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04 Mar 26. Ethiopia-Sudan: RSF attacks increase risk of airstrikes in Ethiopia’s border region, conflict unlikely. On 2 March, the Sudanese foreign ministry accused Ethiopia of allowing drones to be launched from its territory into Sudan in February and March. The statement did not specify from where such attacks were launched, but the allegations follow Reuters’ claimed identification of Sudanese rebel Rapid Support Force’s (RSF) camps in Ethiopia’s Benishangul-Gumuz region, across the border from Sudan’s Blue Nile state. Given both Ethiopia and the RSF’s close ties to the UAE we assess that it is likely that Ethiopia is permitting the RSF to operate from border regions within its territory. There is a realistic possibility that this will trigger skirmishes and even Sudanese airstrikes on RSF positions in remote border regions, though Sudan is highly unlikely to launch attacks on proximate towns or cities. While such instances would significantly elevate tensions, it is highly unlikely that these would trigger a more direct conflict between Ethiopia and Sudan. The two states often engage in skirmishes over the disputed Al-Fashaga territory which borders Ethiopia’s Amhara region and Sudan’s Al-Qadarif state. Moreover, both state’s military resources are currently focused on internal security crises. (Source: Sibylline)
02 Mar 26. Afghanistan-Pakistan: Border hostilities, airstrikes in Afghanistan will likely continue in coming days. On 1 March, the police in Parwan province (Afghanistan) claimed that they had repelled an attempt from Pakistani military jets to ‘bomb Bagram airbase’ with ‘anti-aircraft and missile defence systems’ at around 0500hrs (local time). This claim has not been verified and Pakistan has avoided commenting on the allegation. If true, such an attempt would represent a further escalation in Pakistan’s targets, with airstrikes so far largely limited to alleged militant hide-outs and military sites following renewed hostilities on 27 February. Armed exchanges along the border have continued into at least 1 March; Pakistan has carried out airstrikes deeper into Afghanistan, claiming that 46 locations have been struck. However, claims regarding damage inflicted by both sides have been difficult to verify, while misinformation online has remained persistent. We assess that sporadic fighting along the border and airstrikes in Afghanistan will continue in the coming days, given that Pakistan has rejected offers to participate in talks. Additionally, these tensions will significantly increase the risk of militant attacks within Pakistan, particularly in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province, but also in urban areas elsewhere in the country. (Source: Sibylline)
27 Feb 26. China: Purge of military officials highlights continued upheaval, reduces short-term conflict risks. On 26 February, the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress (NPC; i.e. China’s legislature) dismissed 19 members, including nine military officials. In January, Chinese President Xi Jinping purged vice chairman of the Central Military Commission (CMC) Zhang Youxia, as well as CMC chief of staff Liu Zhenli (see Sibylline Situation Update Brief – 30 January 2026). While the authorities have not yet given an official reason for the dismissals, we assess they are likely part of efforts to consolidate power within the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) amid ongoing corruption concerns. Reportedly, more than 100 senior military officials have been purged since 2022. We assess that the level and rate of this upheaval likely undermine the PLA’s immediate combat readiness and reduce the short-term likelihood of China conducting major military action in the South China Sea or the Taiwan Strait. However, the consolidation of military command and control around Xi will drive greater military uncertainty in the longer term, given the potential for fewer checks and balances on his power. (Source: Sibylline)
27 Feb 26. Pakistan-Afghanistan: Large-scale border clashes, airstrikes underscore risk of intense conflict. On 26 February, Afghanistan conducted ‘large-scale offensive operations’ against the Pakistani military at multiple locations along the border. In response, the Pakistan Air Force (PAF) conducted airstrikes, reportedly targeting military infrastructure and militant hideouts in the capital Kabul and in Kandahar and Paktia provinces (all Afghanistan). Reportedly, border clashes are ongoing at some locations along the border in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province (Pakistan). According to the Pakistani authorities, 228 Taliban fighters have been killed in the attacks, while both sides claim to have destroyed each other’s military posts. The strikes on Kabul and Kandahar – beyond border districts – mark an escalation in Pakistan’s strategy. This follows a spate of Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) attacks targeting high-ranking Pakistani military personnel, as well as an attack in Pakistan’s capital Islamabad. Pakistan accuses the Afghan Taliban of providing safe havens to the TTP. Given the border clashes’ scale and the escalation in airstrikes, we assess that further cross-border hostilities will continue in the coming hours and days, barring significant progress in mediation efforts by China, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and/or Turkey. Any further hostilities will focus on border areas, with the Afghan Taliban’s military mostly limited to cross-border artillery and drone attacks. However, TTP revenge attacks are likely to increase in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, with a possibility of them spreading to other major cities across Pakistan; security measures will be increased in major urban areas as a result. (Source: Sibylline)
03 Mar 26. Colombia: Security force operation will elevate physical safety risks along Colombia-Ecuador border. On 1 March, Colombia’s defence minister, Pedro Sánchez, launched ‘Operation Espejo’ to combat illegal armed groups operating along the Colombia-Ecuador border. Colombia has deployed approximately 20,000 military personnel in Nariño and Putumayo departments to tackle illicit economies such as drug trafficking, smuggling, extortion and illegal mining. The US will provide intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) support. Sánchez also announced that the Ecuadorian security forces would participate; the Ecuadorian authorities have rejected claims of their involvement. We assess that heightened deployments will likely precipitate clashes between armed groups and security forces personnel. Armed conflict and physical security risks will therefore be elevated in the coming weeks, particularly near security outposts in Nariño and Putumayo. A sustained intensification in security operations along the Colombia-Ecuador border will marginally reduce regional tensions between Bogotá and Quito. (Source: Sibylline)
03 Mar 26. Taiwan: Potential budget cut would allow funding for US arms sales, temporarily easing tensions.Earlier on 3 March, the opposition Taiwan People’s Party (TPP) reportedly stated that it will pass a USD 40bn special defence budget bill in full only if the US announces a new military sales package to Taiwan. The governing Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) intends to allocate USD 30bn of the special defence budget to fund arms procurement from the US. The US package (announced in December 2025) is worth USD 11.1bn. We assess that the US is unlikely to announce a new arms sale package before April, given that the US seeks to avoid provoking China before the leaders’ summit, scheduled for late March or early April. As such, the TPP will not co-operate with the DPP to pass the full budget during this month. The payment deadline for the first instalment of the December 2025 arms sales package is on 31 March. Opposition parties will highly likely advocate for separating the budget approvals for US arms sales and domestic programmes, while tightening the overall spending cap. While this could delay future procurements and slow military modernisation, there is a realistic possibility that the opposition’s proposals will ensure that funding for the March payment is procured, easing tensions with the US in the short term.,(Source: Sibylline)
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Founded in 1987, Exensor Technology is a world leading supplier of Networked Unattended Ground Sensor (UGS) Systems providing tailored sensor solutions to customers all over the world. From our Headquarters in Lund Sweden, our centre of expertise in Network Communications at Communications Research Lab in Kalmar Sweden and our Production site outside of Basingstoke UK, we design, develop and produce latest state of the art rugged UGS solutions at the highest quality to meet the most stringent demands of our customers. Our systems are in operation and used in a wide number of Military as well as Homeland Security applications worldwide. The modular nature of the system ensures any external sensor can be integrated, providing the user with a fully meshed “silent” network capable of self-healing. Exensor Technology will continue to lead the field in UGS technology, provide our customers with excellent customer service and a bespoke package able to meet every need. A CNIM Group Company
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