a wide number of Military as well as Homeland Security applications worldwide. The modular nature of the system ensures any external sensor can be integrated, providing the user with a fully meshed “silent” network capable of self-healing. Exensor Technology will continue to lead the field in UGS technology, provide our customers with excellent customer service and a bespoke package able to meet every need. A CNIM Group Company

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Sponsored by Bertin Exensor

 

www.exensor.com

 

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10 Mar 26. 260th Special Purpose Brigade Activated to Strengthen Security in the Nation’s Capital.

The District of Columbia National Guard activated the 260th Special Purpose Brigade at the D.C. Armory, March 7. It is the only brigade in the Army specifically designed to coordinate military support to civil authorities and protect critical infrastructure in the nation’s capital.

The brigade was created in response to Executive Order 14339 and a subsequent directive from the secretary of war. These called for the immediate establishment, training and equipping of a dedicated National Guard unit. The goal is to support public safety operations and strengthen coordination between military forces and civilian security partners in the district.

Army Brig. Gen. Craig Maceri, land component commander for the D.C. National Guard, presided over the activation ceremony. Soldiers stood in formation as the brigade’s colors were uncased — a military tradition that signals a unit’s formal activation and readiness for duty.

“The activation of the 260th Special Purpose Brigade represents the deliberate execution of national guidance,” Maceri said. “This unit provides the critical command and control structure that enables us to execute a broad spectrum of scalable operations while effectively integrating with our federal and district partners.”

The brigade will coordinate military support to civil authorities and enabling National Guard forces to rapidly integrate with federal and local agencies responsible for safeguarding the capital.

Washington presents a unique operational environment, including the constitutional institutions of the federal government, foreign embassies and national monuments, as well as millions of visitors each year. Protecting that environment requires close coordination between military forces and civilian agencies during major national events, security operations and emergencies.

Among the brigade’s key partners is the U.S. Marshals Service, which regularly works alongside the D.C. National Guard during security operations in the capital.

“Partnerships like this are essential in Washington,” U.S. Marshal Jurgen Soekhoe said. “The 260th Special Purpose Brigade brings a level of coordination and readiness that allows federal law enforcement and the National Guard to operate as a unified team when security demands it.”

Army Col. Lawrence Doane, commander of the 260th Special Purpose Brigade, said the brigade structure ensures continuous coordination with partner agencies. It also allows the brigade to expand rapidly when missions require additional forces.

“This brigade gives us an operational foundation for unity of effort,” Doane said. “It ensures continuity of planning and coordination so that when the situation changes, we can respond quickly and with clarity.”

The brigade also reflects the unique federal role of the D.C. National Guard, which reports directly to the president, not a state or territory governor. This structure places the organization at the center of national-level security planning for the capital.

The unit’s new patch connects the brigade’s modern mission with its historic lineage. The design features three red stars and two red bars drawn from the District of Columbia flag, itself derived from the coat of arms of George Washington’s family.

The brigade carries forward the heritage of the 260th Military Police Command, a D.C. National Guard headquarters brigade that, for decades, coordinated military police operations supporting civil authorities and emergency response across the district, until its inactivation in 2011. Its lineage reflects a long-standing mission of integrating National Guard forces with federal and local partners to protect critical institutions and maintain security in the nation’s capital.

At the patch’s center is an upright, unsheathed sword representing the brigade’s role in providing security for all who live, work and visit the nation’s capital.

“This new patch reflects something bigger,” Doane said. “It represents our commitment to protecting every person who sets foot in the nation’s capital.”

With the uncasing of its colors, the 260th Special Purpose Brigade begins its mission as a dedicated force. It will support public safety, infrastructure protection and coordination between civilian and military agencies in Washington.  (Source: U.S. DoD)

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Founded in 1987, Exensor Technology is a world leading supplier of Networked Unattended Ground Sensor (UGS) Systems providing tailored sensor solutions to customers all over the world. From our Headquarters in Lund Sweden, our centre of expertise in Network Communications at Communications Research Lab in Kalmar Sweden and our Production site outside of Basingstoke UK, we design, develop and produce latest state of the art rugged UGS solutions at the highest quality to meet the most stringent demands of our customers. Our systems are in operation and used in a wide number of Military as well as Homeland Security applications worldwide. The modular nature of the system ensures any external sensor can be integrated, providing the user with a fully meshed “silent” network capable of self-healing. Exensor Technology will continue to lead the field in UGS technology, provide our customers with excellent customer service and a bespoke package able to meet every need. A CNIM Group Company

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Sponsored by Bertin Exensor

 

www.exensor.com

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09 Mar 26.  European NATO nations reduce reliance on US arms imports: SIPRI data. European NATO countries reduced their reliance on the United States for weapons imports in the past year, funneling a greater share of their foreign defense acquisitions to South Korea, France and Israel, analysis by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute showed.

The U.S. accounted for 58% of major arms imports by NATO’s European member states in the 2021-2025 period, according to a March 9 report by the Swedish think tank. That’s down from 64% for the five years through 2024, based on SIPRI’s year-earlier report.

Europe stepped up defense spending following Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine, prompting a more than threefold jump in the region’s arms imports. Now European leaders are looking to reduce their dependency on the U.S., as threats by President Donald Trump against allies and a policy shift towards American homeland defense have raised doubts whether the country is still a reliable ally.

“Threat perceptions concerning Russia, compounded by uncertainties over the USA’s commitment to defending its European allies, have boosted demand for arms among European member states,” SIPRI said in its report.

While European defense firms boosted production, and European Union investment support for the bloc’s domestic weapons industry led to a number of intra-EU orders, European nations continued to import U.S. arms in the past five years, especially combat aircraft and long-range air-defense systems, according to Katarina Djokic, a researcher with SIPRI’s Arms Transfers Programme.

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Twelve European countries had a total of 466 F-35 fighter jets on order or preselected for order by the end of 2025, including 39 of the Lockheed Martin jets ordered or preselected for order last year.

South Korea was the next-biggest supplier to European NATO members, securing 8.6% of their arms imports in the most recent five-year period, from 6.5% reported last year. Israel accounted for 7.7% of European NATO imports, from 3.9% in the period through 2024. France increased its share to 7.4% from 6.5%.

Global weapons exports rose at the fastest pace in a decade as Europe more than tripled weapons imports in the face of a threatening Russia. The volume of major arms transferred between states rose 9.2% in 2021-2025 from the prior five-year period, the biggest increase since the 2011-2015 bracket, according to SIPRI..

‘Deliveries to Ukraine since 2022 are the most obvious factor, but most other European states have also started importing significantly more arms to shore up their military capabilities against a perceived growing threat from Russia,” said Mathew George, director of SIPRI’s Arms Transfers Programme.

Shipments of U.S. weapons to Europe rose 217% in 2021-2025 from the prior five-year period, according to SIPRI. That included arms for Ukraine, with the think tank counting weapons bought by other countries for transfer to the Ukrainian forces, including air-defense missiles and guided bombs, as U.S. exports to Ukraine.

The U.S. remained the world’s biggest arms exporter in 2021-2025, with a market share of 34%, ahead of France with 9.8%. Russia accounted for 6.8% of global weapons transfers between states, about a third of its share in the prior five-year period.

“For importers, U.S. arms offer advanced capabilities and a way of fostering good relations with the USA, while the USA views arms exports as a tool of foreign policy and a way of strengthening its arms industry,” said Pieter Wezeman, senior researcher with the SIPRI Arms Transfers Programme.

Germany overtook China to become the world’s fourth-biggest arms exporter in 2021-2025, with 24% of German exports going to Ukraine. Italy climbed to sixth place from 10th in the prior five-year period, with 59% of the country’s arms exports going to the Middle East.

The U.S. had outstanding orders for 936 combat aircraft by the end of 2025, followed by France with 180 or more aircraft, and China with 90 combat aircraft in its order book. Order data can give “a rough indication” of which countries will be the top exporters in coming years, SIPRI says.

The United Kingdom had 34 or more major warships on order, similar to Germany, according to SIPRI. Israel had at least 78 export orders for missile air-defense systems, Germany had at least 66 such systems on order, and the U.S. 55 or more, according to SIPRI.

Ukraine was the largest weapons importer in the 2021-2025 period, accounting for 9.7% of global arms imports, with the U.S. the source for 44% of Ukraine’s imports, followed by Germany with 14%. Arms transfers to Ukraine were “substantially lower” in 2025 than in the preceding two years as the U.S. reduced its military aid to the country, according to SIPRI.

India was the world’s second-biggest importer of arms, even if its share of global imports fell 4% in the period, based on the SIPRI data. Elsewhere in Asia, Pakistan’s imports of major arms rose 66% from the prior five years, while Japan lifted imports by 76% and Taiwan by 54%.

“Fears over China’s intentions and its growing military capabilities continue to influence armament efforts in other parts of Asia and Oceania, which often still depend on imported arms,” said Siemon Wezeman, senior researcher with the SIPRI Arms Transfers Programme.

“In South Asia, the high volume of arms that India imports is largely due to the perceived threat from China and to India’s long-running conflict with the main recipient of Chinese arms exports, Pakistan,” Siemon Wezeman said. “Imported weapons were used in the 2025 clash between India and Pakistan, both nuclear-armed states.”

In Africa, imports by Algeria fell by 78% in 2021-2025 from the prior period, while those by Morocco increased 12%, making the latter the continent’s largest arms importer. (Source: Defense News)

 

09 Mar 26. Finland readies itself to be able to host nukes in longtime policy departure. S Finland’s government has proposed scrapping a Cold War-era blanket ban on nuclear weapons on its territory, a move the Ministry of Defense says is needed to fully integrate into NATO’s deterrence architecture.

The proposal, circulated for public comment on March 5, would amend both the Nuclear Energy Act and the Criminal Code. Under current law − passed in 1987 during a period of Finnish neutrality − the import, transport, possession, manufacture, and detonation of nuclear devices is categorically prohibited, without exception.

The draft amendment would permit nuclear weapons to be brought into or handled on Finnish soil “in the context of Finland’s homeland defense, NATO’s collective defense or defense cooperation,” according to the ministry. Manufacturing or detonating the weapons would remain a criminal offense, in line with Finland’s international treaty obligations.

“The amendment is essential to strengthen Finland’s military defense within the alliance and to fully leverage NATO’s deterrence and collective defense capabilities,” Defense Minister Antti Häkkänen said at a press briefing in Helsinki.

Most NATO members carry no equivalent legislative restrictions, making Finland an outlier since its 2023 accession. The government of Prime Minister Petteri Orpo has flagged the change as part of a broader package of legal reforms required to align Finnish statutes with alliance obligations.

Passage appears likely. The ruling right-wing coalition commands a parliamentary majority, and the proposal has the backing of the full government.

Finland’s Nordic neighbors have taken different approaches. Sweden, Denmark and Norway maintain peacetime political policies − not laws − against nuclear weapons on their territory. Opposition figures, including SDP lawmaker Tytti Tuppurainen, have argued the Finnish amendment goes further, removing all restrictions rather than preserving a peacetime prohibition.

The proposal is open for public comment ahead of a formal parliamentary vote. No timeline for enactment has been announced, though the government said it wanted the changes to go into effect as soon as possible. (Source: Defense News)

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Founded in 1987, Exensor Technology is a world leading supplier of Networked Unattended Ground Sensor (UGS) Systems providing tailored sensor solutions to customers all over the world. From our Headquarters in Lund Sweden, our centre of expertise in Network Communications at Communications Research Lab in Kalmar Sweden and our Production site outside of Basingstoke UK, we design, develop and produce latest state of the art rugged UGS solutions at the highest quality to meet the most stringent demands of our customers. Our systems are in operation and used in a wide number of Military as well as Homeland Security applications worldwide. The modular nature of the system ensures any external sensor can be integrated, providing the user with a fully meshed “silent” network capable of self-healing. Exensor Technology will continue to lead the field in UGS technology, provide our customers with excellent customer service and a bespoke package able to meet every need. A CNIM Group Company

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Sponsored by Bertin Exensor

 

www.exensor.com

 

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04 Mar 26. Ethiopia-Sudan: RSF attacks increase risk of airstrikes in Ethiopia’s border region, conflict unlikely. On 2 March, the Sudanese foreign ministry accused Ethiopia of allowing drones to be launched from its territory into Sudan in February and March. The statement did not specify from where such attacks were launched, but the allegations follow Reuters’ claimed identification of Sudanese rebel Rapid Support Force’s (RSF) camps in Ethiopia’s Benishangul-Gumuz region, across the border from Sudan’s Blue Nile state. Given both Ethiopia and the RSF’s close ties to the UAE we assess that it is likely that Ethiopia is permitting the RSF to operate from border regions within its territory. There is a realistic possibility that this will trigger skirmishes and even Sudanese airstrikes on RSF positions in remote border regions, though Sudan is highly unlikely to launch attacks on proximate towns or cities. While such instances would significantly elevate tensions, it is highly unlikely that these would trigger a more direct conflict between Ethiopia and Sudan. The two states often engage in skirmishes over the disputed Al-Fashaga territory which borders Ethiopia’s Amhara region and Sudan’s Al-Qadarif state. Moreover, both state’s military resources are currently focused on internal security crises. (Source: Sibylline)

 

02 Mar 26. Afghanistan-Pakistan: Border hostilities, airstrikes in Afghanistan will likely continue in coming days. On 1 March, the police in Parwan province (Afghanistan) claimed that they had repelled an attempt from Pakistani military jets to ‘bomb Bagram airbase’ with ‘anti-aircraft and missile defence systems’ at around 0500hrs (local time). This claim has not been verified and Pakistan has avoided commenting on the allegation. If true, such an attempt would represent a further escalation in Pakistan’s targets, with airstrikes so far largely limited to alleged militant hide-outs and military sites following renewed hostilities on 27 February. Armed exchanges along the border have continued into at least 1 March; Pakistan has carried out airstrikes deeper into Afghanistan, claiming that 46 locations have been struck. However, claims regarding damage inflicted by both sides have been difficult to verify, while misinformation online has remained persistent. We assess that sporadic fighting along the border and airstrikes in Afghanistan will continue in the coming days, given that Pakistan has rejected offers to participate in talks. Additionally, these tensions will significantly increase the risk of militant attacks within Pakistan, particularly in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province, but also in urban areas elsewhere in the country. (Source: Sibylline)

 

27 Feb 26. China: Purge of military officials highlights continued upheaval, reduces short-term conflict risks. On 26 February, the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress (NPC; i.e. China’s legislature) dismissed 19 members, including nine military officials. In January, Chinese President Xi Jinping purged vice chairman of the Central Military Commission (CMC) Zhang Youxia, as well as CMC chief of staff Liu Zhenli (see Sibylline Situation Update Brief – 30 January 2026). While the authorities have not yet given an official reason for the dismissals, we assess they are likely part of efforts to consolidate power within the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) amid ongoing corruption concerns. Reportedly, more than 100 senior military officials have been purged since 2022. We assess that the level and rate of this upheaval likely undermine the PLA’s immediate combat readiness and reduce the short-term likelihood of China conducting major military action in the South China Sea or the Taiwan Strait. However, the consolidation of military command and control around Xi will drive greater military uncertainty in the longer term, given the potential for fewer checks and balances on his power. (Source: Sibylline)

 

27 Feb 26. Pakistan-Afghanistan: Large-scale border clashes, airstrikes underscore risk of intense conflict. On 26 February, Afghanistan conducted ‘large-scale offensive operations’ against the Pakistani military at multiple locations along the border. In response, the Pakistan Air Force (PAF) conducted airstrikes, reportedly targeting military infrastructure and militant hideouts in the capital Kabul and in Kandahar and Paktia provinces (all Afghanistan). Reportedly, border clashes are ongoing at some locations along the border in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province (Pakistan). According to the Pakistani authorities, 228 Taliban fighters have been killed in the attacks, while both sides claim to have destroyed each other’s military posts. The strikes on Kabul and Kandahar – beyond border districts – mark an escalation in Pakistan’s strategy. This follows a spate of Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) attacks targeting high-ranking Pakistani military personnel, as well as an attack in Pakistan’s capital Islamabad. Pakistan accuses the Afghan Taliban of providing safe havens to the TTP. Given the border clashes’ scale and the escalation in airstrikes, we assess that further cross-border hostilities will continue in the coming hours and days, barring significant progress in mediation efforts by China, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and/or Turkey. Any further hostilities will focus on border areas, with the Afghan Taliban’s military mostly limited to cross-border artillery and drone attacks. However, TTP revenge attacks are likely to increase in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, with a possibility of them spreading to other major cities across Pakistan; security measures will be increased in major urban areas as a result. (Source: Sibylline)

 

03 Mar 26. Colombia: Security force operation will elevate physical safety risks along Colombia-Ecuador border. On 1 March, Colombia’s defence minister, Pedro Sánchez, launched ‘Operation Espejo’ to combat illegal armed groups operating along the Colombia-Ecuador border. Colombia has deployed approximately 20,000 military personnel in Nariño and Putumayo departments to tackle illicit economies such as drug trafficking, smuggling, extortion and illegal mining. The US will provide intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) support. Sánchez also announced that the Ecuadorian security forces would participate; the Ecuadorian authorities have rejected claims of their involvement. We assess that heightened deployments will likely precipitate clashes between armed groups and security forces personnel. Armed conflict and physical security risks will therefore be elevated in the coming weeks, particularly near security outposts in Nariño and Putumayo. A sustained intensification in security operations along the Colombia-Ecuador border will marginally reduce regional tensions between Bogotá and Quito. (Source: Sibylline)

 

03 Mar 26. Taiwan: Potential budget cut would allow funding for US arms sales, temporarily easing tensions.Earlier on 3 March, the opposition Taiwan People’s Party (TPP) reportedly stated that it will pass a USD 40bn special defence budget bill in full only if the US announces a new military sales package to Taiwan. The governing Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) intends to allocate USD 30bn of the special defence budget to fund arms procurement from the US. The US package (announced in December 2025) is worth USD 11.1bn. We assess that the US is unlikely to announce a new arms sale package before April, given that the US seeks to avoid provoking China before the leaders’ summit, scheduled for late March or early April. As such, the TPP will not co-operate with the DPP to pass the full budget during this month. The payment deadline for the first instalment of the December 2025 arms sales package is on 31 March. Opposition parties will highly likely advocate for separating the budget approvals for US arms sales and domestic programmes, while tightening the overall spending cap. While this could delay future procurements and slow military modernisation, there is a realistic possibility that the opposition’s proposals will ensure that funding for the March payment is procured, easing tensions with the US in the short term.,(Source: Sibylline)

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Founded in 1987, Exensor Technology is a world leading supplier of Networked Unattended Ground Sensor (UGS) Systems providing tailored sensor solutions to customers all over the world. From our Headquarters in Lund Sweden, our centre of expertise in Network Communications at Communications Research Lab in Kalmar Sweden and our Production site outside of Basingstoke UK, we design, develop and produce latest state of the art rugged UGS solutions at the highest quality to meet the most stringent demands of our customers. Our systems are in operation and used in a wide number of Military as well as Homeland Security applications worldwide. The modular nature of the system ensures any external sensor can be integrated, providing the user with a fully meshed “silent” network capable of self-healing. Exensor Technology will continue to lead the field in UGS technology, provide our customers with excellent customer service and a bespoke package able to meet every need. A CNIM Group Company

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Sponsored by Bertin Exensor

 

www.exensor.com

 

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Military And Security Developments

Mar 05.

KEY DEVELOPMENTS 

• IRAN-US-ISRAEL: Iran will likely continue conserving munitions as part of efforts to transition the ongoing conflict into a war of attrition, increasing the risk of prolonged instability.
• IRAQ-IRAN: Further pre-emptive Iranian strikes against opposition groups in Iraqi Kurdistan are highly likely in the coming days, amid contested reports regarding a Kurdish-led ground operation in western Iran.
• ISRAEL-LEBANON: The Israel Defense Forces (IDF)’s evacuation warning for municipalities in the Lebanese capital Beirut’s Dahieh and Shiyyah suburbs highlight significant armed escalation risks.
• IRAN-AZERBAIJAN: A likely Iranian drone attack targeting Azerbaijan’s exclave underscores the risk of conflict spillover in the Caucasus region.
• IRAN: The US’ ambiguity regarding succession plans in Iran underscores the risk of a protracted leadership crisis in Iran.
• IRAN-US-ISRAEL: The US and Israel have continued to launch airstrikes targeting Iran’s security and police forces, underscoring sustained security threats in residential areas. Since our last report, US and Israeli airstrikes have continued targeting government and military facilities, with a particular focus on missile storage and launch facilities. Airstrikes have also targeted police stations and the Iranian Cyber Police (FATA)’s facilities in major cities such as Ilam (Ilam province), Karaj (Alborz province), Kermanshah (Kermanshah province), Tabriz (East Azerbaijan province) and the capital Tehran. Earlier on 5 March, an airstrike destroyed Azadi Stadium in the capital Tehran, following reports that the Basij paramilitary had requisitioned the facility as a staging area for forces and equipment. These developments underscore the US’ and Israel’s continued efforts to undermine Iran’s capacity to repress internal dissent, as part of their aim to establish conditions conducive to a popular uprising. While such airstrikes will almost certainly continue, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC)’s and the Basij’s ability to requisition civilian infrastructure and embed positions in residential areas will likely prevent the US and Israel from entirely undermining their capacity in the short term. Nevertheless, civilians in Iran will face sustained threats to life stemming from exposure to airstrikes, shrapnel and cascading infrastructure failure, particularly in major cities in western Iran.
• IRAN-US-ISRAEL: Iran will likely continue conserving munitions as part of efforts to transition the ongoing conflict into a war of attrition, increasing risks of prolonged instability. On 4 March, the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) announced that they had dropped over 5,000 munitions within Iran since launching Operation Roaring Lion on 28 February. The neutralisation of Iran’s air defences will likely facilitate further airstrikes in the coming days, sustaining critical threats to life in Iran. By contrast, on 4 March, US officials stated that the number of daily Iranian ballistic missile launches observed has fallen by 86% since 28 February, while drone launches have decreased by 73%. While this trend likely reflects US and Israeli success in undermining Iran’s military capacity, the Iranian security forces are likely conserving munitions to facilitate a prolonged engagement in a war of attrition with the US and Israel. Consequently, the rate of Iranian missile and drone attacks will likely remain below the levels observed on 28 February and 1 March. However, the risk of successful air defence penetration in the Gulf region and Israel will sustain threats to locally engaged staff and assets (see below).
• IRAN-US: The US has continued to target Iranian naval vessels, increasing the likelihood of Iran’s naval retaliation in the coming days. On 4 March, a US Navy submarine struck and destroyed the IRIS Dena while it was located approximately 40 nautical miles (74km) south of Galle (Sri Lanka). The strike reportedly killed 80 crew members, while 30 others remain unaccounted for. The US Central Command (CENTCOM) subsequently released a statement indicating that it has ‘struck or sunk’ at least 20 Iranian naval vessels since 28 February. Although US Secretary of War Pete Hegseth stated on 4 March that the US has ‘eliminated’ Iran’s naval capabilities, it is unlikely that the above-mentioned strikes (targeting 20 vessels) constitute the effective destruction of Iran’s conventional and non-conventional (i.e. IRGC) naval capabilities. As such, Iran’s naval forces will likely remain semi-operational in the coming days, sustaining pressure on the Strait of Hormuz and restricting commercial shipping activity in the Persian Gulf. Nevertheless, the US’ continued targeting of Iranian naval vessels and port facilities is highly likely to limit Iran’s conventional naval capacity. Consequently, Iran will likely increase its use of unmanned surface vehicles (USVs), unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) and missiles to enforce the de facto closure of the Strait of Hormuz, sustaining critical threats to vessels, crew and cargo attempting to traverse the waterway in the coming days.
• IRAN-IRAQ-REGION: Concerns of an imminent Kurdish-led insurgency in western Iran will increase risks of broader tensions with Iraq and the US. Overnight on 4-5 March, several media outlets reported that ‘hundreds’ of ethnic-Kurdish militants had launched a ground operation in north-western Iran. While no evidence of such an operation has emerged in the past 24 hours, reports come amid increasing speculation of an imminent offensive by the Coalition of Political Forces of Iranian Kurdistan (CPFIK; a coalition of six Iranian Kurdish armed groups based in Iraq) against the Iranian authorities, possibly with US backing. White House Press Secretary Karoline Leavitt stated on 4 March that reports that the US plans to arm Iranian Kurdish militants are ‘completely false’. However, we assess that there is a realistic possibility that the US will provide covert support to Iranian Kurdish militants to exacerbate pressure on Iran’s security forces. In the event of an escalating Kurdish insurgency in western Iran, security conditions are highly likely to deteriorate in Iran’s Kermanshah, Kurdistan and West Azerbaijan provinces, with conflict spillover likely impacting security conditions in western Hamadan, Ilam and Lorestan provinces. The Iranian security forces are highly likely to engage in indiscriminate attacks targeting ethnic-Kurdish communities, significantly increasing human rights concerns and ethno-religious tensions. Amid broader capacity constraints, the Iranian security forces will also possibly engage in low-cost offensive operations targeting militant-linked locations, employing barrel bombs, land mines and improvised explosive devices. Amid concerns of an imminent CPFIK insurgency, tensions between the US, Iran and the Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI) will likely escalate, increasing instability risks along the Iran-Iraq border (see below).
• IRAQ-IRAN: Further pre-emptive Iranian strikes against opposition groups in Iraqi Kurdistan are highly likely in the coming days, amid contested reports regarding a Kurdish-led ground operation in western Iran. On 4 March, local media reported that Iranian missiles struck a base belonging to the Kurdistan Freedom Party (PAK), a prominent Iranian opposition group, in Degala (Erbil governorate; Iraq). On the same day, a separate Iranian drone and missile attack targeted a camp belonging to the Komala Party, another Iranian Kurdish opposition movement, in Sulaymaniyah governorate (Iraq). The strikes came hours after the Komala Party joined the newly formed CPFIK, which aims to unify efforts against Iran’s government and advance Kurdish self-determination, according to the official announcement. The developments coincide with the above mentioned reports of an imminent Kurdish-led ground operation against the Iranian forces in Iran’s western majority-Kurdish provinces (commonly known collectively as Rojhelat). Nevertheless, we assess that the risks of such operations will remain high throughout the next two weeks despite the likely reluctance of Iraq’s Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) to become involved. The KRG has been actively distancing itself from reports of said operation, primarily to mitigate risks of direct Iranian retaliation against the KRI’s capital Erbil and to reduce tensions with Turkey and the central Iraqi authorities. However, despite the KRG’s cautious approach, we assess that further Iranian pre-emptive strikes against opposition groups inside Iraq’s Kurdistan are highly likely in the coming days. Similarly, US-Israeli clearing strikes are also likely along the border between KRI and Rojhelat, widening the scope of the ongoing armed conflict.
• IRAQ-US-ISRAEL: Iran-linked proxies will almost certainly continue targeting Erbil in the coming days, possibly widening the scope of attacks to include oil fields, energy grids and infrastructure. Since our last report, joint Israel-US strikes against the Iran-backed Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) and affiliated groups have continued, mostly in rural areas of Nineveh governorate. The strikes killed and injured several Kata’ib Hezbollah (KH) and Kata’ib Sayyid al‑Shuhada members. Meanwhile, Saraya Awliya al-Dam, a faction within the Islamic Resistance in Iraq (IRI) organisation, has claimed to have conducted a drone attack on a hotel in Erbil hosting US troops, though no data at the time of writing corroborates such a claim. Additionally, several drones have targeted Erbil International Airport (EBL) and the US consulate in Erbil. While these were all intercepted, debris fell in three residential areas, injuring at least one civilian. We assess that Iran-linked proxy attacks will almost certainly continue, primarily in Erbil and against Erbil Airport. There is also a high possibility that these groups will target oil fields in Iraqi Kurdistan, triggering further operational disruption to the region’s energy sector and exacerbating already-high risks of intermittent power cuts.
• ISRAEL-LEBANON: The IDF’s evacuation warning for municipalities in the Lebanese capital Beirut’s Dahieh and Shiyyah suburbs highlight significant armed escalation risks. Earlier on 5 March, the IDF issued an evacuation warning for all residents of Beirut’s Bourj el-Barajneh, Hadath and Haret Hreik municipalities (within Dahieh suburb), as well as Shiyyah suburb. The announcement includes guidance on evacuation routes, prohibiting movement to the south and warning against returning until further notice. An intensive Israeli strike campaign targeting these areas is almost certain in the coming hours; it is highly likely to continue throughout the next 24 hours at least and likely to carry on through the coming days. There is a realistic possibility that these strikes aim to eliminate Lebanese Hizballah (LH)’s secretary general Naim Qassem and other LH leaders. As such, targeted strikes against vehicles on roads exiting Beirut will remain a realistic possibility in the coming hours and days. This will significantly increase security risks within Beirut and its surrounding areas. Furthermore, the evacuation warning and strike campaign will significantly increase the risk of LH escalating strikes against Israeli population centres. This will further increase security and business disruption risks in northern Israel and particularly along the Israel-Lebanon border in the coming days.
• GULF REGION-IRAN: Iranian missile and drone attacks continue against Gulf states, increasing the likelihood of retaliation in the coming days. Air defence systems have successfully intercepted most of Iran’s ordnance; however, some impacts have been confirmed in the UAE and near energy infrastructure in Saudi Arabia. There are also reports of explosions near Qatar’s capital Doha, likely during attempted strikes on sites linked to the US’ Al Udeid Air Base (Al Rayyan municipality). Continued Iranian attacks against Gulf states will possibly prompt a military response from the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) in the coming days. A response will possibly take the form of directly targeting drone and missile launch facilities within Iran, or of launching attacks against Iran-linked proxies in Iraq or Yemen. Regardless, Iranian attacks against GCC states will likely continue in the coming hours and days, elevating personnel security risks for individuals near US military assets, energy facilities and/or in urban centres arising from direct targeting and debris from interception. Meanwhile, Saudi Arabia has begun shifting crude oil exports to its Red Sea hub at Yanbu (Medina province) as disruptions in the Strait of Hormuz constrain Gulf shipments, underscoring efforts to circumvent regional energy supply chain failures. However, this is unlikely to offset the shortfalls caused by the Strait of Hormuz’s effective closure and the disruption to energy production sites in the Gulf, including Saudi Aramco’s Ras Tanura refinery (Saudi Arabia) and QatarEnergy’s liquefied natural gas (LNG) plant (Qatar).
• EUROPE REGION-CYPRUS-IRAN: A European deployment of military assets to the eastern Mediterranean region will sustain conflict escalation risks in the coming days and weeks. Earlier on 5 March, Italy’s Minister of Defence Guido Crosetto told the Italian parliament that France, Italy, the Netherlands and Spain will send naval assets to protect Cyprus in the coming days. Also earlier on 5 March, France authorised the temporary presence of US aircraft at its bases. This comes after France’s 3 March announcement that it is deploying the aircraft carrier Charles de Gaulle (R91) to the eastern Mediterranean region. The developments follow a warning on 2 March from a senior IRGC commander that Iran would launch additional attacks against Cyprus, after the UK Royal Air Force (RAF) Akrotiri base in Cyprus was struck by a drone from an unknown source. Europe’s growing involvement in defensive measures will increase the risk of a multi-party conflict escalation in the coming days and weeks, compounding regional security risks.
• IRAN-AZERBAIJAN: A likely Iranian drone attack targeting an Azeri exclave underscores the risk of conflict spillover in the Caucasus region. Earlier on 5 March, unidentified drones crashed in the Nakhchivan Autonomous Republic, Azerbaijan’s exclave located along the Armenia-Iran border. A drone struck a school building in Shakarabad village, while the other struck the passenger terminal of Nakhchivan International Airport (NAJ), which functions as both a civilian and military airport. The Azerbaijani authorities have stated that the drones were Iranian and have summoned Iran’s ambassador to explain the incident; the Iranian authorities have denied this allegation. Given Azerbaijan’s longstanding relations with Israel, we assess that the drones were likely Iranian and possibly targeted the Nakhichevan Airport due to its military usage. As the Israel-US-Iran war continues to escalate, we also assess that the Iranian authorities’ fear of encirclement will increase the risk of them intensifying drone and missile attacks targeting locations along the Iran-Azerbaijan border. In the event of an extended conflict and/or direct European involvement in airstrikes against Iran, hostilities targeting Azerbaijan’s energy infrastructure will become more likely, including offshore and onshore oil refining facilities and hydrocarbon transit infrastructure supplying Europe and Israel. This will increase the risk of temporary localised airspace closures across Azerbaijan and Armenia, compounding pressure on regional supply chain continuity and restricting access to commercial evacuation routes.

POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS 

• IRAN: The US’ ambiguity regarding succession plans in Iran underscores the risk of a protracted leadership crisis in Iran. On 4 March, Leavitt stated that the international community should ‘wait and see’ who becomes Iran’s next supreme leader. Leavitt’s statement comes after US President Donald Trump stated on 3 March that most of the individuals the US had considered as alternative leaders for Iran ‘are dead [… or] may be dead’. The statement underscores the US’ ambiguous goals regarding regime dynamics in Iran following the assassination of Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei on 28 February and of numerous high-ranking government officials in Iran. Given these deaths, we assess that Iran’s Assembly of Experts is unlikely to select an individual amenable to co-operation with the US and to diplomatic de-escalation as the next supreme leader. Furthermore, on 4 March, Israel’s Minister of Defense Israel Katz released a statement indicating that the Israeli security forces will consider ‘every leader’ selected by Iran’s existing authorities as a ‘target for elimination’. These statements indicate that the US and Israel will likely continue engaging in strikes targeting high-ranking Iranian regime members, undermining the prospects for a rapid and uncontested succession process. If the US and Israel engage in repeated strikes targeting successive leadership candidates for the office of the supreme leader, Iran will likely face a protracted leadership crisis, undermining the government’s command and control over the IRGC. Increasingly decentralised decision-making among the armed forces will likely compound regional security concerns and risks of broader destabilisation in the coming weeks.
• STRAIT OF HORMUZ: Iran’s closure of the Strait of Hormuz will likely undermine the continuity of cross-sector maritime supply chains in the coming weeks, while also impacting cruise tourism in the Gulf region. On 4 March, the secretary general of the UN International Maritime Organization (IMO) stated that approximately 20,000 seafarers are currently unable to leave the Persian Gulf and proximate waters due to the effective closure of the Strait of Hormuz (see MILITARY DEVELOPMENTS above). The announcement underscores ongoing critical disruption to maritime supply chains in the Persian Gulf, where vessel traffic has broadly stalled since 28 February. On 4 March, the BBC reported that two vessels had transited the waterway, whereas before the Israel-US-Iran war, between 110 and 150 vessels moved daily through the Strait of Hormuz. If sustained, Iran’s closure of the Strait of Hormuz will almost certainly continue to disrupt global maritime supply chains due to a backlog of vessels, containers and crews in the Persian Gulf. Supply chains reliant on specialised tankers to transit goods and commodities (such as gases, industrial compounds and specialist equipment) will face particularly acute risks of protracted disruption, as will entities reliant on just-in-time (JIT) supply chains and/or perishable goods sourced from international markets. Additionally, the IMO has stated that the strait’s closure is affecting an additional 15,000 passengers on cruise ships. In combination with broad disruption to regional flight operations and decreasing consumer confidence, the hospitality industry is highly likely to face significant financial exposure from the Israel-US-Iran war, particularly cruise-based or adjacent tourism.
• OMAN-UK-REGION: A grounded UK government-chartered evacuation flight from Oman underscores evacuation capacity issues; significant regional travel and operational disruption will continue. Late on 4 March, the first UK government-chartered evacuation flight scheduled to depart from the Omani capital’s Muscat International Airport (MCT) was grounded due to technical failures. The UK government has stated that the flight will depart later on 5 March (at the time of writing, no official time has been issued), with additional flights leaving in the coming days. The UK’s foreign office has urged people not to travel to Muscat Airport without prior instruction from the government. Some limited repatriation or special flights are operating during short airspace openings in the region, with several airports resuming limited operations. Earlier on 5 March, Israel confirmed that it would reopen its airspace to facilitate outbound flights from Ben Gurion Airport (TLV; Tel Aviv district) from 8 March. Ben Gurion Airport previously reopened on 4 March for limited inbound flights, allowing only one passenger flight to land per hour. Limited operations have also resumed at the UAE’s Dubai International Airport (DXB; Dubai emirate) and Zayed International Airport (AUH; Abu Dhabi emirate), accommodating select commercial and repositioning flights. Major airports remain operational in Saudi Arabia, including the capital Riyadh’s King Khalid International Airport (RUH), though schedules are significantly reduced. Muscat Airport is functioning as a regional evacuation hub. With most commercial flights suspended across the region, some foreign nationals will possibly attempt overland evacuations in the coming hours and days, increasing their exposure to on-the-ground security threats in third countries and severe mobility constraints due to vehicle congestion in urban areas and at border crossings. However, many will choose to remain in-country while awaiting repatriation flights, exacerbating financial and operational strains on personnel and businesses due to extended stays, increased expenditure and disruption to normal activities.
• ISRAEL: The Home Front Command’s defence policy update will moderate financial risks to businesses in Israel, though it will increase the risk of a high-casualty event. Earlier on 5 March, the Home Front Command updated its defence policy to allow the economy’s limited opening. The new policy allows work and gatherings of up to 50 individuals in areas close to protected shelters. The new policy will remain in effect until 2000hrs (local time) on 7 March. While the new guidelines will moderate financial risks to businesses in Israel, many employees will likely avoid in-person work due to safety risks, sustaining disruption across Israel’s economy. Furthermore, the easing of restrictions on gatherings will elevate the risk of a mass-casualty event, possibly overwhelming medical institutions and undermining the provision of emergency response capabilities across Israel, particularly in major cities such as Jerusalem (Jerusalem district) and Tel Aviv (Tel Aviv district).
• LEBANON-IRAN: The cancellation of visa-free entry to Lebanon for Iranian nationals and a ban on IRGC activities will elevate compliance risks for Iranian nationals living abroad and their employers. Earlier on 5 March, the Lebanese government announced that it would ban the IRGC’s activities in Lebanon, with operatives to be deported at a later time (which remains unspecified). The government also announced the cancellation of visa-free entry for Iranian nationals. These decisions will elevate risks for Iranian nationals in Lebanon, who will likely face increased scrutiny by the authorities, increasing risks of arbitrary questioning and detentions. Businesses employing Iranian nationals will also likely face elevated scrutiny by the authorities, as well as elevated compliance and financial risks. At the time of writing, the new visa requirements and process for Iranian nationals already living in Lebanon remain unclear.

Mar 04.

KEY DEVELOPMENTS

• IRAN-STRAIT OF HORMUZ: Despite US efforts to increase market confidence in the Gulf region’s capacity to export oil, Iranian hostilities targeting vessels in the Strait of Hormuz will likely continue.
• ISRAEL-LEBANON: The Israel Defense Forces (IDF)’s evacuation warning south of the Litani River indicates a likely expansion of ground operations in the coming hours and days.
• SAUDI ARABIA-IRAN: Iran’s sustained targeting of Saudi Arabia will elevate the likelihood of Saudi retaliation against either Iran or its proxies in the coming hours and days.
• IRAQ: Further strikes against Iranian Kurdish opposition groups in the Kurdistan region are likely in the coming days, amid reports of a US-backed insurgency.
• IRAN: Despite reports that Mojtaba Khamenei will succeed his father Ali Khamenei as Supreme Leader, no successor has been confirmed; we assess that a protracted succession process within Iran will increase threats to government stability.
• IRAN-REGION: The US and Israel will almost certainly maintain the current airstrike pressure on Iran in the coming 24 hours, though Iran will likely retain the capacity to continue retaliatory missile and drone attacks. Earlier on 4 March, Israel conducted an airstrike targeting the Assembly of Experts office in Qom (Qom province; the council responsible for electing the supreme leader). The Assembly of Experts was not meeting in the facility at the time of the strike. In the coming days, airstrikes are highly likely to continue targeting locations associated with Iran’s government, including those directly responsible for the planning and execution of the succession process (see POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS below). Also earlier today, the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) announced that they had launched numerous airstrikes targeting the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and the Basij militia’s positions in the preceding 24 hours. This announcement underscores Israel’s ongoing efforts to undermine the IRGC’s capacity to repress internal dissent and establish conditions for a successful popular uprising within Iran. Although such strikes are highly likely to continue in the coming hours and days, the IRGC and Basij are highly likely to maintain repressive capabilities by requisitioning civilian buildings and dispersing small arms, motorcycles and tear gas supplies across urban areas. These practices will likely restrict the IDF’s capability to eliminate the security forces’ internal capacities through airstrikes. Meanwhile, broader US and Israeli airstrikes targeting missile production, storage and launch facilities have continued at pace; earlier on 4 March, the IDF announced that it has struck over 300 missile launchers within Iran since launching airstrikes on 28 February. The pursuit of this strategy will restrict Iran’s capacity to launch large-scale missile attacks consistently targeting locations in Israel and the Middle East region. Nevertheless, Iran will likely remain able to launch missiles sporadically towards the Gulf region in the short term, sustaining threats to locally engaged assets and economic disruption in the coming weeks.
• IRAN-ISRAEL: The downing of an Iranian fighter jet underscores Iran’s limited conventional aerial capacity, though the use of diffuse and non-conventional air defences will sustain threats to Israeli and US aircraft. At approximately 1200hrs (local time) earlier on 4 March, an Israeli Air Force (IAF) F-35I fighter jet shot down an Islamic Republic of Iran Air Force (IRIAF) Yak-130 fighter following an air-to-air engagement in the capital Tehran’s airspace. The IDF subsequently confirmed the engagement via official channels, marking the first report of air-to-air engagement in the Israel-US-Iran war. Local Iranian media reports also indicate that US and Israeli aircraft are operating at low altitude above Tehran, particularly in western Tehran. This likely reflects the broad neutralisation of Iran’s air defences in and around the capital, which will facilitate further sustained airstrikes targeting Tehran in the coming days. The IRIAF is unlikely to continue engaging routinely in air-to-air-engagement using military aircraft, given the significant constraints on its conventional capacity. Rather, the IRIAF and the IRGC will likely leverage unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) and portable air defences (such as man-portable air-defence systems; MANPADS) to harass and deter Israeli and US aircraft, particularly those conducting low-altitude operations or strike missions near dispersed Iranian air defence sites. Although this strategy is unlikely to repel airstrikes effectively, successful attacks targeting US and Israeli aircraft will likely trigger an escalation in the intensity of airstrikes, compounding threats to locally engaged staff and assets.
• IRAN-STRAIT OF HORMUZ: Despite US efforts to increase market confidence in the Gulf region’s capacity to export oil, Iranian hostilities targeting vessels in the Strait of Hormuz will likely continue. On 3 March, the UK Maritime Organisation (UKMTO) announced that unidentified objects had hit two vessels near the Strait of Hormuz; we assess that Iran is likely responsible for these attacks amid broader efforts to disrupt the movement of commercial vessels through the waterway. On 3 March, US President Donald Trump stated that he has ordered the US International Development Finance Corporation (DFC) to offer political risk insurance and guarantees for all maritime trade transiting the Gulf region, particularly energy shipments. Trump also stated that the US is willing to provide naval escorts to vessels moving through the Strait of Hormuz if necessary. These announcements come after a senior IRGC advisor announced the strait’s effective closure on 3 March, with the Iranian security forces conducting drone and missile attacks against several vessels in recent days (see Sibylline Middle East Crisis Update – 3 March 2026). Subsequently, numerous insurance providers have instituted war premiums on vessels attempting to traverse the Strait of Hormuz, while others have refused to provide insurance coverage for affected vessels. These developments have critically disrupted the movement of vessels through the Strait of Hormuz, triggering sustained price hikes on international energy and commodity markets. Despite Trump’s statement, energy prices remain elevated as of 4 March, with Brent crude trading at approximately USD 82 per barrel. While insurance coverage and naval escorts will possibly facilitate the limited movement of vessels through the Strait of Hormuz, we assess that Iranian missile and drone swarming attacks on commercial vessels and oil facilities in the Gulf region will likely sustain the upward pressure on energy prices. Additionally, US claims to have ‘eliminated’ Iran’s naval capabilities are unlikely to indicate that Iran lacks the military capacity to harass, damage and destroy vessels in nearby waters. Consequently, the risk of major hazard incidents in the Persian Gulf will remain elevated in the coming days, sustaining market concerns and energy price volatility.
• ISRAEL-LEBANON: The IDF’s evacuation warning indicates a likely expansion of ground operations in the coming hours and days. Earlier on 4 March, the IDF issued an evacuation warning for all residents living south of the Litani River to evacuate to the north. The warning comes amid continued armed escalation between the IDF and Lebanese Hizballah (LH) in the past 48 hours (see Sibylline Middle East Crisis Update – 3 March 2026). The warning likely signals a significant expansion of IDF ground operations in southern Lebanon in the coming hours and days. This will significantly increase physical security risks south of the Litani River and particularly close to LH-affiliated infrastructure and institutions. Furthermore, the expansion of IDF ground operations will also significantly increase risks of clashes between the IDF and LH operatives, as well as LH’s increased targeting of northern Israel. Clashes between the IDF and the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) remain a realistic possibility, though they are unlikely to escalate to a sustained interstate conflict. In the event of an expansion of ground operations, the risk of IDF airstrikes across Lebanon will also increase. Outside southern Lebanon, the risk of airstrikes will be particularly acute in and around the capital Beirut, as well as in Baalbek-Hermel and Beqaa governorates. Population displacement will likely elevate travel disruption, ethno-religious tensions and socio-economic risks in major cities across northern Lebanon in the coming weeks.
• UAE-REGION: Despite a decline in the frequency of Iranian aerial attacks, the threat of drone strikes and fallen debris will remain elevated near the UAE’s military and energy infrastructure facilities. On 3 March, an Iranian drone strike near the US consulate in Dubai (Dubai emirate) caused a limited fire, with no injuries reported. Notably, since our last report, the frequency of Iranian missiles and drones targeting Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar and the UAE has partially declined compared to the first 48 hours of hostilities. Additionally, most Iranian projectiles in the last 24 hours have been successfully intercepted by local air defence systems and local air forces. Nevertheless, the threat of Iranian drones and falling debris from interceptions will remain very high in the coming days, particularly near military and energy infrastructure facilities. Bystander and physical security threats will also remain high near landmarks and high-visibility targets such as out-of-town areas, markets and waterfronts.
• QATAR-REGION: The arrests of Iran-linked sleeper cells underscore growing sabotage risks in Gulf countries in the coming days. On 3 March, the Qatari authorities arrested ten members of two cells allegedly employed by the IRGC. The authorities stated that seven members of these cells had been spying on vital and military facilities, while three other individuals had carried out sabotage operations. The IRGC likely maintains further cells across Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries, driving staff exposure to active sabotage threats (including bombings) near military and infrastructure facilities, as well as high-visibility targets (such as tourist landmarks). We assess that state security campaigns targeting Shia-majority neighbourhoods and/or towns in the GCC region will increase in the coming days, particularly in Bahrain, Kuwait and Saudi Arabia, elevating risks of domestic unrest, ethno-religious tensions and clashes between local populations and the security forces. Additionally, the risk of arbitrary arrests to foreign nationals recording or filming missile strikes near military facilities will also be elevated, following recent warnings from Gulf governments against filming and uploading this footage on social media.
• SAUDI ARABIA-IRAN: Iran’s sustained targeting of Saudi Arabia will elevate the likelihood of Saudi retaliation against either Iran or its proxies in the coming hours and days. Earlier on 4 March, Saudi Arabia’s Ministry of Defence reported another attempted (and unsuccessful) drone attack on Saudi Aramco’s Ras Tanura refinery (Eastern province). The Saudi authorities also intercepted two cruise missiles over Riyadh province. These incidents follow a successful Iranian drone strike on the US embassy in the capital Riyadh on 3 March. Continued Iranian attacks on Saudi sovereign territory will likely increase pressure on the Saudi authorities to conduct a military response in the coming hours or days. This would possibly involve strikes on drone and missile launch facilities inside Iran or against Iran-backed proxy groups in third countries, such as elements of the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) in Iraq or the Houthis in Yemen. Targeting proxies would likely represent a more controlled escalation than direct strikes on Iranian assets, which would possibly trigger large-scale Iranian retaliation against Saudi military and civilian infrastructure. Iranian attacks against Saudi Arabia are likely to continue in the coming hours and days, sustaining significant security risks to on-the-ground personnel, including from direct attacks against US-linked assets, the mistargeting of civilian areas and injury risks from shrapnel over major urban centres caused by interception. Further attacks against critical energy infrastructure, including the Ras Tanura refinery, will exacerbate already-heightened regional and global energy security risks and raise operational costs for businesses.
• IRAQ: Further strikes against Iranian Kurdish opposition groups in the Kurdistan region are likely in the coming days, amid reports of a US-backed insurgency. On 3 March, Israeli-US joint strikes against the PMF and affiliated groups continued across several locations in Al-Anbar, Babylon, Diyala and Nineveh governorates, including the border regions with Syria. Strikes repeatedly targeted military infrastructure (likely including rocket and drone launch pads) and weapons warehouses. Since our last report, attacks by various Iran-backed groups, including the Islamic Resistance in Iraq (IRI), have continued to primarily target the Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI). Most attacks occurred in the regional capital Erbil (Erbil governorate), where the authorities and the US-led coalition intercepted several drones and missiles targeting Erbil International Airport (EBL), the US consulate in the city and Peshmerga facilities. Further drone attacks attempted to target Harir Air Base (Erbil governorate) but were successfully intercepted, while a drone reportedly struck the UN compound in Sulaymaniyah (Sulaymaniyah governorate) with no casualties. Notably, three drones and a missile killed three people at the Azadi Camp in Koy Sanjaq town (Erbil governorate), the location of the headquarters of the Democratic Party of Iranian Kurdistan (PDKI). With reports that the US will possibly back a Kurdish insurgency against the Iranian government, Iran and its Iraqi proxies are likely to conduct further strikes against the Iranian Kurdish opposition inside the KRI in the coming days. The realisation of any such insurgency will almost certainly trigger a major escalation in armed conflict along the Iranian border with Iraq, mainly in Ilam, Kermanshah, Kurdistan and West Azerbaijan provinces, fuelling ethno-religious violence.
• TURKEY-NATO-IRAN: NATO’s interception of an Iranian missile in Turkish airspace underscores conflict spillover risks and the increased risk of Turkey’s involvement in conflict. Earlier on 4 March, Turkey’s Ministry of National Defense confirmed that a ballistic missile launched from Iran – which was detected heading toward Turkish airspace after crossing Iraqi and Syrian airspace – was intercepted by NATO’s air and missile defence systems in the eastern Mediterranean region. Debris from the interception fell in Dörtyol (Hatay province) near Turkey’s border with Syria; it caused no casualties or damage. Ankara has conveyed its protest to Tehran over the incident and warned that it reserves the right to respond if similar actions occur again. While NATO has also condemned Iran, US Secretary of War Pete Hegseth stated he had ‘no sense’ that the incident would trigger NATO’s Article 5 (i.e. the alliance’s collective defence clause). Given the incident’s location, it is possible the missile was intended to target the UK Royal Air Force (RAF) Akrotiri base in Cyprus, rather than assets in Turkey. Nevertheless, the incident underscores the growing risk of conflict spillover, with any further incidents possibly drawing Turkey into the confrontation. The risk of Turkey’s involvement would also increase if strikes against Cyprus overshoot or undershoot their intended target, particularly if intercepted debris or ordnance falls within the self-declared Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC; recognised only by Turkey), which hosts a substantial Turkish military presence. This would possibly create pressure for wider NATO involvement.
• REGION-ENERGY: The suspension of oil and gas production, along with associated downstream product lines in Iraq and Qatar, is highly likely to persist in the coming days as the regional security environment deteriorates. On 3 March, Iraq ordered a full shutdown of South Rumaila oil field (Basra, Basra governorate) due to tanker shortages and maxed‑out storage amid the de facto closure of the Strait of Hormuz. This comes following gradual reductions in daily oil output at Rumaila and the West Qurna‑2 field (also Basra, one of the largest in the world) since the onset of the conflict. On the same day, the KRI’s oil crude exports through Ceyhan port (Adana province, Turkey) also stopped after companies halted operations, citing geopolitical and security threats. Also on the same day, QatarEnergy (which owns which owns 51% of Qatar Aluminium Manufacturing Co) announced the suspension of several downstream product lines, including aluminium, methanol, polymers and urea. This decision followed the company’s earlier halt of liquefied natural gas (LNG) production in the wake of an Iranian drone strike targeting Qatar’s critical Ras Laffan energy hub. These developments underscore the ongoing critical disruption of the energy sector across the Gulf as well as the cascading knock-on effects for regional shipping, logistics, chemicals and manufacturing. We assess that the risk of further operational disruption to oil/gas fields across Iraq and the broader Gulf region will intensify in the coming days, posing a significant and growing threat to regional economic stability.

POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS 

• IRAN: Despite reports that Mojtaba Khamenei will succeed his father as Supreme Leader, no successor has been confirmed; we assess that a protracted succession process within Iran will increase threats to government stability. On 3 March, unofficial Iranian media reported that the Assembly of Experts had selected Mojtaba Khamenei to succeed his father Ali Khamenei as Supreme Leader. The Iranian authorities have not officially commented on Khamenei’s successor at the time of writing. We assess that there is a realistic possibility that Khamenei will serve as the next Supreme Leader, given his strong support base within the IRGC. In turn, this would likely increase the IRGC’s influence within the regime and reinforce the centrality of hardliners to government command-and-control networks. However, Khamenei’s appointment would also possibly increase tensions with Iran’s clerical and judicial establishments; consequently, there is also a realistic possibility of Alireza Arafi (a member of the Guardian Council and the Assembly of Experts) or Chief Justice Gholam-Hossein Mohseni Eje’i being chosen as Supreme Leader. Regardless, a protracted succession process will undercut government stability and the centralisation of decision-making processes within the military. The continued siloing of decision-making amid ongoing hostilities will increase risks of broader regional escalation and threats to staff and assets positioned in the Gulf and Israel (see Sibylline Middle East Crisis Update – 3 March 2026). The US and Israel will also likely sustain airstrikes targeting individuals and entities associated with the Assembly of Experts, including potential successors (see above). If these are successful, the elimination of potential candidates for Supreme Leader will likely extend the succession process further, increasing risks of regime factionalism and instability thereafter.
• IRAN-US: A diplomatic deadlock will likely persist in the coming hours, moderating prospects for de-escalation. Earlier on 4 March, a senior advisor to the late Khamenei, Mohammad Mokhber, stated that Iran would not engage in negotiations with the US as long as airstrikes continue to target the country. Mokhber’s statement comes after Trump released a statement indicating that Iran was ‘too late’ in attempting to initiate talks with the US. In the coming days, escalating hostilities and inflammatory rhetoric from conflict parties is highly likely to undercut the prospects for diplomatic engagement and a resolution to the conflict, sustaining critical threats to regional security and operational conditions.
• OMAN-UK-REGION: Foreign nationals will likely remain dependent on self-evacuation from the region despite UK government-chartered evacuation flights from Oman. Earlier on 4 March, the UK government announced that a UK government-chartered evacuation flight would depart from the Omani capital’s Muscat International Airport (MCT) at 2300hrs (local time) later on 4 March. The UK government said additional flights would leave in the coming days. Vulnerable individuals are being prioritised for seat allocation. The UK Foreign Office has urged people not to make their way to MCT without prior instruction from the Foreign Office. At present, it is unclear when the additional evacuation flights will take place from Oman and options for foreign nationals, including UK citizens, to leave the region remain limited. If further evacuations are announced, demand for seats is likely to significantly exceed the available capacity. This will sustain the likelihood that foreign nationals will need to self-evacuate from the region in the coming hours and days, particularly in the event of further conflict escalation. However, most commercial flights remain suspended across the region, with only limited repatriation or special flights operating during short airspace openings. This will likely increase the incidence of foreign nationals attempting overland evacuations, elevating their exposure to on-the-ground security threats in third countries with heightened terror and attack risks. Individuals and businesses who decide to evacuate by land will likely face severe mobility constraints from vehicle congestion in urban areas and at border crossings. The risk of sporadic land border closures and communications failures in rural areas will be heightened.
• ISRAEL: The plan to open Ben Gurion International Airport (TLV; Central district) will not immediately increase evacuation options for personnel; primary flight evacuation options will still require border crossing to neighbouring countries. On 3 March, Israel’s transport minister announced that, subject to security approval, Ben Gurion Airport will return to limited but continuous operation from 5 March. According to the plan, from 5 March, one narrow-bodied aircraft (that can contain up to 200 passengers) will land at Ben Gurion once every hour. From 6 March, the frequency will increase to two narrow-bodied aircrafts or one wide-bodied aircraft every hour. This activity will continue, operating 24 hours a day, including on weekends. However, the plan will not offer flights out of Israel, with incoming flights scheduled to depart empty shortly after arrival to avoid a prolonged stay on the ground. This will sustain challenges to personnel evacuation from Israel in the coming days, though extension of the plan to departing flights with passengers is a realistic possibility in the next ten days. Israeli airlines have increased their flights to multiple destinations from King Hussein International Airport (AQJ, Jordan), Sharm El Sheikh International Airport (SSH, Egypt) and Taba International Airport (TCP, Egypt). These locations are a short drive from Israel’s border and have experienced an influx of passengers in the past three days, driving the risk of bottlenecks at border crossings and associated travel disruption.
• ISRAEL: Arrest of journalists highlights the elevated threats for media and news crews filming in Israel during the war. On 3 March, the Israeli police detained two Turkish CNN journalists who were broadcasting live outside HaKirya IDF military headquarters in Tel Aviv (Tel Aviv district). The incident highlights elevated security and legal risks for crews of foreign media outlets and content creators filming and taking pictures near sensitive facilities and missile-impact locations across Israel. Furthermore, media firms and parent companies associated with staff who are arrested for such activities will be at increased risk of operational bans across the country. These risks will remain elevated for the duration of the war.
• Qatar-region: Arrests underscore risks of Iran-linked sleeper cells, sabotage in Gulf region countries. On 3 March, the Qatari authorities arrested ten members of two cells allegedly employed by Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC). The authorities stated that seven members of these cells had been spying on vital and military facilities, while three other individuals had carried out sabotage operations. The development underscores the significant risk of Iran-linked sleeper cells in Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries amid daily Iranian missile and drone attacks. As such, we assess that active sabotage threats (including bombings) will sustain elevated physical security risks near military and infrastructure facilities, as well as high-visibility targets (such as tourist landmarks). We also assess that state security campaigns targeting Shia-majority neighbourhoods and/or towns in the GCC region will increase in the coming days, particularly in Bahrain, Kuwait and Saudi Arabia, elevating risks of domestic unrest, ethno-religious tensions and clashes between local populations and the security forces. Additionally, the risk of arbitrary arrests to foreign nationals recording or filming missile strikes near military facilities will also be elevated.

Mar 03.

• UK-US: Ongoing airstrikes will heighten security, operational risks from Iranian threat actors. On 2 March, security agencies in the US and the UK warned that cyber attacks on US and UK-based organisations are highly likely in the short term due to the ongoing Israel-US-Iran war (see Sibylline Middle East Crisis Update as of 1600hrs GMT – 2 March 2026). The warning singled out UK and US organisations operating in the Middle East region, highlighting heightened security and operational risks to regional and supply chain assets, including those providing services to US military personnel. Iranian state-sponsored threat actors likely retain some ability to conduct cyber attacks, despite a state-mandated internet blackout which has reduced internet connectivity to about 1% of its normal level since 28 February. Based on historical attack patterns, we assess that any Iran-led cyber attacks would likely encompass data-leak operations wherever possible to expose pre-obtained data, as well as lower-impact distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) attacks. Pro-Iran hacktivist attacks are also a possibility and could aim to disrupt industrial equipment temporarily, underscoring elevated operational risks. Consequently, UK and US-based organisations in the region are recommended to review cyber security protections as airstrikes are ongoing.
• Europe region: Israel-US-Iran war will likely continue to drive gas price volatility; shortages are unlikely. Earlier on 3 March, natural gas prices in Europe reportedly increased by 34% in response to the ongoing Israel-US-Iran war. This is largely due to decreased export capacity from the Gulf region due to ongoing Iranian hostilities targeting the Strait of Hormuz. Additionally, due to military attacks on oil company QatarEnergy’s operating facilities, the firm has halted its production of liquefied natural gas (LNG). Europe is not fully dependent on Qatari LNG and therefore gas shortages are unlikely. However, Qatari LNG has been an important part of the EU’s energy diversification strategy as it divests from Russian gas. QatarEnergy also has long-term supply contracts with major European companies, including Shell, TotalEnergies and Eni, increasing operational risks for these companies and their clients. Energy security risks will be higher for EU member states with lower gas storage levels, such as Germany (20%) and the Netherlands (11%). We assess that energy prices will remain volatile in the coming days; energy risks will significantly increase if the Israel-US-Iran war protracts.
• Iran-Saudi Arabia-US: Embassy attack, drone interception underscores risk of Saudi involvement in war. Earlier on 3 March, two Iranian drones targeted the US embassy in Saudi Arabia’s capital Riyadh, causing a limited fire and minor damage to the building. There are no reports of injuries or casualties. The attack aligns with Iran’s broader retaliation against US assets in the Middle East region and is unlikely to change the US’ force posture or operations meaningfully. Nevertheless, the attack comes amid a broader dangerous escalation of military activity targeting Saudi Arabia. Earlier on 3 March, Saudi Arabia’s Ministry of Defence claimed that its military had intercepted and destroyed eight drones in Riyadh and Al-Kharj (Riyadh province). We assess that these latest developments will possibly prompt a military response from Saudi Arabia in the coming hours, possibly by allowing the US to conduct offensive operations from bases on its territory or directly targeting drone and missile launch facilities within Iran. Despite this risk, Iranian attacks against Saudi Arabia will likely continue in the coming hours and days. This will elevate personnel security risks, especially for staff in Riyadh’s diplomatic quarter and those near US military installations and global energy infrastructure nationwide.

• Israel-Lebanon: New, limited ground operation will increase risks of wider armed conflict in March. Earlier on 3 March, the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) said that they had deployed troops deeper into southern Lebanon, up to approximately 500m beyond the five posts it currently holds. The IDF added that the goal of the new ground operation is to create an additional layer of security for residents of northern Israel after the resumption of rocket fire by Lebanese Hizballah (LH). The operation also comes amid extensive Israeli airstrikes targeting LH’s infrastructure and affiliated businesses all over Lebanon, including in the capital Beirut. We assess that the new ground operations are likely to be limited in scope and will possibly drive limited clashes with LH cells and Iran-backed groups in the area. However, there is a realistic possibility that the IDF will further expand its ground operations in Lebanon in the coming hours and days, particularly if LH continues targeting Israel with drones and rockets. Ground operations and their possible expansion will increase the risks of a wider armed conflict with LH in March, augmenting security instability in the country.
• Iran-Saudi Arabia-US: Embassy attack, drone interception underscores risk of Saudi involvement in war. Earlier on 3 March, two Iranian drones targeted the US embassy in Saudi Arabia’s capital Riyadh, causing a limited fire and minor damage to the building. There are no reports of injuries or casualties. The attack aligns with Iran’s broader retaliation against US assets in the Middle East region and is unlikely to change the US’ force posture or operations meaningfully. Nevertheless, the attack comes amid a broader dangerous escalation of military activity targeting Saudi Arabia. Earlier on 3 March, Saudi Arabia’s Ministry of Defence claimed that its military had intercepted and destroyed eight drones in Riyadh and Al-Kharj (Riyadh province). We assess that these latest developments will possibly prompt a military response from Saudi Arabia in the coming hours, possibly by allowing the US to conduct offensive operations from bases on its territory or directly targeting drone and missile launch facilities within Iran. Despite this risk, Iranian attacks against Saudi Arabia will likely continue in the coming hours and days. This will elevate personnel security risks, especially for staff in Riyadh’s diplomatic quarter and those near US military installations and global energy infrastructure nationwide.
• US: Attack risks will remain elevated for duration of US military campaign in Middle East. On 2 March, Texas Governor Greg Abbott warned that the possibility of Iranian ‘sleeper cells’ is being ‘seriously’ evaluated in his state. The statement comes as the federal authorities investigate a shooting, which took place in Austin (Texas) on 1 March, as a potential terrorist attack. The shooting took place the day after the US and Israel launched an airstrike campaign against Iran; the gunman allegedly wore clothing featuring an Iranian flag design. Abbott has increased the number of law enforcement officers patrolling cities and has deployed the Texas National Guard. We assess that the threat of US-based individuals plotting domestic attacks will remain elevated for the duration of the US and Israel’s military campaign. The risk of attack will be highest for institutions associated with the US government or Israel, as well as in urban centres with a high population of Jewish or Israeli residents, such as New York City (New York). Sole perpetrators will likely continue to rely on low-capacity attacks employing firearms or vehicle ramming. Nevertheless, the likelihood of a successful attack materialising is low.
• Region: Drone strike on RAF base in Cyprus underlines regional spillover risk of Middle East conflict. On 1 March, UK Prime Minister Keir Starmer announced that the UK has given the US permission to use British military bases to launch attacks on Iranian missile sites. The bases are likely to be Royal Air Force (RAF) Fairford (Gloucestershire, UK) and Diego Garcia (British Indian Ocean Territory). Starmer also reiterated his position that the British military will not participate in offensive attacks on Iran. Shortly after Starmer’s announcement, at approximately 0000hrs (local time) earlier on 2 March, a suspected Iranian Shahed-type drone struck the UK’s RAF Akrotiri airbase in Cyprus. A second projectile was intercepted. No injuries were reported and there was reportedly minimal material damage. The strike underlines the risk of the Middle East conflict directly spilling over to the eastern Mediterranean Sea; the Akrotiri airbase is likely to remain a target given that it is the largest RAF base in the region. Meanwhile, the Greek authorities have augmented the security posture at airports and business facilities nationwide; they have also advised Greece-flagged vessels to exercise maximum vigilance and avoid the Persian Gulf, the Gulf of Oman and the Strait of Hormuz.

• Region: Risk of Iran-backed proxy attacks against Israeli, US targets is elevated. We assess there is a realistic possibility that Iranian proxies will attempt to carry out terrorist attacks in Europe following the US’ and Israel’s strikes on Iran. The risks will be elevated in countries where hostile Iran-linked actors have a notable presence, including Belgium, Denmark, Germany, Netherlands, Sweden and the UK. Possible targets include Israeli and US diplomatic representatives and soft targets. In recent weeks, anonymous US and Western security officials cited by the New York Times have reported that they have detected increased ‘chatter’ in electronic interceptions of terrorist communications, suggesting possible planning and co-ordination, though no concrete plans have been detected. UK defence secretary John Healey has confirmed that the UK’s terror threat level is currently under review (the current level is ‘substantial’; i.e. an attack is likely); France has placed the domestic security forces on high alert in case of social unrest or violent acts. We also assess that robust counter-terrorism capabilities and increased security measures will likely thwart terrorism plots. However, the Iranian regime maintains ties with European organised crime groups; it can leverage them to carry out targeted attacks. The risk of sole-perpetrator attacks by individuals radicalised online will be also elevated.
• Armenia-Azerbaijan: Iran war will sustain evacuations, supply chain disruption in South Caucasus. On 1 March, the Russian embassy in Azerbaijan stated that it was assisting approximately 500 Russian nationals for evacuation from Iran via Azerbaijan amid the Israel-US-Iran war. Evacuations are taking place via the Astara border crossing (situated between Azerbaijan’s Astara district and Iran’s Gilan province). Aside from Russian nationals, citizens of other countries have also evacuated from Iran via this crossing. On 1 March, the Russian embassy in Armenia stated that the sole border Armenia-Iran crossing, Agarak-Nordooz (between Armenia’s Syunik province and Iran’s East Azerbaijan province), continues operations. However, the prospect of a large-scale outflux of Iranian refugees to these countries will remain limited in the short term. Evacuations of foreign nationals will likely constitute the majority of border crossings in the coming days, as was the case in the Iran-Israel 12-day war in June 2025. Nevertheless, sustained conflict or escalation will likely drive migratory flows of Iran’s ethnic-Azeri population into Azerbaijan over the coming weeks. Meanwhile, the continuation of hostilities over the coming weeks will likely increase supply chain disruption across the South Caucasus region, particularly impacting Armenian trade to Iran.

Mar 02.

• KEY DEVELOPMENTS 
• IRAN: Possible airstrikes targeting nuclear facilities will increase hazard risks within Iran, particularly in the currently unlikely event of strikes on nuclear energy facilities.
• SAUDI ARABIA-IRAN: An attempted Iranian drone strike against Prince Sultan Air Base (Riyadh province) signals a major escalation, elevating the risk of Saudi retaliatory action in the coming hours and days.
• CYPRUS-IRAN-TURKEY: Further Iranian strikes on the UK’s air base in Cyprus are likely, driving conflict escalation risks and possibly targeting Turkish military assets inadvertently.
• QATAR: The closure of a state-owned energy facility underscores the Israel-US-Iran war’s impact on global energy security, elevating global energy prices.
• IRAN: The US has claimed that it has established ‘air superiority’ over Iran; this will likely facilitate an escalation of airstrikes targeting military facilities in eastern Iran in the coming days. During a press conference earlier on 2 March, the US Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Dan Caine announced that the US had established ‘local air superiority’ in Iran. The announcement comes after the US and Israel conducted strikes on several locations in eastern Iran earlier on 2 March, including in Kerman (Kerman province) and Zahedan (Sistan and Baluchestan province). The announcement likely reflects the suppression and destruction of much of Iran’s air defence systems. In the coming days, the US and Israel will likely expand airstrikes targeting locations in eastern Iran, including Gorgan (Golestan province), Iranshahr (Sistan and Baluchestan province), Kerman, Mashhad (both Razavi Khorasan province), Yazd (Yazd province) and Zabol (Sistan and Baluchestan province). If sustained, the expansion of airstrikes will likely compound pressure on Iran’s security force capacity, undermining government stability and retaliation capability. Increasingly frequent airstrikes in eastern Iran will also likely disrupt overland movement along major thoroughfares, potentially restricting evacuation efforts via Iran’s land borders with Pakistan and Turkmenistan. In response to rising pressure on government stability and military capacity, Iran is highly likely to maintain its de facto closure of the Strait of Hormuz, compounding pressure on oil and gas prices worldwide. Further missile and drone attacks targeting Israel and US allies in the Gulf region are also highly likely (see below).
• IRAN: Possible airstrikes targeting nuclear facilities will increase hazard risks within Iran, particularly in the currently unlikely event of strikes on nuclear energy facilities. Earlier on 2 March, Iranian media reported a series of intense explosions near the Natanz fuel-enrichment plant (Isfahan province), though the explosions likely resulted from an airstrike targeting the Iran Air Force’s 8th Shekari Air Base (also Isfahan). It remains unclear whether the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran has resumed operations at the facility following US and Israeli airstrikes on it in June 2025. Prior to the explosions, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)’s Director General Rafael Grossi stated that there were no indications that the US and Israel had engaged in airstrikes targeting Iran’s nuclear facilities since operations began on 28 February. However, in the coming days, there is a realistic possibility that the US and Israel will resume airstrikes targeting nuclear facilities, including non-operational facilities targeted during the June 2025 Israel-Iran war. The targeting of enrichment, development and stockpile storage facilities is unlikely to trigger a major nuclear incident, though it will increase localised radiological hazard risks. While unlikely, the expansion of airstrikes to include the targeting of nuclear energy facilities will significantly increase the risk of a major nuclear incident and potential radiological release into the Persian Gulf; such targets include the Bushehr Nuclear Power Plant (Bushehr province) and the Khondab Heavy Water Research Reactor (Markazi province). Such conditions will compound risks of supply chain disruption for oil and gas exports, amid critical threats to personal safety stemming from radiation exposure.
• ISRAEL: An Iranian missile strike on Beersheba (Southern district) highlights the limitations of air defences and the rising risk of strain on medical facilities. Earlier on 2 March, an Iranian missile successfully penetrated Israeli air defences and hit Beersheba, injuring 74 individuals; there are no confirmed deaths at the time of writing. The incident highlights elevated risks to assets, staff and customer welfare nationwide and particularly near the Israel Defense Forces (IDF)’s bases, many of which are located within civilian population centres (the IDF’s Southern Command headquarters are located in Beersheba). The high number of casualties also reflects a rising risk of mounting strain on Israeli medical facilities, compounding existing challenges in some areas. These capacity issues are particularly elevated in Southern district, where the key Soroka Medical Center (Beersheba) was hit during the June 2025 Iran-Israel war and is still suffering from capability constraints.
• ISRAEL-LEBANON: The killing of a senior Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) commander is unlikely to trigger retaliation against Israel. Earlier on 2 March, IDF strikes in the Dahieh neighbourhood of the Lebanese capital Beirut killed a PIJ military commander. We assess that the PIJ in Lebanon is unlikely to retaliate against the IDF or Israel given the group’s limited capabilities and concerns about possible backlash by both Israel and the Lebanese state. More broadly, we assess that the IDF will continue to conduct strikes across Lebanon and Beirut in the coming days, elevating armed escalation and security risks nationwide (see Sibylline Daily Analytical Update – 2 March 2026).
• SAUDI ARABIA-IRAN: An attempted Iranian drone strike against Prince Sultan Air Base (Riyadh province) signals a major escalation, elevating the risk of Saudi retaliatory action in the coming hours and days. Earlier on 2 March, Saudi Arabia’s Ministry of Defense said that five hostile drones had been successfully intercepted near Prince Sultan Air Base, with no casualties reported. This air base houses the US Air Force’s 378th Air Expeditionary Wing. This comes after Iran targeted oil company Saudi Aramco’s refinery in Ras Tanura (Eastern province) earlier in the day; it also follows reports of missile attacks targeting the air base and the capital Riyadh’s King Khalid International Airport (RUH) on 1 March. The move signals a major escalation from Iran against Saudi sovereign territory and will possibly trigger Saudi retaliatory action against Iran in the coming hours and days. This would possibly involve the Saudi military’s targeting of drone and missile launch facilities within Iran, or possibly allowing the US to conduct further operations from bases within Saudi Arabia. A Saudi military response against Iran would exacerbate regional tensions and increase the risk of more widespread strikes across Saudi Arabia.
• QATAR-IRAN: Qatar’s downing of two Iranian tactical bombers underscores the Qatari forces’ elevated defensive posture and increased conflict escalation risks. Earlier on 2 March, Qatar’s Ministry of Defence announced that the Qatar Emiri Air Force (QAEF) successfully shot down two Iranian Sukhoi Su-24 tactical bombers approaching Qatari airspace from Iran. Qatar said that the threat was addressed immediately upon detection, in accordance with its operational protocol. The incident signals an elevation of Qatar’s defensive posture, raising the risk of Iranian retaliatory action against Qatari military assets in the coming hours and days and elevating conflict escalation risks.
• CYPRUS-IRAN-TURKEY: Further Iranian strikes on the UK’s air base in Cyprus likely, will drive conflict escalation risks, with a possibility of inadvertently targeting Turkish military assets. Earlier on 2 March, senior Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) commander Sardar Jabbari claimed that the US had transferred a significant number of military aircraft to the UK’s Royal Air Force (RAF) Akrotiri air base in Cyprus and that Iran would launch additional attacks against Cyprus. His remarks followed a suspected Iranian drone strike on RAF Akrotiri and the interception of a second projectile. Furthermore, also earlier today, Cyprus’ Paphos International Airport (PFO; Paphos district) was evacuated after drones were detected in its vicinity. Further Iranian attacks against Cyprus would increase the likelihood of the UK expanding its defensive involvement in the conflict in the coming days. As Iranian missile stockpiles are depleted, forcing greater reliance on older or less advanced ordnance, the risk of targeting errors will also rise. This will increase the possibility of an overshoot beyond the intended target, including into areas under Cyprus’ sovereign control as well as the self-declared Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC). The TRNC is recognised only by Turkey; the presence of a substantial Turkish military contingent within it will heighten the risk that Iranian misfires inadvertently strike Turkish military assets or personnel. This would drive regional escalation risks, including the prospect of Turkish retaliation. At present, we assess this risk to be low.
• US-REGION: Further US military personnel deaths are likely in the coming days; they are unlikely to shift the US’ operational outlook. Earlier on 2 March, the US announced that a fourth service member had died from injuries sustained during Iran’s initial attacks against US assets on 28 February. Additional US military personnel are highly likely to be killed in the coming hours and days, as Iran sustains retaliatory strikes against US military bases and assets in the Middle East region. When US President Donald Trump announced the military operation on 28 February, he confirmed that US casualties were likely. Consequently, we assess that US personnel deaths are accounted for within the US’ military planning and are unlikely to shift the administration’s perspective on the scale or nature of continued operations in the coming days.

POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS

• IRAN: Despite the formation of a leadership council in Iran, threats to government stability will remain acute, particularly in the event of a contested or protracted succession. On 2 March, Iran’s Interim Leadership Council (ILC) released its first statement after assuming the duties of the Supreme Leader’s office. The ILC is composed of Alireza Arafi (a member of the Guardian Council and the Assembly of Experts), Chief Justice Gholam-Hossein Mohseni Ejei and President Masoud Pezeshkian. The ILC will execute the functions of the Supreme Leader’s office until the Assembly of Experts appoints a successor (see Sibylline Middle East Crisis Update – 1 March 2026). The Assembly will highly likely attempt to expedite this process, in order to emphasise regime continuity. However, as both Arafi and Ejei will likely seek election to the Supreme Leader’s office, risks of factionalism and protracted infighting among competing hardline political factions will remain elevated in the coming days. The associated deadlock will likely disrupt government and military decision-making processes, as well as the continuity of the security forces’ internal chains of command. A protracted and contested succession will highly likely undermine government stability, increasing risks of high-level defection and regime collapse, particularly amid ongoing US and Israeli strike action.
• ISRAEL: A possible limited opening of airspace beginning next week will likely reduce bottlenecks at border crossings and challenges to personnel evacuations. Earlier on 2 March, the Israeli transport minister announced plans for the limited opening of Israel’s airspace from next week (8 March). The plan is designed to allow Israeli citizens and reserve soldiers abroad to return to Israel and reduce bottlenecks along its land border crossings. The plan will remain subject to Israel’s security assessments. We assess that its actioning will likely reduce challenges to personnel evacuation through both land borders and air transit. While there is a realistic possibility that this plan will be fulfilled, it is highly likely that only a few airlines will resume flights to Israel (highly likely El Al airline) and that opening times will remain extremely limited.
• LEBANON: The banning of Lebanese Hizballah (LH) military activities will elevate domestic tensions, though armed clashes between the Lebanese military and LH remain unlikely in the coming 48 hours. Earlier on 2 March, the Lebanese government decided to outlaw LH’s security and military activities during an emergency meeting following LH attacks on Israel earlier that day. While the move is significant, we assess that the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) are unlikely to make determined efforts to enforce the order in the coming days. However, tensions will remain high between the government and LH in the coming weeks, elevating risks of small-scale sporadic clashes over the coming months, particularly after the ongoing Israel-US-Iran war and Israeli strikes against LH in Lebanon cease.
• QATAR: The closure of a state-owned energy facility underscores the Israel-US-Iran war’s impact on global energy security, elevating global energy prices. Earlier on 2 March, state-owned oil company QatarEnergy halted production of liquefied natural gas (LNG) at its main facilities in Ras Laffan Industrial City (Al Khor municipality) following reported Iranian strikes on its energy infrastructure. The complex is the largest LNG production centre in the world; Qatar accounts for roughly 20% of global seaborne LNG supply. LNG prices have surged in response, underscoring the ongoing conflict’s impact on global energy security. Disruption to energy supply chains will likely escalate in the coming days due to reduced maritime traffic through the Strait of Hormuz and the Arabian Gulf. They will also likely escalate given the suspension of operations at other regional energy facilities, including Saudi Aramco’s Ras Tanura refinery (Saudi Arabia) and the offshore Leviathan gas field (Israel). Reduced LNG and oil export capacity from Gulf states will likely trigger further energy price spikes in the coming days (European gas prices have already risen by around 50% today), raising operational costs for global businesses, particularly in energy-intensive sectors such as aviation, shipping and manufacturing. The EU sources approximately 60% of its LNG imports from the US and is therefore less exposed than many Asian states, which will possibly face immediate supply shortfalls. However, while the US will possibly increase exports to the EU in the coming days, it is unlikely to offset fully the shortfall resulting from QatarEnergy’s shutdown. The overall global impact will almost certainly depend on the Israel-US-Iran war’s duration and trajectory, for which there are currently limited signs of viable de-escalation in the short term.
• UAE: Limited flight resumption will facilitate initial personnel departure from the Gulf region, though large-scale evacuation operations remain unlikely in the coming hours. Earlier on 2 March, the capital Abu Dhabi’s Zayed International Airport (AUH) announced the resumption of limited operations and urged prospective travellers to check with their airlines for updated flight schedules. Dubai International Airport (DXB; Dubai emirate) similarly confirmed that a limited number of flights would operate from the evening of 2 March, with departure priority given to passengers holding earlier bookings. Both airports advised travellers not to proceed to terminals without confirmation from airlines to do so. Meanwhile, the UK government is drawing up emergency evacuation plans for British nationals stranded in the Gulf region, while EU governments are considering repatriation options for member states’ nationals. These developments will possibly facilitate initial personnel departures from the region in the coming hours and days. However, we assess that the capacity for large-scale evacuation operations remains limited due to ongoing Iranian military activity impacting regional airspace and civilian aviation infrastructure. Additionally, there remains a realistic possibility that Iran will target either airport in the coming hours despite the resumption of civilian traffic, sustaining significant threats to personnel welfare and the possibility of last-minute cancellations.

Feb 27.

• Iraq-Kuwait: Naval standoff underscores tensions over maritime borders, oil exploration risks. On 26 February, an Iraqi vessel near the Khor Abdullah channel withdrew from the area after a Kuwaiti patrol boat approached it and asked it to leave, claiming it fell within Kuwait’s maritime boundaries. The incident underscores the ongoing elevated tensions between the two countries. This comes after Iraq’s submission of maritime co-ordinates to the UN, which Kuwait claim infringe on its sovereign maritime territories. The controversial co-ordinates include the Fisht Al Eid and Fisht Al Eij submerged islets as within Iraq’s boundaries, which are claimed by Kuwait. The Iraqi move will possibly halt oil exploration in areas along the shared maritime borders with Kuwait. This will likely disrupt plans for new foreign investments in oil fields and the energy sector throughout the coming months, possibly weakening foreign direct investment (FDI) flows into both Kuwait and Iraq. However, there is a possibility that the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) will seek to mediate between the two countries in Q2 2026, mitigating the risk of a larger geopolitical crisis or a military confrontation.
• Israel-Lebanon: LH attacks on Israel drive escalation risks; further airstrikes likely in coming hours. Earlier on 2 March, the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) killed 31 people in strikes on Lebanese Hizballah (LH) targets in Lebanon, including the Dahieh neighbourhood of the capital Beirut. The move came after LH launched a barrage of missiles and drones targeting northern Israel, including allegedly at an IDF missile defence facility near Haifa (Haifa district). Later in the day, an IDF spokesperson stated that all options were on the table for retaliation. These developments increase the risk of limited Israeli ground operations in southern Lebanon’s South and Nabatieh governorates in the coming days, possibly involving raids targeting weapons caches, launch infrastructure and command and training facilities. Further Israeli strikes across Lebanon against LH’s chain of command, as well as drone and missile operators, are likely in the coming hours. Sustained airstrikes will significantly increase threats to personnel safety across Lebanon, particularly in Baalbek-Hermel, Nabatieh and South governorates, as well as in Beirut.

• Region: Killing of Iranian supreme leader will drive risk of protests, attacks targeting US missions. On 1 March, at least 22 people were killed in protests across Pakistan against the US’ and Israel’s strikes on Iran and the killing of Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei. At least 10 people were killed in Karachi (Sindh province) as the security forces opened fire while protesters stormed the US consulate. Eight people were killed in Skardu (Gilgit-Baltistan administrative territory) after protesters set several government buildings and a UN office on fire. Two people were killed in the capital Islamabad as protesters attempted to march towards the US embassy, while demonstrations were also monitored near the US consulate in Lahore (Punjab province). The authorities have heightened security measures across urban centres in Pakistan. In India, protests were monitored in Jammu and Kashmir and Ladakh union territories, the capital New Delhi and Uttar Pradesh state. Pakistan is home to one of the largest Shia populations outside Iran, with Shia communities also present in Afghanistan and India. We assess that further protests are highly likely in the coming days in cities with large Shia populations and due to pro-Iran sentiment in the region, particularly in Pakistan. There is a realistic possibility that protests will target US missions and associated facilities, increasing domestic unrest and safety risks for bystanders.
• Russia-Ukraine: Middle East conflict will likely threaten short-to-medium term support for Ukraine. On 1 March, Russian President Vladimir Putin condemned the death of Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei in US and Israeli strikes on Iran. Iran, Russia’s closest regional partner, provided crucial support to Russia during the early stages of the Russo-Ukrainian war, particularly in the field of drone technology (see Sibylline Special Report – 2 March 2026). Although any profound destabilisation of Iran would threaten Russia’s long-term investments and regional influence, it is unlikely to have a direct impact on its ongoing military operations against Ukraine. Russia has significantly reduced its reliance on Iranian-supplied military equipment. Meanwhile, a sharp increase in oil prices would highly likely increase the Kremlin’s federal revenues, thereby improving its ability to finance the war. Instead, we assess that the short-term consequences of the Middle East conflict will likely prove more detrimental to Ukraine. The US’s operational focus on Iran will significantly constrain the short-to-medium-term availability of critical military equipment for Kyiv (and Europe), including essential air defence systems and interceptors. Simultaneously, potential European involvement in the conflict, particularly in support of regional allies, would further strain Europe’s limited defence stockpiles. This would put pressure on European nations’ capacity to sustain their military assistance to Ukraine.

 

04 Mar 26. Four Days In, Hegseth, Caine Say U.S. Making Decisive Progress in Iran. During the War Department’s second press conference since the U.S. and Israel’s launch of Operation Epic Fury against the Iranian regime Feb. 28, Secretary of War Pete Hegseth and Air Force Gen. Dan Caine, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, today said America is making decisive offensive progress in the conflict.

“I stand before you today with one unmistakable message about Operation Epic Fury: America is winning decisively, devastatingly and without mercy,” Hegseth told the media from the Pentagon’s press briefing room.

“We are only four days into this, and the results have been incredible — historic, really. … Only the United States could lead this [mission]. … But, when you add the Israeli Defense Forces — a devastatingly capable force — the combination is sheer destruction for our radical Islamist Iranian adversaries,” Hegseth said.

During his remarks, Caine reiterated that the U.S. and Israel’s joint, three-pronged mission in the region is to target and eliminate Iran’s ballistic missile systems, destroy the Iranian navy and ensure Iran cannot rebuild or reconstitute its combat capability or power —  including ensuring the country never obtains nuclear weapons.

In terms of battle damage, Caine said there has been an 86% overall drop in Iran’s ballistic missile launches since the first day of fighting, and a 23% decrease in just the last 24 hours. Additionally, he added there has been 73% decrease in Iranian one-way attack drone shots fired from early on in the conflict.

In terms of air power, Hegseth said that the U.S. and Israeli forces are poised to have complete control of Iranian air space within the next few days.

“I hope all the folks watching understand what ‘uncontested airspace’ and ‘complete control’ means: It means we will fly all day [and] all night … finding, fixing and finishing the missiles and defense industrial base of the Iranian military; finding and fixing their leaders and their military leaders; flying over Tehran … [with] Iranian leaders looking up and seeing only U.S. and Israeli air power every minute of every day, until we decide it’s over — and Iran will be able to do nothing about it,” Hegseth said.

At sea, U.S. Central Command announced yesterday that more than 20 Iranian navy vessels have been destroyed, including the sinking of an Iranian combatant ship in the Indian Ocean by a U.S. Navy fast attack submarine.

It was the first time a U.S. submarine has used a Mark 48 torpedo to sink an enemy vessel since 1945, Caine noted.

“I want to remind everybody that this is an incredible demonstration of America’s global reach. To hunt, find and kill an out-of-area deployer is something that only the United States can do at this type of scale,” he said.

In discussing the Iranian regime’s predicament, Hegseth said he likens the situation to a football game, wherein Iran’s offense has already exhausted all of its scripted plays.

“But now that the game has started and the [U.S. and Israeli] defensive blitz is on, [Iran doesn’t] know what plays to call, let alone how to get in the huddle and call those plays,” Hegseth said.

He added, because so many of Iran’s senior leaders being killed on Operation Epic Fury’s first day, the military is unable to effectively communicate, let alone mount a coordinated and sustained offensive.

“This was never meant to be a fair fight, and it is not a fair fight. We are punching [the enemy] while they’re down, which is exactly how it should be,” Hegseth said, adding that Epic Fury has already unleashed twice the air power as the initial “shock and awe” phase of Operation Iraqi Freedom in 2003.

Looking ahead, Caine said that Centcom will continue to strike the regime’s infrastructure — including hunting and killing ballistic missile launchers and one-way attack capabilities — as well as continuing to attack Iran’s naval capabilities.

“We are just getting started,” Hegseth said. (Source: U.S. DoD)

 

02 Mar 26. Armenia-Azerbaijan: Iran war will sustain evacuations, supply chain disruption in South Caucasus. On 1 March, the Russian embassy in Azerbaijan stated that it was assisting approximately 500 Russian nationals for evacuation from Iran via Azerbaijan amid the Israel-US-Iran war. Evacuations are taking place via the Astara border crossing (situated between Azerbaijan’s Astara district and Iran’s Gilan province). Aside from Russian nationals, citizens of other countries have also evacuated from Iran via this crossing. On 1 March, the Russian embassy in Armenia stated that the sole border Armenia-Iran crossing, Agarak-Nordooz (between Armenia’s Syunik province and Iran’s East Azerbaijan province), continues operations. However, the prospect of a large-scale outflux of Iranian refugees to these countries will remain limited in the short term. Evacuations of foreign nationals will likely constitute the majority of border crossings in the coming days, as was the case in the Iran-Israel 12-day war in June 2025. Nevertheless, sustained conflict or escalation will likely drive migratory flows of Iran’s ethnic-Azeri population into Azerbaijan over the coming weeks. Meanwhile, the continuation of hostilities over the coming weeks will likely increase supply chain disruption across the South Caucasus region, particularly impacting Armenian trade to Iran. (Source: Sibylline)

 

03 Mar 26. US Attacks Iran with Shahed Replicas. The U.S. military has used LUCAS kamikaze drones in combat for the first time, U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) confirmed Saturday. The ground-launched drones were deployed by Task Force Scorpion Strike (TFSS), a unit established in December to “flip the script on Iran,” according to a U.S. official at the time.

“Costing approximately $35,000 per platform, LUCAS is a low-cost, scalable system that provides cutting-edge capabilities at a fraction of the cost of traditional long-range U.S. systems that can deliver similar effects,”

Navy Capt. Tim Hawkins, a CENTCOM spokesperson, said in December. Compared to conventional missiles — which are more expensive and slower to produce — LUCAS offers a cheaper and more rapidly scalable strike option.

CENTCOM says the drone has extensive range, can operate beyond line of sight, and is capable of autonomous operations. Its design supports coordinated swarm tactics and network-centric strikes. LUCAS can be launched using multiple methods, including catapults, rocket-assisted takeoff, and mobile ground or vehicle systems.

While the drones used against Iran were launched from the ground, U.S. Navy personnel previously test-fired one from the Independence-class littoral combat ship USS Santa Barbara shortly after TFSS was formed.

According to U.S. officials, the LUCAS “pretty much follows the Shahed design,” but is now being produced in cooperation with American companies focused on rapid innovation and scalable manufacturing. (Source: UAS VISION/The War Zone)

 

01 Mar 26. Iran’s Shahed retaliatory drone attacks raise new C-UAS. questions for defence planners. The performance of Gulf states’ counter-UAS (C-UAS) systems in defending against Iranian Shahed drone attacks on Arabian Gulf states’ infrastructure, following US and Israel February 28 strikes, is being closely monitored by defence planners around the world.

According to United Arab Emirates (UAE) Ministry of Defence in a March 1 posting on X, “since the beginning of the Iranian attack on 28th February, 2026, 165 ballistic missiles launched from Iran towards the UAE have been detected. Of these, 152 were destroyed, while 13 fell into sea waters. Two cruise missiles were also detected and destroyed. A total of 541 Iranian drones were detected, of which 506 were intercepted and destroyed, while 35 fell within the country, causing material damage. The incidents resulted in three fatalities of Pakistani, Nepali and Bangladeshi nationalities, and 58 minor injuries among Emirati, Egyptian, Ethiopian, Filipino, Pakistani, Iranian, Indian, Bangladeshi, Sri Lankan, Azerbaijani, Yemeni, Ugandan, Eritrean, Lebanese and Afghan nationals.”

The UAE has developed a sophisticated counter-UAS (C-UAS) strategy to protect critical infrastructure including the Edge Group Skyshield C-UAS – a multi-layered system using 3D radars, electro-optical (EO) sensors and soft-kill (jamming) capabilities – complemented by more tactical systems such as the Calidus AI-based AlDeraa tracking and mitigation system and Raytheon Coyote interceptors.

The Edge Skyshield system (Edge)

The initial question for defence ministries around the globe is: is this an acceptable rate of success for a strategic C-UAS system developed to protect critical infrastructure rather than military assets? And the second should be – how do we scale this system to defeat more complex drone threats which are just around the corner?

Measuring damage from these kinds of attacks is notoriously difficult. Alongside the casualties and the cost there is the psychological impact of seeing images of burning hotels splashed across social media and the closure of airports and airspace for indefinite periods. Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar and the United Arab Emirates were all targeted by Iran, along with US military bases.

All the early indications suggest that Iran’s drone attacks were largely based on the Shahed-136 drone/cruise missile and the Shahed-136B, an upgraded version of the original model, with a more powerful engine, a range of over 2,000 miles and a larger explosive warhead than the ubiquitous 136.  A long-range Iranian Shahed reportedly struck a radar system at the US Naval Support Activity Bahrain – most likely to be the Shahed-136B.

Iran’s January 2025 Treaty on Comprehensive Strategic Partnership with Russia will give it access to Russia’s Shahed-derived Geran-3 and Geran-5 cruise missiles, if Russia has any to spare. These are far more formidable than Iran’s current stock of Shaheds. Flying at speeds of 600 km/h, at altitudes up to 9 km and with a 90kg warhead (in the Geran 5 version), with jam resistant 12-element adaptive antenna arrays, Gerans are effectively low-cost cruise missiles with the potential to bypass many of the counter-UAS systems deployed by states to protect critical infrastructure.

But supplying these systems to Iran will not be a simple choice for Russia: it will degrade already depleted stocks and will raise the anger levels against it in the USA and throughout the Middle East if Geran-3s and -5s suddenly start appearing in the sky.  At the same time, Russia cannot afford to lose a valuable ally.

The next few months will see many countries in the region seek urgent upgrades to their air defence and C-UAS strategic systems and one of the key beneficiaries to these requirements will be Ukraine, who knows better than anyone else how to cost-effectively defend again swarms of drones, cruise and other missiles. If Ukraine can forge the same kind of drone/C-UAS industrial links with Gulf state countries as it has done with Europe – setting up production lines a long way away from Ukraine – that would provide both sides with quick wins.

For the first time, drone and C-UAS technology forged in the heat of the battlefields in Ukraine could soon be exported to the wider world at scale, depending on how long the current hostilities last. (Source: www.unmannedairspace.info)

 

02 Mar 26. Hegseth Says ‘Epic Fury’ Goals in Iran Are ‘Laser-Focused.’ Since early morning Feb. 28, American forces in the U.S. Central Command area of operations have been involved in an intense bombing campaign against Iran that has already resulted in the death of Iranian Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei.

As part of Operation Epic Fury, which started at 1:15 a.m. EST, American forces have already targeted the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps command and control facilities, Iranian air defense capabilities, missile and drone launch sites and military airfields.

Secretary of War Pete Hegseth said that while there is no timeline for the military operation, there are clearly defined goals for what the United States hopes to achieve.

“The mission of Operation Epic Fury is laser-focused,” Hegseth said today during a briefing at the Pentagon. “Destroy Iranian offensive missiles, destroy Iranian missile production, destroy their navy and other security infrastructure, and they will never have nuclear weapons.”

For decades, Iran has been in pursuit of a nuclear weapons capability, through both enrichment of weapons-grade nuclear material and development of missiles that can carry a nuclear warhead.

In June 2025, during Operation Midnight Hammer, the United States struck Iran’s Fordow Fuel Enrichment Plant using 30,000-pound GBU-57 “massive ordnance penetrator” bombs. That operation, Hegseth said, obliterated Iran’s nuclear program.

Nevertheless, Hegseth said, the Iranians have persisted in pursuing a nuclear capability and in building conventional capabilities to protect their nuclear ambitions.

“Iran was building powerful missiles and drones to create a conventional shield for their nuclear blackmail ambitions,” he said. “Our bases, our people, our allies, all in their crosshairs — Iran had a conventional gun to our head as they tried to lie their way to a nuclear bomb.”

The secretary said the clear goals for Epic Fury mean it will be unlike past American conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan.

“Our ambitions are not utopian; they are realistic, scoped to our interests and the defense of our people and our allies,” he said. “This is not Iraq. This is not endless. … This is the opposite. This operation [has] a clear, devastating, decisive mission: destroy the missile threat, destroy the navy, no news.”

Hegseth said Epic Fury doesn’t include nation-building or democracy building goals.

Air Force Gen. Dan Caine, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, said planning for an operation such as Epic Fury has been underway for a significant amount of time.

“This marked the culmination of months, and in some cases, years, of deliberate planning and refinement against this particular target set,” Caine said. “From precision strikes against key military infrastructure to persistent intelligence and targeting integration to the close coordination of the components across vast distances, this operation again demonstrated America’s reach, readiness and professionalism, and that of our joint united force.”

Setting the Force

Over the last 30 days, at the direction of the secretary, Caine said, the joint force repositioned forces around the region in order to provide President Donald J. Trump with options, if he intended to act.

“These movements ensured that U.S. forces remained postured, protected and ready to respond decisively [to] any emerging threat,” he said.

That effort included thousands of service members, hundreds of advanced fighter aircraft, refueling tankers, a sustained flow of munitions, fuel and supplies, and the USS Abraham Lincoln and USS Gerald R. Ford carrier strike groups, along with their air wings. More capabilities continue to flow into the region, Caine said.

“This rapid buildup of forces demonstrated the joint force’s ability to adapt and project power at the time and place of our nation’s choosing,” Caine said.

The final word that Epic Fury was going to happen, he added, came Friday afternoon from the president.

“Operation Epic Fury approved. No aborts. Good luck,” Caine said, relaying the message from the president.

“In the region, every element of the joint force made their final preparations,” he said. “Air defense batteries readied themselves, checking their systems to respond to Iranian attacks. Pilots and crews rehearsed their strike packages for the final time. Air crews began loading their final weapons, and two carrier strike groups began to move towards their launching points across the globe.”

Epic Fury

U.S. Cyber Command and U.S. Space Command, he said, initiated action with non-kinetic effects to disable Iran’s communications ability. And then, at 1:15 a.m. EST, 9:45 a.m. Tehran time, Epic Fury kicked off.

“More than 100 aircraft launched from land and sea: fighters, tankers, airborne early warning, electronic attack, bombers from the states and unmanned platforms forming a single synchronized wave,” he said. “This was a daylight strike based on a trigger event conducted by the Israeli Defense Forces, enabled by the U.S. intelligence community.”

On the sea, the U.S. Navy launched Tomahawk missiles at Iran and attacked Iranian naval forces. While on the ground, he said, coordinated salvos of precision standoff weapons from across the region have neutralized hundreds of preplanned targets.

“This was a massive, overwhelming attack across all domains of warfare, striking more than 1,000 targets in the first 24 hours,” Caine said. “We are now roughly 57 hours into the operation. In the initial phase, Centcom’s focus was systematic, targeting of Iranian command and control, infrastructure, naval forces, ballistic missile sites and intelligence infrastructure — designed to daze and confuse them.”

As a result of strikes in Iran, Caine said the U.S. has established local air superiority, which enhances the ability to protect U.S. forces and allows them to continue operations there.

“Operation Epic Fury stands as a reminder of what the United States military uniquely delivers: the ability to project power on a global scale with speed, surprise, precision and overwhelming force, when and where our nation requires it,” Caine said. “What we’ve demonstrated over the past several days reflects years of investment in readiness, joint integration and professionalism of the joint force.”

During the briefing, Hegseth also directly addressed U.S. troops who are participating in Epic Fury, telling them that both he and the president have their backs.

“We will finish this on ‘America First’ conditions of President Trump’s choosing — nobody else’s — as it should be,” Hegseth said. “And know this above all, President Trump and I have your back, always. Through fire, through criticism, through fake news, through everything, we unleash you because you are the best, most powerful, most lethal fighting force the world has ever seen.”  (Source: U.S. DoD)

 

02 Mar 26. Israel Ministry of Defense Spokesperson’s Statement. Israel Ministry of Defense Spokesperson’s Statement. As part of the full support for the IDF’s operational needs, the Israel Ministry of Defense (IMOD) and the IDF completed the reception and unloading of a cargo ship over the weekend, carrying tons of military equipment including military gear, dozens of Humvees, trucks, and more. The ship, which docked at the Port of Haifa, was brought to Israel in a joint operation by the IMOD Mission to the United States, the International Shipping Division of the Ministry’s Defense Procurement Directorate (DPD), and the IDF’s Planning Directorate. The IMOD and the IDF continue their ongoing procurement and shipping efforts to supply the IDF with required equipment.

Since the onset of the war, 1,150 cargo aircraft and 166 ships have arrived in Israel carrying over 130,000 tons of munitions and military equipment, of which over 6,500 tons were delivered in 90 flights and shipments in recent weeks. The shipping effort will continue to intensify in the coming period as part of Operation Roaring Lion.

Over the past 24 hours, the first cargo aircraft landed in Israel carrying various munitions and military equipment. Defense Minister Israel Katz and Israel Ministry of Defense (IMOD) Director General, Maj. Gen. (Res.) Amir Baram, have prioritized bolstering Israel’s strategic endurance and ensuring uninterrupted operational readiness amid preparations for potential escalation across additional fronts.

The airlift operation is expected to scale up in the coming days. It is being carried out jointly by the IMOD Defense Procurement Directorate (DPD) through its International Shipping Division, the IMOD Missions to the United States and Germany, the IDF Planning Directorate, the Israel Airports Authority, and the Israel Civil Aviation Authority

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Military And Security Developments

Mar 03.

KEY DEVELOPMENTS 

• STRIKES: A fibre-optic drone struck Kharkiv (Kharkiv oblast) for the first time this week, which given it is located around 12 miles (20km) from Russian-occupied territory, underscores the extended range of such systems
• TRUCE: On 27 February, a temporary local ceasefire at the Russian-occupied Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant (Zaporizhzhia oblast) commenced, indicating that localised, short-term ceasefires are possible
• NEGOTIATIONS: The US’ preoccupation with the Middle East region amid the ongoing Israel-US-Iran war (beginning on 28 February) will likely divert the Trump administration’s attention away from the Russo-Ukrainian war in the coming weeks
• FORECAST: The ongoing Israel-US-Iran war will increase the likelihood of shortages of critical US equipment for Ukraine both in the short and long term; this will further undermine Ukraine’s air defence situation
• OFFENSIVES: We maintain our assessment that recent Ukrainian territorial gains are not indicative of a broader shift in the strategic dynamics on the battlefield, but rather a localised (and likely time sensitive) opportunity successfully exploited by Ukrainian forces. On 2 March, Ukrainian Commander-in-Chief Oleksandr Syrskyi claimed that Ukrainian forces had captured more territory than Russia was able to occupy in February.
• OFFENSIVES: While we cannot confirm the amount of territory retaken, Ukrainian forces have exploited disruptions to Russian military communications, including the interruption to Starlink Services and disruption to Telegram communication. The Ukrainian gains have coincided with a slowing of Russian advances across the front line due to winter conditions, a pattern observed last year. Ukrainian forces have nevertheless been able to launch successful counter-attacks in Zaporizhzhia oblast, north of Huliapole (Sibylline Ukraine Update – 17 February 2026), as well as towards Kupiansk (Kharkiv oblast) in February. Despite tactical losses in these areas, Russia has continued to make gains and consolidate its positions elsewhere, particularly in Donetsk oblast, and it remains unclear how long Ukrainian forces will retain the initiative in this section of the front line. We continue to assess that Russian forces broadly retain the initiative in all other sectors of the front line.
• DONETSK: Russian forces are consolidating their control over Pokrovsk (Donetsk oblast), are pushing westwards and are possibly preparing for renewed assaults to the north in the direction of Dobropillia (Donetsk oblast). Russian forces likely completed the capture of Pokrovsk by late January, while open-source intelligence (OSINT) has confirmed that Russian forces have conducted offensive operations in Hryshne, located immediately to the north-west of Pokovsk, in recent weeks. Most of Myrnohrad, located directly to the east of Pokrovsk, has fallen under Russian control, though small areas in the western part of the settlement remain contested; Ukrainian forces continue to claim that fighting is ongoing in this grey zone. Meanwhile, a prominent Ukrainian military observer has reported the resumption of Russian offensive activity in the direction of Dobropillia, located to the north-west of Pokrovsk. Last year, Russia launched an incursion towards Dobropilla, which was later repelled by Ukrainian forces. We assess that once Russia has completed the full capture of Myrnohrad and consolidated its advances in the Pokrovsk area, it will likely prioritise operations towards Dobropillia.
• STRIKES: A fibre-optic drone struck Kharkiv for the first time this week. Given it is located around 12 miles (20km) from Russian-occupied territory, this underscores the extended range of such systems. Unlike radio-frequency drones, fibre-optic-controlled unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) are resistant to electronic jamming; counter-measures remain limited and mostly involve kinetic methods. Previously, Russian fibre-optic drones were assessed to have a range of approximately six to 12 miles (10-20km). However, reports from 2025 indicated that Russia has extended the range of these drones, which can now reportedly reach targets up to 31-37 miles (50-60km) away. Given the difficulty of intercepting such drones, their expanded range will significantly enhance the depth of Russian front-line strikes, facilitating the targeting of Ukrainian logistical nodes and placing more urban environments within the ‘grey zone’ dominated by drones.
• TRUCE: On 27 February, a temporary local ceasefire began at the Russian-occupied Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant (ZNPP; Zaporizhzhia oblast). The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), which brokered the ceasefire, said the truce was agreed to facilitate the restoration of the offsite back-up power supply to the ZNPP. The IAEA did not specify how long the ceasefire would last, but the Russian-installed communications director at the facility said on 2 March that the truce was holding on its fourth day. However, earlier on 3 March, the Russian-appointed director of the ZNPP accused Ukraine of ‘indirectly’ violating the ceasefire by shelling the nearby city of Enerhodar (Zaporizhzhia oblast). The ZNPP does not currently produce electricity (and is in cold shutdown), but needs external power to cool nuclear fuel to prevent a meltdown. Repairs will therefore not improve Ukraine’s energy security in the near term. While the relatively stable truce underscores that temporary, localised ceasefires are possible, the likelihood of a comprehensive ceasefire across the frontline lasting more than several days will remain low in the coming weeks and months.

POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS

• NEGOTIATIONS: The US’ preoccupation with the Middle East region amid the ongoing Israel-US-Iran war (beginning on 28 February) will likely divert the Trump administration’s attention away from the Russo-Ukrainian war in the coming weeks. On 2 March, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stated that another round of trilateral negotiations was tentatively due to take place on 5 and 6 March in Abu Dhabi (UAE). Although Zelensky stated that the meeting has not been cancelled, Kyiv cannot confirm whether the meeting will take place there due to hostilities in the Middle East region. Similarly, Kremlin press secretary Dmitry Peskov stated earlier on 3 March that there is no confirmation yet regarding the time and venue of the next round of negotiations. We assess that Istanbul (Turkey) and Geneva (Switzerland), where the last trilateral talks were held, are possible alternative venues if negotiations take place in the coming days.
• NEGOTIATIONS: Even if talks do occur in the near term, the Israel-US-Iran war’s continuation or escalation will lower the likelihood and frequency of talks over the coming weeks. Since late January, trilateral negotiations and other forms of diplomatic engagement have taken place on a relatively regular basis. While such talks have not yet yielded major tangible results, a breakdown of negotiations will limit the (already low) likelihood of a breakthrough towards ending the war in the coming months. Furthermore, prolonged hostilities in the Middle East will realistically render the US less willing (or able) to commit senior officials to negotiations, particularly those focused on defence and security such as US Secretary of the Army Dan Driscoll (who has played a prominent role in negotiations thus far). Ultimately, redirected US attention away from Ukraine will likely benefit Russia over the coming weeks, as it seeks to advance further on the battlefield and exhaust Ukrainian resources (see FORECAST below).
• NEGOTIATIONS: On 28 February, Bloomberg reported that Russia is increasingly considering abandoning the peace process unless Ukraine is willing to make significant territorial concessions. According to an unspecified insider close to the Kremlin, Russia is prepared to sign a draft memorandum of a peace deal if Ukraine agrees to withdraw from Ukraine-controlled parts of Donetsk oblast. A summit between Zelensky and Russian President Vladimir Putin would then allegedly follow, after which both countries’ troops would ‘pull back’, though specifics remain unclear. Under this reported proposal, Russia would be ready to withdraw from Dnipropetrovsk, Kharkiv and Sumy oblasts; it would also not demand more territory in Kherson and Zaporizhzhia oblasts (likely freezing the frontlines there). Allegedly, Russia would also accept the US-led monitoring of a ceasefire, but would reject the deployment of foreign troops to Ukraine; the Russian authorities would also soften previous demands to limit the size of Ukraine’s post-war armed forces.
• NEGOTIATIONS: While we cannot confirm the report, if true, it is highly unlikely to represent a significant shift in Russia’s ultimate long-term war objectives, which have largely remained unchanged since the beginning of its full-scale invasion in February 2022. Zelensky has repeatedly stated that any peace deal should be put to a referendum in Ukraine, with polling consistently showing that the majority of Ukrainian society is against withdrawing from the Donbas region (which comprises Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts). Thus, if Ukraine were to sign a draft peace deal with these conditions (which is highly unlikely in the short term), it remains unclear whether the Ukrainian population would subsequently accept them in a referendum. Russia would highly likely consider opposition in a vote as a confirmation that Ukraine does not want ‘peace’, using it to justify its continuation of the war.
• NEGOTIATIONS: We assess that as the US’ attention is now likely diverted, Russia highly likely perceives that this is not the time to soften its demands. There have been numerous reports in recent weeks that the Trump administration is keen to reach a peace deal by spring or early summer of 2026, which we assess remains an unlikely prospect. On 25 February, a report by Axios further detailed the US’ eagerness for a quick end to the war, reporting of a telephone call between Zelensky and Trump. In that call, Trump reportedly stated that he would like the war to conclude ‘in a month’. We have repeatedly assessed that the US is more likely to pressure Ukraine, rather than Russia, to accept a peace deal given its reliance on Western military aid and other forms of support. As such, a prolonged war in the Middle East will increase the likelihood of the US ramping up pressure on Ukraine over the coming weeks, given the US’ likely desire to end this war quickly to facilitate a focus elsewhere. (For further analysis on how the ongoing Middle East conflict will shape the Russo-Ukrainian war, see FORECAST below).

FORECAST

AIR DEFENCES: The ongoing Israel-US-Iran war will increase the likelihood of shortages of critical US equipment for Ukraine both in the short and long term; this will further undermine Ukraine’s air defence situation. On 2 March, Zelensky warned that a prolonged confrontation between Iran, Israel and the US could result in a shortage of vital air defence interceptors, particularly those used by Patriot systems (PAC-3). Although Ukraine possesses a limited number of such systems, they remain critical for the country’s air defence network, especially for countering ballistic missiles, which are Russia’s most lethal aerial threats.

The successive waves of drone and missile attacks Iran has launched in recent days are likely placing a growing strain on the air defence resources of the US and its regional partners. According to an internal analysis cited by Bloomberg News, Qatar’s stock of Patriot interceptors could be exhausted within four days at its current rate of use. While we are unable to confirm these reports, we assess that a conflict that lasts several weeks will likely reduce the stockpiles of air defence interceptors down to critical levels. This will increase global demand for resupply (which was already high before the beginning of the ongoing Middle East conflict), including for other US regional partners affected by Iran’s strikes. In this scenario, the US’ needs not only to resupply its regional allies but also to maintain reserve stocks (for a potential confrontation with China in the coming years) will place additional pressures on production rates, which are too small to offset the expected surge in orders.

Despite the reported increase in Patriot interceptor production, the US is highly likely to prioritise the resupply of its Middle Eastern regional partners over Ukraine. In January, US defence contractor Lockheed Martin announced that it had reached an agreement with the US Department of War to raise the annual production of its PAC-3 missile interceptors to 2,000 units per year. Over the past two years, the firm has reportedly increased output by around 60%; it is expected to reach the new production target by the end of 2030. Given these systems’ current expenditure rates in the Middle East, we assess that the US will prioritise resupply to that region over deliveries to Ukraine and its European partners, particularly if stockpiles fall to critical levels as a result of a protracted conflict with Iran. This, in turn, would constrain EU partners’ ability to supply Ukraine with additional PAC-3 packages indirectly by drawing down their own stocks and transferring them to Ukraine; numerous European countries began doing so over the past year since US arms transfers to Ukraine ceased in early 2025.

Ultimately, our assessment remains that Ukraine is highly likely to face a critical shortage of air defence systems in the coming months. As a result, Ukraine will highly likely become increasingly vulnerable to ballistic missile strikes, the frequency of which has increased markedly in recent months (see Sibylline Ukraine Monthly – 26 February 2026). Meanwhile, Russia is highly likely to maintain its current saturation strike strategy, relying on large numbers of cost-effective drones and cheap cruise missiles to force Ukraine to expend its limited stocks of PAC-3 interceptors and other high-value Western-supplied systems.

Given that Russia’s strategy has long aimed to undermine the cost-effectiveness of air defence systems reliant on expensive interceptors, the longer the war in the Middle East lasts, the more that it will reinforce the likely effectiveness of the Kremlin’s attritional strategy. The ongoing Middle East war likely illustrates the asymmetrical advantages that cheap one-way attack drones and large quantities of ballistic missiles have over high-cost missile air defence systems during a protracted war. This is a dynamic Ukraine has been facing for years, as it has had to supplement its afore-mentioned air defence systems with lower-cost ones. However, the effectiveness of these supplemental systems remains limited; US-provided Patriot air defence systems are the only capability Ukraine retains that can reliably intercept ballistic missiles. Consequently, depending on how long the Israel-US-Iran war lasts and on Iran’s ballistic missile stocks, severe global shortages of interceptors in the coming years will further undermine Ukraine’s already-strained air defence capabilities.

Feb 27.

• Ukraine: IMF loan will moderately alleviate short-term budgetary strain. On 26 February, the IMF signed a USD 8.1bn loan programme for Ukraine, with a first tranche of USD 1.5 bn to be disbursed immediately. The IMF relaxed its earlier terms, which required Kyiv to implement unpopular tax reforms to unlock the funding. Nevertheless, Ukraine is expected to pass such reforms to receive future tranches. Meanwhile, the final approval of the EU’s separate EUR 90 bn (USD 106 bn) loan to Ukraine has been delayed due to Hungary’s blocking. Securing the funding is essential for Ukraine’s long-term economic stability and, more crucially, its ability to finance its war effort. Ultimately, we assess that the loan will likely be approved either after a compromise with Hungary, or via a legal route that the European Commission (EC) is currently exploring to bypass Hungary’s veto. However, the ongoing dispute will possibly delay the release of the EU loan’s first tranche, which was initially estimated for April. In the meantime, we assess that the disbursement of the IMF loan’s first tranche will moderately ease Ukraine’s budgetary pressures and funding gaps.
• Russia-US: Sanctions pressure will unlikely push Russia to end Ukraine war in coming months. On 26 February, citing unspecified people familiar with the matter, Reuters reported that the US is stalling the sale of international assets belonging to Russian oil major Lukoil, in order to pressure Russia in peace negotiations. On the same day, the US Treasury Department’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) extended the deadline for deals to be completed to 1 April; it was previously set for 28 February. This marks the third such extension since the US sanctioned Lukoil alongside Russia’s largest oil producer Rosneft in October 2025. An unspecified US official stated that any deal will require that Lukoil does not benefit from the sale upfront, with all proceeds to be deposited in a frozen account subject to US jurisdiction. While the Reuters report and the deadline extension indicate limited US pressure to push Russia to negotiate in good faith, we assess that this is unlikely to represent a major policy shift in President Donald Trump’s administration. Pressure on Moscow is unlikely to grow substantially over the coming weeks, with sanctions-related coercion unlikely to alter the Kremlin’s calculus on continuing the Russo-Ukrainian war in the medium term at least.  (Source: Sibylline)

 

03 Mar 26. Cuashub.com said today that Ukrainian interceptors have downed over 1,500 Russian drones in February aloneOleksandr Syrskyi, Commander-in-Chief of Ukraine’s Armed Forces, said Ukrainian interceptor drones destroyed more than 1,500 Russian drones in February, demonstrating the effectiveness of Ukraine’s increasing reliance on drone-based air defense.

Speaking on March 3, Syrskyi said that despite significantly worsening weather conditions and ongoing weapons shortages, the effectiveness of Ukraine’s small air defense units did not decline.

According to the general, Ukrainian interceptor drones carried out approximately 6,300 sorties over the past month, destroying more than 1,500 Russian UAVs of various types launched against Ukrainian territory.

Syrskyi emphasized that he is personally monitoring the implementation of projects aimed at strengthening anti-drone protection, particularly efforts to counter Russian Shahed-type strike UAVs. He said the key role in this effort is increasingly shifting to interceptor drones.

In Kyiv and the surrounding region during February, interceptor drones accounted for more than 70 percent of successful engagements against Shahed drones, he noted.

The Commander-in-Chief also said he received reports on the progress of an anti-drone protection project covering important administrative centers across Ukrainian regions, as well as updates on the modernization of army aviation helicopters to improve their ability to counter Shahed drones.

He added that Ukrainian forces are adapting to new Russian tactics involving the use of Shahed-type drones flying at extremely low altitudes. Work is ongoing with manufacturers to improve the effectiveness of various interceptor drone models.

Syrskyi said that following the meeting, he issued instructions to relevant military command bodies, including newly established structures.

Earlier, Volodymyr Zelenskyy said Ukraine’s interceptor drones had achieved a 68 percent success rate in neutralizing Russian Shahed drones. In an October 2025 interview, Zelenskyy described the interceptors as the most cost-effective method for countering the Iranian-made UAVs used by Russian forces.

He noted that a single interceptor drone costs between $3,000 and $5,000, while the Shahed drones they destroy are valued at up to $150,000. According to Zelenskyy, that economic balance makes the approach favorable for Ukraine, although significant additional funding is required to scale production.

Ukrainian interceptors have downed over 1,500 Russian drones in February alone – cuashub.com (Source: https://cuashub.com/

 

02 Mar 26. €500,000 was pledged in under 60 seconds in Latvia on February 24th, the 4-year anniversary of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, to accelerate the delivery of frontline evacuation systems for Ukrainian units operating under sustained artillery and drone threat. The rapid commitments were made during an emergency mobilisation at the Latvian National Opera in Riga. By the end of the evening, total funds raised reached €1.45 m for battlefield evacuation and survivability systems, marking the largest civilian donation initiative in Latvia since it regained independence in 1991.

While NATO medical doctrine emphasises the “golden hour” principle – rapid evacuation and stabilisation within the first hour after injury – frontline conditions in Ukraine frequently make this unattainable. Persistent artillery fire, ISR drone surveillance, and damaged infrastructure can extend evacuation routes to 20 kilometres or more. In some sectors, extraction times can reach 24 hours or longer.

The raised funds will be used to procure unmanned ground evacuation systems capable of operating under fire, dedicated evacuation transport vehicles, secure battlefield communication systems, mobile power supply solutions, and night-vision equipment for frontline medics.

Several of the unmanned systems and related technologies are manufactured in Latvia by defence-technology firms, including Natrix, Origin Robotics, and Frankenburg Technologies. Organisers said the equipment will be supplied through established channels supporting Ukrainian units engaged in active operations.

 

Latvia, a NATO member state on the alliance’s eastern flank bordering Russia, has ranked among the highest per capita supporters of Ukraine since 2022. Jānis Sārts, Director of the NATO Strategic Communications Centre of Excellence in Riga, speaking independently at the event, said survivability and sustainment are increasingly decisive in protracted, high-intensity warfare: “In modern drone-dominated battlefields, evacuation capability directly affects force endurance,” Sārts said. “Survivability is a strategic variable.”

The mobilisation was organised by the foundation Uzņēmēji mieram (“Entrepreneurs for Peace”) – a fundraising initiative to support the people of Ukraine, spearheaded by Latvian entrepreneurs – in cooperation with McCann Riga & White Label. The emergency session preceded a national charity concert attended by political and business leaders, including Latvia’s president.

 

23 Feb 26. “Aerlijn’s Nightmare V3 high speed C-UAS interceptor now available in Europe.” Ukraine’s Defence Tech Community in a Linkedin story reports that Dutch company Aerlijn has introduced its Nightmare V3 high-speed interceptor to the European market, developed in collaboration with Ukrainian Project ODIN.

“Designed to neutralise Class-1 strike drones, Nightmare V3 reaches speeds of 280–300 km/h and features a thermal LWIR camera, automatic target acquisition up to 800m, a 10 km tactical range, and an operational ceiling above 6 km,” said the report. “The Dutch company has successfully intercepted Shahed, Gerbera, and Lancet drones. The system has been used and recommended by Ukrainian brigades and is now scaling production in Europe.”

For more information: https://www.linkedin.com/company/defence-tech-community/posts/?feedView=all

https://aerlijn.nl/ (Source: www.unmannedairspace.info)

 

02 Mar 26. Cuashub.com said today that Zelenskyy says Ukraine ready to share expertise countering Shahed drones. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy said Kyiv is prepared to share its operational experience and technologies for countering Iranian-made drones with international partners, but stressed that protecting Ukrainian cities remains his government’s primary focus.

Zelenskyy addressed reports that Ukrainian specialists could assist allied nations facing similar drone threats. While expressing openness to cooperation, he emphasized that Ukraine’s immediate priority is defending its own territory against ongoing attacks.

“My priority is clear. This morning I held a conference call, and again we discussed how to better protect Kharkiv, Sumy, Poltava, Dnipro, Kryvyi Rih, Kyiv. We have many different challenges,” Zelenskyy said in February.

Ukraine has faced sustained drone and missile strikes since the start of Russia’s full-scale invasion, including repeated attacks involving Iranian-designed loitering munitions used by Russian forces. Ukrainian air defense units have developed tactics and technical adaptations to counter these systems over the course of the conflict.

Zelenskyy’s comments followed remarks by British Prime Minister Keir Starmer indicating that the United Kingdom could engage Ukrainian experts to assist partners in intercepting Iranian-designed drones. However, Zelenskyy said he has not received any formal requests.

“I haven’t received any direct requests, neither from Great Britain, nor from any of the partners, nor from representatives of the Middle East,” he told journalists.

The president noted that military cooperation has evolved since the early stages of the invasion. Initially, Ukrainian personnel traveled to partner countries including Germany, the United Kingdom and the United States for training. Now, he said, Ukraine has accumulated substantial battlefield experience and operational data on drone warfare, allowing for a more reciprocal exchange.

“We have very experienced people; we are ready to share information. Let our partners come to us, we can continue this,” Zelenskyy said, adding that Ukraine is open to sharing both expertise and relevant technologies with supporting nations.

His remarks carry additional weight amid heightened regional tensions following reports that an Iranian one-way attack drone struck the United Kingdom’s RAF Akrotiri base in Cyprus. According to British media reports, the incident caused minor damage and no casualties but prompted precautionary measures, including the relocation of military families. Unconfirmed accounts suggested the drone may have been a Shahed-136 type, similar to those used in Ukraine.

Zelenskyy reiterated that while Ukraine is willing to assist partners, its first obligation is to safeguard its own population and infrastructure against continued aerial threats.

 

04 Mar 26. NUBURU, Inc. (NYSE American: BURU), a dual-use Defense & Security platform company focused on non-kinetic effects, directed-energy technologies, electronic warfare and software-orchestrated defense systems, today announced that its wholly owned subsidiary, Nuburu Defense LLC, together with Tekne S.p.A. (“Tekne”), has executed a strategic cooperation agreement with Engineering Bureau “BERYL” LLC, an established Ukrainian industrial company currently producing and supplying vehicles to Ukrainian military forces, to support structured deployment of the TEKNE GRAELION platform within Ukraine.

Tekne has already delivered multiple GRAELION vehicles in Ukraine to the State Emergency Service of Ukraine for demining operations. These vehicles are operational in-country. No additional deliveries are contemplated under that civil-emergency framework.

The present initiative advances deployment of the existing military configuration of the GRAELION platform — previously commercialized in Italy — and now enters the formal Ukrainian military qualification pathway.

As part of the execution structure, Nuburu Defense and Tekne will establish a joint representative office in Kyiv, serving as the program’s operational, industrial and compliance coordination hub.

Industrial Framework Anchored by Proven Assets

The deployment platform is anchored by:

• Operational GRAELION units already active in Ukraine.
• An established military configuration with prior commercialization track record.
• Beryl’s in-country industrial footprint and experience supplying Ukrainian armed forces.

The program roadmap centers on qualification, structured deployment and coordinated industrial scaling — not platform development.

Defined Three-Phase Revenue Scaling Model

The agreement establishes a phased industrial expansion pathway:

• Phase 1 (0–12 months): €5–10m annual revenue target.
• Phase 2: €30–50m annual revenue target.
• Phase 3 (Steady-State): €80–120m annual revenue target.

These benchmarks represent structured annual program volume targets under the agreement’s KPI framework, establishing a defined industrial scaling trajectory aligned with Ukrainian qualification milestones and phased deployment protocols.

The cooperation agreement governs governance, exclusivity and compliance matters. Technical specifications, pricing, volumes and commercial terms remain subject to definitive agreements.

Structured Economic Participation for NUBURU

NUBURU participates structurally through:

• Joint pricing and margin approval authority.
• Program governance and coordinated capital participation.
• Potential integration of higher-margin non-kinetic and software subsystems.
• A 2.9% minority equity position in Tekne, with potential — subject to Italian Government authorization under Golden Power regulation — to increase ownership up to 70% in connection with a potential controlling-interest transaction, including conversion of shareholder loan capital.

This framework positions NUBURU for scalable economic participation aligned with program expansion, subject to regulatory approvals and execution milestones.

Governance, Compliance and Industrial Discipline

Tekne retains sole design authority and IP ownership of the GRAELION platform. All binding commercial proposals require joint technical and financial approval.

The framework includes:

• ITAR, EAR and EU export-control compliance protocols.
• Sanctions-monitoring safeguards.
• Conditional two-year exclusivity for Ukrainian Ministry of Defense participation.

The Kyiv office will oversee qualification progress, pricing discipline, regulatory compliance and industrial coordination.

Management Commentary

Alessandro Zamboni, Executive Chairman and Co-CEO of NUBURU, stated: “The presence of operational GRAELION units in Ukraine and the availability of a commercialized military configuration provide a defined execution baseline. The structured revenue roadmap toward €80–120 m steady-state reflects disciplined industrial scaling anchored in proven assets.”

Dario Barisoni, Co-CEO of NUBURU and CEO of Nuburu Defense LLC, added: “This initiative centers on qualification, structured deployment and industrial oversight. The Kyiv office establishes coordinated regulatory and operational alignment as the program advances through Ukrainian military approval procedures.”

Ambrogio D’Arrezzo, CEO of Tekne S.p.A., commented: “GRAELION is already operational in Ukraine for demining activities and has a commercialized military configuration in Italy. The program now advances through formal military qualification within a structured industrial framework.

(Source: BUSINESS WIRE)

 

03 Mar 26. British–Ukrainian Company Trypillian Launches VORON-10 and BOMBER-15 Combat Drones. The British–Ukrainian company Trypillian has launched its new combat drones, VORON-10 and BOMBER-15.

According to the manufacturer, the drones were designed to meet the realities of modern warfare, where heavy use of electronic warfare systems (EW), operations in high-risk “kill zones,” and the need for fast, on-site maintenance at frontline positions have become standard practice.

At Trypillian, the main advantage of these systems is described as the combination of combat-proven operational methods with high Western quality standards.

The VORON-10 drone by Trypillian

The VORON-10 tactical strike quadcopter is designed for operations in high-risk areas.

It is intended to meet unit-level needs for destroying armored vehicles, enemy personnel, and electronic warfare (EW) systems at the tactical depth of the battlefield.

The VORON-10 has an effective range of 20–25 km, a payload of 1.5–3 kg, and a modular design that allows for rapid repairs or component replacement in the field. The drone is equipped with a communication system resistant to active jamming by electronic warfare (EW) systems.

BOMBER-15 Strike UAV

The BOMBER-15 drone by Trypillian

The BOMBER-15 unmanned aerial vehicle is designed for precision strikes against targets in the enemy’s near rear.

It maintains controllability throughout its entire flight range. Its deployment makes it possible to hit logistics hubs, field ammunition depots, and firing positions beyond direct line of sight.

The strike range against enemy targets using the BOMBER-15 reaches up to 65 km (depending on the power configuration), with a payload capacity of up to 6 kg.

The drone’s architecture allows for rapid replacement of the warhead and integration of additional equipment – such as signal relays or night vision systems – tailored to specific mission requirements. (Source: UAS VISION/MILITARNYI)

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Founded in 1987, Exensor Technology is a world leading supplier of Networked Unattended Ground Sensor (UGS) Systems providing tailored sensor solutions to customers all over the world. From our Headquarters in Lund Sweden, our centre of expertise in Network Communications at Communications Research Lab in Kalmar Sweden and our Production site outside of Basingstoke UK, we design, develop and produce latest state of the art rugged UGS solutions at the highest quality to meet the most stringent demands of our customers. Our systems are in operation and used in a wide number of Military as well as Homeland Security applications worldwide. The modular nature of the system ensures any external sensor can be integrated, providing the user with a fully meshed “silent” network capable of self-healing. Exensor Technology will continue to lead the field in UGS technology, provide our customers with excellent customer service and a bespoke package able to meet every need.

A CNIM Group Company

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Sponsored by Bertin Exensor

www.exensor.com

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05 Mar 26. Air Force, Space Force Ready for All Warfighting Challenges. The Air Force’s lethality depends on the professionalism of airmen and the capability of their equipment, said Air Force Gen. John D. Lamontagne, Air Force vice chief of staff, who testified yesterday at a Senate Armed Services Committee hearing on joint force readiness in Washington.

“Airmen are our most precious resource. The active-duty, Air National Guard, reserve and civilian workforce are why the United States Air Force is effective at a moment’s notice,” Lamontagne said.

The Air Force updated its fitness policy to push airmen to new levels and ensure they are ready to stand shoulder to shoulder with its joint partners on the toughest battlefields, the general said.

The service is improving airmen’s quality of life by updating dormitories and child development care centers.

“We strive to make the Air Force an unmatched place to serve,” Lamontagne said, adding that recruiting goals are being met and retention numbers are strong.

The Air Force is increasing aircraft availability, which allows aviators to get the repetitions they need to build competence. The service is also recapitalizing its ground-based strategic deterrent, fighter, bomber and tanker aircraft, as well as the command-and-control architectures that bring them together, the general said.

At the tactical level, airmen are practicing agile combat employment and preparing to fight in exercises like Bamboo Eagle. Last summer, the Air Force deployed more than 400 aircraft and 15,000 personnel across 50 locations in the Pacific region, Lamontagne said.

Space Force Gen. Shawn N. Bratton, vice chief of space operations, said his service, along with commercial partners, executed 170 launches this year.

A new radar has upgraded optical surveillance systems to track adversarial activity on orbit better, he said, noting that additional systems will increase domain awareness.

Regarding readiness, Bratton said guardians must be ready at any time for any threat across the entire spectrum of conflict. They participated in a variety of exercises designed to ensure space superiority, and officer training courses now include training in space, cyber, intelligence and acquisitions.

“We will need to double in size in the coming years to meet identified operational needs, as well as significantly increase our training facilities. Even as we prepare for current warfighting challenges, we are aggressively looking ahead at capability requirements for the future force,” he said. (Source: U.S. DoD)

 

05 Mar 26.  Vice Chiefs Testify on Joint Force Readiness, Improvements. The vice chiefs of staff for the armed services testified yesterday during a Senate Armed Services Committee hearing in Washington on the current readiness of the joint force.

Army Gen. Christopher C. LaNeve said his primary focus is on making soldiers “more lethal and ready to fight and win,” which, in addition to acquisition reform, includes infrastructure initiatives and better nutrition and fitness programs for troops.

Navy Adm. James W. Kilby affirmed the Navy’s readiness, which was tested through a variety of global operations over the past year, and its focus on improving sailor quality of life.

Marine Corps Gen. Bradford J. Gering told the committee that the Corps is addressing amphibious ship availability challenges in partnership with the Navy, as well as taking concrete steps to improve recruiting, retention and fiscal accountability.

Air Force Gen. John D. Lamontagne said the service is investing in airmen, its “most precious resource,” and quality of life, as well as focusing on its primary mission to “fix and fly aircraft.”

Space Force Gen. Shawn N. Bratton noted that guardians are deployed globally, in harm’s way, delivering “unmatched combat capability from space” in support of combatant commanders.m(Source: U.S. DoD)

 

05 Mar 26. Army Vice Chief Says Department Ready to Meet Threats Worldwid.

Every decision begins and ends with ensuring soldiers are ready to fight and win when called upon, said Army Gen. Christopher C. LaNeve, Army vice chief of staff, who, along with other service leaders, testified yesterday at a Senate Armed Services Committee hearing on joint force readiness.

Today, more than 108,000 soldiers are deployed or forward-postured across 160 countries, securing America’s interests in the Western Hemisphere, deterring aggression in the Indo-Pacific and responding to threats worldwide, he said.

Turning to regional specifics, he added, “In the Middle East, our soldiers are operating in a complex and dangerous environment, amid active conflict with Iran and its proxies. They’re defending U.S. forces and partners, intercepting missiles and drones, and protecting critical infrastructure.”

Supporting these efforts, sustainment formations are moving fuel, munitions and medical support across the theater, while command posts are integrating joint fires and intelligence to ensure rapid response to evolving threats in the U.S. Central Command area of responsibility, the general said.

“Brave Americans have been killed and wounded in the line of duty. Their loss is felt across our formations and in communities across this nation. To their families, we extend our deepest condolences and our enduring support,” he said.

Shifting back to organizational structure, the department consolidated Army North and South in the Western Hemisphere into a single, unified headquarters responsible for homeland defense, while retaining the capacity to generate and deploy forces globally in response to crisis, LaNeve said.

In the Indo-Pacific, the Army maintains 91,000 troops and has committed $1.3 billion to the Pacific deterrence initiative, he said.

At home, soldiers at training centers solve complex problems and test the latest systems, he said.

The Army has restructured its acquisition processes to reduce the time between field experience and program decisions from years to months, the general said, citing several ground and aviation prototypes.

“After 36 years, I’ve never seen a unit readiness determined by a depot or its equipment alone. What I have seen repeatedly is how we treat our soldiers shapes whether we retain the experienced ones and whether the force we’re building reflects the standards we claim to uphold,” LaNeve said, adding the service is surpassing recruiting goals. (Source: U.S. DoD)

 

05 Mar 26. Marine Corps Improving Amphibious Warfare Ship Availability, Says Defense Leader. The Marine Corps is the nation’s global response force, said Marine Corps Gen. Bradford J. Gering, assistant commandant of the Marine Corps, who, along with other service leaders, testified yesterday at a Senate Armed Services Committee hearing in Washington on joint force readiness.

The Marine Corps’ traditional role as a crisis response force is embodied by the amphibious ready group and Marine expeditionary unit, he said.

“This sea-based capability provides our nation with decision space and options, changes the behavior of bad actors and delivers swift and decisive action when required,” Gering said.

These forces deploy from the East and West Coasts, along with one based in Japan.

“These forward deployed forces provide a continuous presence, enable the joint force and contribute to deterrence with allies and partners,” he added, noting that in partnership with the Navy, the Marine Corps is working to improve the availability of amphibious warfare ships, and significant progress has been made with the procurement of medium landing ships.

“We need to continue to move forward with a sense of urgency in … amphibious warship readiness availability and littoral mobility. Despite these challenges, your Marines are ready,” the general said.

Once again, the Marine Corps met its recruiting mission last fiscal year and is on track to meet it again this year.

Taking care of Marines and their families is a warfighting necessity that directly impacts readiness and retention, Gering said, noting that new barracks are under construction and child care incentives are underway.

“Finally, I’m proud to report to you that for a third consecutive year, your Marine Corps has earned a clean audit opinion,” he said. “This is a direct reflection [of] our commitment to fiscal stewardship and demonstrates our accountability for every taxpayer dollar.” (Source: U.S. DoD)

————————————————————————————————————-

Founded in 1987, Exensor Technology is a world leading supplier of Networked Unattended Ground Sensor (UGS) Systems providing tailored sensor solutions to customers all over the world. From our Headquarters in Lund Sweden, our centre of expertise in Network Communications at Communications Research Lab in Kalmar Sweden and our Production site outside of Basingstoke UK, we design, develop and produce latest state of the art rugged UGS solutions at the highest quality to meet the most stringent demands of our customers. Our systems are in operation and used in a wide number of Military as well as Homeland Security applications worldwide. The modular nature of the system ensures any external sensor can be integrated, providing the user with a fully meshed “silent” network capable of self-healing. Exensor Technology will continue to lead the field in UGS technology, provide our customers with excellent customer service and a bespoke package able to meet every need.

A CNIM Group Company

——————————————————————————————————————–

Sponsored by Bertin Exensor

 

www.exensor.com

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04 Mar 26. “NATO’s 1.5% resilience and security-related spending target creates an opportunity to strengthen collective defence [but]…without a clear governance and accounting approach, the 1.5% risks inefficiency, duplication and politicised re-labelling of domestic spending.”

This is according to Sustainability for Resilience: Meeting NATO’s 1.5% Target, a new research report by RUSI Fellows Dan Marks and Ed Arnold. The report examines how NATO allies can meet their commitment, agreed at the 2025 NATO Summit in The Hague, to spend 1.5% of GDP on resilience and security-related measures alongside 3.5% on core defence by 2035.

It says that the absence of a standardised definition of eligible spending risks undermining accountability, coherence and value for money at a time of mounting fiscal pressure across Europe, and that without effective governance, the 1.5% target could fail to deliver tangible security gains.

The paper proposes a framework to align resilience investments with NATO’s three core tasks and seven Baseline Requirements for national resilience. The report says that resilience is a domestic policy concern and also a prerequisite for credible deterrence, particularly in the context of Russia’s war against Ukraine and the intensification of hybrid threats across Europe.

The study highlights critical infrastructure vulnerabilities – including rail bottlenecks, constrained electricity interconnections, concentrated gas supply nodes and fragile mineral supply chains – that could hinder reinforcement and industrial surge in a high-intensity conflict. It says that targeted investment in rail, electricity grid reinforcement, decentralised energy systems, dual-use technologies and strategic nature restoration can simultaneously enhance deterrence, reduce emissions and bolster economic resilience.

Key Findings

• The current definition of the 1.5% target lacks clarity and governance. The report warns that “the definition of what counts towards the 1.5% is opaque, with greater clarity expected in 2026 to ensure standardisation, accountability and transparency.”
• Energy system transformation can strengthen resilience to attack. Drawing on the Ukrainian experience, the authors argue that “the strategic deployment of clean energy technologies, grid infrastructure and grid management technologies might deter attacks on energy infrastructure and improve resilience.”
• Infrastructure underpins both deterrence and societal resilience. It states: “Infrastructure determines: the speed of mobilisation, and therefore the credibility of deterrence; the ability to scale and sustain defence industrial production; the ability to supply the front with materiel and energy; and the achievement of the seven baseline requirements for societal resilience.”
• Resilience investments must be aligned to national wartime roles. The report says: “Projects should be counted where they directly support a nation’s role in collective defence or strengthen resilience against hybrid attack in line with the baseline requirements.”

Key Recommendations

• Define and standardise eligibility criteria for the 1.5% target by 2026.

To avoid duplication and re-labelling, the report recommends that “NATO and European countries need to quickly define how best to allocate, monitor and coordinate these funds while building on NATO’s existing processes and planning.”

• Require National Resilience Plans aligned with NATO defence planning.

The paper proposes that “Member states would submit National Resilience Plans outlining the investments required to fulfil their role in collective defence and meet NATO’s resilience objectives.”

• Invest in decentralised and reinforced energy systems. It says: “Adaptable, decentralised energy systems making use of renewable generation and energy storage can enhance ‘energy sovereignty’ and make grids more resilient to physical attack.”
• Prioritise dual-use infrastructure that strengthens mobility and energy security. They report says: “Greater capacity for public transport, particularly rail, is required for military mobility and credible deterrence.”

Conclusion

The report says that NATO’s new 1.5% spending commitment is both a political signal and an opportunity, but if treated as an accounting exercise, it risks becoming pro-cyclical, opaque and strategically misaligned. If anchored in a clear governance framework aligned to NATO regional defence plans and national wartime roles, it can strengthen deterrence by denial while delivering co-benefits in decarbonisation, biodiversity protection and industrial competitiveness.

By linking grid reinforcement, decentralised generation, rail expansion, supply-chain diversification and nature-based defences to measurable resilience outcomes, the report reframes sustainability as a force multiplier. In doing so, it advances a practical model for aligning civil preparedness, industrial strategy and environmental policy with collective defence in an era of systemic rivalry and climate stress.

 

04 Mar 26. EIF Commits €50m via the InvestEU Defence Equity Facility to Join Capital Fund III for European Deeptech and Dual-use

• EIF commits €50 m to Join Capital’s Fund III, supported by the InvestEU Defence Equity Facility co-funded by the European Commission
• The commitment is its largest so far in defence and is intended to provide additional private capital for strategic innovation in dual-use, defence, security and space
• Join Capital Fund III targets €235m to back dozens of early-stage, deeptech and dual-use startups building critical capabilities across Europe

The European Investment Fund (EIF), part of the EIB Group, today announces at the EIB Group Forum in Luxembourg a €50m commitment to Join Capital’s third fund as Europe moves from defence spending announcements to rebuilding industrial capability.

The commitment is the EIF’s largest to date in defence and supported by the InvestEU Defence Equity Facility, which is designed to strengthen Europe’s defence technological and industrial base by backing venture capital funds. Join Capital’s Fund III, targeting €235m, will invest in 25 early-stage deeptech startups across Europe developing technologies with critical capabilities in defence, dual-use, security and space.

“This investment, backed by the InvestEU fund, could not come at a better time, given the strategic importance attached to the fields of space, security and defence,” said EIF Chief Executive Marjut Falkstedt. “With this backing, we are confident that additional investments will follow, helping Europe in building a robust ecosystem for innovative defence solutions.”

“Innovation and disruptive technologies are crucial for EU’s defence readiness. By investing in specialist defence Venture capital funds, like Join capital, the Commission and the EIF are strengthening the financial ecosystem that nurtures and supports our defence innovators, startups and SMEs to grow and scale up in Europe.” said Commissioner Andrius Kubilius.

Join Capital has backed early-stage defence and deeptech innovators across Europe including Optics11 (Netherlands), Quadsat (Denmark), Kreios Space (Spain), Quantum Optics Jena (Germany) and 2D Photonics (Italy). These companies span fibre-optic sensing for critical infrastructure, quantum-secure communications, advanced electronic payloads, and cybersecurity.

“We back founders whose technologies create an asymmetric advantage for their customers in the military and commercial industry. Investments in such dual-use technologies have a doubling effect, they create both deterrence and economic growth for Europe,” said Jan Borgstädt, a Founding Partner at Berlin-based Join Capital.

Throughout history, defence research and development has not only enhanced security but reshaped civilian life. Technologies were born in military programmes, from satellite navigation and radar systems to semiconductors and the internet, now underpin global logistics, communications and productivity.

Join Capital Fund III is focused on ensuring the next generation of critical technologies is developed, scaled and anchored in Europe.

Background information

About the InvestEU Defence Equity Facility

The InvestEU Defence Equity Facility (DEF) is a €175m initiative, co-financed by the European Defence Fund (EDF) – a €7.3bn EU programme dedicated to defence research and development – and the European Investment Fund. This instrument, designed to stimulate the development of an ecosystem of European private funds focused on defence innovation, is expected to unlock over €500m in support of European companies. The Defence Equity Facility is a key component of the EU Defence Innovation Scheme (EUDIS), which leverages EDF resources to provide targeted support for start-ups, scale-ups and SMEs. EUDIS offers a range of initiatives, including business accelerators, matchmaking events, hackathons, challenges, and grants for disruptive technologies.

The Defence Equity Facility is deployed under the InvestEU programme, which provides the European Union with long-term funding by leveraging substantial private and public funds in support of European Union’s strategic priorities. The programme consists of three components: the InvestEU Fund, the InvestEU Advisory Hub, and the InvestEU Portal. The InvestEU Fund is deployed through implementing partners that will invest in projects using the EU budget guarantee of €26.2bn. The entire budget guarantee will back the investment projects of the implementing partners, increase their risk-bearing capacity and thus mobilise at least €372 bn in additional investment.

About the EIB Group

The European Investment Bank (ElB) Group is the financing arm of the European Union, owned by the 27 Member States, and one of the largest multilateral development banks in the world. In 2025, the EIB Group signed €100bn of new financing and advisory services for over 870 high-impact projects in eight core priorities that support EU policy objectives: climate action and the environment, digitalisation and technological innovation, security and defence, territorial cohesion, agriculture and the bioeconomy, social infrastructure, strong global partnerships and the savings and investment union. Beyond long-term loans for large infrastructures, the EIB Group crowds-in private investment for high-risk innovative projects and businesses, with a growing role in Europe’s markets for venture debt, venture capital, guarantees and securitisations.

The European Investment Fund (EIF) is the subsidiary of the EIB Group specialised in providing guarantees and equity to improve access to finance for small and medium size businesses and startups across Europe. Acting as an anchor investor, through its extensive network of partnering banks and investment funds, the EIF mobilizes private investment and nurtures the ecosystem of venture capital funds to support innovative European entrepreneurs.

About Join Capital

Join Capital is an early-stage, pan-European venture capital fund with offices in Berlin, London, and Milan. Since 2017, we’ve been backing founders whose technologies strengthen Europe’s resilience and strategic autonomy through an asymmetric technological advantage. Our focus is on deep tech across enterprise, industrial, space, and defense sectors — solutions that strengthen economies, secure critical infrastructure, and create enduring strategic advantage.

Join Capital currently invests from its second fund generation, managing over €150m in assets. Investors include NATO Innovation Fund (NIF), Isomer Capital, KfW Capital, and Cassa Depositi e Prestiti (CDP), leading funds-of-funds, and prominent family offices. To date, we’ve backed 36 portfolio companies and successfully realised five exits.

 

03 Mar 26. EIB Group Forum: New support announced to reinforce European defence and tech sovereignty.

• President Calviño opens 4th edition of EIB Group Forum bringing together European and global policymakers, business leaders and institutions
• EIB Group to expand European Tech Champions Initiative and introduce new instruments to strengthen Europe’s venture capital ecosystem, in push for speed and scale to close funding gap for EU’s tech pioneers
• EIB Group Annual Investment Report launched today shows resilience of EU firms, strong momentum in digital and green investment, and opportunities to unlock Europe’s single market and mobilise savings

The European Investment Bank (EIB) Group today opened the 4th edition of the EIB Group Forum in Luxembourg, with President Nadia Calviño announcing new financing to strengthen European security and defence and laying out a set of actions to advance the Savings and Investment Union, supporting businesses seeking to innovate, expand and compete globally. Held from 3–5 March, the Forum brings together policymakers, innovators, academics and business leaders, this year under the theme of building “A Strong Europe in a Changing World”.

In her opening speech, President Nadia Calviño underlined Europe’s strong fundamentals and the need to accelerate investment, as well as capital market integration, simplification. She stressed the importance of reinforcing Europe’s sovereignty and strengthening global partnerships was more important than ever in these turbulent times.

The EIB Group will propose to its Board – representatives of the 27 member states – the expansion  of the successful European Tech Champions Initiative (ETCI) to increase scaleup-funding in Europe, as well as  the  introduction of a pilot exit toolbox for early investors and start up founders including expanded scaleup debt, convertible instruments, acquisition finance, and support for listings on European stock markets. The plans mark a decisive step to support the Savings and Investment Union with concrete pan-European instruments complementing regulatory measures.

“These tools will help ensure that ideas, technologies and companies born in Europe can grow and thrive in Europe,” Calviño said. “Europe is a global superpower, with the willingness, capacity and the resources to lead the way into the future.”

President Calviño also said in her opening speech that the EIB Group plans to expand the successful Defence Equity Facility, through which the European Investment Fund acts as anchor investor for equity investments into European defence companies, mobilizing capital into specialized private funds. Another major investment into a pan-European venture capital fund dedicated to deep tech and defence technologies will be announced this week.

Also addressing the Forum, European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen underlined the vital contribution of the EIB Group, “We are all aware of the profound geopolitical shifts we face. And our mission is clear.  Europe must become more independent and more competitive. In this the EIB is an indispensable partner because your investments multiply opportunities and will help us to deliver on our goals “

Keynote speakers attending the Forum include European Council President Antonio Costa, European Commission Executive Vice Presidents Teresa Ribera and Raffaele Fitto, Commissioners Valdis Dombrovskis and Jessika Roswall, Eurogroup President Kyriakos Pierrakakis, Chief Executive Officer of Mistral AI, Arthur Mensch, astronaut Sławosz Uznański-Wiśniewski, actor and United Nations Development Programme Goodwill Ambassador Nikolaj Coster-Waldau, and Nobel Peace Prize laureate Oleksandra Matviichuk.

Investment Report

Among the Forum’s highlights, the flagship EIB Group Investment Report based on a survey of around 13,000 businesses across the EU, shows that European firms have proved to be resilient despite heightened uncertainty caused by geopolitical shifts and recent tariff and energy shocks. Global investors continue to view Europe as a stable, trusted market.

EU firms match US firms in digitalisation and Artificial Intelligence adoption, 90% of them continue to invest in the green transition. Such investment strengthens EU’s energy security and sovereignty as renewables reach two‑thirds of EU power capacity, cutting costs and dependence on imports.

“Investment in Europe has been resilient but needs to accelerate,” said EIB Chief Economist Debora Revoltella. “Investment growth will depend on decisive push for private investment, driven by business opportunities. In this context, leveraging the scale of the EU single market is critical. It will increase business opportunities, firms’ investment, and resilience to external shocks. EU market scale is also critical for the growth of strategic sectors and for further reinforcing the European global role.”

The Report also stresses the need to accelerate investment in grids, storage and cross-border interconnections, address emerging bottlenecks in the energy transition, and strengthen coordination in defence investment as EU governments move toward spending 5% of GDP on security and defence by 2035.

At the same time, the Report shows that removing barriers within the single market could increase firms’ investment intensity by 10%, particularly for intangible assets vital for innovation. Free‑trade agreements under negotiation could increase exports by more than 20% to partner countries.

Additional information on the latest EIB Group Investment Report is available here.

Forum Highlights

Over the next three days, participants will discuss Europe’s investment priorities and the steps needed to reinforce its competitiveness, from digital infrastructure and climate action to strategic autonomy, deeper capital markets and win-win global partnerships.

A number of new agreements and financing commitments will be announced including finance for Europe’s security and defence capabilities, energy efficiency, and tech innovation, deepening cooperation with EU partner financial institutions, clean energy projects in Africa and, and a new partnership with the World Trade Organization. The EIB Group will also launch its third Gender Action Plan, to advance gender equality and women’s economic empowerment in Europe and worldwide.

The President’s full speech is available here

Background information

EIB Group

The European Investment Bank (ElB) Group is the financing arm of the European Union, owned by the 27 Member States, and one of the largest multilateral development banks in the world. In 2025, the EIB Group signed €100bn of new financing and advisory services for over 870 high-impact projects in eight core priorities that support EU policy objectives: climate action and the environment, digitalisation and technological innovation, security and defence, territorial cohesion, agriculture and bioeconomy, social infrastructure, strong global partnerships and the savings and investment union. Beyond long-term loans for large infrastructures, the EIB Group crowds-in private investment for high-risk innovative projects and businesses, with a growing role in Europe’s markets for venture debt, venture capital, guarantees and securitisations

The European Investment Fund (EIF) is the subsidiary of the EIB specialised in providing equity, guarantees and securitisations to improve access to finance for small and medium size businesses and startups across Europe. Acting as an anchor investor, through its extensive network of partnering banks and investment funds, the EIF mobilises private investment and nurtures the ecosystem of venture capital funds to support innovative European entrepreneurs.

In 2023, the EIF launched together with six member states (France, Germany, Italy, Spain, Belgium and the Netherlands) the European Tech Champions Initiative, a fund of funds to scale-up innovative startups. This initiative has already enabled the creation of 14 European venture capital mega-funds and scaled up 40 companies, including 11 unicorns (with more than €1bn in valuation).

High-quality, up-to-date photos of the organisation’s headquarters for media use are available here.

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26 Feb 26. “Supporting the strategic deterrents of Europe’s two nuclear powers by providing the ability to disable the Russian BMD [Ballistic Missile Defence] system represents both a comparatively modest and strategically vital function for prompt strike capabilities.”  This is according to Conventional Prompt Strike in European Military Power, a new RUSI research report by Dr Sidharth Kaushal, which says enhancing Europe’s long-range precision strike capabilities is becoming critical to safeguarding the credibility of Britain and France’s nuclear deterrents.   The report says that as Russian missile defence systems, such as the A-235 and S-500, around Moscow improve, the longstanding assumption that a limited number of submarine-launched ballistic missiles from Britain’s and France’s nuclear deterrent will penetrate layered defences may no longer hold.   The paper says the European ability to defeat or suppress Russian air and missile defences around Moscow through conventional prompt strike (CPS) capabilities, using medium-range ballistic missiles (MRBMs) and hypersonic glide vehicles (HGVs), must therefore be the “irreducible minimum” mission requirement for maintaining Europe’s assured credible nuclear deterrence.  The report says that unlike the United States, Europe’s nuclear powers lack the scale of forces required to guarantee saturation of a robust, multi-layered BMD network and notes that Israel and the United States intercepted 90% of two Iranian ballistic missile salvoes of approximately 200 missiles each in 2024.  The research also finds that, beyond this critical function, factors which are driving down the cost of both building and enabling missiles could also allow them to be fielded at a scale which means that a much wider target set can be struck. Noting the growing importance of conventional prompt strike in recent conflicts, the study sets out a series of recommendations, which acknowledge both US concerns of overstretch and a two-peer nuclear challenge, as well as European budgetary constraints.

Key Findings

• The credibility of European nuclear deterrence depends on defeating Moscow’s missile defences. The report states that supporting Europe nuclear deterrence by degrading Russian BMD is an “irreducible minimum” requirement of Europe’s prompt strike capabilities and “would constitute both the most achievable and the most urgent application of European prompt strike capabilities…European policymakers would thus do well to plan against the irreducible minimum immediately.”
• Layered missile defence poses a real challenge to smaller arsenals. The report concludes that “a three-tier ballistic missile defence system can be highly effective against a small to medium-sized number of targets.”
• Prompt strike is uniquely suited to suppress hardened, defended or dynamic targets. The report says: “The qualities of speed and manoeuvrability would serve as a means of maximising probability of effect against a small but very well-defended target set”, such as Moscow’s Ballistic Missile Defences.

Key Recommendations

• Prioritise the suppression of Russian BMD around Moscow as Europe’s critical prompt strike mission. The report argues that “prioritising this mission to the exclusion of others would be especially reasonable if the costs of missiles and availability of ISR do not substantially change.” It says ensuring that Moscow’s Don-2N radar, A-235 interceptors and S-500 components can be neutralised is essential to sustaining credible nuclear deterrence.
• Develop complementary capabilities to saturate and suppress layered defences. Ballistic missiles and HGVs should be combined to increase interceptor expenditure and target key elements of the BMD. The report notes: “Ballistic missiles and HGVs should be viewed as mutually reinforcing capabilities rather than alternatives.”
• Enhance Europe’s prompt strike capabilities incrementally. The report says: “European prompt strike capabilities should be developed incrementally, beginning with the irreducible minimum mission and expanding only as costs, industrial capacity and ISR access permit.”  It warns against trying to achieve “unattainable theatre-wide strike concepts”.
• Europe can exploit changing economics. “The commercialisation of space-based ISR [Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance], advances in AI for data processing, and changes in defence industrial practices could substantially reduce the cost of sensing and effectors over the next decade. If missile costs fall and ISR becomes more available (independent of US support), the range of viable European concepts of operations expands significantly.”

Conclusion

Conventional Prompt Strike in European Military Power reframes the debate on hypersonic missiles and long-range strike in Europe. Rather than presenting CPS as a purely conventional deep-strike tool, it situates the capability within the logic of nuclear deterrence.

As Russia fields increasingly capable air and missile defence systems around Moscow, the assumption of assured penetration by smaller nuclear forces becomes less certain. In this environment, the ability to degrade or suppress those defences through conventional means becomes central to preserving deterrence stability. Prompt strike thus serves not merely as an operational enabler, but as a guarantor of strategic credibility.

The report says that without a credible pathway to defeat Moscow’s air and missile defences with prompt strike, Europe’s independent nuclear deterrents risk erosion. With carefully prioritised and incrementally developed prompt strike capabilities, however, they can remain credible even in an era of layered defences and shifting great-power dynamics.

Dr Sidharth Kaushal is a Senior Research Fellow at the Royal United Services Institute (RUSI), specialising in sea power and missile warfare. His work focuses on the operational implications of emerging military technologies. The report draws on research conducted between October and December 2025, including modelling of missile defence effectiveness, analysis of Russian primary sources, data from recent conflicts, and semi-formal interviews with analysts and industry experts. It conceptualises prompt strike as a “reconnaissance-strike complex” and assesses how missile costs and ISR access shape viable European concepts of operations.

For more information and media inquiries please email

 

26 Feb 26. Benin-Niger-Nigeria: Escalating jihadist activity elevates attack, kidnap risks in north-western Nigeria. On 16 February, Armed Conflict Location and Event Data (ACLED) reported an intensification of activity in the past year by the al-Qaeda-aligned Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM) and Islamic State – Sahel Province (ISSP) in the border region between Benin, Niger and Nigeria. The two groups’ attacks have increased by 86% in the tri-border region, while deaths have increased by 262% to over 1,000. In Nigeria, armed groups (known locally as bandits) were the largest prior security threat in north-western states; they engage in attacks, extortion and other forms of violent crime (see Sibylline Situation Update Brief – 23 January 2026). However, bandits’ motivations are primarily financial and resource-focused, in contrast to jihadist groups’ ideologically driven determination to destabilise the Nigerian state. Consequently, we assess that an expanding jihadist presence will likely evolve security threats in north-western Nigeria, increasing the risk of attacks designed to cut off supplies to towns and cities in Kebbi, Kwara, Niger and Sokoto states. Additionally, an increased jihadist presence would increase the risk of kidnappings against Western nationals in these states, with local criminals able to pass on captives and mitigate their exposure to violent rescue operations. (Source: Sibylline)

 

25 Feb 26. SA Defence budget disappointment. In spite of Presidential assurances and some ad hoc allocations, South Africa’s defence budget will shrink by R2bn next year. This is according to the 2026 Estimates of National Expenditure (ENEs) published by National Treasury on Wednesday alongside Finance Minister Enoch Godongwana’s Budget Speech. The 2025/26 defence budget (Vote 23) stands at R59bn, up from R57.9bn the year before, but will drop down to R57.6 bn in 2026/27 before increasing slightly to R59.8bn in 2027/28, and R61.7bn in 2028/29. This represents a 1.5% average growth rate, which is well below inflation and represents a decrease in real terms. This “is due to a sharp decrease in spending in the Regional Security subprogramme in the Force Employment programme because of the phased withdrawal of South African National Defence Force troops deployed in the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo through Operation Thiba,” Vote 23 read. Operation Thiba was in support of the Southern African Development Community (SADC) Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo (SAMIDRC), which was terminated in March last year. South Africa’s contribution to the United Nations mission in the DRC (MONUSCO) is also being terminated. The real term decline in the defence budget goes against promises by President and Commander-in-Chief Cyril Ramaphosa at Armed Forces Day commemorations on 21 February. Ramaphosa acknowledged the underfunding of the South African National Defence Force (SANDF) over many years and pledged additional financial allocations to turn the situation around, as well as matching resources with missions. In his speech he said funding of the SANDF has been tapering down over a number of years, but this “can no longer continue”. As a result, the military must be repositioned to make it stronger, with resources matching operational missions.

“Given the critical importance of the SANDF to our security, sovereignty and development, additional resources have been allocated from the budget”, to equip the SANDF to execute its task of defending the people of South Africa, Ramaphosa said. “This is a targeted intervention to close funding gaps, improve efficiencies and ensure our operational ambitions are matched by our resources.”

Godongwana said that R2.7 bn has been added to defence over the three-year medium term period to improve operations, including to maintain the South African Air Force’s fighter capability: defence will receive an additional R857 m in 2026/27, another R899 m in 2027/28, and R942 m in 2028/29.

“In addition, we have allocated R1 bn to the police service, and another R1 bn to the SANDF, through the CARA [Criminal Assets Recovery Account] fund for the fight against organised crime,” the Minister said.

This is in line with Ramaphosa’s State of the Nation Address announcement that the SANDF would be deployed alongside police to fight illegal mining and gangsterism in the Eastern Cape, Western Cape, and Gauteng.

Additional allocations

Some good news for the SA Air Force is that an additional R1.4 bn is allocated over the next three years in the Air Defence programme for the maintenance of the South African Air Force’s fighter capability. “These funds are expected to ensure that 12 000 hours are flown each year over the medium term, thereby strengthening the fighter fleet’s readiness for urgent internal and external deployments,” the ENEs stated. For 2024/25, just 6 210 flying hours were flown. For the SA Navy, a total of R1.6bn is allocated over the next three years for the maintenance of vessels. “The department aims to maintain the number of hours at sea at 8 000 in each year over the MTEF period to align performance with the available budget. The Maritime Combat Capability subprogramme in the Maritime Defence programme has a budget of R3.7 bn over the medium term to carry out these activities,” Vote 23 read. Funding has hampered hours at sea due to the non-availability of serviceable vessels – the SA Navy spent only 3 717 hours at sea in 2024/25, against an 8 000 hour target. During the period ahead, the Department of Defence will continue to combat maritime threats, including maritime crime and piracy, terrorism, illegal fishing, the smuggling of contraband, the illegal dumping of toxic waste, and uncontrolled migration at sea, according to the ENEs. The South African Navy plans to conduct maritime border patrols and combat piracy particularly in the Mozambique Channel through the deployment of frigate), submarines and offshore patrol vessels to keep South Africa’s maritime space safe and support the execution of the Southern African Development Community’s maritime security strategy, Vote 23 continued. Travel and subsistence funds are going to be reprioritised over the next three years from across the SANDF and allocated to the Maritime Defence programme to strengthen the maritime reaction squadron, “a specialised unit of the South African Navy responsible for providing combat-ready amphibious, diving and small-boat capabilities for peacekeeping and humanitarian operations, and for the procurement of South African Navy ammunition.” R338 m will be reprioritised. The South African Army will be getting new vehicles and technology for border safeguarding. These force multipliers are “expected to increase the range of the borderline under protection and help prevent illegal border crossings, smuggling and other activities that could compromise national security.”

“The department will also continue to support the South African Police Service to address internal security challenges, including the protection of critical government infrastructure and national key points, and operations related to illegal mining, public unrest and the 2026 local government elections. These activities are carried out through allocations amounting to R4.2 bn over the next three years in the Support to the People subprogramme in the Force Employment programme,” according to the defence vote.

SA Army personnel will benefit from an allocation of R255 m over the next three years to procure new uniforms as the SANDF rolls out its new camouflage scheme.

Compensation of employees

The spending on the compensation of employees (CoE) accounts for 65% of the defence budget, although this is likely to be higher as the SANDF consistently overspends on salaries. As a result, the 2026 ENEs stated that “To ease the pressure on the department’s personnel budget, over the next three years, it will continue to manage commuted overtime within the South African Military Health Service by ensuring that it does not exceed 30% of each employee’s total annual salary package and allow natural attrition to ensure that total personnel numbers do not exceed an average strength of 74 000.” At present, personnel headcount is 70 000. To further manage personnel costs, the department plans to exit 227 eligible personnel hired in terms of the Public Service Act (1994) by the end of 2026/27 through the government-wide early retirement programme, which allows retirement without penalties on pension benefits. The department is set to receive an additional R76.1 m in 2026/27 in its budget for transfers to households to make provision for early retirement and voluntary exit programmes. Commenting on the latest budget, Deputy Defence and Military Veterans Minister Bantu Holomisa noted Treasury’s efforts to provide additional funding through various means, but warned that “the resources provided do not even come close to the directive given by the President to spend 1.5% of GDP on Defence. It’s not only a decrease in real terms but in normal terms as well.” Defence spending is currently about .8% of GDP. Defence analyst Ricardo Teixeira noted that the current budget is a 5.14% decrease in nominal terms, and a far cry from the promised 1.5%. “At this rate, SANDF will have zero capabilities left by the end of the decade. Treasury seems to treat defence with disdain. (Source: https://www.defenceweb.co.za/)

 

24 Feb 26. New funding programme aims to strengthen the Brazilian defence industry. The Brazilian Ministry of Science, Technology and Innovation has launched a new funding effort designed to promote innovation across the local defence industrial base and reduce dependence on foreign technologies. A total of BRL300m (USD58.2m) from the National Fund for Scientific and Technological Development is to be gradually made available by the Funding Authority for Studies and Projects (Finep) of the Ministry of Science, Technology and Innovation. This funding is part of a BRL3.3bn package approved on 6 February as part of the ‘More Innovation Brazil’ initiative. The public call led by Finep seeks to achieve 50% autonomy in the production of critical defence technologies to strengthen national sovereignty. Funding will be applied to projects between technology readiness level (TRL) 3 and 8 during the project execution period, according to Finep. Projects to be supported include unmanned systems and robotics; space systems; hypersonic systems; cyber security and cyber defence; electronic warfare; biotechnology; and chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) defence; missiles and rockets; communications; radar systems; artificial intelligence; energy and storage; propulsion; energetic materials; directed energy; advanced materials; nuclear technologies; and quantum technologies. Economic sustainability, such as exports, dual-use, and substitution of imports, will also be considered. Every project must be submitted by a company in a single or consortium format arrangement that is accredited as a Strategic Defense Company (EED) by the Secretariat of Defence Products (SEPROD) of the Ministry of Defence. (Source: Janes)

 

25 Feb 26. Afghanistan-Pakistan: Border clashes underscore elevated tensions, risk of further airstrikes. On 24 February, Afghan and Pakistani forces engaged in fresh clashes in the Torkham and Tirah sectors (Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province, Pakistan) along the shared border. Both countries have accused each other of provoking the exchange, with the spokesperson for Pakistan’s prime minister accusing the Afghan Taliban authorities of initiating unprovoked fire. The spokesperson for an Afghan army corps in eastern Afghanistan stated that border forces were on patrol near the Durand Line (the de facto border) in Achin and Durbaba districts (both Nangarhar province, Afghanistan) when they came under fire. No casualties have been reported so far. The border clashes come after Pakistan conducted airstrikes in Afghanistan targeting ‘militant camps and hideouts’ in Nangarhar and Paktika provinces on 22 February, killing 18 people. The skirmishes, which follow a fragile ceasefire in October 2025, underscore elevated tensions between Islamabad and Kabul. We assess that further border exchanges are highly likely in the coming days. There is a realistic possibility of Pakistan conducting additional airstrikes inside Afghanistan, particularly in response to deadly militant attacks in Pakistan. (Source: Sibylline)

 

25 Feb 26. Cambodia-Thailand: Border exchange allegations highlight sustained fragility of ceasefire. On 24 February, Thailand’s military alleged that Cambodian troops fired a single 44 mm round from a grenade launcher at Thai troops patrolling along a barbed wire fence in Kantharalak district (Si Sa Ket province). The Thai military claimed that they returned fire to control the situation and that the Cambodian side had acted similarly twice before. No injuries were reported. Cambodia has disputed the allegations and stated that it remains committed to the ceasefire agreed in December 2025. We assess that this incident is unlikely to result in a breakdown of the ceasefire, with Thailand suggesting that it possibly occurred due to issues of unfamiliarity arising from recently rotated Cambodian troops. In the short term, we assess that both sides will likely be motivated to avoid a return to active armed hostilities. However, tensions remain high, with Cambodia accusing Thailand of encroaching on its territory. Significant exchanges of fire or casualties from allegedly freshly planted landmines would threaten the ceasefire. The risk will remain elevated until bilateral talks progress over demarcation and heavy weaponry is withdrawn from border areas. (Source: Sibylline)

 

24 Feb 26. SA NCACC inefficiency leading to loss of business – JSCD. Parliament’s Joint Standing Committee on Defence (JSCD) has raised “serious concerns” over the effectiveness of the National Conventional Arms Control Committee (NCACC) and the functionality of the Directorate for Conventional Arms Control (DCAC) in facilitating defence imports and exports, which have led to business closures and job losses. The committee made its concerns known in a statement issued on Saturday after a Friday 20 February meeting with the Aerospace, Maritime and Defence Industries Association of South Africa (AMD), which outlined the significant challenges currently facing the sector. The Co-Chairperson of the committee, Phiroane Phala, said: “It is unacceptable that the South African defence industry continues to suffer under the weight of irregular meetings by the NCACC, which make it difficult to approve applications, leading to loss of business. The fact that defence industry businesses are forced to shut down, resulting in job losses, is an indictment on the NCACC and must be resolved urgently.” The committee said its concerns arise in the context of the call by President Cyril Ramaphosa to intensify efforts to attract investment and remove barriers that impede economic growth.

“The longstanding challenges at the NCACC and the DCAC directly undermine the industry’s ability to compete in a highly competitive global environment. This not only leads to job losses, but also erodes intellectual capacity within the industry, as critical skills are lost to international competitors,” Phala emphasised.

The committee noted that inefficiencies within the NCACC and DCAC have had a direct and adverse impact on companies, including increased export and import losses, missed delivery deadlines resulting in revenue loss, reputational damage, job losses, and the relocation of companies offshore. The JSCD said it is also of serious concern that no formal platform exists for structured engagement between the regulator and the defence industry to address operational challenges. “A formal platform to ventilate impediments is necessary to resolve challenges before they become barriers to effectiveness. The committee calls on the Chairperson of the NCACC to urgently revive and finalise a process initiated by the former Chairperson,” said Dr Malusi Gigaba, Co-Chairperson of the committee.   Regarding capacity constraints within the DCAC, the committee “expressed alarm that despite repeated assurances of improvements to Information Technology systems aimed at streamlining application processes, no tangible progress has been realised. Persistent staff shortages, incompatible IT infrastructure, and the loss of applications remain ongoing challenges. Furthermore, the committee also called for the completion of a process to fill the office of the Director of DCAC to ensure strategic drive of the secretariat.” The committee said it resolved to urgently invite the NCACC and DCAC to appear before it to account for the failure to implement the promised reforms. A physical meeting has been scheduled for 6 March 2026 to urgently address the matter.

“We do not want to be complicit in these challenges. We cannot continue discussing the same issues without arriving at a cogent and implementable solution,” Phala concluded.

The committee said it has requested the industry to submit concrete proposals aimed at strengthening the regulatory framework and ensuring a more efficient and competitive arms trade environment. (Source: https://www.defenceweb.co.za/)

 

23 Feb 26. Mali: Tuareg militant drone strike will increase threats to staff, human rights concerns. On 18 February, the secessionist Azawad Liberation Front (FLA) conducted a drone strike on a convoy of Malian Armed Forces (FAMa) and Africa Corps personnel transiting between Aguelhok and Anéfis (both Kidal region). The FLA claims that the strike resulted in several casualties and that subsequent FAMa operations killed two militants. Since 2023, the FLA has conducted sporadic drone strikes targeting FAMa and Africa Corps personnel, assets and convoys, primarily in north-eastern Mali. In the coming months, the FLA will almost certainly continue leveraging these capabilities and engaging in further drone attacks within its area of operations. Staff routinely engaging in overland movement in Kidal and Tombouctou regions will face an elevated risk of exposure to militant drone attacks, particularly if accompanied by military escorts. More broadly, we assess that sustained secessionist militant activity will likely continue undermining the FAMa’s capacity to engage in counter-insurgency operations targeting local al Qaeda and Islamic State (IS) affiliates. Consequently, the FAMa and Africa Corps will likely continue relying on indiscriminate attacks targeting ethnic-Tuareg and ethnic-Fulani communities, increasing ethno-religious tensions and bolstering militant recruitment. (Source: Sibylline)

 

23 Feb 26. The latest Military Balance assessment produced by the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) finds that global defence dynamics are undergoing rapid change, driven by shifts in US policy under President Donald Trump’s second administration.

Key findings:

• The United States’ defence policy has pivoted to homeland defence and burden-shifting
• Global defence spending reached USD2.63 trillion, rising 2.5% year on year
• Four years on from the 2022 invasion of Ukraine, Russia’s marginal territorial gains continue to come at a high cost. However, Russia has been able to adapt, regenerate and maintain its capability
• Growth in trackable Russian military expenditure has moderated compared to previous years, reaching just 3% in real terms in 2025. Nonetheless, military spending still accounts for 7.3% of GDP
• Europe’s share of total global spending is now at 21% with Germany’s increase accounting for a quarter of all European growth since 2024
• Chinese military spending growth still outpaces the rest of Asia. As a result, Beijing’s share of the regional total grew to almost 44% in 2025, up from an average of 37% between 2010 and 2020
• Despite the recent purge within the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) command structure, there appears to be little impact on Chinese capabilities

In its 67th edition, The Military Balance 2026 examines the effects on the United States, its allies and the wider world. US defence policy is increasingly focussed on homeland defence, exemplified by proposals for a multi-layered “Golden Dome” missile-defence system. Direct US support for Ukraine has been curtailed while at the same time, US forces face growing strain from simultaneous commitments in the Caribbean, the Indo-Pacific and the Middle East. Europe’s share of global defence spending has increased sharply to 21%, up from 17% in 2022, reflecting sustained growth as the continent responds to both Russian aggression and reduced US willingness to underwrite regional security.  While German spending increases are largely driving that rise, there were also significant budget uplifts in Belgium, the Nordic countries and Spain. Despite further increases expected across the region in 2026, procurement reform in general remains relatively slow and insufficiently innovative. Efforts to reinforce NATO’s eastern flank are under way, but addressing air and missile defence shortfalls remains a priority. Limited industrial capacity and the challenges of scaling production remain constraints on European rearmamentno. Russia’s war against Ukraine continues to impose severe costs on Moscow. Despite achieving only limited territorial gains with heavy casualties, Russia has been able to sustain the size of its deployed forces and has pushed defence spending to record levels in the years immediately after 2022.  This is now triple the figure in 2021, despite a slowdown in growth in 2025.  China’s sustained military activity around Taiwan continues, despite an ongoing internal anti-corruption campaign within the PLA. Its technological developments were showcased at the “Victory Day” parade in September, where systems on show included the now operational JL-1 air-launched ballistic missile.  The PLA Navy commissioned its largest and most capable aircraft carrier, the Fujian, along with at least nine new major surface combatants. Ten new nuclear-powered submarines were launched between 2021 and 2025, outpacing the US Navy both in terms of hulls and tonnage during that timeframe. Furthermore, Chinese-origin aircraft and weapons were put to the test operationally by Pakistan’s military in its conflict with India.  Consistent uplifts in the Chinese defence budget over the last decade have outpaced growth in the wider region and Beijing’s share of regional spending has grown to almost 44% in 2025, up from an average of 37% between 2010 and 2020. In the Middle East and North Africa, US defence partnerships with the Gulf states have strengthened, particularly with Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates. Regional defence spending reached USD219 bn, with countries spending an average of 4.3% of GDP.

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Founded in 1987, Exensor Technology is a world leading supplier of Networked Unattended Ground Sensor (UGS) Systems providing tailored sensor solutions to customers all over the world. From our Headquarters in Lund Sweden, our centre of expertise in Network Communications at Communications Research Lab in Kalmar Sweden and our Production site outside of Basingstoke UK, we design, develop and produce latest state of the art rugged UGS solutions at the highest quality to meet the most stringent demands of our customers. Our systems are in operation and used in a wide number of Military as well as Homeland Security applications worldwide. The modular nature of the system ensures any external sensor can be integrated, providing the user with a fully meshed “silent” network capable of self-healing. Exensor Technology will continue to lead the field in UGS technology, provide our customers with excellent customer service and a bespoke package able to meet every need. A CNIM Group Company

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Sponsored by Bertin Exensor

 

www.exensor.com

 

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Military And Security Developments

Feb 26.

Key points

• Iranian retaliation would likely prioritise US military assets in Bahrain and Qatar; the scope of escalation would be determined by the scale of any US / Israeli strikes.
• Severe disruption to regional maritime trade would be almost certain, with heightened risks in the Strait of Hormuz and Red Sea threatening energy flows and global supply chains.
• Regional airspace closures would almost certainly follow strikes, significantly constraining mobility, delaying cargo and complicating evacuation planning.
• A sudden and sharp increase in energy market volatility, deteriorating investor confidence and pressure on tourism-dependent economies would be likely, with risks intensifying under prolonged hostilities.

Context

On 19 February, US President Donald Trump set a 10-15-day deadline for Iran to reach a nuclear deal, threatening that ‘really bad things’ would otherwise materialise. The threat came after a second round of indirect negotiations between the two states on 17 February, and amid a growing US military build-up in the region, including the deployment of two aircraft carriers. Tensions between the US and Iran have been rising since early January, following Iran’s violent suppression of large-scale domestic protests that began on 27 December 2025.

The increasing prospect of US strikes on Iran has raised concerns about the possible regional impact (particularly on Gulf states). On 14 January, a US official confirmed reports that personnel were evacuating the US’ al-Udeid air base in Qatar, the largest US air base in the region. The news has raised concerns of imminent armed escalation, as Iran targeted the base in late June 2025 in retaliation for previous US strikes. In late January, amid growing tensions and rising risks of military conflict, Saudi Arabia and the UAE announced that they would not allow the US to use their territories (including air and sea facilities) to conduct any military action against Iran.

This report discusses the likely regional impacts of Iran-US tensions materialising into armed conflict. For our different strike scenarios, please see Sibylline Middle East Crisis Update – Iran-US Special Edition – 11 February 2026. For our latest scenarios on the Iranian regime’s stability and the associated impact of US strikes, see Sibylline Special Report – 19 January 2026. Sibylline also conducts bi-weekly webinars discussing the latest developments in the Middle East Crisis; click here to register.

Forecast

Iranian retaliation is likely to prioritise US military installations and assets, particularly in Bahrain and Qatar

A limited US strike would likely prompt Iranian retaliation aimed at mitigating escalation. As such, limited Iranian retaliation would almost certainly target military assets and infrastructure while seeking to constrain damage and minimise loss of life. In this scenario, Iranian retaliation would likely be highly telegraphed and focus on US military assets in Bahrain and Qatar, as well as US naval vessels operating in regional waters. Limited Iranian strikes against US assets in Iraq and Syria would also remain a realistic possibility. However, pro-Iran Iraqi militias are unlikely to be involved at this stage, reflecting Tehran’s interest in maintaining escalation control and avoiding a broader regional conflict.

A significant US and Israeli strike campaign would likely alter both the intensity and geographic scope of Iranian retaliation. In this scenario, Iran is almost certain to target civilian and military sites within Israel. In addition to the assets outlined above, there is a realistic possibility that Iran would target US military installations in Jordan and Kuwait. There is also a realistic possibility that pro-Iran Iraqi militias would join the conflict and target US assets in Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, and Syria. Proxy targeting of Israel would also remain a realistic possibility.

Significant US airstrikes would possibly also prompt Iran to target US assets in the UAE, particularly in the event of strikes against Iranian energy infrastructure and/or if the Iranian leadership perceives an existential threat to regime stability. However, such targeting would likely be aimed at coercive signalling rather than indiscriminate escalation in an attempt to encourage Gulf states to pressure the US to cease operations, not to target the civilian and government assets of those states directly (and thereby risk antagonising them). Iranian strikes against Saudi Arabia would remain unlikely unless Saudi territory is used to facilitate military action against Iran.

Significant disruption to regional commercial shipping would be almost certain, elevating supply chain risks, particularly for the energy sector

Severe disruption to maritime transit through regional waterways would likely follow escalating Iran-US hostilities. Iranian naval forces – including those of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) – would likely harass commercial shipping, particularly US or Israeli-affiliated vessels, including attempted diversions into Iranian waters through coercive manoeuvres and boarding operations. Such activities would be particularly likely in the Strait of Hormuz and the Arabian Gulf. We assess that there would also be a realistic possibility of incidents extending into the Arabian Sea. In the event of a significant military Israel/US strike campaign, the blockade, closure or mining of the Strait of Hormuz would be a realistic possibility (see Scenarios 2 and 3 in Sibylline Middle East Crisis Update – Iran-US Special Edition – 11 February 2026).

In the event of significant or prolonged strikes, there is also a realistic possibility that the Iranian-backed Houthis would resume attacks on Israeli and US-affiliated commercial vessels in the Red Sea. Parallel disruption across the Strait of Hormuz and the Red Sea would compound routing constraints and increase operational strain. Reduced crew availability, vessel withdrawal from high-risk areas and sharply elevated war-risk premiums would likely materialise within the first several days of hostilities. Rerouting vessels around the Cape of Good Hope (South Africa) would extend delivery cycles by several weeks, tightening inventory buffers and increasing working capital requirements, though this risk is partly mitigated by the number of firms that have not yet resumed transit through the Red Sea. Energy shipments – including crude oil, refined products and LNG – would be particularly exposed to scheduling delays and contractual strain.

Disruption beyond several weeks would likely intensify the effects of second-order supply chain disruption. There is a realistic possibility that companies would increasingly pass higher transport and insurance costs down production chains, raising input prices across the construction and manufacturing sectors. Sustained disruption extending beyond several months would significantly elevate structural risks to trade flows for GCC economies, with implications for energy export schedules, refining throughput and regional industrial output.

• Iran-US: Breakthrough in negotiations is unlikely; risk of strikes remains elevated. Earlier on 26 February, US and Iranian envoys arrived in Geneva (Switzerland) for the third round of indirect talks over Iran’s nuclear programme, amid elevated tensions and a US military build-up in the Middle East region. Discussions are ongoing at the time of writing. Notably, the talks come hours after a statement from US Secretary of State Marco Rubio warning that Iran’s refusal to discuss its ballistic missile programme is a major issue. We assess that Iran is unlikely to offer major concessions regarding its nuclear program, ballistic missiles or support to regional proxies. Such maximalist negotiating positions will undermine the prospects for the imminent signature of a permanent, comprehensive US-Iran nuclear agreement. However, there is a realistic possibility that the US and Iran will instead focus on establishing a framework for further talks via an interim agreement. Such an agreement will possibly delay US strike action in the coming days, though the risk of strikes remains elevated.

Feb 25.

KEY DEVELOPMENTS

IRAN

• The US and Iran will engage in a third round of indirect negotiations on 26 February, though an imminent breakthrough remains unlikely.
• Concerns that Iran has resumed the development of its nuclear programme will compound the risk of US airstrikes in the coming days and weeks.
• Small-scale demonstrations associated with mourning rituals and larger-scale demonstrations at universities in Iran underscore sustained anti-government sentiment and the risk of an imminent crackdown.

ISRAEL

• The arrest of four ethnic-Arab Israeli citizens in connection with a planned small-arms attack on IDF soldiers in Karmiel (Northern district) highlights elevated radicalisation risks within ethnic-Arab Israeli communities.

PALESTINIAN TERRITORIES

• GAZA STRIP: A likely deadlock over Hamas’ disarmament will impede progress on the Peace Plan, despite recent troop and financial pledges at the inaugural meeting of the Board of Peace.
• WEST BANK: The increasing condemnation of Israel’s policies vis-à-vis the West Bank will likely trigger broader scrutiny of Israel and Israel-linked entities in the coming months.

IRAN

• The US and Iran will engage in a third round of indirect negotiations on 26 February, though an imminent breakthrough remains unlikely. Despite continued talks, both countries have maintained hardline negotiating positions vis-à-vis Iran’s uranium enrichment programme. On 19 February, US President Donald Trump stated that he would decide on potential military action targeting Iran within 10 days (i.e. 1 March). US officials have warned that they are considering limited strikes if Iran does not ‘capitulate’ during negotiations; they have also reiterated their opposition to any enrichment activity taking place within Iran. During the third round of talks, the US will likely attempt to leverage Iran’s concerns regarding military intervention and threats to government stability to secure major concessions. By contrast, Iran likely aims to leverage US concerns regarding the prospects for a protracted regional conflict to secure more leniency and sanctions relief commitments. Such maximalist negotiating positions will undermine prospects for the imminent signature of a permanent, comprehensive US-Iran nuclear agreement. However, there is a realistic possibility that the US and Iran will instead focus on establishing a framework for further talks via an interim agreement, potentially delaying strike action and the associated regional fallout. We assess that the failure to secure an interim or permanent agreement following talks on 26 February will substantially increase the risk of US airstrikes targeting Iran (for scenario analysis, see Sibylline Middle East Crisis Update – 11 February 2026). US airstrikes would almost certainly trigger substantial price volatility on international energy markets, while associated airspace closures would almost certainly disrupt regional and transcontinental travel. The scale of Iran’s retaliation (which would likely prioritise US military assets in the Gulf region, including in Bahrain, Qatar and the Red Sea) will almost certainly depend on the scale, intensity and targeting profile of the US’ prior airstrikes. Consequently, a limited US airstrike campaign will moderate risks of regional escalation and critical operational disruption.
• Concerns that Iran has resumed the development of its nuclear programme will compound the risk of US airstrikes in the coming days and weeks. On 18 February, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)’s Director General Rafael Grossi stated that the ‘majority’ of Iran’s nuclear equipment and material (including its uranium stockpiles) remains within the country. However, the Iranian authorities have restricted the IAEA’s monitoring capacity since the Iran-Israel war and have prevented inspectors from accessing their facilities, undermining the IAEA’s ability to verify the location and status of stockpiles at the time of writing. Given long-standing tensions with the IAEA, the Iranian authorities are highly unlikely to agree to broad or rigorous monitoring measures amid ongoing negotiations with the US, exacerbating bilateral tensions (see above). During the State of the Union address on 24 February, US President Donald Trump also alleged that Iran had ‘restarted’ its nuclear programme in recent months and is attempting to develop missiles capable of reaching the US. If the US and Iran fail to reach an agreement in the upcoming talks, further allegations of this kind are likely to signal the imminent approval of US airstrikes targeting Iran.
• Small-scale demonstrations associated with mourning rituals and larger-scale demonstrations at universities in Iran underscore sustained anti-government sentiment and the risk of an imminent crackdown. Since 22 February, thousands of students have participated in repeated anti-government demonstrations at universities in Isfahan (Isfahan province), Mashhad (Razavi Khorasan province) and the capital Tehran. Protests have triggered low-intensity clashes between the security forces, anti-government protesters and pro-government counter-protesters. Clashes have resulted in numerous injuries (though no verified casualties at the time of writing). Further protests are highly likely on university campuses in major cities in the coming days, including Isfahan, Kermanshah (Kermanshah province), Mashhad, Shiraz (Fars province) and Tehran. On 24 February, international media also reported that a revolutionary court in Tehran issued a death sentence to an individual detained during anti-government protests in January. In the coming days, reports of further sentences or imminent executions will likely sustain protest attendance, particularly in Tehran. The security forces will almost certainly continue employing heavy-handed techniques to disperse and deter anti-government gatherings, increasing the risk of intensifying clashes and further demonstrations thereafter. The security forces will likely enact increasingly stringent measures to secure university and school facilities to deter participation, possibly including water-based chemical attacks. Clashes between the security forces and protesters will also likely exacerbate tensions with the US, increasing the risk of airstrikes, particularly those targeting security force positions, communications infrastructure and possibly detention facilities (to aid jail breaks) in the coming days and weeks (see above).

ISRAEL

• The arrest of four ethnic-Arab Israeli citizens in connection with a planned small-arms attack on IDF soldiers in Karmiel (Northern district) highlights elevated radicalisation risks within ethnic-Arab Israeli communities. On 23 February, the Israeli police and Shin Bet announced the arrest of four individuals, two of whom are under 18 years old. According to local news outlets, the four suspects were influenced by reports of the war in Gaza, Islamic State (IS) material and the July 2024 stabbing attack in Karmiel (see Sibylline Israel-Hamas War Update – 4 July 2024). The arrests highlight the persistently elevated risks of radicalisation among the country’s ethnic-Arab Israeli population, particularly in northern Israel. This trend will sustain elevated attack risks over the coming months. While such attacks are likely to target Israeli security personnel primarily, we assess that the targeting of civilians remains a realistic possibility, driving elevated crossfire risks for bystanders in crowded areas such as shopping centres, as well in religious sites in the coming months.

PALESTINIAN TERRITORIES

• GAZA STRIP: A likely deadlock over Hamas’ disarmament will impede progress on the Peace Plan, despite recent troop and financial pledges at the inaugural meeting of the Board of Peace. On 19 February, Trump announced pledges totalling USD 17 bn for emergency relief and the reconstruction of Gaza during the Board of Peace’s inaugural meeting in the US capital Washington DC. Trump also revealed that Albania, Kazakhstan, Kosovo and Morocco (in addition to Indonesia) have agreed to contribute thousands of troops to the International Stabilization Force (ISF). However, the countries have made their contributions contingent on the ISF’s tasks being limited to activities such as border patrol and securing humanitarian aid. As such, responsibility for ensuring Hamas’ disarmament will likely fall primarily on a yet-to-be-established Palestinian police force. Israel has previously conditioned the withdrawal of its forces from Gaza on the disarmament of Hamas, as stipulated within the second phase of the Peace Plan. By contrast, Hamas has conditioned its disarmament on Israel’s withdrawal from Gaza. We assess that a deadlock over Hamas’ disarmament is likely. This will exacerbate the ceasefire’s fragility, driving ceasefire violations and prolonging armed conflict risks in Gaza over the coming months.
• WEST BANK: The increasing condemnation of Israel’s policies vis-à-vis the West Bank will likely trigger broader scrutiny of Israel and Israel-linked entities in the coming months. On 23 February, 20 states including France, Egypt, Jordan, Ireland, Spain and Turkey issued a joint declaration condemning Israel’s efforts to advance ‘de facto annexation’ in the West Bank. The declaration characterises proliferating settlement activity (including the approval of the E1 settlement to the east of Jerusalem) and efforts to establish a land settlement procedure as unlawful, underscoring rising regional tensions vis-à-vis Israel’s policies in the West Bank (see Sibylline Middle East Crisis Update – 18 February 2026). In the coming months, we assess that settlement expansion, violence targeting Palestinian communities and efforts to broaden Israel’s administrative control of the West Bank will likely trigger increasing international scrutiny of Israel and Israeli settlers. States such as Canada, France and the UK will possibly move to expand sanctions targeting extremist settlers and associated entities, increasing compliance concerns in Israel’s finance, construction and agricultural sectors. Israel’s trade partners will also possibly adopt measures initiating reviews of arms export licenses or restricting trade with settlements and firms active in the West Bank, increasing the risk of supply chain disruption. Firms operating in Israel, particularly those providing services to settlements or purchasing goods from settler-linked entities, will face increasing risks of targeted pro-Palestine activism, compounding reputational concerns and corporate governance risks.
• ISRAEL-LEBANON: The evacuation of staff from the US embassy in Beirut underscores high risks of armed conflict resumption between LH and Israel following possible US-Israel strikes against Iran. The order was issued on 23 February and directed at non-essential government personnel and eligible family members; travel within Lebanon for remaining embassy staff will be restricted without prior authorisation. The embassy has suspended routine consular services and encouraged US nationals in Lebanon to depart, echoing the State Department’s travel advisory reiterating that US citizens should not travel to Lebanon. These measures come amid the US forces’ ongoing build-up in the region, heightened US-Iran tensions and the deadlock in their bilateral talks. Nevertheless, in the event of a large-scale US military campaign targeting Iran, we assess that LH is unlikely to attack US assets in Lebanon, in order to avoid US retaliation and dragging Lebanon into a larger conflict. However, there is a realistic possibility that a protracted joint US-Israeli strike targeting Iran will prompt LH to resume its missile and drone attacks against Israel. This would highly likely prompt a robust Israeli response, including IDF ground operations deeper into Lebanon’s South and Nabatieh governates and possible strikes on Beirut. Consequently, further pre-emptive Israeli strikes across Lebanon against LH’s chain of command, as well as drone and missile operators, are likely in the coming days, similar to the IDF’s 21 February strikes in Baalbek-Hermel governorate.
• IRAQ-US: The Iran-backed militia Kata’ib Hezbollah (KH)’s warning to Kurdish communities to not get involved in a US-Iran conflict underscores Iraq’s vulnerability to regional tensions. On 23 February, the head of KH’s Security Bureau, Abu Ali al-Askari, issued a statement warning the Kurdish authorities in Iraq to not get involved in any potential US-Iran conflict. Al-Askari claimed that the US’ military activity is expanding in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI) in a manner that he alleges can be used for future land operations against Iran. However, we assess that the US is unlikely to use KRI to launch land or air operations into Iranian territory, given the region’s proximity to Iran and the logistical difficulties to defend it effectively against any retaliation. Nevertheless, there is a realistic possibility that Iran-backed militias in Iraq (including KH) will target US forces in KRI with missiles and drones in the event of US strikes (including limited ones) against Iran. The primary targets for such action will likely include Erbil International Airport (EBL; Erbil governorate), disrupting transit and driving significant physical security risks in the city of Erbil and its periphery during any such conflict. These risks will remain elevated despite a likely augmented posture and reinforcement of US troops in Erbil and around strategic facilities (such as oil fields) in the coming days.
• Iran: Student protests are likely to continue in coming days, elevating personnel security risks. On 24 February, anti-government demonstrations at universities across Iran continued for a fourth consecutive day, notably in Isfahan (Isfahan province), Mashhad (Razavi Khorasan province) and the capital Tehran. Several clashes, including running battles and fistfights, broke out between the security forces, protesters and pro-regime counter-protesters. Reportedly, demonstrations have expanded beyond universities to schools, underscoring widening participation amid growing youth disillusionment with the regime. As demonstrations grow, reports on 24 February stated that a court in Tehran issued a death sentence for an attendee of the January anti-government protests; this will likely increase protest attendance. The proliferation of protests on university campuses and schools will elevate the risk of domestic unrest in Iran in the coming days. Nevertheless, government restrictions on communications will possibly moderate demonstrations’ turnout while also disrupting evacuation procedures, logistics operations and supply chains. In the event of wider protests, the security forces are likely to employ baton charges and use tear gas, rubber bullets and live ammunition to disperse protesters, increasing threats to life for personnel near large gatherings.
• Iraq-US: Militia warning to Kurdish communities underscores security instability amid regional tensions. On 23 February, the head of the Security Bureau of the Iran-backed militia Kata’ib Hezbollah (KH), Abu Ali al‑Askari, issued a statement warning Kurdish communities in Iraq to not get involved in any potential US-Iran conflict. Al-Askari claimed that the US’ military activity is expanding in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI) in a manner that can be used for future land operations against Iran. However, we assess that the US is unlikely to use KRI territory to launch land or air operations into Iranian territory. Regardless, there is a realistic possibility that Iran-backed militias in Iraq (including KH) will target US forces in KRI with missiles and drones in the event of US strikes (including limited ones) against Iran. The primary targets for such action will likely include Erbil International Airport (EBL; Erbil governorate), disrupting transit and driving significant physical security risks in the city of Erbil and its periphery during any such conflict. These risks will remain elevated despite a likely augmented posture and reinforcement of US troops in Erbil and around strategic facilities (such as oil fields) in the coming days.

Feb 24.

• Lebanon: Evacuation of US embassy staff underscores armed conflict risks between LH, Israel. On 23 February, the US Department of State withdrew non-essential government personnel and eligible family members from the US embassy in the Lebanese capital Beirut. On the same day, the State Department also updated its travel advisory, reiterating that US citizens should not travel to Lebanon. The Department has also restricted travel within Lebanon for the remaining embassy staff, permitting travel only with prior authorisation. The evacuation underscores the sustained risk of armed conflict escalation amid the US forces’ build-up in the region and heightened tensions between Washington DC and Tehran. We assess that in the event of a large-scale military campaign against Iran, there is a realistic possibility that Lebanese Hizballah (LH) will target US and Israeli assets, particularly those based in Israel. Such action would highly likely prompt a robust Israeli response, including ground operations by the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) deeper into Lebanon and possible strikes targeting Beirut. Armed escalation will significantly elevate security risks in southern Lebanon, as well as in Beirut to a lesser extent.
• Israel-Palestinian Territories: New government measures will elevate sanctions, reputational risks. On 23 February, the foreign ministers of several countries (including Brazil, Denmark, France, Norway, Saudi Arabia and Turkey) issued a joint statement condemning the Israeli government’s recent decisions that expand Israeli administrative control over the West Bank and facilitate the purchase of land for settlers. The ministers claim that these decisions amount to a de facto annexation of the West Bank, in violation of international law. Also on 23 February, Israeli settlers vandalised and set fire to a mosque near Nablus (Nablus governorate), underscoring a broader rise in settler violence in the West Bank. The expansion of settlements under the new measures will almost certainly exacerbate ethno-religious tensions, increase the frequency of similar incidents and escalate intercommunal clashes, driving personnel exposure to violence. We assess that more countries are likely to follow suit and condemn these measures, driving tensions between Israel and its international partners. In turn, some states will possibly issue further sanctions targeting Israeli settlers and associated entities, elevating sanctions exposure risks and reputational concerns for businesses, particularly in the financial, agricultural and construction sectors

Feb 23.

• Palestinian Territories: Likely deadlock over disarmament will prolong conflict risks. On 19 February, US President Donald Trump pledged USD 17 bn in emergency relief and for the reconstruction of Gaza during the inaugural meeting of the Board of Peace in Washington DC. Trump also revealed that Albania, Indonesia, Kazakhstan, Kosovo and Morocco agreed to contribute thousands of troops to the International Stabilisation Force (ISF). However, the countries made their contributions contingent on the ISF’s tasks being limited to activities such as border patrol and securing humanitarian aid. As such, responsibility for ensuring Hamas’ disarmament would fall on a yet-to-be-established Palestinian police force. Israel has previously conditioned the withdrawal of its forces from Gaza on the disarmament of Hamas, as stipulated within the second phase of the Peace Plan. By contrast, Hamas has conditioned its disarmament on the withdrawal of Israel from Gaza. We assess that a deadlock over Hamas’ disarmament is likely. This will exacerbate the ceasefire’s fragility, driving ceasefire violations and prolonging armed conflict in Gaza over the coming months.
• Turkey: Reporter arrest highlights repressive press environment, legal exposure for media firms. On 19 February, the Turkish authorities arrested Deutsche Welle (DW) journalist Alican Uludağ in the capital Ankara for ‘disseminating misleading information’ and ‘insulting the president’. His arrest was allegedly linked to online criticism of Turkish government measures that led to the release of suspected Islamic State (IS) militants. DW has called the accusations baseless. The move comes amid a wider crackdown on press freedoms in Turkey, including the 2025 arrests of several journalists from Halk TV and the seizure of the conglomerate Can Holding, which includes the major media outlets Bloomberg HT, Habertürk and Show TV. We assess that the authorities will likely continue to target journalists and media outlets over the next six to 12 months, increasing legal exposure for associated businesses. This will heighten the risk of arbitrary detention for individuals working in the press sector and lead to self-censorship due to fear of arrest. Turkish media firms and international media outlets operating in Turkey will face increased compliance and regulatory risks in the coming months, possibly undercutting revenues. (Source: Sibylline)

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Founded in 1987, Exensor Technology is a world leading supplier of Networked Unattended Ground Sensor (UGS) Systems providing tailored sensor solutions to customers all over the world. From our Headquarters in Lund Sweden, our centre of expertise in Network Communications at Communications Research Lab in Kalmar Sweden and our Production site outside of Basingstoke UK, we design, develop and produce latest state of the art rugged UGS solutions at the highest quality to meet the most stringent demands of our customers. Our systems are in operation and used in a wide number of Military as well as Home land Security applications worldwide. The modular nature of the system ensures any external sensor can be integrated, providing the user with a fully meshed “silent” network capable of self-healing. Exensor Technology will continue to lead the field in UGS technology, provide our customers with excellent customer service and a bespoke package able to meet every need.

A CNIM Group Company

————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————

Sponsored by Bertin Exensor

 

www.exensor.com

 

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Military And Security Developments

Feb 26.

• In our updated Strategic Risk Forecast, we put forward various scenarios concerning the trajectory of the Russo-Ukrainian war in the next 12 months. Our baseline scenario is that the war will likely continue in some form without a definitive resolution; there is also a realistic possibility of a fragile ceasefire that will fail to stop the fighting entirely.
• This week, 24 February marked the fourth anniversary of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine; despite continuing efforts to make progress during negotiations, the war is more likely to continue well into its fifth year than definitively end. US-brokered trilateral negotiations have nevertheless continued to intensify this month, though we assess that only modest progress has likely been made, rather than a major breakthrough towards a peace deal (or a ceasefire).
• On the battlefield, Russian advances have been slow this month, though Ukrainian forces have retaken land during a series of counter-attacks, likely facilitated by SpaceX blocking Russian access to its Starlink satellite network in February. While Russian forces are likely to regain access to the network in the coming months, the disruption is likely to be undermining battlefield communication and navigation of long-range drones which had Starlink terminals strapped to them to aid navigation.
• Looking ahead to the coming month, Russia’s long-range strike campaign is likely to shift away from targeting energy facilities ahead of the end of the heating season, and to reprioritise other military-industrial facilities, railways, logistics hubs and wider critical national infrastructure (CNI). The rate of Russian missile and drone strikes has remained extremely high over the last month, with a likely new monthly record set for the number of ballistic missiles fired – underscoring the growing risk that air defence shortages in Ukraine will continue to cause. All these issues will continue to cause profound disruption to business operations across the country, including blackouts.
• Key triggers, warnings and indicators (TWIs) to watch for in March include the official end of the Ukrainian heating season on 31 March and the potential for disruption or tensions during maritime hybrid operations; Iceland and Norway are now unlikely to assist UK and French efforts to seize vessels linked to Russia’s shadow fleet, which will possibly reduce the immediate risks of escalation.

• Ukraine: Expedited EU membership remains unlikely by 2027, even under two-tier model. A Politico article from 25 February reported that Ukraine seeks to join the EU within a narrow window between the Hungarian legislative and French presidential elections (scheduled for April 2026 and April 2027, respectively). Kyiv’s strategy hinges on the belief that the potential defeat of the incumbent and anti-Ukraine Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán would remove Hungary’s veto over its accession path. Ukrainian leaders likewise fear that a hard-right victory in the French presidential election would prompt Paris to oppose Ukraine’s entry to the bloc. Kyiv sees EU membership as crucial for its long-term security and prosperity (see Sibylline Special Report – 5 February 2026). The EU is reportedly considering a fast-tracked, two-tier accession model, under which Kyiv would join with limited powers. A Ukrainian media outlet recently revealed that the EU has sent a confidential list of accession conditions, referred to as the ‘Lviv criteria’. However, we assess that Ukraine’s ability to meet such conditions remains highly constrained by the ongoing war and persistent governance challenges, including corruption. This means that the prospects of Kyiv joining the EU by 2027 remain low, especially if the Russo-Ukrainian war is ongoing by that time.

Feb 25.

• Ukraine-US: UN abstention amid fragile peace process reflects shift in US’ Ukraine policy. On 24 February, the US abstained from a vote in the UN General Assembly (UNGA) in support of a ‘lasting peace in Ukraine’ on the fourth anniversary of Russia’s full-scale invasion. The resolution, proposed by Ukraine, calls for an ‘immediate, full and unconditional ceasefire’ between the warring parties, as well as a comprehensive and just peace ‘in line with international law’. The document also emphasises a ‘strong commitment’ to Ukraine’s independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity within its internationally recognised borders. Keith Kellogg, the Trump administration’s former special envoy to Ukraine, has condemned the abstention; he was largely sidelined in the US’ efforts to broker peace, in part likely due to his perceived pro-Kyiv stance. We assess that this abstention further reflects the US’ transition to what the Trump administration likely considers to be a more neutral policy towards Ukraine, with concerns that a condemnation of Russia or clear-cut support for Ukraine could threaten the fragile peace process. Over the coming months, the US will likely continue to apply pressure on Ukraine to compromise on its conditions for ending the war.
• Russia: Ukrainian strikes against oil infrastructure will pressure revenues, drive regional tensions. Reuters reported on 24 February that Russia’s state-owned oil pipeline operator Transneft has cut oil intake by 250,000 barrels per day (bpd) following a Ukrainian drone strike against a key pumping station on the previous day. The attack forms part of a renewed intensification of Ukrainian drone strikes against Russian oil infrastructure. Through these attacks, Kyiv aims to constrain Russia’s crucial oil export revenues even further – and to amplify the impact of international sanctions on Russia’s oil sector – in a bid to undermine Moscow’s ability to finance its war effort. Also on 24 February, the Centre for Research on Energy and Clean Air (CREA) reported that, while Russia boosted its oil exports by 6% over the previous 12 months, it earned 18% less than pre-war levels due to being forced to sell at steep discounts. We assess that continued Ukrainian strikes will exacerbate the impact of international sanctions on Russian oil revenues, though Moscow will highly likely be able to continue financing its war over the medium term, regardless. Nevertheless, Ukrainian strikes of this type will heighten tensions with countries that continue to import Russian oil, including EU members Hungary and Slovakia.

Feb 24.

KEY DEVELOPMENTS

• OFFENSIVES: Ukraine has continued its counter-attacks in Zaporizhzhia oblast, further illustrating its ability to make localised gains, though a more substantial breakthrough remains unlikely
• STRIKES: When the heating season comes to an end (on 31 March), Russia is likely to shift the focus of its long-range strikes from energy facilities to other critical infrastructure, such as logistics facilities, water supplies and/or telecommunications
• ASSASSINATIONS: An uptick in explosions in urban centres targeting police personnel underscores the potential for tit-for-tat attacks as part of both sides’ hybrid operations against each other
• FORECAST: Continued limited progress in US-facilitated efforts to end the war will likely encourage Moscow to pitch further economic proposals to Washington DC over the coming months, aiming to influence the negotiating process and incentivise concessions in Russia’s interests
• OFFENSIVES: Ukraine has continued its counter-attacks in Zaporizhzhia oblast, further illustrating its ability to make localised gains, though a more substantial breakthrough remains unlikely. On 20 February, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky claimed that Ukrainian forces have retaken around 115.8 square miles (300 sq km) in unspecified areas of southern Ukraine during an undefined period. Zelensky likely referred partly to the recent intensification of Ukraine’s offensive operations in Zaporizhzhia oblast. On the same day, the UK Defence Intelligence (DI) offered a more conservative estimate of approximately 38.6 square miles (100 sq km), while the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) estimated that Ukrainian gains amounted to around 77.2 square miles (200 sq km). According to the DI, Ukrainian forces achieved most of these gains to the north of Huliapole, with additional limited gains further north near Verbove (both Zaporizhzhia oblast). We previously assessed that Ukraine’s operations do not amount to a counter-offensive (see Sibylline Ukraine Update – 17 February 2026). Rather, they are successful localised counter-attacks that likely benefit from disruption to Russian military communications, caused by the suspension of Starlink services and possibly by the Kremlin’s prioritisation of other fronts.
• OFFENSIVES: Continued Ukrainian pressure will possibly complicate Russia’s preparations for a potential summer offensive in Zaporizhzhia oblast. A prominent Ukrainian military observer reported that the Russian command has committed additional forces to areas in Zaporizhzhia oblast contested by Ukraine. However, at this stage, Russian forces are reportedly focused on westward advances near Huliapole. We assess that if Ukrainian forces maintain their current momentum, particularly towards settlements such as Uspenivka or Temyrivka (both Zaporizhzhia oblast) along the Yanchur River, this will threaten to cut off ground lines of communication along the Huliapole-Velyka Novosilka axis. Such a development would disrupt Russia’s operational logistics and ability to co-ordinate manoeuvres across Zaporizhzhia oblast. We assess that Ukraine’s counter-attacks are likely delaying Russian offensive attempts to advance towards Orikhiv (Zaporizhzhia oblast) from the east and broader offensive efforts in the oblast, though it remains unclear for how long Ukraine can maintain the initiative in this section of the frontline.
• DONETSK: Russian forces continue to pressure Lyman, particularly from the north and north-west, possibly indicating plans to bypass the city to advance towards Sloviansk (both Donetsk oblast). On 22 February, Ukrainian Joint Forces Task Force spokesperson Colonel Viktor Trehubov stated that Russian forces are attempting to bypass Lyman from Drobysheve and Stavky (both Donetsk oblast; located to the north of Lyman) in order to reach Sloviansk, a key city in the oblast’s so-called ‘Fortress Belt’. However, Russia remains unlikely to achieve this goal in the short term. It remains questionable whether Russian forces could apply pressure on Sloviansk without first taking Lyman, particularly given the need to cross the Siverskyi-Donets River. Overall, the situation in the area remains fluid, characterised by shifting frontlines and expanding contested grey zones. The above-mentioned Ukrainian military observer reported that Russian activity is intensifying around Zakitne (Donetsk oblast), a town to the east and south-east of Lyman along the Donets River road; this is an attempt to advance south-west towards Kryva Luka and Kalenyky (both Donetsk oblast). Russian forces have also made gains along the Bakhmut-Slovyansk road in recent days, underscoring that this section of the frontline remains particularly intense at present.
• STRIKES: Russia launched a significant high-intensity combined strike overnight on 21-22 February ahead of the fourth anniversary of its full-scale invasion of Ukraine (24 February). The attack comprised 297 drones and 50 missiles, including various ballistic missiles. Ukraine’s air force reported downing 274 drones and 33 missiles. According to the Ukrainian authorities, the attack specifically targeted Ukrainian logistics sites, including railway and water supply infrastructure in urban areas, and notably fewer energy facilities. We assess that when the heating season comes to an end (on 31 March), Russia is likely to shift the focus of its long-range strikes from energy facilities to other critical infrastructure, such as logistical facilities, water supplies and/or telecommunications.
• STRIKES: The Ukrainian authorities reported that the 21-22 February attack struck a sweet factory in Sumy oblast owned by a US multinational company. Western entities, including commercial sites owned by US outfits, have been struck before. While such incidents are possibly the result of miscalculation, particularly during intense barrages, they are also liable to be deliberate due to (possibly erroneous) intelligence indicating potential military activity at the site. Such strikes against Western-owned assets are highly likely to continue on a sporadic basis for the full duration of the war.
• STRIKES: The recent Ukrainian strike against oil infrastructure linked to the Druzhba oil pipeline will heighten tensions with Hungary and Slovakia amid ongoing disputes over oil transit via Ukraine. Early on 23 February, Ukrainian long-range drones hit the Kaleykino oil pumping station in Almetyevsk (Russia’s autonomous Tatarstan Republic). The facility is linked to the Druzhba oil pipeline, which supplies Russian oil to Hungary and Slovakia via Ukrainian territory, and which was already damaged by what was likely Russian military action earlier this month. We assess that the incident will exacerbate tensions between Ukraine and Hungary/Slovakia, possibly prompting further retaliatory measures from both countries. Slovakia has already suspended emergency supplies of electricity to Ukraine; Hungary will possibly adopt a similar move, placing additional pressure on the already-acute energy situation across the country.

POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS

• CEASEFIRE: Despite a supposed agreement for the US to lead on ceasefire monitoring following recent trilateral negotiations in Geneva (Switzerland), the conditions to agree to a viable ceasefire remain elusive. On 20 February, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stated that the US will be ‘primarily responsible’ for monitoring a theoretical ceasefire. According to Zelensky, all sides ‘acknowledged’ the US’ role in observing a potential ceasefire. However, Zelensky did not mention further technical specifics, or how (if at all) the US would respond to any potential violations. While this marks a notable result of the US-facilitated efforts to end the war thus far, we assess that a comprehensive, durable ceasefire (let alone a peace agreement) remains unlikely in the coming months. It is highly unlikely that Russia currently believes that a ceasefire is in its strategic interests without major concessions from Ukraine. At the same time, the positions of the two warring parties remain far apart on key issues; this also undermines the likelihood of a cessation of hostilities in the medium term (at least).
• ASSASSINATIONS: An uptick in explosions targeting police personnel in urban centres underscores the potential for tit-for-tat attacks to form part of both sides’ hybrid operations against the other. On 23 February at approximately 1810hrs (local time), seven police officers were injured in an explosion in the southern city of Mykolaiv (Mykolaiv oblast). According to the chief of Ukraine’s national police, Ivan Vyhivskyi, the blast occurred at a non-operational petrol station when the officers arrived for their shift and parked their vehicles in the vicinity. Later on 23 February, another explosion occurred at a police station in the south-eastern city of Dnipro (Dnipropetrovsk oblast); the incident is being investigated as a terror attack. The developments follow a double bombing on 22 February in the western city of Lviv (Lviv oblast) and underscore an emerging pattern of attacks (see Sibylline Daily Analytical Update – 23 February 2026).
• ASSASSINATIONS: While both sides have utilised sabotage operations and assassinations throughout the course of the war, we assess that the recent spate of explosions indicates a shift in Russia’s hybrid warfare tactics. Ukrainian assassinations in Russia have mainly targeted high-profile figures, largely generals, likely in a bid to demonstrate Ukraine’s capability and will to orchestrate such operations on Russian territory and to disrupt command and control (C2) decision-making processes. Meanwhile, Russia has carried out fewer confirmed assassination operations inside Ukraine. Until now, it is unlikely that assassinations have been the top priority for Russian intelligence operatives inside Ukraine; Russia’s hybrid warfare has hitherto likely focused on recruiting Ukrainian citizens to gather intelligence on Ukrainian infrastructure and military assets to facilitate Moscow’s long-range strike campaign.
• ASSASSINATIONS: As such, the recent incidents likely reflect an (at least temporary) diversification of Russian hybrid activity and potential shift to using its intelligence assets in more overtly kinetic missions. The goal of such attacks is possibly to further strain Ukraine’s law enforcement capabilities and increase societal panic so as to reinforce the psychological impact of the war on the Ukrainian population. A bombing in Moscow (Russia) earlier on 24 February was possibly Ukrainian retaliation (see Sibylline Daily Analytical Update – 24 February 2026); we therefore assess that the likelihood of tit-for-tat attacks remains elevated over the coming weeks and months.
• For further analysis and scenario planning around how the war will evolve in 2026 and beyond, see our updated Sibylline Strategic Risk Forecast – 6 January 2026 and Sibylline Ukraine Monthly Forecast – 23 January 2026.

FORECAST

INVESTMENT: Ahead of the fourth anniversary of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine on 24 February, limited progress in US-facilitated efforts to end the war will likely encourage Moscow to pitch further economic proposals to Washington DC over the coming months, in an attempt to influence the negotiating process and incentivise concessions in Russia’s interests. On 18 February, the head of Russia’s sovereign wealth fund Kirill Dmitriev claimed that the value of potential Russia-US projects in the context of a normalisation in economic relations would be over USD 14 trillion. Dmitriev was responding to reports from recent weeks based on Ukrainian intelligence assessments, which state that Russia has pitched deals worth USD 12 trillion in exchange for sanctions relief.

While we cannot confirm the figure provided by Dmitriev, the development indicates efforts to appeal to President Donald Trump’s eagerness to conclude deals and ensure a financial return for the US in its geopolitical relationships. Irrespective of whether the USD 14 trillion figure is unrealistic (which it highly likely is), Dmitriev’s appointment as a special economic envoy to engage with Washington DC in February 2025 showed that from the start, Moscow has understood the value of leveraging economic opportunities in dealings with the US. Ukraine has likewise sought to attract the Trump administration with deals, including one on minerals (see Sibylline Situation Update Brief – 8 May 2025). However, Russia almost certainly seeks to leverage its greater resource wealth and developed business environment compared to Ukraine’s, in order to extract preferable peace terms over the coming months.

Reports detailing an (unconfirmed) internal Russian document that contains proposals for Russia-US economic co-operation following a deal to end the Russo-Ukrainian war heavily emphasise harnessing natural resources and energy. According to a Bloomberg report on 12 February, the memorandum envisions joint oil and liquefied natural gas (LNG) ventures, including offshore and ‘hard-to-cover reserves’. Such ventures would also consider previous US investments and allow US companies to recover past losses. US firms would also be granted preferential conditions to return to the Russian market. We assess that this offer potentially seeks to mirror the expectations the Trump administration placed on Venezuela following the US military operation that captured its president on 3 January.

Elements of the reported proposals indicate Russia’s apparent willingness to leverage the US’ competition with China, despite China being Russia’s most important trading partner. The document outlines co-operation on raw materials, including copper, lithium, nickel and platinum. This aligns with the Trump administration’s efforts to diversify its sources of critical minerals and reduce dependence on China. Another proposal entails Russia returning to the US dollar (USD) system, including possibly for Russian energy transactions. This would mark a significant reversal from Russia’s long-term pursuit of de-dollarisation in trade settlements, including those with China. We continue to assess that the Trump administration will likely continue to view China as a key competitor and threat over the longer term. Thus, these (unconfirmed) Russian proposals are likely another way in which Moscow seeks to appeal to the Trump administration and to consolidate its strategic advantage over Kyiv in US-brokered negotiations.

Despite the proposed Russian incentives, significant unilateral US sanctions relief is unlikely in the short term; however, if US interest in co-operation grows and lucrative business contracts are offered, the likelihood of punitive measures being relaxed will increase. Nevertheless, the Trump administration is highly unlikely to roll back existing sanctions without considerable progress in the peace process. However, we continue to assess that sanctions are a lever at the US’ disposal to both encourage or coerce Russia, depending on the Trump administration’s stance at any given time. Therefore, it remains possible that the Trump administration could offer Russia limited sanctions relief in the coming months, as it did with Russia’s ally Belarus (see Sibylline Situation Update Brief – 14 October 2025). This could realistically include modest sanctions relief for Russia’s ailing aviation sector (a demand which Moscow has long made), in a bid to begin the normalisation of US-Russia economic relations – which we have long assessed remains a key strategic driver and strategic goal of the Trump administration.

However, if the US moves to relax sanctions on Russia, this would be highly unlikely to precipitate a massive return of US business to the Russian market, at least in the medium term. Our assessment remains that the business climate in Russia is hostile to foreign investment from ‘unfriendly’ Western countries, even if the Kremlin offered nominally favourable business terms to US firms. Furthermore, Canada, the EU, the UK and others are highly unlikely to lift their own sanctions in tandem with the US in the foreseeable future. Ultimately, the emergence of a two-track sanctions regime would increase compliance risks and due diligence requirements for multinational firms, with companies also likely to face reputational backlash for returning to the Russian market.

If the US unilaterally removes significant sanctions on Russia, this would almost certainly further strain the transatlantic alliance, given that many European countries have sought to reduce their dependence on Russia (specifically Russian energy). Before the full-scale invasion of Ukraine, the EU and the UK broadly balanced economic engagement with targeted sanctions for Russian aggression. However, many hawkish European countries now view this approach as not viable. This stance would raise the possibility of threats of additional tariffs, sanctions and trade restrictions in the event of a major rift with the US over the approach to Russia. In this context, the US could realistically increase pressure on Europe to lift sanctions and re-integrate Russia into the global economy over the longer term. If the US proceeds with its own programme of re-opening the Russian market to its firms, numerous business sectors across Europe with traditionally strong business ties to Russia (particularly in Austria, Germany and Italy) are highly likely to lobby for a similar normalisation of economic relations. However, this scenario remains unlikely in the short-to-medium term; sanctions regimes are likely to remain in place and continue to strengthen in the coming months.

• Europe region-Russia: PMC onboard Russia’s shadow sea fleet points to dual purpose of vessels. On 23 February, AFP reported that two employees of Russia-based private military company (PMC) Moran Security Group were found aboard a Russian shadow fleet vessel seized by French forces in September 2025. According to AFP sources, the two employees, one of which previously worked for the Wagner PMC, were responsible for monitoring the ship crew and for gathering unspecified intelligence. Moran Security Group provides armed security services for Russian state-owned companies and oil tankers that belong to Russia’s shadow fleet. The use of this PMC, which has ties to Russia’s intelligence agencies, provides the Kremlin with plausible deniability regarding vessel ownership and in the event that vessels are linked to grey-zone or hybrid activity. The AFP’s report is the latest indicator that Russia’s shadow sea fleet serves the dual purpose of evading Western sanctions and facilitating Russian grey-zone operations; these vessels have been linked to undersea cable damage and suspected irregular drone operations.
• Ukraine: Dispute over oil transit will threaten crucial short-term energy assistance. On 24 February, Slovakian Prime Minister Robert Fico announced the suspension of emergency electricity supplies to Ukraine until oil flows via the Russian Druzhba pipeline resume. The infrastructure, which transits through Ukraine, was damaged by Russian military operations and has been offline since the end of January. Fico, along with the Hungarian authorities, accused Ukraine of withholding oil transit for political reasons. Hungary recently pledged to block EU sanctions against Russia and veto the EU’s approval of a EUR 90 bn (USD 106 bn) loan to support Ukraine. Slovakia’s move will prove highly detrimental to Ukraine, which relies on emergency electricity imports from neighbouring countries to compensate for the severe destabilisation of its energy grid by Russian long-range strikes. Kyiv has reportedly proposed several solutions to resolve the dispute. We assess that a failure to reach an agreement will prolong the suspension of Slovakian (and potentially trigger similar Hungarian suspensions of) electricity supplies, thereby increasing the severity of Ukraine’s energy crisis in the short term. The dispute will moderately threaten the EU’s ability to disburse its loan in the short term, which is crucial for Kyiv’s war effort and socio-economic health (though a resolution is likely in the coming months).
• Russia: Explosion near railway station reflects sustained risk of attacks in capital. At approximately 0005hrs (local time) on 24 February, an unknown person detonated an explosive device near Savyolovsky Station in the capital Moscow, killing one traffic police officer and injuring two others. Russia’s Investigative Committee (SKR) stated that the assailant, who also died at the scene, carried out a suicide bombing after approaching a vehicle patrolling the area. The authorities stated that the deceased officer was a senior inspector in the traffic police. No motive has been established at the time of writing, and the authorities have yet to announce any suspicion of Ukrainian involvement. However, Ukraine has shown an increasing capability and will to orchestrate assassinations across Russia since the beginning of the Russo-Ukrainian war (the fourth anniversary of which is today). Nonetheless, senior Russian generals or military figures have usually been the target of Ukrainian-linked or suspected assassination plots; the nature of the latest attack possibly also indicates Islamist motives. We assess that a heightened security presence in the affected area is almost certain in the coming hours, with security also highly likely to be bolstered at other train and metro stations across the capital.

Feb 23.

• Russia-US: Economic co-operation, sanctions relief remain unlikely in short term, despite proposals. On 18 February, the head of Russia’s sovereign wealth fund Kirill Dmitriev claimed that the value of potential Russia-US projects is over USD 14 trillion in a likely attempt to appeal to the Trump administration as it seeks to end the war in Ukraine. Dmitriev was responding to reports that Moscow has pitched deals worth USD 12 trillion in exchange for sanctions relief. While we cannot confirm the figure provided by Dmitriev, who also serves as a special envoy, it indicates efforts to appeal to the Trump administration’s eagerness to conclude deals and receive a financial return on geopolitical relationships. In a similar vein, on 12 February Bloomberg reported details of an (unconfirmed) internal Russian document containing proposals for Russia-US economic co-operation following a deal to end the Russo-Ukrainian war. Continued limited progress in US-facilitated efforts to end the war will likely encourage Moscow to pitch further economic proposals to Washington DC with the aim of extracting preferable peace terms. If agreeable to Washington DC, this would increase pressure on Kyiv to agree to major concessions, including over territory. While significant unilateral US sanctions relief is unlikely in the short term, if the US’ interest in co-operation grows and lucrative business contracts are offered, the likelihood of punitive measures being relaxed will increase as part of the peace process.

(Source: Sibylline)

 

24 Feb 26. G7 leaders’ statement on the war in Ukraine: 24 February 2026. G7 leaders’ statement on the war in Ukraine. On the fourth anniversary of the Russian further invasion of Ukraine in 2022, we, the leaders of the G7, reaffirm our unwavering support for Ukraine in defending its territorial integrity and right to exist, and its freedom, sovereignty, and independence. We express our continued support for President Trump’s efforts to achieve these objectives by initiating a peace process and bringing the parties to direct discussions. Europe has a leading role to play in this process, joined by other partners. We also support the commitments under the Coalition of the Willing to provide robust and reliable security guarantees to Ukraine. We acknowledge that only Ukraine and Russia, working together in good faith negotiations, can reach a peace agreement.

We welcome the efforts made by the G7 members and other partners to provide substantial financial and in-kind support to Ukraine to help the country get through this winter. Substantial additional power production capacities have been mobilized in recent weeks together with other critical equipment, including the shipment of more than 2500 generators and other much needed equipment like transformers, turbines, cogeneration units, boilers and repair equipment from the G7 countries to Kyiv since January, and more than half a bn euros of new pledges were made to the Ukraine Energy Support Fund to purchase equipment to repair and protect the Ukrainian energy system. A resilient and robust energy system will be needed ahead of next winter and for the country’s recovery.

We commit to working closely in terms of ensuring nuclear safety, including with the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development and Ukraine to promote fundraising for the rehabilitation at the earliest of the Chornobyl containment arch and to prevent any radiological incident that would have serious humanitarian and environmental consequences for the entire continent.

We also support initiatives aimed at ensuring the immediate, safe and unconditional return of Ukrainian children to their families and communities and commend the work of the International Coalition for the Return of Ukrainian Children.

We will continue to provide humanitarian aid and support to the Ukrainian population. (Source: https://www.gov.uk/)

 

25 Feb 26. Cuashub.com said today that Ukrainian interceptor drones now down 30% of Russian air targets. Ukraine’s interceptor drones are now responsible for nearly a third of the Russian aerial threats destroyed over the country, highlighting how rapidly low-cost unmanned systems have become embedded in Kyiv’s air defense architecture.

“If we take into account the share of interceptor UAVs in the destruction of air targets, we have already reached the mark of 30%,” said Col. Yuriy Cherevashenka in a video interview published Monday by Ukraine’s air force.

“That is, every third drone target that is destroyed in Ukraine is destroyed by an interceptor UAV,” he added.

Interceptor drones, typically small, fast quadcopters, are designed to pursue and physically destroy incoming one-way attack drones, often by ramming them or detonating an onboard explosive charge. Initially viewed as an experimental or supplementary capability in the early years of the war, interceptor drones became a focus area in late 2024 as Russia intensified its long-range drone strikes against Ukrainian cities and infrastructure. By December, Ukrainian officials said domestic production had reached 950 interceptor drones per day. Russia is known to launch thousands of long-range drones into Ukraine each month, at times massing more than 800 in a single night. Its most frequently used platform is a locally produced version of the Iranian-designed Shahed loitering munition.

Cherevashenka noted the scale of the shift: “Compared to 2022, when the first drone arrived in September over Kyiv, it had a 40-kilogram warhead and was a primitive drone flying by coordinates,” he said. “Now, we have 14 types of warheads for the strike drones of the Russian Federation.”

He also warned that Russia has begun integrating artificial intelligence into its Shahed variants and is known to use mesh networks to guide them.

“We understand that this is not the end, that they will increase their capabilities,” Cherevashenka said. “Moreover, this year they have invested in the production of twice as many drones as last year.”

Interceptor drones represent one layer of Ukraine’s multi-tiered air defense system. The country also deploys truck-mounted machine-gun teams to engage incoming Shaheds, while reserving higher-end interceptor munitions for cruise and ballistic missile threats.

Many of Ukraine’s interceptor platforms are quadcopter-based, built for speed and agility. While the typical Shahed can reach speeds of up to 115 mph, more advanced variants are estimated to reach 230 mph, placing significant demands on pilot skill and reaction time. Successful engagements depend on rapid detection, precise tracking and aggressive maneuvering.

The 30 percent milestone suggests that Ukraine’s investment in inexpensive, rapidly produced interceptor drones is offsetting part of Russia’s numerical advantage in unmanned aerial attacks and reshaping how modern air defense is executed under sustained drone saturation.

Ukrainian interceptor drones now down 30% of Russian air targets

(Source: https://cuashub.com/

 

25 Feb 26. Metis Aerospace’s Skyperion Lightweight RF sensor previously tested in Ukraine. Metis Aerospace’s newly launched Skyperion Lightweight passive radio frequency (RF) sensor for unmanned aircraft system (UAS) detection has been tested in Ukraine, the CEO of Metis Aerospace, Tony Burnell, told Janes on 4 February. Skyperion Lightweight can detect and “bearing-locate Shahed 131/136 variants that emit RF such as those fitted with telemetry radios, video links, or commercial cellular modems”, according to Burnell. The system is unable to detect Shahed variants which are operating in a fully autonomous global navigation satellite system-aided inertial navigation system (GNSS/INS)-only configuration, Burnell added. This type of configuration means that the loitering munitions are “effectively radio silent”, according to Burnell. Skyperion Lightweight can be integrated within a multisensor counter-UAS (C-UAS). Skyperion performs UAS identification through a signal-level feature extraction, protocol analysis, and comparison against an RF signature library. Skyperion Lightweight is designed for wideband passive RF monitoring from approximately 30 MHz to 18 GHz, according to the company. It enables detection of UAS command-and-control (C2); telemetry and payload emissions across the very high frequency (VHF)/ultra-high frequency (UHF) telemetry bands including L, S, C, and X band links; 2.4 GHz and 5 GHz industrial, scientific, medical (ISM) bands; and commercial cellular bands, according to Burnell. (Source: Janes)

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25 Feb 26. Acquisition Reform Means a Focus on Warfighter Success. The War Department aims to modernize how acquisition — the buying of weapons and other materiel from manufacturers — is done to ensure American warfighters get the best tools, at the right price, and as quickly as possible.
In November 2025, for instance, Secretary of War Pete Hegseth announced a reorganization of the existing program executive offices into portfolio acquisition executives.
“The acquisition chain of authority will run directly from the program manager to the PAE,” Hegseth said at the time. “Each PAE will be the single accountable official for portfolio outcomes and have the authority to act without running through months or even years of approval chains. And they’ll be held accountable to deliver results.”
The secretary said PAEs will be empowered with authorities to make decisions on cost, schedule and performance trade-offs that prioritize time to field and mission outcomes.
During a panel discussion yesterday as part of the Air and Space Forces Association’s warfare symposium in Aurora, Colorado, Air Force Gen. Dale R. White, director of critical major weapon systems, said that effort will be transformational in the acquisition community.
“I think now we take it down to the next level and just think about where we are with our , what we’re doing with the PAEs, giving them authority to make decisions in real time, make trades, and be able to do probably the most important thing with this whole transformation,” White said. ” is not measure ourselves against acquisition outcomes but measure ourselves against mission outcomes, allowing that PAE to look at the operational problem and work to figure out a solution to that problem and be able to have the decision space to do so.”
White said it’s not just PAEs that must be empowered to do their job, but the acquisition enterprise as a whole must be aligned to make acquisition success about meeting mission requirements for the warfighter, not just a positive business outcome.
“We’re just not empowering PAEs; the idea is you get unity of command,” he said. “You get unity of effort. You allow that contracting officer to have a voice in solving that operational problem, that person, that engineer; you change the cultural mindset of how we look at what we’re doing.”
There are plenty of examples, White said, of where there was acquisition success that didn’t result in operational mission success.
“We may have done well on the acquisition side, but how well did that align to the operational need and what we’re trying to do,” he asked. “It is really that hard reset. It’s the empowerment piece and changing the dynamic by which we study the problems that we have.”
For acquisition professionals, White said, acquisition reform will require them to lead with conviction.
“Lead with vision, lead ruthlessly and lead with an intent to solve the operational problem,” he said. “If you want to know what acquisition as a warfighting function means, it means come together as a team, the operational team, the acquiring team, and deliver on the outcome. Sometimes that means you’re going to make some tough decisions that you have to have courage to make; make the decision, drive for the outcome.”
(Source: U.S. DoD)

 

26 Feb 26. Pentagon asks defense contractors about reliance on Anthropic’s AI services, source says.
• Summary
• Companies
• Pentagon wants Anthropic to ease military usage restrictions
• Hegseth has given Anthropic until 5 p.m. ET Friday to respond
• Pentagon has asked Lockheed about Anthropic, company says
• Has also contacted Boeing, Axios reports
The Pentagon has asked defense contractors to assess their reliance on Anthropic, a person familiar with the matter said on Wednesday, ahead of its Friday deadline for the AI service provider to respond to a request to eliminate safeguards.
The Department of Defense has been engaged in a months-long dispute with Anthropic, which Reuters reported has no intention of easing its usage restrictions for military purposes.
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Talks are continuing after a meeting between the Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth and Anthropic CEO Dario Amodei.
During the meeting, Hegseth said if Anthropic did not comply, the Pentagon would take action against it, with options including labeling it a supply-chain risk or invoking a law that would force Anthropic to change its rules, Reuters reported.
The Department of Defense has given Anthropic until Friday 5 p.m. Eastern time (2200 GMT) to respond, Reuters reported.
“The Office of the Secretary of War is preparing to execute on any decision that the Secretary might make on Friday regarding Anthropic,” a senior Pentagon official said.
The Pentagon has asked contractors including Lockheed Martin (LMT.N), oto provide an assessment of reliance on Anthropic, a step toward a potential designation of the AI firm as a supply-chain risk, the person familiar with the matter told Reuters.
Contacted contractors include Boeing (BA.N) Axios reported on Wednesday.
A Lockheed spokesperson told Reuters the Pentagon had contacted the company. Boeing Defense, Space and Security said it does not have any active contracts with Anthropic.
Anthropic did not respond to a request for comment.
The person familiar with the matter was not authorized to speak with media so declined to be identified.
The Pentagon has pushed big AI companies including Anthropic and OpenAI to make their AI tools available on classified networks without many of the standard restrictions that the companies apply to users, Reuters has reported.
Its dispute with Anthropic stems from the AI startup’s refusal to remove safeguards that would stop its technology being used to target weapons autonomously and conduct surveillance in the U.S.
The department used Anthropic’s AI products during a military raid that captured Venezuela’s President Nicolas Maduro, the Wall Street Journal reported. (Source: Reuters)

 

24 Feb 26. Air Force Secretary Outlines Priorities. The Department of the Air Force’s priorities are readiness, modernization, defending the homeland — including the entire hemisphere, border security, missile defense, nuclear deterrence and people, said Air Force Secretary Troy Meink, who spoke yesterday during the Air and Space Forces Association’s 2026 Warfare Symposium in Aurora, Colorado.
From a conventional deterrence perspective, the focus is on China, which continues to expand and modernize its military at an extremely fast pace, making deterrence in the Indo-Pacific region the biggest challenge by far, he said.
“Given that threat environment, the Air Force and the Space Force must be ready at any time for any threat across the entire spectrum of conflict,” Meink said.
One of the challenges is scaling up production of weapon systems and munitions. Accomplishing that requires the revival of the defense industrial base, which has experienced decades of neglect, he said.
The good news is that beginning last year, production of advanced aircraft and munitions has ramped up. Not as fast as needed, but faster than in the past, the secretary said, adding the testing program for the LGM-35A Sentinel is proceeding well.
The Air Force will replace the aging LGM-30 Minuteman III intercontinental ballistic missile with the Sentinel ICBM. This represents the modernization of the land-based leg of the nuclear triad.
In the space domain, an increase in rocket launches has put more capability into orbit than ever before, thanks to help from commercial partnerships and other military services, as well as the National Reconnaissance Office.
Acquisition transformation includes delivering mission-effective capabilities faster.
“To do that, we must innovate faster than our adversaries,” the secretary said.
To accomplish this, the workforce must be empowered to unleash their talent, take the initiative and know that supervisors have their backs, Meink said, adding that the Department of the Air Force has a phenomenal team. (Source: U.S. DoD)——————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————–
Founded in 1987, Exensor Technology is a world leading supplier of Networked Unattended Ground Sensor (UGS) Systems providing tailored sensor solutions to customers all over the world. From our Headquarters in Lund Sweden, our centre of expertise in Network Communications at Communications Research Lab in Kalmar Sweden and our Production site outside of Basingstoke UK, we design, develop and produce latest state of the art rugged UGS solutions at the highest quality to meet the most stringent demands of our customers. Our systems are in operation and used in a wide number of Military as well as Homeland Security applications worldwide. The modular nature of the system ensures any external sensor can be integrated, providing the user with a fully meshed “silent” network capable of self-healing. Exensor Technology will continue to lead the field in UGS technology, provide our customers with excellent customer service and a bespoke package able to meet every need.

A CNIM Group Company
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www.exensor.com
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02 Mar 26. Billion-pound helicopter deal secures 3,300 British jobs, boosts battlefield kit and unlocks up to £15 billion in UK exports

Leonardo UK selected for £1 billion contract for new medium helicopters (NMH) – which could work alongside uncrewed aircraft – to support defence operations around the globe.

• Leonardo UK selected for £1 billion contract for new medium helicopters (NMH) – which could work alongside uncrewed aircraft – to support defence operations around the globe.
• Upgraded deal makes Yeovil the global centre for Leonardo’s military helicopter production and exports, and sets up the UK as a leader for uncrewed and autonomous systems, a key frontier technology in the government’s Defence Industrial Strategy.
• International orders for Leonardo’s military helicopters built in Yeovil could see over £15 billion in exports over the next 10 years.

Thousands of skilled British jobs have been secured with a major helicopter deal that will boost the UK Armed Forces’ battlefield kit and makes Britain Leonardo’s global centre for military helicopter production and exports – worth a potential £15 billion over the next decade.

The £1 billion deal will also make Yeovil the centre of excellence for military helicopter autonomy, as the Ministry of Defence invests further in Proteus – the UK’s first autonomous uncrewed air system which is built by Leonardo and recently undertook its first flight. The development of uncrewed and autonomous technology in the UK is at the heart of the government’s Defence Industrial Strategy and could offer the opportunity to make platforms such as NMH optionally-crewed.

The new deal secured by the Government with Leonardo will provide the UK Armed Forces with 23 new medium-lift helicopters – which could work alongside uncrewed aircraft – and paves the path for future military international orders to be built in the UK, with an increased workshare for the UK above 40%. There are around 20 countries with requirements for new medium-lift helicopters. Together with Leonardo’s other helicopters, international orders for NMH could generate over £15 billion in exports over the next 10 years.

The agreement secures the future of the UK’s sovereign helicopter production and Leonardo’s facility in Yeovil, Somerset, sustaining 3,300 jobs. This includes 650 people working directly on NMH and more involved with autonomous systems and providing ongoing support and manufacture of the Merlin and Wildcat helicopter fleets. With a UK supply chain of nearly 70 companies, the programme also secures sovereign defence skills and expertise for decades to come.

The deal represents a major investment into the UK’s industrial base – a key pillar of delivery for the Defence Industrial Strategy and other growth driving sectors like Advanced Manufacturing and Digital and Technology.

Defence Secretary John Healey MP said: “This defence investment works for Britain on every level. It strengthens our Armed Forces, secures thousands of skilled British jobs, and sets up big export opportunities. It is a major vote of confidence in British industry, British workers and British innovation.

This Government’s broad deal makes Yeovil the proud home of Leonardo’s global military helicopter production, building world-class helicopters for our forces and allies around the world for many years to come.  It backs British jobs and security today and makes the UK a pace-setter in uncrewed, technology and innovation for tomorrow. ”

Chancellor Rachel Reeves said: “In an uncertain world we are backing Britain’s world‑class defence sector to both keep Britain safe and drive economic growth.

This historic partnership not only supports British jobs and security today, but positions the UK and its allies at the forefront of the next generation of defence and autonomous systems tomorrow.

The upgraded deal is the result of the government’s commitment to a new partnership and new ways of working with industry as set out in the Strategic Defence Review and Defence Industrial Strategy – and makes the MOD’s relationship with Leonardo even stronger. ”

In a major backing for Britain, the partnership will see the UK lead the world in helicopter innovation and autonomy, with Leonardo setting up Yeovil as a future centre of excellence for autonomous helicopters. Proteus which undertook its first flight at the end of January has demonstrated it can conduct a range of missions including anti-submarine warfare.

The agreement paves the path for future export orders of the AW149 helicopter to be built in the UK, significantly expanding the UK’s workshare for the aircraft and growing the local workforce in the South West, with a potential to sustain 3,900 jobs – a 20% increase.

Nigel Colman, Managing Director of Helicopters UK, Leonardo said: “We welcome the decision to award the New Medium Helicopter contract to supply medium lift helicopters to the Ministry of Defence, as well as the continued investment in Proteus – our autonomous rotary wing uncrewed air system in development with the Royal Navy.  Leonardo is committed to providing the UK Armed Forces with a world-class medium lift helicopter based on our leading AW149 platform that will serve our military personnel for many years to come.    The Government’s procurement of the AW149, as well as the continued investment in autonomy, will support more than 3,300 jobs in Yeovil, the Home of British Helicopters, as well as 12,000 across the UK supply chain.”

As the nature of warfare changes, the war in Ukraine has highlighted the continued importance of helicopters on the battlefield – transporting forces, kit and capabilities in complex environments. The NMH is capable of operating in all environments in support of defence operations around the globe, from warfighting to humanitarian assistance and disaster relief efforts.

The AW149 NMH will deliver multiple rotary wing requirements using a single aircraft-type. This means that the platform will be able to undertake defence tasks that were previously delivered by three different aircraft types, streamlining our capabilities – improving efficiency and operational flexibility now and in the future.

The new deal delivers on the Strategic Defence Review and Defence Industrial Strategy – improving warfighting readiness, strengthening the UK’s defence industrial base, and making defence as an engine for growth. The Ministry of Defence spends nearly £7 billion with the defence industry in the South-West, which supports more than 37,000 jobs.

The procurement is backed by the largest sustained increase in defence spending since the end of the Cold War – hitting 2.6% of GDP from 2027 with £270 billion this Parliament. (Source: https://www.gov.uk/

 

26 Feb 26. This week Finland brought together senior UK defence and aerospace stakeholders at the Finnish Ambassador’s Residence in London for a high-level strategic dialogue focused on Earth Observation (EO), Positioning, Navigation and Timing (PNT), and resilient space-enabled situational awareness.
Hosted by the Embassy of Finland and opened by Finland’s Minister for Foreign Trade and Development of Trade, Ville Tavio, the event convened representatives from UK defence institutions alongside six leading Finnish aerospace and security technology companies: ICEYE, Kuva Space, Kelluu, Modirum Platforms, ReOrbit and SharpNav.
The dialogue centred on how Arctic-hardened European space capabilities can support UK operational needs in contested environments, from maritime and northern approaches to resilient command and control systems.
Opening the event, Ambassador Teemu Turunen emphasised the importance of strengthening Europe’s technological sovereignty and resilience in an increasingly unstable geopolitical environment, stating that “every dependency is a vulnerability” and underlining the need for Europe to build strength together with trusted partners.
Minister Tavio placed the discussion firmly within the broader European security landscape:

“In the current geopolitical context, Europe must develop its capabilities in order to enhance its capacity to act on its own and reduce dependencies. We must ensure that European space capabilities are developed efficiently.
In this field, we see that Finland and the UK would be an excellent match. In both countries, we need growth and prosperity. In addition, we need economic activity and more partnerships with like-minded and trusted countries and companies.”
The Minister’s remarks echoed the UK Prime Minister’s recent statement at the Munich Security Conference, where he stressed the importance of deeper cooperation between Britain and Europe: “There is no British security without Europe, and there is no European security without Britain.”
Throughout the event, speakers highlighted how Finland’s operating environment – including its 1,300km border with Russia and Arctic conditions where austere weather and electromagnetic disruption are routine – has shaped the development of resilient, dual-use space technologies.
The Finnish companies showcased a breadth of operational capabilities spanning persistent, all-weather synthetic aperture radar (SAR) satellite imagery, advanced hyperspectral Earth observation and analytics, GPS-resilient positioning and timing systems, software-defined satellite connectivity, lower-altitude persistent ISR platforms, and secure communications and interoperable mission systems. Developed and tested in demanding Arctic conditions, these technologies are designed to operate in degraded and contested environments, supporting resilient command and control across maritime, air and joint domains.
A keynote address by Major General (Ret.) Juha-Pekka Keränen, former Commander of the Finnish Air Force, underscored how rapidly civilian-developed space technologies have transformed operational awareness, data processing and targeting cycles. He highlighted the growing importance of resilient space-based capabilities, diverse sensor integration, and sovereign access to data in modern multi-domain operations.
The panel discussion between company representatives that followed focused on accelerating collaboration between UK and Finnish industry, addressing procurement barriers, improving interoperability, and creating faster pathways from pilot projects to operational capability. Participants stressed that operational experimentation and early engagement with end users are essential for effectively integrating emerging technologies.
The governmental organisations present were encouraged to test services of start- and scaleups boldly with short pilot agreements, whereas the companies were encouraged to make sure that they understand the problems they intend to solve.
The event reflects Finland’s strengthened bilateral partnership with the UK following its accession to NATO and the Joint Declaration on Strategic Partnership signed in 2024. It also aligns with Finland’s new Team Finland strategy, which identifies the UK as a priority market, especially for digital services and advanced technologies.
As Europe reassesses its defence industrial base and space sovereignty in light of evolving security threats, the dialogue in London demonstrated clear alignment between Finnish innovation and UK operational priorities – and strong appetite on both sides for deeper industrial and technological cooperation.

 

24 Feb 26. Serbia: Alleged assassination plot is unlikely to weaken anti-government protest movement. On 23 February, the authorities arrested two men from Kraljevo (Raška district) suspected of planning the assassination of President Aleksandar Vučić and his family, as well as of preparing attacks on employees of the Ministry of Internal Affairs. The two men (43 and 51 years old, reportedly veterans) have allegedly plotted to overturn the constitutional order violently since December 2025. At the time of writing, no evidence confirming the suspicions has been presented, including any procured weapons. The case will almost certainly exacerbate tensions, which have been high since the start of a student-led anti-corruption, anti-government protest movement in November 2024. The ruling Serbian Progressive Party (SNS) and pro-government media have framed the case as the direct result of the protest movement, spreading false narratives that protesters have legitimised violence against Vučić. We assess that the case is unlikely to impact the protest movement, which remains highly resilient. A major protest is set to take place on 1 March in Niš (Nišava district); other major protests throughout March are possible nationwide. (Source: Sibylline)

 

24 Feb 26. Royal Marines will have an extra edge in Arctic combat after accomplishing a number of historic firsts as the UK looks to quickly develop how it utilises drones in warfare.
The UK’s Commandos are operating their heavy-lift Malloy Aeronautics T150B quadcopters, primarily used for logistical missions, during their winter deployment to Northern Norway in support of major NATO mission rehearsals in the region.
The marine drone operators of Malloy Flight, Delta Squadron, part of Devon-based Commando Logistic Regiment, have successfully carried out a number of milestone sorties, including transporting 81mm mortars, machine guns, ammunition, blood, and a bomb disposal robot across the battlefield.
These missions strengthen the Commando Force’s ability to fight across the extreme conditions of the Arctic while reducing the need for high-risk, long range ground manoeuvres – relying on the drone to make logistical deliveries instead of navigating across the unforgiving environment in all-terrain vehicles or on skis.
The three-man team have faced temperatures as low as -28c, pushing their machines to the limit as they carried out flights at the Blåtinden Ranges in the Troms region of Norway.
Malloy flight commander, Colour Sergeant Dan Lyness, said: “As the first team to integrate into ground forces in the UK we have been able to bring our experience from working in the UK to the high north and learn to operate with all the challenges of operating in temperatures below zero.
“This is a completely new capability that we are learning to exploit to enable greater movement on the ground with a reduced risk to life leveraging modern technology to our advantage.
“Heavy lift Uncrewed Aerial Systems have been used extensively in the Russia/Ukraine conflict with many new use cases, so it is critical we master this emerging capability quickly, training in the high north is a key part of that.”
The Royal Navy is developing its drone operations as it looks to keep pace with developments seen on the battlefields of Ukraine.
The Malloy T150B, which was declared ready for front-line operations last year after years of rigorous trials, can lift up to 68kg, fly up to 40 minutes and has a top speed of 60mph.
It is designed to carry ammunition, weaponry, food, team and medical supplies to Royal Marines operating in all manner of extreme environments.
The first operational deployment to Norway with the Royal Marines saw Delta Squadron assist mortar troops from 40 and 45 Commando to keep them moving forward without the need to carry their own weaponry.
The Malloy T150 flew the barrel, tripod and base plate for their 81mm mortars to their new firing lines, while also moving ammunition tins.
Fire Support Group from Charlie Company, 40 Commando, also benefitted from the help of the Malloys, with their General-Purpose Machine Guns and tripods moved to new positions, taking the burden away from the teams on the ground.
The drone operators also passed on critical knowledge of how to load and receive cargos from the drones, making future operations more seamless.
Added to that, a bomb disposal robot was flown to location, again freeing up the logistical burden.
Malloy Flight, made up of LCpl Will Cole, Colour Sergeant Lyness and Sergeant Ben Sykes, also helped medics develop tactics and procedures for flying blood boxes and medical packs to the front-line.
Coupled with these successes in the field, the drone operators worked closely with allies, mostly from Norway and the United States, to share tactical knowledge.
They also gave a brief to the Defence Secretary John Healey and 24 MPs from the parliamentary group, as well as defence seniors and commanders.
The Royal Marines Uncrewed Aerial System branch, currently 63-strong, work at Royal Navy Air Station Culdrose in Cornwall. They are assured by 700X Naval Air Squadron to operate and maintain their drones, before being sent out on deployments where they are needed.
700X are the Royal Navy’s drone experts and, last year, successfully made deliveries between warships during HMS Prince of Wales’ major Carrier Strike Group 25 global mission.
They are playing a central role as the UK looks to equip its aircraft carriers with hybrid air wings, combing fast jets, long-range weapons and a range of advanced drones. (Source: https://www.gov.uk
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Founded in 1987, Exensor Technology is a world leading supplier of Networked Unattended Ground Sensor (UGS) Systems providing tailored sensor solutions to customers all over the world. From our Headquarters in Lund Sweden, our centre of expertise in Network Communications at Communications Research Lab in Kalmar Sweden and our Production site outside of Basingstoke UK, we design, develop and produce latest state of the art rugged UGS solutions at the highest quality to meet the most stringent demands of our customers. Our systems are in operation and used in a wide number of Military as well as Homeland Security applications worldwide. The modular nature of the system ensures any external sensor can be integrated, providing the user with a fully meshed “silent” network capable of self-healing. Exensor Technology will continue to lead the field in UGS technology, provide our customers with excellent customer service and a bespoke package able to meet every need.

A CNIM Group Company
————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————–