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26 Feb 26. “Supporting the strategic deterrents of Europe’s two nuclear powers by providing the ability to disable the Russian BMD [Ballistic Missile Defence] system represents both a comparatively modest and strategically vital function for prompt strike capabilities.” This is according to Conventional Prompt Strike in European Military Power, a new RUSI research report by Dr Sidharth Kaushal, which says enhancing Europe’s long-range precision strike capabilities is becoming critical to safeguarding the credibility of Britain and France’s nuclear deterrents. The report says that as Russian missile defence systems, such as the A-235 and S-500, around Moscow improve, the longstanding assumption that a limited number of submarine-launched ballistic missiles from Britain’s and France’s nuclear deterrent will penetrate layered defences may no longer hold. The paper says the European ability to defeat or suppress Russian air and missile defences around Moscow through conventional prompt strike (CPS) capabilities, using medium-range ballistic missiles (MRBMs) and hypersonic glide vehicles (HGVs), must therefore be the “irreducible minimum” mission requirement for maintaining Europe’s assured credible nuclear deterrence. The report says that unlike the United States, Europe’s nuclear powers lack the scale of forces required to guarantee saturation of a robust, multi-layered BMD network and notes that Israel and the United States intercepted 90% of two Iranian ballistic missile salvoes of approximately 200 missiles each in 2024. The research also finds that, beyond this critical function, factors which are driving down the cost of both building and enabling missiles could also allow them to be fielded at a scale which means that a much wider target set can be struck. Noting the growing importance of conventional prompt strike in recent conflicts, the study sets out a series of recommendations, which acknowledge both US concerns of overstretch and a two-peer nuclear challenge, as well as European budgetary constraints.
Key Findings
- The credibility of European nuclear deterrence depends on defeating Moscow’s missile defences. The report states that supporting Europe nuclear deterrence by degrading Russian BMD is an “irreducible minimum” requirement of Europe’s prompt strike capabilities and “would constitute both the most achievable and the most urgent application of European prompt strike capabilities…European policymakers would thus do well to plan against the irreducible minimum immediately.”
- Layered missile defence poses a real challenge to smaller arsenals. The report concludes that “a three-tier ballistic missile defence system can be highly effective against a small to medium-sized number of targets.”
- Prompt strike is uniquely suited to suppress hardened, defended or dynamic targets. The report says: “The qualities of speed and manoeuvrability would serve as a means of maximising probability of effect against a small but very well-defended target set”, such as Moscow’s Ballistic Missile Defences.
Key Recommendations
- Prioritise the suppression of Russian BMD around Moscow as Europe’s critical prompt strike mission. The report argues that “prioritising this mission to the exclusion of others would be especially reasonable if the costs of missiles and availability of ISR do not substantially change.” It says ensuring that Moscow’s Don-2N radar, A-235 interceptors and S-500 components can be neutralised is essential to sustaining credible nuclear deterrence.
- Develop complementary capabilities to saturate and suppress layered defences. Ballistic missiles and HGVs should be combined to increase interceptor expenditure and target key elements of the BMD. The report notes: “Ballistic missiles and HGVs should be viewed as mutually reinforcing capabilities rather than alternatives.”
- Enhance Europe’s prompt strike capabilities incrementally. The report says: “European prompt strike capabilities should be developed incrementally, beginning with the irreducible minimum mission and expanding only as costs, industrial capacity and ISR access permit.” It warns against trying to achieve “unattainable theatre-wide strike concepts”.
- Europe can exploit changing economics. “The commercialisation of space-based ISR [Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance], advances in AI for data processing, and changes in defence industrial practices could substantially reduce the cost of sensing and effectors over the next decade. If missile costs fall and ISR becomes more available (independent of US support), the range of viable European concepts of operations expands significantly.”
Conclusion
Conventional Prompt Strike in European Military Power reframes the debate on hypersonic missiles and long-range strike in Europe. Rather than presenting CPS as a purely conventional deep-strike tool, it situates the capability within the logic of nuclear deterrence.
As Russia fields increasingly capable air and missile defence systems around Moscow, the assumption of assured penetration by smaller nuclear forces becomes less certain. In this environment, the ability to degrade or suppress those defences through conventional means becomes central to preserving deterrence stability. Prompt strike thus serves not merely as an operational enabler, but as a guarantor of strategic credibility.
The report says that without a credible pathway to defeat Moscow’s air and missile defences with prompt strike, Europe’s independent nuclear deterrents risk erosion. With carefully prioritised and incrementally developed prompt strike capabilities, however, they can remain credible even in an era of layered defences and shifting great-power dynamics.
Dr Sidharth Kaushal is a Senior Research Fellow at the Royal United Services Institute (RUSI), specialising in sea power and missile warfare. His work focuses on the operational implications of emerging military technologies. The report draws on research conducted between October and December 2025, including modelling of missile defence effectiveness, analysis of Russian primary sources, data from recent conflicts, and semi-formal interviews with analysts and industry experts. It conceptualises prompt strike as a “reconnaissance-strike complex” and assesses how missile costs and ISR access shape viable European concepts of operations.
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26 Feb 26. Benin-Niger-Nigeria: Escalating jihadist activity elevates attack, kidnap risks in north-western Nigeria. On 16 February, Armed Conflict Location and Event Data (ACLED) reported an intensification of activity in the past year by the al-Qaeda-aligned Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM) and Islamic State – Sahel Province (ISSP) in the border region between Benin, Niger and Nigeria. The two groups’ attacks have increased by 86% in the tri-border region, while deaths have increased by 262% to over 1,000. In Nigeria, armed groups (known locally as bandits) were the largest prior security threat in north-western states; they engage in attacks, extortion and other forms of violent crime (see Sibylline Situation Update Brief – 23 January 2026). However, bandits’ motivations are primarily financial and resource-focused, in contrast to jihadist groups’ ideologically driven determination to destabilise the Nigerian state. Consequently, we assess that an expanding jihadist presence will likely evolve security threats in north-western Nigeria, increasing the risk of attacks designed to cut off supplies to towns and cities in Kebbi, Kwara, Niger and Sokoto states. Additionally, an increased jihadist presence would increase the risk of kidnappings against Western nationals in these states, with local criminals able to pass on captives and mitigate their exposure to violent rescue operations. (Source: Sibylline)
25 Feb 26. SA Defence budget disappointment. In spite of Presidential assurances and some ad hoc allocations, South Africa’s defence budget will shrink by R2bn next year. This is according to the 2026 Estimates of National Expenditure (ENEs) published by National Treasury on Wednesday alongside Finance Minister Enoch Godongwana’s Budget Speech. The 2025/26 defence budget (Vote 23) stands at R59bn, up from R57.9bn the year before, but will drop down to R57.6 bn in 2026/27 before increasing slightly to R59.8bn in 2027/28, and R61.7bn in 2028/29. This represents a 1.5% average growth rate, which is well below inflation and represents a decrease in real terms. This “is due to a sharp decrease in spending in the Regional Security subprogramme in the Force Employment programme because of the phased withdrawal of South African National Defence Force troops deployed in the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo through Operation Thiba,” Vote 23 read. Operation Thiba was in support of the Southern African Development Community (SADC) Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo (SAMIDRC), which was terminated in March last year. South Africa’s contribution to the United Nations mission in the DRC (MONUSCO) is also being terminated. The real term decline in the defence budget goes against promises by President and Commander-in-Chief Cyril Ramaphosa at Armed Forces Day commemorations on 21 February. Ramaphosa acknowledged the underfunding of the South African National Defence Force (SANDF) over many years and pledged additional financial allocations to turn the situation around, as well as matching resources with missions. In his speech he said funding of the SANDF has been tapering down over a number of years, but this “can no longer continue”. As a result, the military must be repositioned to make it stronger, with resources matching operational missions.
“Given the critical importance of the SANDF to our security, sovereignty and development, additional resources have been allocated from the budget”, to equip the SANDF to execute its task of defending the people of South Africa, Ramaphosa said. “This is a targeted intervention to close funding gaps, improve efficiencies and ensure our operational ambitions are matched by our resources.”
Godongwana said that R2.7 bn has been added to defence over the three-year medium term period to improve operations, including to maintain the South African Air Force’s fighter capability: defence will receive an additional R857 m in 2026/27, another R899 m in 2027/28, and R942 m in 2028/29.
“In addition, we have allocated R1 bn to the police service, and another R1 bn to the SANDF, through the CARA [Criminal Assets Recovery Account] fund for the fight against organised crime,” the Minister said.
This is in line with Ramaphosa’s State of the Nation Address announcement that the SANDF would be deployed alongside police to fight illegal mining and gangsterism in the Eastern Cape, Western Cape, and Gauteng.
Additional allocations
Some good news for the SA Air Force is that an additional R1.4 bn is allocated over the next three years in the Air Defence programme for the maintenance of the South African Air Force’s fighter capability. “These funds are expected to ensure that 12 000 hours are flown each year over the medium term, thereby strengthening the fighter fleet’s readiness for urgent internal and external deployments,” the ENEs stated. For 2024/25, just 6 210 flying hours were flown. For the SA Navy, a total of R1.6bn is allocated over the next three years for the maintenance of vessels. “The department aims to maintain the number of hours at sea at 8 000 in each year over the MTEF period to align performance with the available budget. The Maritime Combat Capability subprogramme in the Maritime Defence programme has a budget of R3.7 bn over the medium term to carry out these activities,” Vote 23 read. Funding has hampered hours at sea due to the non-availability of serviceable vessels – the SA Navy spent only 3 717 hours at sea in 2024/25, against an 8 000 hour target. During the period ahead, the Department of Defence will continue to combat maritime threats, including maritime crime and piracy, terrorism, illegal fishing, the smuggling of contraband, the illegal dumping of toxic waste, and uncontrolled migration at sea, according to the ENEs. The South African Navy plans to conduct maritime border patrols and combat piracy particularly in the Mozambique Channel through the deployment of frigate), submarines and offshore patrol vessels to keep South Africa’s maritime space safe and support the execution of the Southern African Development Community’s maritime security strategy, Vote 23 continued. Travel and subsistence funds are going to be reprioritised over the next three years from across the SANDF and allocated to the Maritime Defence programme to strengthen the maritime reaction squadron, “a specialised unit of the South African Navy responsible for providing combat-ready amphibious, diving and small-boat capabilities for peacekeeping and humanitarian operations, and for the procurement of South African Navy ammunition.” R338 m will be reprioritised. The South African Army will be getting new vehicles and technology for border safeguarding. These force multipliers are “expected to increase the range of the borderline under protection and help prevent illegal border crossings, smuggling and other activities that could compromise national security.”
“The department will also continue to support the South African Police Service to address internal security challenges, including the protection of critical government infrastructure and national key points, and operations related to illegal mining, public unrest and the 2026 local government elections. These activities are carried out through allocations amounting to R4.2 bn over the next three years in the Support to the People subprogramme in the Force Employment programme,” according to the defence vote.
SA Army personnel will benefit from an allocation of R255 m over the next three years to procure new uniforms as the SANDF rolls out its new camouflage scheme.
Compensation of employees
The spending on the compensation of employees (CoE) accounts for 65% of the defence budget, although this is likely to be higher as the SANDF consistently overspends on salaries. As a result, the 2026 ENEs stated that “To ease the pressure on the department’s personnel budget, over the next three years, it will continue to manage commuted overtime within the South African Military Health Service by ensuring that it does not exceed 30% of each employee’s total annual salary package and allow natural attrition to ensure that total personnel numbers do not exceed an average strength of 74 000.” At present, personnel headcount is 70 000. To further manage personnel costs, the department plans to exit 227 eligible personnel hired in terms of the Public Service Act (1994) by the end of 2026/27 through the government-wide early retirement programme, which allows retirement without penalties on pension benefits. The department is set to receive an additional R76.1 m in 2026/27 in its budget for transfers to households to make provision for early retirement and voluntary exit programmes. Commenting on the latest budget, Deputy Defence and Military Veterans Minister Bantu Holomisa noted Treasury’s efforts to provide additional funding through various means, but warned that “the resources provided do not even come close to the directive given by the President to spend 1.5% of GDP on Defence. It’s not only a decrease in real terms but in normal terms as well.” Defence spending is currently about .8% of GDP. Defence analyst Ricardo Teixeira noted that the current budget is a 5.14% decrease in nominal terms, and a far cry from the promised 1.5%. “At this rate, SANDF will have zero capabilities left by the end of the decade. Treasury seems to treat defence with disdain. (Source: https://www.defenceweb.co.za/)
24 Feb 26. New funding programme aims to strengthen the Brazilian defence industry. The Brazilian Ministry of Science, Technology and Innovation has launched a new funding effort designed to promote innovation across the local defence industrial base and reduce dependence on foreign technologies. A total of BRL300m (USD58.2m) from the National Fund for Scientific and Technological Development is to be gradually made available by the Funding Authority for Studies and Projects (Finep) of the Ministry of Science, Technology and Innovation. This funding is part of a BRL3.3bn package approved on 6 February as part of the ‘More Innovation Brazil’ initiative. The public call led by Finep seeks to achieve 50% autonomy in the production of critical defence technologies to strengthen national sovereignty. Funding will be applied to projects between technology readiness level (TRL) 3 and 8 during the project execution period, according to Finep. Projects to be supported include unmanned systems and robotics; space systems; hypersonic systems; cyber security and cyber defence; electronic warfare; biotechnology; and chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) defence; missiles and rockets; communications; radar systems; artificial intelligence; energy and storage; propulsion; energetic materials; directed energy; advanced materials; nuclear technologies; and quantum technologies. Economic sustainability, such as exports, dual-use, and substitution of imports, will also be considered. Every project must be submitted by a company in a single or consortium format arrangement that is accredited as a Strategic Defense Company (EED) by the Secretariat of Defence Products (SEPROD) of the Ministry of Defence. (Source: Janes)
25 Feb 26. Afghanistan-Pakistan: Border clashes underscore elevated tensions, risk of further airstrikes. On 24 February, Afghan and Pakistani forces engaged in fresh clashes in the Torkham and Tirah sectors (Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province, Pakistan) along the shared border. Both countries have accused each other of provoking the exchange, with the spokesperson for Pakistan’s prime minister accusing the Afghan Taliban authorities of initiating unprovoked fire. The spokesperson for an Afghan army corps in eastern Afghanistan stated that border forces were on patrol near the Durand Line (the de facto border) in Achin and Durbaba districts (both Nangarhar province, Afghanistan) when they came under fire. No casualties have been reported so far. The border clashes come after Pakistan conducted airstrikes in Afghanistan targeting ‘militant camps and hideouts’ in Nangarhar and Paktika provinces on 22 February, killing 18 people. The skirmishes, which follow a fragile ceasefire in October 2025, underscore elevated tensions between Islamabad and Kabul. We assess that further border exchanges are highly likely in the coming days. There is a realistic possibility of Pakistan conducting additional airstrikes inside Afghanistan, particularly in response to deadly militant attacks in Pakistan. (Source: Sibylline)
25 Feb 26. Cambodia-Thailand: Border exchange allegations highlight sustained fragility of ceasefire. On 24 February, Thailand’s military alleged that Cambodian troops fired a single 44 mm round from a grenade launcher at Thai troops patrolling along a barbed wire fence in Kantharalak district (Si Sa Ket province). The Thai military claimed that they returned fire to control the situation and that the Cambodian side had acted similarly twice before. No injuries were reported. Cambodia has disputed the allegations and stated that it remains committed to the ceasefire agreed in December 2025. We assess that this incident is unlikely to result in a breakdown of the ceasefire, with Thailand suggesting that it possibly occurred due to issues of unfamiliarity arising from recently rotated Cambodian troops. In the short term, we assess that both sides will likely be motivated to avoid a return to active armed hostilities. However, tensions remain high, with Cambodia accusing Thailand of encroaching on its territory. Significant exchanges of fire or casualties from allegedly freshly planted landmines would threaten the ceasefire. The risk will remain elevated until bilateral talks progress over demarcation and heavy weaponry is withdrawn from border areas. (Source: Sibylline)
24 Feb 26. SA NCACC inefficiency leading to loss of business – JSCD. Parliament’s Joint Standing Committee on Defence (JSCD) has raised “serious concerns” over the effectiveness of the National Conventional Arms Control Committee (NCACC) and the functionality of the Directorate for Conventional Arms Control (DCAC) in facilitating defence imports and exports, which have led to business closures and job losses. The committee made its concerns known in a statement issued on Saturday after a Friday 20 February meeting with the Aerospace, Maritime and Defence Industries Association of South Africa (AMD), which outlined the significant challenges currently facing the sector. The Co-Chairperson of the committee, Phiroane Phala, said: “It is unacceptable that the South African defence industry continues to suffer under the weight of irregular meetings by the NCACC, which make it difficult to approve applications, leading to loss of business. The fact that defence industry businesses are forced to shut down, resulting in job losses, is an indictment on the NCACC and must be resolved urgently.” The committee said its concerns arise in the context of the call by President Cyril Ramaphosa to intensify efforts to attract investment and remove barriers that impede economic growth.
“The longstanding challenges at the NCACC and the DCAC directly undermine the industry’s ability to compete in a highly competitive global environment. This not only leads to job losses, but also erodes intellectual capacity within the industry, as critical skills are lost to international competitors,” Phala emphasised.
The committee noted that inefficiencies within the NCACC and DCAC have had a direct and adverse impact on companies, including increased export and import losses, missed delivery deadlines resulting in revenue loss, reputational damage, job losses, and the relocation of companies offshore. The JSCD said it is also of serious concern that no formal platform exists for structured engagement between the regulator and the defence industry to address operational challenges. “A formal platform to ventilate impediments is necessary to resolve challenges before they become barriers to effectiveness. The committee calls on the Chairperson of the NCACC to urgently revive and finalise a process initiated by the former Chairperson,” said Dr Malusi Gigaba, Co-Chairperson of the committee. Regarding capacity constraints within the DCAC, the committee “expressed alarm that despite repeated assurances of improvements to Information Technology systems aimed at streamlining application processes, no tangible progress has been realised. Persistent staff shortages, incompatible IT infrastructure, and the loss of applications remain ongoing challenges. Furthermore, the committee also called for the completion of a process to fill the office of the Director of DCAC to ensure strategic drive of the secretariat.” The committee said it resolved to urgently invite the NCACC and DCAC to appear before it to account for the failure to implement the promised reforms. A physical meeting has been scheduled for 6 March 2026 to urgently address the matter.
“We do not want to be complicit in these challenges. We cannot continue discussing the same issues without arriving at a cogent and implementable solution,” Phala concluded.
The committee said it has requested the industry to submit concrete proposals aimed at strengthening the regulatory framework and ensuring a more efficient and competitive arms trade environment. (Source: https://www.defenceweb.co.za/)
23 Feb 26. Mali: Tuareg militant drone strike will increase threats to staff, human rights concerns. On 18 February, the secessionist Azawad Liberation Front (FLA) conducted a drone strike on a convoy of Malian Armed Forces (FAMa) and Africa Corps personnel transiting between Aguelhok and Anéfis (both Kidal region). The FLA claims that the strike resulted in several casualties and that subsequent FAMa operations killed two militants. Since 2023, the FLA has conducted sporadic drone strikes targeting FAMa and Africa Corps personnel, assets and convoys, primarily in north-eastern Mali. In the coming months, the FLA will almost certainly continue leveraging these capabilities and engaging in further drone attacks within its area of operations. Staff routinely engaging in overland movement in Kidal and Tombouctou regions will face an elevated risk of exposure to militant drone attacks, particularly if accompanied by military escorts. More broadly, we assess that sustained secessionist militant activity will likely continue undermining the FAMa’s capacity to engage in counter-insurgency operations targeting local al Qaeda and Islamic State (IS) affiliates. Consequently, the FAMa and Africa Corps will likely continue relying on indiscriminate attacks targeting ethnic-Tuareg and ethnic-Fulani communities, increasing ethno-religious tensions and bolstering militant recruitment. (Source: Sibylline)
23 Feb 26. The latest Military Balance assessment produced by the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) finds that global defence dynamics are undergoing rapid change, driven by shifts in US policy under President Donald Trump’s second administration.
Key findings:
- The United States’ defence policy has pivoted to homeland defence and burden-shifting
- Global defence spending reached USD2.63 trillion, rising 2.5% year on year
- Four years on from the 2022 invasion of Ukraine, Russia’s marginal territorial gains continue to come at a high cost. However, Russia has been able to adapt, regenerate and maintain its capability
- Growth in trackable Russian military expenditure has moderated compared to previous years, reaching just 3% in real terms in 2025. Nonetheless, military spending still accounts for 7.3% of GDP
- Europe’s share of total global spending is now at 21% with Germany’s increase accounting for a quarter of all European growth since 2024
- Chinese military spending growth still outpaces the rest of Asia. As a result, Beijing’s share of the regional total grew to almost 44% in 2025, up from an average of 37% between 2010 and 2020
- Despite the recent purge within the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) command structure, there appears to be little impact on Chinese capabilities
In its 67th edition, The Military Balance 2026 examines the effects on the United States, its allies and the wider world. US defence policy is increasingly focussed on homeland defence, exemplified by proposals for a multi-layered “Golden Dome” missile-defence system. Direct US support for Ukraine has been curtailed while at the same time, US forces face growing strain from simultaneous commitments in the Caribbean, the Indo-Pacific and the Middle East. Europe’s share of global defence spending has increased sharply to 21%, up from 17% in 2022, reflecting sustained growth as the continent responds to both Russian aggression and reduced US willingness to underwrite regional security. While German spending increases are largely driving that rise, there were also significant budget uplifts in Belgium, the Nordic countries and Spain. Despite further increases expected across the region in 2026, procurement reform in general remains relatively slow and insufficiently innovative. Efforts to reinforce NATO’s eastern flank are under way, but addressing air and missile defence shortfalls remains a priority. Limited industrial capacity and the challenges of scaling production remain constraints on European rearmamentno. Russia’s war against Ukraine continues to impose severe costs on Moscow. Despite achieving only limited territorial gains with heavy casualties, Russia has been able to sustain the size of its deployed forces and has pushed defence spending to record levels in the years immediately after 2022. This is now triple the figure in 2021, despite a slowdown in growth in 2025. China’s sustained military activity around Taiwan continues, despite an ongoing internal anti-corruption campaign within the PLA. Its technological developments were showcased at the “Victory Day” parade in September, where systems on show included the now operational JL-1 air-launched ballistic missile. The PLA Navy commissioned its largest and most capable aircraft carrier, the Fujian, along with at least nine new major surface combatants. Ten new nuclear-powered submarines were launched between 2021 and 2025, outpacing the US Navy both in terms of hulls and tonnage during that timeframe. Furthermore, Chinese-origin aircraft and weapons were put to the test operationally by Pakistan’s military in its conflict with India. Consistent uplifts in the Chinese defence budget over the last decade have outpaced growth in the wider region and Beijing’s share of regional spending has grown to almost 44% in 2025, up from an average of 37% between 2010 and 2020. In the Middle East and North Africa, US defence partnerships with the Gulf states have strengthened, particularly with Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates. Regional defence spending reached USD219 bn, with countries spending an average of 4.3% of GDP.
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