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NEWS IN BRIEF – MIDDLE EAST – CONFLICT

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Military And Security Developments

Mar 10

KEY DEVELOPMENTS 

  • BAHRAIN-UAE: Iranian drone attacks on the Gulf region have continued; the rate of direct hits in Bahrain underscores the growing risks that possibly dwindling interceptor stockpiles will pose during the next two weeks.
  • ISRAEL-LEBANON: Further armed escalation is likely in the coming days following Lebanese Hizballah (LH)’s strikes on central Israel.
  • US-IRAN-ISRAEL: The US’ strategic ambiguity regarding its war goals possibly indicates plans to declare total victory over Iran in the coming days.
  • STRAIT OF HORMUZ: Despite anecdotal evidence suggesting that an oil tanker successfully transited the Strait of Hormuz in recent days, broad resumption of shipping remains unlikely as the Israel-US-Iran conflict continues.
  • ISRAEL-US-IRAN: The US’ and Israel’s airstrikes against Iran are highly likely to continue in the coming 24 hours, with their possible intensification increasing threats to security and infrastructure resilience. Israeli and US airstrikes across Iran have continued since our last report, with local media noting particularly intense bombardment in Behbahan (Khuzestan province), Karaj (Alborz province), Kerman (Kerman province), Shokohieh (Qom province), Tabriz (East Azerbaijan province) and the capital Tehran. Airstrikes are highly likely to continue, targeting locations associated with Iran’s security forces and particularly with the production, storage and launch of missiles and drones. In the past 24 hours, local media have also reported numerous explosions near port infrastructure in Bandar Abbas, Bandar Lengeh (both Hormozgan province), Bushehr (Bushehr province) and Chabahar (Sistan and Baluchestan province). These reports likely reflect continued US and Israeli efforts to negate Iranian naval assets, in order to curtail the authorities’ capacity to restrict the navigability of the Strait of Hormuz. However, strikes targeting port facilities (particularly in Chabahar) are highly likely to disrupt Iranian import and export activity, including of agricultural staples, oil products and medical supplies. Such conditions are highly likely to compound socio-economic pressure on Iran, amid broad conflict-related economic disruption. Earlier on 10 March, US Secretary of War Pete Hegseth announced that the US plans to escalate airstrikes targeting Iran imminently. This likely indicates that airstrikes’ frequency and intensity is highly likely to increase in the coming hours, particularly near Isfahan (Isfahan province), Karaj, Tehran and Tabriz. Rolling airstrikes will likely restrict civilian access to evacuation routes; they will also increase the risk of cascading infrastructure failures, further undermining food, energy and water security conditions within Iran.
  • IRAN: Possible cyber attacks targeting Iranian financial institutions will likely compound socio-economic pressure, though high-level security force defections remain unlikely. Earlier on 10 March, several state-linked media outlets in Iran reported that financial institutions associated with the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) are facing substantial service disruption. Bank Melli and Bank Sepah have both reported outages, including to mobile banking services and ATMs. Although the Iranian authorities have not attributed the outages to any specific incident, we assess that there is a realistic possibility that the service disruption results from a cyber attack conducted by the US and/or Israel. If the outage results from hostile cyber activity, this would likely reflect efforts to restrict IRGC and conventional security force personnel’s access to banking facilities and savings in order to incentivise defections. Even so, there is also a realistic possibility that the service outage results from conflict-related damage to Iran’s telecommunications infrastructure; throughout the conflict, US and Israeli strikes have routinely targeted elements of Iran’s telecoms infrastructure, including the digital police (FAJAR) and the Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcasting (IRIB) corporation. The Iranian authorities have instituted an internet blackout since 1 March, which has partially restricted civilian access to banking facilities and online payment systems. In the coming days, restricted online and physical banking is highly likely to build pressure on socio-economic health conditions, particularly amid increasing conflict-related displacement. If sustained, restricted banking access will also increase the likelihood of low-level defections within Iran’s security forces, particularly the conventional army (Artesh). However, high-level defections among the IRGC remain unlikely, particularly due to long-standing IRGC efforts to develop alternative and informal financial networks, including crypto-currency channels.
  • BAHRAIN-UAE: Iranian drone attacks on the Gulf region have continued; the rate of direct hits in Bahrain underscores the growing risks that possibly dwindling interceptor stockpiles will pose during the next two weeks. Between 9 and 10 March, Iran continued to launch a steady rate of drone salvos targeting Gulf countries (though fewer barrages than last week). On 9 March in Bahrain, a drone strike on a high-rise residential building in the capital Manama killed one civilian and injured eight others. The attack comes a day after a major attack on Bahrain’s main refinery and a separate attack on a nearby residential area, resulting in several fatalities (see Sibylline Middle East Crisis Update – 9 March 2026). Earlier on 10 March in the UAE, a drone struck a facility in the Ruwais industrial complex (Abu Dhabi emirate), causing a fire and material damage. The complex houses state-owned Abu Dhabi National Oil Company (ADNOC) facilities. The attack comes hours after the UAE’s authorities confirmed the deaths of two armed forces personnel in a helicopter crash caused by a technical malfunction, which likely occurred while intercepting Iranian drones. The rate of successful strikes in Bahrain over the past 48 hours possibly indicates early signs of interceptor stockpile exhaustion, a growing risk for all Gulf countries should the Israel-US-Iran war extend into late March. In our most dangerous scenario, the partial depletion of interceptors almost certainly prompts a spike in successful Iranian strikes against key infrastructure, likely triggering major economic disruption in the Gulf. These risks will remain most acute for Bahrain and Kuwait, as limited stockpiling and poor infrastructure resiliency make these states the most vulnerable to any direct hits, including those causing temporary disruption to infrastructure tied to energy or water security.
  • ISRAEL-LEBANON: Further armed escalation is likely in the coming days following Lebanese Hizballah (LH)’s strikes on central Israel. On 9 March, LH lightly injured 18 people and caused damage to military and communications infrastructure in strikes on central Israel, which utilised long-range precision missiles. According to local reports, the missile barrage did not activate early warning sirens. Additionally, according to footage, the barrage caused severe damage to the satellite communication farm in the Valley of Elah (located near Beit Shemesh; Jerusalem district). The damage will elevate risks of communications and broadband disruption in Israel, possibly also impacting broadcasting by international outlets. Furthermore, there is a realistic possibility that the complex also housed antennas used by the military, possibly undermining Israel’s early alert systems, compounding security risks nationwide. There is a realistic possibility that LH used an Iranian surface-to-surface Fateh-110 missile, which allegedly has an operational range of up to 186 miles (about 300km) and the ability to carry a heavy warhead of around 500kg. Such missiles significantly increase the damage potential of LH strikes and are among the organisation’s most advanced weapons. LH will likely use more such weapons and further intensify its attacks against Israel in the coming days. This will increase physical security risks and disruption across Israel, particularly in northern and central areas. In return, Israel is likely to escalate strikes and ground operations against Lebanon. However, we assess that the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) will prioritise establishing an initial buffer zone in southern Lebanon before expanding ground operations northwards.
  • LEBANON-SYRIA: LH artillery shelling into Syria elevates risk of armed escalation along border areas. Earlier on 10 March, the Syrian army claimed that LH fired artillery shells into Syrian territory overnight, landing near Serghaya (Rif Dimashq governorate). The army also accused LH of targeting Syrian military positions in the area and said it had observed LH reinforcements along the Lebanon-Syria border. The incident follows Syrian President Ahmed al-Sharaa’s declaration of support for Lebanon’s efforts to disarm LH on 9 March. The incident highlights the elevated tensions between LH and regional governments, amid a significant escalation in Israel’s attacks on the group since 2 March (see Sibylline Middle East Crisis Update as of 1200hrs GMT – 2 March 2026). In the coming days, there is a realistic possibility that LH will attempt to secure or reinforce land crossings along the Lebanon-Syria border, elevating risks of sporadic armed clashes with Syrian military personnel along border areas. Currently, a Syrian ground incursion into Lebanon remains unlikely; however, further LH targeting of Syrian forces would elevate risks of limited Syrian military ground operations along the border.
  • IRAQ: Attacks by Iran-backed groups against US and Kurdish assets continue; physical security threats will be most acute around military facilities and telecommunication towers. Since our last report, Iran-backed militias have continued to launch missile and drone attacks against various US and Kurdish assets in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI). Local air forces intercepted several drones over Erbil (Erbil governorate), likely targeting the US consulate in the city. Separately, a drone struck a house in the Jian residential district of central Erbil, without triggering an explosion but causing a minor fire. In Sulaymaniyah (Sulaymaniyah governorate), a drone struck the former UN compound next to the Titanic Hotel for the second time in three days. Local media have also reported that nine drones struck telecommunications towers located between the Darbandikhan and Garmian border regions (also Sulaymaniyah). These attacks reflect a persistent trend of Iran-backed groups targeting telecommunications infrastructure used by US, Iraqi and Kurdish forces, likely intended to disrupt drone interceptions. As such, physical security threats near telecommunication towers and military facilities will remain very high. Meanwhile, joint Israeli-US strikes have continued to target Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) positions in Al Anbar, Kirkuk, Nineveh and Saladin governorates, killing at least five militia members. Such strikes will almost certainly persist through the coming days (particularly in rural areas of the mentioned governorates) in response to proxy group attacks.

POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS

  • US-IRAN-ISRAEL: The US’ strategic ambiguity regarding its war goals possibly indicates plans to declare total victory over Iran in the coming days. On 9 March, US President Donald Trump issued various statements regarding the progress of the US airstrike campaign targeting Iran and the potential duration of US engagement in the region. Although Trump characterised the conflict as ‘very complete, pretty much’ in an interview with CBS, he later stated in public engagement that while the US has ‘won in many ways’, it has not ‘won enough’ vis-à-vis Iran. Trump’s statements likely reflect increasing concerns regarding conflict-related disruption to operational conditions in the Gulf and supply chain continuity through the Strait of Hormuz, which have triggered significant volatility on international energy and commodity markets. Trump’s statements are unlikely to indicate that the US plans to disengage from Iran unilaterally in the coming 24 hours. However, escalating ambiguity regarding the US’ war goals in Iran will increase the likelihood of the US announcing a symbolic victory in the coming days, given the significant damage to its conventional security forces and the successful targeting of several high-ranking regime and security force figures. If the US announces the end of combat operations in Iran, regional operational conditions will likely stabilise thereafter, facilitating a progressive resumption of key economic activity, particularly in the shipping, aviation and energy sectors. However, we assess that damage to energy facilities resulting from Iranian attacks, supply chain backlogs and concerns regarding possible conflict re-escalation will possibly delay efforts to return to pre-conflict operational levels, sustaining broader economic pressure in the coming days.
  • STRAIT OF HORMUZ: Despite reports suggesting that an oil tanker successfully transited the Strait of Hormuz in recent days, a broad resumption of shipping remains unlikely as the Israel-US-Iran conflict continues. On 10 March, Bloomberg reported that a Greek-flagged oil tanker successfully transited the Strait of Hormuz after turning off its transponder on 4 March. The vessel had loaded approximately 1 million barrels of crude from the Ras Tanura port facility (Eastern province, Saudi Arabia) before the Israel-US-Iran war; after turning off its transponder for five days, the vessel subsequently began signalling near India’s coastline on 9 March. This report comes amid increasing speculation that commercial vessels in the Persian Gulf are attempting to break Iran’s de facto closure of the Strait of Hormuz by turning off location systems or re-flagging themselves in order to secure passage. Although there is a realistic possibility that further covert transit will take place in the coming days, vessels traversing the waterway will remain acutely exposed to Iranian missile and drone attacks. This will highly likely continue to deter any broad resumption of shipping activity in the Gulf in the immediate term, critically disrupting import and export activity in the coming days. Covert efforts to transit through the Strait of Hormuz will also increase the likelihood of vessel collisions and major hazards resulting from cargo ignition or spills, increasing hazard risks for nearby vessels.

* Lebanon-Syria: LH artillery shelling into Syria elevates risk of armed escalation along border areas. Earlier on 10 March, the Syrian Army claimed that Lebanese Hizballah (LH) fired artillery shells into Syrian territory overnight, landing near Serghaya (Rif Dimashq governorate). The army also accused LH of targeting Syrian military positions in the area and stated that it had observed LH reinforcements along the Lebanon-Syria border. The incident follows Syrian President Ahmed al-Sharaa’s declaration of support for Lebanon’s efforts to disarm LH on 9 March. The incident highlights the elevated tensions between LH and regional governments, amid a significant escalation in Israel’s attacks on the organisation since 2 March (see Sibylline Middle East Crisis Update as of 1200hrs GMT – 2 March 2026). In the coming days, there is a realistic possibility that LH will attempt to secure or reinforce land crossings along the Lebanon-Syria border, elevating risks of sporadic armed clashes with Syrian military personnel along border areas. Currently, a Syrian ground incursion into Lebanon remains unlikely; however, further LH targeting of Syrian forces would elevate risks of a limited Syrian military ground operations along the border.

Azerbaijan-Iran: War spillover, Iran-linked plots risks sustain tensions despite de-escalation attempts . On 6 March, Azerbaijan’s State Security Service (DTX) claimed that it had thwarted what it called ‘terror and sabotage plots’ allegedly planned by Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC). The alleged targets included the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan oil pipeline, the Israeli embassy in Azerbaijan, the leader of a Jewish community in Azerbaijan (known as Mountain Jews) and an Ashkenazi synagogue. While we cannot confirm this information, would-be terrorists have previously targeted the Israeli embassy in Azerbaijan’s capital Baku. The reported foiling of IRGC-linked plots follows a likely Iranian drone attack in Azerbaijan’s Nakhchivan exclave (see Sibylline Situation Update Brief – 5 March 2026). Despite these recent developments, Azerbaijan and Iran are both attempting to decrease tensions. On 8 March, President Ilham Aliyev and Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian spoke via telephone; while earlier on 9 March, Azerbaijan resumed cargo transportation across the border with Iran. However, we assess that the continuation of the Israel-US-Iran war and IRGC-related plots facing Azerbaijan (potentially without central Tehran authorisation) over the coming weeks will likely drive bilateral tensions periodically and increase the risk of Azerbaijan’s entry into the war.

Iran: Election of new supreme leader likely to centralise IRGC power, elevate prolonged conflict risks. On 8 March, Iran’s Assembly of Experts elected Mojtaba Khamenei as the country’s new supreme leader, succeeding his father the late supreme leader Ali Khamenei, who was killed in recent US-Israeli strikes (see Sibylline Middle East Crisis Update – 1 March 2026). Khamenei is a hardline conservative and has long maintained close relations with the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC); his accession will likely centralise the IRGC’s role in executive decision-making amid the ongoing Israel-US-Iran war. Such hardline influence will increase the likelihood of Iranian escalation against civilian infrastructure in Gulf states, compounding energy, food and water security risks across the region. In addition, the US and Israel are unlikely to welcome Khamenei’s election and are highly likely to target him in additional strikes in the coming days. These dynamics will likely reduce the prospects for an Iranian compromise with the US and Israel in the coming weeks, elevating the risk of prolonging the war.

Mar 08.

KEY DEVELOPMENTS

  • BAHRAIN-KUWAIT-UAE: Retaliatory Iranian attacks against energy and water infrastructure in the Gulf region are likely in the coming days.
  • IRAQ: Recent waves of attacks by Iran-backed militias underscore persistent threats to US government and commercial staff and assets nationwide.
  • ISRAEL-LEBANON: A strike on a hotel in the Lebanese capital Beirut highlights the extension of conflict risks to hospitality venues across Lebanon, including in central Beirut.
  • IRAN: The Assembly of Experts will likely announce Iran’s next supreme leader in the coming hours, though threats to government stability are unlikely to decrease substantially.
  • ISRAEL-US-IRAN: US and Israeli airstrikes targeting airports and dual-use transport infrastructure will almost certainly continue in the coming days.  In the past 24 hours, the US and Israel have continued to engage in airstrikes throughout Iran, with repeated strikes reported in Isfahan (Isfahan province), Hamadan (Hamadan province), the capital Tehran and Yazd (Yazd province). In Isfahan, the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) have destroyed an unspecified number of Iranian F-14s in strikes on the city’s Isfahan Shahid Beheshti International Airport (IFN); this follows the IDF’s destruction of several military aircraft in strikes targeting Tehran’s Mehrabad International Airport (THR) on 6 March. The strikes underscore increasing pressure on Iran’s conventional aerial resources, with further strikes increasing the Iranian authorities’ dependence on non-conventional capabilities, particularly unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs; i.e. drones) and unmanned surface vehicles (USVs; i.e. drone boats). Airstrikes targeting airport facilities and dual-use transport infrastructure (including port facilities) will almost certainly continue in the coming days, further restricting access to evacuation routes within Iran.
  • IRAN-REGION: US and Israeli airstrikes targeting Iranian oil and water infrastructure will almost certainly trigger a reciprocal targeting of facilities in the Gulf region in the coming days. Overnight on 7-8 March, airstrikes targeted four oil depots and a petroleum products transport centre across Alborz and Tehran provinces, all of which service Tehran; the resultant fires are ongoing at the time of writing. In the coming days, strikes targeting Iranian oil facilities are highly likely to continue, particularly those related to domestic energy infrastructure. The targeting of oil extraction, refinery, transport and storage facilities will significantly increase the risk of rolling power outages in Iran’s major cities. In the coming days, risks of exposure to fires, explosions and heavy air pollution will remain acute for individuals and assets near oil and energy facilities, while petrol shortages and official rationing will become increasingly likely. Additionally, on 7 March, Iran’s Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi stated that the US had attacked water desalination facilities on Qeshm Island (Hormozgan province), impacting the supply of fresh water to 30 coastal population centres. In the coming days, US and Israeli airstrikes targeting water infrastructure will likely continue, with targets including desalination facilities, water treatment plants and sewage management systems. Similarly, earlier on 8 March, Israeli media reported that the UAE launched strikes on an unspecified Iranian water desalination facility; however, these reports cannot be verified at the time of writing. Such strikes are highly likely to compound long-standing water security concerns within Iran, while increasing broader pressure on infrastructure and essential services. In response to deteriorating energy and water security conditions, Iran will likely increase the intensity of attacks targeting similar infrastructure in the Gulf region (particularly the UAE, if its strike is confirmed), exacerbating risks of cross-sector operational disruption (see below).
  • BAHRAIN-KUWAIT-UAE: Retaliatory Iranian attacks against energy and water infrastructure in the Gulf region are likely in the coming days. As we previously assessed, since our last report, Iranian drone and missile strikes against Gulf countries have continued despite recent de-escalatory statements from Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian (see Sibylline Middle East Crisis Update – 7 March 2026). In the UAE, debris from an intercepted drone killed the driver of a vehicle in the Al Barsha district of Dubai (Dubai emirate), while a separate interception caused structural damage to the facade of a tower in the city’s Dubai Marina district. In Bahrain, drones and missiles targeted the capital Manama, with debris impacting residential properties in Juffair district and near the Salman port, sparking localised fires and material damage. Additionally, the Bahraini authorities have confirmed that an Iranian strike damaged a critical desalination plant in Manama, though water supplies and network capacity remain unaffected. Meanwhile, in Kuwait, a drone strike triggered a major fire at the Public Institution for Social Security headquarters in the capital, Kuwait City. The authorities also confirmed the death of two officers ​while performing duties, without disclosing further details. Another wave of drone attacks struck two fuel storage tanks at the capital’s Kuwait International Airport (KWI). We assess that Iran’s intensified targeting of Gulf infrastructure over the past 24 hours is likely a direct response to recent US and Israeli strikes on Iranian oil infrastructure. Accordingly, further Iranian attacks against energy, power and water facilities in the above-mentioned countries are likely to continue for as long as joint US-Israeli strikes persist. Specifically, any strikes on desalination infrastructure in Kuwait and Bahrain would almost certainly trigger significant business disruption, raising the risk of broader economic shock in both states. Similarly, while the UAE’s infrastructure is generally more resilient than Bahrain’s and Kuwait’s, any Iranian strike on the country’s desalination plants would trigger reduced water supply and possible water rationing across the affected emirate, accelerating capital and labour flight. We also assess that such an attack would significantly raise the likelihood of the UAE conducting direct military retaliation against Iran, including airstrikes on nearby coastal energy and water facilities.
  • IRAQ: Iran-backed militias’ recent waves of attacks underscore persistent threats to US government and commercial staff and assets nationwide. On 7 March, three Katyusha rockets targeted the US embassy in the capital Baghdad’s Green Zone; the embassy’s C‑RAM system intercepted all projectiles. The Iraqi authorities have attributed the launch to unidentified groups operating from eastern Baghdad’s Canal Street area. Later on 7 March, Iraqi air defences intercepted multiple drones approaching the Baghdad Diplomatic Support Center (BDSC), located on the western edge of the capital’s Baghdad International Airport (BGW). Additionally, a drone struck the Al Dora power plant in southern Baghdad, causing a localised fire. Meanwhile, for the second consecutive day, a drone struck the Burjesia oil complex in Basra (Basra governorate) on 7 March, causing a major fire. The complex is home to several facilities belonging to US and Western energy companies. In the Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI), a drone struck the vicinity of Erbil International Airport (EBL; Erbil governorate), killing a security force member and wounding another, while a second drone hit a nearby warehouse. Notably, a day after a drone attack on a hotel in Erbil on 6 March, Iran-backed groups issued an explicit warning across the KRI which named all hotels used by US personnel as potential targets. Earlier on 8 March, a drone struck the vicinity of Titanic Hotel, located near the UN’s office in Sulaymaniyah (Sulaymaniyah governorate), causing material damage. These attacks reflect a pattern whereby Iran-backed militias increasingly target US commercial interests across Iraq. This pattern will likely persist in the coming days, increasing the risk of attacks against US staff and assets across all business sectors in Iraq (not only limited to energy), as we previously assessed (see Sibylline Middle East Crisis Update – 7 March 2026).
  • ISRAEL-LEBANON: A strike on a hotel in the capital Beirut highlights the extension of conflict risks to hospitality venues across Lebanon, including in central Beirut. Earlier on 8 March, the IDF conducted a targeted strike against an apartment in the Ramada Hotel of Beirut’s upmarket Raouché neighbourhood, killing at least four individuals and injuring at least ten others. The IDF has claimed that it targeted Iranian Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) Quds Force commanders. In contrast to recent Israeli strikes conducted in civilian areas of Lebanon, the IDF did not issue an evacuation warning prior to this strike. The incident underlines the IDF’s willingness to view hospitality venues across Lebanon (including in central Beirut) as legitimate targets in their pursuit of strikes on high-value individuals affiliated with Lebanese Hizballah (LH) and Iran. This will elevate the risk of strikes on hotels, particularly in Beirut, with a possibility of such targeted operations happening with little to no notice. In addition, IDF strikes across Lebanon are highly likely to continue over the coming days, sustaining elevated security risks, particularly in Beirut, eastern and southern Lebanon, as well as in areas along the borders with Israel and Syria.

POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS 

  • IRAN: The Assembly of Experts will likely announce Iran’s next supreme leader in the coming hours, though threats to government stability are unlikely to decrease substantially. Earlier on 8 March, the state-aligned Mehr news agency reported that the Assembly of Experts had reached a consensus on Iran’s next supreme leader, indicating that a succession announcement is likely imminent. We assess that the assembly will likely elect either Mojtaba Khamenei (the son of deceased supreme leader Ali Khamenei) or Alireza Arafi (a member of the Assembly of Experts, the Guardian Council and the Interim Leadership Council). Both candidates are associated with Iran’s hardline conservative movements, with Khamenei maintaining particularly close ties with the IRGC. Khamenei’s election would likely centralise the IRGC’s role in executive decision-making amid the ongoing Israel-US-Iran war. In contrast, despite Arafi’s ideological alignment with the IRGC, his election would likely result in the IRGC operating as an increasingly autonomous force with parallel decision-making independent of the executive. The US and Israel are not likely to welcome either Arafi or Khamenei’s election; they are highly likely to target both individuals in airstrikes in the coming days. We assess that the successful, repeated targeting of high-ranking government and religious officials within Iran will likely compound threats to government stability amid an intensifying leadership vacuum. If sustained, the IRGC will likely capitalise on this dynamic to assume de facto control of Iran’s government, increasing the likelihood of a protracted conflict with the US and Israel while significantly undermining prospects for diplomatic de-escalation.
  • IRAN-IRAQ-US: Despite the Trump administration’s decreasing public support for an Iranian Kurdish insurgency, we continue to assess that covert support remains a realistic possibility. On 7 March, US President Donald Trump stated that he does not ‘want the Kurds to go into Iran’, amid increasing speculation that Iranian Kurdish forces based in the KRI plan to launch an imminent ground offensive (see Sibylline Middle East Crisis Update – 5 March 2026). Trump claimed that Kurdish involvement would render the conflict ‘too complicated’. The statement underscores the decreasing prospects for overt US support for a Kurdish insurgency in Iran’s Kurdish-majority regions. However, Trump’s statement contrasts with claims from several figures associated with the Coalition of Political Forces of Iranian Kurdistan (CPFIK; a coalition of six Iranian Kurdish armed groups based in Iraq) that the US has communicated offers of air and logistical support for any such offensive. We continue to assess that there is a realistic possibility of covert US support for the mobilisation of Kurdish separatist forces along the northern Iran-Iraq border, as part of broader efforts to intensify pressure on Iran’s security apparatus. In the event of Iranian Kurdish mobilisation, security conditions in north-western Iran are highly likely to deteriorate further, while tensions between Iran, Iraq, Turkey and the US are highly likely to increase.
  • Mar 09.
  • BAHRAIN-SAUDI ARABIA-REGION: Iranian attacks on regional energy infrastructure will compound existing disruption to fuel supply chains in the coming days, with knock-on effects across other economic sectors.
  • TURKEY-NATO-IRAN: NATO’s interception of a second Iranian missile in Turkish airspace within a week will increase the risk of Turkey’s involvement in the conflict if aerial hostilities persist.
  • IRAN: The Assembly of Experts selected Mojtaba Khamenei to serve as supreme leader, sustaining conflict protraction risks.
  • US-STRAIT OF HORMUZ: Despite US efforts to moderate investor concerns regarding the safety of vessels in the Persian Gulf, traffic through the Strait of Hormuz is highly unlikely to resume in the coming days.
  • EUROPE: Explosions in Belgium and Norway underscore the rising risk of attacks targeting Jewish, Israeli and US-linked entities in Europe amid conflict escalation.
  • ISRAEL-US-IRAN: US and Israeli airstrikes continue to target locations throughout Iran, sustaining critical threats to life in major cities. On 8 March, the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) announced that they had targeted the headquarters of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) Aerospace Force in the capital Tehran. Airstrikes have also targeted missile production, storage and launch facilities in the vicinity of Garmdarreh (Alborz province), Jam (Bushehr province), Isfahan (Isfahan province), Shahrud (Semnan province), Shiraz (Fars province) and Tehran. On 9 March, an airstrike also targeted Bandar Abbas International Airport (BND; Hormozgan province), underscoring broad risks of airstrikes targeting commercial aviation installations and disrupting access to aerial evacuation routes. Local media reports indicate that airstrikes have also targeted numerous Basij militia facilities and Law Enforcement Command (LEC) installations in Alborz, Ilam, Kermanshah, Lorestan and Tehran provinces, underscoring US and Israeli efforts to undermine Iran’s domestic security capabilities and capacity to repress anti-government protests and unrest. Airstrikes targeting Iran’s conventional, non-conventional and domestic-focused security forces are highly likely to continue in the coming days, sustaining critical threats to life within Iran. Airstrikes targeting water, energy and transport infrastructure are also highly likely, critically disrupting operational continuity and compounding pressure on socio-economic conditions. If sustained, such conditions are likely to progressively undermine government stability and security force capacity within Iran, increasing the risk of internal instability. Even so, the IRGC are highly likely to sustain missile and drone strikes targeting Israel, the Gulf and US military installations across the region, sustaining risks of conflict protraction into the coming weeks.
  • BAHRAIN-SAUDI ARABIA-REGION: Iranian attacks on regional energy infrastructure will compound existing disruption to fuel supply chains in the coming days, with knock-on effects across other economic sectors. On 8 March, several Iranian drones struck the refinery complex of state-owned Bahrain Petroleum Company (Bapco) at Sitra (Southern governorate), causing a major fire. In the same area, falling debris from intercepted drones and missiles fell on nearby homes, injuring at least 32 people and causing substantial damage, according to the authorities. However, there is also a possibility that a malfunctioning interception missile caused this incident. This is the second major Iranian attack on Bahrain’s only refinery since the Israel-US-Iran war’s onset; it prompted Bapco to declare force majeure on its group operations at the site hours later. Also on 8 March, in Saudi Arabia, the authorities confirmed that an Iranian projectile fell in a residential area in Al Kharj (Riyadh province), killing two people and injuring 12 others. The intended target was likely either local energy infrastructure or the nearby Prince Sultan Air Base; this comes a day after an Iranian drone was intercepted over central Riyadh (Riyadh province). Notably, earlier on 9 March, international media reported that oil company Saudi Aramco has began cutting output at two ​oilfields, citing ongoing security threats and the Strait of Hormuz’s de facto closure. However, at the time of writing, no data indicates which fields have been affected and by ‌how ⁠much production has been curtailed. Nevertheless, this development, in addition to Bapco’s force majeure, is highly likely to compound disruption to regional fuel supply chains this week, even if domestic needs remain met. Moreover, additional operational disruption in other economic sectors across the region is likely in the coming days, including logistics and the petrochemical industry (such as plastics, solvents and other chemicals). Bapco’s and Aramco’s decisions, which follow similar moves by Kuwait and Qatar on oil and gas production, underscore the substantial and persistent physical security threat facing all energy companies operating in the Gulf region and Iraq. This will increase the risk of labour flight from the Gulf region and likely lead to an uptick in evacuations of foreign staff working in the energy sector if the Israel-US-Iran war continues into late March.
  • ISRAEL-LEBANON: Strikes against a Lebanese Hizballah (LH)-affiliated financial institution highlight elevated risks across Lebanon and possible future targeting of assets in the capital Beirut outside the Dahieh suburb. Earlier on 9 March, the IDF conducted strikes across Beirut, targeting branches of the Al-Qard Al-Hasan Association, a financial institution affiliated with LH. The strikes come amid ongoing intensification of IDF military operations against LH and are consistent with our earlier assessment that financial institutions affiliated with LH would likely be targeted (see Sibylline Middle East Crisis Update – 3 March 2026). Before the strikes, the IDF issued an evacuation warning and named the intended target. We assess that IDF strikes against assets of the Al-Qard Al-Hasan Association, as well as other LH-affiliated financial assets, are likely to continue in the coming days across Lebanon, including in Beirut. Furthermore, there is a realistic possibility that in the coming days the IDF will target branches of the association or other LH-affiliated institutions in Beirut, including those outside the Dahieh suburb. This will elevate security risks across the capital in addition to the already elevated risks near hospitality venues (see Sibylline Middle East Crisis Update – 8 March 2026).
  • ISRAEL-LEBANON: The IDF’s ground operations in villages along the Israel-Lebanon border highlight heightened security risks in frontier areas; the further expansion of such operations across southern Lebanon remains a realistic possibility. Overnight on 8-9 March, the IDF conducted focused ground raids in Lebanese villages opposite the Israeli population centres of Kfar Giladi and Margaliot (both Northern district, Israel). The operations highlight persistently elevated security risks across southern Lebanon and particularly those close to the Israel-Lebanon border. The IDF is likely to further such operations in the coming days in pursuit of establishing a buffer zone in southern Lebanon. There is also a realistic possibility that ground operations will expand deeper into Lebanese territory in the coming weeks, particularly if LH attacks continue after the establishment of said buffer zone.
  • TURKEY-NATO-IRAN: NATO’s interception of a second Iranian missile in Turkish airspace within a week will increase the risk of Turkey’s involvement in the conflict should the aerial hostilities persist. Earlier on 9 March, NATO’s air defences in ​the eastern Mediterranean ‌shot down a ballistic missile that was ​fired from Iran ​and entered Turkey’s airspace. The ⁠Turkish defence ministry stated that ammunition parts ​had ​fallen ⁠in south-eastern areas of Gaziantep ​province and that there were ​no ⁠casualties as a result of the incident. The ministry added that it will take all necessary measures against similar threats. This marks the ​second Iranian ballistic missile ​to be shot down over ‌Turkey within a week. However, similar to the first ballistic incident, it is possible the missile was aimed at the UK’s Royal Air Force (RAF) Akrotiri base in Cyprus, rather than assets in Turkey. Nevertheless, the incident underscores the growing risk of conflict spillover and the possibility of Turkey being drawn into the confrontation. The risk of Turkey’s involvement would also increase if strikes against Cyprus overshoot or undershoot their intended target, particularly if intercepted debris or ordnance falls within the self-declared Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC, recognised only by Turkey), which hosts a substantial Turkish military presence.

POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS 

  • IRAN: The Assembly of Experts selected Mojtaba Khamenei to serve as supreme leader, sustaining conflict protraction risks. On 8 March, the Assembly of Experts appointed Mojtaba Khamenei to serve as Iran’s supreme leader; Mojtaba is the son of deceased supreme leader Ali Khamenei. Given Mojtaba Khamenei’s close ties to the IRGC, his accession will likely centralise the IRGC’s role in executive decision-making amid the ongoing Israel-US-Iran war. Khamenei is also associated with Iran’s hardline conservative political factions and supports adherence to the 1979 Islamic Revolution’s principles. Consequently, Khamenei’s appointment indicates that Iran is highly unlikely to seek conflict de-escalation or diplomatic engagement with the US in the coming days. Rather, the IRGC is highly likely to continue engaging in attacks targeting Israel and US military installations throughout the Middle East, sustaining risks of exposure to munitions, explosions and shrapnel for locally engaged assets and personnel. The IRGC is also likely to continue escalating attacks targeting dual-use and civilian infrastructure in Gulf states, including water desalination plants, energy infrastructure and hospitality venues. Continued Iranian attacks will likely compound energy, food and water security concerns, while sustaining risks of cross-sector operational disruption. More broadly, the US and Israel are unlikely to welcome Khamenei’s appointment; as such, attempts to target him and other high-profile regime figures are highly likely to continue in the coming days. If successful, the routine targeting of regime figures will increase the likelihood of a protracted leadership vacuum emerging within Iran in the coming weeks, undermining the prospects for domestic stabilisation and conflict de-escalation.
  • US-STRAIT OF HORMUZ: Despite US efforts to moderate investor concerns regarding the safety of vessels in the Persian Gulf, traffic through the Strait of Hormuz is highly unlikely to resume in the coming days. On 6 March, the US International Development Finance Corporation (IDFC) announced that it had finalised plans to establish a USD 20 billion reinsurance programme for vessels attempting to transit the Strait of Hormuz. Since the Israel-US-Iran war began on 28 February, the majority of carriers and underwriters have implemented significant war risk premium loadings or suspended war risk cover for vessels attempting to transit the waterway. Coupled with acute threats to vessel security stemming from Iranian drone and missile attacks, maritime traffic has broadly ceased. This dynamic has critically disrupted oil, gas and commodity exports from the Gulf to global markets, triggering price hikes; on 9 March, Brent crude traded at over USD 100 per barrel, compared to USD 68 per barrel on 23-26 February. The IDFC programme is highly unlikely to trigger the immediate and full-scale resumption of maritime activity in the Strait of Hormuz. Vessel operators will likely remain reluctant to transit the waterway given acute security concerns stemming from risks of vessel, crew and cargo exposure to Iranian hostilities. Although the US will possibly offer to provide naval escorts for affected vessels in the coming days, traffic will likely be slow to resume and is highly unlikely to reach pre-conflict levels in the short term. Additionally, the reinsurance programme is highly unlikely to mitigate against supply issues stemming from the suspension of operations at oil refineries, LNG facilities and export terminals in the region, amid ongoing Iranian attacks targeting energy infrastructure and storage backlogs (see above). Consequently, the rollout of the IDFC reinsurance programme is unlikely to address critical supply chain disruption the in Gulf imminently, sustaining upwards pressure on oil and gas prices in the coming days.
  • IRAN-US: Despite speculation regarding potential US special operations within Iran, large-scale deployments of US service personnel remain unlikely in the short term. On 8 March, Bloomberg reported that US President Donald Trump is ‘weighing the option’ of deploying US special forces personnel to secure Iran’s stockpiles of medium-enriched uranium. Although no other major media outlet has verified this report, we assess there is a realistic possibility that the US will deploy a small number of specialised personnel to conduct commando missions within Iran to secure specified Iranian assets, such as nuclear material. Any such operations will almost certainly be covert; a public confirmation of ground operations within Iran remains unlikely in the short term. Nevertheless, large-scale deployments of US personnel remain unlikely in the immediate term, moderating the risk of the Israel-US-Iran war evolving into widespread ground engagements between the Iranian and US security forces.
  • EUROPE: Explosions in Belgium and Norway underscore rising risk of attacks targeting Jewish, Israeli and US-linked entities in Europe amid conflict escalation. At approximately 0400hrs (local time) earlier on 9 March, an explosion at a synagogue in Liège (Wallonia region, Belgium) resulted in limited material damage but no reported injuries. The Federal Prosecutor’s Office subsequently launched an investigation into the case, with Belgium’s interior minister characterising the incident as an ‘antisemitic act’. The incident followed a small explosion at the US embassy in Norway’s capital Oslo at approximately 0100hrs (local time) on 8 March; this incident also resulted minor damage and no reported injuries. The authorities are investigating it as a possible terrorist attack, though Norway’s terrorism threat level remains unchanged at the time of writing. These incidents reflect increasing risks of low-capacity attacks targeting locations associated with Jewish communities, Israel and the US following the outbreak of the Israel-US-Iran war on 28 February (see Sibylline Situation Update Brief – 3 March 2026). Robust European counter-terrorism capabilities and augmented security postures are likely to disrupt complex co-ordinated plots, such as those organised by Iran-backed proxies or organised criminal elements. However, the risk of rudimentary attacks including sole-perpetrator attacks and those employing small explosives will remain elevated in the coming weeks. Risks of further attacks will become particularly acute in the event of direct European intervention in the Israel-US-Iran war, including in a defensive capacity. (Source: Sibylline)

 

10 Mar 26. Hegseth Says U.S. Attacks Intensify Under Epic Fury, While Iranian Responses Slow. The U.S. launched strikes on Iran last week to stop the terrorist-run state from its continued and ill-advised pursuit of nuclear weapons it hopes to use to threaten the American homeland.

Nearly 11 days into Operation Epic Fury, Secretary of War Pete Hegseth says the U.S attacks continue to be strong while Iranian responses wane.

“Today will be, yet again, our most intense day of strikes inside Iran,” Hegseth said during a press briefing today at the Pentagon. “The most fighters, the most bombers, the most strikes; intelligence more refined and better than ever. So, that’s on one hand. On the other hand, the last 24 hours have seen Iran fire the lowest number of missiles they’ve been capable of firing yet.”

The secretary told journalists that much of what the Iranians are doing is lobbing missiles at their neighbors in the Middle East, making enemies of what may have once been bystanders, and launching those missiles from near their own schools and hospitals, putting innocent civilians at risk from retaliatory strikes.

“The [Iranians] are desperate and scrambling. Like the terrorist cowards they are, they fire missiles from schools and hospitals … deliberately targeting innocents … because they know their military is being systematically degraded and annihilated,” Hegseth said. “Iran’s neighbors and in some cases former allies in the [Persian] Gulf — they’ve abandoned them.”

Iranian proxy groups like Hezbollah, the Houthis and Hamas are also broken, ineffective, or on the sidelines now, Hegseth said.

“Iran stands alone, and they are badly losing,” the secretary said. “On day 10 of Operation Epic Fury, we are winning with an overwhelming and unrelenting focus on our objectives.”

The secretary said that, surprisingly, Iran’s response after the initial U.S. assault was to attack its neighbors. The result of that, he said, has not been good for Iran.

“The big mistake by the Iranian regime was to start targeting its neighbors,” Hegseth said. “I think it was a demonstration of the desperation of that regime … that they still think their pathway out is to try to alienate their Arab partners even more.”

Those neighbors, Hegseth said, have decided instead to side with the U.S.

“[They have] instead decided to come to us and have been willing to go on the offense, have been giving us access, basing and overflight in a new partnership that will continue to remake the region,” Hegseth said.

The U.S. has short-term, clearly defined goals in Iran. First, destroying Iranian missile stockpiles, missile launchers and their defense industrial base. Second, destroy the Iranian navy. And finally, permanently deny Iran the ability to have nuclear weapons.

“It’s a laser-focused maximum authority mission delivered with overwhelming and unrelenting precision,” he said.

Air Force Gen. Dan Caine, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, shared the latest tactical details of Operation Epic Fury.

“To date, [U.S. Central Command has] struck more than 5,000 targets,” Caine said. “[U.S.] Strategic Command bombers recently dropped dozens of 2,000-pound GPS penetrating weapons on deeply buried missile launchers across the southern flank.”

Also, Caine said, the U.S. struck several factories the Iranians use to make one-way attack drones.

“Alongside our regional partners along the southern flank, [we] continue to execute intercepts against one-way attack drones, using fighters and attack helicopters,” he said. “Our strikes mean we’ve made significant progress in reducing the number of missile and drone attacks out of Iran. Ballistic missile attacks continue to trend downward, 90% from where they started. And one-way attack drone [attacks] have decreased 83% since the beginning of the operation — a testament to our air defenders and our air defense systems.”

When it comes to taking out the Iranian navy, Caine said the joint force is making “substantial progress.” So far, he said, the joint force has taken out more than 50 Iranian naval ships using artillery, fighters, bombers and sea-launched missiles.

“We struck and sank an Iranian drone carrier ship, and U.S. Centcom continues today to hunt and strike mine-laying vessels and mine storage facilities,” Caine said. “This work will continue.”

The secretary and President Donald J. Trump have said Operation Epic Fury will not be a long-term, nation-building endeavor, and the secretary reiterated that today.

“This is not [an] endless nation-building … quagmire — it’s not even close,” Hegseth said. “Our generation of soldiers will not let that happen again, and nor will this president — who very clearly ran against … never-ending, nebulously scoped missions; those days are dead. Instead, we’re winning decisively with brutal efficiency, total air dominance and an unbreakable will to accomplish the president’s objectives on our timeline.”  (Source: U.S. DoD)

 

10 Mar 26. Iran begins laying mines in Strait of Hormuz, sources say. Luojiashan tanker sits anchored in Muscat, as Iran vows to close the Strait of Hormuz, amid the U.S.-Israeli conflict with Iran, in Muscat, Oman, on March 7.

Iran has begun laying mines in the Strait of Hormuz, the world’s most important energy chokepoint that carries about one-fifth of all crude oil, according to two people familiar with US intelligence reporting on the issue.

The mining is not extensive yet, with a few dozen having been laid in recent days, the sources said. But Iran still retains upward of 80% to 90% of its small boats and mine layers, one of the sources said, so its forces could feasibly lay hundreds of mines in the waterway.

Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, which now effectively controls the strait along with Iran’s traditional navy, has the capability to deploy a “gauntlet” of dispersed mine-laying craft, explosive-laden boats and shore-based missile batteries, CNN has reported.

President Donald Trump said in a post on Truth Social on Tuesday that “if Iran has put out any mines in the Hormuz Strait, and we have no reports of them doing so, we want them removed, IMMEDIATELY!”

He added that if mines were placed and they are not removed, Iran will face consequences “at a level never before seen.” He said, however, that if Tehran removes “what may have been placed, it will be a giant step in the right direction!”

Following Trump’s post, Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth posted on X that at Trump’s direction, US Central Command “has been eliminating inactive mine-laying vessels in the Strait of Hormuz—wiping them out with ruthless precision. We will not allow terrorists to hold the Strait of Hormuz hostage.”

US Central Command said in a social media post later Tuesday that the military destroyed multiple Iranian naval ships — including 16 minelayers — near the Strait of Hormuz. (Source: CNN)

 

06 Mar 26.  Israel Ministry of Defense Spokesperson’s Statement‫: Operation Roaring Lion – Israel MOD Aerial Airlift Expands: 50 Cargo Aircraft Have Landed in Israel Since the Start of the Campaign

As part of the procurement and shipping effort in support of the evolving operations in Iran and Lebanon, the Israel Ministry of Defense (IMOD) is reporting the scope of the aerial airlift underway since the launch of the operation: approximately 50 cargo aircraft carrying over 1,000 tons of weaponry, military equipment, and various types of munitions have landed in Israel over the past ten days and have been transferred to the IDF.

This is a large-scale shipping operation, conducted under fire and in parallel with the advancement of Operation Roaring Lion and preparations for the next phases of the campaign. The airlift is expected to scale up in the coming period, as directed by Defense Minister Israel Katz and IMOD Director General, Maj. Gen. (Res.) Amir Baram.

The aerial airlift is led by the IMOD Defense Procurement Directorate (DPD), through its International Shipping Division, the IMOD Missions to the United States and Germany, and the IDF’s Planning Directorate. The Israel Airports Authority and the Israel Civil Aviation Authority are also partners in the operation.

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