NEWS IN BRIEF – MIDDLE EAST

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Military And Security Developments

Mar 05.

KEY DEVELOPMENTS

IRAN-US-ISRAEL: Iran will likely continue conserving munitions as part of efforts to transition the ongoing conflict into a war of attrition, increasing the risk of prolonged instability.
IRAQ-IRAN: Further pre-emptive Iranian strikes against opposition groups in Iraqi Kurdistan are highly likely in the coming days, amid contested reports regarding a Kurdish-led ground operation in western Iran.
ISRAEL-LEBANON: The Israel Defense Forces (IDF)’s evacuation warning for municipalities in the Lebanese capital Beirut’s Dahieh and Shiyyah suburbs highlight significant armed escalation risks.
IRAN-AZERBAIJAN: A likely Iranian drone attack targeting Azerbaijan’s exclave underscores the risk of conflict spillover in the Caucasus region.
IRAN: The US’ ambiguity regarding succession plans in Iran underscores the risk of a protracted leadership crisis in Iran.
IRAN-US-ISRAEL: The US and Israel have continued to launch airstrikes targeting Iran’s security and police forces, underscoring sustained security threats in residential areas. Since our last report, US and Israeli airstrikes have continued targeting government and military facilities, with a particular focus on missile storage and launch facilities. Airstrikes have also targeted police stations and the Iranian Cyber Police (FATA)’s facilities in major cities such as Ilam (Ilam province), Karaj (Alborz province), Kermanshah (Kermanshah province), Tabriz (East Azerbaijan province) and the capital Tehran. Earlier on 5 March, an airstrike destroyed Azadi Stadium in the capital Tehran, following reports that the Basij paramilitary had requisitioned the facility as a staging area for forces and equipment. These developments underscore the US’ and Israel’s continued efforts to undermine Iran’s capacity to repress internal dissent, as part of their aim to establish conditions conducive to a popular uprising. While such airstrikes will almost certainly continue, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC)’s and the Basij’s ability to requisition civilian infrastructure and embed positions in residential areas will likely prevent the US and Israel from entirely undermining their capacity in the short term. Nevertheless, civilians in Iran will face sustained threats to life stemming from exposure to airstrikes, shrapnel and cascading infrastructure failure, particularly in major cities in western Iran.
IRAN-US-ISRAEL: Iran will likely continue conserving munitions as part of efforts to transition the ongoing conflict into a war of attrition, increasing risks of prolonged instability. On 4 March, the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) announced that they had dropped over 5,000 munitions within Iran since launching Operation Roaring Lion on 28 February. The neutralisation of Iran’s air defences will likely facilitate further airstrikes in the coming days, sustaining critical threats to life in Iran. By contrast, on 4 March, US officials stated that the number of daily Iranian ballistic missile launches observed has fallen by 86% since 28 February, while drone launches have decreased by 73%. While this trend likely reflects US and Israeli success in undermining Iran’s military capacity, the Iranian security forces are likely conserving munitions to facilitate a prolonged engagement in a war of attrition with the US and Israel. Consequently, the rate of Iranian missile and drone attacks will likely remain below the levels observed on 28 February and 1 March. However, the risk of successful air defence penetration in the Gulf region and Israel will sustain threats to locally engaged staff and assets (see below).
IRAN-US: The US has continued to target Iranian naval vessels, increasing the likelihood of Iran’s naval retaliation in the coming days. On 4 March, a US Navy submarine struck and destroyed the IRIS Dena while it was located approximately 40 nautical miles (74km) south of Galle (Sri Lanka). The strike reportedly killed 80 crew members, while 30 others remain unaccounted for. The US Central Command (CENTCOM) subsequently released a statement indicating that it has ‘struck or sunk’ at least 20 Iranian naval vessels since 28 February. Although US Secretary of War Pete Hegseth stated on 4 March that the US has ‘eliminated’ Iran’s naval capabilities, it is unlikely that the above-mentioned strikes (targeting 20 vessels) constitute the effective destruction of Iran’s conventional and non-conventional (i.e. IRGC) naval capabilities. As such, Iran’s naval forces will likely remain semi-operational in the coming days, sustaining pressure on the Strait of Hormuz and restricting commercial shipping activity in the Persian Gulf. Nevertheless, the US’ continued targeting of Iranian naval vessels and port facilities is highly likely to limit Iran’s conventional naval capacity. Consequently, Iran will likely increase its use of unmanned surface vehicles (USVs), unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) and missiles to enforce the de facto closure of the Strait of Hormuz, sustaining critical threats to vessels, crew and cargo attempting to traverse the waterway in the coming days.
IRAN-IRAQ-REGION: Concerns of an imminent Kurdish-led insurgency in western Iran will increase risks of broader tensions with Iraq and the US. Overnight on 4-5 March, several media outlets reported that ‘hundreds’ of ethnic-Kurdish militants had launched a ground operation in north-western Iran. While no evidence of such an operation has emerged in the past 24 hours, reports come amid increasing speculation of an imminent offensive by the Coalition of Political Forces of Iranian Kurdistan (CPFIK; a coalition of six Iranian Kurdish armed groups based in Iraq) against the Iranian authorities, possibly with US backing. White House Press Secretary Karoline Leavitt stated on 4 March that reports that the US plans to arm Iranian Kurdish militants are ‘completely false’. However, we assess that there is a realistic possibility that the US will provide covert support to Iranian Kurdish militants to exacerbate pressure on Iran’s security forces. In the event of an escalating Kurdish insurgency in western Iran, security conditions are highly likely to deteriorate in Iran’s Kermanshah, Kurdistan and West Azerbaijan provinces, with conflict spillover likely impacting security conditions in western Hamadan, Ilam and Lorestan provinces. The Iranian security forces are highly likely to engage in indiscriminate attacks targeting ethnic-Kurdish communities, significantly increasing human rights concerns and ethno-religious tensions. Amid broader capacity constraints, the Iranian security forces will also possibly engage in low-cost offensive operations targeting militant-linked locations, employing barrel bombs, land mines and improvised explosive devices. Amid concerns of an imminent CPFIK insurgency, tensions between the US, Iran and the Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI) will likely escalate, increasing instability risks along the Iran-Iraq border (see below).
IRAQ-IRAN: Further pre-emptive Iranian strikes against opposition groups in Iraqi Kurdistan are highly likely in the coming days, amid contested reports regarding a Kurdish-led ground operation in western Iran. On 4 March, local media reported that Iranian missiles struck a base belonging to the Kurdistan Freedom Party (PAK), a prominent Iranian opposition group, in Degala (Erbil governorate; Iraq). On the same day, a separate Iranian drone and missile attack targeted a camp belonging to the Komala Party, another Iranian Kurdish opposition movement, in Sulaymaniyah governorate (Iraq). The strikes came hours after the Komala Party joined the newly formed CPFIK, which aims to unify efforts against Iran’s government and advance Kurdish self-determination, according to the official announcement. The developments coincide with the above mentioned reports of an imminent Kurdish-led ground operation against the Iranian forces in Iran’s western majority-Kurdish provinces (commonly known collectively as Rojhelat). Nevertheless, we assess that the risks of such operations will remain high throughout the next two weeks despite the likely reluctance of Iraq’s Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) to become involved. The KRG has been actively distancing itself from reports of said operation, primarily to mitigate risks of direct Iranian retaliation against the KRI’s capital Erbil and to reduce tensions with Turkey and the central Iraqi authorities. However, despite the KRG’s cautious approach, we assess that further Iranian pre-emptive strikes against opposition groups inside Iraq’s Kurdistan are highly likely in the coming days. Similarly, US-Israeli clearing strikes are also likely along the border between KRI and Rojhelat, widening the scope of the ongoing armed conflict.
IRAQ-US-ISRAEL: Iran-linked proxies will almost certainly continue targeting Erbil in the coming days, possibly widening the scope of attacks to include oil fields, energy grids and infrastructure. Since our last report, joint Israel-US strikes against the Iran-backed Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) and affiliated groups have continued, mostly in rural areas of Nineveh governorate. The strikes killed and injured several Kata’ib Hezbollah (KH) and Kata’ib Sayyid al‑Shuhada members. Meanwhile, Saraya Awliya al-Dam, a faction within the Islamic Resistance in Iraq (IRI) organisation, has claimed to have conducted a drone attack on a hotel in Erbil hosting US troops, though no data at the time of writing corroborates such a claim. Additionally, several drones have targeted Erbil International Airport (EBL) and the US consulate in Erbil. While these were all intercepted, debris fell in three residential areas, injuring at least one civilian. We assess that Iran-linked proxy attacks will almost certainly continue, primarily in Erbil and against Erbil Airport. There is also a high possibility that these groups will target oil fields in Iraqi Kurdistan, triggering further operational disruption to the region’s energy sector and exacerbating already-high risks of intermittent power cuts.
ISRAEL-LEBANON: The IDF’s evacuation warning for municipalities in the Lebanese capital Beirut’s Dahieh and Shiyyah suburbs highlight significant armed escalation risks. Earlier on 5 March, the IDF issued an evacuation warning for all residents of Beirut’s Bourj el-Barajneh, Hadath and Haret Hreik municipalities (within Dahieh suburb), as well as Shiyyah suburb. The announcement includes guidance on evacuation routes, prohibiting movement to the south and warning against returning until further notice. An intensive Israeli strike campaign targeting these areas is almost certain in the coming hours; it is highly likely to continue throughout the next 24 hours at least and likely to carry on through the coming days. There is a realistic possibility that these strikes aim to eliminate Lebanese Hizballah (LH)’s secretary general Naim Qassem and other LH leaders. As such, targeted strikes against vehicles on roads exiting Beirut will remain a realistic possibility in the coming hours and days. This will significantly increase security risks within Beirut and its surrounding areas. Furthermore, the evacuation warning and strike campaign will significantly increase the risk of LH escalating strikes against Israeli population centres. This will further increase security and business disruption risks in northern Israel and particularly along the Israel-Lebanon border in the coming days.
GULF REGION-IRAN: Iranian missile and drone attacks continue against Gulf states, increasing the likelihood of retaliation in the coming days. Air defence systems have successfully intercepted most of Iran’s ordnance; however, some impacts have been confirmed in the UAE and near energy infrastructure in Saudi Arabia. There are also reports of explosions near Qatar’s capital Doha, likely during attempted strikes on sites linked to the US’ Al Udeid Air Base (Al Rayyan municipality). Continued Iranian attacks against Gulf states will possibly prompt a military response from the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) in the coming days. A response will possibly take the form of directly targeting drone and missile launch facilities within Iran, or of launching attacks against Iran-linked proxies in Iraq or Yemen. Regardless, Iranian attacks against GCC states will likely continue in the coming hours and days, elevating personnel security risks for individuals near US military assets, energy facilities and/or in urban centres arising from direct targeting and debris from interception. Meanwhile, Saudi Arabia has begun shifting crude oil exports to its Red Sea hub at Yanbu (Medina province) as disruptions in the Strait of Hormuz constrain Gulf shipments, underscoring efforts to circumvent regional energy supply chain failures. However, this is unlikely to offset the shortfalls caused by the Strait of Hormuz’s effective closure and the disruption to energy production sites in the Gulf, including Saudi Aramco’s Ras Tanura refinery (Saudi Arabia) and QatarEnergy’s liquefied natural gas (LNG) plant (Qatar).
EUROPE REGION-CYPRUS-IRAN: A European deployment of military assets to the eastern Mediterranean region will sustain conflict escalation risks in the coming days and weeks. Earlier on 5 March, Italy’s Minister of Defence Guido Crosetto told the Italian parliament that France, Italy, the Netherlands and Spain will send naval assets to protect Cyprus in the coming days. Also earlier on 5 March, France authorised the temporary presence of US aircraft at its bases. This comes after France’s 3 March announcement that it is deploying the aircraft carrier Charles de Gaulle (R91) to the eastern Mediterranean region. The developments follow a warning on 2 March from a senior IRGC commander that Iran would launch additional attacks against Cyprus, after the UK Royal Air Force (RAF) Akrotiri base in Cyprus was struck by a drone from an unknown source. Europe’s growing involvement in defensive measures will increase the risk of a multi-party conflict escalation in the coming days and weeks, compounding regional security risks.
IRAN-AZERBAIJAN: A likely Iranian drone attack targeting an Azeri exclave underscores the risk of conflict spillover in the Caucasus region. Earlier on 5 March, unidentified drones crashed in the Nakhchivan Autonomous Republic, Azerbaijan’s exclave located along the Armenia-Iran border. A drone struck a school building in Shakarabad village, while the other struck the passenger terminal of Nakhchivan International Airport (NAJ), which functions as both a civilian and military airport. The Azerbaijani authorities have stated that the drones were Iranian and have summoned Iran’s ambassador to explain the incident; the Iranian authorities have denied this allegation. Given Azerbaijan’s longstanding relations with Israel, we assess that the drones were likely Iranian and possibly targeted the Nakhichevan Airport due to its military usage. As the Israel-US-Iran war continues to escalate, we also assess that the Iranian authorities’ fear of encirclement will increase the risk of them intensifying drone and missile attacks targeting locations along the Iran-Azerbaijan border. In the event of an extended conflict and/or direct European involvement in airstrikes against Iran, hostilities targeting Azerbaijan’s energy infrastructure will become more likely, including offshore and onshore oil refining facilities and hydrocarbon transit infrastructure supplying Europe and Israel. This will increase the risk of temporary localised airspace closures across Azerbaijan and Armenia, compounding pressure on regional supply chain continuity and restricting access to commercial evacuation routes.

POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS

IRAN: The US’ ambiguity regarding succession plans in Iran underscores the risk of a protracted leadership crisis in Iran. On 4 March, Leavitt stated that the international community should ‘wait and see’ who becomes Iran’s next supreme leader. Leavitt’s statement comes after US President Donald Trump stated on 3 March that most of the individuals the US had considered as alternative leaders for Iran ‘are dead [… or] may be dead’. The statement underscores the US’ ambiguous goals regarding regime dynamics in Iran following the assassination of Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei on 28 February and of numerous high-ranking government officials in Iran. Given these deaths, we assess that Iran’s Assembly of Experts is unlikely to select an individual amenable to co-operation with the US and to diplomatic de-escalation as the next supreme leader. Furthermore, on 4 March, Israel’s Minister of Defense Israel Katz released a statement indicating that the Israeli security forces will consider ‘every leader’ selected by Iran’s existing authorities as a ‘target for elimination’. These statements indicate that the US and Israel will likely continue engaging in strikes targeting high-ranking Iranian regime members, undermining the prospects for a rapid and uncontested succession process. If the US and Israel engage in repeated strikes targeting successive leadership candidates for the office of the supreme leader, Iran will likely face a protracted leadership crisis, undermining the government’s command and control over the IRGC. Increasingly decentralised decision-making among the armed forces will likely compound regional security concerns and risks of broader destabilisation in the coming weeks.
STRAIT OF HORMUZ: Iran’s closure of the Strait of Hormuz will likely undermine the continuity of cross-sector maritime supply chains in the coming weeks, while also impacting cruise tourism in the Gulf region. On 4 March, the secretary general of the UN International Maritime Organization (IMO) stated that approximately 20,000 seafarers are currently unable to leave the Persian Gulf and proximate waters due to the effective closure of the Strait of Hormuz (see MILITARY DEVELOPMENTS above). The announcement underscores ongoing critical disruption to maritime supply chains in the Persian Gulf, where vessel traffic has broadly stalled since 28 February. On 4 March, the BBC reported that two vessels had transited the waterway, whereas before the Israel-US-Iran war, between 110 and 150 vessels moved daily through the Strait of Hormuz. If sustained, Iran’s closure of the Strait of Hormuz will almost certainly continue to disrupt global maritime supply chains due to a backlog of vessels, containers and crews in the Persian Gulf. Supply chains reliant on specialised tankers to transit goods and commodities (such as gases, industrial compounds and specialist equipment) will face particularly acute risks of protracted disruption, as will entities reliant on just-in-time (JIT) supply chains and/or perishable goods sourced from international markets. Additionally, the IMO has stated that the strait’s closure is affecting an additional 15,000 passengers on cruise ships. In combination with broad disruption to regional flight operations and decreasing consumer confidence, the hospitality industry is highly likely to face significant financial exposure from the Israel-US-Iran war, particularly cruise-based or adjacent tourism.
OMAN-UK-REGION: A grounded UK government-chartered evacuation flight from Oman underscores evacuation capacity issues; significant regional travel and operational disruption will continue. Late on 4 March, the first UK government-chartered evacuation flight scheduled to depart from the Omani capital’s Muscat International Airport (MCT) was grounded due to technical failures. The UK government has stated that the flight will depart later on 5 March (at the time of writing, no official time has been issued), with additional flights leaving in the coming days. The UK’s foreign office has urged people not to travel to Muscat Airport without prior instruction from the government. Some limited repatriation or special flights are operating during short airspace openings in the region, with several airports resuming limited operations. Earlier on 5 March, Israel confirmed that it would reopen its airspace to facilitate outbound flights from Ben Gurion Airport (TLV; Tel Aviv district) from 8 March. Ben Gurion Airport previously reopened on 4 March for limited inbound flights, allowing only one passenger flight to land per hour. Limited operations have also resumed at the UAE’s Dubai International Airport (DXB; Dubai emirate) and Zayed International Airport (AUH; Abu Dhabi emirate), accommodating select commercial and repositioning flights. Major airports remain operational in Saudi Arabia, including the capital Riyadh’s King Khalid International Airport (RUH), though schedules are significantly reduced. Muscat Airport is functioning as a regional evacuation hub. With most commercial flights suspended across the region, some foreign nationals will possibly attempt overland evacuations in the coming hours and days, increasing their exposure to on-the-ground security threats in third countries and severe mobility constraints due to vehicle congestion in urban areas and at border crossings. However, many will choose to remain in-country while awaiting repatriation flights, exacerbating financial and operational strains on personnel and businesses due to extended stays, increased expenditure and disruption to normal activities.
ISRAEL: The Home Front Command’s defence policy update will moderate financial risks to businesses in Israel, though it will increase the risk of a high-casualty event. Earlier on 5 March, the Home Front Command updated its defence policy to allow the economy’s limited opening. The new policy allows work and gatherings of up to 50 individuals in areas close to protected shelters. The new policy will remain in effect until 2000hrs (local time) on 7 March. While the new guidelines will moderate financial risks to businesses in Israel, many employees will likely avoid in-person work due to safety risks, sustaining disruption across Israel’s economy. Furthermore, the easing of restrictions on gatherings will elevate the risk of a mass-casualty event, possibly overwhelming medical institutions and undermining the provision of emergency response capabilities across Israel, particularly in major cities such as Jerusalem (Jerusalem district) and Tel Aviv (Tel Aviv district).
LEBANON-IRAN: The cancellation of visa-free entry to Lebanon for Iranian nationals and a ban on IRGC activities will elevate compliance risks for Iranian nationals living abroad and their employers. Earlier on 5 March, the Lebanese government announced that it would ban the IRGC’s activities in Lebanon, with operatives to be deported at a later time (which remains unspecified). The government also announced the cancellation of visa-free entry for Iranian nationals. These decisions will elevate risks for Iranian nationals in Lebanon, who will likely face increased scrutiny by the authorities, increasing risks of arbitrary questioning and detentions. Businesses employing Iranian nationals will also likely face elevated scrutiny by the authorities, as well as elevated compliance and financial risks. At the time of writing, the new visa requirements and process for Iranian nationals already living in Lebanon remain unclear.

Mar 04.

KEY DEVELOPMENTS

IRAN-STRAIT OF HORMUZ: Despite US efforts to increase market confidence in the Gulf region’s capacity to export oil, Iranian hostilities targeting vessels in the Strait of Hormuz will likely continue.
ISRAEL-LEBANON: The Israel Defense Forces (IDF)’s evacuation warning south of the Litani River indicates a likely expansion of ground operations in the coming hours and days.
SAUDI ARABIA-IRAN: Iran’s sustained targeting of Saudi Arabia will elevate the likelihood of Saudi retaliation against either Iran or its proxies in the coming hours and days.
IRAQ: Further strikes against Iranian Kurdish opposition groups in the Kurdistan region are likely in the coming days, amid reports of a US-backed insurgency.
IRAN: Despite reports that Mojtaba Khamenei will succeed his father Ali Khamenei as Supreme Leader, no successor has been confirmed; we assess that a protracted succession process within Iran will increase threats to government stability.
IRAN-REGION: The US and Israel will almost certainly maintain the current airstrike pressure on Iran in the coming 24 hours, though Iran will likely retain the capacity to continue retaliatory missile and drone attacks. Earlier on 4 March, Israel conducted an airstrike targeting the Assembly of Experts office in Qom (Qom province; the council responsible for electing the supreme leader). The Assembly of Experts was not meeting in the facility at the time of the strike. In the coming days, airstrikes are highly likely to continue targeting locations associated with Iran’s government, including those directly responsible for the planning and execution of the succession process (see POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS below). Also earlier today, the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) announced that they had launched numerous airstrikes targeting the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and the Basij militia’s positions in the preceding 24 hours. This announcement underscores Israel’s ongoing efforts to undermine the IRGC’s capacity to repress internal dissent and establish conditions for a successful popular uprising within Iran. Although such strikes are highly likely to continue in the coming hours and days, the IRGC and Basij are highly likely to maintain repressive capabilities by requisitioning civilian buildings and dispersing small arms, motorcycles and tear gas supplies across urban areas. These practices will likely restrict the IDF’s capability to eliminate the security forces’ internal capacities through airstrikes. Meanwhile, broader US and Israeli airstrikes targeting missile production, storage and launch facilities have continued at pace; earlier on 4 March, the IDF announced that it has struck over 300 missile launchers within Iran since launching airstrikes on 28 February. The pursuit of this strategy will restrict Iran’s capacity to launch large-scale missile attacks consistently targeting locations in Israel and the Middle East region. Nevertheless, Iran will likely remain able to launch missiles sporadically towards the Gulf region in the short term, sustaining threats to locally engaged assets and economic disruption in the coming weeks.
IRAN-ISRAEL: The downing of an Iranian fighter jet underscores Iran’s limited conventional aerial capacity, though the use of diffuse and non-conventional air defences will sustain threats to Israeli and US aircraft. At approximately 1200hrs (local time) earlier on 4 March, an Israeli Air Force (IAF) F-35I fighter jet shot down an Islamic Republic of Iran Air Force (IRIAF) Yak-130 fighter following an air-to-air engagement in the capital Tehran’s airspace. The IDF subsequently confirmed the engagement via official channels, marking the first report of air-to-air engagement in the Israel-US-Iran war. Local Iranian media reports also indicate that US and Israeli aircraft are operating at low altitude above Tehran, particularly in western Tehran. This likely reflects the broad neutralisation of Iran’s air defences in and around the capital, which will facilitate further sustained airstrikes targeting Tehran in the coming days. The IRIAF is unlikely to continue engaging routinely in air-to-air-engagement using military aircraft, given the significant constraints on its conventional capacity. Rather, the IRIAF and the IRGC will likely leverage unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) and portable air defences (such as man-portable air-defence systems; MANPADS) to harass and deter Israeli and US aircraft, particularly those conducting low-altitude operations or strike missions near dispersed Iranian air defence sites. Although this strategy is unlikely to repel airstrikes effectively, successful attacks targeting US and Israeli aircraft will likely trigger an escalation in the intensity of airstrikes, compounding threats to locally engaged staff and assets.
IRAN-STRAIT OF HORMUZ: Despite US efforts to increase market confidence in the Gulf region’s capacity to export oil, Iranian hostilities targeting vessels in the Strait of Hormuz will likely continue. On 3 March, the UK Maritime Organisation (UKMTO) announced that unidentified objects had hit two vessels near the Strait of Hormuz; we assess that Iran is likely responsible for these attacks amid broader efforts to disrupt the movement of commercial vessels through the waterway. On 3 March, US President Donald Trump stated that he has ordered the US International Development Finance Corporation (DFC) to offer political risk insurance and guarantees for all maritime trade transiting the Gulf region, particularly energy shipments. Trump also stated that the US is willing to provide naval escorts to vessels moving through the Strait of Hormuz if necessary. These announcements come after a senior IRGC advisor announced the strait’s effective closure on 3 March, with the Iranian security forces conducting drone and missile attacks against several vessels in recent days (see Sibylline Middle East Crisis Update – 3 March 2026). Subsequently, numerous insurance providers have instituted war premiums on vessels attempting to traverse the Strait of Hormuz, while others have refused to provide insurance coverage for affected vessels. These developments have critically disrupted the movement of vessels through the Strait of Hormuz, triggering sustained price hikes on international energy and commodity markets. Despite Trump’s statement, energy prices remain elevated as of 4 March, with Brent crude trading at approximately USD 82 per barrel. While insurance coverage and naval escorts will possibly facilitate the limited movement of vessels through the Strait of Hormuz, we assess that Iranian missile and drone swarming attacks on commercial vessels and oil facilities in the Gulf region will likely sustain the upward pressure on energy prices. Additionally, US claims to have ‘eliminated’ Iran’s naval capabilities are unlikely to indicate that Iran lacks the military capacity to harass, damage and destroy vessels in nearby waters. Consequently, the risk of major hazard incidents in the Persian Gulf will remain elevated in the coming days, sustaining market concerns and energy price volatility.
ISRAEL-LEBANON: The IDF’s evacuation warning indicates a likely expansion of ground operations in the coming hours and days. Earlier on 4 March, the IDF issued an evacuation warning for all residents living south of the Litani River to evacuate to the north. The warning comes amid continued armed escalation between the IDF and Lebanese Hizballah (LH) in the past 48 hours (see Sibylline Middle East Crisis Update – 3 March 2026). The warning likely signals a significant expansion of IDF ground operations in southern Lebanon in the coming hours and days. This will significantly increase physical security risks south of the Litani River and particularly close to LH-affiliated infrastructure and institutions. Furthermore, the expansion of IDF ground operations will also significantly increase risks of clashes between the IDF and LH operatives, as well as LH’s increased targeting of northern Israel. Clashes between the IDF and the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) remain a realistic possibility, though they are unlikely to escalate to a sustained interstate conflict. In the event of an expansion of ground operations, the risk of IDF airstrikes across Lebanon will also increase. Outside southern Lebanon, the risk of airstrikes will be particularly acute in and around the capital Beirut, as well as in Baalbek-Hermel and Beqaa governorates. Population displacement will likely elevate travel disruption, ethno-religious tensions and socio-economic risks in major cities across northern Lebanon in the coming weeks.
UAE-REGION: Despite a decline in the frequency of Iranian aerial attacks, the threat of drone strikes and fallen debris will remain elevated near the UAE’s military and energy infrastructure facilities. On 3 March, an Iranian drone strike near the US consulate in Dubai (Dubai emirate) caused a limited fire, with no injuries reported. Notably, since our last report, the frequency of Iranian missiles and drones targeting Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar and the UAE has partially declined compared to the first 48 hours of hostilities. Additionally, most Iranian projectiles in the last 24 hours have been successfully intercepted by local air defence systems and local air forces. Nevertheless, the threat of Iranian drones and falling debris from interceptions will remain very high in the coming days, particularly near military and energy infrastructure facilities. Bystander and physical security threats will also remain high near landmarks and high-visibility targets such as out-of-town areas, markets and waterfronts.
QATAR-REGION: The arrests of Iran-linked sleeper cells underscore growing sabotage risks in Gulf countries in the coming days. On 3 March, the Qatari authorities arrested ten members of two cells allegedly employed by the IRGC. The authorities stated that seven members of these cells had been spying on vital and military facilities, while three other individuals had carried out sabotage operations. The IRGC likely maintains further cells across Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries, driving staff exposure to active sabotage threats (including bombings) near military and infrastructure facilities, as well as high-visibility targets (such as tourist landmarks). We assess that state security campaigns targeting Shia-majority neighbourhoods and/or towns in the GCC region will increase in the coming days, particularly in Bahrain, Kuwait and Saudi Arabia, elevating risks of domestic unrest, ethno-religious tensions and clashes between local populations and the security forces. Additionally, the risk of arbitrary arrests to foreign nationals recording or filming missile strikes near military facilities will also be elevated, following recent warnings from Gulf governments against filming and uploading this footage on social media.
SAUDI ARABIA-IRAN: Iran’s sustained targeting of Saudi Arabia will elevate the likelihood of Saudi retaliation against either Iran or its proxies in the coming hours and days. Earlier on 4 March, Saudi Arabia’s Ministry of Defence reported another attempted (and unsuccessful) drone attack on Saudi Aramco’s Ras Tanura refinery (Eastern province). The Saudi authorities also intercepted two cruise missiles over Riyadh province. These incidents follow a successful Iranian drone strike on the US embassy in the capital Riyadh on 3 March. Continued Iranian attacks on Saudi sovereign territory will likely increase pressure on the Saudi authorities to conduct a military response in the coming hours or days. This would possibly involve strikes on drone and missile launch facilities inside Iran or against Iran-backed proxy groups in third countries, such as elements of the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) in Iraq or the Houthis in Yemen. Targeting proxies would likely represent a more controlled escalation than direct strikes on Iranian assets, which would possibly trigger large-scale Iranian retaliation against Saudi military and civilian infrastructure. Iranian attacks against Saudi Arabia are likely to continue in the coming hours and days, sustaining significant security risks to on-the-ground personnel, including from direct attacks against US-linked assets, the mistargeting of civilian areas and injury risks from shrapnel over major urban centres caused by interception. Further attacks against critical energy infrastructure, including the Ras Tanura refinery, will exacerbate already-heightened regional and global energy security risks and raise operational costs for businesses.
IRAQ: Further strikes against Iranian Kurdish opposition groups in the Kurdistan region are likely in the coming days, amid reports of a US-backed insurgency. On 3 March, Israeli-US joint strikes against the PMF and affiliated groups continued across several locations in Al-Anbar, Babylon, Diyala and Nineveh governorates, including the border regions with Syria. Strikes repeatedly targeted military infrastructure (likely including rocket and drone launch pads) and weapons warehouses. Since our last report, attacks by various Iran-backed groups, including the Islamic Resistance in Iraq (IRI), have continued to primarily target the Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI). Most attacks occurred in the regional capital Erbil (Erbil governorate), where the authorities and the US-led coalition intercepted several drones and missiles targeting Erbil International Airport (EBL), the US consulate in the city and Peshmerga facilities. Further drone attacks attempted to target Harir Air Base (Erbil governorate) but were successfully intercepted, while a drone reportedly struck the UN compound in Sulaymaniyah (Sulaymaniyah governorate) with no casualties. Notably, three drones and a missile killed three people at the Azadi Camp in Koy Sanjaq town (Erbil governorate), the location of the headquarters of the Democratic Party of Iranian Kurdistan (PDKI). With reports that the US will possibly back a Kurdish insurgency against the Iranian government, Iran and its Iraqi proxies are likely to conduct further strikes against the Iranian Kurdish opposition inside the KRI in the coming days. The realisation of any such insurgency will almost certainly trigger a major escalation in armed conflict along the Iranian border with Iraq, mainly in Ilam, Kermanshah, Kurdistan and West Azerbaijan provinces, fuelling ethno-religious violence.
TURKEY-NATO-IRAN: NATO’s interception of an Iranian missile in Turkish airspace underscores conflict spillover risks and the increased risk of Turkey’s involvement in conflict. Earlier on 4 March, Turkey’s Ministry of National Defense confirmed that a ballistic missile launched from Iran – which was detected heading toward Turkish airspace after crossing Iraqi and Syrian airspace – was intercepted by NATO’s air and missile defence systems in the eastern Mediterranean region. Debris from the interception fell in Dörtyol (Hatay province) near Turkey’s border with Syria; it caused no casualties or damage. Ankara has conveyed its protest to Tehran over the incident and warned that it reserves the right to respond if similar actions occur again. While NATO has also condemned Iran, US Secretary of War Pete Hegseth stated he had ‘no sense’ that the incident would trigger NATO’s Article 5 (i.e. the alliance’s collective defence clause). Given the incident’s location, it is possible the missile was intended to target the UK Royal Air Force (RAF) Akrotiri base in Cyprus, rather than assets in Turkey. Nevertheless, the incident underscores the growing risk of conflict spillover, with any further incidents possibly drawing Turkey into the confrontation. The risk of Turkey’s involvement would also increase if strikes against Cyprus overshoot or undershoot their intended target, particularly if intercepted debris or ordnance falls within the self-declared Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC; recognised only by Turkey), which hosts a substantial Turkish military presence. This would possibly create pressure for wider NATO involvement.
REGION-ENERGY: The suspension of oil and gas production, along with associated downstream product lines in Iraq and Qatar, is highly likely to persist in the coming days as the regional security environment deteriorates. On 3 March, Iraq ordered a full shutdown of South Rumaila oil field (Basra, Basra governorate) due to tanker shortages and maxed‑out storage amid the de facto closure of the Strait of Hormuz. This comes following gradual reductions in daily oil output at Rumaila and the West Qurna‑2 field (also Basra, one of the largest in the world) since the onset of the conflict. On the same day, the KRI’s oil crude exports through Ceyhan port (Adana province, Turkey) also stopped after companies halted operations, citing geopolitical and security threats. Also on the same day, QatarEnergy (which owns which owns 51% of Qatar Aluminium Manufacturing Co) announced the suspension of several downstream product lines, including aluminium, methanol, polymers and urea. This decision followed the company’s earlier halt of liquefied natural gas (LNG) production in the wake of an Iranian drone strike targeting Qatar’s critical Ras Laffan energy hub. These developments underscore the ongoing critical disruption of the energy sector across the Gulf as well as the cascading knock-on effects for regional shipping, logistics, chemicals and manufacturing. We assess that the risk of further operational disruption to oil/gas fields across Iraq and the broader Gulf region will intensify in the coming days, posing a significant and growing threat to regional economic stability.

POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS

IRAN: Despite reports that Mojtaba Khamenei will succeed his father as Supreme Leader, no successor has been confirmed; we assess that a protracted succession process within Iran will increase threats to government stability. On 3 March, unofficial Iranian media reported that the Assembly of Experts had selected Mojtaba Khamenei to succeed his father Ali Khamenei as Supreme Leader. The Iranian authorities have not officially commented on Khamenei’s successor at the time of writing. We assess that there is a realistic possibility that Khamenei will serve as the next Supreme Leader, given his strong support base within the IRGC. In turn, this would likely increase the IRGC’s influence within the regime and reinforce the centrality of hardliners to government command-and-control networks. However, Khamenei’s appointment would also possibly increase tensions with Iran’s clerical and judicial establishments; consequently, there is also a realistic possibility of Alireza Arafi (a member of the Guardian Council and the Assembly of Experts) or Chief Justice Gholam-Hossein Mohseni Eje’i being chosen as Supreme Leader. Regardless, a protracted succession process will undercut government stability and the centralisation of decision-making processes within the military. The continued siloing of decision-making amid ongoing hostilities will increase risks of broader regional escalation and threats to staff and assets positioned in the Gulf and Israel (see Sibylline Middle East Crisis Update – 3 March 2026). The US and Israel will also likely sustain airstrikes targeting individuals and entities associated with the Assembly of Experts, including potential successors (see above). If these are successful, the elimination of potential candidates for Supreme Leader will likely extend the succession process further, increasing risks of regime factionalism and instability thereafter.
IRAN-US: A diplomatic deadlock will likely persist in the coming hours, moderating prospects for de-escalation. Earlier on 4 March, a senior advisor to the late Khamenei, Mohammad Mokhber, stated that Iran would not engage in negotiations with the US as long as airstrikes continue to target the country. Mokhber’s statement comes after Trump released a statement indicating that Iran was ‘too late’ in attempting to initiate talks with the US. In the coming days, escalating hostilities and inflammatory rhetoric from conflict parties is highly likely to undercut the prospects for diplomatic engagement and a resolution to the conflict, sustaining critical threats to regional security and operational conditions.
OMAN-UK-REGION: Foreign nationals will likely remain dependent on self-evacuation from the region despite UK government-chartered evacuation flights from Oman. Earlier on 4 March, the UK government announced that a UK government-chartered evacuation flight would depart from the Omani capital’s Muscat International Airport (MCT) at 2300hrs (local time) later on 4 March. The UK government said additional flights would leave in the coming days. Vulnerable individuals are being prioritised for seat allocation. The UK Foreign Office has urged people not to make their way to MCT without prior instruction from the Foreign Office. At present, it is unclear when the additional evacuation flights will take place from Oman and options for foreign nationals, including UK citizens, to leave the region remain limited. If further evacuations are announced, demand for seats is likely to significantly exceed the available capacity. This will sustain the likelihood that foreign nationals will need to self-evacuate from the region in the coming hours and days, particularly in the event of further conflict escalation. However, most commercial flights remain suspended across the region, with only limited repatriation or special flights operating during short airspace openings. This will likely increase the incidence of foreign nationals attempting overland evacuations, elevating their exposure to on-the-ground security threats in third countries with heightened terror and attack risks. Individuals and businesses who decide to evacuate by land will likely face severe mobility constraints from vehicle congestion in urban areas and at border crossings. The risk of sporadic land border closures and communications failures in rural areas will be heightened.
ISRAEL: The plan to open Ben Gurion International Airport (TLV; Central district) will not immediately increase evacuation options for personnel; primary flight evacuation options will still require border crossing to neighbouring countries. On 3 March, Israel’s transport minister announced that, subject to security approval, Ben Gurion Airport will return to limited but continuous operation from 5 March. According to the plan, from 5 March, one narrow-bodied aircraft (that can contain up to 200 passengers) will land at Ben Gurion once every hour. From 6 March, the frequency will increase to two narrow-bodied aircrafts or one wide-bodied aircraft every hour. This activity will continue, operating 24 hours a day, including on weekends. However, the plan will not offer flights out of Israel, with incoming flights scheduled to depart empty shortly after arrival to avoid a prolonged stay on the ground. This will sustain challenges to personnel evacuation from Israel in the coming days, though extension of the plan to departing flights with passengers is a realistic possibility in the next ten days. Israeli airlines have increased their flights to multiple destinations from King Hussein International Airport (AQJ, Jordan), Sharm El Sheikh International Airport (SSH, Egypt) and Taba International Airport (TCP, Egypt). These locations are a short drive from Israel’s border and have experienced an influx of passengers in the past three days, driving the risk of bottlenecks at border crossings and associated travel disruption.
ISRAEL: Arrest of journalists highlights the elevated threats for media and news crews filming in Israel during the war. On 3 March, the Israeli police detained two Turkish CNN journalists who were broadcasting live outside HaKirya IDF military headquarters in Tel Aviv (Tel Aviv district). The incident highlights elevated security and legal risks for crews of foreign media outlets and content creators filming and taking pictures near sensitive facilities and missile-impact locations across Israel. Furthermore, media firms and parent companies associated with staff who are arrested for such activities will be at increased risk of operational bans across the country. These risks will remain elevated for the duration of the war.
Qatar-region: Arrests underscore risks of Iran-linked sleeper cells, sabotage in Gulf region countries. On 3 March, the Qatari authorities arrested ten members of two cells allegedly employed by Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC). The authorities stated that seven members of these cells had been spying on vital and military facilities, while three other individuals had carried out sabotage operations. The development underscores the significant risk of Iran-linked sleeper cells in Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries amid daily Iranian missile and drone attacks. As such, we assess that active sabotage threats (including bombings) will sustain elevated physical security risks near military and infrastructure facilities, as well as high-visibility targets (such as tourist landmarks). We also assess that state security campaigns targeting Shia-majority neighbourhoods and/or towns in the GCC region will increase in the coming days, particularly in Bahrain, Kuwait and Saudi Arabia, elevating risks of domestic unrest, ethno-religious tensions and clashes between local populations and the security forces. Additionally, the risk of arbitrary arrests to foreign nationals recording or filming missile strikes near military facilities will also be elevated.

Mar 03.

UK-US: Ongoing airstrikes will heighten security, operational risks from Iranian threat actors. On 2 March, security agencies in the US and the UK warned that cyber attacks on US and UK-based organisations are highly likely in the short term due to the ongoing Israel-US-Iran war (see Sibylline Middle East Crisis Update as of 1600hrs GMT – 2 March 2026). The warning singled out UK and US organisations operating in the Middle East region, highlighting heightened security and operational risks to regional and supply chain assets, including those providing services to US military personnel. Iranian state-sponsored threat actors likely retain some ability to conduct cyber attacks, despite a state-mandated internet blackout which has reduced internet connectivity to about 1% of its normal level since 28 February. Based on historical attack patterns, we assess that any Iran-led cyber attacks would likely encompass data-leak operations wherever possible to expose pre-obtained data, as well as lower-impact distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) attacks. Pro-Iran hacktivist attacks are also a possibility and could aim to disrupt industrial equipment temporarily, underscoring elevated operational risks. Consequently, UK and US-based organisations in the region are recommended to review cyber security protections as airstrikes are ongoing.
Europe region: Israel-US-Iran war will likely continue to drive gas price volatility; shortages are unlikely. Earlier on 3 March, natural gas prices in Europe reportedly increased by 34% in response to the ongoing Israel-US-Iran war. This is largely due to decreased export capacity from the Gulf region due to ongoing Iranian hostilities targeting the Strait of Hormuz. Additionally, due to military attacks on oil company QatarEnergy’s operating facilities, the firm has halted its production of liquefied natural gas (LNG). Europe is not fully dependent on Qatari LNG and therefore gas shortages are unlikely. However, Qatari LNG has been an important part of the EU’s energy diversification strategy as it divests from Russian gas. QatarEnergy also has long-term supply contracts with major European companies, including Shell, TotalEnergies and Eni, increasing operational risks for these companies and their clients. Energy security risks will be higher for EU member states with lower gas storage levels, such as Germany (20%) and the Netherlands (11%). We assess that energy prices will remain volatile in the coming days; energy risks will significantly increase if the Israel-US-Iran war protracts.
Iran-Saudi Arabia-US: Embassy attack, drone interception underscores risk of Saudi involvement in war. Earlier on 3 March, two Iranian drones targeted the US embassy in Saudi Arabia’s capital Riyadh, causing a limited fire and minor damage to the building. There are no reports of injuries or casualties. The attack aligns with Iran’s broader retaliation against US assets in the Middle East region and is unlikely to change the US’ force posture or operations meaningfully. Nevertheless, the attack comes amid a broader dangerous escalation of military activity targeting Saudi Arabia. Earlier on 3 March, Saudi Arabia’s Ministry of Defence claimed that its military had intercepted and destroyed eight drones in Riyadh and Al-Kharj (Riyadh province). We assess that these latest developments will possibly prompt a military response from Saudi Arabia in the coming hours, possibly by allowing the US to conduct offensive operations from bases on its territory or directly targeting drone and missile launch facilities within Iran. Despite this risk, Iranian attacks against Saudi Arabia will likely continue in the coming hours and days. This will elevate personnel security risks, especially for staff in Riyadh’s diplomatic quarter and those near US military installations and global energy infrastructure nationwide.

Israel-Lebanon: New, limited ground operation will increase risks of wider armed conflict in March. Earlier on 3 March, the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) said that they had deployed troops deeper into southern Lebanon, up to approximately 500m beyond the five posts it currently holds. The IDF added that the goal of the new ground operation is to create an additional layer of security for residents of northern Israel after the resumption of rocket fire by Lebanese Hizballah (LH). The operation also comes amid extensive Israeli airstrikes targeting LH’s infrastructure and affiliated businesses all over Lebanon, including in the capital Beirut. We assess that the new ground operations are likely to be limited in scope and will possibly drive limited clashes with LH cells and Iran-backed groups in the area. However, there is a realistic possibility that the IDF will further expand its ground operations in Lebanon in the coming hours and days, particularly if LH continues targeting Israel with drones and rockets. Ground operations and their possible expansion will increase the risks of a wider armed conflict with LH in March, augmenting security instability in the country.
Iran-Saudi Arabia-US: Embassy attack, drone interception underscores risk of Saudi involvement in war. Earlier on 3 March, two Iranian drones targeted the US embassy in Saudi Arabia’s capital Riyadh, causing a limited fire and minor damage to the building. There are no reports of injuries or casualties. The attack aligns with Iran’s broader retaliation against US assets in the Middle East region and is unlikely to change the US’ force posture or operations meaningfully. Nevertheless, the attack comes amid a broader dangerous escalation of military activity targeting Saudi Arabia. Earlier on 3 March, Saudi Arabia’s Ministry of Defence claimed that its military had intercepted and destroyed eight drones in Riyadh and Al-Kharj (Riyadh province). We assess that these latest developments will possibly prompt a military response from Saudi Arabia in the coming hours, possibly by allowing the US to conduct offensive operations from bases on its territory or directly targeting drone and missile launch facilities within Iran. Despite this risk, Iranian attacks against Saudi Arabia will likely continue in the coming hours and days. This will elevate personnel security risks, especially for staff in Riyadh’s diplomatic quarter and those near US military installations and global energy infrastructure nationwide.
US: Attack risks will remain elevated for duration of US military campaign in Middle East. On 2 March, Texas Governor Greg Abbott warned that the possibility of Iranian ‘sleeper cells’ is being ‘seriously’ evaluated in his state. The statement comes as the federal authorities investigate a shooting, which took place in Austin (Texas) on 1 March, as a potential terrorist attack. The shooting took place the day after the US and Israel launched an airstrike campaign against Iran; the gunman allegedly wore clothing featuring an Iranian flag design. Abbott has increased the number of law enforcement officers patrolling cities and has deployed the Texas National Guard. We assess that the threat of US-based individuals plotting domestic attacks will remain elevated for the duration of the US and Israel’s military campaign. The risk of attack will be highest for institutions associated with the US government or Israel, as well as in urban centres with a high population of Jewish or Israeli residents, such as New York City (New York). Sole perpetrators will likely continue to rely on low-capacity attacks employing firearms or vehicle ramming. Nevertheless, the likelihood of a successful attack materialising is low.
Region: Drone strike on RAF base in Cyprus underlines regional spillover risk of Middle East conflict. On 1 March, UK Prime Minister Keir Starmer announced that the UK has given the US permission to use British military bases to launch attacks on Iranian missile sites. The bases are likely to be Royal Air Force (RAF) Fairford (Gloucestershire, UK) and Diego Garcia (British Indian Ocean Territory). Starmer also reiterated his position that the British military will not participate in offensive attacks on Iran. Shortly after Starmer’s announcement, at approximately 0000hrs (local time) earlier on 2 March, a suspected Iranian Shahed-type drone struck the UK’s RAF Akrotiri airbase in Cyprus. A second projectile was intercepted. No injuries were reported and there was reportedly minimal material damage. The strike underlines the risk of the Middle East conflict directly spilling over to the eastern Mediterranean Sea; the Akrotiri airbase is likely to remain a target given that it is the largest RAF base in the region. Meanwhile, the Greek authorities have augmented the security posture at airports and business facilities nationwide; they have also advised Greece-flagged vessels to exercise maximum vigilance and avoid the Persian Gulf, the Gulf of Oman and the Strait of Hormuz.

Region: Risk of Iran-backed proxy attacks against Israeli, US targets is elevated. We assess there is a realistic possibility that Iranian proxies will attempt to carry out terrorist attacks in Europe following the US’ and Israel’s strikes on Iran. The risks will be elevated in countries where hostile Iran-linked actors have a notable presence, including Belgium, Denmark, Germany, Netherlands, Sweden and the UK. Possible targets include Israeli and US diplomatic representatives and soft targets. In recent weeks, anonymous US and Western security officials cited by the New York Times have reported that they have detected increased ‘chatter’ in electronic interceptions of terrorist communications, suggesting possible planning and co-ordination, though no concrete plans have been detected. UK defence secretary John Healey has confirmed that the UK’s terror threat level is currently under review (the current level is ‘substantial’; i.e. an attack is likely); France has placed the domestic security forces on high alert in case of social unrest or violent acts. We also assess that robust counter-terrorism capabilities and increased security measures will likely thwart terrorism plots. However, the Iranian regime maintains ties with European organised crime groups; it can leverage them to carry out targeted attacks. The risk of sole-perpetrator attacks by individuals radicalised online will be also elevated.
Armenia-Azerbaijan: Iran war will sustain evacuations, supply chain disruption in South Caucasus. On 1 March, the Russian embassy in Azerbaijan stated that it was assisting approximately 500 Russian nationals for evacuation from Iran via Azerbaijan amid the Israel-US-Iran war. Evacuations are taking place via the Astara border crossing (situated between Azerbaijan’s Astara district and Iran’s Gilan province). Aside from Russian nationals, citizens of other countries have also evacuated from Iran via this crossing. On 1 March, the Russian embassy in Armenia stated that the sole border Armenia-Iran crossing, Agarak-Nordooz (between Armenia’s Syunik province and Iran’s East Azerbaijan province), continues operations. However, the prospect of a large-scale outflux of Iranian refugees to these countries will remain limited in the short term. Evacuations of foreign nationals will likely constitute the majority of border crossings in the coming days, as was the case in the Iran-Israel 12-day war in June 2025. Nevertheless, sustained conflict or escalation will likely drive migratory flows of Iran’s ethnic-Azeri population into Azerbaijan over the coming weeks. Meanwhile, the continuation of hostilities over the coming weeks will likely increase supply chain disruption across the South Caucasus region, particularly impacting Armenian trade to Iran.

Mar 02.

KEY DEVELOPMENTS
IRAN: Possible airstrikes targeting nuclear facilities will increase hazard risks within Iran, particularly in the currently unlikely event of strikes on nuclear energy facilities.
SAUDI ARABIA-IRAN: An attempted Iranian drone strike against Prince Sultan Air Base (Riyadh province) signals a major escalation, elevating the risk of Saudi retaliatory action in the coming hours and days.
CYPRUS-IRAN-TURKEY: Further Iranian strikes on the UK’s air base in Cyprus are likely, driving conflict escalation risks and possibly targeting Turkish military assets inadvertently.
QATAR: The closure of a state-owned energy facility underscores the Israel-US-Iran war’s impact on global energy security, elevating global energy prices.
IRAN: The US has claimed that it has established ‘air superiority’ over Iran; this will likely facilitate an escalation of airstrikes targeting military facilities in eastern Iran in the coming days. During a press conference earlier on 2 March, the US Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Dan Caine announced that the US had established ‘local air superiority’ in Iran. The announcement comes after the US and Israel conducted strikes on several locations in eastern Iran earlier on 2 March, including in Kerman (Kerman province) and Zahedan (Sistan and Baluchestan province). The announcement likely reflects the suppression and destruction of much of Iran’s air defence systems. In the coming days, the US and Israel will likely expand airstrikes targeting locations in eastern Iran, including Gorgan (Golestan province), Iranshahr (Sistan and Baluchestan province), Kerman, Mashhad (both Razavi Khorasan province), Yazd (Yazd province) and Zabol (Sistan and Baluchestan province). If sustained, the expansion of airstrikes will likely compound pressure on Iran’s security force capacity, undermining government stability and retaliation capability. Increasingly frequent airstrikes in eastern Iran will also likely disrupt overland movement along major thoroughfares, potentially restricting evacuation efforts via Iran’s land borders with Pakistan and Turkmenistan. In response to rising pressure on government stability and military capacity, Iran is highly likely to maintain its de facto closure of the Strait of Hormuz, compounding pressure on oil and gas prices worldwide. Further missile and drone attacks targeting Israel and US allies in the Gulf region are also highly likely (see below).
IRAN: Possible airstrikes targeting nuclear facilities will increase hazard risks within Iran, particularly in the currently unlikely event of strikes on nuclear energy facilities. Earlier on 2 March, Iranian media reported a series of intense explosions near the Natanz fuel-enrichment plant (Isfahan province), though the explosions likely resulted from an airstrike targeting the Iran Air Force’s 8th Shekari Air Base (also Isfahan). It remains unclear whether the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran has resumed operations at the facility following US and Israeli airstrikes on it in June 2025. Prior to the explosions, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)’s Director General Rafael Grossi stated that there were no indications that the US and Israel had engaged in airstrikes targeting Iran’s nuclear facilities since operations began on 28 February. However, in the coming days, there is a realistic possibility that the US and Israel will resume airstrikes targeting nuclear facilities, including non-operational facilities targeted during the June 2025 Israel-Iran war. The targeting of enrichment, development and stockpile storage facilities is unlikely to trigger a major nuclear incident, though it will increase localised radiological hazard risks. While unlikely, the expansion of airstrikes to include the targeting of nuclear energy facilities will significantly increase the risk of a major nuclear incident and potential radiological release into the Persian Gulf; such targets include the Bushehr Nuclear Power Plant (Bushehr province) and the Khondab Heavy Water Research Reactor (Markazi province). Such conditions will compound risks of supply chain disruption for oil and gas exports, amid critical threats to personal safety stemming from radiation exposure.
ISRAEL: An Iranian missile strike on Beersheba (Southern district) highlights the limitations of air defences and the rising risk of strain on medical facilities. Earlier on 2 March, an Iranian missile successfully penetrated Israeli air defences and hit Beersheba, injuring 74 individuals; there are no confirmed deaths at the time of writing. The incident highlights elevated risks to assets, staff and customer welfare nationwide and particularly near the Israel Defense Forces (IDF)’s bases, many of which are located within civilian population centres (the IDF’s Southern Command headquarters are located in Beersheba). The high number of casualties also reflects a rising risk of mounting strain on Israeli medical facilities, compounding existing challenges in some areas. These capacity issues are particularly elevated in Southern district, where the key Soroka Medical Center (Beersheba) was hit during the June 2025 Iran-Israel war and is still suffering from capability constraints.
ISRAEL-LEBANON: The killing of a senior Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) commander is unlikely to trigger retaliation against Israel. Earlier on 2 March, IDF strikes in the Dahieh neighbourhood of the Lebanese capital Beirut killed a PIJ military commander. We assess that the PIJ in Lebanon is unlikely to retaliate against the IDF or Israel given the group’s limited capabilities and concerns about possible backlash by both Israel and the Lebanese state. More broadly, we assess that the IDF will continue to conduct strikes across Lebanon and Beirut in the coming days, elevating armed escalation and security risks nationwide (see Sibylline Daily Analytical Update – 2 March 2026).
SAUDI ARABIA-IRAN: An attempted Iranian drone strike against Prince Sultan Air Base (Riyadh province) signals a major escalation, elevating the risk of Saudi retaliatory action in the coming hours and days. Earlier on 2 March, Saudi Arabia’s Ministry of Defense said that five hostile drones had been successfully intercepted near Prince Sultan Air Base, with no casualties reported. This air base houses the US Air Force’s 378th Air Expeditionary Wing. This comes after Iran targeted oil company Saudi Aramco’s refinery in Ras Tanura (Eastern province) earlier in the day; it also follows reports of missile attacks targeting the air base and the capital Riyadh’s King Khalid International Airport (RUH) on 1 March. The move signals a major escalation from Iran against Saudi sovereign territory and will possibly trigger Saudi retaliatory action against Iran in the coming hours and days. This would possibly involve the Saudi military’s targeting of drone and missile launch facilities within Iran, or possibly allowing the US to conduct further operations from bases within Saudi Arabia. A Saudi military response against Iran would exacerbate regional tensions and increase the risk of more widespread strikes across Saudi Arabia.
QATAR-IRAN: Qatar’s downing of two Iranian tactical bombers underscores the Qatari forces’ elevated defensive posture and increased conflict escalation risks. Earlier on 2 March, Qatar’s Ministry of Defence announced that the Qatar Emiri Air Force (QAEF) successfully shot down two Iranian Sukhoi Su-24 tactical bombers approaching Qatari airspace from Iran. Qatar said that the threat was addressed immediately upon detection, in accordance with its operational protocol. The incident signals an elevation of Qatar’s defensive posture, raising the risk of Iranian retaliatory action against Qatari military assets in the coming hours and days and elevating conflict escalation risks.
CYPRUS-IRAN-TURKEY: Further Iranian strikes on the UK’s air base in Cyprus likely, will drive conflict escalation risks, with a possibility of inadvertently targeting Turkish military assets. Earlier on 2 March, senior Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) commander Sardar Jabbari claimed that the US had transferred a significant number of military aircraft to the UK’s Royal Air Force (RAF) Akrotiri air base in Cyprus and that Iran would launch additional attacks against Cyprus. His remarks followed a suspected Iranian drone strike on RAF Akrotiri and the interception of a second projectile. Furthermore, also earlier today, Cyprus’ Paphos International Airport (PFO; Paphos district) was evacuated after drones were detected in its vicinity. Further Iranian attacks against Cyprus would increase the likelihood of the UK expanding its defensive involvement in the conflict in the coming days. As Iranian missile stockpiles are depleted, forcing greater reliance on older or less advanced ordnance, the risk of targeting errors will also rise. This will increase the possibility of an overshoot beyond the intended target, including into areas under Cyprus’ sovereign control as well as the self-declared Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC). The TRNC is recognised only by Turkey; the presence of a substantial Turkish military contingent within it will heighten the risk that Iranian misfires inadvertently strike Turkish military assets or personnel. This would drive regional escalation risks, including the prospect of Turkish retaliation. At present, we assess this risk to be low.
US-REGION: Further US military personnel deaths are likely in the coming days; they are unlikely to shift the US’ operational outlook. Earlier on 2 March, the US announced that a fourth service member had died from injuries sustained during Iran’s initial attacks against US assets on 28 February. Additional US military personnel are highly likely to be killed in the coming hours and days, as Iran sustains retaliatory strikes against US military bases and assets in the Middle East region. When US President Donald Trump announced the military operation on 28 February, he confirmed that US casualties were likely. Consequently, we assess that US personnel deaths are accounted for within the US’ military planning and are unlikely to shift the administration’s perspective on the scale or nature of continued operations in the coming days.

POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS

IRAN: Despite the formation of a leadership council in Iran, threats to government stability will remain acute, particularly in the event of a contested or protracted succession. On 2 March, Iran’s Interim Leadership Council (ILC) released its first statement after assuming the duties of the Supreme Leader’s office. The ILC is composed of Alireza Arafi (a member of the Guardian Council and the Assembly of Experts), Chief Justice Gholam-Hossein Mohseni Ejei and President Masoud Pezeshkian. The ILC will execute the functions of the Supreme Leader’s office until the Assembly of Experts appoints a successor (see Sibylline Middle East Crisis Update – 1 March 2026). The Assembly will highly likely attempt to expedite this process, in order to emphasise regime continuity. However, as both Arafi and Ejei will likely seek election to the Supreme Leader’s office, risks of factionalism and protracted infighting among competing hardline political factions will remain elevated in the coming days. The associated deadlock will likely disrupt government and military decision-making processes, as well as the continuity of the security forces’ internal chains of command. A protracted and contested succession will highly likely undermine government stability, increasing risks of high-level defection and regime collapse, particularly amid ongoing US and Israeli strike action.
ISRAEL: A possible limited opening of airspace beginning next week will likely reduce bottlenecks at border crossings and challenges to personnel evacuations. Earlier on 2 March, the Israeli transport minister announced plans for the limited opening of Israel’s airspace from next week (8 March). The plan is designed to allow Israeli citizens and reserve soldiers abroad to return to Israel and reduce bottlenecks along its land border crossings. The plan will remain subject to Israel’s security assessments. We assess that its actioning will likely reduce challenges to personnel evacuation through both land borders and air transit. While there is a realistic possibility that this plan will be fulfilled, it is highly likely that only a few airlines will resume flights to Israel (highly likely El Al airline) and that opening times will remain extremely limited.
LEBANON: The banning of Lebanese Hizballah (LH) military activities will elevate domestic tensions, though armed clashes between the Lebanese military and LH remain unlikely in the coming 48 hours. Earlier on 2 March, the Lebanese government decided to outlaw LH’s security and military activities during an emergency meeting following LH attacks on Israel earlier that day. While the move is significant, we assess that the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) are unlikely to make determined efforts to enforce the order in the coming days. However, tensions will remain high between the government and LH in the coming weeks, elevating risks of small-scale sporadic clashes over the coming months, particularly after the ongoing Israel-US-Iran war and Israeli strikes against LH in Lebanon cease.
QATAR: The closure of a state-owned energy facility underscores the Israel-US-Iran war’s impact on global energy security, elevating global energy prices. Earlier on 2 March, state-owned oil company QatarEnergy halted production of liquefied natural gas (LNG) at its main facilities in Ras Laffan Industrial City (Al Khor municipality) following reported Iranian strikes on its energy infrastructure. The complex is the largest LNG production centre in the world; Qatar accounts for roughly 20% of global seaborne LNG supply. LNG prices have surged in response, underscoring the ongoing conflict’s impact on global energy security. Disruption to energy supply chains will likely escalate in the coming days due to reduced maritime traffic through the Strait of Hormuz and the Arabian Gulf. They will also likely escalate given the suspension of operations at other regional energy facilities, including Saudi Aramco’s Ras Tanura refinery (Saudi Arabia) and the offshore Leviathan gas field (Israel). Reduced LNG and oil export capacity from Gulf states will likely trigger further energy price spikes in the coming days (European gas prices have already risen by around 50% today), raising operational costs for global businesses, particularly in energy-intensive sectors such as aviation, shipping and manufacturing. The EU sources approximately 60% of its LNG imports from the US and is therefore less exposed than many Asian states, which will possibly face immediate supply shortfalls. However, while the US will possibly increase exports to the EU in the coming days, it is unlikely to offset fully the shortfall resulting from QatarEnergy’s shutdown. The overall global impact will almost certainly depend on the Israel-US-Iran war’s duration and trajectory, for which there are currently limited signs of viable de-escalation in the short term.
UAE: Limited flight resumption will facilitate initial personnel departure from the Gulf region, though large-scale evacuation operations remain unlikely in the coming hours. Earlier on 2 March, the capital Abu Dhabi’s Zayed International Airport (AUH) announced the resumption of limited operations and urged prospective travellers to check with their airlines for updated flight schedules. Dubai International Airport (DXB; Dubai emirate) similarly confirmed that a limited number of flights would operate from the evening of 2 March, with departure priority given to passengers holding earlier bookings. Both airports advised travellers not to proceed to terminals without confirmation from airlines to do so. Meanwhile, the UK government is drawing up emergency evacuation plans for British nationals stranded in the Gulf region, while EU governments are considering repatriation options for member states’ nationals. These developments will possibly facilitate initial personnel departures from the region in the coming hours and days. However, we assess that the capacity for large-scale evacuation operations remains limited due to ongoing Iranian military activity impacting regional airspace and civilian aviation infrastructure. Additionally, there remains a realistic possibility that Iran will target either airport in the coming hours despite the resumption of civilian traffic, sustaining significant threats to personnel welfare and the possibility of last-minute cancellations.

Feb 27.

Iraq-Kuwait: Naval standoff underscores tensions over maritime borders, oil exploration risks. On 26 February, an Iraqi vessel near the Khor Abdullah channel withdrew from the area after a Kuwaiti patrol boat approached it and asked it to leave, claiming it fell within Kuwait’s maritime boundaries. The incident underscores the ongoing elevated tensions between the two countries. This comes after Iraq’s submission of maritime co-ordinates to the UN, which Kuwait claim infringe on its sovereign maritime territories. The controversial co-ordinates include the Fisht Al Eid and Fisht Al Eij submerged islets as within Iraq’s boundaries, which are claimed by Kuwait. The Iraqi move will possibly halt oil exploration in areas along the shared maritime borders with Kuwait. This will likely disrupt plans for new foreign investments in oil fields and the energy sector throughout the coming months, possibly weakening foreign direct investment (FDI) flows into both Kuwait and Iraq. However, there is a possibility that the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) will seek to mediate between the two countries in Q2 2026, mitigating the risk of a larger geopolitical crisis or a military confrontation.
Israel-Lebanon: LH attacks on Israel drive escalation risks; further airstrikes likely in coming hours. Earlier on 2 March, the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) killed 31 people in strikes on Lebanese Hizballah (LH) targets in Lebanon, including the Dahieh neighbourhood of the capital Beirut. The move came after LH launched a barrage of missiles and drones targeting northern Israel, including allegedly at an IDF missile defence facility near Haifa (Haifa district). Later in the day, an IDF spokesperson stated that all options were on the table for retaliation. These developments increase the risk of limited Israeli ground operations in southern Lebanon’s South and Nabatieh governorates in the coming days, possibly involving raids targeting weapons caches, launch infrastructure and command and training facilities. Further Israeli strikes across Lebanon against LH’s chain of command, as well as drone and missile operators, are likely in the coming hours. Sustained airstrikes will significantly increase threats to personnel safety across Lebanon, particularly in Baalbek-Hermel, Nabatieh and South governorates, as well as in Beirut.

Region: Killing of Iranian supreme leader will drive risk of protests, attacks targeting US missions. On 1 March, at least 22 people were killed in protests across Pakistan against the US’ and Israel’s strikes on Iran and the killing of Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei. At least 10 people were killed in Karachi (Sindh province) as the security forces opened fire while protesters stormed the US consulate. Eight people were killed in Skardu (Gilgit-Baltistan administrative territory) after protesters set several government buildings and a UN office on fire. Two people were killed in the capital Islamabad as protesters attempted to march towards the US embassy, while demonstrations were also monitored near the US consulate in Lahore (Punjab province). The authorities have heightened security measures across urban centres in Pakistan. In India, protests were monitored in Jammu and Kashmir and Ladakh union territories, the capital New Delhi and Uttar Pradesh state. Pakistan is home to one of the largest Shia populations outside Iran, with Shia communities also present in Afghanistan and India. We assess that further protests are highly likely in the coming days in cities with large Shia populations and due to pro-Iran sentiment in the region, particularly in Pakistan. There is a realistic possibility that protests will target US missions and associated facilities, increasing domestic unrest and safety risks for bystanders.
Russia-Ukraine: Middle East conflict will likely threaten short-to-medium term support for Ukraine. On 1 March, Russian President Vladimir Putin condemned the death of Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei in US and Israeli strikes on Iran. Iran, Russia’s closest regional partner, provided crucial support to Russia during the early stages of the Russo-Ukrainian war, particularly in the field of drone technology (see Sibylline Special Report – 2 March 2026). Although any profound destabilisation of Iran would threaten Russia’s long-term investments and regional influence, it is unlikely to have a direct impact on its ongoing military operations against Ukraine. Russia has significantly reduced its reliance on Iranian-supplied military equipment. Meanwhile, a sharp increase in oil prices would highly likely increase the Kremlin’s federal revenues, thereby improving its ability to finance the war. Instead, we assess that the short-term consequences of the Middle East conflict will likely prove more detrimental to Ukraine. The US’s operational focus on Iran will significantly constrain the short-to-medium-term availability of critical military equipment for Kyiv (and Europe), including essential air defence systems and interceptors. Simultaneously, potential European involvement in the conflict, particularly in support of regional allies, would further strain Europe’s limited defence stockpiles. This would put pressure on European nations’ capacity to sustain their military assistance to Ukraine.

04 Mar 26. Four Days In, Hegseth, Caine Say U.S. Making Decisive Progress in Iran. During the War Department’s second press conference since the U.S. and Israel’s launch of Operation Epic Fury against the Iranian regime Feb. 28, Secretary of War Pete Hegseth and Air Force Gen. Dan Caine, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, today said America is making decisive offensive progress in the conflict.

“I stand before you today with one unmistakable message about Operation Epic Fury: America is winning decisively, devastatingly and without mercy,” Hegseth told the media from the Pentagon’s press briefing room.

“We are only four days into this, and the results have been incredible — historic, really. … Only the United States could lead this [mission]. … But, when you add the Israeli Defense Forces — a devastatingly capable force — the combination is sheer destruction for our radical Islamist Iranian adversaries,” Hegseth said.

During his remarks, Caine reiterated that the U.S. and Israel’s joint, three-pronged mission in the region is to target and eliminate Iran’s ballistic missile systems, destroy the Iranian navy and ensure Iran cannot rebuild or reconstitute its combat capability or power — including ensuring the country never obtains nuclear weapons.

In terms of battle damage, Caine said there has been an 86% overall drop in Iran’s ballistic missile launches since the first day of fighting, and a 23% decrease in just the last 24 hours. Additionally, he added there has been 73% decrease in Iranian one-way attack drone shots fired from early on in the conflict.

In terms of air power, Hegseth said that the U.S. and Israeli forces are poised to have complete control of Iranian air space within the next few days.

“I hope all the folks watching understand what ‘uncontested airspace’ and ‘complete control’ means: It means we will fly all day [and] all night … finding, fixing and finishing the missiles and defense industrial base of the Iranian military; finding and fixing their leaders and their military leaders; flying over Tehran … [with] Iranian leaders looking up and seeing only U.S. and Israeli air power every minute of every day, until we decide it’s over — and Iran will be able to do nothing about it,” Hegseth said.

At sea, U.S. Central Command announced yesterday that more than 20 Iranian navy vessels have been destroyed, including the sinking of an Iranian combatant ship in the Indian Ocean by a U.S. Navy fast attack submarine.

It was the first time a U.S. submarine has used a Mark 48 torpedo to sink an enemy vessel since 1945, Caine noted.

“I want to remind everybody that this is an incredible demonstration of America’s global reach. To hunt, find and kill an out-of-area deployer is something that only the United States can do at this type of scale,” he said.

In discussing the Iranian regime’s predicament, Hegseth said he likens the situation to a football game, wherein Iran’s offense has already exhausted all of its scripted plays.

“But now that the game has started and the [U.S. and Israeli] defensive blitz is on, [Iran doesn’t] know what plays to call, let alone how to get in the huddle and call those plays,” Hegseth said.

He added, because so many of Iran’s senior leaders being killed on Operation Epic Fury’s first day, the military is unable to effectively communicate, let alone mount a coordinated and sustained offensive.

“This was never meant to be a fair fight, and it is not a fair fight. We are punching [the enemy] while they’re down, which is exactly how it should be,” Hegseth said, adding that Epic Fury has already unleashed twice the air power as the initial “shock and awe” phase of Operation Iraqi Freedom in 2003.

Looking ahead, Caine said that Centcom will continue to strike the regime’s infrastructure — including hunting and killing ballistic missile launchers and one-way attack capabilities — as well as continuing to attack Iran’s naval capabilities.

“We are just getting started,” Hegseth said. (Source: U.S. DoD)

02 Mar 26. Armenia-Azerbaijan: Iran war will sustain evacuations, supply chain disruption in South Caucasus. On 1 March, the Russian embassy in Azerbaijan stated that it was assisting approximately 500 Russian nationals for evacuation from Iran via Azerbaijan amid the Israel-US-Iran war. Evacuations are taking place via the Astara border crossing (situated between Azerbaijan’s Astara district and Iran’s Gilan province). Aside from Russian nationals, citizens of other countries have also evacuated from Iran via this crossing. On 1 March, the Russian embassy in Armenia stated that the sole border Armenia-Iran crossing, Agarak-Nordooz (between Armenia’s Syunik province and Iran’s East Azerbaijan province), continues operations. However, the prospect of a large-scale outflux of Iranian refugees to these countries will remain limited in the short term. Evacuations of foreign nationals will likely constitute the majority of border crossings in the coming days, as was the case in the Iran-Israel 12-day war in June 2025. Nevertheless, sustained conflict or escalation will likely drive migratory flows of Iran’s ethnic-Azeri population into Azerbaijan over the coming weeks. Meanwhile, the continuation of hostilities over the coming weeks will likely increase supply chain disruption across the South Caucasus region, particularly impacting Armenian trade to Iran. (Source: Sibylline)

03 Mar 26. US Attacks Iran with Shahed Replicas. The U.S. military has used LUCAS kamikaze drones in combat for the first time, U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) confirmed Saturday. The ground-launched drones were deployed by Task Force Scorpion Strike (TFSS), a unit established in December to “flip the script on Iran,” according to a U.S. official at the time.

“Costing approximately $35,000 per platform, LUCAS is a low-cost, scalable system that provides cutting-edge capabilities at a fraction of the cost of traditional long-range U.S. systems that can deliver similar effects,”

Navy Capt. Tim Hawkins, a CENTCOM spokesperson, said in December. Compared to conventional missiles — which are more expensive and slower to produce — LUCAS offers a cheaper and more rapidly scalable strike option.

CENTCOM says the drone has extensive range, can operate beyond line of sight, and is capable of autonomous operations. Its design supports coordinated swarm tactics and network-centric strikes. LUCAS can be launched using multiple methods, including catapults, rocket-assisted takeoff, and mobile ground or vehicle systems.

While the drones used against Iran were launched from the ground, U.S. Navy personnel previously test-fired one from the Independence-class littoral combat ship USS Santa Barbara shortly after TFSS was formed.

According to U.S. officials, the LUCAS “pretty much follows the Shahed design,” but is now being produced in cooperation with American companies focused on rapid innovation and scalable manufacturing. (Source: UAS VISION/The War Zone)

01 Mar 26. Iran’s Shahed retaliatory drone attacks raise new C-UAS. questions for defence planners. The performance of Gulf states’ counter-UAS (C-UAS) systems in defending against Iranian Shahed drone attacks on Arabian Gulf states’ infrastructure, following US and Israel February 28 strikes, is being closely monitored by defence planners around the world.

According to United Arab Emirates (UAE) Ministry of Defence in a March 1 posting on X, “since the beginning of the Iranian attack on 28th February, 2026, 165 ballistic missiles launched from Iran towards the UAE have been detected. Of these, 152 were destroyed, while 13 fell into sea waters. Two cruise missiles were also detected and destroyed. A total of 541 Iranian drones were detected, of which 506 were intercepted and destroyed, while 35 fell within the country, causing material damage. The incidents resulted in three fatalities of Pakistani, Nepali and Bangladeshi nationalities, and 58 minor injuries among Emirati, Egyptian, Ethiopian, Filipino, Pakistani, Iranian, Indian, Bangladeshi, Sri Lankan, Azerbaijani, Yemeni, Ugandan, Eritrean, Lebanese and Afghan nationals.”

The UAE has developed a sophisticated counter-UAS (C-UAS) strategy to protect critical infrastructure including the Edge Group Skyshield C-UAS – a multi-layered system using 3D radars, electro-optical (EO) sensors and soft-kill (jamming) capabilities – complemented by more tactical systems such as the Calidus AI-based AlDeraa tracking and mitigation system and Raytheon Coyote interceptors.

The Edge Skyshield system (Edge)

The initial question for defence ministries around the globe is: is this an acceptable rate of success for a strategic C-UAS system developed to protect critical infrastructure rather than military assets? And the second should be – how do we scale this system to defeat more complex drone threats which are just around the corner?

Measuring damage from these kinds of attacks is notoriously difficult. Alongside the casualties and the cost there is the psychological impact of seeing images of burning hotels splashed across social media and the closure of airports and airspace for indefinite periods. Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar and the United Arab Emirates were all targeted by Iran, along with US military bases.

All the early indications suggest that Iran’s drone attacks were largely based on the Shahed-136 drone/cruise missile and the Shahed-136B, an upgraded version of the original model, with a more powerful engine, a range of over 2,000 miles and a larger explosive warhead than the ubiquitous 136. A long-range Iranian Shahed reportedly struck a radar system at the US Naval Support Activity Bahrain – most likely to be the Shahed-136B.

Iran’s January 2025 Treaty on Comprehensive Strategic Partnership with Russia will give it access to Russia’s Shahed-derived Geran-3 and Geran-5 cruise missiles, if Russia has any to spare. These are far more formidable than Iran’s current stock of Shaheds. Flying at speeds of 600 km/h, at altitudes up to 9 km and with a 90kg warhead (in the Geran 5 version), with jam resistant 12-element adaptive antenna arrays, Gerans are effectively low-cost cruise missiles with the potential to bypass many of the counter-UAS systems deployed by states to protect critical infrastructure.

But supplying these systems to Iran will not be a simple choice for Russia: it will degrade already depleted stocks and will raise the anger levels against it in the USA and throughout the Middle East if Geran-3s and -5s suddenly start appearing in the sky. At the same time, Russia cannot afford to lose a valuable ally.

The next few months will see many countries in the region seek urgent upgrades to their air defence and C-UAS strategic systems and one of the key beneficiaries to these requirements will be Ukraine, who knows better than anyone else how to cost-effectively defend again swarms of drones, cruise and other missiles. If Ukraine can forge the same kind of drone/C-UAS industrial links with Gulf state countries as it has done with Europe – setting up production lines a long way away from Ukraine – that would provide both sides with quick wins.

For the first time, drone and C-UAS technology forged in the heat of the battlefields in Ukraine could soon be exported to the wider world at scale, depending on how long the current hostilities last. (Source: www.unmannedairspace.info)

02 Mar 26. Hegseth Says ‘Epic Fury’ Goals in Iran Are ‘Laser-Focused.’ Since early morning Feb. 28, American forces in the U.S. Central Command area of operations have been involved in an intense bombing campaign against Iran that has already resulted in the death of Iranian Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei.

As part of Operation Epic Fury, which started at 1:15 a.m. EST, American forces have already targeted the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps command and control facilities, Iranian air defense capabilities, missile and drone launch sites and military airfields.

Secretary of War Pete Hegseth said that while there is no timeline for the military operation, there are clearly defined goals for what the United States hopes to achieve.

“The mission of Operation Epic Fury is laser-focused,” Hegseth said today during a briefing at the Pentagon. “Destroy Iranian offensive missiles, destroy Iranian missile production, destroy their navy and other security infrastructure, and they will never have nuclear weapons.”

For decades, Iran has been in pursuit of a nuclear weapons capability, through both enrichment of weapons-grade nuclear material and development of missiles that can carry a nuclear warhead.

In June 2025, during Operation Midnight Hammer, the United States struck Iran’s Fordow Fuel Enrichment Plant using 30,000-pound GBU-57 “massive ordnance penetrator” bombs. That operation, Hegseth said, obliterated Iran’s nuclear program.

Nevertheless, Hegseth said, the Iranians have persisted in pursuing a nuclear capability and in building conventional capabilities to protect their nuclear ambitions.

“Iran was building powerful missiles and drones to create a conventional shield for their nuclear blackmail ambitions,” he said. “Our bases, our people, our allies, all in their crosshairs — Iran had a conventional gun to our head as they tried to lie their way to a nuclear bomb.”

The secretary said the clear goals for Epic Fury mean it will be unlike past American conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan.

“Our ambitions are not utopian; they are realistic, scoped to our interests and the defense of our people and our allies,” he said. “This is not Iraq. This is not endless. … This is the opposite. This operation [has] a clear, devastating, decisive mission: destroy the missile threat, destroy the navy, no news.”

Hegseth said Epic Fury doesn’t include nation-building or democracy building goals.

Air Force Gen. Dan Caine, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, said planning for an operation such as Epic Fury has been underway for a significant amount of time.

“This marked the culmination of months, and in some cases, years, of deliberate planning and refinement against this particular target set,” Caine said. “From precision strikes against key military infrastructure to persistent intelligence and targeting integration to the close coordination of the components across vast distances, this operation again demonstrated America’s reach, readiness and professionalism, and that of our joint united force.”

Setting the Force

Over the last 30 days, at the direction of the secretary, Caine said, the joint force repositioned forces around the region in order to provide President Donald J. Trump with options, if he intended to act.

“These movements ensured that U.S. forces remained postured, protected and ready to respond decisively [to] any emerging threat,” he said.

That effort included thousands of service members, hundreds of advanced fighter aircraft, refueling tankers, a sustained flow of munitions, fuel and supplies, and the USS Abraham Lincoln and USS Gerald R. Ford carrier strike groups, along with their air wings. More capabilities continue to flow into the region, Caine said.

“This rapid buildup of forces demonstrated the joint force’s ability to adapt and project power at the time and place of our nation’s choosing,” Caine said.

The final word that Epic Fury was going to happen, he added, came Friday afternoon from the president.

“Operation Epic Fury approved. No aborts. Good luck,” Caine said, relaying the message from the president.

“In the region, every element of the joint force made their final preparations,” he said. “Air defense batteries readied themselves, checking their systems to respond to Iranian attacks. Pilots and crews rehearsed their strike packages for the final time. Air crews began loading their final weapons, and two carrier strike groups began to move towards their launching points across the globe.”

Epic Fury

U.S. Cyber Command and U.S. Space Command, he said, initiated action with non-kinetic effects to disable Iran’s communications ability. And then, at 1:15 a.m. EST, 9:45 a.m. Tehran time, Epic Fury kicked off.

“More than 100 aircraft launched from land and sea: fighters, tankers, airborne early warning, electronic attack, bombers from the states and unmanned platforms forming a single synchronized wave,” he said. “This was a daylight strike based on a trigger event conducted by the Israeli Defense Forces, enabled by the U.S. intelligence community.”

On the sea, the U.S. Navy launched Tomahawk missiles at Iran and attacked Iranian naval forces. While on the ground, he said, coordinated salvos of precision standoff weapons from across the region have neutralized hundreds of preplanned targets.

“This was a massive, overwhelming attack across all domains of warfare, striking more than 1,000 targets in the first 24 hours,” Caine said. “We are now roughly 57 hours into the operation. In the initial phase, Centcom’s focus was systematic, targeting of Iranian command and control, infrastructure, naval forces, ballistic missile sites and intelligence infrastructure — designed to daze and confuse them.”

As a result of strikes in Iran, Caine said the U.S. has established local air superiority, which enhances the ability to protect U.S. forces and allows them to continue operations there.

“Operation Epic Fury stands as a reminder of what the United States military uniquely delivers: the ability to project power on a global scale with speed, surprise, precision and overwhelming force, when and where our nation requires it,” Caine said. “What we’ve demonstrated over the past several days reflects years of investment in readiness, joint integration and professionalism of the joint force.”

During the briefing, Hegseth also directly addressed U.S. troops who are participating in Epic Fury, telling them that both he and the president have their backs.

“We will finish this on ‘America First’ conditions of President Trump’s choosing — nobody else’s — as it should be,” Hegseth said. “And know this above all, President Trump and I have your back, always. Through fire, through criticism, through fake news, through everything, we unleash you because you are the best, most powerful, most lethal fighting force the world has ever seen.” (Source: U.S. DoD)

02 Mar 26. Israel Ministry of Defense Spokesperson’s Statement. Israel Ministry of Defense Spokesperson’s Statement. As part of the full support for the IDF’s operational needs, the Israel Ministry of Defense (IMOD) and the IDF completed the reception and unloading of a cargo ship over the weekend, carrying tons of military equipment including military gear, dozens of Humvees, trucks, and more. The ship, which docked at the Port of Haifa, was brought to Israel in a joint operation by the IMOD Mission to the United States, the International Shipping Division of the Ministry’s Defense Procurement Directorate (DPD), and the IDF’s Planning Directorate. The IMOD and the IDF continue their ongoing procurement and shipping efforts to supply the IDF with required equipment.

Since the onset of the war, 1,150 cargo aircraft and 166 ships have arrived in Israel carrying over 130,000 tons of munitions and military equipment, of which over 6,500 tons were delivered in 90 flights and shipments in recent weeks. The shipping effort will continue to intensify in the coming period as part of Operation Roaring Lion.

Over the past 24 hours, the first cargo aircraft landed in Israel carrying various munitions and military equipment. Defense Minister Israel Katz and Israel Ministry of Defense (IMOD) Director General, Maj. Gen. (Res.) Amir Baram, have prioritized bolstering Israel’s strategic endurance and ensuring uninterrupted operational readiness amid preparations for potential escalation across additional fronts.

The airlift operation is expected to scale up in the coming days. It is being carried out jointly by the IMOD Defense Procurement Directorate (DPD) through its International Shipping Division, the IMOD Missions to the United States and Germany, the IDF Planning Directorate, the Israel Airports Authority, and the Israel Civil Aviation Authority

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