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Military And Security Developments

Jan 21. Yemen

Key points

• The status of the Southern Transitional Council (STC) remains disputed after elements of the group announced its dissolution.
• Meanwhile, the internationally recognised government (IRG) aims to consolidate all southern militant factions (including former STC factions) into a new Supreme Military Committee (SMC).
• Splintering within the STC will possibly complicate immediate efforts to stabilise the south, with several UAE-backed groups unlikely to integrate into the new SMC; however, we assess that many likely will.
• As such, the overall internal security environment in the south will likely stabilise unevenly in the coming weeks.
• In turn, the SMC will likely reposition itself for an offensive against Houthi positions in the coming 12 months, increasing security risks across the country’s north-west.

Context

On 9 January, an STC delegation in Riyadh (Saudi Arabia) announced the group’s dissolution after forces of the Saudi-backed internationally recognised government (IRG) recaptured southern and eastern areas of Yemen. The STC seized these areas during its failed December 2025 offensive. However, the STC’s official spokesperson rejected the announcement, stating that only the full council and its president, Aidarus al-Zoubaidi, could issue such a decision following the delegation’s ‘release’ from Saudi Arabia. As such, the status of the STC remains disputed. Furthermore, al-Zoubaidi’s whereabouts are unknown after he fled Aden (Aden governorate) early on 7 January for Somaliland, possibly travelling onward to Abu Dhabi (UAE). Saudi Arabia welcomed the supposed dissolution of the STC and stated it would host a conference on southern Yemeni issues (with all groups invited). By contrast, thousands of Yemenis protested on 10 January in support of the STC in Aden, chanting anti-Saudi slogans and criticising the IRG.

Local media reports indicate that the Southern Giants Brigade militia and other IRG-aligned forces have secured Aden, and that violence across the south has eased in the past week. Additionally, Presidential Leadership Council (PLC) Chairman Rashad al-Alimi has launched efforts to bolster the state’s control of military resources across areas of Yemen outside Houthi dominance. He stated his intention to consolidate weapons under state control and announced the formation of the SMC, a framework that aims to unify and prepare military forces ahead of the next phase of the conflict (if the Houthis reject peaceful solutions).

Forecast

Short-term splintering within the STC will possibly complicate immediate efforts to stabilise the south, with several UAE-backed groups unlikely to integrate into the new SMC

Splintering within the STC is likely in the coming weeks; the group’s dissolution remains disputed and factions loyal to Aidarus al-Zoubaidi are trying to reassert control over the entity and its former assets. Core STC-aligned militias, including the Security Belt Forces, Hadrami Elite Forces and Shabwani Elite Forces, will possibly seek to consolidate their now-siloed command structures in the absence of clear central leadership. In the short term, several will possibly try to re-establish control over positions previously conceded to the Southern Giants Brigades, particularly in Aden and Lahij governorates. This would increase the exposure of local staff to sporadic and sudden bouts of crossfire and also possible instances of misidentification.

As demonstrated by the Southern Giants Brigade’s operation to consolidate STC positions, many groups will likely opt to align with the IRG and willingly dissolve or integrate into the new SMC under the leadership of al-Alimi and the PLC. The Southern Giants Brigade is a militia that was formerly aligned with the STC. However, smaller militia groups with strong secessionist positions (and which were formerly backed by the UAE) will possibly resist integration, increasing the risk of fragmentation. This would complicate short-term efforts to stabilise southern Yemen and consolidate military capabilities aimed at renewed operations against the Houthis in the north-west. While this is unlikely to impact force consolidation and re-posturing significantly, it would possibly delay integration and redeployment, especially if the UAE sustains selective support for STC holdouts.

The security environment in the south will likely stabilise unevenly in the coming weeks as IRG-aligned forces consolidate control

In the absence of significant UAE backing for former STC-aligned groups, the IRG and its allied militias will likely establish a broadly stable force posture in Yemen’s southern governorates under the SMC framework. The SMC will also likely position itself as the primary security force in the south, improving its command-and-control (C2) capabilities to establish coercive control over the region’s various militia groups. As such, the internal security environment in the south is likely to improve moderately, possibly reducing smuggling activity in the short term, as well as organised and violent crime. Yet sporadic secessionist and pro-STC protests will likely continue in the coming weeks, especially in Aden, sustaining an elevated risk of domestic unrest.

Jan 20.

• Syria: Ethno-religious violence, sporadic clashes are likely despite new ceasefire deal. On 20 January, the Syrian government announced a ceasefire with the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), following days of wide clashes in western Euphrates region. The government has given Kurdish-led organisations a four-day deadline to agree on full integration into state institutions. Notably, the SDF has lost most of its territory; ethnic-Kurdish militias have now withdrawn to Al-Hasakah governorate (the last SDF stronghold). This retreat follows government forces and allied ethnic-Arab tribal militias’ seizure of control over Deir ez-Zor and Raqqa governorates, after their rapid advancement across multiple fronts. We assess that the SDF leadership’s control over Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) and People’s Defence Units (YPG) elements is likely faltering. This will increase the risk of sporadic clashes between the government and tribal forces along the current lines of control in the coming hours, despite the ceasefire. These risks will be particularly high in Al-Hasakah. Furthermore, there is a realistic possibility of retaliatory attacks by Kurdish-led militias against ethnic-Arab residents in Al-Hasakah, increasing the risk of wide domestic unrest and ethno-religious violence.
• Iraq-Iran: Kurdish militant group claims Iran struck headquarters in Iraq; diplomatic tensions are likely. Earlier on 21 January, the ethnic-Kurdish Iranian separatist militant group Kurdistan Freedom Party (PAK) accused Iran of launching a ballistic missile and drone attack on its headquarters in Erbil (Iraq) overnight. Although unconfirmed, Iran has previously carried out similar strikes on PAK positions in Iraq, often in retaliation against groups allegedly supporting anti-government protests. If confirmed, Iraq’s federal government and Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) are likely to pursue legal measures against Tehran, possibly by filing a complaint with the UN Security Council (UNSC). This would likely escalate diplomatic tensions between Iraq and Iran and pave the way for further international sanctions against Iran, thereby elevating compliance and regulatory risks for businesses operating in the region. Any cross-border military action by Iran will likely undermine confidence in Iraq’s capacity to protect business assets, moderating international investment and driving some businesses to re-evaluate operations. This will especially impact the energy and logistics sectors within Kurdistan region (Iraq).
• Syria: Clashes with Kurdish-led forces increase risk of total ceasefire collapse. On 19 January, clashes between the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) and the Syrian government resumed on multiple fronts in Al-Hasakah and Raqqa governorates despite the ceasefire agreement. The clashes erupted hours after reports that talks between the SDF leader and the Syrian president had collapsed. The SDF have claimed that Turkish drones carried out airstrikes against the group in Al-Hasakah; they have also accused the Syrian government forces of attacking a prison holding thousands of Islamic State (IS) detainees. Currently, Syria’s government forces are advancing towards Al-Hasakah, which will increase the risk of wider armed conflict. As the situation is increasingly unstable, we assess that there is a realistic possibility of a total ceasefire collapse in the coming hours. Any prolonged conflict with ethnic-Kurdish organisations will increase the risk of the US re-imposing sanctions on Syria. Should Al-Hasakah surrender to government forces, the SDF will likely collapse, prompting thousands of fighters to flee to Iraq’s Kurdistan region. However, we assess that the risks of Kurdish-led insurgency and retaliatory attacks against Damascus will remain elevated throughout 2026, even if the government establishes control of Al-Hasakah.
• Israel: Further ultra-Orthodox protests are likely in coming hours, driving localised security risks. On 19 January, hundreds of ultra-Orthodox protesters clashed with the police in Jerusalem and Beit Shemesh (both Jerusalem district) over the authorities’ plan to perform autopsies on the bodies of two babies found earlier that day at an unlicensed daycare centre. We assess that further protests are highly likely later on 20 January, particularly in ultra-Orthodox population centres, including Beit Shemesh, Bnei Brak (Tel Aviv district) and Jerusalem. There is a realistic possibility that protesters will block major transit routes and burn tyres and waste bins, especially at intersections on Highways 1 and 4 near Bnei Brak and Jerusalem. This will increase localised disruption to overland movement and supply chain risks, while also exacerbating respiratory health conditions. Further clashes between protesters and the security forces are likely, including the use of water cannons (including ‘skunk’ water), stun grenades and batons, elevating security risks to nearby personnel. Demonstrators will possibly also damage nearby vehicles and buildings, elevating financial and operational risks for local businesses.

Jan 19.

• Iraq-US: US withdrawal from Iraqi federal territory will heighten IS resurgence risks in coming months. On 18 January, Iraq’s government announced the full withdrawal of US military forces from facilities under its federal control, excluding the semi-autonomous Kurdistan Region (KRI), after Iraq assumed full control of Al-Asad Airbase in Al Anbar governorate. The withdrawal will almost certainly reduce Iraqi-US co-operation on security and military operations, including intelligence sharing and counter-terrorism activities. As such, there is a heightened risk of an Islamic State (IS) resurgence in the coming months, especially in rural areas where Baghdad’s oversight is limited. The Iraqi security forces are unlikely to sustain the same level of pressure on extremist networks, increasing the risk of localised attacks and associated personnel security risks. Additionally, the Popular Mobilisation Forces (PMF) will possibly consolidate power, as the withdrawal of a US military presence will enable PMF factions to fill security gaps, raising the likelihood of clashes between PMF units and the Iraqi security forces. In the long term, the US will possibly also reduce its political and economic engagement, increasing Iraq’s exposure to sanctions risks and restrictions on oil sales, while further discouraging foreign direct investment (FDI).
• Syria: Ceasefire between government, Kurdish forces will remain highly fragile in coming days. On 18 January, under a US-backed agreement the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) agreed to implement a ceasefire and cede control of Deir ez-Zor and Raqqa governorates to the Syrian government. This came following rapid advances by the government forces towards the Kurdish territories east of the Euphrates River in the past 72 hours, alongside an anti-SDF uprising by the pro-government Arab tribal forces in Deir ez-Zor and Raqqa. The agreement also stipulates the merging of the Kurdish forces into the country’s army and the expulsion of Kurdistan Workers Party’s (PKK) elements. As part of the agreement, government forces will also be deployed to the last SDF strongholds in Aleppo and Al-Hasakah governorates in the coming weeks. However, the ceasefire will remain highly fragile in the coming days, as there is a realistic possibility that radical Kurdish groups within the SDF and the PKK will not abide by the agreement. This will elevate the risks of retaliatory attacks and sporadic clashes with the pro-government forces, particularly in Al-Hasakah and Raqqa. (Source: Sibylline)

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Military And Security Developments

23 Jan26.

Russian areas of occupation prior to the 2022 invasion are shown in orange; estimated areas of Russian control since the invasion are shown in yellow; a proposed Russian 18.6-mile (30km) ‘sanitary zone’ along the international border is shown with a bright red dashed line

Executive summary

• In our updated Strategic Risk Forecast, we put forward various scenarios concerning the trajectory of the Russo-Ukrainian war in the next 12 months. Our baseline scenario is that the war will likely continue in some form without a definitive resolution; there is also a realistic possibility of a fragile ceasefire that will fail to stop the fighting entirely.
• Over the last month, diplomatic attention has drifted away from Ukraine amid numerous global crises that have dominated decision-makers’ attention, from Venezuela and Iran to Greenland. As such, negotiations over Ukraine are unlikely to have made any significant progress, despite the US remaining engaged and organising various meetings. The most significant development this month was the so-called ‘coalition of the willing’ summit, which resulted in a UK-France declaration of intent to send troops to Ukraine in the event of a peace deal. However, we assess that this remains a non-starter for the Russian authorities, who have consistently opposed any NATO troop deployments to Ukraine.
• Looking ahead to the coming month, maritime threats are likely to increase. On 22 January, France announced that it had boarded a sanctioned Russia-linked tanker in the Mediterranean Sea in tandem with allies. If the UK, France or other European states proceed with further plans to seize Russia-flagged or -linked shadow fleet vessels, the threat of Russian retaliation will increase. This will include not only grey-zone threats to land-based assets but also the harassment of Europe-linked shipping.
• Since our last report, Russia has intensified its strikes against Ukraine’s energy infrastructure, resulting in the harshest heating season the country has experienced since the start of the full-scale war. The capital Kyiv remains particularly affected; the mayor has declared a state of emergency and encouraged residents to leave the city given the scale of the strikes’ impact.
• Key triggers, warnings and indicators (TWIs) to watch for in February include high-profile negotiations (though a major breakthrough towards peace remains unlikely) and the evolving energy crisis across Ukraine, including in Kyiv, which is facing temperatures as low as -20 C (-4 F) without heating.

The interception rate of ussian strikes by attack type; in recent months, Ukraine has not reported any drones intercepted through electronic warfare (EW) measures; we will therefore no longer report EW / lost drones from January onwards; the category is retained in the visual to account for those months in which EW activity was recorded; sources: Ukraine’s air force, Sibylline

Jan 20.

KEY DEVELOPMENTS

• STRIKES: Russia continues its systematic strike campaign against Ukraine’s energy infrastructure, with the aim of disabling the country’s remaining power-generation capabilities; strikes on substations of nuclear plants are highly unlikely to trigger a nuclear incident
• NEGOTIATIONS: A significant breakthrough towards peace during the World Economic Forum (WEF) between 19 and 23 January is highly unlikely, particularly amid increased intra-NATO tensions over Greenland
• POLITICS: Zelensky’s recent meetings with potential political rivals, including Valeriy Zaluzhnyi, are likely aimed at strengthening his position as the prospect of elections in the coming months grows more likely
• FORECAST: Mykhailo Fedorov has been appointed as Ukraine’s new minister of defence, as part of Kyiv’s latest extensive cabinet overhaul; systemic manpower shortages are set to remain among the largest challenges for the new minister
• DONETSK: The Russian forces have been steadily building pressure on Kostiantynivka, operating close to the southern outskirts of the city. Kostiantynivka is the southernmost part of the so-called fortress belt in Donetsk oblast and is therefore a key objective for Russian operations. On 18 January, a Ukrainian military observer confirmed that, over a 24- to 48-hour period, Russian forces conducted assaults immediately east of Kostiantynivka, as well as near three villages – Yablunivka, Berestok and Illinivka – located to the south.
• DONETSK: According to the Ukrainian source, the Russian command is amassing assault infantry in preparation for more intensive infiltration operations in Kostiantynivka, akin to the offensive campaign against Pokrovsk further south in Donetsk oblast. However, Russia reportedly does not retain sufficient resources to intensify infiltration operations in the immediate term (likely due to its continued focus on Pokrovsk to the south). Instead, at this stage, Russian forces are more likely to focus on identifying and probing Ukrainian defensive weaknesses in preparation for a future, more substantial infiltration campaign, targeting areas to the south, south-east and east of Kostiantynivka. Ultimately, manpower shortages will shape Ukrainian defensive capabilities in the sector.
• DONETSK: Further south, despite a slowdown in Russian advances in the Pokrovsk sector, the Russian command is reportedly taking steps to accelerate the full capture of Pokrovsk and, to its immediate east, Myrnohrad. On 19 January, Ukrainian Commander-in-Chief Oleksandr Syrskyi warned that the situation in the Pokrovsk-Myrnohrad sector remains critical, with the Russian forces reportedly increasing pressure by redeploying reserves towards the area. Ukrainian forces still control the northern part of Pokrovsk and maintain defensive positions in Myrnohrad. Ultimately, the quantity and quality of reinforcements will determine whether Russia can achieve the full capture of the Pokrovsk and Myrnohrad in the coming weeks.
• STRIKES: Russia continues its systematic strike campaign against Ukraine’s energy infrastructure, with the aim of disabling the country’s remaining power-generation capabilities. Overnight on 19-20 January, Russia launched a high-intensity combined strike involving several aerial projectiles, targeting substations connected to Ukraine’s nuclear power plants (NPP). The Ukrainian authorities, however, stated that the attacks on these facilities were unsuccessful. This is not the first time that Russia has targeted NPP-linked substations; such attacks occurred in November 2025, but the Ukrainian authorities did not specify whether they were damaged.
• STRIKES: On 17 January, Ukraine’s military intelligence (GUR) warned that Russia was planning strikes against substations linked to Ukraine’s three remaining operational nuclear power plants in its western and southern regions. Years of Russian attacks against its energy infrastructure have significantly increased Ukraine’s reliance on nuclear power generation. We previously assessed that Russian forces would strike nuclear power plant-linked substations and that wider power infrastructure related to nuclear plants remains a high-priority target for Moscow. While the Ukrainian authorities have likely reinforced the protection of these facilities over the last year, the risk of damage will remain elevated. We continue to assess that Russian forces are unlikely to strike nuclear reactor buildings directly with missiles (though drone strikes remain possible given their more limited payload). However, even if strikes do hit these locations, the safety features therein mean that a catastrophic nuclear incident remains highly unlikely. Instead, such strikes would likely be aimed at forcing a shutdown of the plants.

POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS

• NEGOTIATIONS: A significant breakthrough towards peace during the World Economic Forum (WEF) between 19 and 23 January is highly unlikely, particularly amid increased intra-NATO tensions over Greenland (semi-autonomous territory of Denmark). On 14 January, Politico reported that Ukraine and its European partners were hoping that US President Donald Trump would commit to US-backed security guarantees during the WEF, citing two unspecified European officials. Meanwhile, two other unnamed officials stated that Ukraine and Europe are aiming to secure Trump’s endorsement of an economic plan supporting Ukraine’s post-war recovery. While details of the initiative remain limited, the plan aims to mobilise USD 800 bn in public and private investments over ten years to rebuild Ukraine and kick-start long-term economic growth.
• NEGOTIATIONS: Various meetings between key stakeholders, including Russia’s principal negotiator, Kirill Dmitriev, Trump’s son-in-law Jared Kushner and US envoy Steve Witkoff, are likely to take place over the coming days. The meetings come after Trump said his Ukrainian counterpart, Volodymyr Zelensky, is stalling peace, rather than Russian President Vladimir Putin, who continues to show no willingness to make genuine steps towards ending the war.
• NEGOTIATIONS: We assess that the US’ efforts to increase pressure on its NATO allies to acquire Greenland will almost certainly distract attention away from the Ukraine peace process. Heightened tensions between Europe and the US over Greenland will likely further strain transatlantic ties. Ultimately, Russia will highly likely seek to leverage fractures in Europe-US relations to undermine unity on supporting Ukraine over the coming weeks and months. We continue to assess that Moscow calculates that its attritional war strategy will outlast Western resolve, particularly as the West faces competing geopolitical priorities.
• POLITICS: Zelensky’s recent meetings with potential political rivals are likely aimed at strengthening his position, as the prospect of elections in the coming months grows more likely. On 15 January, Zelensky met with former commander-in-chief Valeriy Zaluzhnyi, who currently serves as Ukraine’s ambassador to the UK. Zaluzhnyi was dismissed from his position in 2024 amid a rift between him and Zelensky. Zaluzhnyi is a popular former military commander and is widely considered a potential frontrunner in a future presidential election. However, Zaluzhnyi has previously denied harbouring plans to launch a political party and opposes holding elections during wartime.
• POLITICS: Before holding talks with Zaluzhnyi, Zelensky also met with Serhiy Prytula and Serhiy Sternenko, who are involved in activism supporting Ukraine’s armed forces. Zelensky stated that the two men had agreed to work with him, without offering further specifics. This likely indicates Zelensky’s efforts to form alliances or strengthen ties with prominent public figures ahead of any potential vote. Notably, in November 2025, Sternenko criticised his country’s military and political leadership, warning that what he perceived as the authorities’ insufficient approach to defence could result in the loss of Ukrainian statehood.
• POLITICS: According to polling from the Kyiv International Institute of Sociology (KIIS) released on 19 January, Zaluzhnyi enjoys the highest level of trust (72%) of Ukrainian officials and public figures. Meanwhile, trust for Zelensky and Prytula stands at 62% and 46%, respectively. Sternenko was not listed in the polling. Prytula has previously been involved in politics; he ran in the Kyiv mayoral elections in 2020 as a member of the pro-European Holos (Voice) party. We assess that the US’ eagerness for Kyiv to hold elections following a peace deal will likely spur similar engagements between Zelensky and political contenders over the coming months, facilitating a ‘return of politics’ to Ukraine.

FORECAST

DEFENCE: On 14 January, the Ukrainian parliament (known as the Verkhovna Rada) voted in favour of appointing Mykhailo Fedorov as the new minister of defence, as part of Kyiv’s latest extensive cabinet overhaul. Fedorov previously served as the minister of digital transformation since 2019; he is the fourth person to lead Ukraine’s Ministry of Defence (MoD) since the beginning of the full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. Although Fedorov does not have a formal military background, he was instrumental in bolstering Ukraine’s drone capabilities and assisting with military technological advancements in his past tenure.

While technological expertise is almost certainly a factor influencing Fedorov’s appointment, we assess that underlying issues remain in the MoD which he is highly unlikely to remedy easily or in the short term. Prior to the parliamentary vote, Fedorov had informed lawmakers that his goals included reforming the army, improving frontline infrastructure, eradicating corruption within the ministry and fostering a new culture of trust – all of which will be extremely difficult to implement at pace. The Ukrainian MoD has previously been at the centre of corruption scandals; in September 2023, Zelensky dismissed defence minister Oleksiy Reznikov as part of a crackdown on corrupt practices in the institution. Meanwhile, Zelensky has listed strengthening air defences as Fedorov’s principal task, with the second priority being the use of technology to blunt Russian gains and resolve logistical issues on the frontline.

Fedorov will inherit a significant funding shortfall and chronic manpower shortages, which will highly likely continue to constrain Ukraine’s operational capability over the long term. On 14 January, Fedorov stated that the MoD is facing a deficit of UAH 300 bn (over USD 6.9 bn). An attempt at bridging this will highly likely require consultations with international partners. Separately, Fedorov disclosed that two m Ukrainian citizens are wanted for evading mobilisation, while 200,000 soldiers are absent without official leave (AWOL). Although Fedorov highly likely aims to offset manpower shortages with technological advances, we assess that technology is unlikely to resolve chronic personnel shortages significantly (especially not in the short-to-medium term).

In contrast, Russia will likely maintain recruitment strategies to reinforce its manpower advantage over Ukraine. On 16 January, Russia’s Security Council stated that the number of people signing contracts with the Russian military in 2025 dropped by 6% compared with 2024. While the exact reasons remain unclear, some Russian regions have reportedly reduced the size of their military sign-up bonuses in 2025 due to economic pressures. That said, an exiled Russian media outlet reported that the authorities in at least five regions have sharply increased sign-on bonuses for contract soldiers, having reduced them to the federal minimum in 2025. Although the regional authorities did not disclose the reasons for reintroducing lucrative sign-on bonuses, we assess that this is most likely due to pressure from the federal authorities, in a bid to maintain a steady flow of military recruits to sustain its highly attritional tactics.

Ultimately, we assess that Ukraine’s growing military personnel shortages will remain a key factor shaping its ability to resist Russian offensives, increasingly pressuring Kyiv to lower the mobilisation age. However, this remains a highly unpopular measure which, if implemented, would likely trigger a strong backlash against the current leadership. In the absence of such a policy change, mounting personnel constraints will significantly complicate Kyiv’s ability to defend multiple sectors of the frontline simultaneously. In response, Russia is highly likely to exploit these weaknesses by increasing pressure across several frontline areas over the medium-to-long term, as part of an attritional strategy that it believes will bear fruit in 2026.

• UK: Ongoing cyber attacks sustain CNI security, disruption risks from pro-Russia hacktivists. On 19 January, the UK National Cyber Security Centre (NCSC) reported that pro-Russia hacktivist groups are consistently targeting critical national infrastructure (CNI) and local government organisations in disruptive cyber attacks. The groups conduct distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) attacks, flooding targeted systems with high volumes of traffic to disrupt operations. One of these groups (‘NoName057’) reportedly operates a volunteer project (‘DDoSia’) that enables politically aligned affiliates to contribute resources and crowdsource attacks; we assess that this illustrates the group’s resilience and possible operational scale despite a previous takedown attempt in July 2025. NoName057 often aims to compromise operational technology (OT) environments within CNI, alongside information technology (IT) systems, to disrupt the provision of key services, cause temporary and/or permanent damage to equipment and instil panic and discontent among citizens. Consequently, we assess that this trend will sustain elevated security and disruption risks to key British sectors amid escalating geopolitical hostilities. (Source: Sibylline)

 

21 Jan 26. Ukraine Holds Off New Helsing HX-2 Drone Orders After Setbacks. Ukraine has paused additional orders of HX-2 strike drones from German defence technology firm Helsing after technical problems emerged during frontline testing, according to Bloomberg. The decision followed field trials by Ukraine’s 14th Regiment, a unit specializing in unmanned aerial systems. During the tests, the HX-2 reportedly experienced repeated difficulties at launch and during operation. An internal German military presentation dated Nov. 20 and reviewed by Bloomberg said several drones failed to take off and lacked some of the artificial intelligence features promised in the system’s design. The presentation, prepared by a unit reporting to General Gunter Schneider at the German Defense Ministry, said the HX-2 was expected to include AI-enabled terminal guidance, midcourse navigation, and visual target acquisition. However, not all of these functions were installed on the drones tested in Ukraine. People familiar with the trials said the drones also struggled under intense electronic warfare conditions near the front line, where jamming disrupted communications between the drone and its human operator. Mechanical problems with the launch catapult further reduced reliability during deployment attempts, according to the document and people briefed on the tests. As a result, Germany does not plan to place a follow-on order for HX-2 systems unless Ukraine formally signals renewed interest. The drones are funded by the German military and supplied to Ukraine as part of Berlin’s support package. Helsing, Europe’s most valuable defence technology startup, said it was not aware of the German military presentation and rejected several of its conclusions. The company denied claims of a high takeoff failure rate and said Ukrainian units continue to show interest in the HX-2. Helsing added that early hit-rate data was encouraging and argued it is too soon to draw firm conclusions from limited frontline testing. Unveiled in December 2024, the HX-2 is Helsing’s first in-house strike drone delivered to an active war zone. It features an X-wing design combining vertical takeoff with forward flight and is advertised as an AI-enabled system capable of operating at ranges of up to 100 kilometers. The setbacks underscore the rapid and unforgiving innovation cycle of the war in Ukraine, where systems are tested under combat stress and quickly refined or abandoned as battlefield conditions evolve. (Source: UAS VISION/Defence Blog )

 

21 Jan 26. Ukraine’s new defence minister vows data-driven overhaul of military

• Summary
• New minister says he will overhaul ministry management
• Mission control system for drones to be rolled out
• Kyiv to share wartime combat data with allies to train AI
• Ukraine to test home-grown DJI Mavic drone replacement

Ukraine’s new defence minister promised a sweeping, data-driven overhaul of Europe’s largest military to reward commanders achieving results on the battlefield and give Ukrainian forces the upper hand against Russia’s bigger and better-equipped army.

Mykhailo Fedorov – previously the digitalisation minister – took up his new post last week, tasked by President Volodymyr Zelenskiy with driving innovation and strengthening Ukraine’s defence of its frontline and its skies.

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In remarks to reporters over the weekend, cleared for release on Tuesday, Fedorov said he would start by overhauling the vast ministry’s management: “If people don’t demonstrate measurable results, they can’t remain in the system.”

Fedorov said his team had assembled “high-quality data” on where the ministry was spending money and where savings could be made as he seeks to address a large budget gap.

“It is very important that we have begun to calculate everything systematically,” he said, emphasising the importance of “the mathematics of war.”

Fedorov said his ministry would soon launch a mission control system for drone flights, which would increase the data available about crews’ performance and effectiveness. A similar system would be developed for artillery crews.

“We need to see the full picture to simplify and speed up management decision-making,” Fedorov said, adding that his aim was to increase Russia’s losses on the battlefield until they became unsustainable.

AI MODEL TRAINING

Fedorov said Ukraine will establish a system allowing its allies to train their artificial intelligence military models on Kyiv’s valuable combat data collected throughout the nearly four-year war with Russia.

Since Russia’s invasion in February 2022, Ukraine has gathered extensive battlefield information, including systematically logged combat statistics and ms of hours of drone footage captured from above.

Such data is important for training AI models, which require large volumes of real-world information to identify patterns and predict how people or objects might act. Fedorov previously described Kyiv’s wartime data trove as one of its “cards” in negotiations with other nations.

Fedorov has previously said Ukraine was using AI technology from U.S. data analytics firm Palantir.

Outlining his plans for the wartime defence ministry after his appointment, he said he wanted to “more actively” integrate allies into projects.

He said his team was receiving advice from the Center for Strategic and International Studies and RAND in the U.S., as well as Britain’s Royal United Services Institute.

MAVIC REPLACEMENT

Fedorov also said Ukraine would test its home-grown replacement for China’s DJI Mavic drone this month, which is widely used for aerial reconnaissance on the front lines by both sides. He did not disclose the manufacturer.

Ukraine has previously raised concerns about reliance on Beijing for drones and components, given China’s deepening diplomatic ties with Russia.

“We will have our own Mavic analogue: the same camera, but with a longer flight range,” Fedorov said. (Source: Reuters)

 

20 Jan 26. Ukraine’s new Air Force chief to build ‘anti-drone shield.’

The system will no longer respond post factum, but destroy threats while they are still in the air.

• Ukraine’s President has appointed Colonel Pavlo “Lazar” Yelizarov as Deputy Commander of the Air Force
• His promotion comes with a new responsibility to construct a counter-uncrewed air system (C-UAS) shield, which will provide coverage across the war-torn country
• The system will be designed not to respond post factum, but to destroy UAS threats while they are still en route

Ukraine has resolved to pre-empt Russian drones with the construction of an anti-drone shield with coverage extending across the war-torn nation. Last year, the Ministry of Defence determined that 100,000 Shahed drones and other drone types were used against Ukraine, damaging dozens of critical infrastructure facilities, hitting hundreds of residential buildings and causing casualties. Responding to this daily blitz, President Volodymyr Zelenskyy called for the transformation of Ukraine’s existing short-range air defence (SHORAD) units. To this end, the country’s Ministry of Defence (MoD) described its new vision as “a system designed not to respond post factum, but to destroy threats while they are still en route”. However, the government have not described how this will be achieved or what type of technology will be procured to enable the concept. But Ukraine’s Defence Minister Mykhailo Fedorov maintained that “we must change our approaches, structures, and work logic to ensure technologies deliver real results on the battlefield…” Should this lower-tier interception shield operate successfully, then it would prove detrimental to existing Russian tactics since drones now account for 80% of casualties in the conflict.

Lazar’s mobile fires group

The man who has been tasked to deliver the shield – with coverage across more than 233,000 square miles –  is Colonel Pavlo “Lazar” Yelizarov, whom Zelenskyy has appointed the new Deputy Air Force Commander. Under his leadership, the “Lazar’s Group” unit emerged as one of the most effective units in the Armed Forces. The MoD claims that this mobile firing team alone destroyed enemy equipment valued at more than $13bn. It is said that one in every five destroyed Russian tanks is attributed to their work. In December alone, it destroyed 364 artillery systems and 12 multiple launch rocket systems.

Drone Shield: in practice

Ukraine is not the first to conceive such a concept: the Baltic States – Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania – are working together to establish SHORAD coverage in their “Drone Wall”. The cross-border system will be sourced from local defence industry, combining autonomous surveillance sensors, integrated drone countermeasure systems, multilayer sensor networks, interceptor drones and mobile C-UAS platforms.(Source: army-technology.com)

 

20 Jan 26. Czechs will not sell Ukraine jets to fight drones, prime minister says. The Czech Republic will not sell or donate to Ukraine light combat planes that could shoot down incoming drones, Prime Minister Andrej Babis said on Monday, rejecting a plan outlined by President Petr Pavel. Pavel said during a visit to Kyiv on Friday that his country could in a short time provide several planes, and added over the weekend that Ukraine had offered to buy some subsonic L-159 jets. Babis told a press conference after a cabinet meeting on Monday that the Czech army needed the planes and they could not be provided.

“The planes are not available and we do not have any other ones,” Babis said.

Pavel has been a strong supporter of Kyiv during Russia’s war in Ukraine. Babis has pledged not to provide military aid to Ukraine and opted out of the financial costs of a European Union loan to Kyiv in December.

The potential aircraft deal with Ukraine had been criticised by Babis’s coalition partners from the far-right, the pro-Russian SPD.

Babis said Prague’s position was not changing as the previous government, which had a more pro-Ukrainian stance, had also rejected the option of sending L-159 jets to Kyiv.  (Source: Reuters)

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Founded in 1987, Exensor Technology is a world leading supplier of Networked Unattended Ground Sensor (UGS) Systems providing tailored sensor solutions to customers all over the world. From our Headquarters in Lund Sweden, our centre of expertise in Network Communications at Communications Research Lab in Kalmar Sweden and our Production site outside of Basingstoke UK, we design, develop and produce latest state of the art rugged UGS solutions at the highest quality to meet the most stringent demands of our customers. Our systems are in operation and used in a wide number of Military as well as Homeland Security applications worldwide. The modular nature of the system ensures any external sensor can be integrated, providing the user with a fully meshed “silent” network capable of self-healing. Exensor Technology will continue to lead the field in UGS technology, provide our customers with excellent customer service and a bespoke package able to meet every need.

A CNIM Group Company

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Sponsored by Bertin Exensor

 

www.exensor.com

 

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19 Jan 26. Any surge in federal troops will increase domestic unrest, security forces risks in Minneapolis. On 18 January, the US Department of War ordered an estimated 1,500 active-duty soldiers in Alaska to prepare for a possible deployment to Minneapolis (Minnesota). The US Army has placed the units on prepare-to-deploy orders in the event that violence escalates in the city. This follows President Donald Trump’s threat to invoke the Insurrection Act on 15 January, following days of protests over the fatal shooting of a woman by an Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) agent on 7 January. We assess that Trump is unlikely to invoke the act in the coming days, which would grant federal troops the power to enforce laws, including by making arrests. However, troops can be deployed without recurring to the Insurrection Act. Any surge in forces in the short term will intensify the deployments’ public characterisation as an ‘invasion’ and increase the risk that residents do not comply with law enforcement. In the interim, the already-bolstered presence of federal immigration officers in the Minneapolis area will sustain elevated domestic unrest risks, raising bystander safety risks near federal personnel and buildings. (Source: Sibylline)

 

09 Jan 26. DAF Shifts to ‘Wartime’ Acquisition Footing, Activates First Portfolio. The Department of the Air Force (DAF) officially placed its procurement enterprise on a “wartime footing” on Thursday, Jan. 8, commencing the immediate implementation of the “Warfighting Acquisition System.”

The directive, issued to align with mandates from Secretary of War Pete Hegseth, fundamentally restructures the service’s buying power by transitioning from the traditional Program Executive Officer (PEO) model to “Portfolio Acquisition Executives” (PAEs). The overhaul aims to replace compliance-heavy processes with a streamlined structure designed for speed and combat relevance. From Programs to Portfolios The shift codifies a strategy first previewed by Secretary of the Air Force Troy Meink in December 2025. Under the new architecture, PAEs receive broader authorities over resources, talent management, and mission-specific decision-making, effectively decentralizing power from the Pentagon to the mission level. This structural change follows the U.S. Space Force’s recent moves to consolidate acquisition and operations, such as the activation of System Delta 80 to unify launch procurement and the stand-up of the MILCOMM & PNT System Delta late last year. Commercial-First Posture For the Space Force, the implementation designates Space Access and Space Based Sensing and Targeting as the initial mission areas to be led by PAEs. These executives are charged with executing a “commercial first” strategy to bypass decade-long development cycles.

“Acquisition is now a warfighting function. We cannot be locked into decade-long development cycles,” said Maj. Gen. Stephen Purdy, the Space Force’s acting Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Space Acquisition and Integration. “Our ‘commercial first’ approach allows us to harness the incredible innovation happening in the private sector, getting cutting-edge technology into the hands of our Guardians at the speed of a startup, not a bureaucracy.”

Operational Impact The reforms grant PAEs the ability to make “smart trades” between cost, schedule, and performance without extensive external oversight. The DAF stated that the goal is to field minimum viable products (MVPs) and iterate rapidly, a philosophy Purdy described as “speed with discipline.”

Effective immediately, the Air Force also designated its first tranche of PAEs covering five key sectors:

• Command, Control, Communications and Battle Management (C3BM)
• Fighters and Advanced Aircraft
• Nuclear Command, Control and Communications (NC3)
• Propulsion
• Weapons

“This acquisition transformation is not just about buying things faster; it’s a fundamental overhaul of our culture to empower our Airmen… and deliver the integrated capabilities we need to deter and, if necessary, defeat our adversaries,” said William D. Bailey, performing the duties of the Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics. (Source: Satnews)

 

16 Jan 26.  Threat of military deployment will sustain domestic unrest, ethno-social tensions in Minneapolis. On 15 January, President Donald Trump threatened to invoke the Insurrection Act to deploy military forces in Minneapolis (Minnesota), following days of protests over immigration enforcement operations. Protests have included clashes with federal officers after the fatal shooting of a woman by an Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) agent on 7 January. Trump stated that he will invoke the act if politicians in Minnesota ‘don’t obey the law’. We assess that Trump is unlikely to invoke the act in the coming days, though the likelihood will increase if there is a significant spike in physical attacks against federal immigration agents. If invoked, the act would grant federal troops the power to enforce laws, including by making arrests and conducting searches. This would intensify the deployments’ public characterisation as an ‘invasion’, increasing the risk that residents do not comply with law enforcement. In the interim, the ongoing deployment of 3,000 federal officers to Minneapolis will sustain elevated domestic unrest risks. Bystander safety risks will be highest adjacent to demonstrations and near federal personnel and buildings (such as the Bishop Henry Whipple Federal Building). (Source: Sibylline)

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Founded in 1987, Exensor Technology is a world leading supplier of Networked Unattended Ground Sensor (UGS) Systems providing tailored sensor solutions to customers all over the world. From our Headquarters in Lund Sweden, our centre of expertise in Network Communications at Communications Research Lab in Kalmar Sweden and our Production site outside of Basingstoke UK, we design, develop and produce latest state of the art rugged UGS solutions at the highest quality to meet the most stringent demands of our customers. Our systems are in operation and used in a wide number of Military as well as Homeland Security applications worldwide. The modular nature of the system ensures any external sensor can be integrated, providing the user with a fully meshed “silent” network capable of self-healing. Exensor Technology will continue to lead the field in UGS technology, provide our customers with excellent customer service and a bespoke package able to meet every need.

A CNIM Group Company

—————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————–

Sponsored by Bertin Exensor

 

www.exensor.com

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21 Jan 26. Spain’s Albares says India-EU on cusp of trade deal, plan stronger defence ties.

• Summary
• India-EU trade deal should be concluded in days, Albares says
• Free trade agreements protect Europe from coercion, he says
• Spain, India discuss closer defence ties in Delhi meeting

A historic India-EU trade deal will likely be concluded in the next few days, Spain’s Foreign Minister José Manuel Albares said on a visit to New Delhi on Wednesday, framing the agreement as a measure of security against economic coercion.

The deal, coming on the heels of an agreement signed on Monday between the European Union and Mercosur, would create the world’s largest free-trade zone, a powerful signal as U.S. President Donald Trump imposes steep tariffs on India and threatens higher tariffs on Europe for its refusal to support his plans to take Greenland against its will.

“Everything is going forward perfectly. We do not expect any obstacle,” Albares said after bilateral meetings with India’s Foreign Minister Subrahmanyam Jaishankar and President Droupadi Murmu in Delhi.

“We need to make clear to the whole world that we believe in free trade and have the instruments of dissuasion to protect ourselves from any economic coercion,” Albares said.

European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen is expected to arrive in India on Sunday evening to finalise the sticking points – primarily over carbon levies and import duties for key sectors such as autos and steel – ahead of an EU-India summit on January 27.

Von der Leyen has said the deal would create a market of 2 bn people, accounting for nearly a quarter of global GDP.

Trade in goods between the EU and India has increased by almost 90% in the past decade, according to EU data, valued at 120 bn euros ($140.47 bn) in 2024.

CLOSER DEFENCE TIES

Addressing the Spanish delegation on Wednesday, India’s Foreign Minister Jaishankar said he saw “considerable potential” for more economic partnerships between the two countries, singling out a joint commitment to building resilient manufacturing capabilities in defence.

A joint venture between Airbus and Indian conglomerate Tata Group to build C-295 aircraft in India was an example of the type of trade relationship that should be replicated, Albares added.

The first made-in-India Airbus aircraft, produced at a joint facility with Indian conglomerate Tata Group in the western state of Gujarat, is expected to roll off production lines before September 2026, Jaishankar said, slightly ahead of schedule. ($1 = 0.8543 euros) (Source: Reuters)

 

——————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————-

Founded in 1987, Exensor Technology is a world leading supplier of Networked Unattended Ground Sensor (UGS) Systems providing tailored sensor solutions to customers all over the world. From our Headquarters in Lund Sweden, our centre of expertise in Network Communications at Communications Research Lab in Kalmar Sweden and our Production site outside of Basingstoke UK, we design, develop and produce latest state of the art rugged UGS solutions at the highest quality to meet the most stringent demands of our customers. Our systems are in operation and used in a wide number of Military as well as Homeland Security applications worldwide. The modular nature of the system ensures any external sensor can be integrated, providing the user with a fully meshed “silent” network capable of self-healing. Exensor Technology will continue to lead the field in UGS technology, provide our customers with excellent customer service and a bespoke package able to meet every need.

A CNIM Group Company

———————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————

Sponsored by Bertin Exensor

www.exensor.com

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15 Jan 26. NATO nations send scouting teams to Greenland amid US annexation talk. Several NATO countries have announced they are sending troops to Greenland amid the Trump administration’s rhetoric of a potential annexation, continuing a balancing act of offering a win to Washington while preserving Denmark’s territorial integrity. Germany’s armed forces, the Bundeswehr, announced it would send an expeditionary group of soldiers to Greenland along with “further European countries” in a short statement late on Wednesday. Sweden, Norway and France, too, have confirmed they have ordered soldiers to the Arctic island. Additionally, the Netherlands and Canada will be deploying forces to the Danish territory in the high North, officially to take part in a planned NATO military exercise, Operation Arctic Endurance.
The operation does not appear to have any publicly communicated start or end dates, atypical for NATO exercises, which are usually communicated well in advance. There does not appear to be an online record of an operation by that name being publicly discussed prior to Jan. 14. A search of the NATO website similarly returned no results. Denmark, whose realm the self-administered territory is a part of, had previously announced it would “immediately” bolster its defenses there.
European capitals have been scrambling to make sense of the martial rhetoric out of the White House and find a potential route for de-escalation by touting their efforts to boost Arctic defenses against Russian and Chinese ships around Greenland. They have appealed to U.S. leaders to respect Danish sovereignty while boosting Arctic defenses under a joint NATO push.
At the same time, they have reaffirmed their commitment to Denmark’s territorial integrity, and the EU has said it is looking at potential countermeasures behind closed doors.
The German government initially said 13 Bundeswehr soldiers would depart for Nuuk aboard an A400M transport plane and remain there through Jan. 17. The plans changed on Thursday, with Germany saying its expeditionary team would now fly to Denmark instead and go from there to Greenland aboard a civilian aircraft on Friday, together with Danish forces.
“The aim is to explore the framework conditions for possible military contributions to support Denmark in ensuring security in the region,” the Bundeswehr said in its nocturnal press statement on Wednesday, “for example, for maritime surveillance capabilities.”
On Thursday, the German defense ministry said “specific skill contributions are not yet the focus” of the mission and that, instead, “the task is to gather fundamental insights into the local conditions for deployment and training opportunities” in preparation for further talks and planning within NATO.
In the latest statement, German Minister of Defense Pistorius also called out an alleged threat by Russia and China in the Arctic, in an apparent olive branch to the United States.
Danish officials have pushed back against the U.S. assertion that the waters around Greenland are swarming with Russian and Chinese vessels.
Pistorius had previously name-checked the country’s brand-new P-8A Poseidon maritime patrol aircraft in the context of a discussion about Greenland and protecting the high North.
Swedish Prime Minister Ulf Kristersson confirmed that Stockholm, too, had sent soldiers to Greenland as early as Wednesday, although the government maintains they were dispatched to “prepare for upcoming elements within the framework of the Danish exercise Operation Arctic Endurance.”
Both Sweden and Germany said Denmark had requested that the allied countries’ armed forces be sent.
Norway has confirmed two military service members have been sent to Greenland “to map out the ‍further cooperation between (NATO) allies,” ‍Tore Sandvik, Oslo’s defense minister, said in an email to Reuters.
French President Emmanuel Macron confirmed his country’s sending of troops 18 minutes past midnight local time on Thursday, saying on X that “at the request of Denmark, I have decided that France will participate in the joint exercises organized by Denmark in Greenland.” At the time, he said that “the first French military elements are already on their way. Others will follow.”
On Wednesday, representatives of Greenland, Denmark, and the United States met at the White House, but the meeting failed to resolve the standoff.
“We agreed to disagree,” Danish foreign minister Lars Lökke Rasmussen told reporters after the “frank but constructive” talks concluded. He said there was a “fundamental disagreement” between Copenhagen and Washington about the future of the world’s largest island.
The countries agreed to create a high-level working group tasked with finding a common path forward, while Trump reiterated his intention for the U.S. to take possession of the island after the meeting concluded. (Source: Defense News)

 

15 Jan 26. Danish and Greenlandic representatives travelled to Washington to dissuade the US from seeking the territory of Greenland. Even among the Nordics, the Danes are known for their characteristic directness. This might explain the rationale behind the Prime Ministers of Denmark and Greenland’s gambit to send their Foreign Ministers to Washington to confront, head-on, President Donald Trump’s desire to own Greenland. While the meeting ended in an agreement to disagree and establishment of a high-level working group to manage the issue, this move was not without risk and could have easily ended badly. No doubt stirring in the casements of Elsinore Castle, Holger the Dane – the legendary Viking who will awaken, it is said, from his long slumber if Denmark is ever threated – is preparing to bare his sword.
Denmark and Greenland’s relative success in Washington was not easily achieved. Behind it lies months of careful, well-orchestrated diplomacy that validates the value of statecraft and offers important lessons on how deal with the current US administration and its single-minded President.
The first lesson is in how Denmark and Greenland reclaimed the narrative. In the run-up to the meeting, the White House launched an information operation designed to portray Denmark as delinquent in its constitutional responsibility to provide for the security of Greenland. In fact, in 2025 alone, Denmark allocated $13.7bn to initiatives and capabilities for operations in the Arctic and North Atlantic including maritime patrol aircraft, surface vessels and satellite surveillance. The US also falsely claimed that there has been an increase in Russian and Chinese presence in and around Greenland, with a post from the White House X account depicting Greenland’s failure to choose the US over Denmark as the equivalent of walking into Russia and China’s hands. Actually, there has been little to no Chinese and Russian military activity around Greenland over the last decade. As Norwegian Foreign Minister Espen Barth Eide reminded, what Russian or Chinese presence there is in the Arctic is located on the Russian side at Russian bases in the Kola peninsula, which is much closer to the coast of Norway.
A second skilful step was for Finland and Greenland to call on friends and seek strength in numbers. Many European nations, as well as Canada and Australia, voiced support for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Kingdom of Denmark, underscoring that the future of Greenland is a matter for the people of Greenland and Denmark to decide. Still others – including France, Germany, Norway, Sweden and the UK – pledged to send troops to Greenland for exercises to address the alleged security gap and, ostensibly, act as a deterrent against US military action. This show of solidarity and commitment is important, but it must be followed through upon to avoid giving the US yet another example of European talk without action, and continued dependence on the US for its security.
Yet perhaps the most powerful brake on Trump’s Greenland ambition is found in the US, where Denmark and Greenland have garnered significant support. Polls show that only 4% of Americans support taking Greenland by military force. Of US efforts to acquire the country, far more disapprove (73%) than approve (17%). Bipartisan support from the US Congress has been even more forceful and impactful. Senators Thom Tillis (R-NC) and Jeanne Shaheen (D-NH), leaders of the Senate NATO Observer’s Group, issued a joint statement noting that, ‘The United States must honour its treaty obligations and respect the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Kingdom of Denmark.’ Senator Mitch McConnell (R-KY) stated that the use of force to seize the sovereign territory of a US ally would be ‘an especially catastrophic act of strategic self-harm’. Ahead of Denmark and Greenland’s meeting with US counterparts, another bipartisan group of US Senators introduced legislation prohibiting military action against fellow NATO members. While less public, Denmark has also benefited from significant support among the US military, many of whom fought and bled alongside Danish soldiers in Iraq and Afghanistan. US forces also work side-by-side with their Danish and Greenlandic counterparts on exercises and joint operations in the region and operations at Pituffik Space Base, a relationship that dates to the 1951 Mutual Defense Agreement between the US and Denmark.
The final element that delivered success was unity between Denmark and Greenland. While Greenland retains its long-term ambition for full independence from Denmark, Prime Minister Jens-Frederik Nielsen made clear Greenland’s preference to remain part of the Kingdom of Denmark for the foreseeable future, noting that now is not the time for internal discussion and divisions, but rather a time for to stand together. Since the 2009 Act on Greenland Self-Government, Greenland has acquired more autonomy at home and, more recently, a greater voice in its foreign and security policy. Going forward, it is vital that Denmark, supported by its NATO and EU partners, continue to respect Greenland’s voice and support it on the path to eventual independence. If not, US threats of annexation may gain new momentum, forcing the great sleeping Viking hero to awake. (Source: )

13 Jan 26. Colombia: Guerrilla attacks in Cauca, Chocó departments increase physical security, transit risks. On 14 January, an explosive-laden drone detonated near Alto del Oso (Chocó department), injuring ten patrolling soldiers. Reports indicate that the Ernesto ‘Che’ Guevara Front of the National Liberation Army (ELN) guerrilla group conducted the attack. Reportedly, this was a retaliation against a recent security forces operation in the area on 4 January, which killed local ELN leader Hernán Chica Palacios (alias ‘Santiago’). Meanwhile, also on 14 January, the security forces clashed with unidentified armed actors in Suárez (Cauca department). Reportedly, unidentified armed actors assaulted the Suárez police station with small arms and crashed a drone near the building; the security forces repelled the attack without casualties. The authorities suspect that dissident factions of the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC-D) perpetrated the attack. We assess that the security forces will highly likely reinforce Alto del Oso and Suárez in the coming days and escalate their operations. Consequently, the risks of armed clashes and retaliatory attacks will increase, elevating physical security and transit risks. (Source: Sibylline)

 

15 Jan 26. Philippines-Japan: Military resupply pact supports joint exercises, bolsters China deterrence. Earlier on 15 January, Japan and the Philippines signed an Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreement that will allow the tax-free provision of ammunition, fuel, food and other necessities during joint military training. The agreement still awaits ratification from the Japanese legislature. This agreement supports an earlier Reciprocal Access Agreement (RAA) between the two countries that streamlined procedures for troops to enter each other’s territory for drills and defence co-operation. The Japanese foreign minister, referring to Chinese assertiveness, stated that the two countries oppose ‘unilateral attempts’ to change the status quo by coercion in the East and South China seas. Philippine and Chinese vessels frequently clash in disputed waters of the South China Sea, while Japan and China dispute the ownership of the Senkaku Islands (Japan) / Diaoyu Islands (China) Islands in the East China Sea. To deter Chinese influence, the two parties are likely to finalise their agreement to bolster military information-sharing within the year. The Philippines is also almost certain to expand visiting forces agreements with European partners. This is likely to sustain tensions with China but highlights the Philippines’ strategy to diversify its security partners. (Source: Sibylline)

 

15 Jan 26. Cameroon: Security risks in Anglophone regions will remain elevated through 2026. On 14 January, Anglophone secessionists killed 14 civilians during an attack in Guiado (Northwest region). The attack follows an intensification in violence since October 2025; a month that marks the anniversary of Anglophone separatist groups’ proclamation of Ambazonian independence, typically triggering an uptick in secessionist activity. The separatist movement is increasingly fragmented following successful security forces operations in 2024, undermining its capacity to conduct attacks. However, the government’s reluctance to offer political concessions to the English-speaking Northwest and Southwest regions will sustain the elevated risk of attacks, particularly Bamenda (Northwest) and Akwaya, Buea, Kumba, Mbonge and Muyuka (all Southwest). We assess that attacks will likely fall in the first quarter of 2026 (as per historical precedent), while entrenched ethno-religious tensions will sustain security risks across Cameron’s Anglophone regions. Attacks will likely include IEDs, small-arms and kidnap-for-ransom (KFR) targeting government and security facilities, driving sporadic exposure to crossfire and blast risks for business and NGO staff. In the aftermath of attacks, retaliatory security force operations will elevate the risks of arbitrary detention and indiscriminate violence, exacerbating human rights concerns. (Source: Sibylline)

 

15 Jan 26. Denmark-Greenland-US: Disagreement over Greenland will sustain regional tensions in coming weeks. On 14 January, Danish foreign minister Lars Løkke Rasmussen stated that there is a ‘fundamental disagreement’ with the US over the latter’s stated aim to control Greenland (semi-autonomous territory of Denmark). This statement followed a meeting between Rasmussen, Greenland’s foreign minister Vivian Motzfeldt, US Vice President JD Vance and US Secretary of State Marco Rubio in the US capital Washington DC. While the meeting was reportedly constructive, no breakthrough was reached. Parties agreed to establish a high-level working group in the coming weeks to explore a possible compromise regarding Greenland’s future. Denmark and Greenland are open to a major expansion of US military presence on the island, acknowledging that security measures to counter Russian and Chinese interests should be increased. However, we assess that this posture will remain insufficient for US President Donald Trump’s administration, which will highly likely continue to push for a deal providing the US with territorial control. Consequently, negotiations will likely protract in the coming months. Additionally, preparations by several European partners – including France, Germany, Sweden and the UK – to send small military and reconnaissance teams to Greenland are unlikely to address US concerns. (Source: Sibylline)

 

15 Jan 26. Military trade union maintains SANDF fails on equipment, planning and post deployment care. An anonymous South African soldier’s claims of major deployment what the country’s largest military labour organisation was told about the South African contribution to the Southern African Development Community Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo (SAMIDRC).
The claims, seemingly from a 2 SA Infantry (SAI) Battalion soldier, were published by DefenceWeb earlier this week (12 January). Under the headline “An SANDF soldier’s experience with SAMIDRC” the infantryman details the sorry state of the deployment.
South Africa, in the form of its SA National Defence Force (SANDF), along with troop and equipment contributions from Malawi and Tanzania, comprised the mission to eastern Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). The mission was deployed in mid-December 2024 with official withdrawal starting on 29 April 2025, well ahead of the officially announced mandate finish of 15 December 2025.
Responding to the anonymous soldier’s claims, Sandu (the SA National Defence Union), said it could not verify all operational details, but confirmed “core issues” were previously raised with it by paid-up union members. “In turn, we [Sandu] made these public and reported on them before, during and after the deployment.”
“Long prior to the events at Sake and Goma, Sandu formally placed on record serious shortcomings in equipment provisioning, force protection, logistic readiness, allowance structures and post-deployment care,” the Arcadia, Pretoria, headquartered military trade union told DefenceWeb.
“We specifically warned that the SANDF’s approach to combat-related trauma support was inadequate and fragmented.
“The [trade union’s] Healing Heroes campaign was launched in 2025 precisely because these concerns were being raised with us and we anticipated that returning members would not receive appropriate care. Members who have difficulty in accessing medical care due trauma – whether physical or mental – are encouraged to contact Sandu so that we can assist them in enforcing their right to proper care.
“A dedicated helpline has been set up where members can report their needs in this regard (WhatsApp only on 066 06 7354).”
On what Sandu terms “systemic failure issues” – some raised by the anonymous soldier, the military labour organisation has it “reports of soldiers being compelled to self-fund essential equipment, operate with outdated peacekeeping allowances in a peace enforcement mission and receiving minimal post-return psychological support” shows them up and reinforces what had “consistently” been raised on behalf of members.
“Institutional failure to properly equip soldiers, failure to plan realistically for a combat mandate and failure to adequately care for members once they return home should never be accepted.
“Sandu continues to call for a transparent review of the SAMIDRC deployment, urgent improvements to structured long-term psychological support, an end to soldiers self-funding basic equipment and a serious reassessment of allowances and force protection for external deployments,” the union told DefenceWeb.
Sandu members’ experiences tie in with research by Stellenbosch University, funded by the Open Society Foundations, revealing that SANDF soldiers on missions in Mozambique and the DRC felt neglected due to logistical failures, inadequate training, equipment shortages, and organisational issues, impairing mission performance, safety, and welfare.
Researchers found that pre-deployment training lacks realism for environments like DRC jungles, and budget cuts dilute exercises. Organisational and logistical failures hamper not just training but deployments. Short notice and hastily planned deployments resulted in insufficient time to obtain uniforms and equipment. The widespread lack of equipment was cited as a major problem, including vehicles, night vision goggles, maps, weapons, bullet-resistant jackets etc. – for example, soldiers sometimes had to take turns wearing body armour on patrols as there was not enough for everyone. Soldiers have been routinely forced to purchase their own boots, tents and personal equipment.
The SANDF suffers from obsolete equipment, Stellenbosch University researchers said, with a notable lack of surveillance equipment, night vision goggles, unmanned aerial vehicles, electronic communications, electronic warfare equipment etc. In the DRC, troops said opposing forces were often better armed and equipped than they were (possessing high calibre weapons, missiles, and long-range mortars), and that South African troops were outgunned from the start.
Researchers recommended the SANDF enhance realistic training and interoperability; modernise equipment and overhaul logistics/supply chains; improve intelligence sharing, command structures, and civil-military ties; ensure air evacuation, morale, and welfare support; and isolate unreliable military partners in mission theatres. (Source: https://www.defenceweb.co.za/)

 

13 Jan 26. U.S., Regional Partners Establish New Air Defense Operations Cell in Qatar. U.S. Central Command and regional partners opened a new coordination cell at Al Udeid Air Base in Qatar this week to enhance integrated air and missile defense.
The new Middle Eastern Air Defense — Combined Defense Operations Cell is located in the Combined Air Operations Center on base and comprised of personnel from the U.S. and regional partners.
The Qatar-based operations center, established more than 20 years ago, currently includes representatives from 17 nations who coordinate the employment of military air assets across the Middle East. The new operations cell is designed to enhance coordination and integration for air and missile defense efforts among regional partners.
“This is a significant step forward in strengthening regional defense cooperation,” said Navy Adm. Brad Cooper, Centcom commander. “This cell will improve how regional forces coordinate and share air and missile defense responsibilities across the Middle East.”
U.S. Air Force Central service members will work alongside regional counterparts at the operations cell in planning multinational exercises, conducting drills and responding to contingencies. The cell will also be responsible for sharing information and threat warnings.
“The creates a consistent venue to share expertise and collectively create new solutions together with our regional partners,” said Air Force Lt. Gen Derek France, U.S. Air Force Central commander. “This strengthens our integrated air and missile defense throughout the region.”
The formation of the cell follows the opening of two bilateral combined command posts last year for air and missile defense. The new facilities, opened by U.S Army Central in partnership with Qatar and Bahrain, will serve as hubs for integrated air defense planning, coordination and operations. (Source: U.S. DoD)

 

13 Jan 26. Uganda: General election will undermine operational continuity, elevate security risks. On 13 January, the authorities cut internet access and limited mobile services nationwide ahead of the general election on 15 January (see Sibylline Alert – 13 January 2026). The authorities almost certainly restricted communications services to undermine opposition leader Robert Kyagulanyi Ssentamu’s (known as Bobi Wine) ability to mobilise protests. Such outages will likely persist throughout the election period, disrupting communication with on-the-ground staff. We assess that President Yoweri Museveni will almost certainly utilise authoritarian tactics such as ballot box stuffing and falsifying tallies to secure re-election, while his National Resistance Movement (NRM) party will likely secure a majority in the legislative elections. In anticipation, the authorities deployed the military to strategic locations throughout the capital Kampala. However, we assess that this is unlikely to prevent well-attended protests in major cities and opposition strongholds such as Kampala, Luweero and Mukono (all Central region) in the coming days. The security forces are highly likely to employ heavy-handed tactics to disperse protesters, including baton charges, tear gas and rubber bullets, elevating security risks to staff and assets therein. (Source: Sibylline)

 

13 Jan 26. Colombia: President rejects guerrilla negotiation proposal, increasing risk of retaliatory attacks. On 12 January, Colombian President Gustavo Petro rejected a proposal by the National Liberation Army (ELN) guerrilla group for a ‘National Accord’ to combat poverty and drug trafficking. Furthermore, Petro has suggested that Colombia and Venezuela would carry out joint military operations against the ELN if the group does not re-enter peace negotiations and vacate Venezuelan territory. Meanwhile, reports indicate that Washington DC and Bogotá have also explored conducting joint operations against the ELN. In the near term, Petro’s rejection of the ELN’s proposal will likely trigger retaliatory attacks. In this event, the ELN will highly likely target the security forces, elevating physical security risks proximate to army patrols, police stations and military bases. In the longer term, if Colombia carries out joint military operations against the ELN, with Venezuela or the US, the risk of armed clashes and forced displacements will increase significantly in key guerrilla strongholds, such as Norte de Santander department. (Source: Sibylline)

 

12 Jan 26. Moldova-Romania: Unification is highly unlikely in long term despite presidential support. In an interview on 12 January, Moldovan President Maia Sandu stated that she would vote in favour of unification with Romania if a referendum on the matter ever took place. Sandu named geopolitical developments occurring globally and near Moldova (likely referring to Russia’s ongoing full-scale invasion of Ukraine) as one of her reasons for supporting joining Romania, a neighbouring NATO state and EU member. Although Moldova shares close cultural and linguistic ties with Romania, the majority of Moldovan nationals oppose unification. In a poll by the Moldovan Institute of Marketing and Opinion Surveys (IMAS) released in February 2025, 56% of respondents believed Moldova should remain independent, compared to 31% who would support unification. Despite Sandu’s support for unification and her pro-West stance, we assess that the two countries will highly unlikely unify in the long term. Nevertheless, discussions about joining Romania will likely maintain societal polarisation in Moldova, which will encourage Russian and pro-Russia destabilisation efforts.(Source: Sibylline)

 

12 Jan 26. Armenia: Russian destabilisation risks remain elevated; military action remains remote possibility. On 12 January, an Armenian state news outlet reported that Armenia’s foreign ministry had summoned the Russian ambassador to Armenia over hawkish comments made by Kremlin-aligned television presenter Vladimir Solovyov. During a Russian television broadcast, Solovyov criticised Armenia’s shift away from Russia’s sphere of influence and suggested a possible Russian ‘special military operation’ targeting the country. The Russo-Ukrainian war remains Russia’s primary priority and continues to absorb most of its military and political resources. Therefore, we assess that a Russian military operation against Armenia remains a remote possibility in the foreseeable future. Instead, Russia is more likely to intensify grey-zone and influence operations aimed at destabilising Armenia’s pro-Western leadership. Such efforts are likely to increase ahead of Armenian parliamentary elections, scheduled for 7 June. In our most dangerous (and highly unlikely) scenario, Russia could facilitate or back a coup aimed at ousting the current leadership, though an invasion remains a remote possibility in the medium term. (Source: Sibylline)

 

12 Jan 26. Pakistan: Jet sales talks underscore efforts to expand defence exports, diversify economy. On 12 January, news reports citing security officials stated that Indonesia’s Defence Minister Sjafrie Sjamsoeddin met Pakistan’s Air Force Chief Marshal Zaheer Ahmed Baber Sidhu to discuss a potential deal involving the sale of combat jets and drones to Indonesia. Reportedly, the talks focused on strengthening communication between defence institutions, as well as the sale of JF-17 jets (a combat aircraft jointly developed by Pakistan and China) and drones. This follows Pakistan’s sale of fighter jets to the Libyan National Army and Azerbaijan in 2025, alongside reports of ongoing talks to sell jets to Bangladesh, Saudi Arabia and Sudan. Pakistan’s military development programme has experienced a surge in interest, following the perceived success of JF-17 jets during the conflict with India in May 2025. While no deal has been finalised, we assess that the ongoing talks highlight Pakistan’s efforts to capitalise on the positive sentiment towards its air force to expand weapons sales to other countries. If these arms deals materialise, they will help mitigate fiscal strain over the medium-to-long term by increasing and diversifying exports. (Source: Sibylline)

 

13 Jan 26. South Sudan: Removal of vice president’s allies will compound tensions, elevating risk of clashes. On 12 January, President Salva Kiir dismissed 11 members of the opposition Sudan People’s Liberation Movement – In Opposition (SPLM-IO) from the Transitional National Assembly; the individuals were loyal to imprisoned Vice President Riek Machar. Subsequently, Kiir appointed 11 new members affiliated with the SPLM-IO’s anti-Machar faction, almost certainly in an effort to factionalise the party further. This move is likely to compound tensions following renewed clashes between SPLM-IO-affiliated forces and government forces in Jonglei state, with the SPLM-IO pledging to advance to the capital Juba. On 12 January, the SPLM-IO issued an evacuation warning for civilians and NGO staff covering Ayod, Bor, Gaatdiang and Poktap (all Jonglei), citing the risk of imminent clashes. This will almost certainly elevate collateral risks and threats to life for NGO staff therein, particularly near military installations. While we assess it is unlikely that the SPLM-IO has sufficient mobilisation capacity to launch a substantive assault on Juba, an intensified conflict will almost certainly deteriorate nationwide security conditions. This will compound NGO staff exposure to crossfire and violent crime. (Source: Sibylline)

 

12 Jan 26. Venezuela-US: Internal regime power struggle underscores elevated government stability risks. As of 11 January, the Venezuelan regime has released 18 political prisoners since the US’ capture of former president Nicolás Maduro. Human rights groups estimate that approximately 811 political prisoners remain in Venezuela, including approximately 80 foreign nationals. US President Donald Trump and Venezuela’s acting President Delcy Rodríguez have indicated that prisoners’ releases are a gesture of peace, following the US military’s operation in Venezuela on 3 January. We assess that such prisoner releases will decrease regional tensions, thereby reducing the risk of further US military action in Venezuela (see Sibylline Special Report – 4 January 2026). However, reports indicate that an internal power struggle between Rodríguez and Minister of Interior, Peace and Justice Diosdado Cabello has stalled further prisoner releases. Reportedly, Cabello has blocked the execution of court orders authorising the freedom of prisoners. If Cabello continues to oppose Rodríguez, government stability risks will increase significantly. We also assess that if Cabello continues to subvert the Trump administration’s expectations of the Venezuelan regime, regional tensions and the risk of further US military action will increase. (Source: Sibylline)

 

12 Jan 26. Bangladesh-Myanmar: Intensifying conflict will drive border security, displacement risks. Earlier on 12 January, Border Guard Bangladesh (BGB) announced that it was on ‘high alert’ due to fighting across the border in neighbouring Myanmar. It also announced that 53 members of the Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army (ARSA) had been detained for entering Bangladesh. The increased security along the border with Myanmar’s Rakhine state has been prompted by intensifying conflict between ARSA and the Arakan Army (AA), while Myanmar’s junta has continued carrying out airstrikes in the area in an effort to reclaim territory from the AA. Significant gunfire and shelling have increased security risks in Bangladeshi villages near the border. A nine-year-old girl was critically injured by a stray bullet in Teknaf upazila of Cox’s Bazar district (Chattogram division, Bangladesh) on 11 January. Security risks will likely remain elevated in the coming weeks, as the ongoing elections in Myanmar (which will run until 28 January) drive greater conflict. The situation also risks driving greater displacement of Rohingya refugees into Bangladesh and further straining resources in Cox’s Bazar. (Source: Sibylline)

 

12 Jan 26. Thailand: Security measures will be elevated in Deep South region following bomb attacks. At around 0100hrs (local time) on 11 January, IEDs exploded at 11 petrol stations across Thailand’s southern Narathiwat, Pattani and Yala provinces, injuring at least four people. Following this, the local authorities increased security measures at road checkpoints and border controls along the Golok River. The authorities also imposed a night curfew in Narathiwat, which was lifted earlier on 12 January. While Thai security agencies did not confirm a motive behind the incidents, they have referred to local elections occurring that day. Separatist militants are active in Thailand’s Deep South region, though attacks have become less frequent in recent years. We assess that there is an elevated risk of attacks in southern provinces ahead of general Thai elections on 8 February and during the Ramadan period (i.e. 17 February to 18 March). Any attacks will most likely take the form of an arson or bomb attack targeting police, Buddhist sites or petrol stations. However, a heightened security force posture will mitigate the risk of mass-casualty incidents. (Source: Sibylline)

 

12 Jan 26. Mali: Attack on industrial sites underscores increasing threats to local staff, assets. On 11 January, over 150 militants attacked and destroyed three industrial facilities located along the N22 highway in Kayes region. The militants targeted a cement factory in Gangonteri, an industrial coating facility in Groundapé and a limestone production plant in Karaga (all Kayes region). We assess that al-Qaeda-affiliated Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM) almost certainly conducted the attacks, given the substantial expansion of its operations in Kayes in recent months. The attacks underscore the growing threats to assets outside Mali’s major cities, as the government concentrates its military resources on securing fuel deliveries to the capital Bamako. In the coming months, JNIM will likely continue expanding and developing its operations in western Mali, increasing the risk of similar attacks targeting industrial facilities, mining operations and vehicles during overland movement. Locally engaged staff will almost certainly continue facing elevated risks of kidnap attacks, particularly individuals linked to businesses or states known to pay ransoms for hostages. More broadly, JNIM’s increasing presence in western Mali will likely continue to facilitate the group’s pursuit of a nationwide fuel embargo, undermining energy security conditions, operational continuity and government stability. (Source: Sibylline)

 

12 Jan 26. Burundi-Congo (DRC): Sustained conflict will drive displacement, straining humanitarian resources. On 10 January, the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) stated that at least 53 refugees fleeing conflict in eastern DRC have died in Burundi, including 25 who died of a cholera outbreak. Following the Rwanda-backed M23 rebels’ capture of Uvira (DRC) in December 2025, at least 100,000 Congolese nationals have fled to Burundi. While M23 declared a unilateral withdrawal from Uvira in December 2025, its forces reportedly continue to control the city. M23 is unlikely to withdraw from Uvira; it has accused pro-Congolese government forces of exploiting the withdrawal to launch attacks on M23 forces. Such statements are likely to drive further clashes (including airstrikes) with Congolese forces (and to a lesser extent Burundian forces), likely triggering further waves of displacement into Burundi. We assess that this is likely to intensify pressure on strained aid resources, leading to shortages of water and sanitation resources (particularly in refugee camps along the border with Tanzania). This is likely to trigger further water-borne disease outbreaks, compounding deteriorating humanitarian conditions and increasing staff exposure risks. (Source: Sibylline)
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Military And Security Developments

Jan 16.

• Iraq: New PM unlikely to revoke previous government’s deals, though policy risks remain elevated. On 15 January, Nouri al-Maliki, leader of the State of Law Coalition (SLC), stated that he will revoke recent decisions issued by the caretaker Prime Minister Mohammed Shia al-Sudani if he assumes office. Al-Maliki is highly likely to lead the next Iraqi government. Al-Maliki added that these decisions include public sector regulations as well as tax and customs fees measures. We assess that al-Maliki’s statement likely refers to the recent government session where it approved technical measures regulating the public sector. As such, we assess that it is highly unlikely that al-Maliki will revoke government decisions taken before the November elections, particularly those relating to any major investments or oil deals with foreign companies and/or Iraqi Kurdistan. Nevertheless, the selection of al-Maliki as PM by the Shia coalition will raise policy and compliance risks in 2026. Furthermore, his pro-Iran stance will elevate the risk of new US sanctions against the country, possibly impacting banking and logistics operations due to the influence of Iran’s proxies in these sectors.
• Iran-US: Sanctions will likely drive financial, operational risks for businesses with assets in Iran. On 15 January, the US Department of the Treasury sanctioned several senior Iranian security officials and ‘shadow banking’ networks over Tehran’s crackdown on anti-government protesters in recent weeks. The EU has indicated that it is also considering further sanctions on Iran. Such measures will increase legal, financial and operational risks for businesses with assets in Iran and in adjacent supply chains, especially in the petroleum and petrochemical industries. Furthermore, sanctions will heighten compliance and regulatory risks across several sectors, including energy, logistics and shipping companies operating in the region. Additional sanctions from G7 countries (including France and the UK) remain likely and will possibly further impact Iranian exports, including crude oil, natural gas and some agricultural products. While the US’ imposition of sanctions possibly signals a move away from immediate kinetic action against Iran, the risk of military intervention will remain elevated over the coming weeks given the US’ repositioning of its USS Abraham Lincoln (CVN-72) aircraft carrier strike group to the US Central Command (CENTCOM) area of responsibility (which covers the Middle East).
  Jan 15.
  • Palestinian Territories: Ceasefire will remain fragile despite announcement of peace plan’s Phase 2. On 14 January, US Special Envoy to the Middle East Steve Witkoff announced the launch of Phase 2 of the Gaza ceasefire, which entails the formation of a Palestinian-led authority to govern the enclave and the full disarmament of all armed factions. The transitional government will operate under the supervision of the Board of Peace (BoP) and will be headed by Ali Shaath, a former deputy planning minister in the Palestinian Authority (PA). Despite the announcement, Phase 2’s timeline and implementation remain highly vague. The International Stabilization Force (ISF)’s composition – which is a key part of the peace plan – has yet to be agreed. Consequently, we assess that Phase 2’s implementation will likely be delayed until at least the second quarter of 2026. This will possibly further postpone Israel’s withdrawal from the ‘yellow line’ in Gaza. Furthermore, a full disarmament of Hamas and its allied factions in Gaza remains unlikely. This will constitute a major challenge to the peace plan’s implementation and will increase the risk of a ceasefire collapse in the coming months.
  • Iran-US: Risk of US intervention in coming weeks remains elevated amid strike group re-positioning. On 14 January, US President Donald Trump stated that Tehran has told him that the ‘killing has stopped’ and that no executions will take place, following weeks of anti-government protests. This move is possibly aimed at easing immediate bilateral tensions. However, the US has not ruled out military action; it is moving its USS Abraham Lincoln (CVN-72) aircraft carrier strike group to the US Central Command (CENTCOM) area of responsibility (which covers the Middle East). Current statements suggest that the risk of immediate military intervention has moderately decreased. Nevertheless, we assess that the group’s re-positioning underscores that the likelihood of intervention will remain elevated in the coming weeks. Also on 14 January, the UK evacuated staff from its embassy in Iran’s capital Tehran, highlighting the reduced access to consular support for personnel. Iran’s airspace closed overnight on 14-15 January but has now reopened; further airspace closures will reduce access to commercially available evacuation routes and drive disruption to overland transport due to congestion. Several airlines including Lufthansa have confirmed that they will avoid Iranian and Iraqi airspace until further notice, likely increasing transit costs for associated businesses.
  Jan 14.
  KEY DEVELOPMENTS
  IRAN
  • Protests unrest has gripped Iran in recent days, though protests are unlikely to undermine government stability critically in the short term.
  • US President Donald Trump has repeatedly threatened to engage in ‘action’ targeting Iran amid the escalating crackdown on protests, increasing the risk of retaliation and a regional fallout.
  ISRAEL
  • ISRAEL-GAZA: US Special Envoy to the Middle East Steve Witkoff announced the launch of Phase 2 of the Gaza ceasefire, though its full implementation is likely to be delayed.
  PALESTINIAN TERRITORIES
  • GAZA STRIP: The discovery of rocket launchers in the north and south of Gaza by IDF troops highlights the likely prevalence of hidden weapons caches and the long-term threat of Hamas’ rearmament.
  • GAZA STRIP: Armed clashes between Hamas militants and IDF troops will elevate the risk of further Israeli airstrikes.
  • WEST BANK: The IDF reported that Israeli settler violence substantially increased in 2025; this will likely trigger broader scrutiny of Israeli-linked entities with operations in the West Bank.
  IRAN
  • Nationwide unrest has gripped Iran in recent days, though protests are unlikely to undermine government stability critically in the short term. Since anti-government demonstrations emerged in the capital Tehran on 27 December 2025, protests and unrest have continued to escalate throughout the country. Bouts of significant unrest have emerged in major cities, including Isfahan (Isfahan province), Mashhad (Razavi Khorasan province), Qom (Qom province), Tabriz (East Azerbaijan province) and Tehran. Protests have primarily taken place during the night, with demonstrators repeatedly clashing with the security forces, blocking major thoroughfares and attacking installations associated with the Iranian government and Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC). During working hours, local reports indicate that numerous merchant associations have engaged in rolling strike action, restricting access to retail outlets and disrupting operational continuity. On 8 January, the Iranian authorities instituted an internet blackout and significantly restricted access to telecommunications services. These efforts have significantly hampered efforts to verify the scale of the protests, as well as the number of associated casualties. Although the US-based NGO Human Rights Activists News Agency (HRANA) has verified over 2,500 protest-related deaths, global media reports indicate that the security forces have possibly killed up to 12,000 protesters and arrested 10,000 more. Amid the intensifying crackdown and restrictions to communications services, protests have likely dissipated moderately in recent days. As such, we continue to assess that the ongoing protests do not present a critical threat to government stability and are unlikely to result in regime change in the coming days. Nevertheless, anti-government sentiment is almost certainly entrenched, and risks of protest re-escalation will remain elevated in the coming weeks. On 13 January, the family of a detained protester, Erfan Soltani, stated that the Iranian authorities plan to execute him on 14 January; executions of protesters and anti-government activists will possibly trigger further unrest in the coming hours and days. The risk of re-escalation will be particularly acute in early to mid-February due to Shia mourning observances, which occur 40 days after an individual’s death (Chehelom). Security force crackdowns on observances and gatherings will increase risks of cyclical protest escalation and de-escalation in the coming months, compounding pressure on economic conditions and government stability in the medium term.
  • US President Donald Trump has repeatedly threatened to engage in ‘action’ targeting Iran amid the escalating crackdown on protests, increasing the risk of retaliation and a regional fallout. On 11 January, Trump stated that he was ‘considering’ military action against Iran due to the escalating crackdown on demonstrations, after making numerous remarks in support of protesters. Trump also stated on 11 January that Iran had attempted to initiate diplomatic negotiations; however, both Iran and Trump stated that talks had broken down by 13 January, underscoring diminishing prospects for a diplomatic resolution. The US is highly likely to engage in non-kinetic operations targeting Iran in the coming days, including boosting satellite internet access, conducting cyber attacks and engaging in information campaigns. We also assess that there is a realistic possibility of the US pursuing a limited campaign of airstrikes targeting security forces’ positions in Iran in the coming days, possibly with support from the Israel Defense Forces (IDF). Such airstrikes would almost certainly exacerbate regional tensions and would highly likely trigger Iranian retaliation, including possible missile attacks on US military installations in the region. Amid growing concerns over Iranian retaliation and possible regional escalation, the US advised some of its non-essential personnel to leave the Al Udeid Air Base (Qatar) on 14 January. US airstrikes and Iranian retaliation would significantly increase the risk of major disruption to regional travel (particularly air travel), as well as exposure to missile fire and resulting shrapnel for installations close to US military assets in the region, including in Kuwait, Qatar and the UAE (see Regional and Global Developments Section below).
  ISRAEL
  • ISRAEL-GAZA: US Special Envoy to the Middle East Steve Witkoff announced the launch of Phase 2 of the Gaza ceasefire, though its full implementation is likely to be delayed. Witkoff announced the move earlier on 14 January. This comes after several Palestinian figures received invitations on 13 January to join a technocratic committee slated to manage Gaza’s daily affairs. However, the formation of the International Stabilization Force (ISF) in Gaza, which is a key part of phase two, has yet to be fully agreed. As such, it is likely that the implementation of all the clauses within the second phase plan will be segmented and delayed for several months. This will likely also include delays to further IDF withdrawals from the ‘yellow line’ and the release of Palestinian prisoners by Israel. The second stage also envisions the disarmament of Hamas, which remains unlikely. As such, the risk of a ceasefire breakdown will be at its highest during this period.
  PALESTINIAN TERRITORIES
  • GAZA STRIP: The discovery of rocket launchers in the north and south of Gaza by IDF troops highlights the likely prevalence of hidden weapons caches and the long-term threat of Hamas’ rearmament. The discovery was made on 13 January and marks the third time that IDF troops have found launchers in the past week. According to initial military assessments, these are likely old launchers that Hamas positioned in the area before the ceasefire. The discovery signals that further ready-to-use arms likely remain hidden within the strip. This will sustain the long-term risk of rapid Hamas rearmament, likely prompting future IDF military operations across Gaza. This will possibly present long-term friction points in the peace process. Furthermore, security risks for personnel across the strip will remain elevated due to undiscovered weapons and remnants of Israeli munitions. These will also likely continue delaying reconstruction efforts in the coming months.
  • GAZA STRIP: Armed clashes between Hamas militants and IDF troops will elevate the risk of further Israeli airstrikes. On 13 January, IDF troops with tank and aerial support clashed with six Hamas militants in western Rafah (southern Gaza). Two IDF servicemen were lightly injured and all six militants were killed. An IDF spokesperson has characterised the incident as ‘a blatant violation of the ceasefire agreement’. The incident comes amid mounting IDF reports over the past week claiming that Hamas intends to attack IDF service personnel guarding the Israel-controlled ‘yellow line’. These reports have identified an increasing frequency in militants’ suspected probing and reconnaissance operations near the yellow line, likely to test soldiers’ conduct and speed of response. Additionally, on 8 January, militant elements in northern Gaza launched a rocket that fell within the strip, near IDF outposts. We assess that the latest incident and the increasing militant activity in the past week will likely prompt IDF airstrikes across the strip in the coming days. These will sustain elevated security risks across Gaza, highlighting the fragility of the ceasefire.
  • WEST BANK: The IDF reported that Israeli settler violence substantially increased in 2025; this will likely trigger broader scrutiny of Israeli-linked entities with operations in the West Bank. On 12 January, the Haaretz media outlet published an IDF report detailing a significant increase in incidents of settler violence in the West Bank. IDF data shows that the number of settler attacks increased by 25% in 2025 compared with 2024; violence was most acute in Hebron, Nablus and Ramallah and al-Bireh governorates. The report underscores increasing attack risks for Palestinian communities in the West Bank, particularly those located close to Israeli settlements. In the coming months, Palestinians engaging in agricultural activity will almost certainly continue to face elevated exposure to settler attacks, while those attempting to document attacks will also face elevated risks of harassment and assault. As settler violence continues to escalate, Australia, Canada, the EU and the UK will likely move to expand sanctions on Israeli settlers and associated entities in the agricultural sector. Such efforts will increase compliance concerns for multinational firms with operations in Israel, particularly in the financial, telecommunications, construction and agricultural sectors. Firms providing services to settlements in the West Bank or purchasing goods from settler-linked entities will also likely face continued scrutiny from pro-Palestine activists, increasing reputational and governance concerns.
  IRAN-QATAR-US: The mounting indications of possible US strike action against Iran in the coming days will raise the prospect of retaliation against US military assets in the Gulf region; we assess that highly targeted strikes would pose limited threats to host countries. On 13 January, international media reported that the US had advised several of its personnel to leave al-Udeid Air Base (Qatar) by later on 14 January. The Qatari government has confirmed these reports, adding that the departure of US personnel from the base was taken as a ‘precautionary measure’. Additionally, similar reports on the relocation of US military personnel have emerged from Jordan. These reports are consistent with other such measures adopted by US bases in the lead-up to the US’ strike on Iran’s nuclear facilities in June 2025. Consequently, they reflect the mounting possibility of further US strikes against Iran in the coming days. In the event of such US strikes, Iran is highly likely to pursue retaliatory action against US regional bases. However, such retaliatory strikes are likely to be highly targeted and limited to US bases, mitigating the threat to host countries’ broader infrastructure, as well as to locally based foreign commercial assets (including those belonging to US companies). Nevertheless, Iranian retaliatory strikes in the Gulf region (even if they are limited) will almost certainly disrupt regional airline and shipping operations temporarily.
  • Iran-US: Protest remobilisation is possible in coming days as US threatens intervention. Earlier on 14 January, direct communication between Iran and the US was suspended after US President Donald Trump urged Iranians to continue anti-government protests and threatened to ‘take very strong action’ if the authorities executed demonstrators. Reportedly, jailed protester Erfan Soltani faces execution later on 14 January. Although the demonstrations have likely calmed since last weekend, Trump’s comments and the prospect of Soltani’s execution will possibly embolden protesters, sustaining the risk of renewed nationwide unrest. Internet access and SMS communications remain restricted; however, phone calling services have resumed and Starlink access is now free, which will possibly facilitate co-ordination for protesters’ remobilisation. Several countries including Canada, France, Germany and the US have urged their citizens to leave Iran; the US has advised departures by land to Armenia or Turkey. However, we assess that Iran’s communication restrictions and checkpoints will likely continue to hinder evacuation procedures, particularly in rural border areas, sustaining elevated personnel security risks. Meanwhile, global media reports indicate that the US has advised some personnel at its Al Udeid Air Base (Qatar) to leave. This underscores heightened concerns about US kinetic action against Iran and a retaliatory Iranian response targeting US regional assets.
  • Syria: New military operation against Kurdish group in Aleppo governorate is likely in coming days. On 13 January, the Syrian government declared the area between the towns of Dayr Hafir and Maskanah (both Aleppo governorate) a closed military zone and deployed government forces to the area. Local media also reported on the build-up of Kurdish forces in the area. The area is a critical logistical node for the largely ethnic-Kurdish Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) in the western Euphrates region. As such, the government is highly likely to conduct a major military operation to secure control of the area in the coming days. Government forces likely aim to push the Kurdish factions to the east side of the Euphrates River to mitigate attack threats against Aleppo and the surrounding area. Regardless, radical groups within the SDF are likely to target water pipelines and the electricity grid supplying Aleppo, as well as conduct drone strikes against the city. This will significantly increase the security risks in the downtown area and near government and military facilities.
  Jan 13.
  • Lebanon: Hurdles to disarmament campaigns will increase risks of armed conflict resumption. On 12 January, local media published claims by unnamed Lebanese officials that the US has issued a ‘grace period’ of several weeks before it will hold Lebanon accountable regarding the second phase of disarming Lebanese Hizballah (LH). This comes days after the Lebanese army announced that it has completed the first phase of LH disarmament south of the Litani River. Nevertheless, the Israeli Air Force continues to target LH’s personnel and assets. These airstrikes are highly likely to continue in the coming days across South and Nabatieh governorates, albeit without a significant uptick. While the US deadline remains unclear, we assess that LH will continue to refuse full disarmament. This will increase the risks of armed conflict resumption with Israel and ethno-religious tensions inside Lebanon during the first quarter of 2026, before Lebanese general elections in May. However, if the US and Israel were to strike Iran during this period (which remains a realistic possibility), the risks of armed conflict in Lebanon will decrease, though they would likely rise in the second half of 2026.
  • Iran-US: Protesters’ arrests will almost certainly continue in coming days; US intervention is possible. Earlier on 13 January, Iranian state media claimed that calm had been restored in most cities nationwide following two weeks of anti-government demonstrations. While this statement is highly unlikely to be accurate, communications restrictions (including the jamming of satellite internet services) have possibly contributed to protesters’ moderate demobilisation, particularly in rural areas. An Iranian official has confirmed that around 2,000 people have been killed during the protests; however, according to the NGO Iran Human Rights (IHRNGO), the figure is likely above 6,000. The Iranian authorities have vowed to punish participants ‘severely’. We assess that mass arrests are almost certain to continue in the coming days, increasing the risk of exposure to torture, sexual violence and extortion for detained individuals. Meanwhile, US President Donald Trump’s national security team will meet later on 13 January to discuss possible military, cyber and psychological campaigns against Iran, sustaining the risk of a US attack in the coming days. However, if Iran agrees to engage in nuclear negotiations in the coming days, the US is more likely to pursue non-kinetic action in the short term.
  • US-Iran: Secondary tariffs increase tensions with Iran, raising risk of military action in coming days. On 12 January, US President Donald Trump stated that any country doing business with Iran will face a tariff rate of 25% on trade with the US. The measure comes as the Iranian regime seeks to crack down on nationwide anti-government protests. Iran exports a significant amount of oil to China, while India, Iraq, Turkey and the UAE are among its top trading partners. Chinese officials have denounced the US tariff initiative. While Trump stated on social media that this order is ‘effective immediately’, the White House has released no official documentation on the policy or information about the legal authority used for such tariffs. Given that the US is currently engaged in tenuous trade negotiations with China and India, we assess that the threatened ‘secondary tariffs’ are unlikely to be imposed unilaterally in the coming days. Instead, the threat likely represents leverage that Washington DC seeks to use, amid reported diplomatic engagement with Tehran over curbing its nuclear programme. Despite ongoing bilateral talks, there remains a realistic possibility that the US pursues military action against Iran over the coming days, specifically airstrikes (possibly with Israeli support).
  Jan 12.
  • Iran-US: Anti-government protests are likely to continue at pace; US intervention is possible. On 11 January, the US-based NGO Human Rights Activists News Agency (HRANA) reported that violence during ongoing anti-government protests has killed at least 538 people, while authorities have arrested over 10,000 individuals. Demonstrations will likely continue at pace in the coming days, with further reports of mass casualties possibly triggering escalations in the intensity of unrest. Clashes between the authorities and protesters will almost certainly involve baton charges, live fire and mass arrests. The government continues to restrict internet access, exacerbating nationwide communication and supply chain disruption. Late on 11 January, US President Donald Trump stated that he was considering military action against Iran. Tehran said it was ready for negotiations; however, Trump indicated that the US ‘may’ act ahead of any discussions. As such, the US will possibly pursue military action, specifically airstrikes, against Iran over the coming days (possibly with Israeli support), elevating security risks for personnel near government buildings, state-owned assets and military sites. However, it is more likely that the US engages in non-kinetic operations, including boosting satellite internet access and conducting cyber attacks and information campaigns.
  • US: Potential US military action in Iran will increase domestic unrest, violent extremism risks. On 11 January, a sole perpetrator drove a truck into a crowd of thousands of demonstrators in Los Angeles (California), who were marching to support ongoing anti-government demonstrations in Iran. The police have reportedly detained the driver, who was also attacked by protesters. On the same day, President Donald Trump stated that the US military is considering ‘strong options’ on Iran as the country’s regime cracks down on the protests. In the short term, any indications that the Trump administration intends to take military action against Iran (either unilaterally or in support of Israel) will increase the likelihood of violent extremism in the US. This threat will also rise if the Iranian leadership calls for retaliatory violence against targets inside Western nations. In this scenario, there will be an elevated risk of attacks on institutions, protests and public figures who criticise Iran and the regime publicly. Still, the US authorities are largely capable of mitigating sophisticated plots. Sole perpetrators will likely remain reliant on low-capacity attacks employing firearms, vehicle ramming or rudimentary incendiary devices; however, we assess that these remain unlikely across North America.
  • Syria: Retaliatory attacks by Kurdish groups remain likely following Aleppo withdrawal. On 11 January, the last groups of Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) withdrew from Aleppo (Aleppo governorate) after days of heavy clashes with the government forces, who now fully control the city. The SDF leader stated that the withdrawal was implemented via an internationally backed agreement with the government. Meanwhile, the authorities claimed that they arrested around 300 SDF fighters and that a further 400 had fled Aleppo. Nevertheless, on the same day, local media reported a buildup of Kurdish forces along the lines of control near Dayr Hafir (Aleppo governorate), though this has not yet resulted in major clashes. While the security situation inside Aleppo city has partly stabilised, drone attacks by radical elements within the SDF, particularly on government and military facilities, will remain likely in the coming days. Electricity and water infrastructure supplying the city will also be possible targets in any Kurdish retaliatory attack. Furthermore, there is a possibility of a gradual increase in clashes around Dayr Hafir and the Tishrin dam, increasing the risks of a wider armed conflict between Damascus and Kurdish groups in the first quarter of 2026.
  • Iran-US: Anti-government protests are likely to continue at pace; US intervention is possible. On 11 January, the US-based NGO Human Rights Activists News Agency (HRANA) reported that violence during ongoing anti-government protests has killed at least 538 people, while authorities have arrested over 10,000 individuals. Demonstrations will likely continue at pace in the coming days, with further reports of mass casualties possibly triggering escalations in the intensity of unrest. Clashes between the authorities and protesters will almost certainly involve baton charges, live fire and mass arrests. The government continues to restrict internet access, exacerbating nationwide communication and supply chain disruption. Late on 11 January, US President Donald Trump stated that he was considering military action against Iran. Tehran said it was ready for negotiations; however, Trump indicated that the US ‘may’ act ahead of any discussions. As such, the US will possibly pursue military action, specifically airstrikes, against Iran over the coming days (possibly with Israeli support), elevating security risks for personnel near government buildings, state-owned assets and military sites. However, it is more likely that the US engages in non-kinetic operations, including boosting satellite internet access and conducting cyber attacks and information campaigns. (Source: Sibylline)

 

13 Jan 26. Update: air strikes against Daesh. The RAF are continuing to take the fight to Daesh in Iraq and Syria. Royal Air Force aircraft have continued to conduct patrols over Syria to help prevent any attempted resurgence of the Daesh terrorist movement following its military defeat at Baghuz Fawqani in March 2019. Careful intelligence analysis identified an underground facility, in the mountains some miles north of the ancient site of Palmyra. This facility had been occupied by Daesh, most likely to store weapons and explosives. The area around the facility is devoid of any civilian habitation.
RAF Typhoon FGR4s, supported by a Voyager refuelling tanker, therefore joined French aircraft in a joint strike on the underground facility on the evening of Saturday 3 January. Our aircraft used Paveway IV guided bombs to target a number of access tunnels down to the facility; whilst detailed assessment is now underway, initial indications are that the target was engaged successfully. There is no indication of any risk having been posed to civilians by the strike, and all our aircraft returned safely. (Source: https://www.gov.uk/)

 

13 Jan 26. Hamas Readies Gaza Handover to Planned Palestinian Government. Hamas has directed all its governing agencies to prepare for a handover of authority to a planned Palestinian technocratic government, according to the group’s official media outlet, SAFA.
“[Hamas] has issued directives to all government agencies and institutions to be ready to hand over all areas to this body,” SAFA quoted Hamas spokesman Hazem Qassem as saying. “There are instructions to facilitate the handover process in order to ensure the success of this body’s work.”
The planned government will be overseen by President Donald Trump’s proposed Board of Peace, an international body tasked with managing the government and other aspects of the ceasefire that took effect on Oct. 10, including disarming Hamas and deploying an international security force.
Members of the board must be elected by Palestinians and vetted by Israel. Its composition is expected to be announced this month.
Meanwhile, the post-ceasefire death toll in Gaza continued to rise.
Palestinian health officials said that three Palestinians were killed and nine others wounded in Israeli strikes across multiple areas of the Gaza Strip on Sunday, marking the latest violation of the fragile ceasefire between Israel and Hamas. (Source: https://www.sofx.com/)

 

13 Jan 26. Trump says nations doing business with Iran face 25% tariff on US trade.
• Summary
• Iran facing its biggest anti-government protests in years
• Trump has used leverage of tariffs throughout his second term against many nations
• Trump weighs further options on US action against Iran
President Donald Trump said on Monday any country that does business with Iran will face a tariff rate of 25% on any trade with the U.S., as Washington weighs a response to the situation in Iran which is seeing its biggest anti-government protests in years.
“Effective immediately, any Country doing business with the Islamic Republic of Iran will pay a Tariff of 25% on any and all business being done with the United States of America,” Trump said in a post on Truth Social.
Tariffs are paid by U.S. importers of goods from those countries. Iran, a member of the OPEC oil producing group, has been heavily sanctioned by Washington for years. It exports much of its oil to China, with Turkey, Iraq, the United Arab Emirates and India among its other top trading partners.
“This Order is final and conclusive,” Trump said without providing any further detail.
There was no official documentation from the White House of the policy on its website, nor information about the legal authority Trump would use to impose the tariffs, or whether they would be aimed at all of Iran’s trading partners. The White House did not respond to a request for comment.
The Chinese embassy in Washington criticized Trump’s approach, saying China will take “all necessary measures” to safeguard its interests and opposed “any illicit unilateral sanctions and long-arm jurisdiction.”
“China’s position against the indiscriminate imposition of tariffs is consistent and clear. Tariff wars and trade wars have no winners, and coercion and pressure cannot solve problems,” a spokesperson of the Chinese embassy in Washington said on X.
Japan and South Korea, which agreed on trade deals with the U.S. last year, said on Tuesday they are closely monitoring the development.
“We … plan to take any necessary measures once the specific actions of the U.S. government become clear,” South Korea’s trade ministry said in a statement.
Japan’s Deputy Chief Cabinet Secretary Masanao Ozaki told reporters that Tokyo will “carefully examine the specific content of any measures as they become clear, as well as their potential impact on Japan, and will respond appropriately.”
Iran, which had a 12-day war with U.S. ally Israel last year and whose nuclear facilities the U.S. military bombed in June, is seeing its biggest anti-government demonstrations in years.
Trump has said the U.S. may meet Iranian officials and that he was in contact with Iran’s opposition, while piling pressure on its leaders, including threatening military action.
Tehran said on Monday it was keeping communication channels with Washington open as Trump considered how to respond to the situation in Iran, which has posed one of the gravest tests of clerical rule in the country since the Islamic Revolution in 1979.
Demonstrations evolved from complaints about dire economic hardships to defiant calls for the fall of the deeply entrenched clerical establishment. U.S.-based rights group HRANA said it had verified the deaths of 599 people – 510 protesters and 89 security personnel – since the protests began on December 28.
While air strikes were one of many alternatives open to Trump, “diplomacy is always the first option for the president,” White House press secretary Karoline Leavitt said on Monday.
During the course of his second term in office, Trump has often threatened and imposed tariffs on other countries over their ties with U.S. adversaries and over trade policies that he has described as unfair to Washington.
Trump’s trade policy is under legal pressure as the U.S. Supreme Court is considering striking down a broad swathe of Trump’s existing tariffs.
Iran exported products to 147 trading partners in 2022, according to World Bank’s most recent data. (Source: Reuters)

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Military And Security Developments

Jan 16.

• Ukraine: Defence entities face heightened security risks from Russian state actors. On 13 January, international news outlets reported that Russian state-sponsored group ‘Void Blizzard’ targeted Ukrainian defence officials in a cyber operation between October and December 2025. Void Blizzard distributed phishing messages via the popular messaging platforms Signal and WhatsApp as an initial attack vector, tricking victims into downloading a password-protected archive. The archive contains malicious executables that are responsible for deploying a backdoor (‘PluggyApe’) onto compromised systems to ultimately facilitate reconnaissance, persistence and remote code execution. Throughout December 2025, the group reportedly used a new version of PluggyApe which boasts more sophisticated obfuscation techniques, highlighting the malware’s continued development. This operation likely relied on extensive research since it used the Ukrainian language and legitimate mobile operators to enhance authenticity and tailor attacks. Consequently, we assess that Ukrainian military and defence entities will continue to face heightened security risks amid the ongoing Russo-Ukrainian war.
• Ukraine: Two-tier EU membership proposal will likely face strong opposition from member states. Earlier on 16 January, the Financial Times reported that the European Commission (EC) is drafting a proposal to replace the EU’s current accession framework with a two-tier membership model designed to accelerate Ukraine’s path to joining the bloc. Under the proposal, Kyiv would be fast-tracked into the EU but would initially be granted limited decision-making powers, with full voting rights withheld. The EC’s plan would allow Ukraine to gain gradual access to the single market, as well as to the EU’s agricultural subsidies and other internal development funds, provided it meets key post-accession requirements. EU membership is a key element of the peace talks and features in Ukraine’s revised 20-point peace plan. As such, the EC’s proposal is likely aimed at facilitating peace negotiations by providing a tangible outcome for Ukraine if a peace agreement is reached. This would possibly offset other more contentious elements of a settlement, including mooted territorial concessions. However, we assess that several EU member states are highly likely to oppose such a deal, while Kyiv is also expected to remain initially reluctant to accept this system.

Jan 15.

• Ukraine: Deepening energy crisis will worsen humanitarian situation, elevate business disruption. On 14 January, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky declared a state of emergency in Ukraine’s energy sector, with particular emphasis on the situation in the capital Kyiv. The associated measures include the establishment of a headquarters in Kyiv tasked with overseeing the authorities’ response to the energy crisis. Additional steps include deregulating procedures for connecting back-up power equipment, securing the provision of necessary equipment and obtaining additional support from Ukraine’s allies. Zelensky also highlighted efforts to increase energy imports and to review curfew regulations. Russia has intensified its strike campaign against Ukraine’s energy grid in recent weeks, with Kyiv among the most heavily affected areas. The declaration of a state of emergency in the energy sector underscores the severe degradation of Ukraine’s energy infrastructure, with the country facing its most challenging winter since the onset of the war. Amid the ongoing crisis, disruption to business operations is likely to remain elevated, while the humanitarian situation is expected to deteriorate further.
• Kazakhstan: West will unlikely take effective measures to protect vessels in Black Sea in near term. On 14 January, Kazakhstan’s foreign ministry called on Europe and the US to help secure the transport of oil following an uptick in drone attacks on tankers in the Black Sea. As per the ministry, on 13 January, three tankers were targeted by unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) en route to a Caspian Pipeline Consortium (CPC) terminal on the Russian coast to load Kazakh oil. As a result of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, the Black Sea has become increasingly militarised and Ukrainian attacks against Russian energy infrastructure have impacted Kazakhstan’s oil exports in late 2025. Ultimately, it remains unlikely that Europe and/or the US would be willing (or able) to implement measures to guarantee the security of tankers in the near term given concerns about military confrontation with Russia. In fact, European states are discussing tightening sanctions enforcement and even seizing Russian-linked shipping. Instead, we assess that conflict spillover will likely continue to impact Kazakhstan’s oil exports. This will moderately reduce Western investor interest in the Central Asian state’s energy sector for the duration of the war.

Jan 14.

• Russia-Ukraine: Persistent conflict spillover risks will complicate insurance for Black Sea shipping. On 13 January, unidentified drones struck two oil tankers in the Black Sea en route to a terminal exporting Kazakh oil on the Russian coast. According to several unspecified insiders, both vessels were bound for the Yuzhnaya Ozereyevka terminal, which is operated by the Caspian Pipeline Consortium (CPC) near Russia’s port city of Novorossiysk (Krasnodar krai). Ukraine has been targeting Russian energy infrastructure to increase pressure on Russia’s war effort; this terminal came under attack in late November 2025. Also on 13 January, Reuters reported that war insurance for vessels sailing to Black Sea terminals has risen to 1% of the ship’s value, an increase from the 0.6% to 0.8% rates in late December 2025. We assess that given the continued threats of war spillover in the Black Sea, insurance rates are likely to remain volatile and subject to spikes for the duration of the Russo-Ukrainian war. Furthermore, insurers with limited risk appetite could realistically be more reluctant to offer insurance or could require terms to be reviewed more frequently.
• Ukraine: Bribery probe into former prime minister will further erode public trust in institutions. On 13 January, Ukraine’s National Anti-Corruption Bureau (NABU) and the Specialized Anti-Corruption Prosecutor’s Office (SAPO) reported that they were uncovering a bribery scheme involving the head of a parliamentary faction. Former prime minister and Batkivshchyna party leader Yulia Tymoshenko confirmed that she is the target of the investigation and that searches were conducted at her party’s premises. According to investigators, the suspect organised a long-term systematic scheme to bribe MPs through advance payments in exchange for controlled voting behaviour. Tymoshenko has rejected the allegations, describing the probe as politically motivated and intended to weaken the opposition. In 2025, Tymoshenko – who has previously faced other corruption allegations – backed a government-proposed bill that aimed to curtail NABU and SAPO’s independence. We assess that the institutions’ probe is unlikely to be politically motivated. Instead, the investigation likely points to persistent corrupt practices among political officials. This will continue to undermine public trust in state institutions, especially given the recent large-scale corruption scandal in the energy sector. Nevertheless, protest risks remain low.

Jan 13.

KEY DEVELOPMENTS

• STRIKES: We assess that Russia’s recent use of its Oreshnik intermediate-range ballistic missile (IRBM) was part of a strategic messaging effort aimed at deterring future European troop deployments to Ukraine
• MARITIME: The UK government has identified legal grounds that allow for the military to board and detain vessels operating as part of ‘shadow fleets’, indicating that a tightening of UK sanctions against Russia is likely
• GUARANTEES: Despite France and the UK agreeing to send troops to Ukraine at a meeting of the so-called Coalition of the Willing on 6 January, such a deployment is unlikely in the event of a peace deal
• FORECAST: Ukraine is currently experiencing one of the harshest heating seasons since the start of the war, as Russia’s intense strikes against the country’s energy grid triggers widespread blackouts and business disruptions
• OFFENSIVES: Despite recent reports, a large Russian offensive in the direction of Sumy (Sumy oblast) remains unlikely, with Russian forces likely to remain focused on other priority fronts. On 11 January, the 7th Corps of Ukraine’s Airborne Assault Forces stated that Russian forces are attempting to create a beachhead for new offensive operations, possibly setting the stage for an advance towards Sumy. Previously in December 2025, Russian forces launched a series of cross-border attacks into Sumy oblast (see Sibylline Ukraine Update – 23 December 2025). Over the past week, Russian forces have continued offensive operations around recently occupied areas in the oblast. However, a prominent Russian milblogger noted that despite the recent uptick in the intensity of operations, Sumy remains secondary and an offensive is unlikely.
• OFFENSIVES: We assess that a more substantial offensive in the near term is unlikely to utilise the sufficient resources to pose a serious threat to Sumy. According to the above-mentioned Russian source, Russian forces remain focused on other axes, including the Lyman direction in Donetsk oblast and Zaporizhzhia oblast in the direction of Huliapole. In Huliapole, Russian forces have continued to make slow but steady advances in recent weeks; they are likely now in control of around half the city.
• STRIKES: Over the past week, Russia has continued its long-range strike campaign, heavily targeting Ukraine’s critical infrastructure and causing significant disruption to energy, heating and water supplies. For more analysis on the impact of Russian strikes, please see FORECAST below.
• STRIKES: We assess that Russia’s recent use of its Oreshnik intermediate-range ballistic missile (IRBM) was part of a strategic messaging effort aimed at projecting strength. On 9 January, Russia’s Ministry of Defence (MoD) announced that it had launched an Oreshnik at Lviv (Lviv oblast) overnight, near the Polish border. This was part of a larger strike package and was the second of its kind (the first occurred in December 2024 targeting Dnipro; Dnipropetrovsk oblast). Russia claimed that the Oreshnik missile hit and disabled an aircraft repair plant in Lviv. Allegedly, the plant carries out repairs and maintenance of the Ukrainian armed forces’ aviation equipment, including US-supplied F-16 and MiG-29 aircraft transferred by Western countries.
• STRIKES: Russia claimed that the Oreshnik attack on Lviv was a response to an alleged Ukrainian strike against one of Russia’s presidential residences in late December 2025. We previously forecast high-intensity Russian ‘retaliation’ after the alleged strike in Novgorod oblast (Russia; see Sibylline Alert – 30 December 2025). The attack occurred shortly after the US confirmed the seizure of a Russian-flagged vessel in the Atlantic Ocean. The launch also follows the latest meeting of the so-called Coalition of the Willing in France on 6 January, which focused on post-war security guarantees for Ukraine. At the summit, France and the UK signed a letter of intent to deploy troops to Ukraine in the event of a peace agreement (see GUARANTEES below).
• STRIKES: The Oreshnik strike was likely intended as retaliation for the vessel’s seizure and especially to deter Western countries considering sending troops to Ukraine. Lviv’s choice as the target was highly likely intended to demonstrate Russia’s ability to strike anywhere in Ukraine, including areas close to NATO’s border. Therefore, the Oreshnik launch was highly likely intended as a warning to the UK and France that any military deployments – even those positioned far from the frontline – would be regarded as ‘legitimate targets’ for Russian long-range systems.
• STRIKES: Since 2024, Ukraine has extended the maximum radius of its long-range drone strikes, increasing the threat to high-value facilities inside Russia, including targets located more than 621 miles (1,000km) from the frontline. Long-range drone strikes in 2024 were sporadic and largely experimental. They produced mixed effects and relied on the Aeroprakt A-22 in some cases, a Ukrainian light civilian aircraft converted into an unmanned aerial system (UAS) for some attacks. These operations became more systematic in 2025, driven by technological improvements and the introduction of the E-300 Enterprise drone, reportedly based on the Skyranger Ninja aircraft. Reportedly, these drones were employed in repeated attacks against selected targets across Russia. Additionally, Ukraine has continued to upgrade existing drone systems to achieve greater ranges, as demonstrated by enhancements to platforms such as the Liutyi drone, which has been involved in several long-range strikes. We assess that major disruption to Russian oil and military facilities is likely to continue in 2026 as Ukraine escalates its drone campaign in a bid to deter or retaliate against Russian long-range strikes.

POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS

• MARITIME: As of 11 January, the UK government has identified legal grounds that allow for the military to board and detain vessels operating as part of ‘shadow fleets’, indicating that a tightening of UK sanctions against Russia is likely. Unspecified ministers reportedly believe that the Sanctions and Money Laundering Act 2018 can be used to approve the use of military force against any sanctioned vessel that is not correctly flagged. Officials reportedly claim that this mechanism would have applied to the Russia-flagged Marinera tanker (previously named Bella-1) that the US seized last week with the support of the UK. According to the BBC, there are plans for the British armed forces to use these powers to crack down on these ships, after UK Defence Secretary John Healey pledged to tackle the network of shadow vessels operated by Russia. The Times reported on 12 January that British special forces, namely the Royal Navy’s Special Boat Service (SBS), are preparing for such missions.
• MARITIME: A British move to seize significant numbers of Russian-linked vessels would enhance the effectiveness of sanctions against Russia, given that the shadow fleet has, until now, effectively allowed Moscow to circumvent sanctions and continue selling hydrocarbons. The justification for any British seizure of a vessel would require the UK to establish that it is legally stateless (i.e. is not legitimately registered to any country), is flying a false flag or has been disowned by the country under whose flag the vessel is claiming to sail.
• MARITIME: While this does not give the UK carte blanche to seize any vessel, it is estimated that 107 shadow fleet vessels currently fall into these legal categories; as of last week, an estimated 11 such Russia-linked sanctioned vessels were transiting the English Channel. While Russia will likely seek to convoy its vessels to deter any boarding by British authorities, it faces some key obstacles. The nature of the shadow fleet (it being highly dispersed, with complex legal and flagging arrangements) and the fact that the UK and its allies control key maritime chokepoints (namely the English Channel and the Danish Straits) will present serious problems for Russia if seizures begin to chip away at the shadow fleet. It is possible that the UK will seek to launch an operation to help build a legal consensus, with Denmark, the Netherlands and Norway among the most likely to support such an operation.
• MARITIME: However, the seizure of Russian-flagged or -linked shipping will also increase the threat of retaliation, including not only grey-zone threats to the UK mainland but also the harassment of British-linked shipping. We assess that Northern European waters (including the North Sea and Baltic Sea) and the Black Sea will remain the most likely locations for hostile Russian actions towards UK-linked maritime interests. Harassment could realistically involve Russia flying aircraft or drones in proximity to commercial vessels, jamming attempts, intimidation by warships or ‘constabulary’ boarding (and possible seizure). At the same time, repeated UK seizures of sanctioned vessels will moderately increase the risk of Russia using maritime drones against strategically significant ports, including Felixstowe (Suffolk county, UK). We will continue to monitor the situation, but for further analysis of maritime drone threats and Russian grey-zone activity, see Sibylline Situation Update Brief – 1 October 2025.
• GUARANTEES: Despite France and the UK agreeing to send troops to Ukraine at a meeting of the so-called Coalition of the Willing on 6 January, such a deployment is unlikely in the event of a peace deal. According to a press release of the declaration of intent published by the UK government, the ‘Multinational Force-Ukraine’ (MNF-U) would seek to deter Russia from resuming hostilities in the future. The statement acknowledges that the MNF-U would conduct ‘deterrence operations’ in the air, on land, at sea, as well as assist with training, planning and force regeneration. France and the UK have been at the forefront of discussions about sending troops to Ukraine in recent months. The declaration formalises their past pledges, though details remain limited.
• GUARANTEES: Russia has long opposed the presence of Western troops in Ukraine, and this is highly likely a non-starter for Russia; as such, it is more likely that an MNF-U would deploy in the absence of a peace deal, rather than as part of one. The Russian foreign ministry said on 7 January that Russia would view any such deployment as ‘foreign intervention’, echoing past comments about Western forces being ‘legitimate targets’. We assess that the recent Oreshnik strike against Lviv, close to the NATO border in Poland, was almost certainly a signal to London and Paris that any future deployment could be hit by Russian nuclear-capable missiles (see STRIKES above). Ultimately, such threats are almost certainly aimed at deterring countries from sending troops to Ukraine. At the same time, concerns about the US’ willingness (or lack thereof) to support any such reassurance force and provide a credible backstop will also likely discourage other countries from committing troops to Ukraine in the near term. No other countries have yet come out in support of the Franco-British proposals.
• GUARANTEES: Official details remain unknown regarding the number of personnel both France and the UK would be willing (and, more crucially, able) to commit to such a deployment. According to an article published by The Times on 7 January, France and the UK would possibly send up to 15,000 soldiers. Unspecified military insiders claimed that London will dispatch fewer than 7,500 troops, which they assess would likely strain already-stretched resources. Various estimates indicate that the British Army comprises around 73,000 regular full-time personnel, with manpower and equipment continuing to decline. Meanwhile, French President Emmanuel Macron’s declining popularity and domestic political instability would likely undermine his ability to send a large contingent of soldiers to Ukraine.
• GUARANTEES: Even if such a force was to deploy to Ukraine, it is uncertain what the rules for engagement with Russia would be (if it were to attack Ukraine again). Russia has consistently stated that any such troops would be ‘legitimate targets’. The Franco-British press release notes that the MNF-U would be empowered to use ‘necessary means’, including force, to protect its troops, equipment and infrastructure. The locations in which the force would operate are also yet to be determined, with the UK’s statement disclosing that ‘military hubs’ would be established (effectively meaning military bases).
• GUARANTEES: Amongst Russia’s primary justifications for its invasion of Ukraine in 2022 was the perceived need to prevent the establishment of NATO bases and deployments inside Ukraine. While Western deployments would highly likely be away from the frontline, any such deployment would, by its very nature, be entirely contrary to the objectives of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. As such, without Russia facing military defeat on the battlefield, it remains extremely unlikely that Moscow would agree to any Western troop deployments to Ukraine as part of a peace settlement, as this would undermine one of the claimed objectives for which it has been fighting for almost four years. Nevertheless, the declaration underscores British and French commitment to Ukraine, though such deployments are unlikely to form part of a serious peace deal involving Russia.

FORECAST

ENERGY: Ukraine is currently experiencing one of the harshest heating seasons since the start of the war; Russia’s intense strikes against the country’s energy grid and other critical infrastructure are triggering widespread blackouts and business disruption. Recent attacks have heavily impacted the capital Kyiv and its surrounding oblast. Following the 9 January strike, which severely damaged all the capital’s thermal power plants and numerous substations, around 6,000 buildings were left without heating. A subsequent mass Russian strike overnight on 12-13 January left approximately 70% of the capital without power. Meanwhile, these outages have also disrupted water and sewage systems and affected hospitals, public transport and road management, including traffic lights. Other heavily targeted regions include those comprising eastern and frontline oblasts, as well as Odesa oblast in the south.

The process of carrying out repairs to the damaged energy grid remains a highly complex endeavour due to harsh weather conditions and the scale of the destruction inflicted by Russian strikes. A Ukrainian energy expert noted that Ukraine lacks critical spare parts for combined heat and power plants, which Russia has deliberately targeted (as we previously forecast). Meanwhile, private energy operators have warned that the functioning parts of the energy grid are overloaded, rendering further outages inevitable. In addition, daily Russian attacks are further complicating efforts to repair infrastructure, especially as Russian drone operators have reportedly been targeting Ukrainian repair crews, further undermining restoration operations and long-term resilience.

In addition to the humanitarian impact, the significant energy disruption has had a severe effect on businesses, forcing production halts and necessitating operational adaptations that threaten business continuity. Such disruption has particularly undermined industrial output in heavily targeted areas, such as the south-eastern parts of Zaporizhzhia and Dnipropetrovsk oblasts. For instance, in Kryvyi Rih (Dnipropetrovsk) the steelmaker ArcelorMittal reported a temporary suspension of production, while Zaporizhstal in Zaporizhzhia reported similar disruption. Meanwhile, the severe disruption to energy supplies has significantly impacted the service sector, leading to widespread closures, while also threatening business continuity and promoting substantial financial losses.

The chronic strain on Ukraine’s air defence resources is likely to continue facilitating Russia’s strike campaign throughout 2026, including for the duration of the winter period. On 11 January, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky emphasised the need for Ukraine’s allies to transfer additional stockpiles of air defence missiles. His comments highlight a likely shortage of interceptors, despite recent deliveries of air defence systems by various partners (which remain insufficient to sustain Ukraine’s defences against Russia’s ongoing strike campaign). We assess that Russia will continue to leverage its expanding drone and missile production capabilities to implement a saturation strategy aimed at depleting Ukraine’s air defence capabilities. Although highly capable, most Western-provided air defence systems rely on expensive munitions. Against relatively low-cost Russian projectiles, the cost-effectiveness of these systems remains limited, with Western countries unable to resupply Ukrainian forces at scale.

• Russian threat actors pose increased data-theft risks to strategic adversarial sectors. On 12 January, international news outlets reported that the renowned Russian state-sponsored group ‘APT28’ (also known as ‘Fancy Bear’) has targeted the energy, government, military and media sectors in a large-scale data-theft cyber operation since at least February 2025. APT28 likely uses spear phishing emails to trick victims into visiting APT28-made pages that impersonate legitimate email and authentication services. These malicious pages prompt victims to input their credentials. Subsequently, APT28 uses several free services to facilitate data exfiltration, highlighting the cyber operation’s resource-efficient nature. Reportedly, the group also displays legitimate-looking PDF documents pertaining to the sector’s expertise before the phishing pages, likely to enhance the cyber operation’s legitimacy. We assess that APT28 likely uses stolen credentials to hijack user accounts in order to collect strategic intelligence and strengthen its security posture. We assess that this cyber operation will increase security and data-theft risks to the above-mentioned targeted sectors amid ongoing geopolitical hostilities.
• UK-Russia: Possible seizure of Russian shadow vessels will raise harassment risks for UK shipping. On 12 January, The Times reported that UK special forces have been notified of possible deployments to seize Russian shadow fleet vessels. UK officials have reportedly identified a legal mechanism under the Sanctions and Anti-Money Laundering Act 2018 which could allow UK military personnel to board and detain sanctioned vessels sailing without a legitimate flag. Under maritime law, stateless vessels are viable targets for seizure; The Times estimates that there are least 107 UK-sanctioned vessels sailing under false state flags. No official information has been released regarding the target, timeframe or location of a possible operation. However, UK Defence Secretary John Healey’s pledge to ‘clamp down’ on Russia’s illegal shipping network during a visit to Kyiv (Ukraine) on 9 January indicates a growing willingness to seize a tanker in coming weeks (possibly with allied support). We assess that such an intervention will highly likely reinforce Russia’s intention to target the UK with grey-zone operations in the coming months and will increase the risk of retaliatory harassment of shipping – particularly following the UK’s assistance in the US-led seizure of the Marinera tanker on 7 January

Jan 12.

• Ukraine: Widespread energy outages will undermine business operations in Kyiv in coming weeks. On 11 January, Vitaliy Klitschko, the mayor of Ukraine’s capital Kyiv, warned of the city’s deteriorating energy situation as a result of Russian long-range strikes. In particular, a large-scale strike on 9 January severely disrupted heating, electricity and water supplies across the capital. In the aftermath, the city authorities acknowledged difficulties in restoring heating and electricity in some areas, prompting Klitschko to urge residents, where possible, to evacuate temporarily to locations with alternative sources of power. Russia’s systematic strike campaign against energy and other critical infrastructure, combined with low winter temperatures, has triggered escalating energy and heating challenges nationwide, leaving Ukraine facing one of the harshest heating seasons since the start of the war. Moscow is almost certain to continue its strike campaign at the current intensity, characterised by routine daily and semi-regular high-intensity strikes. As a result, we assess that blackouts and major knock-on disruptions to business operations, including water and heating outages, are highly likely to continue over the coming month. (For more analysis of Russia’s strike campaign, (Source: Sibylline)

 

16 Jan 26. UK industry support to Ukraine supercharged with new business centre. A new business centre will open in Kyiv this year to ensure Britain’s cutting-edge defence industry and innovators can step up their work to equip Ukraine’s Armed Forces in their fight against Putin’s illegal invasion.

• A new centre for industry will help UK firms support Ukraine’s Armed Forces against Putin’s illegal invasion.
• Based in Kyiv, the centre will supercharge UK support as nations mark the first anniversary of UK-Ukraine 100-Year Partnership.
• Builds on successful existing UK-Ukraine industry partnerships including the Octopus interceptor drone.

A new business centre will open in Kyiv this year to ensure Britain’s cutting-edge defence industry and innovators can step up their work to equip Ukraine’s Armed Forces in their fight against Putin’s illegal invasion.   Backed by three years of UK Government funding, the facility will help deliver good jobs across the UK by opening up new markets for UK defence companies, especially small and medium sized businesses. On its first anniversary, it is a clear demonstration of the 100 Year Partnership in action – establishing stronger and closer defence cooperation and industrial bases.   The realities of Russia’s brutal invasion mean that travel restrictions, security, insurance requirements and suitable premises make it complicated for smaller UK companies to operate in Ukraine. The new centre will help address some of these challenges to ensure British companies of all sizes can provide Ukraine with the vital equipment they need in their fight.

Defence Secretary John Healey MP said: “An Armed Forces is only as strong as the industry that stands behind them, and our brilliant British industry and innovators are already playing a vital role in sustaining Ukraine’s courageous fight against Putin’s illegal invasion.   This new centre will supercharge that and ensure that British companies, no matter how small, can support Ukraine in the fight today and to secure the peace we hope to see tomorrow. This facility will deliver good jobs at home and bring Ukrainian and UK defence industries closer than ever while embedding the lessons from the battlefield.”

UK and Ukrainian industry and governments are already working in close partnership. The rapid production of British-built Octopus interceptor drones will begin this month, boosting Ukraine’s ability to defend itself against Russian drone attacks on civilians and critical infrastructure.   Designed to take out Russian Shaheeds and other weapons at a fraction of the cost, the UK will produce thousands of Octopus drones per month, building on the UK’s £600 million investment in Ukraine’s air defence this year, part of the Ministry of Defence’s £4.5 billion military support package.   Led by the UK Ministry of Defence’s National Armaments Director (NAD) Group, the centre is being launched on the first anniversary of the UK-Ukraine 100 Year Partnership and follows the UK’s Defence Industrial Strategy published last year. The landmark industrial strategy will drive defence as an engine for growth across the nation.   The centre demonstrates the UK delivering on the Strategic Defence Review’s ambition for UK innovation driven by lessons from Ukraine, including harnessing drones, data, and digital warfare to make our Armed Forces stronger and safer.

UK National Armaments Director Rupert Pearce said: “Economic strength and national security are inseparable. This centre will enable British companies, to partner with Ukraine and deliver the defence solutions they need now. This is the 100 Year Partnership in action – strengthening our industrial ties and proving why the UK remains Ukraine’s closest and most reliable ally.”

Expected to open later this year in secure facilities in Kyiv, the centre will provide an export and matching service to give potential companies clear information on Ukraine’s requirements so British innovators and industry can support the Armed Forces urgent warfighting needs.   With innovation cycles on the battlefield measured in days and weeks, companies will also be provided with the latest data to ensure lessons are learned and embedded to keep Ukraine ahead of the enemy.   The announcement follows a number of trade missions led by the UK Government to Ukraine to drive industrial collaboration and support Ukraine’s fight against Putin’s illegal invasion.   The Ministry of Defence is working with industry and industry bodies to establish the hub and ensure it meets the needs of the businesses who will use it. Further details will be provided in the coming weeks. (Source: https://www.gov.uk/)

 

14 Jan 26. Ukraine’s new defence minister vows innovation on battlefield.

Summary

• Zelenskiy orders fast decisions for air defence, supplies
• Ukraine extends martial law, mobilisation until May
• Fedorov pledges innovation, reforms in military structure

Ukraine’s parliament appointed young technocrat Mykhailo Fedorov as defence minister on Wednesday as the government seeks to drive innovation to strengthen the military during a difficult phase of the nearly four-year war. President Volodymyr Zelenskiy said he had ordered Fedorov, 34, to implement fast decisions to protect Ukraine’s skies, strengthen supplies to the front line and introduce other technological solutions to stop Russian advances. The Reuters Gulf Currents newsletter brings you the latest on geopolitics, energy and finance in the region. Sign up here.

“We immediately identified the first priorities for the ministry of defence. The main one is air defence,” Zelenskiy said in a post on X after meeting Fedorov.

The exhausted Ukrainian army is outmanned and outgunned on the battlefield after Russia’s invasion in February 2022. Russian forces are steadily grinding forward in the eastern Donetsk region and trying to punch through defence lines in the south and northeast. With diplomatic efforts to end the war failing to produce tangible results, Kyiv needs to strengthen its armed forces, which total around 1m personnel.

Zelenskiy said “much broader changes” were needed in the system for mobilising troops for the war.

“Decisions have already been made to ensure a more equitable distribution of personnel among combat brigades,” he said.

Parliament voted to extend martial law and mobilisation until May, the 18th time since Russia’s full-scale invasion.

NEW DEFENCE CHIEF TO DRIVE INNOVATION

Fedorov has already played an important role in shaping Ukraine’s high-tech response to Russia’s invasion in previous roles as the first deputy prime minister and digital transformation minister.

“Today, it is impossible to fight with new technologies using an old organisational structure,” Fedorov told lawmakers before the vote, promising sweeping changes.

“Our goal is to change the system: to reform the army, improve infrastructure on the front lines, eradicate lies and corruption, and make leadership and trust a new culture.”

Fedorov was instrumental in creating a “drone line” — a defensive line of drones meant to inflict maximum damage on Russian troops. He also helped improve connectivity for Ukraine’s forces at the front line by deploying Starlink terminals. Along with strengthening its defence efforts, Ukraine needs to implement big changes to stabilise the battered energy sector. Parliament appointed Denys Shmyhal, a former prime minister, as the new energy minister. Shmyhal, one of the country’s most experienced government officials, faces the dual challenge of keeping Ukraine’s lights on despite heavy Russian attacks while also cleaning up the energy sector. His predecessor was dismissed in November after anti-corruption agencies uncovered a scheme to skim $100 m from Ukraine’s state nuclear energy company. Both new ministers take up their positions weeks after a corruption scandal in the energy sector that caused Ukraine’s biggest wartime political crisis and led to widespread public anger at Zelenskiy’s government. Following that, Zelenskiy replaced several security officials and placed a popular spy chief at the centre of his administration as his chief of staff. (Source: Reuters)

 

15 Jan 26. Spain approves manufacture and delivery of Indra’s Lanza LTR-25 radar to Ukraine. Spain’s Council of Ministers approved a EUR37 m (USD43.1 m) deal with Indra Group for the manufacture and supply of one of its Lanza Long-Range Tactical Radar 25 (LTR-25) systems to Ukraine, according to a 13 January summary from the Council of Ministers. The contract includes logistical support and will run until 31 December 2026, although no delivery timeline was given by the council. The system is intended to strengthen Ukraine’s anti-aircraft capabilities. The LTR-25 is an L-band (1–2 GHz) 3D long-range air-surveillance radar system with a range of up to 240 n mile (approximately 444 km), as per Janes C4ISR & Mission Systems: Land . The radar integrates a 3D primary surveillance radar based on a pencil beam architecture. The target co-ordinates provided by the LTR-25 include target altitude (3D coverage), according to Indra. Some of the radars in the Lanza family have electronic counter-countermeasures (ECCM) capabilities, anti-clutter capabilities, digital signal and data processing, and tactical ballistic missile (TBM) detection and tracking. The LTR-25 can be transported by two trucks or one C-130 cargo aircraft. (Source: Janes)

 

13 Jan 26. US-Made Tempest Air Defense System First Spotted with Hellfire Missiles in Ukraine. Ukraine’s Air Force appears to be operating the U.S.-made Tempest, a high-mobility air defense vehicle armed with AGM-114 Hellfire missiles to counter Russian drones. Footage from the Air Force Command Center shows two Hellfires being launched at drone-like targets, though the system has not been identified. (Source: https://www.sofx.com/)

 

12 Jan 26. Britain aims to arm Ukraine with new shoot-and-scoot ballistic missile system. Standing in front of a blackened block of flats in Kyiv, Defence Secretary John Healey saw first-hand the devastation wrought by Russia’s arsenal of drones and ballistic missiles. With temperatures plunging to -20°C, Moscow has bombarded Ukrainian cities with waves of drones and missiles, targeting key infrastructure and cutting heat and light to thousands of homes. President Volodymyr Zelensky has repeatedly asked for more long-range weaponry to hit back. American Tomahawks and German Taurus cruise missiles would help, but there is no sign they are coming. Built in Britain for use in Ukraine What is though, it has emerged, is a new British-built ballistic missile. The new ground-launched, tactical ballistic missile – part of what is being called Project Nightfall – will be one of the most ambitious missile programmes the UK has seen in decades. The MOD issued an initial contract notice for this new system back in early December, setting out what it wants it to be able to do, and when it wants it delivered. It was very specific, and, interestingly, it reflects a lot of the hard lessons learned from the war in Ukraine. The contract notice calls for a “cost-effective, tactical (>500km) ballistic missile system, capable of being safely ground-launched from a mobile platform in a high-threat tactical environment, navigating to and accurately striking a user-programmed fixed target coordinate”. So essentially what the MOD is after is a missile system on the back of a truck, that can drive onto the battlefield, fire at least two missiles – known as “effectors” – 300 miles into Russian lines, and then escape within 15 minutes.

Shoot, then scoot

This so-called shoot-and-scoot way of fighting reflects the way the battlefield in Ukraine has developed over the past four years. Anything that is stationary for any period runs a high chance of being seen and targeted by Russian counter-battery fire, attack drones or loitering munitions like the Lancet. The other core requirement of this new system is the ability to resist electronic warfare (EW). Russian forces are tactically poor in lots of areas, but EW is one of their strengths. The contract notice says the new system must be “resilient in a complex electromagnetic environment (EME), including within a GNSS contested/degraded environment, and resistant against targeted EW attack and spoofing”. Before Ukraine, electronic warfare was a rather exquisite, nice-to-have capability. Four years on, GPS denial and jamming are so common that having the ability to combat electronic attack is now a non-optional, baseline expectation.

Destructive capability

In terms of payload and performance, the MOD says Nightfall’s effector must be able to “carry a high-explosive payload of around 200kg over more than 500km on a ballistic trajectory at supersonic speeds, with some basic manoeuvrability”. Defence planners say Nightfall missiles must be able to strike targets within 10 minutes of launch. That implies that it could well be used to engage time-sensitive targets such as mobile headquarters, air defence systems or logistics nodes. Russia’s most effective and frequently used short-range ballistic missile is the Iskander-M. It routinely uses them to attack both military and civilian targets. Compared to the Iskander’s 480kg payload, Nightfall’s missiles will carry less punch, but like many Western weapons, there is an emphasis on precision over sheer explosive mass. The calculation is clear that accuracy and speed will be able to offset the British missile’s lower payload weight. In fact, the MOD contract notice also specifies how accurate the Nightfall missile must be. It says it should be able to operate in a “GNSS contested/degraded environment” and must be able to hit within 10 metres of a provided target coordinate 50% of the time. The MOD is stipulating that the Nightfall missile system also needs to be upgradeable, so that its range, in-flight manoeuvrability and on-board telemetry can all be improved over time. It also wants production to be scalable to at least 10 systems a month – another indicator that these will be going onto a highly attritional battlefield.

Going to Ukraine, but what about the UK?

So is the British military also going to get its hands on this missile system in the future? For now, ministers are saying this is a short-term project, purely for Ukraine. The real benefit for Britain will be the boost in missile expertise that this project brings. Following the announcement, Defence Readiness and Industry Minister Luke Pollard said Nightfall would “keep Ukraine in the fight and give Putin another thing to worry about”. In terms of timescale, the Government is planning to award three competing contracts, each worth £9m, by March. Each team will then be expected to design and build three missiles within the next 12 months for test-firing. (Source: forces.net)

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Founded in 1987, Exensor Technology is a world leading supplier of Networked Unattended Ground Sensor (UGS) Systems providing tailored sensor solutions to customers all over the world. From our Headquarters in Lund Sweden, our centre of expertise in Network Communications at Communications Research Lab in Kalmar Sweden and our Production site outside of Basingstoke UK, we design, develop and produce latest state of the art rugged UGS solutions at the highest quality to meet the most stringent demands of our customers. Our systems are in operation and used in a wide number of Military as well as Homeland Security applications worldwide. The modular nature of the system ensures any external sensor can be integrated, providing the user with a fully meshed “silent” network capable of self-healing. Exensor Technology will continue to lead the field in UGS technology, provide our customers with excellent customer service and a bespoke package able to meet every need.

A CNIM Group Company

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Sponsored by Bertin Exensor

 

www.exensor.com

 

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12 Jan 26. The War Department Overhauls Innovation Ecosystem to Accelerate Technology to the American Warfighter. The Department of War today announced a transformative realignment of the DoW’s innovation ecosystem under the leadership of Emil Michael, the Under Secretary of Research and Engineering (USW(R&E)) and Chief Technology Officer (CTO) of the Department. This overhaul replaces a historically fragmented system with a more unified and fast-paced innovation enterprise built to deliver technology to the warfighter with greater urgency. Commercial innovation demands clarity and speed, not long delays or uncertainty. This realignment is designed to push technology to the warfighter through faster decisions and a more focused innovation enterprise. Effective today, the Defense Innovation Unit (DIU) is designated a Department of War Field Activity. DIU will continue to provide technology scouting, rapid contracting, and commercial adoption services at the speed of industry and will work closely with the Mission Engineering and Integration Activity (MEIA) to connect operational problems directly to commercial solutions. The CTO will support DIU on administrative and resource matters and align its work with Department priorities, while the Director of DIU will continue to report directly to the Secretary as a Principal Staff Assistant (PSA). Leading DIU through this mandate is Owen West, appointed by Secretary Hegseth as its next Director.  Serving as Assistant Secretary of War for Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict in President Trump’s first administration, West brings Marine Corps combat experience, private capital expertise and a warfighter’s mindset to DIU’s mission of moving commercial technology into the hands of the American warfighter. The Strategic Capabilities Office (SCO) is also being designated a Department of War Field Activity. SCO will continue to identify and prototype disruptive applications of new systems, unconventional uses of existing systems, and near-term technologies that create strategic effects. SCO will maintain its statutory reporting relationship to the Deputy Secretary but will be operationally aligned under the CTO to eliminate duplication and drive daily focus on delivering near-term capabilities. DIU and SCO will both adopt term-limited appointments to maintain organizational agility and bring in top talent from the private sector and the operational force, ensuring a consistent flow of fresh ideas and technical insight. Alongside this realignment, Cameron Stanley has been named as the new Chief Digital and Artificial Intelligence Officer (CDAO). Stanley will drive Department-wide AI adoption across warfighting, intelligence, and enterprise use cases to deliver on President Trump’s mandate of American AI dominance.

These changes anchor a unified innovation ecosystem built around six execution organizations that will operate under the purview of the CTO:

• Chief Digital and Artificial Intelligence Office (CDAO)
• Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA)
• Defense Innovation Unit (DIU)
• Office of Strategic Capital (OSC)
• Strategic Capabilities Office (SCO)
• Test Resource Management Center (TRMC)

The newly established CTO Action Group (CAG) will anchor innovation alignment across the Department, driving accountability, clearing legacy blockers and ensuring transparency on transition decisions. In support of the CAG, the Military Services will reorganize their innovation ecosystems and present Service Innovation Plans that describe how they will focus the efforts of labs, research enterprises, experimental units and rapid capability offices around the three innovation outcomes of technology, product and operational capability innovation. These plans will also identify how acquisition portfolios will onramp innovation and what policy or legislative barriers require action. Services are valuable contributors to this ecosystem, not bystanders.

“We are rolling out the red carpet for innovators who want to work with the War Department,” said Emil Michael, Under Secretary of War for Research and Engineering. “This new structure creates a stronger identity for our innovation ecosystem and gives industry a more direct path to move technology into the hands of the American warfighter.”

This realignment is a direct signal to industry that the War Department is focused on making faster decisions and transitioning breakthrough technology into the hands of America’s bravest warriors. Read the official Innovation Ecosystem Memo here: chrome-extension://efaidnbmnnnibpcajpcglclefindmkaj/https://media.defense.gov/2026/Jan/12/2003855657/-1/-1/0/TRANSFORMING-THE-DEFENSE-INNOVATION-ECOSYSTEM-TO-ACCELERATE-WARFIGHTING-ADVANTAGE.PDF (Source: U.S. DoD)

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Founded in 1987, Exensor Technology is a world leading supplier of Networked Unattended Ground Sensor (UGS) Systems providing tailored sensor solutions to customers all over the world. From our Headquarters in Lund Sweden, our centre of expertise in Network Communications at Communications Research Lab in Kalmar Sweden and our Production site outside of Basingstoke UK, we design, develop and produce latest state of the art rugged UGS solutions at the highest quality to meet the most stringent demands of our customers. Our systems are in operation and used in a wide number of Military as well as Homeland Security applications worldwide. The modular nature of the system ensures any external sensor can be integrated, providing the user with a fully meshed “silent” network capable of self-healing. Exensor Technology will continue to lead the field in UGS technology, provide our customers with excellent customer service and a bespoke package able to meet every need.

A CNIM Group Company

——————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————–

Sponsored by Bertin Exensor

 

www.exensor.com

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15 Jan 26. UK MoD faces budget constraints, defence chief warns.  The UK’s most senior military officer has admitted that the Ministry of Defence (MoD) will struggle to deliver all the current programmes and the desired capabilities set out in the Strategic Defence Review under planned budgets.  Air Chief Marshal Sir Richard Knighton, Chief of the Defence Staff, appeared before a session at the House of Commons Defence Committee, where he said that “we can’t do everything we would want to do” in the current budgetary context. The head of the military declined to comment on when the overdue Defence Industrial Plan would be released, which sets out where the money will go, or on a widely reported GBP28 billion shortfall in defence spending.  In other news, Poland and the UK have agreed to increase collaboration on air defence following Russian drone incursions into the former’s airspace in September. Personnel from the two countries will undergo joint training in “virtual environments”, with some Polish personnel travelling to the UK under a UK-led NATO programme designed to bolster air and missile defence. (Source: Clarion)

 

13 Jan 26. UK and Poland agree enhanced missile defence and helicopter training cooperation. The UK and Poland’s ability to shoot down air and missile threats will be strengthened by deepened cooperation between the two countries.

• UK and Poland to enhance joint training to improve both countries’ ability to shoot down air and missile threats.
• Polish helicopter pilots and instructors to begin training in the UK this summer as part of deepening cooperation.
• Agreement comes as Prime Minister Sir Keir Starmer welcomes Polish President Karol Nawrocki to Downing Street.

The UK and Poland’s ability to shoot down air and missile threats will be strengthened by deepened cooperation between the two countries. The allies have agreed to explore the development and procurement of new capabilities to counter a range of air threats, as well as how to encourage the establishment of new manufacturing capacity in Europe. Under the agreement, the British and Polish militaries will train together in virtual environments to improve air defence coordination without the cost and danger of live exercises. The enhanced training will boost Euro-Atlantic security and will be delivered as part of the UK-led NATO initiative known as Delivering Integrated Air and Missile Operational Networked Defences (DIAMOND). The UK and Poland also agreed at today’s meeting in Downing Street between Prime Minister Keir Starmer and Polish President Karol Nawrocki to enhance their helicopter training cooperation. From this summer, the first of eight Polish military helicopter pilots will begin training in the UK under the NATO Flight Training Europe (NFTE) programme. They will be joined by two experienced Polish helicopter instructors who will be permanently stationed in RAF Shawbury for a full rotational tour.   The pilots will undertake world-class helicopter training at RAF Shawbury, including advanced training to prepare them for their future roles flying attack helicopters.

Defence Secretary John Healey MP said: “The UK and Poland’s defence relationship has never been stronger. Standing strong on NATO’s eastern flank, Poland is a crucial ally for the UK in this era of rising threats. This new cooperation we have announced today will see more joint training and integration between our two militaries. It is another example of how the UK and Poland are stepping up to defend Europe and face down the threat from Putin. It comes as the UK defence budget is rising to record levels, with the biggest boost to defence spending since the Cold War, totalling £270bn this parliament alone. Poland is one of the UK’s strongest allies with over 350 British personnel currently deployed across Poland, and with British and Polish pilots flying together as part of NATO’s Eastern Sentry mission to protect Polish and NATO airspace.” UK-Polish defence industrial collaboration is deepening rapidly – worth around £8bn to the UK over the past three years, showcasing how defence is an engine for growth. (Source: https://www.gov.uk/)

 

11 Jan 26. 3,000 jobs at risk unless MoD signs helicopter order, sources say. Skilled workers at Leonardo Helicopters fear it will close Yeovil site if Ministry of Defence delays awarding contract. The UK’s last military helicopter factory must land a long-awaited order from the Ministry of Defence within the coming weeks to secure about 3,000 manufacturing jobs, industry sources suggest. Skilled workers at Leonardo Helicopters – the Italian owner of the former Westland factory in Yeovil, Somerset – fear the company will follow through on threats to close the facility at the end of March, if the UK military fails to place an order for new helicopters by that time. Leonardo was the only bidder for the UK’s £1bn “new medium helicopter” contract that was launched in February 2024, but delays in awarding the deal seem to have put the future of the factory at risk. The bid’s “best and final offer” expires in March. One source close to the process suggested the company needed to be told it had been awarded the deal by January if it was to meet the contract’s various deadlines. A delay until after March risks having to restart the whole process, as the price is dependent on Leonardo’s supply chain. “It’s critical at the moment,” the source said. In November, Leonardo’s chief executive, Roberto Cingolani, told investors he was negotiating with the MoD to try “to boost the collaboration with the UK government”, while in December he wrote to the defence secretary, John Healey, and threatened to scrap all investment in Britain, in a letter first reported by the Daily Telegraph. Cingolani described the new medium helicopter contract as “a cornerstone” of Leonardo’s UK strategy and added: “Any delay or cancellation in the programme award … would force a reevaluation of Leonardo’s UK presence, including investment in electronics and cyber security divisions.” The process has stalled despite ministers pledging to boost defence spending in light of the increased threat from Russia. The defence industry has become frustrated by the wait for the government’s promised defence investment plan, which was expected before Christmas. Sharon Graham, the general secretary of the Unite union, said: “Leonardo workers in Yeovil are looking over their shoulders wondering where the next order will come from while the government dithers and delays. This uncertainty must end by confirming the order for medium-lift helicopters.” (Source: Google/Guardian)

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Founded in 1987, Exensor Technology is a world leading supplier of Networked Unattended Ground Sensor (UGS) Systems providing tailored sensor solutions to customers all over the world. From our Headquarters in Lund Sweden, our centre of expertise in Network Communications at Communications Research Lab in Kalmar Sweden and our Production site outside of Basingstoke UK, we design, develop and produce latest state of the art rugged UGS solutions at the highest quality to meet the most stringent demands of our customers. Our systems are in operation and used in a wide number of Military as well as Homeland Security applications worldwide. The modular nature of the system ensures any external sensor can be integrated, providing the user with a fully meshed “silent” network capable of self-healing. Exensor Technology will continue to lead the field in UGS technology, provide our customers with excellent customer service and a bespoke package able to meet every need.

A CNIM Group Company

————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————-

Sponsored by Bertin Exensor

 

www.exensor.com

 

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09 Jan 26. Mexico-US: US president threatens strikes on cartel positions in Mexico, escalating regional tensions. On 8 January, US President Donald Trump stated that the US will soon strike drug cartel organisations on land and suggested that ‘cartels are running Mexico’. We assess that US unilateral military action in Mexico – or any other country in Latin America and the Caribbean region – is highly unlikely in the short-to-medium term. However, there is a realistic possibility that Mexican President Claudia Sheinbaum will request US military assistance. Such action would likely come in the form of targeted strikes on cartel positions at the direction of the Mexican authorities, or as co-operation between US special forces and Mexican security forces in joint missions. These operations would likely take place in cartel stronghold territories and fentanyl-producing states, such as Michoacán, Sinaloa and Sonora. Furthermore, we continue to assess that security co-operation between Mexico and the US will highly likely escalate in the coming weeks and months. Mexico will likely increase intelligence sharing, extradition of cartel leaders and requests for US surveillance drone and/or spy plane flyovers of cartel territory in Mexico. In response to increasing bilateral security co-operation, cartels will likely increase attacks on the Mexican security forces and erect ‘narcobloqueos’ (roadblocks), increasing physical security and supply chain risks. (Source: Sibylline)

 

07 Jan 26. Pakistan-Bangladesh: Potential defence pact will increase bilateral ties. On 6 January, the head of the Bangladesh Air Force, Air Chief Marshal Hasan Mahmood Khan, held talks with Pakistan’s Chief of Air Staff, Air Chief Marshal Zaheer Ahmed Baber Sidhu in the Pakistani capital Islamabad. The talks reportedly focused on a potential defence pact and Pakistan’s sale of JF-17 fighter jets to Bangladesh. Pakistan also assured Bangladesh of the ‘fast-tracked delivery’ of PAC MFI-17 Super Mushshak trainer aircraft as well as ‘a complete training and long-term support ecosystem’. The defence talks come after the resumption of direct trade and improving ties between Dhaka and Islamabad since the ousting of former prime minister Sheikh Hasina. The talks also follow Pakistan’s efforts to capitalise on the perceived successes of its air force in the recent conflict with India in May 2025 and to expand weapons sales to other countries. We assess that the potential pact will further promote ties between Pakistan and Bangladesh. Additionally, there is a realistic possibility of the pact worsening already-strained ties between India and Bangladesh. (Source: Sibylline)

 

07 Jan 26. South Sudan: Conflict with opposition forces is likely to escalate, driving collateral risks to NGOs. On 5 January, government officials confirmed that over 60,000 people have been displaced following the capture of Yuai and Waat (both Jonglei state) by Sudan People’s Liberation Army-in-Opposition (SPLA-IO) forces in recent weeks. Those displaced have largely congregated in Duk county (Jonglei) and Mingkaman (Lakes state), straining resources in these areas. The developments come a day after the SPLA-IO’s acting chief of general staff announced a renewed military offensive against government forces and an intention to push towards the capital Juba. Government operations against SPLA-IO forces over recent months will likely undercut the SPLA-IO’s capacity to fully mobilise loyal elements. However, the call will increase the risk of clashes between the SPLA-IO and government forces across the country. Government forces will likely conduct air strikes on SPLA-IO positions, driving collateral risks to civilian settlements and NGO staff nearby. Persistent conflict over the coming weeks will drive further displacement, increasing the risk of intercommunal violence in host communities and increasing demand for aid. This will, in turn, drive NGO exposure to violent crime and extortion. (Source: Sibylline)

 

05 Jan 26. Somalia-Israel: Somaliland recognition will likely compound regional tensions, sanctions risk. On 6 January, Israel’s foreign minister met with Somaliland’s president in the breakaway region’s capital Hargeisa. Israel recognised Somaliland’s independence on 26 December 2025, triggering significant diplomatic backlash from Somalia and the African Union (AU). The AU condemned Israel’s recognition of Somaliland’s independence, underscoring rising regional tensions. In the coming weeks, the AU will possibly vote to withdraw Israel’s observer accreditation formally, which was suspended in February 2023. Such a move would almost certainly undermine Israel’s long-standing efforts to develop economic and military co-operation frameworks with the AU. The AU will also possibly move to impose limited and targeted sanctions against Israel, including travel bans, asset freezes and trade restrictions (though implementation will be decided by individual member states). Even so, there remains a possibility that Ethiopia will move to recognise Somaliland’s independence in the coming weeks, in line with a 2024 memorandum of understanding between Addis Ababa and Hargeisa (see Sibylline Situation Update Brief – 12 January 2024). Although such an agreement would grant Ethiopia preferential access to port facilities in Berbera (Somaliland), it would almost certainly exacerbate tensions with Somalia and undercut their bilateral security co-operation. (Source: Sibylline)

 

05 Jan 26. Russia: Recent official appointments in Chechen Republic underscore efforts to consolidate power. On 5 January, Ramzan Kadyrov, head of the Republic of Chechnya in Russia’s North Caucasus, appointed his son Akhmat Kadyrov as acting deputy prime minister of the autonomous republic. Akhmed Dudayev, Chechnya’s minister for national policy, external relations press and information, was also named as acting deputy prime minister. Over the past two years, Kadyrov has also appointed Akhmat’s younger brother, Adam, to several official roles. This latest move follows reports that Ramzan Kadyrov was urgently hospitalised in December 2025. Speculation about his health has persisted for over a year, raising questions about succession in Chechnya. We assess that the appointment of Akhmat Kadyrov, alongside other relatives and close associates, is highly likely to consolidate the clan’s grip on power and prevent renewed instability. Meanwhile, the Kadyrov family will almost certainly continue to enjoy full Kremlin backing, as maintaining stability in Chechnya and the wider region remains a top priority for Moscow, particularly amid its ongoing war in Ukraine. (Source: Sibylline)

 

06 Jan 26. Cambodia-Thailand: Risk of border escalation remains despite ceasefire. Earlier on 6 January, the Thai military accused Cambodia of firing mortar rounds into Ubon Ratchathani province (Thailand), violating a 10-day-old truce. Later on the same day, the military claimed that Cambodia had explained the incident as an ‘operational error’, with ‘no intention’ to fire into Thailand. One Thai soldier was wounded by shrapnel in the incident. Also on 6 January, Cambodia claimed that a ‘garbage pile explosion’ injured two soldiers in Preah Vihear province (Cambodia; near the border with Ubon Ratchathani province). The Thai military has warned that it may retaliate if a similar incident occurs again. This follows a new ceasefire agreement signed on 27 December 2025, whereby both sides have accepted to freeze troop movements and to co-operate in demining border areas. However, we assess that a limited border conflict will possibly resume, as troops and heavy weaponry remain deployed along the border. Bilateral tensions will likely persist; major progress in border demarcation efforts is highly unlikely before Thailand’s general elections on 8 February. Thai Prime Minister Anutin Charnvirakul has claimed that formal meetings regarding border demarcation cannot proceed under the caretaker government. (Source: Sibylline)

 

05 Jan 26. US-Latin America and Caribbean region: Further US military operations are unlikely in near term. On 4 January, US President Donald Trump suggested that the US could take action against other countries after the US military conducted several airstrikes in Venezuela and captured Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro and his wife. Trump specifically threatened Colombia’s President Gustavo Petro, described Cuba as ‘ready to fall’ and reasserted his desire to take control of Greenland (autonomous territory of Denmark). On the same day, congressional Democrats stated that they had still received no information from the Trump administration regarding the operation in Venezuela. In the short term, the Trump administration will likely increase its assertive rhetoric towards Latin American governments that are perceived to support Venezuela or other states considered to be adversarial (such as China and Iran) or heavily involved in drug trafficking (such as Colombia, Cuba and Mexico). Despite threats of military action, we assess that further unilateral US military operations in the region remain unlikely in the immediate term; punitive economic measures and sanctions are more likely. Furthermore, supervision quality risks will increase as the Trump administration allegedly circumvented Congress to conduct the operation in Venezuela. The administration is likely to come under elevated congressional scrutiny in the coming weeks amid concerns that proper checks and balances are being eroded. (Source: Sibylline)

 

05 Jan 26. Region-US: Condemnation of US military action in Venezuela will increase regional tensions. On 4 January, the presidents of Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Cuba and Mexico all criticised the US’ operation to capture Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro, calling for diplomacy rather than military action. We assess that, although this will moderately increase regional tensions in the short-to-medium term, further US sanctions or tariffs against these countries are unlikely in the immediate term. Meanwhile, also on 4 January, protesters against the US’ military action demonstrated outside the US Embassy in the Costa Rican capital San José. Domestic unrest risks outside US embassies across the region and targeted activism towards firms perceived to aid the US military will increase in the near term. Lastly, a leaked Colombian intelligence report suggests that commanders of the National Liberation Army (ELN) and dissident Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC-D) guerrilla groups in Venezuela may relocate to Colombia due to the possible loss of Venezuelan state protection. We assess that any significant migration of non-state armed groups into Colombia will increase the risk of armed clashes and attacks in the short-to-medium term. (Source: Sibylline)

 

05 Jan 26.  North Korea: Hypersonic missile launches will sustain regional tensions. On 4 January, North Korea reportedly fired at least two hypersonic missiles from the capital Pyongyang’s Ryokpo district, landing approximately 621 miles (1,000km) away in the Sea of Japan. The South Korean authorities have assessed that these could be the Hwasong-11Ma, a short-range ballistic missile equipped with a hypersonic glide vehicle (HGV) warhead. Fully working HGVs could make missile trajectory prediction difficult for Seoul. The missiles were fired following North Korea’s denunciation of the US detention of Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro, with leader Kim Jong-un stressing the need to uphold its nuclear deterrent amid international instability. The launch preceded South Korean President Lee Jae-myung’s state visit to China, also on 4 January. We assess that Lee is highly likely to push China (a historical ally of North Korea) to help advance denuclearisation talks. Given Pyongyang’s strong distrust of Washington DC, there is a remote chance that the North Korean authorities will abandon their nuclear programmes. We also assess that China is highly unlikely to push for such an outcome, as it regards North Korea as a strategic buffer against the US’ presence in South Korea. (Source: Sibylline)

 

05 Jan 26. Burkina Faso: Alleged coup plot will likely trigger military purges, reducing security forces’ capacity. On 3 January, the authorities allegedly disrupted a plot to oust the interim president, Ibrahim Traoré, in a military coup. Although the military government has yet to comment officially, allegations of a coup plot triggered a pro-junta demonstration in the capital Ouagadougo on 4 January. Although the protest remained peaceful, official statements relating to the alleged plot will possibly trigger further pro-government demonstrations in the coming days, disrupting cross-city transit. Pro-junta media outlets will also likely attempt to link the coup plot to foreign powers, particularly Cote d’Ivoire and France, increasing risks of hostility to foreign investment and harassment for foreign nationals. Regional media reports indicate that the authorities have arrested several military officials in relation to the plot. In the coming months, the junta will highly likely continue purging high-ranking security force personnel to reduce the risk of a successful coup. While these measures will possibly moderate threats to government stability in the short term, they will also likely undermine the security forces’ capacity to counter ongoing insurgencies of regional al-Qaeda and Islamic State (IS) affiliates, sustaining attack risks. (Source: Sibylline)

 

05 Jan 26. Venezuela-US: US airstrikes, military operation in Venezuela will elevate government stability risks. On 3 January, the US military conducted a series of airstrikes and a special forces operation in Venezuela, capturing Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro and his wife, Cilia Flores (see Sibylline Special Report – 4 January 2025). Following the operation, US President Donald Trump claimed that the US would ‘run’ Venezuela on a temporary basis, likely in tandem with Venezuelan Vice (now acting) President Delcy Rodríguez. In response, Rodríguez published a statement calling for co-operation with the US. We assess that further US military action in Venezuela is unlikely in the coming days. However, this risk will increase in the coming weeks and months if the Trump administration and Rodríguez are unable to co-operate. Meanwhile, we assess that, with Maduro removed from power, the Venezuelan regime will be vulnerable to a coup d’état in the coming days and weeks, increasing the risk of armed clashes, as well as government stability risks. Furthermore, domestic unrest, societal upheaval and repression risks will remain elevated in the near term, with the Venezuelan opposition likely to call for demonstrations while the Rodríguez-led regime attempts to consolidate its position. (Source: Sibylline)

 

05 Jan 26. The US Commits to Venezuela’s Transition. Can it Succeed? The decision by the US President Donald Trump to carry out military strikes inside Venezuela and extract President Nicolás Maduro and his wife Cilia Flores marks a pivotal moment in Washington’s posture toward Latin America, one that abandons longstanding restraint in favour of a more overt and assertive projection of power on behalf of American national security. The execution of precision hits on at least five military bases signals that the administration is no longer treating the region as a peripheral security concern, but as a theatre of direct confrontation. Yet running the country’s transition is a job that very few will want, as many questions remain unresolved. First, does the US bombing and extraction operation risk triggering unintended escalation? The remaining government in Caracas is unlikely to acquiesce quietly. It is still very early days, too early to decipher what President Trump meant while saying that the US will run Venezuela until a new government is installed. ‘We are going to run the country, until we can do a safe, proper and judicious transition,’ Trump argued from a news conference in Mar-a-Lago, Florida. Yet, the local armed forces, paramilitary actors and criminal networks could intensify defensive operations and build up resistance hotspots, particularly along border zones with neighbouring Colombia, Guyana and Brazil, transforming the Caribbean and Amazonian frontiers into contested spaces to any outside actor, including the US.

In fact, it is likely that the ‘US running the country’ expression is meant to be directed at Venezuela’s leaders as a form of warning more than anything else: the US is now fully committing to drive change in Venezuela, and they better accept – and cooperate with – an approaching transition.

Second, is the legal justification on the entirety of the military build-up and the extraction of Maduro now more certain? While Washington frames its 3 January operation and the almost five months of boat strikes in the Caribbean Sea as part of a counternarcotics mission, critics have questioned the lack of transparency in both intelligence evidence, civilian oversight and command authorisation, raising doubts about compliance with international law and rules-of-engagement norms. The absence of clear communication from the Department of State risks eroding trust and reinforcing perceptions of unilateralism, an issue that has historically strained US-Latin American relations.

Third, how is this operation likely to reverberate throughout the hemisphere? Many regional governments and civil society actors view the strikes as a reversion to interventionist doctrine. This perception may energise anti-US narratives, strengthen extra-hemispheric alignments with powers such as China and Russia and complicate the very regional cooperation Washington claims to seek. The 2025 US National Security Strategy (NSS) presents the Western Hemisphere as the United States’ primary strategic arena, anchored in what the administration terms a new ‘Trump Corollary’ to the Monroe Doctrine. At first glance, the NSS appeared to mark a major strategic reset, rhetorically elevating hemispheric sovereignty, migration control and anti-narcotics operations as core national security imperatives.

But beneath this ideological rebranding lies a substantial continuity: for years, US engagement with Latin America and the Caribbean has been driven less by Washington as a whole than by the expanding remit of the US Southern Command, whose defence diplomacy, security cooperation and operational partnerships have already positioned the region as a quiet but persistent strategic priority. The question, then, is whether the strategy signals a genuine strategic shift, or simply a refresh of long-standing military-led engagement, repackaged in a more assertive doctrinal frame which now includes steering Venezuela towards re-democratisation, 27 years after the coming to power of Hugo Chávez, the man who gave the Venezuelan Presidency to Nicolás Maduro in 2013.

Hemispheric Security Under America First

The America First policy under President Trump represents a recalibration of US foreign policy toward transactional alliances and a heightened emphasis on measures to achieve strategic homeland security. Within this paradigm, Trump’s administration sees Venezuela not only as a source of regional instability but as a direct challenge to US influence in the Western Hemisphere. Venezuela’s significance under America First is, however, intricate and multi-layered. First, the country is framed as a hub of transnational crime and narcotics trafficking, which is presented as directly affecting US domestic security. Second, the regime is portrayed as a proxy for extra-hemispheric adversaries, particularly Russia and Cuba, whose presence undermines US geopolitical leverage in Latin America. Consequently, kinetic measures such as strikes on strategic targets and maritime interdiction operations are consistent with the America First doctrine: they are intended to project power unilaterally, degrade Venezuela’s operational capacity and signal resolve without requiring broad international sanction or support. Domestically, the strikes have occurred in an increasingly polarised US political environment. President Trump’s decision enjoys strong backing among his conservative base, which views decisive military action in the hemisphere as a demonstration of restored American strength and deterrence. According to a Harvard-Harris Poll conducted in early December, 64% of Americans believed Maduro had to be removed from office. On the other hand, a CBS survey from late November found that most Americans opposed military action and instead wanted the administration to explain what the US intends regarding Venezuela. Yet in Congress, reactions are mixed. Republican leadership has largely rallied behind the Trump administration, framing the intervention as a necessary stand against transnational crime and ‘narco-authoritarianism.’ Democrats, by contrast, have raised alarms over the absence of congressional authorisation, potential civilian harm and the risk of entangling the US in another open-ended regional conflict. The result is a fragmented political consensus, one that may limit the administration’s room to manoeuvre diplomatically even as it asserts military resolve abroad.

During 2025, Trump took an unambiguous turn toward kinetic measures in multiple theatres. In the Middle East, the US conducted airstrikes on nuclear facilities inside Iran, targeting key enrichment sites such as Fordow, Natanz and a facility near Isfahan. In the Red Sea region, the US launched a major campaign, codenamed Operation Rough Rider, of air and naval strikes against the Houthi rebels in Yemen with the objective of stopping attacks on shipping lanes. Washington has framed these operations as part of a broader approach of forward defence, arguing that there is no need for formal congressional declarations of war in certain contexts, especially when targeting groups he defines as ‘narco-terrorists.’ At the same time, he has proposed a sweeping upgrade in US defence posture, including intensified intelligence operations, special-operations deployments and significant force buildups in both the Caribbean region and overseas. The result is a more assertive, multi-front approach that sees US threats ranging from non-state actors to state adversaries, all while reducing formal legal barriers for unilateral action. In that sense, Operation Absolute Resolve, that took Maduro, was framed by President Trump as a joint military and law enforcement raid at the request of the Department of Justice.

How Do the Strikes Affect What’s Left in Venezuela?

The joint military and law enforcement raid inside Venezuela exerted decisive pressure against the remaining Maduristas left behind: former Vice President and now interim President Delcy Rodriguez; Minister of Defence Vladimir Padrino and Minister of Interior Diosdado Cabello. Yet its effectiveness is not guaranteed. Tactically, the strikes degraded the regime’s immediate capabilities: the reported destruction and damage to military bases, air assets, fuel depots, radar sites and logistics hubs that the Venezuelan military uses to project power and sustain operations. This raises the material cost of continued resistance and complicates day‑to‑day operations and resupply. At the operational level, the strikes weakened command‑and‑control, disrupted lines of communication and denied safe havens, thereby raising the risk and cost for regime security units and allied militias to operate freely. The coercive air and land strikes could increase incentives for defections among lower‑level officers or transactional elites who fear being cut off from Maduro’s old patronage networks. Politically, the strikes eroded the regime’s aura of invulnerability, a necessary condition if the US hopes to catalyse elite bargaining and have Rodriguez, Padrino and Cabello leaving power. Trump warned them in Saturday’s press conference: ‘Political figures in Venezuela should understand what happened to Maduro can happen to them,’ he said.

However, military pressure on Venezuela can just as easily produce the opposite: a ‘rally‑’round‑the‑flag’ effect, hardened regime repression, a push toward external patrons (Russia, Iran and China) and a nationalist backlash that complicates efforts to induce defections. Recent reporting shows Caracas seeking external assistance, illustrating that strikes can drive external entanglement. Kinetic action without clear end‑states (Trump even argued from Mar-a-Lago that the US was ready to stage a second, much bigger wave of attacks if needed) and parallel political/diplomatic tracks risks delegitimising US moves, empowering regime propaganda and producing long‑term instability to Venezuela.

Right now, Trump’s NSS and broader posture are widely read as trying to reshape the region’s politics, supporting like-minded governments and punishing others. However, to turn that around the US would need to signal that alignment is not contingent on ideological affinity, but on shared interests. Transnational crime stemming out of Venezuela is a shared interest, even if disagreements persist.

What Happens Next?

The US approach to securing regional cooperation frames collaboration in terms of shared security imperatives (counternarcotics, maritime interdiction and anti-smuggling operations) rather than direct combat involvement with regional countries. But how will the US stress respect for sovereignty and multilateral consultation considering the strikes? These attacks were more than an escalation of force; they are a potential inflection point in how the US engages with Latin America. Whether it leads to greater stability, or a cycle of renewed distrust will depend on Washington’s ability to complement military posture with diplomacy, humility and long-term institutional partnership.

Many Latin American governments, either from the left or the right, will try to preserve their autonomy by balancing between great powers, not by aligning wholly with one side. For them, engaging with China (or other powers) may be a way to strengthen bargaining leverage, extract better deals and avoid over-reliance on the US. This considering the recently released Chinese strategic paper for Latin America and the Caribbean, where Beijing ‘pledges aid’ to the region with little-to-no political conditions attached.

As well, if President Trump can turn US investments in the oil industry in Venezuela, as he mentioned during his press conference at Mar-a-Lago, into a cash return for the American people, then his base will certainly approve of such methods. But getting a return from Venezuela’s deeply shattered and malfunctioning oil economy is still a big bet in the short term. Trump claimed a US administration of Venezuela would take wealth from under the ground, with benefits going to the Venezuelan people and to the ‘US as reimbursement from damages’ inflicted against them. Yet to do this, the US would need to allow both American and international firms to revamp the oil sector, put untapped resources into existing installations and relocate many engineers and technicians to Venezuela, which is currently a no-travel zone for many Western countries. Issues of criminality, poverty and infrastructure will also need quick fixing for Venezuela to be attractive; all while managing a safe passage for the re-democratisation of the country to support the rule of law and the running of its economy. Looking ahead, Venezuela hangs in delicate balance. Should the current scenario precipitate the regime’s full capitulation, whether through internal fractures from within, elite defections, or sustained external pressure, the path to democratic transition will be fraught with uncertainty. The opposition, though politically re-energised around the Nobel Peace Prize awardee María Corina Machado, remains mostly abroad and lacks institutional depth after years of repression and separation from politics. The short-term scenario requires robust negotiation to prevent a lengthy power vacuum where the Maduristas keep running the country. For the US and regional countries, the challenge will lie not in engineering regime change, but in supporting a legitimate, inclusive process that restores governance in Caracas, rebuilds the economy across Venezuela and avoids reproducing the cycle of dependency and mistrust that has long plagued the country’s developmental fruition.

 

08 Jan 26. “Chinese air power in particular poses a fundamentally different level of threat to traditional US dominance in the air domain than it did in 2020…The growth in Chinese air power and ground-based and maritime IADS [integrated air and defence systems] capabilities has already had a transformative effect on US military freedom of action in and around the first island chain during any potential conflict, compared to 2020.” This is according to The Evolution of Russian and Chinese Air Power Threats by Dr Justin Bronk, which examines how Russian and Chinese airpower capabilities have advanced since 2020. It concludes that while Russia remains a serious and increasingly capable threat in Europe, China’s rapid and integrated expansion of air, missile, sensor and networked warfare capabilities has fundamentally altered the balance of power in the Indo-Pacific, particularly within the First Island Chain. The research finds that since 2020, the People’s Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF) and Navy Air Force (PLANAF) have expanded their inventories of advanced fourth and fifth-generation fighters at astonishing speed, while simultaneously fielding long-range air-to-air missiles, modern airborne early warning and control (AEW&C) aircraft, electronic warfare platforms and dense ground-based and maritime air defence systems. Together, these capabilities have already constrained how US and allied air forces could operate in and around Taiwan, Japan and the wider First Island Chain in any high-intensity conflict. By late 2025, China is assessed to have 320–350 J-20 fifth-generation fighters in service, with production rates reaching around 120 aircraft per year, alongside roughly 450 J-16 multirole fighters. These aircraft are armed with missiles that significantly outrange Western equivalents and are supported by an expanding sensor network that includes around 50 KJ-500 AEW&C aircraft, advanced electronic attack platforms and rapidly growing satellite-based ISR (Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance) capabilities. The report says Western aircraft operating inside the First Island Chain would be doing so in contested airspace and at the long end of tanker, basing and electromagnetic chains. As a result, it says previous assumptions of Western air superiority in the Indo-Pacific can no longer be taken for granted.

Key Findings

• China has already reshaped the airpower balance inside the First Island Chain. The report says: “The growth in Chinese air power and ground-based and maritime IADS capabilities has already had a transformative effect on US military freedom of action in and around the first island chain during any potential conflict, compared to 2020.”
• China can threaten key US air and naval enablers at very long range. “The PLA now fields a range of capabilities that can threaten US Air Force aerial refuelling tankers, US Navy carrier groups and forward air bases at 1000 km or more.”
• Chinese fighters enjoy a decisive advantage in air-to-air missile range. “The PLAAF fields at least two air-to-air missiles in frontline service that significantly out-range not just Russian but also American and European equivalents.”
• Western aircraft flying close to China face an operational disadvantage. “Where US or other Allied aircraft can penetrate airspace contested by Chinese forces during a major clash, these aircraft will probably be operating at the end of long and contested tanker, basing and electromagnetic enablement chains.”

Key Recommendations

• Western planners must abandon assumptions of guaranteed air superiority in the Indo-Pacific. “Current Chinese capability growth is sufficiently impressive and rapid that the traditional Western airpower edge is no longer guaranteed.”
• Allied forces should plan for limited, temporary windows of air superiority. “US-led Western forces may still be able to win localised and temporary windows of air superiority in a potential conflict.”
• Investment must prioritise countering long-range Chinese kill chains. “The PLA now fields a range of capabilities that can threaten US Air Force aerial refuelling tankers, US Navy carrier groups and forward air bases at 1000 km or more.”
• Airpower planning must account for the scale and pace of Chinese force generation. “Production rates for the upgraded and technologically mature J-20A (and two-seat J-20S) have reportedly reached around 120 aircraft per year.”

Conclusion

The report concludes that Western dependence on air superiority has increased at precisely the moment when achieving it has become more difficult. In Europe, Russia’s airpower has adapted through hard-won combat experience in Ukraine and now poses a more capable and coordinated threat than it did before 2022. However, these changes are incremental. In the Indo-Pacific the situation is fundamentally different. China’s airpower growth represents a structural and different scale of challenge. The combination of long-range missiles, dense air defences, fifth-generation fighters and powerful sensor networks means that US and allied forces would face sustained pressure throughout the First Island Chain from the opening stages of any conflict. While Western forces may still be able to create temporary windows of air superiority through superior training, fifth-generation platforms and advanced munitions, the report warns that China’s pace of capability development is eroding the margin for error. The traditional Western airpower advantage can no longer be assumed. The Evolution of Russian and Chinese Air Power Threats is written by Dr Justin Bronk, Senior Research Fellow for Airpower and Technology at the Royal United Services Institute (RUSI). His research focuses on combat airpower, military technology and the evolving capabilities of Russia and China. The report draws on interviews conducted during 2024–2025 at fighter weapons schools in the UK, US and Australia, research visits to air force units and defence ministries across Europe and the Indo-Pacific, and extensive analysis of open-source data. For more information and media inquiries please email

 

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Military And Security Developments

Jan 09.

• Syria: Ceasefire between government, Kurdish forces will remain highly fragile in coming hours. Earlier on 9 January, the Syrian defence ministry announced a unilateral ceasefire in Aleppo (Aleppo governorate), following days of major clashes with the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) in the city’s Kurdish-majority districts, which remain surrounded by the government forces. The ministry announced that it will permit ethnic-Kurdish armed groups to leave the districts during the ceasefire. The ceasefire will allow ethnic-Kurdish militants to carry their personal weapons and will provide them with an escort to the SDF’s territories. The government has already secured control of Aleppo’s Ashrafieh district, while a major bulk of SDF fighters are still surrounded in Sheikh Maqsood district (both Kurdish-majority areas). We assess that the majority of these fighters will accept the deal and evacuate. However, smaller armed groups are unlikely to comply, increasing the risks of renewed clashes in Kurdish-majority districts in the coming hours. Furthermore, despite the full evacuation of fighters, clashes between the SDF and the government along the lines of control near Dayr Hafir and Manbij (both Aleppo governorate) will remain likely.

Jan 08.

• Yemen: STC president flees Aden; militia secures city, sustaining transport, security risks. Earlier on 8 January, Saudi state-owned media reported that the president of the UAE-backed Southern Transitional Council (STC), Aidarus al-Zoubaidi, had fled Aden (Aden governorate) for Somaliland on 7 January. He then possibly travelled onward to the UAE’s capital Abu Dhabi. Al-Zoubaidi reportedly ordered large military reinforcements into Aden to counter the Saudi-backed advance by Internationally Recognised Government (IRG) aligned forces, before fleeing. However, the Southern Giants Brigades (a pro-IRG militia) have since secured several state institutions, neighbourhoods and Aden International Airport (ADE). Transport disruption will likely continue over the coming days amid heightened security and reduced services at Aden Airport. A curfew was in force between 2100hrs and 0600hrs (local time) overnight on 7-8 January; further curfews are likely, increasing the risk of arbitrary detentions during nighttime hours. Meanwhile, senior STC officials claim that peace talks in Saudi Arabia without al-Zoubaidi on 7 January were positive, raising the possibility of short-term splintering within the STC which would complicate immediate efforts to stabilise the south. If confirmed, al-Zoubaidi’s presence in Abu Dhabi would likely escalate already-heightened tensions between Saudi Arabia and the UAE.
• Iran: Protests, clashes with security forces are likely to intensify in next 48 hours. On 7 January, anti-government protests and clashes with the security forces continued across several cities, including the capital Tehran. State media reported that protesters had killed security officers in Malekshahi county (Ilam province) and Lordegan city (Chaharmahal and Bakhtiari province). Local activists also reported internet blackouts in several cities. We assess that the scope and intensity of anti-government protests will increase in the next 48 hours, particularly following Friday prayers on 9 January. Such demonstrations will almost certainly trigger further clashes with the security forces, particularly in the vicinity of major mosques, marketplaces, universities and government premises. Partial strikes and business disruption are also possible in Kermanshah and Kurdistan provinces. Additionally, on 7 January, the Mobarizoun Popular Front (MPF), a coalition of ethnic-Baloch anti-government groups, killed a police officer in Iranshahr (Sistan and Baluchestan province). Further attacks against the security forces, governmental facilities and checkpoints in Sistan and Baluchestan will also remain likely in the coming days.

Jan 07.

IRAN  

• Major anti-government protests have emerged in Iran and will almost certainly continue in the coming days, though threats to government stability are unlikely to escalate to critical levels in the short term.
• Iran’s efforts to improve its missile capabilities will increase the risk of Israeli airstrikes in the coming months, as well as conflict re-escalation; there is also a realistic possibility that the US will become involved in strikes against nuclear facilities.

ISRAEL

• The death of a young ultra-Orthodox protester during an anti-conscription demonstration has elevated the risk of escalating domestic unrest in the coming weeks.

PALESTINIAN TERRITORIES

• GAZA STRIP: Israel’s license revocation of 37 international aid groups due to their failure to comply with new registration requirements (introduced in March 2025) will elevate humanitarian concerns in the Gaza Strip.
• WEST BANK: The Palestinian Authority (PA)’s efforts to implement financial reforms will likely trigger further protests and possibly lead to election delays.
• WEST BANK: The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) announced plans to monitor extremist settlers in the West Bank, increasing the risk of settler violence, protests and unrest.

IRAN

• Major anti-government protests have emerged in Iran and will almost certainly continue in the coming days, though threats to government stability are unlikely to escalate to critical levels in the short term. On 28 December 2025, merchants in the capital Tehran began strike action over deteriorating economic conditions and rapid currency devaluations. Protests have quickly spread to cities nationwide and have involved anti-government activists, including many explicitly calling for regime change. Demonstrations have continued daily, with large-scale protests occurring in Isfahan (Isfahan province), Mashhad (Razavi Khorasan province), Qom (Qom province), Shiraz (Fars province), Tehran and Zahedan (Sistan and Baluchestan province). In response, the Iranian authorities have deployed thousands of police and security forces personnel, including members of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps’ (IRGC’s) Basij paramilitary, to disperse protesters. Human rights groups claim that the security forces’ use of baton charges, tear gas, rubber bullets and live ammunition has killed around 34 protesters. Hundreds have also been detained in mass arrest campaigns. Amid escalating clashes with the security forces, protesters have attempted to storm municipal buildings and police stations in several locations, most prominently in Azna (Lorestan province), Fasa and Marvdasht (both Fars province). In the coming days, anti-government protesters will almost certainly continue to demonstrate in major cities, particularly in marketplaces, public squares, university premises and outside government buildings. The security force crackdown will almost certainly continue at pace in the coming days, likely triggering further unrest and sustaining significant security threats to both participants and bystanders. The authorities will also likely engage in increased digital surveillance of individuals associated with anti-government activism and protest mobilisation, increasing risks of detention for locally engaged staff and their associates (particularly foreign and dual nationals). Protests and unrest will likely continue at pace in the short term, with periods of escalation triggering further crackdowns. However, we assess that sustained repression combined with limited policy concessions from the Iranian government will likely undermine mobilisation in the coming weeks and therefore moderate threats to government stability. We also assess that Israel and the US are unlikely to launch a broad airstrike campaign targeting Iran imminently. However, the risk of airstrikes will increase in the event that protests escalate to the point that they critically threaten government stability (for further analysis, see Sibylline Situation Update Brief – 6 January 2026).
• Iran’s efforts to improve its missile capabilities will increase the risk of Israeli airstrikes in the coming months, as well as conflict re-escalation; there is also a realistic possibility that the US will become involved in strikes against nuclear facilities. On 22 December 2025, Iranian state media announced that the security forces had held missile drills in numerous cities. Although the statement did not specify where the missile tests took place, social media footage indicates that the tests took place in proximity to Isfahan, Mashhad and Tehran. The test came shortly after the IRGC Navy conducted missile tests in the Persian Gulf on 5 December 2025, and after Iran hosted a five-day joint counter-terrorism exercise with the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO; see Sibylline Middle East Crisis Update – 3 December 2025). The exercises and tests almost certainly form part of Iran’s efforts to demonstrate and improve its military capabilities, particularly inter-service co-ordination. However, continued missile tests will also almost certainly compound regional concerns regarding the extent of Iran’s existing missile and drone stockpiles (as well as Iran’s production capabilities). During a meeting between US President Donald Trump and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu on 28 December 2025, Trump repeatedly called for Iran to cease the build-up of its nuclear and missile programmes, stating that there would be ‘no choice but very quickly to eradicate that build-up’ should Iran continue. This statement underscores the increasing likelihood of Israeli airstrikes targeting Iranian nuclear and security force positions in the coming months, with possible US involvement. Such airstrikes will highly likely trigger retaliatory Iranian attacks targeting Israel, increasing risks of exposure to missile fire and drone incursions for locally engaged staff. Retaliatory attacks would likely escalate into armed conflict, almost certainly disrupting regional flightpaths and undermining regional operational continuity. There is also a realistic possibility that US involvement in airstrikes in Iran would trigger low-capacity and limited Iranian retaliation against US military assets in Iraq, Qatar and/or Kuwait. However, a direct and sustained armed conflict is unlikely between the US and Iran in the coming months, moderating the risk of a critical regional escalation.

ISRAEL 

• The death of a young ultra-Orthodox protester during an anti-conscription demonstration has elevated the risk of escalating domestic unrest in the coming weeks. On 6 January, thousands of people participated in an anti-conscription protest in Jerusalem’s Bar-Ilan Street (Jerusalem district). Protesters set fires and blocked roads across the city; several attendees attacked a Kan News team covering the demonstration. During the protest, a bus driver drove into a crowd attempting to block the road on Shamgar Street, killing a protester and injuring three others. These incidents come amid growing ethno-religious tensions and ultra-Orthodox protests against military conscription (see Sibylline Middle East Crisis Update – 10 December 2025). The protester’s killing highlights the elevated risks of clashes around key overland routes, driving exposure to vehicular collisions during protests in the coming weeks. Furthermore, the incident will elevate risks of intensified anti-conscription protests led by ultra-Orthodox residents, as well as increase violence risks during demonstrations nationwide. This will elevate security risks for bystanders, particularly near key transport routes such as Highways 1 and 4 and near ultra-Orthodox neighbourhoods in Jerusalem district.

PALESTINIAN TERRITORIES 

• GAZA STRIP: Israel’s license revocation of 37 international aid groups due to their failure to comply with new registration requirements (introduced in March 2025) will elevate humanitarian concerns in the Gaza Strip. On 1 January, Israel suspended the groups’ licenses to operate in Gaza and the West Bank; the groups will have to leave these territories by 1 March. The new regulations require aid groups to provide Israel with the names and personal details of local and international staff. This requirement contravenes international data protection rules and workers’ privacy rights. The new regulations also allow Israel to ban aid groups over political activity and criticism of Israel. Following the license suspension, Israel barred the affected groups from delivering aid to Gaza, as well as barring the entry of associated aid staff in some cases (including doctors and nurses). We assess that this will elevate threats to food and water security significantly, as well as to Gaza’s broader population health, raising exposure to infectious diseases. Given new regulations’ incompatibility with international data protection laws, there is a realistic possibility that compliance challenges will be solved by mechanisms present in the Gaza peace plan’s second phase. However, the constant delays in advancing the ceasefire to this phase and the likely future challenges in negotiating such mechanisms will likely retain this issue until at least Q2 2026, possibly extending into Q3 2026.
• WEST BANK: The Palestinian Authority (PA)’s efforts to implement financial reforms will likely trigger further protests and possibly lead to election delays. On 6 January, protests opposing the PA’s efforts to reform the prisoner payment system emerged in Nablus (Nablus governorate). Similar protests on 18 December also occurred in Jenin (Jenin governorate), Nablus, Ramallah (Ramallah and al Bireh governorate) and Tulkarem (Tulkarem governorate). Although the demonstrations remained broadly peaceful, they underscore substantial opposition to the PA’s efforts to reform welfare payments to Palestinians in Israeli prisons through the Palestinian Martyrs Fund (a programme colloquially referred to as ‘pay-for-slay’). PA President Mahmoud Abbas cancelled the programme in February 2025 amid broader efforts to improve diplomatic relations with the US, though the implementation of reforms has been repeatedly delayed. Further anti-PA protests will likely emerge in the coming weeks, particularly in Jenin, Nablus and Ramallah, increasing the risks of localised operational and transit disruption. Large demonstrations will potentially escalate into localised unrest and vandalism, increasing collateral risks for locally engaged assets, particularly those in proximity to PA facilities and the ruling Fatah party’s offices. In the medium term, anti-reform protests will also compound concerns within Fatah over potential electoral losses. This will possibly result in further delays to the holding of presidential and legislative elections, which last took place in 2005 and 2006, respectively.
• WEST BANK: The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) announced plans to monitor extremist settlers in the West Bank, increasing the risk of settler violence, protests and unrest. On 5 January, the IDF and security agency Shin Bet announced that the head of the IDF’s Central Command, Major General Avi Bluth, had authorised the security forces to use ‘technological monitoring’ to enforce movement restrictions on Israeli settlers in the West Bank. The measures aim to supplement the IDF’s capacity to regulate the movements of extremist settlers, after the Ministry of Defense ended the use of the administrative detention policy for Israeli settlers in November 2024. The announcement comes amid escalating settler violence targeting Palestinian civilians and communities in the West Bank; in 2025, the IDF recorded over 750 incidents of settler violence, compared to 670 incidents recorded in 2024. In recent weeks, Israeli settlers have launched dozens of attacks against Palestinian population centres and agricultural holdings, which have occasionally escalated into altercations with IDF personnel. Efforts to enforce ‘technological monitoring’ through ankle tags are highly unlikely to deter settler violence or moderate risks of attacks in the West Bank. As such, ethno-religious tensions will almost certainly remain elevated. Also on 5 January, the Honenu legal aid organisation announced that it would appeal the decision to authorise the use of electronic monitoring. Legal challenges to the decision will also possibly trigger pro-settlement protests in the Jerusalem area (Jerusalem district), as well as unrest and rioting targeting IDF positions in the West Bank. The risk of vandalism targeting proximate installations and vehicles will be significantly elevated during settler protests, temporarily increasing security threats to locally engaged staff and assets.

RED SEA

• RED SEA: Armed conflict in Yemen is unlikely to undermine navigability in the Red Sea critically or trigger a wider Houthi campaign against domestic rivals. On 3 January, Saudi-backed Internationally Recognised Government (IRG) forces captured the key port of Mukalla (Hadramaut governorate) from the UAE-backed Southern Transitional Council (STC) amid significant clashes between the two factions that erupted on 3 December 2025. The takeover of Mukalla came one day after the STC stated that southern Yemen would hold an independence referendum by January 2028. Notably, between 4 and 6 January, the IRG also secured strategic gains in Aden and Hadhramaut governorates, indicating a significant degradation of STC military capabilities. On 7 January, local media reported that the IRG managed to secure control of several key districts in the port city of Aden, while heavy clashes between the two parties were ongoing at the time of writing. We assess that these clashes are likely to continue in the coming days while the Saudi-led coalition will likely increase airstrikes against STC positions, especially in Aden, Dhale and Lahij governorates, heightening personnel security risks stemming from direct strikes and exposure to shrapnel. Short-term escalation will likely lead to flight cancellations and transport disruption, undermining personnel evacuation. However, we also assess that the current IRG-STC conflict is unlikely to undermine the navigability of Yemeni waters critically, as a heavy Saudi naval deployment is currently securing transit through the Gulf of Aden and the Bab el-Mandeb strait. Furthermore, the ongoing conflict in the south is unlikely to prompt the Iranian-backed Houthis (who control the capital Sanaa and northwest areas of Yemen) to capitalise on the partial security vacuum along the line of control and conduct a major attack on the rival IRG. As such, there is also a realistic possibility that Riyadh will attempt to include the Houthis in any de-escalation agreement with both the IRG and the STC in Q1 2026, reducing the risk of wider armed conflict and instability across Yemen.
• ISRAEL-SOMALIA-YEMEN: Israel’s recognition of Somaliland likely forms part of efforts to increase intelligence gathering vis-à-vis the Houthis, increasing the risk of further IDF airstrikes in the medium term. On 26 December 2025, Israel recognised Somaliland’s independence. Although Somaliland declared independence from Somalia in 1991 and maintains informal relations with several states, Israel is the first UN member state to recognise its independence formally. Israeli Foreign Minister Gideon Sa’ar subsequently visited Somaliland’s capital, Hargeisa, on 6 January, drawing significant criticism from Somalia and the African Union (AU). Somali President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud claims that Somaliland has agreed to accept the resettlement of Palestinians and the establishment of Israeli military bases in exchange for Israel’s recognition of its independence. Although Somaliland President Abdirahman Mohamed Abdullahi denied these claims, there is a realistic possibility that Israel will establish military facilities in Somaliland to facilitate intelligence, reconnaissance and surveillance (IRS) operations targeting the Iranian-backed and Yemen-based Houthis in the medium term. Although Israel is unlikely to station naval assets in Somaliland in the short term, increasing IRS operations will facilitate the possible escalation of IDF operations targeting Houthi-controlled territory in the medium-to-long term. Such an escalation would become increasingly likely if the Israel-Hamas ceasefire breaks down and the Houthis resume missile and drone attacks targeting Israel, as well as Israeli-linked vessels transiting the Red Sea. Intensified Israeli airstrikes would almost certainly compound security threats to NGO staff operating within Houthi-controlled territory, while also likely disrupting
• ISRAEL-SYRIA: An agreement to establish a communication line for co-ordination and intelligence sharing highlights de-escalation, though security challenges and tensions are likely to remain elevated in the coming months. On 6 January, the Trump administration released a joint statement by Israel and Syria announcing a bilateral agreement to establish a dedicated communication cell. The new channel will facilitate intelligence sharing and military de-escalation, as well as diplomatic engagement and commercial opportunities, all under Washington DC’s supervision. The new mechanism will support the rapid resolution of disputes, reducing the risk of escalation to military clashes and improving the prospects of a finalised bilateral security agreement during 2026. However, we assess that there will likely be obstacles to a deal, including Israel’s relations with Druze communities, Israel’s presence in Syria and plans to establish a buffer zone on Syrian territory. This will delay the prospects for commercial co-operation in the coming weeks.

• Syria: Resumed clashes with Kurdish factions elevate risk of armed conflict in north-eastern region. On 6 January, clashes resumed between government forces and the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) in the Kurdish-controlled districts of Ashrafieh and Sheikh Maqsoud in Aleppo (Aleppo governorate). The ongoing clashes, including mutual shelling and drone strikes, killed at least seven people. Earlier on 7 January, government forces created two humanitarian corridors for residents of the districts to evacuate, before they become closed military zones at 1500hrs (local time). There is a realistic possibility that government forces will attempt to impose a siege and enter the Kurdish districts afterwards, elevating the risk that the clashes will expand in scope and intensity throughout the next 48 hours. Furthermore, any military takeover of the Kurdish districts in Aleppo is likely to trigger a wider armed conflict between the two parties along the lines of control in north-eastern Syria, particularly near Dayr Hafir, Manbij and the Tishrin Dam (all Aleppo), which will undermine bilateral talks.
• Yemen: PLC removes STC president from government, underscoring conflict escalation risks. Earlier on 7 January, the Saudi-backed Presidential Leadership Council (PLC) removed the UAE-backed Southern Transitional Council (STC) president, Aidarus al-Zoubaidi, from the PLC, accusing him of high treason. Al-Zoubaidi failed to board a flight carrying an STC delegation to Saudi Arabia for peace talks on 6 January. The STC claims that al-Zoubaidi remains in Aden (Aden governorate), overseeing military operations. However, conflicting reports suggest he has fled and that the STC has withdrawn from several checkpoints in Aden, handing them over to the Southern Giants Brigades militia (a pro-Yemeni government militia established with the support of the UAE in 2018). Regardless, there remains a possibility that the STC will push back against Saudi-backed advances in Yemen’s south and secure Aden in the coming days. In that event, the Saudi-led coalition will almost certainly increase airstrikes against STC positions, especially in Aden, Dhale and Lahij governorates, heightening personnel security risks from direct targeting and shrapnel. Short-term escalation will likely lead to flight cancellations and transport disruption, undermining personnel evacuation. These developments reduce the likelihood of a short-term diplomatic settlement to the conflict.

EVENT

Earlier on 7 January, the US Department of Justice, Department of Homeland Security and Department of War confirmed the seizure of the Russian-flagged and Turkish-owned Marinera tanker in the Iceland-UK gap of the North Atlantic Ocean.

• This development comes after an increasing US military build-up in UK territory, including the deployment of US special forces Pilatus U-28 Draco aircraft. Unconfirmed footage indicates that US MD-6 helicopters deployed US special forces onto the vessel. Other unconfirmed reports indicate that UK and Norwegian forces are supporting the operation in some form. Various indications suggest that a number of UK Royal Air Force (RAF) jets and P-8 Poseidon maritime patrol aircraft were deployed north of Scotland (UK) during the operation.
• The vessel was previously sailing with the name Bella-1 under a Guyanese flag. It has since been renamed the Marinera and reflagged under Russia. The vessel had reportedly eluded previous attempts by the US Coast Guard (USCG) to board it while it was in the Caribbean Sea. It remains unclear why the boarding did not proceed when it was closer to the Caribbean region. However, the apparent deployment of special forces in the operation earlier on 7 January indicates that US military planners anticipated resistance. Therefore, they possibly had to prepare for a more complex special forces (rather than purely coast guard) operation, allowing the vessel to sail further away in the intervening days.
• In recent weeks, the US has imposed a de facto maritime ‘blockade’ on sanctioned vessels linked to Venezuela; it has boarded a number of such vessels in the Caribbean Sea. The Marinera sailed north across the Atlantic Ocean after it failed to dock in Venezuela, likely to avoid capture. However, it has been shadowed by maritime patrol aircraft and the USCG Munro legend-class cutter.
• Russia reportedly deployed at least one submarine and ‘other naval vessels’ to escort the tanker.
• The US also confirmed its seizure of another Venezuela-linked sanctioned vessel in the Caribbean Sea, the M/T Sophia. The two seizures indicate that the US is committed to tightening its imposed maritime ‘blockade’ on sanctioned vessels across the region.

FORECAST

US forces (potentially alongside allied forces) likely launched the operation before Russian surface warships or submarines could establish an effective convoy, thereby reducing the risk of escalation and limiting Russia’s immediate retaliation options. While the location of these Russian naval assets remains unclear, the US likely aimed to proceed with the operation before Russian warships (particularly surface warships) could deter any US boarding attempt. Currently, Russia’s options for retaliation remain limited. We assess that Russia is unlikely to seek a kinetic confrontation with the US over the Marinera’s seizure, given the wider strategic importance of US-brokered peace talks over Ukraine. Since negotiations over Ukraine are likely to remain the Kremlin’s strategic priority, our most likely scenario involves Russia expressing diplomatic outrage at the incident in a bid to prevent a major diplomatic crisis with the US. The Russian government is likely to invoke the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS; to which the US is not a signatory) and call for freedom of passage to be upheld. However, Moscow’s options to take direct action against Washington DC remain limited. The Russian navy could move to sink the vessel in retaliation. Nevertheless, this remains unlikely, particularly if the US intends to control the Marinera (a move it has made during previous seizure operations). Instead, we assess that Russia is likely to blame Europe and specifically the UK for facilitating the operation, amid the Kremlin’s efforts to keep the US onside during Ukraine’s peace negotiations. In the medium term, the incident is likely to encourage further Russian convoying of its commercial vessels. This trend began in the Baltic Sea and across Northern European waters; its continuation will place greater pressure on the limited number of Russian surface hulls capable of conducting such operations. While Russia is unlikely to target US forces in retaliation, UK assets will be more vulnerable as potential ‘legitimate targets’ if the Kremlin wishes to escalate and demonstrate its resolve. In this more dangerous (but unlikely) scenario, Russia is more likely to target RAF or UK Royal Navy assets, or possibly those of the Royal Norwegian Navy or Air Force, given Moscow’s focus on European support for Ukraine. Furthermore, the operation comes less than 24 hours after UK Prime Minister Keir Starmer signed a declaration of intent in Paris (France) to deploy forces in Ukraine after a ceasefire. This timing will increase the risk of Russian punitive action in a bid to deter further UK efforts to contain Moscow. While an open confrontation remains unlikely, this scenario remains plausible given current UK-Russia tensions. We also assess that this incident will reinforce Russia’s interest in grey-zone operations targeting the UK in the coming months.

Jan 06.

Key points

• Deteriorating economic conditions have triggered major anti-government protests in cities across Iran, which will likely continue in the coming days. The security and police forces will almost certainly continue to engage in violent crackdowns on demonstrations, increasing the risk of unrest.
• In conjunction with a sustained crackdown on protests, Iran’s government is likely to make moderate economic concessions to protesters in the coming days, which will undermine anti-government activists’ capacity to mobilise large-scale protests in the coming weeks.
• Protests will likely continue in Iran’s peripheral provinces, while mourning observances will increase the risk of further protests in early February, along with further operational disruption and unrest.
• At present, the protests are unlikely to critically undermine government stability, moderating risks of armed conflict and regional spillover. However, there is a realistic possibility that continued unrest will trigger infighting within the security forces and government, increasing threats to government stability in the medium term.
• Israel and the US are unlikely to launch broad airstrikes targeting Iran during the current protest movement; however, should critical threats to government stability emerge in the coming weeks, airstrikes targeting security force positions will become more likely.

Context

On 28 December 2025, merchants in the capital Tehran began strike action over deteriorating economic conditions and rapid currency devaluation. Further protests subsequently emerged in marketplaces and major cities nationwide, with thousands of university students and anti-government activists joining the demonstrations. Protests have continued daily in numerous urban centres, triggering clashes between demonstrators and the police and security forces. By 3 January, the UN had confirmed reports that the security forces have killed at least eight protesters, though activists have reported 33 fatalities including four children; Iranian state media outlets allege that the unrest has killed at least two security force personnel. Although the demonstrations have not reached the same scale, the campaign marks the most significant outbreak of protests since those following the death of Mahsa Amini in morality police custody in 2022. In response, the Iranian authorities have deployed thousands of police and security forces personnel, including members of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps’ (IRGC) Basij paramilitary, to major cities to disperse protesters. The security forces have employed tear gas, rubber bullets and live ammunition to disperse anti-government demonstrations, while also engaging in mass arrest campaigns targeting hundreds of civilians. Amid escalating clashes with the security forces, protesters have attempted to storm municipal buildings and police stations in several locations, most prominently in Azna (Lorestan province), Fasa and Marvdasht (both Fars province).

The protests reflect Iran’s worsening economic crisis, particularly following the Israel-Iran war in June. Since January 2025, the Iranian Rial (IRR) has lost over 40% of its value; on 27 December 2025 it traded at Iranian IRR 1,429,000 to the USD, a record low. Year-on-year inflation also stands at approximately 42%, while water shortages triggered supply cuts for both urban and rural areas in November and December 2025. Since US President Donald Trump began his second term in January 2025, the resumption of the ‘Maximum Pressure’ sanctions campaign has increased Iran’s isolation from global markets, compounding socio-economic concerns. Iran’s violation of its commitments to limit its nuclear programme under the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) also resulted in the re-implementation of UN sanctions in September, intensifying the economic pressure. Although President Masoud Pezeshkian and Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei have criticised the protests, both have attempted to calm the unrest by characterising protesters’ economic concerns as legitimate. To date however, these efforts have been ineffective and significant fiscal pressure continues to limit the government’s capacity to immediately address protesters’ economic concerns.

• Yemen: Planned peace talks to moderate long-term conflict risks; diplomatic settlement possible. On 5 January, international media outlets reported that a delegation led by the UAE-backed Southern Transitional Council (STC) president, Aidarus al-Zoubaidi, plans to hold peace talks with the Saudi-backed, internationally recognised government (IRG) in Saudi Arabia. However, the exact timing of the visit remains unclear. The prospect of talks follows recent advances by IRG forces, which have retaken military sites from the STC in eastern Al-Mahrah and Hadhramaut governorates, and have claimed that their troops are advancing towards STC-controlled Aden (Aden governorate). While the prospect of peace talks will moderate the risk of a protracted long-term conflict between factions in the south and increase the likelihood of a diplomatic settlement, IRG officials have told the international media that dialogue will only begin once Aden is secured. As such, conflict risks will remain elevated in the coming days, especially in and around Aden, increasing the security risk to personnel from attacks, crossfire and arbitrary detentions at checkpoints.

Jan 05.

• Iran: Protests will likely expand in coming days, increasing risk of arbitrary arrests, violent clashes. On 4 January, anti-government protests continued in the capital Tehran, as well as in numerous cities and towns across central and western Iran. Local human rights groups claimed that at least 16 protesters have been killed nationwide so far, amid widespread clashes with the internal security forces. Iranian opposition media outlets also claimed that the authorities had made hundreds of arbitrary arrests over the last three days. Notably, on 3 January, the governor of Qom (Qom province) claimed that one of the protesters was killed by an explosive device he had made which blew up prematurely. We assess that the protests are highly likely to continue and grow in scope over the coming days, particularly in Tehran as well as in Isfahan (Isfahan province), Mashhad (Razavi Khorasan province), Qom (Qom province), Shiraz (Fars province) and Zahedan (Sistan and Baluchestan province). Radical opposition elements will likely re-attempt to storm police stations and Basij (paramilitary) headquarters to acquire weapons, significantly increasing the risk of violent clashes. Thousands of university students are highly likely to join the protests, prompting waves of arbitrary arrests and security campaigns this week in the aforementioned locations.
• Yemen: Escalating tensions in Aden will elevate personnel security risks from clashes, detentions. On 4 January, Yemen’s Saudi-backed internationally recognised government (IRG) accused the UAE-backed Southern Transitional Council (STC) of restricting movement and conducting mass arrests in Aden (Aden governorate). The IRG forces claimed they have retaken Mukalla (Hadramaut governorate) from the STC on 3 January, with troops advancing towards Aden. These developments will elevate security risks to personnel in and near Aden in the coming days, including exposure to attacks, crossfire and arbitrary detentions at STC checkpoints. On 2 January, the STC stated that southern Yemen will hold an independence referendum by January 2028. This announcement will heighten the short-term risk of clashes between the STC and Saudi-backed factions in southern Yemen, as well as with the Iran-backed Houthis in the north (see Sibylline Special Report – 22 December 2025). Nevertheless, we assess that the IRG’s rapid gains since 2 January underscore the STC’s faltering military and governance capacities, moderately reducing the likelihood of an effective referendum. This will possibly drive the STC to seek a diplomatic settlement to the current military engagement, moderating protracted conflict risks.

Jan 02.

• Iran: Anti-government protests are highly likely to continue in coming days. On 1 January, anti-government protests continued for the fifth consecutive day in several Iranian cities over a record inflation rate, rising prices and deteriorating economic conditions. Hundreds of residents organised sporadic demonstrations in Isfahan (Isfahan province), Mashhad (Razavi Khorasan province), Qom (Qom province), Shiraz (Fars province), the capital Tehran and several other cities. Violent clashes between demonstrators and the internal security forces have resulted in tens of arbitrary arrests and the killing of at least six protesters. We assess that the government is likely to issue several policies to mitigate the ongoing dissent, possibly including price control measures over certain commodities. Nevertheless, the protests are highly likely to continue across Tehran and most of Iran’s major cities in the coming days. The ongoing protests will increase unrest and strike risks significantly, as well as major mobility and business disruption risks. These risks will be particularly high on 3 January, when thousands of pro-government residents will commemorate the assassination of military officer Qassem Suleimani, significantly increasing the risk of clashes with anti-government protesters.
• Yemen: Conflict escalation will drive security risks to personnel, elevate humanitarian concerns.  Earlier on 2 January, the Saudi-backed leader of Hadhramaut governorate announced the launch of an operation to retake military positions that were seized by the UAE-backed Southern Transitional Council (STC) during its offensive in December 2025. The announcement comes amid escalating tensions between Saudi-backed and UAE-backed groups in Yemen, which heightened on 30 December 2025 when Saudi-led coalition forces struck an alleged UAE arms shipment bound for the STC in Mukalla (Hadhramaut governorate). After the incident, the UAE announced that it would withdraw its remaining ‘counter-terrorism’ forces from Yemen. At the time of writing, civilian flights from Aden International Airport (ADE; Aden governorate) remain grounded due to a diplomatic dispute between Saudi Arabia and the UAE that began on 1 January. This has resulted in widespread transport disruption and reduced evacuation capabilities for international NGO personnel. We assess that internal fragmentation is likely to persist in the coming days, including direct clashes between Saudi-backed and UAE-backed forces in Hadhramaut and Al-Mahrah governorates, driving security risks for personnel near military assets and major transport routes. The escalating conflict will almost certainly undermine local governance capacities, disrupting public services and heightening humanitarian concerns. (Source: Sibylline)

 

03 Jan 26. Saudi Arabia Bomb UAE-Backed Separatist Forces in Yemen as Government Forces Launch Operation. Saudi warplanes struck military positions held by UAE-backed separatist forces in Yemen’s Hadramout Governorate on Friday, marking another escalation of tensions between the two Gulf allies over control of the country’s oil-rich eastern provinces. The Royal Saudi Air Force conducted at least seven airstrikes on the 37th Brigade military camp in al-Khasha, according to Mohammed Abdul Malik, head of the Southern Transitional Council in Wadi Hadramout.  Additional strikes hit the First Military Region headquarters in Sayun and the city’s airport, sources told AFP. A senior STC official said the strikes caused casualties, though precise numbers were not disclosed. Al Jazeera reported that one STC member was killed and 15 wounded in clashes with Saudi-backed government forces in Sayun, located approximately 220 miles north of the coastal city of Mukalla. Hours after the strikes, the United Arab Emirates confirmed its last troops had departed Yemen.

“The UAE concluded the presence of its counterterrorism forces,” an unnamed government official told AFP.

The withdrawal came after Yemen’s internationally recognized government, backed by Saudi Arabia, demanded the UAE pull its forces within 24 hours on Tuesday. That ultimatum followed Saudi-led coalition strikes on the port of Mukalla, where officials accused the UAE of delivering ships loaded with armored vehicles, weapons and ammunition to the STC. (Source: https://www.sofx.com/)

 

06 Jan 26. Khamenei Plans to Flee to Russia if Protests in Iran Escalate. Iran’s Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei is reportedly planning to flee the country for Russia with up to 20 close aides and family members if unrest intensifies or security forces fail to contain protests, The Times reported.   The plan reportedly includes securing assets, properties abroad, and cash for their escape. Protests over soaring inflation have continued for a ninth day across 222 locations in Iran, leaving more than 20 dead and nearly 1,000 arrested, according to US-based Human Rights Activists News Agency. (Source: https://www.sofx.com/)

 

06 Jan 26. Israel Strikes Hezbollah, Hamas Sites in Lebanon. Israel launched strikes Monday on Hezbollah and Hamas positions in eastern and southern Lebanon.  The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) said the operation included four strikes targeting militant infrastructure, including two underground Hezbollah facilities. The strikes followed evacuation warnings in Hammara, Ain el-Tineh, Kfar Hatta, and Aanan. In an announcement urging residents to evacuate, Israeli military spokesperson Col. Avichay Adraee said the operations targeted Hezbollah sites in response to the group’s attempts to reestablish activity in the region. In a subsequent post, he said that Hamas sites were also among the targets. (Source: https://www.sofx.com/)

 

03 Jan 26. Israel Strikes Hezbollah Training Compound, Weapons Sites in Southern Lebanon. Israeli warplanes carried out approximately 20 airstrikes across southern Lebanon on Friday, targeting what the military said was a training compound used by Hezbollah’s elite Radwan Force along with structures used to store weapons. The Israel Defense Forces said the training site was used by Radwan operatives for live-fire drills and weapons instruction intended to plan and execute attacks against Israeli forces and civilians. “The terrorist operatives were undergoing firearms training and instruction in the use of various combat means,” IDF spokesman Avichay Adraee said on X. The military said it also struck additional Hezbollah “structures” recently used for weapons storage. Lebanon’s official National News Agency reported Israeli aircraft launched “violent airstrikes” targeting the Aqmata Plain and the outskirts of al-Rayhan in the Jabal al-Rayhan area. Minutes later, another wave of strikes hit the area between the village of Ansar and the town of Zrarieh. The valleys between the villages of Kafrwa and Aazza in the Nabatieh District were also struck, according to NNA. A Lebanese army intelligence source reportedly told Xinhua that Israeli warplanes launched more than 35 air-to-ground missiles, “causing massive explosions whose echoes reverberated across most areas of the south.” Videos circulating on social media showed large plumes of smoke rising from the struck areas. The IDF said Hezbollah’s conduct, including training and entrenchment near the border, violates the ceasefire framework that has been in effect since November 27, 2024, and poses a direct threat to Israel.

“The IDF will continue to operate in order to remove any threat to the State of Israel,” the military said in a statement.

Despite the ceasefire agreement, Israel has continued to conduct strikes in Lebanon, saying they target Hezbollah threats. (Source: https://www.sofx.com/)

 

02 Jan 26.  U.S. and Allied Forces Kill, Capture 25 ISIS Fighters in Syria. Nearly 25 ISIS operatives were killed or captured in Syria this month following the Dec. 13 ambush in Syria that killed two U.S. troops and an American civilian interpreter. In a statement, CENTCOM said the operations conducted from Dec. 20 to 29 included strikes against senior and lower-level ISIS members, as well as the elimination of four weapons caches. At least seven ISIS fighters were killed and 11 captured during the operation. A U.S. official told Military.com that growing cooperation with Syria’s new government has allowed U.S. forces to strike ISIS in areas where they had not previously operated. The recent operations followed earlier U.S. strikes targeting 70 ISIS sites across central Syria, which came after President Donald Trump vowed “very serious retaliation” for the Dec. 13 attack on U.S. forces, who at the time were conducting counter-ISIS and counterterrorism operations in the region. Though no group claimed responsibility, Trump identified ISIS as the perpetrator.

“We will not relent,” said CENTCOM commander Adm. Brad Cooper. “We are steadfast in commitment to working with regional partners to root out the ISIS threat posed to U.S. and regional security.”

According to CENTCOM, ISIS inspired at least 11 plots or attacks against targets in the U.S. in 2025.

Over the past 12 months, CENTCOM operations against ISIS have resulted in the deaths of more than 20 fighters and the detention of over 300. (Source: https://www.sofx.com/)

 

02 Jan 26. U.S.-Led Coalition Forces to Withdraw from Iraq’s Ain al-Asad Base Next Week.  The U.S.-led coalition fighting ISIS will withdraw from the Ain al-Asad Air Base in Iraq’s Anbar province next week.  Lt. Gen. Qais al-Mohammadi, deputy commander of the Joint Operations Command said the withdrawal will involve a full handover of the base to Iraqi forces.

“Ain al-Asad will witness a full withdrawal next week and be transferred to our Iraqi units,” Mohammadi said, calling the move a success for Iraqi capabilities and sovereignty.

Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammed Shia al-Sudani said in September that coalition forces are no longer needed in the region, though Iraq plans bilateral defense agreements with some members, including the U.S. Mohammadi said ISIS has lost its ability to plan, operate, control territory or affect security. The group carried out only four attacks in 2025, down from 42 in 2024, and all were deemed ineffective. Ain al-Asad Air Base has frequently been targeted by Iran-aligned militias that oppose the U.S. presence in the region. Even after Iraq’s 2017 victory over ISIS, roughly 2,500 U.S. troops remain in Iraq. They are stationed near Baghdad International Airport and at Irbil Air Base in the Kurdistan Region. (Source: https://www.sofx.com/)

 

05 Jan 26. British, French Jets Target ISIS Weapons Facility in Syria. British and French warplanes struck an underground ISIS facility said to be storing weapons and explosives in Syria’s Homs province Saturday evening.  In a statement, the U.K. said British Typhoon FGR4 jets, armed with Paveway IV bombs and supported by a Voyager tanker, carried out the strike alongside French aircraft. Initial reports indicate the attack was successful with no civilian casualties. (Source: https://www.sofx.com/)

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Military And Security Developments

Jan 09.

• Russia-Ukraine: Risk of large-scale Russian retaliatory strikes will remain elevated in short term. Earlier on 9 January, Russia’s Ministry of Defence (MoD) announced that it launched an Oreshnik intermediate-range ballistic missile (IRBM) at Lviv City (Lviv oblast) overnight. The Oreshnik launch was part of a larger strike package, involving 242 drones and 36 missiles. The Russian MoD stated that the attack struck energy infrastructure and military facilities, and claimed the launch was retaliation for an alleged Ukrainian strike on one of Russia’s presidential residences (see Sibylline Alert – 30 December 2025). This attack followed shortly after the US confirmed its seizure of a Russian-flagged vessel in the Atlantic (see Sibylline Alert – 7 January). Given its timing, the Oreshnik missile strike is likely also a response to the vessel’s seizure, supporting our assessment that Russia would primarily seek to retaliate inside Ukraine, while avoiding direct confrontation with the US. The choice of Lviv is also significant as it is likely intended to demonstrate Russia’s ability to target anywhere in Ukraine, including close to NATO’s border. The risk of further intense strikes in the coming days remains elevated, including the capital Kyiv. However, the use of the Oreshnik system does not indicate a shift in overall threat levels as it performs similarly to other ballistic missile systems deployed against Ukraine.

Jan 08.

• Russia-US-UK: Indirect Russian retaliation is more likely than major escalation after tanker seizure. On 7 January, the US, supported by UK forces, seized the Russian-flagged oil tanker Marinera (formerly Bella-1) in the North Atlantic Ocean near Iceland, moderately raising the threat of Russian harassment of shipping. US officials reported that Russian military vessels, including a submarine, were in the vicinity of the operation. However, it remains unclear how close these vessels were to the seizure. Russia’s official response has remained contained, denouncing the move as a violation of maritime law and demanding the safe return of the Marinera’s crew. This is consistent with our assessment that Moscow will seek to avoid a major diplomatic crisis with Washington DC (see Sibylline Alert – Russia-US-UK – 7 January 2026). As such, the risk of significant escalation remains low. Nevertheless, the risk of limited Russian tit-for-tat measures against Western-flagged vessels operating close to Russian waters has increased. This includes the harassment of vessels through buzzing by aircraft or drones, jamming attempts, intimidation by warships or possibly ‘constabulary’ boarding actions. Furthermore, if Russia intends to retaliate against US and/or UK interests, it is most likely to do this inside Ukraine; strikes against Western assets inside the country will be a realistic option for Russia.

08 Jan 26. 

Russia-US: Increased likelihood of new sanctions is unlikely to push Moscow to end war in near term. On 7 January, US Republican Senator Lindsey Graham announced that President Donald Trump has ‘greenlit’ a bipartisan bill that will impose new sanctions targeting Russia. Graham stated that the legislation may be voted on as early as next week. The bill envisions placing secondary sanctions on countries that purchase Russian energy (such as China and India), in order to undermine the Kremlin’s ability to sustain its war effort. The bill has been stalled for several months; Graham had stated previously that the measure would progress without any subsequent advancement. Nevertheless, Trump’s reported approval increases the likelihood that policy-makers will vote on the measure in the near term. If approved, the bill would allow Trump to increase pressure on Russia at his choosing, rather than to impose sanctions immediately. While the bill’s approval would likely be used as a negotiating tactic, our assessment remains that increased sanctions pressure will unlikely alter Russia’s calculus on continuing the war in the short-to-medium term. For further analysis, see Sibylline Strategic Risk Forecast – 6 January 2026.

Jan 07.

KEY DEVELOPMENTS

• OFFENSIVES: In 2025, Russian forces occupied about 1,866 square miles (4,831 sq km) of Ukrainian territory (approximately 0.8% of Ukraine) and regained around 183 square miles (473 sq km) previously held by Ukraine in Kursk oblast (Russia)
• STRIKES: In 2025, Russia’s strike campaign intensified markedly; a further intensification of long-range strikes is likely in 2026, together with increased targeting of railway infrastructure across Western Ukraine in the short term
• PEACE: Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky unveiled details of a revised 20-point peace plan to end the Russo-Ukrainian war; this is highly likely to be a non-starter for Russia, which shows no indication of changing its negotiating position
• FORECAST: The recent shake-up of the Ukrainian government and security services, including the appointment of a hawkish new head of the Presidential Office, is the most extensive reshuffle since the beginning of the full-scale invasion
• OFFENSIVES: In 2025, Russian forces occupied 1,866 square miles (4,831 sq km) of Ukrainian territory (approximately 0.8% of Ukraine) and regained around 183 square miles (473 sq km) previously held by Ukraine in the Kursk oblast (Russia). By comparison, OSINT figures indicate that in 2024 Russian forces controlled 1,392 square miles (3,604 sq km). The increase in territorial gains in 2025 was largely driven by a shift in Russian tactics toward infiltration operations, supported by systematic battlefield air interdiction campaigns including elite drone units.
• OFFENSIVES: These tactics also resulted in a slight reduction in casualty rates, though they remained high overall. According to OSINT estimates, Russian operational tempo in 2025 increased by a factor of 1.14 compared to 2024, while overall losses stayed roughly the same. This is likely due to the extensive use of infiltration tactics, which, particularly in urban areas, reduce Russian forces’ exposure to Ukrainian defensive drone operations. Meanwhile, Russia has significantly enhanced its drone capabilities, eroding Kyiv’s previous advantage in this domain and complicating Ukrainian defensive efforts. In particular, technological innovations extended the range of Russian drones significantly in 2025. Overall, it remains unclear whether Russian forces will be able to increase the intensity of its operations in 2026 still further, and if its rate of advance will increase.
• OFFENSIVES: Ultimately, the pace of advance remains slow and efforts to seize the remainder of Donetsk oblast alone will take years at the current rate. However, we assess that Moscow hopes that its attritional strategy will begin to bear more fruit in 2026, with Ukrainian personnel shortages likely to steadily worsen and expose more areas of the frontline to Russian infiltration. The Pokrovsk-Myrnohrad sector (Donetsk oblast) will likely remain the priority for both sides in early 2026. Although Russian forces made steady gains here in 2025, they have not fully captured it. Ukrainian forces still pose an active defence despite Russia’s significant deployment of resources to the sector. Ultimately, we assess that growing strain on personnel will continue to weigh on Ukraine’s ability to sustain defence on multiple fronts, risking Russian advances in other areas.
• ZAPORIZHZHIA: The situation in and around Huliapole (Zaporizhzhia oblast) in recent months, where Russia has made relatively quick gains, highlights the growing difficulties Ukrainian forces faced in defending various fronts simultaneously in 2025. At the end of December 2025, Russia claimed full control of Huliapole; however, Ukraine denied these claims. OSINT evidence confirms Russia’s presence within the city, but Moscow does not appear to control the entire urban centre. Some of the key causes of Ukrainian losses in this area likely included forces not being rotated or reinforced, leaving them vulnerable when Russian pressure intensified. Meanwhile, a lack of coherent command and the prioritisation of other fronts, such as Pokrovsk and Kupiansk, also likely contributed to the Ukrainian withdrawals in this area over the last couple of months.
• STRIKES: In 2025, Russia’s strike campaign markedly intensified, with a further intensification of long-range strikes likely in 2026. According to the Ukrainian government-run platform United24, Russian forces launched over 60,000 glide bombs, 100,000 drones and 2,400 missiles of various types in 2025. By comparison, in 2023 and 2024 combined, Russian forces launched 15,000 drones. The sharp increase in drones (also observed to a certain extent for missiles) underscores the Kremlin’s success in mobilising its defence industrial base and expanding production to support its strike campaign. This has allowed Russia to pursue a strike saturation strategy, involving daily strikes as well as large semi-regular barrages (several hundred aerial threats in a single attack) to overwhelm Ukrainian air defences.
• STRIKES: Russia continues to modify its drones to reduce their vulnerability to Ukrainian interception, which will further undermine Ukrainian air defence capabilities in 2026. A prominent Russian ‘milblogger’ reported that developers have added self-destruct features to some of their Shahed-type drones to allow for remote detonation. This modification aims to prevent Ukrainian forces from analysing the drones and reverse engineering them to develop new counter-measures. Meanwhile, Ukrainian sources have claimed that Russian forces are also equipping some of their drones with man-portable air defence systems (MANPADS) capable of targeting aircraft. If Russian engineers systematically incorporate such MANPADS, it is likely to complicate Ukraine’s interception efforts by increasing the threat to aircraft supporting air defence operations – including F-16s.
• STRIKES: During the festive period, the Kremlin issued a warning that it would respond to an alleged Ukrainian drone attack on one of President Vladimir Putin’s residences in Novgorod oblast. We assessed that any retaliation would likely take the form of large-scale strikes, possibly launched consecutively (see Sibylline Alert – 30 December 2025). However, while Russia continued its air assault on Ukraine, such a response did not materialise, and long-range attacks remained consistent with prior trends. We assess that Russia sought to use these allegations to portray Ukraine as attempting to disrupt peace negotiations and to influence US President Donald Trump’s posture towards Kyiv. Additionally, Russia highly likely intended to exploit these claims as a pretext for escalating its long-range strike campaign.
• STRIKES: More broadly, we assess that Russia is highly likely to seek further pretexts or prepare false flag operations to advance the objectives outlined above, including launching significant strikes. Russian officials renewed calls to intensify the strike campaign following accusations that Ukraine had targeted civilian sites in Russian-occupied territory in Kherson oblast on 1 January during New Year celebrations. Meanwhile, on 2 January, Ukraine’s Foreign Intelligence Service warned that the Kremlin is likely to orchestrate a false flag attack within Russia or in Russian-occupied territories in the run-up to or during Orthodox Christmas (7 January), aiming to undermine the US-mediated peace talks. The intelligence agency explained that this assessment was based on recent trends in the Kremlin’s disinformation campaign. For further analysis on the ongoing peace process, see PEACE below.
• STRIKES: Russia continues to target Ukraine’s railway infrastructure heavily. Some of these attacks are being launched from Belarusian territory in a bid to bypass Ukrainian interception systems and reach infrastructure in central and western Ukraine. The Ukrainian authorities reported damage to railway infrastructure in Odesa, Sumy and Volyn oblasts from Russian strikes on 1 January. Last year, we reported on Russia’s frequent strikes against railway infrastructure, predominantly in eastern Ukraine; the latest attacks indicate greater efforts to target such infrastructure in western and southern regions. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stated that, on 26 December 2025, Russia used Belarusian territory to launch drone strikes against Ukrainian railway infrastructure in the west of the country, including in Lviv and Volyn oblasts. We assess that Ukrainian railway infrastructure will remain a priority target for Russian strikes, aimed at disrupting the flow of military equipment to the front and intensifying logistical challenges. Co-ordinated drone attacks from Belarusian territory are likely to increase the reach of these strikes, enabling them to target areas in western Ukraine and increasing the knock-on disruption risks for business operations there which are reliant upon railway systems.

POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS

• PEACE: On 23 December 2025, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky unveiled details for the first time of a revised peace plan to end the Russo-Ukrainian war. Seemingly, the new 20-point plan has reworked the initial US-backed framework, which consisted of 28 points and was largely favourable to Russia. Zelensky has stated that the peace plan is ‘90% complete’.
• PEACE: The current plan envisions a de facto line of contact determined by both sides’ military positions on the date that they sign the peace framework. Russia has demanded Ukraine’s withdrawal from Donbas region (i.e. Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts) repeatedly, with control over this territory remaining a principal Russian war objective. Consequently, Russia is highly unlikely to entertain proposals to create an ‘economic zone’ in Donbas as a compromise in the foreseeable future; the new proposals whereby the Ukrainian police would administer such a zone are almost certainly a non-starter for the Kremlin (see Sibylline Ukraine Update – 16 December 2025). There is a possibility that Moscow may be willing to make smaller, less strategically significant territorial concessions in Dnipropetrovsk, Kharkiv, Mykolaiv and Sumy oblasts as part of a peace deal. However, Russia is unlikely to agree to forfeit the Ukrainian regions that it has officially annexed (namely Donetsk, Kherson, Luhansk and Zaporizhzhia oblasts).
• PEACE: Ukrainian and US proposals for territory and the Russian-occupied Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant (ZNPP; Zaporizhzhia oblast) do not align with Russia’s terms for ending the war; the Kremlin is highly unlikely to soften its stance on these issues in the near-to-medium term. The Trump administration has proposed the ZNPP to be equally and jointly operated by Russia, Ukraine and the US, with the latter serving as the primary overseer of the plant. By contrast, Ukraine has opposed Russian control of the ZNPP, instead advocating for joint US-Ukrainian management of the facility. As part of Kyiv’s proposition, 50% of the facility’s generated electricity would be distributed to Ukraine-controlled territories, with Washington DC able to determine where the remaining half of the electricity is sent. On 3 January, Russia-appointed ZNPP director Yuri Chernichuk claimed that the facility is Russian and ruled out the possibility of joint management.
• PEACE: Remarks from the Russian Foreign Ministry reinforce our assessment that Moscow does not consider ceasing hostilities and signing a peace deal to be in its current interests. In an interview on 24 December 2025, Deputy Foreign Minister Sergei Ryabkov implied that reports detailing progress in peace negotiations should not be interpreted as a sign that Russia is prepared to ink any ‘packages of documents right now’. Furthermore, Ryabkov insisted that there is ‘no alternative’ to the terms discussed between Russian and US negotiators at the bilateral summit in Alaska (US) in August 2025. Details of the Alaska summit’s negotiations remain limited. We assess that Russian officials will likely continue to reference the terms allegedly agreed at the Alaska summit in the coming months, arguing that the newly proposed peace terms do not align with Moscow’s long-term objectives and minimal war aims.
• VENEZUELA: We assess that the US’ military operation in Venezuela on 3 January will likely reinforce Russia’s lack of interest in reaching a peace agreement in the short-to-medium term. We have assessed repeatedly that Moscow is highly likely counting on outlasting the West, believing that time is on its side and that competing geopolitical crises will direct attention away from Ukraine. We assess that perceptions that the US’ attention is divided will further reduce Russia’s incentive to reach a deal. In the coming weeks, should Venezuelan opposition figures contest the leadership of acting President Delcy Rodríguez, or if she fails to co-operate satisfactorily with the Trump administration, this will likely push the US to focus on stabilising the situation. In this scenario, US efforts to end the war would likely lose momentum (at least temporarily), with Russia likely to continue feigning interest in peace talks while prioritising efforts to capture more territory in Ukraine.

FORECAST

RESHUFFLE: The recent shakeup of the Ukrainian government and security services is likely the most extensive and significant since the beginning of the full-scale invasion of Ukraine. On 2 January, President Zelensky appointed Kyrylo Budanov, the hawkish head of Ukraine’s military intelligence (GUR), to be the new presidential chief of staff. Budanov’s appointment follows a large-scale corruption scandal and the subsequent resignation of his predecessor, Andriy Yermak. We assess that Budanov’s appointment likely aims to reboot the influence of the Presidential Office after Yermak’s departure and restore public trust. During his tenure, Yermak amassed significant political influence, which had raised concerns about a growing centralisation of power and growing resentment among various sections of the government. We assess that, at least in the short term, Budanov is unlikely to wield the power and influence his predecessor Yermak did. Nevertheless, Budanov enjoys considerable support among the Ukrainian population and has been credited with overseeing several highly ambitious operations against Russia. A survey requested by the consulting firm American Political Services in October found that 57.6% of Ukrainians trust him.

Budanov’s appointment highly likely seeks to strengthen Ukraine’s negotiating position amid intensified US-led talks aimed at ending the war. As head of the Presidential Office, Budanov will be Ukraine’s top peace negotiator and lead discussions concerning Ukraine’s security guarantees and other defence issues. As he is known for being hawkish, Budanov may take a hardline approach to various issues and concessions. However, Budanov likely accepts the necessity of dealing with Washington DC and the growing pressure for Kyiv to illustrate its willingness to make concessions to end the war. Additionally, Budanov has notable connections with the US and has participated in a CIA-backed training programme. Budanov has also been involved in prisoner exchanges between Russia and Ukraine, underscoring his ability and willingness to engage successfully with the Kremlin (albeit on tactical prisoner exchanges). Ultimately, Budanov’s previous credentials as head of GUR, his ties to the US and previous involvement in negotiations are likely aimed at improving ties with the US amid a critical period of diplomacy. Furthermore, Budanov’s appointment will reduce the risk of the US suspending military intelligence sharing with Ukraine if talks break down or if Washington DC attempts to force Kyiv to accept unfavourable peace terms in the coming months.

The reshuffle is unlikely to weaken the operational capability of various Ukrainian intelligence services significantly in the short term. Budanov will be replaced by Oleh Ivashchenko as head of GUR. Ivashchenko is the current Foreign Intelligence Service (SZRU) chief; he served previously as the deputy chief of military intelligence between 2015 and 2024. Meanwhile, on 5 January, Zelensky announced that Vasyl Maliuk will step down as the head of the Security Service of Ukraine (SBU), the country’s de facto internal security and counter-intelligence agency (which also acts independently in the war alongside the GUR and the SZRU). Maliuk will remain in the SBU to focus on counter-espionage operations against Russia. Under Maliuk, the SBU conducted several high-profile operations deep inside de jure Russian territory, including Operation Spiderweb (see Sibylline Ukraine Update – 2 June 2025). Although two senior Ukrainian military commanders have warned against Maliuk’s dismissal due to concerns it could weaken the SBU, his possible replacement Yevheniy Khmara is an experienced special forces officer. This will likely mitigate against a significant decline in the SBU’s capabilities in the near term.

Another notable portfolio change concerns the defence ministry’s leadership. On 2 January, Zelensky proposed appointing Mykhailo Fedorov as Ukraine’s new defence minister. Fedorov has served as the Minister of Digital Transformation since 2019; he has no formal military background. We assess that his nomination likely indicates an effort to strengthen Ukraine’s military technological innovations, specifically regarding drones and digitalising procurement. We will continue to monitor the ongoing government reshuffle and its implications for Ukraine and peace negotiations.

• Ukraine: Russian opposition will reduce likelihood of post-war troop deployments by France, UK. On 6 January, France and the UK signed a declaration of intent to send troops to Ukraine in the event of a peace deal, following a summit of the so-called Coalition of the Willing. French President Emmanuel Macron stated that if deployed after a ceasefire, such a force would aim to provide reassurance to Ukraine and that it would be positioned far from the line of contact. Meanwhile, UK Prime Minister Keir Starmer claimed that his country and France would ‘establish military hubs’ across Ukraine. However, details regarding the size of such a deployment remain unknown. France and the UK have been the most vocal European states in support of deploying troops to post-war Ukraine; this signed declaration likely formalises their commitment and paves the way for any such future action. However, we assess that in the foreseeable future, Russia will highly likely remain opposed to European troops’ presence in Ukraine following a ceasefire, reducing the likelihood of such a deployment.
• Ukraine: Russian opposition will reduce likelihood of post-war troop deployments by France, UK. On 6 January, France and the UK signed a declaration of intent to send troops to Ukraine in the event of a peace deal, following a summit of the so-called Coalition of the Willing. French President Emmanuel Macron stated that if deployed after a ceasefire, such a force would aim to provide reassurance to Ukraine and that it would be positioned far from the line of contact. Meanwhile, UK Prime Minister Keir Starmer claimed that his country and France would ‘establish military hubs’ across Ukraine. However, details regarding the size of such a deployment remain unknown. France and the UK have been the most vocal European states in support of deploying troops to post-war Ukraine; this signed declaration likely formalises their commitment and paves the way for any such future action. However, we assess that in the foreseeable future, Russia will highly likely remain opposed to European troops’ presence in Ukraine following a ceasefire, reducing the likelihood of such a deployment.

Jan 05.

• Ukraine: Extensive government reshuffle likely aims to restore domestic, international trust. On 2 January, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky announced a major restructuring of the government and security services. The changes include key government portfolios, such as in the ministries of defence and energy. Furthermore, Zelensky appointed the leader of Ukraine’s military intelligence (GUR) Kyrylo Budanov as the head of the Presidential Office. This move replaces Andriy Yermak, who resigned amid a major corruption investigation. The changes also affect key positions within Kyiv’s security apparatus; however, Zelensky stated that he is not considering replacing Commander-in-Chief Oleksandr Syrskyi. Zelensky’s reshuffle is likely the largest political reconfiguration since the Russo-Ukrainian war started; it is taking place during a critical period for the country amid intense diplomatic activity to end the conflict. We assess that Zelensky’s move highly likely aims to restore trust with Kyiv’s diplomatic partners and also domestically, as public trust has likely declined due to the recent corruption scandal involving high-ranking government personnel.

(Source: Sibylline)

 

08 Jan 26. Ukraine received no Gravehawk air defence systems from UK in 2025. Supply chains issues, training, and even the weather could have been potential factors that caused the delays.

• Out of the public eye, the UK has been developing air defence systems for Ukraine for years, with platforms in-country since 2023
• The Gravehawk and Raven GBAD systems have been developed by the UK, firing missiles known to be in Ukraine’s inventory
• However, apparent delays to Gravehawk deliveries have been revealed following a release of a parliamentary note

Newly disclosed data by the UK Ministry of Defence (MoD) has revealed that Ukraine received no additional Gravehawk ground-based air defence systems (GBAD) from the UK last year, despite earlier assertions that 15 units would be delivered in 2025. In a 6 January parliamentary written response by Armed Forces Minister Al Carns, it was disclosed that the first batch of the 15 additional Gravehawk systems would be delivered “soon”. Two prototype systems of the secretive air defence capability were delivered to Ukraine in 2024, likely for testing and evaluation before rolling the programme out at scale. Loaded into the Gravehawk appear to be R-73 air-to-air missiles adapted for ground launch operations. Credit: UK DE&S. The cause for the apparent delay in delivery of Gravehawk to Ukraine has not been disclosed, but it is thought likely that factors such as delays to supplier part deliveries, training of Ukrainian personnel, and even potentially the weather, have been factors. Additionally, while the delivery timelines were not disclosed by Carns, the relative simplicity of the platform should enable, sans delivery issues, to produce the platforms in quick order. It is thought likely that the bulk of the additional Gravehawks will be delivered in Q1 2026, with the UK potentially completing the order by the end of the summer.

Gravehawk: GBAD in a box

The UK government had earlier described Gravehawk as a UK designed “mobile air defence system” the size of a shipping container and able to “retrofit” air-to-air missiles into a ground-based air defence role. The system was jointly funded with Denmark. Analysis of subsequently released imagery shows that the GBAD system is a containerised launch unit, appearing capable of firing the R-73 short range air-to-air missiles known to be in service with Ukraine. The R-73 Vympel, known as the AA-11 Archer in Nato, has an infrared homing sensor, speed of around Mach 2.5, and a range of around 30km.

UK completes Raven GBAD deliveries

However, more positively, the MoD confirmed that it had delivered five additional Raven GBAD systems to Ukraine between mid-May and the end of 2025, bringing the total number of the UK designed system to 13 platforms. In 2023, the UK delivered a first batch of eight Raven platforms. Similar in concept to Gravehawk, the Raven GBAD uses a Supacat HMT 600 platform as a host vehicle, mounting a launcher that can fire two ASRAAM short-range air-to-air missiles from the flatbed. Ukraine is desperate for additional air defence systems, with Russia transitioning in 2025 to the widespread use of long-range loitering munitions and missile strikes against civil and military targets throughout the country.

UK has been developing systems for Ukraine for years

Behind the public headlines, it is clear that the UK is continuing to provide significant technical and capability expertise to Ukraine, across a range of areas, particularly, but by no means limited to, air defence systems. As well as Gravehawk and Raven, UK forces have helped Ukraine adapt the UK’s own Brimstone land-attack missiles, provided in unknown quantities, into a vehicle-based ‘MLRS-like’ capability. As ever, assistance rendered by UK industry or military forces inside Ukraine comes at a significant risk to personal safety, a fact highlighted by the recent fatal accident of a UK soldier serving with the 1st Battalion, the Parachute Regiment (1 PARA), while observing Ukrainian personnel testing – according to the UK government – a “new defensive capability” away from the front lines. Highly trained, 1 PARA is permanently under the command of the British Army’s Director Special Forces. (Source: army-technology.com)

 

08 Jan 26. Ukraine’s New AIR Speed Interceptor Drone for Targeting Small-Sized Objects. A Ukrainian defence-tech company has unveiled the new AIR Speed interceptor drone, which expands its lineup of unmanned systems designed to counter aerial threats. The drone was developed by the General Cherry, a company known for its FPV drones and interceptor drone solutions. The AIR Speed is a new addition to the General Cherry AIR series. This drone is specifically designed to combat small, fast, and highly maneuverable enemy strike UAVs. Russia is actively using Shahed-type kamikaze drones and other models to attack Ukrainian cities and infrastructure. Their speed and unpredictable trajectories make interception a challenging task. The AIR Speed is built on a compact 8-inch frame, which reduces its size and enhances maneuverability. The drone’s maximum speed reaches 236 km/h. Unlike the AIR Pro version, the new drone performs different tasks. It complements the lineup of interceptors, expanding the range of tools for countering various types of aerial threats. The smaller size and high flight dynamics allow the AIR Speed to operate in scenarios where larger interceptors are limited due to inertia and insufficient speed buildup. The AIR Speed is designed for tasks where decisive factors are rapid approach speed, sharp maneuvers, and targeting small-sized objects. The company has announced that the AIR Speed is now available for orders on the Brave1 platform, which brings together Ukrainian defense-tech developments. It is worth noting that in December of last year, the Ukrainian interceptor drone General Cherry AIR destroyed one of the newest and rarest Russian reconnaissance UAVs – the Knyaz Veshchy Oleg. The successful interception of an aerial target was carried out by the crew of Hrim from the 55th Artillery Brigade “Zaporozhian Sich.” The Knyaz Veshchy Oleg drone is positioned by the Russian defense industry as the most advanced model for deep air reconnaissance. (Source: UAS VISION/MILITARNYI)

 

07 Jan 26. Ukraine showcases new procurement system with UAV acquisition changes. Ukraine’s Ministry of Defence (MoD) has combined various procurement management bodies into a single defence procurement entity as of 1 January 2026, according to a 1 January news release. Ukraine’s State Operator for Non-Lethal Acquisition – State Logistics Operator (Derzhavnuy Operator Tylu: DOT) has been merged into the Defence Procurement Agency (DPA). The plan for a unified acquisition agency, intended to centralise contracts for lethal and non-lethal equipment including clothing and food, was announced by Ukraine’s then Defence Minister Denys Shmyhal on 30 December 2025.  The DOT-Chain Defence system was highlighted as a key achievement in the Ukraine MoD’s 1 January news release. The system “digitised nearly 70%” of all documentation related to the supply of weapons and logistics, according to the MoD. DOT-Chain Defence is a digital platform designed to accelerate the supply of weapons to the Armed Forces of Ukraine (AFU) by allowing military units to independently select and order military equipment. It was launched in July 2025 and gives an opportunity for manufacturers to access direct feedback from military units based near the front line, according to a 7 July 2025 MoD press release. (Source: Janes)

 

07 Jan 26. US backs security guarantees for Ukraine at summit of Kyiv’s allies in Paris.

• Summary
• Commitment comes at ‘coalition of willing’ gathering
• Security protocols ‘as strong as anyone has ever seen,’ Witkoff says
• Guarantees would enter into force after ceasefire
• Question mark hangs over Russian response

The United States for the first time on Tuesday backed a broad coalition of Ukraine’s allies in vowing to provide security guarantees that leaders said would include binding commitments to support the country if Russia attacks again. The pledge came at a summit in Paris of the “coalition of the willing” of mainly European nations to firm up guarantees to reassure Kyiv in the event of a ceasefire with Russia, which invaded its neighbour in 2014 and again at full scale in 2022. Read about innovative ideas and the people working on solutions to global crises with the Reuters Beacon newsletter. Sign up here. Unlike previous coalition meetings, the summit was also attended by U.S. envoys Steve Witkoff and Jared Kushner – President Donald Trump’s son-in-law – as well as America’s top general in Europe, Alexus Grynkewich, who a day earlier fleshed out details of security guarantees with European army chiefs. Witkoff, who has led talks with Russia, said after the summit that Trump “strongly stands behind security protocols”.

“Those security protocols are meant to … deter any attacks, any further attacks in Ukraine, and … if there are any attacks, they’re meant to defend, and they will do both. They are as strong as anyone has ever seen,” he said at a joint news conference with the French, German, British and Ukrainian leaders.

Kushner said that if Ukrainians were to make a final deal “they have to know that after a deal they are secure, they have, obviously, a robust deterrence, and there’s real backstops to make sure that this will not happen again.”

PROPOSAL FOR US TO LEAD CEASEFIRE MONITORING

A statement by coalition leaders also said that allies will participate in a proposed U.S.-led ceasefire monitoring and verification mechanism. Officials have said this would likely involve drones, sensors and satellites, not U.S. troops. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskiy, writing on Telegram after the meeting, said the agreements were “a signal of how seriously Europe and the entire coalition of the willing are ready to work for real security”. But he added that it remained to be determined how the monitoring would work and how the Ukrainian army would be supported and financed. He thanked the United States “for its readiness to be a backstop in all areas – security guarantees, monitoring a ceasefire and rebuilding.” He said the Ukrainian delegation would continue its talks on key issues on Wednesday. The statement was not explicitly endorsed by the United States and details of a U.S. role were watered down from an earlier draft, notably removing language that outlined the use of U.S. capabilities to support a multinational force in Ukraine. But European officials hailed the involvement of the U.S. envoys and their strong comments as evidence Washington stood behind the security framework.

Item 1 of 7 A firefighter works at the site of a residential complex damaged during an overnight Russian drone strike, amid Russia’s attack on Ukraine, in Zaporizhzhia, Ukraine, January 2, 2026. REUTERS/Stringer

[1/7]A firefighter works at the site of a residential complex damaged during an overnight Russian drone strike, amid Russia’s attack on Ukraine, in Zaporizhzhia, Ukraine, January 2, 2026. REUTERS/Stringer Purchase Licensing Rights

Talks to bring the almost four-year war to an end have accelerated since November. However, Moscow has yet to signal willingness to make concessions after Kyiv pushed for changes to a U.S. proposal that initially backed Russia’s main demands. Moscow has also given no public sign that it would accept a peace deal with the security guarantees envisaged by Ukraine’s allies. Russia has previously rejected any NATO members having troops inside Ukraine.

FOCUS ON LEGALLY BINDING SECURITY GUARANTEES

Until recently, much of the allies’ focus was on pledges of military aid for Ukraine’s forces and possible contributions to an international reassurance force. But attention has now shifted to legally binding guarantees to come to Kyiv’s aid in the event of another attack by Moscow. The possibility of a military response is likely to trigger debate in many European countries, diplomats say.

“These commitments may include the use of military capabilities, intelligence and logistical support, diplomatic initiatives, adoption of additional sanctions,” the leaders’ statement said, adding that they would now “finalise binding commitments.”

European leaders present at the meeting, including French President Emmanuel Macron, British Prime Minister Keir Starmer, Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk and Italy’s Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni stressed that the statement showed renewed unity between Europe and the United States on helping Ukraine.

Macron and Starmer brushed aside questions about whether they could rely on commitments by Trump, particularly given his renewed claims that the U.S. should take over Greenland, an autonomous part of NATO ally Denmark.

FRANCE, BRITAIN READY TO DEPLOY TROOPS AFTER CEASEFIRE

The leaders’ statement also pledged a European-led “Multinational Force for Ukraine … to support the rebuilding of Ukraine’s armed forces and support deterrence” with “the proposed support of the U.S”. France and Britain signed a declaration of intent on the future deployment of multinational forces once a ceasefire is reached. Macron said that could involve sending thousands of French troops.

“It paves the way for the legal framework under which British, French and partner forces could operate on Ukrainian soil, securing Ukraine’s skies and seas and regenerating Ukraine’s armed forces for the future,” Starmer said. (Source: Reuters)

 

06 Jan 26. Cuashub.com said today that Ukraine scales up production of counter-drone interceptors. Ukraine is producing between 500 and 800 counter-UAS interceptor drones per day, according to a report by The Kyiv Post, as part of a broader effort to strengthen layered defenses against Russian drone attacks. Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of Ukraine Oleksandr Syrsky said the production surge reflects the changing nature of the aerial threat, with Russian forces adapting their tactics and technology.

“The enemy is taking advantage of weather conditions, modernizing its strike drones and changing tactics, including attacks at ultra-low altitudes,” Syrsky was quoted as saying. “Accordingly, we are modernizing our countermeasures and adapting the system to achieve the necessary results.”

Syrsky said a key priority is expanding Ukraine’s interceptor drone capability, including increasing the number of drones, ground control stations, radars and trained crews. President Volodymyr Zelensky previously stated that Ukraine aimed to reach production levels of 500 to 800 interceptors per day by November, a target that now appears to have been met.

Incentive-based procurement model

Central to the expansion is Ukraine’s “Army of Drones Bonus” program, an incentive-based procurement system that allows service members to earn points by destroying or damaging enemy targets. These points can then be exchanged for drones and other equipment needed for combat missions. Procurement and delivery are managed by the Defence Procurement Agency (DPA) through the DOT-Chain Defence digital platform, which links military units directly with manufacturers. The system enables contract signing, prioritization of demand, and coordinated delivery to frontline units. According to a statement from Ukraine’s Ministry of Defence, the DPA added tactical interceptor drones to the DOT-Chain Defence marketplace in the autumn to counter enemy reconnaissance and strike UAVs. Contracts have been signed with six domestic manufacturers, and nearly 5,000 interceptor drones had been delivered to military units by the end of December.

Feedback-driven supply strategy

DPA Director Arsen Zhumadilov said the agency is shifting away from a top-down supply model toward one that incorporates frontline feedback.

“We are changing the logic of the supply process, focusing not only on delivering equipment to the military but also on their feedback and expertise,” Zhumadilov said.

He added that surveys of service members are used to identify which interceptor drone models are most effective in combat, with procurement decisions increasingly guided by operational performance.

The interceptor drones form a critical element of Ukraine’s evolving counter-drone architecture, which combines kinetic interception, electronic warfare, sensors and air-defense systems to counter the growing volume and sophistication of Russian drone operations. https://cuashub.com/en/content/ukraine-scales-up-production-of-counter-drone-interceptors/ (Source: https://cuashub.com/

 

02 Jan 26. Germany to host small-drones production line for Ukrainian forces. German drone maker Quantum Systems and Ukraine-based Frontline Robotics have announced the creation of a new mass-production line for small drones in Germany to supply the Ukrainian Armed Forces. The new joint venture, dubbed Quantum Frontline Industries (QFI), will manufacture the Zoom and Linza drone variants developed by the Ukrainian company. Production is expected to begin in the first quarter of 2026 and is envisioned in the longer term to reach 10,000 units per year, according to a Frontline Robotics spokesperson. The Linza is designed to perform strike and reconnaissance missions and is able to carry a maximum payload of two kilograms at ranges up to ten kilometers. It is equipped with a communication link resistant to electronic warfare. The Zoom is a reconnaissance drone developed for frontline use.

“Over 60 units [in Ukraine] trust our drones – their primary areas of application are: target acquisition and artillery fire adjustment, transmitting coordinates for combat planning, operating at night and under jamming conditions, and highly resistant to enemy EW,” the spokesperson said in an email to Defense News.

Under the partnership, Quantum Systems will establish a fully automated production line in Germany and Frontline Robotics will provide licensed production rights and additional support, including operator training. The project is expected to generate employment opportunities for Ukrainians in Germany. In a press release, the companies stated that this was the first initiative of Ukrainian drones to be produced on an industrial scale in Europe and called the transnational co-production “the new German Model.” Ukrainian forces have been operating the Quantum Systems-made Vector drones since 2022, with hundreds of units delivered since then, per a company statement. (Source: Defense News)

 

02 Jan 26. “Army of Drones” incentive scheme boosts Ukraine’s C-UAS interceptor production. According to a report in The Kyiv Post, Ukraine is producing between 500 and 800 C-UAS intercept drones a day as a key element in the country’s new layered counter drone defence networks, supported by a new procurement strategy. Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of Ukraine (AFU) Oleksandr Syrsky was quoted in the report as saying: “The enemy is taking advantage of weather conditions, modernizing its strike drones and changing tactics, including attacks at ultra-low altitudes…. Accordingly, we are modernizing our countermeasures and adapting the system to achieve the necessary results. Our key task at this stage is to strengthen the UAV interceptor direction – to increase the number of relevant drones, ground stations and radars, and to expand both the volume and quality of crew training,” he said. Previously, President Volodymyr Zelensky said Ukraine would be producing of 500 to 800 interceptors per day by November. At the heart of this increased procurement drive is “Army of Drones Bonus” incentive programme. Under this scheme, service members earn points for destroying and damaging enemy targets and exchange them for the drones and equipment they need to accomplish combat missions. The supply process is managed by the Defence Procurement Agency (DPA) through the DOT-Chain Defence digital system. Within it, contracts with manufacturers are concluded, and the direct delivery of drones and other equipment to military units is coordinated. According to a Ukraine defence ministry statement: “In the autumn, the DPA added tactical-level interceptor drones to the weapons marketplace, which help counter enemy reconnaissance and strike UAVs on the frontline. Overall, as part of supplying the military through its IT system, the DPA has signed contracts with six manufacturers of this type of UAV. As of the end of December, the military had received nearly 5,000 interceptor drones through DOT-Chain Defence.”

“We are changing the logic of the supply process, focusing not only on delivering equipment to the military but also on their feedback and expertise,” said Arsen Zhumadilov, Director of the DPA, quoted by the defence ministry. “ The DPA team conducted surveys among service members to identify the interceptor drone models they use and consider most effective. We therefore prioritize contracting with the manufacturers of these systems,”.

For more information: https://mod.gov.ua/en/news/anti-shahed-drones-to-be-supplied-to-the-military-through-dot-chain-defence (Source: www.unmannedairspace.info)

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Founded in 1987, Exensor Technology is a world leading supplier of Networked Unattended Ground Sensor (UGS) Systems providing tailored sensor solutions to customers all over the world. From our Headquarters in Lund Sweden, our centre of expertise in Network Communications at Communications Research Lab in Kalmar Sweden and our Production site outside of Basingstoke UK, we design, develop and produce latest state of the art rugged UGS solutions at the highest quality to meet the most stringent demands of our customers. Our systems are in operation and used in a wide number of Military as well as Homeland Security applications worldwide. The modular nature of the system ensures any external sensor can be integrated, providing the user with a fully meshed “silent” network capable of self-healing. Exensor Technology will continue to lead the field in UGS technology, provide our customers with excellent customer service and a bespoke package able to meet every need.

A CNIM Group Company

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Sponsored by Bertin Exensor

www.exensor.com

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09 Jan 26. Pentagon outlines the growing threat posed by the PLA. The Pentagon issued the latest edition of its annual report entitled “Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China” on 23 December 2025. It highlighted how Chairman Xi Jinping continues to invest heavily in the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) as it approaches his 2027 “centennial military building goal”.
Dr. Andrew Erickson, Professor of Strategy at the US Naval War College, noted one important revelation in the 2025 Pentagon report. It surrounds confirmation that China has fielded the conventional DF-27 intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM). The DF-27 features both land-attack and anti-ship capabilities, thanks to different missile variants.
Erickson noted, “This makes China the first nation publicly assessed to have fielded an operational, conventionally armed ICBM…albeit at the low end of the ICBM range band and with variant-dependent roles. America’s homeland is not a sanctuary from either PRC nuclear or conventional missiles.”
The DF-27 has an estimated range of up to 8,000km, meaning it can reach targets in the northwest continental USA, plus Hawaii and Alaska. As such, China’s longest-range anti-ship missile puts US Navy vessels at risk almost anywhere in the Pacific Ocean.
Indeed, China has created the world’s largest arsenal of ground-launched ballistic and cruise missiles in the intermediate range (500-5,500km).The DF-27 is a global first, and the 2024 report also said the DF-27 may have a hypersonic glide vehicle payload option.
Erickson commented too, “China today has the world’s most active and diverse ballistic missile development programme, rapidly producing and fielding purpose-built systems at staggering scope and scale.”
The Pentagon report also assessed that “China has the world’s leading hypersonic missile arsenal, and continued to advance the development of conventional and nuclear-armed hypersonic missile technologies during the past year”.
The DF-27 is a conventionally armed intercontinental ballistic missile, the only one of its type in the world. (Chinese internet)
Erickson added, “China’s fielded hypersonic missiles, including its anti-ship ballistic missile families, combine very high speed with manoeuvrability to greatly complicate missile defence and fleet operations. Manoeuvring payloads can approach from unexpected azimuths, fly at lower-than-traditional trajectories, and potentially exploit gaps in radar and interceptor coverage”
He concluded: “Taken together, China’s anti-ship ballistic missiles – now potentially extending to intercontinental ranges with the DF-27 – pose a potent threat to surface ships across much of the Pacific. In effect, they constitute a new form of naval force.”
The American professor believes “China has dramatically changed the naval balance and the prospective ways of war in the Western Pacific and beyond”.
The Pentagon report explained that China has pursued the world’s most rapid and expansive build-up of nuclear and conventional ballistic missiles. Beijing multiplied its operational nuclear-warhead stockpile from the low 200s in 2020 to the low 600s by the end of 2024. China is on track to surpass 1,000 nuclear warheads by 2030.
Shandong (background) with the newer Fujian aircraft carrier (foreground) at Sanya Naval Base on Hainan Island. (chinamil.com)
The Pentagon also speculated about how many aircraft carriers the PLA Navy (PLAN) wants. “The PLAN aims to produce six aircraft carriers by 2035, for a total of nine.” This figure is higher than what many predict. Indeed, nine Chinese carriers would compare favourably with the eleven that the US Navy possesses.
Erickson commented, “Building six aircraft carriers by 2035 would head Beijing toward some semblance of blue-water force structure parity with Washington, but would be a heavy lift indeed.” This is because it took China ten years to complete its third carrier Fujian. Satellite imagery shows that a fourth – likely nuclear-powered – carrier is now under construction.
The report also confirmed that China’s first Type 041 Zhou-class diesel-electric submarine sank at its pier in mid-2024, as it prepared for sea trials. Another interesting snippet is that the PLAN now has a naval facility operational at Ream Naval Base in Cambodia. (Source: AMR)

 

08 Jan 26. Trump calls for $1.5trn military budget in 2027, up from $901bn in 2026.
• Summary
• Trump says tariff revenues would pay for spending hike
• Experts say increase would increase debt, cost trillions of dollars
• Last such surge in spending came during Korean War
President Donald Trump said on Wednesday the 2027 U.S. military budget should be $1.5 trillion, significantly higher than the $901bn approved by Congress for 2026, boosting defense stocks, but sparking skepticism among budget experts.
Any such increase in the military budget would require congressional authorization, which could pose a challenge, although Trump’s Republicans, who hold slim majorities in both the Senate and House of Representatives, have shown little appetite for objecting to Trump’s spending plans.
Read about innovative ideas and the people working on solutions to global crises with the Reuters Beacon newsletter. Sign up here.
Trump said in a Truth Social post that he made the decision on 2027 military spending “after long and difficult negotiations with Senators, Congressmen, Secretaries, and other Political Representatives… especially in these very troubled and dangerous times.”
In just the last few days, U.S. forces seized Venezuela’s Nicolas Maduro from his country, toppling him from power. The White House has also said that Trump is discussing options for acquiring Greenland, including potential use of the U.S. military. Trump has also deployed U.S. troops to police a number of cities across the country.
The news followed a separate Truth Social post from Trump blasting defense companies for producing weapons too slowly. In it he pledged to block defense contractors from paying dividends or buying back shares until they accelerated production.
Trump said the extra spending would be covered by revenues generated by tariffs he has imposed on nearly every country and many industrial sectors, and the U.S. would still be able to reduce its debt and send dividend checks to “moderate income” Americans.
The Committee for a Responsible Federal Budget, a nonpartisan think tank, estimated the proposal would cost $5trn through 2035, while adding $5.8trn to the U.S. debt with interest. It said only half the cost could be covered by tariffs in place now, noting that the Supreme Court could rule that a large set of tariffs were illegal.
The Bipartisan Policy Center estimates that combined tariffs raised $288bn in 2025, well below Trump’s own estimates, which have fluctuated around $600bn in recent days.
Byron Callan, a defense analyst with Capital Alpha Partners, said Trump’s post raised questions about where the funds would be directed and whether they could even be absorbed by the defense sector.
He said the last time the U.S. Defense Department saw an increase higher than 50% was in 1951 during the Korean War, with even huge surges in military spending under former President Ronald Reagan in 1981 and 1982 amounting to 25% and 20%.
In trading after the market closed, shares in the biggest defense firms rose on the news as investors bet a surge in spending would bolster profits.
Lockheed Martin was up 6.2%, General Dynamics rose 4.4% and RTX added 3.5%. (Source: Reuters)

 

07 Jan 26. Air Force F-35As Deliver Deterrence at Altitude. The runway trembles as Air Force F-35A Lightning IIs surge forward, heat waves dancing behind their engines. The low growl builds to a thunder, echoing across the skies of the Pacific Ocean.
At the heart of that power is the 356th Expeditionary Fighter Squadron, deployed from Eielson Air Force Base, Alaska, to Kadena Air Base, Japan, as part of the Air Force’s fighter rotation program, and prepared to safeguard the skies whenever a mission calls.
“Our mission is to ensure air dominance whenever and wherever we’re called,” said Air Force Maj. John Toner, deployed director of operations for the fighter squadron. “Every training event and every sortie strengthens our ability to deliver combat airpower and ensure stability across the Pacific.”
However, that readiness isn’t developed overnight.
The squadron regularly integrates with F-35B Lightning II aircraft from Marine Corps Air Station Iwakuni, Japan, refining the ability to generate combat airpower from alternate locations. The squadron also participates in large-scale exercises like Keen Sword, reinforcing interoperability and strengthening the U.S.–Japan alliance across the Indo-Pacific region.
Working alongside E-3 Sentry aircraft from the 961st Airborne Air Control Squadron adds a vital layer of airborne command and control, synchronizing missions across air, land and sea domains. Large-force exercises unite U.S. and Japan Air Self-Defense Force aircraft in coordinated formations, transforming partnership into combat-ready power.
“We’re getting on the same sheet of music and operating at a common level ,” said Air Force Capt. Ryan Beveridge, squadron fighter pilot. “Integrating with our allied partners out here has been invaluable. That kind of trust and understanding is what makes deterrence real.”
Behind every launch are the airmen of the 18th Wing, whose infrastructure and support ensure that rotating units like the 356th EFS can arrive and be airborne almost immediately, maintaining a seamless and persistent presence in the region.
As part of the Pacific Air Forces, the fighter squadron brings the unmatched capabilities of the F-35A: a fifth-generation fighter designed for dominance in contested environments. Its stealth profile, sensor fusion and advanced electronic warfare systems connect every platform on the battlefield, allowing pilots to see farther, decide faster and act decisively.
“The F-35 gives us an edge that extends beyond the jet itself,” Toner said. “It’s a force multiplier that links our forces, amplifying deterrence across the theater.”
Operating from Eielson, just south of the Arctic Circle, the 356th trains year-round in some of the harshest conditions on Earth. That experience builds resilience and adaptability, skills that translate directly to deployed operations. The proximity between Alaska and Okinawa allows the squadron to rapidly deploy and sustain missions anywhere in the Pacific.
“Deterrence at altitude is built on preparation,” Beveridge said. “Every sortie we fly and every partner we train with ensures our allies know we’re ready and our adversaries know we’re capable.”
From Alaska’s icy ranges to Okinawa’s tropical skies, the 356th Expeditionary Fighter Squadron stands as a symbol of American airpower and commitment that is ready, resilient and relentless. (Source: U.S. DoD)

 

06 Jan 26. US-Greenland: Assertive rhetoric over Greenland increases regional tensions, strains NATO alliance. On 6 January, White House press secretary Karoline Leavitt stated that President Donald Trump’s administration is discussing a range of options to acquire Greenland (autonomous territory of Denmark), including utilising the US military. On the same day, Secretary of State Marco Rubio told congressional lawmakers that Trump’s goal is to buy the island from Denmark. Additionally, Senate Majority Leader John Thune dismissed the prospect of deploying the military to seize Greenland. In the immediate term, such statements by US policymakers will strain US-EU relations, as well as increase uncertainty over NATO’s stability given Denmark’s membership in the alliance. We assess that Trump will continue to assert rhetorical pressure on Greenland and Denmark in the short term, in order to capitalise on the administration’s perceived success in Venezuela. However, the US military is highly unlikely to acquire Greenland unilaterally in the coming weeks. Rather, the Trump administration will likely seek to work with Copenhagen to increase Washington DC’s business and military presence on the island, specifically regarding access to critical minerals and maritime entry to the Arctic region. (Source: Sibylline)

 

06 Jan 26. Department of War Establishes New Acquisition Model to More than Triple PAC-3 MSE Production in Partnership With Lockheed Martin. The Department of War (DoW), working in partnership with Lockheed Martin, today announced the signing of a landmark framework agreement that establishes a transformative new acquisition model to expand munitions production and procurement—one that delivers long-term demand certainty, incentivizing industrial investment to increase production, cut lead times, drive supply chain management efficiencies, while reducing upfront government facilitization and capacity investments.
This seven-year framework agreement with Lockheed Martin is a direct outcome of the Department’s new Acquisition Transformation Strategy, as unveiled by Secretary of War Pete Hegseth in his Arsenal of Freedom speech at Fort McNair in November. As the Secretary stated, “We will stabilize demand signals. We will award companies bigger, longer contracts for proven systems so those companies will be confident in investing more to grow the industrial base that supplies our weapons systems more and faster.”
Under the framework agreement, Lockheed Martin will increase annual production of the PAC-3 Missile Segment Enhancement (MSE) interceptor from approximately 600 to 2,000, aligning industrial capacity to the long-term demand required by U.S. forces, allies and partner nations. The agreement also aligns the interests of Lockheed Martin, the government, and taxpayers, with Lockheed Martin supporting investments to scale the required production increases, while benefitting from the certainty of long-term, growing demand for the PAC-3 MSE.
“This framework agreement marks a fundamental shift in how we rapidly expand munitions production and magazine depth, and how we collaborate with our industry partners,” said Michael Duffey, Under Secretary of War for Acquisition and Sustainment. “Lockheed Martin’s willingness to help pioneer this transformative acquisition model is a win-win for the taxpayer, our national security, and the rebuilding of the industrial base needed for the Arsenal of Freedom.”
The framework agreement establishes the basis for negotiating a seven-year supply contract, subject to Congressional authorization and appropriations, that would increase PAC-3 MSE production to approximately 2,000 missiles per year, up from approximately 600 today. The agreement also provides for strict delivery accountability and allows both the Department of War and Lockheed Martin to share in any enhanced profitability resulting from new equipment and volume efficiencies. This facilitization strategy will be applied to multiple munitions procurement contracts over the next year, pending Congressional appropriations, to replenish our stockpiles, rebuild our military, reestablish deterrence and strengthen and grow our defense industrial base.
The Department of War recognizes that supply chain facilitization is also required to support production capacity increases. As part of the framework agreement, the DoW will work with key suppliers of PAC-3 MSE to deliver seven-year subcontracts to ensure facilitization investments and the production capacity of components also expand to meet the increased demand for all-up-rounds.
The PAC-3 MSE framework agreement advances the Department’s acquisition transformation priorities and reflects the execution-focused work of the Department’s Munitions Acceleration Council, as well as the strong partnership with Lockheed Martin. The Council was established to rapidly identify and remove structural barriers to scaling weapons production and to translate urgent operational demand into executable, long-term industrial capacity. (Source: U.S. DoD)

 

02 Jan 26. Removal of National Guard troops will decrease domestic unrest risks moderately in cities. On 31 December 2025, President Donald Trump stated that his administration was removing the National Guard from Chicago (Illinois), Los Angeles (California) and Portland (Oregon). Trump noted that the federal forces will ‘come back’ if crime rates go up. The announcement came shortly after a federal appellate court ruled that the Trump administration had to return hundreds of California National Guard troops to California Governor Gavin Newsom’s control. Additionally, on 23 December 2025, the Supreme Court blocked Trump’s attempt to deploy troops in Illinois. These sustained legal challenges will likely deter the Trump administration from deploying the National Guard in the short-to-medium term. Troop removals will lessen domestic unrest risks immediately in the targeted Democratic-led cities, possibly contributing to lower anti-government sentiment and associated demonstrations. However, federal immigration enforcement raids and personnel will continue to stoke localised backlash, sustaining high levels of activism in cities including Chicago and Los Angeles. Specifically, public large-scale enforcement operations (such as roving raids) will raise domestic unrest risks near federal detention centres and Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) properties. (Source: Sibylline)

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Founded in 1987, Exensor Technology is a world leading supplier of Networked Unattended Ground Sensor (UGS) Systems providing tailored sensor solutions to customers all over the world. From our Headquarters in Lund Sweden, our centre of expertise in Network Communications at Communications Research Lab in Kalmar Sweden and our Production site outside of Basingstoke UK, we design, develop and produce latest state of the art rugged UGS solutions at the highest quality to meet the most string8ent demands of our customers. Our systems are in operation and used in a wide number of Military as well as Homeland Security applications worldwide. The modular nature of the system ensures any external sensor can be integrated, providing the user with a fully meshed “silent” network capable of self-healing. Exensor Technology will continue to lead the field in UGS technology, provide our customers with excellent customer service and a bespoke package able to meet every need.

A CNIM Group Company
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Sponsored by Bertin Exensor

www.exensor.com
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09 Jan 26. UK: Defence funding shortfall will likely drive uncertainty for defence sector, undermine readiness. On 8 January, The Times reported that the Ministry of Defence (MoD) allegedly faces a GBP 28bn (USD 37.5bn) shortfall in funding between 2026 and 2030. Despite government plans to increase defence spending, MoD’s assessments in 2025 reportedly indicated that higher inflation, troop pay rises and nuclear deterrence costs have contributed to a major financing gap. Prime Minister Keir Starmer has ordered defence officials to rework the defence investment plan (DIP), which determines the implementation of the UK’s strategic defence review (SDR). The DIP’s delayed publication will highly likely cause business planning uncertainty for defence and defence-related sectors in the coming months. Amid preparations by senior military officials for cuts and/or delays in key defence programmes, the armed forces’ fiscal situation will likely undermine its ability to implement the government’s stated defence aims effectively. This includes enhancing military readiness to counter increasing Russian aggression and Starmer’s pledge to deploy troops to Ukraine in the event of a peace deal with Russia. However, we assess that the latter pledge faces considerable hurdles and that a peace deal is ultimately unlikely in the short-to-medium term. (Source: Sibylline)

 

08 Jan 26. Denmark-Greenland: Crisis meeting highlights tensions ahead of meeting with US secretary of state. On 7 January, Danish media outlet DR reported that a 6 January meeting between Denmark and Greenland to co-ordinate a response to US pressure had escalated into a dispute. Greenland’s Foreign and Security Policy Committee chair Pipaluk Lynge-Rasmussen reportedly accused Denmark of neo-colonialism after Greenlandic representatives were not invited to a second meeting in the Danish capital Copenhagen to discuss Danish-US relations. Greenland has demanded direct negotiations with the US (i.e. without Danish involvement), which would conflict with the constitution. The confrontation indicates that renewed US efforts to gain control of the semi-autonomous Danish territory have reignited historic tensions between Denmark and Greenland ahead of next week’s meeting with US Secretary of State Marco Rubio. We assess that there is a realistic possibility the rift could increase Greenlandic support for an independence referendum in 2026; opinion polls taken in 2025 already indicated 56% of Greenlanders would vote in favour. Greenland’s independence would likely increase acquisition opportunities for the US, including through a Compact of Free Association (COFA). However, we assess that this remains a long-term prospect. (Source: Sibylline)

 

08 Jan 26. Royal Marines expand Arctic operations with year-round UK-Norway deployments. The two nations are boosting joint capabilities with new weapons, undersea systems, autonomous vehicles, and shared Type 26 frigates.
The UK and Norway have expanded joint military operations in the Arctic Circle, allowing Royal Marines to conduct year-round deployments in Norway following the recent Lunna House agreement.
The arrangement strengthens UK commitments to NATO’s northern flank, with the Commando Force set to operate across Norway’s challenging terrain and emphasises readiness for potential conflict in the region.
The Royal Marines will continue to lead British activities in the area, a statement from the Royal Navy said.
Last year, the UK established Camp Viking near Øverbygd as a permanent base for these activities, facilitating the stationing of 1,500 personnel and equipment including all-terrain vehicles and helicopters from Commando Helicopter Force.
These deployments will see UK forces operating alongside Norwegian troops, as well as marines from the Netherlands.
The collaboration will culminate in Exercise Cold Response in 2026, which is the largest military exercise hosted by Norway and aims to demonstrate NATO’s collective operational strength across fjords and mountain environments.
In addition to ongoing deployments, both the UK and Norway are investing in military capabilities such as uncrewed mine-hunting systems, undersea warfare technology, autonomous underwater vehicles, and an interchangeable fleet of Type 26 frigates.
In August last year, Norway confirmed it would adopt the British Type 26 anti-submarine warfare frigate after a selection process that began in December 2024.
30 Commando Information Exploitation Group commanding officer lieutenant colonel Chris Armstrong said: “The UK Commando Force is stepping up readiness to war-fight alongside our allies in the High North. As NATO’s cold-weather specialists, we are ruthlessly focussed on mission rehearsals with our closest partners. Fusing intelligence, bold commando tactics, and cutting-edge technology – we remain poised for operations.”
The UK Commando Force has undergone modernisation over recent years, incorporating AI-enabled targeting systems, multi-domain fire capabilities, and uncrewed surface vessels.
The implementation of these technologies is intended to provide NATO with operational advantages within the region.
A previous agreement forged between the UK and Norway in 2023 established a strategic partnership focused on countering shared threats, including safeguarding undersea infrastructure. (Source: naval-technology.com)

 

07 Jan 26. UK provides support to U.S. seizure of Bella 1 accused of shadow fleet activities and Iran sanctions breaches.
The UK has provided enabling support to the United States at their request to interdict the vessel Bella 1 today.
The UK has provided enabling support to the United States at their request to interdict the vessel Bella 1 today.
UK armed forces provided pre-planned operational support, including basing, to U.S. military assets interdicting the Bella 1 between the UK and Iceland following a U.S. request for assistance. RFA Tideforce is providing support for U.S. forces pursuing and interdicting the Bella 1, while the RAF provided surveillance support from the air.
The UK and U.S. defence and security relationship is the deepest in the world and the UK provided enabling support in full compliance with international law.
Defence Secretary John Healey MP said: “Our UK Armed Forces showed skill and professionalism in support of a successful U.S. interception of the vessel Bella 1 while on its way to Russia. This action formed part of global efforts to crack down on sanctions busting. This ship, with a nefarious history, is part of a Russian-Iranian axis of sanctions evasion which is fuelling terrorism, conflict, and misery from the Middle East to Ukraine. The UK will continue to step up our action against shadow fleet activity to protect our national security, our economy, and global stability – making Britain secure at home and strong abroad. The U.S. is the UK’s closest defence and security partner and the security of the North Atlantic is critical to both our homelands. The depth of our defence relationship with the U.S. is an essential part of our security, and today’s seamlessly executed operation shows just how well this works in practice.”
The Bella 1 is sanctioned by the U.S. under its counter-Iran sanctions, aimed at stopping Iran from fuelling instability in the Middle East through the profits of illegal oil sales.
The ship, initially flying a false flag, turned off its transponders while at sea and sought to reflag while being pursued, indicating its nefarious links to global sanctions evasion.
Assessments going back several years that the Bella 1 has been involved in illegal activity, linked to international terrorism and crime including Hezbollah, and part of the web of rising shadow activity that fuels and finances nefarious activity across the globe.
The Russian flagging of the vessel shows their role in this interconnected shadow activity we are seeing across the world, which threatens our national security, harms our economy and undermines global security.
Further information
• Deterring and disrupting the Russian shadow fleet is a priority for the UK. To date, we have imposed sanctions on 520 Russian shadow fleet vessels.
• This is working. For example, Russia’s critical oil revenues are down 27% compared to October 2024, the lowest since the start of the war in Ukraine. (Source: https://www.gov.uk/)

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Founded in 1987, Exensor Technology is a world leading supplier of Networked Unattended Ground Sensor (UGS) Systems providing tailored sensor solutions to customers all over the world. From our Headquarters in Lund Sweden, our centre of expertise in Network Communications at Communications Research Lab in Kalmar Sweden and our Production site outside of Basingstoke UK, we design, develop and produce latest state of the art rugged UGS solutions at the highest quality to meet the most stringent demands of our customers. Our systems are in operation and used in a wide number of Military as well as Homeland Security applications worldwide. The modular nature of the system ensures any external sensor can be integrated, providing the user with a fully meshed “silent” network capable of self-healing. Exensor Technology will continue to lead the field in UGS technology, provide our customers with excellent customer service and a bespoke package able to meet every need.

A CNIM Group Company
—————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————–

Sponsored by Bertin Exensor

 

www.exensor.com

 

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03 Jan 26.  Earlier on 3 January, the US military conducted several airstrikes in Venezuela at around 0200hrs (local time), including in the capital Caracas; US President Donald Trump also stated that the US military has captured Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro and his wife. The Venezuelan regime reported that attacks also occurred in Aragua, Miranda and La Guaira states. Targets reportedly included the major military complex Fort Tiuna and La Carlota Air Base (both Caracas); communications infrastructure near El Volcán (Miranda state) and La Guaira port (La Guaira state); and unidentified targets in Aragua state. Furthermore, the US Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) issued a notice to airmen (NOTAM) earlier on 3 January banning US commercial flights over Venezuela and Curaçao due to the ‘ongoing military activity’. In response, the Venezuelan regime declared a national emergency and has enacted military mobilisation plans. Neither the US nor the Venezuelan authorities have reported the number of casualties.

SIGNIFICANCE

* Since August, the US has deployed military assets to the Caribbean Sea with the stated aim of tackling regional drug trafficking. The deployment comprises significant naval and air assets, including the USS Gerald R Ford aircraft carrier.

* Since September, the US military has conducted a series of strikes against suspected drug trafficking boats in the Caribbean, killing at least 110 people to date. The US has also seized sanctioned oil tankers servicing Venezuela to increase economic pressure.

* In response, Maduro’s regime offered the Trump administration a number of significant concessions, such as minerals and oil rights, in exchange for a decrease in military pressure. The Trump administration has so far rejected all proposals.

FORECAST

Further strikes on key military and Venezuelan regime positions are a realistic possibility in the coming hours and days, elevating physical security risks. Possible targets include military airstrips, ports, barracks, power stations, communications infrastructure and government buildings housing high-profile regime members. Further strikes would significantly increase asset damage and physical security risks for personnel and assets proximate to these installations. Additionally, if the US accompanies strikes with special forces operations to capture other members of the Venezuelan regime, the risk of armed clashes will increase. Nevertheless, we continue to assess that a large-scale US ground invasion of Venezuela is a remote possibility in the near term. The Venezuelan regime is unlikely to retaliate militarily against the US in the short-to-medium term, decreasing the risk of armed conflict. The Venezuelan regime will likely attempt to negotiate with the Trump administration by offering further concessions which will possibly de-escalate bilateral tensions.

In the immediate term, the risk of a coup d’état against the Venezuelan regime by elements of the armed forces will increase significantly (see Sibylline Special Report – 23 December 2025). Vice President Delcy Rodríguez will highly likely assume the presidency in Maduro’s absence. The Venezuelan regime will highly likely mobilise the security forces to lock down Caracas and other major urban centres, as well as reinforcing critical national infrastructure, such as airports and ports. This will cause significant operational disruption to the aviation and maritime sectors in the immediate term. The disruption will be exacerbated by the FAA NOTAM and the likelihood of intense GPS jamming operations by the US military off the coast of Venezuela. In the event of an attempted coup, the risk of armed clashes will increase significantly in Caracas, proximate to key regime infrastructure, such as the Miraflores presidential palace.

The Venezuelan regime will likely retaliate by cracking down on opposition supporters, increasing repression risks. The Venezuelan opposition will highly likely take advantage of the strikes and Maduro’s alleged exfiltration by the US. Anti-government demonstrations calling for de facto opposition leader María Corina Machado or former presidential candidate Edmundo González Urrutia to take power are highly likely in the coming hours and days. A heavy-handed crackdown on protests by the regime is highly likely as well as arrests of prominent opposition figures. Increased repression will elevate arbitrary detention, censorship and physical security risks for personnel in the humanitarian and journalism sectors, as well as individuals associated with the opposition. Surveillance of US nationals in Venezuela will also likely increase in the coming days. (Source: Sibylline)

 

29 Dec 25. China stages military drills around Taiwan to warn ‘external forces’.  China’s military on Monday dispatched air, navy and missile units to conduct joint live-fire drills around the island of Taiwan, which Beijing called a “stern warning” against separatist and “external interference” forces. Taiwan said it was placing its forces on alert and called the Chinese government “the biggest destroyer of peace.” Taiwan’s aviation authority said more than 100,000 international air travelers would be affected by flight cancellations or diversions. The drills came after Beijing expressed anger at what could be the largest-ever U.S. arms sale to the self-ruled territory and at a statement by Japan’s prime minister, Sanae Takaichi, saying its military could get involved if China were to take action against Taiwan. China says Taiwan must come under its rule. The Chinese military did not mention the United States and Japan in its statement on Monday, but Beijing’s foreign ministry accused the Taiwanese ruling party of trying to seek independence through requesting U.S. support.  Taiwan’s Defense Ministry said rapid response exercises were underway, with forces on high alert.

“The Chinese Communist Party’s targeted military exercises further confirm its nature as an aggressor and the biggest destroyer of peace,” it said.

Beijing sends warplanes and navy vessels toward the island on a near-daily basis, and in recent years it has stepped up the scope and scale of these exercises. Senior Col. Shi Yi, spokesperson of China’s People’s Liberation Army’s Eastern Theater Command, said the drills would be conducted in the Taiwan Strait and areas to the north, southwest, southeast and east of the island. Shi said the activities would focus on sea-air combat readiness patrol, “joint seizure of comprehensive superiority” and blockades on key ports. It was also the first large-scale military drill where the command publicly mentioned one goal was “all-dimensional deterrence outside the island chain.”

“It is a stern warning against ‘Taiwan independence’ separatist forces and external interference forces, and it is a legitimate and necessary action to safeguard China’s sovereignty and national unity,” Shi said.

China and Taiwan have been governed separately since 1949, when a civil war brought the Communist Party to power in Beijing. Defeated Nationalist Party forces fled to Taiwan. The island has operated since then with its own government, though the mainland’s government claims it as sovereign territory.

Drills will continue on Tuesday

The command on Monday deployed destroyers, frigates, fighters, bombers and unmanned aerial vehicles, alongside long-range rockets, to the north and southwest of the Taiwan Strait. It carried out live-fire exercises against targets in the waters as well. Among other training, drills to test the capabilities of sea-air coordination and precise target hunting were conducted in the waters and airspace to the east of the strait. Hsieh Jih-sheng, deputy chief of the general staff for intelligence of the Taiwanese Defense Ministry, said that as of 3 p.m. Monday, 89 aircraft and drones were operating around the strait, with 67 of them entering the “response zone” — airspace under the force’s monitoring and response.

In the sea, the ministry detected 14 navy ships around the strait and four other warships in the Western Pacific, in addition to 14 coast guard vessels.

“Conducting live-fire exercises around the Taiwan Strait … does not only mean military pressure on us. It may bring more complex impact and challenges to the international community and neighboring countries,” Hsieh told reporters.

Military drills are set to continue Tuesday. Taiwan’s Civil Aviation Administration said Chinese authorities had issued a notice saying seven temporary dangerous zones would be set up around the strait to carry out rocket-firing exercises from 8 a.m. to 6 p.m. on Tuesday, barring aircraft from entering them. The Taiwanese aviation authority said more than 850 international flights were initially scheduled during that period and the drills would affect over 100,000 travelers. Over 80 domestic flights, involving around 6,000 passengers, were also canceled, it added. The Chinese command released themed posters about the drills online accompanied by provocative wording. One poster depicted two shields with the Great Wall alongside three military aircraft and two ships. Its social media post said the drills were about the “Shield of Justice, Smashing Illusion,” adding that any foreign interlopers or separatists touching the shields would be eliminated. Last week, Beijing imposed sanctions against 20 U.S. defense-related companies and 10 executives, a week after Washington announced large-scale arms sales to Taiwan valued at more than $10 bn. It still requires approval by the U.S. Congress. Under U.S. federal law in place for many years, Washington is obligated to assist Taipei with its defense, a point that has become increasingly contentious with China. The U.S. and Taiwan had formal diplomatic relations until 1979, when President Jimmy Carter’s administration recognized and established relations with Beijing. Asked about the drills, Chinese foreign ministry spokesperson Lin Jian said Taiwan’s Democratic Progressive Party has attempted “to seek independence by soliciting U.S. support and even risk turning Taiwan into a powder keg and ammunition depot.”

“External forces’ attempts to use Taiwan to contain China and to arm Taiwan will only embolden the Taiwan independence forces and push the Taiwan Strait toward a dangerous situation of military confrontation and war,” he said.

There was no immediate U.S. statement on the drills.

Taiwanese army on high alert

Karen Kuo, spokesperson for the Taiwanese president’s office, said the drills were undermining the stability and security of the Taiwan Strait and Indo-Pacific region and openly challenging international law and order.

“Our country strongly condemns the Chinese authorities for disregarding international norms and using military intimidation to threaten neighboring countries.” she said.

Taiwan’s Defense Ministry released a video that featured its weapons and forces in a show of resilience. Multiple French Mirage-2000 aircraft conducted landings at an air force base. In October, the Taiwanese government said it would accelerate the building of a “Taiwan Shield” or “T-Dome” air defense system in the face of the military threat from China. The military tensions came a day after Taipei Mayor Chiang Wan-an said he hoped the Taiwan Strait would be associated with peace and prosperity, instead of “crashing waves and howling winds,” during a trip to Shanghai.  (Source: Defense News)

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Founded in 1987, Exensor Technology is a world leading supplier of Networked Unattended Ground Sensor (UGS) Systems providing tailored sensor solutions to customers all over the world. From our Headquarters in Lund Sweden, our centre of expertise in Network Communications at Communications Research Lab in Kalmar Sweden and our Production site outside of Basingstoke UK, we design, develop and produce latest state of the art rugged UGS solutions at the highest quality to meet the most stringent demands of our customers. Our systems are in operation and used in a wide number of Military as well as Homeland Security applications worldwide. The modular nature of the system ensures any external sensor can be integrated, providing the user with a fully meshed “silent” network capable of self-healing. Exensor Technology will continue to lead the field in UGS technology, provide our customers with excellent customer service and a bespoke package able to meet every need.

A CNIM Group Company

—————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————–

Sponsored by Bertin Exensor

 

www.exensor.com

 

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Military And Security Developments

Jan 02.

• Estonia-Finland: Threats to undersea cables in Baltic Sea will likely persist in 2026. On 31 December 2025, the Finnish police detained the Fitburg, a Russia-linked cargo vessel suspected of damaging an undersea telecommunications cable in the Gulf of Finland by dragging its anchor. The investigation was launched after the Finnish telecommunications provider Elisa reported damage to its cable between Helsinki (Finland) and Tallinn (Estonia). The Fitburg boarded in Finnish waters, with its anchor chain still deployed. On 1 January, Finnish customs officials stated that the vessel – which was sailing from St Petersburg (Russia) to the port of Haifa (Israel) – was transporting Russian steel products subject to EU sanctions. All 14 crew members have been detained. Elisa has confirmed that rerouted services prevented service outages, indicating minimal operational disruption for telecommunications customers. Although the police has declined to comment on foreign state involvement, the incident is consistent with suspected Russian grey-zone activity targeting critical underwater infrastructure in the Baltic Sea. While NATO’s Operation Baltic Sentry has likely helped to deter Russian threats to undersea infrastructure in the Baltic Sea, we assess that the risk will remain elevated in 2026.
• Russia-Ukraine: Moscow’s unwillingness to compromise means peace treaty is unlikely in short term. In his new year’s address on 31 December 2025, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stated that while a peace agreement to end the Russo-Ukrainian war is ‘90% ready’, the remaining 10% is crucial for the country’s future. Zelensky stressed his commitment to sign an agreement that will prevent the resumption of hostilities in the foreseeable future. Zelensky also pointed out that any peace plan should be put to a referendum in Ukraine. Similarly, US President Donald Trump praised the progress in peace talks, but highlighted that the US-led negotiations remain vulnerable to collapse. We assess that a peace agreement is unlikely in the short term, as many of the points discussed by the US and Ukraine remain unacceptable to Russia. The Kremlin is highly unlikely to compromise on its key objectives, particularly if it believes that it can achieve its goals militarily if negotiations fail to satisfy Russian demands. Moscow’s recent (and currently uncorroborated) allegations that Ukrainian drones targeted a presidential residence form part of its bellicose rhetoric, signalling the Kremlin’s willingness to continue hostilities (see Sibylline Alert – 30 December 2025). Ultimately, the war is highly likely to continue at its current intensity in the coming months.

Dec 30.

EVENT

On 29 December, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov stated that, overnight on 28-29 December, Ukraine had launched a large-scale drone attack targeting one of Russian President Vladimir Putin’s residences in Novgorod oblast. Lavrov said that all drones were intercepted and that no casualties or damage were recorded. He added that Moscow would review its negotiating position in response to the alleged incident.

SIGNIFICANCE

• Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky rejected the allegations, stating that they were fabricated and intended to undermine the ongoing peace negotiations. We cannot confirm this, though Moscow has at time of writing provided no evidence of the drone strike.
• It is highly unusual that Lavrov, the foreign minister, rather than the Ministry of Defence, should make such an announcement. This highly likely indicates that the primary impact of the allegations will be diplomatic, amid the ongoing US-led peace negotiations, rather than purely military.
• The allegations come shortly after President Zelensky met US President Donald Trump in Florida on 28 December to continue peace negotiations, whereafter Trump stated that ‘close to 95%’ of the points of a potential peace place have been agreed. Despite this, we continue to assess that many of these unconfirmed terms highly likely remain unacceptable to the Kremlin at present.

FORECAST

We assess that Russia is highly likely to use the allegations to launch ‘retaliatory’ large-scale, combined strikes in the coming days. A prominent Russian military blogger has claimed that Moscow has announced preparations for a retaliatory strike, retaining the right to determine the time and location, and has reportedly communicated this to the US. We assess that any retaliatory operation is likely to involve very large barrages, likely involving ballistic and cruise missiles, potentially launched over several consecutive days.

Despite possessing the densest air defence coverage in Ukraine, Kyiv’s threat level will remain significantly elevated in the coming days. The aforementioned Russian source specifically cited Bankova Street in central Kyiv (home to the Presidential Office and other goverment buildings) as a potential target. Such statements likely indicate that the capital will remain a priority target for Russian strikes. In addition to targeting symbolic political targets, strikes could also aim to hit the already degraded energy infrastructure, leading to further severe power outages and mass black outs. Russian forces could realistically target numerous 750kV substations aross the country to illustrate its capacity to inflict costs and trigger mass blackouts in Kyiv as well as other major cities.

Kremlin spokesperson Dmitry Peskov warned on 30 December of the ‘diplomatic consequences’ of the alleged strikes, stating that Moscow will only negotiate with the US and threatened to ‘strengthen its negotiating position’ as a result. While Peskov confirmed that Russia will not withdraw from the US-led peace process as a result of the alleged strikes, he stated that Moscow will not publicly disclose what this potential revision of its negotiating position will be. This could realistically signal a potential hardening of territorial demands in the coming weeks. We have also long assessed that Moscow does not wish to conduct direct negotiations with Ukraine in the short-to-medium term, but has rather pushed to impose a US-Russian settlement on the country.

As such, this latest development has reinforced our most likely scenario, that peace will remain elusive and that Russia will seek to continue advancing on the battlefield while the current peace terms remain unacceptable to it. The fact that President Trump has condemned the strikes and indicated he was ‘angry’ about it, despite Kyiv’s denials, indicates the possibility of increased US pressure on Ukraine in the coming weeks, if Washington DC believes that Kyiv is deliberately trying to sabotage the peace process. (Source: Sibylline)

—————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————

Founded in 1987, Exensor Technology is a world leading supplier of Networked Unattended Ground Sensor (UGS) Systems providing tailored sensor solutions to customers all over the world. From our Headquarters in Lund Sweden, our centre of expertise in Network Communications at Communications Research Lab in Kalmar Sweden and our Production site outside of Basingstoke UK, we design, develop and produce latest state of the art rugged UGS solutions at the highest quality to meet the most stringent demands of our customers. Our systems are in operation and used in a wide number of Military as well as Homeland Security applications worldwide. The modular nature of the system ensures any external sensor can be integrated, providing the user with a fully meshed “silent” network capable of self-healing. Exensor Technology will continue to lead the field in UGS technology, provide our customers with excellent customer service and a bespoke package able to meet every need.

A CNIM Group Company

———————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————

 

Sponsored by Bertin Exensor

 

www.exensor.com

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29 Dec 25. UK defence exports reach $26.9bn driven by Norway frigate deal. Major contracts with Norway and Türkiye drive UK defence export growth, supporting thousands of jobs. The UK has achieved its largest annual defence export total on record, surpassing £20bn ($26.9bn) in deals secured with allied nations during 2025. This figure marks the highest since record-keeping began over four decades ago. The increase is largely attributed to a £10bn agreement with Norway involving the supply of at least five Type 26 anti-submarine warfare frigates. Under this arrangement, both the Royal Navy and Royal Norwegian Navy will operate a combined fleet aimed at countering maritime threats. In addition to the Norwegian deal, the UK has finalised an £8bn contract to supply Türkiye with 20 Typhoon fighter jets. This agreement is expected to maintain approximately 20,000 jobs across the UK. The export of 12 C-130 aircraft to Türkiye has also been completed, jointly benefiting UK Defence and Marshall Aerospace Group with revenue exceeding £550m. Further developments this year include the signing of a new AUKUS treaty between the UK and Australia, designed to strengthen collaborative naval capabilities. The deal holds potential for up to £20bn in future exports and could support more than 21,000 jobs within the UK. Alongside these export contracts, British authorities have launched reforms within the Ministry of Defence, creating the National Armaments Director Group and introducing an International Collaboration & Exports team in an effort not seen in five decades. Looking ahead to 2026, Britain plans to expand its defence exports through new agreements focused on advanced aircraft, maritime systems, and armoured vehicles such as Boxer. To facilitate international sales, the UK has joined with France, Germany and Spain under the Agreement on Defence Export Controls, simplifying procedures for exports to partner countries. The series of export achievements in 2025 has involved over 430 companies of varying sizes across Britain’s defence sector and supported around 4,000 shipbuilding jobs through the Type 26 contract alone. UK Director General of International Collaboration and Exports Avril Jolliffe said: “Global security demands an always-on approach to international collaboration and exports. As announced in the Strategic Defence Review, we’re creating a single point of focus that connects UK industry directly with international opportunities.” (Source: naval-technology.com)

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Founded in 1987, Exensor Technology is a world leading supplier of Networked Unattended Ground Sensor (UGS) Systems providing tailored sensor solutions to customers all over the world. From our Headquarters in Lund Sweden, our centre of expertise in Network Communications at Communications Research Lab in Kalmar Sweden and our Production site outside of Basingstoke UK, we design, develop and produce latest state of the art rugged UGS solutions at the highest quality to meet the most stringent demands of our customers. Our systems are in operation and used in a wide number of Military as well as Homeland Security applications worldwide. The modular nature of the system ensures any external sensor can be integrated, providing the user with a fully meshed “silent” network capable of self-healing. Exensor Technology will continue to lead the field in UGS technology, provide our customers with excellent customer service and a bespoke package able to meet every need.

A CNIM Group Company

———————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————–

Sponsored by Bertin Exensor

 

www.exensor.com

 

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22 Dec 25. Colombia: Ceasefires during holiday period will moderately decrease physical security risks. On 21 December, three of Colombia’s most high-profile non-state armed groups (NSAGs) announced temporary ceasefires with the government. The ceasefires involve the National Liberation Army (ELN; 24 December to 3 January 2026), the Central General Staff (EMC) Iván Mordisco faction (23 December to 7 January 2026) and the EMC’s Calarcá Cordoba faction (indefinite). In each agreement, the groups have pledged not to target the state security forces except in self-defence; the ceasefires do not extend to other armed groups. We assess that the ceasefires will likely be largely upheld, moderately decreasing the risk of armed clashes and physical safety risks nationwide, though sporadic clashes with the state forces remain a realistic possibility. Nevertheless, if the authorities attempt to exploit the temporary ceasefires to target NSAGs, attack and physical security risks will be elevated in the vicinity of police stations and military bases, particularly in Antioquia and Chocó departments. Meanwhile, on 21 December, locals kidnapped 18 military personnel in Carmen de Atrato (Chocó department) during an anti-ELN operation. In the immediate term, we assess that the kidnapped personnel will likely be released in the coming days as a gesture of goodwill ahead of the temporary agreements. (Source: Sibylline)

 

22 Dec 25. Venezuela-US: US seizure of second oil tanker near Venezuela elevates regional tensions. On 20 December, the US Coast Guard (USCG) intercepted an oil tanker that had recently departed from Venezuela in international waters. Reports indicate that the seized vessel was the Panama-flagged, Chinese-owned ‘Centuries’; Centuries is not subject to US sanctions but was reportedly carrying sanctioned oil purchased by a Chinese buyer. The USCG is also reportedly pursuing another oil vessel, the ‘Bella 1’, in international waters near Venezuela. The seizure of Centuries is the second such operation by the USCG in recent weeks and the first since US President Donald Trump announced a ‘complete blockade’ of sanctioned oil tankers leaving and entering Venezuela. The seizure of a non-sanctioned vessel points to an escalation in tensions between the US, China and Venezuela. We assess that further US seizures of oil tankers suspected of carrying sanctioned oil are likely in the short-to-medium term, increasing operational and supply chain disruption risks for the energy sector. Significant oil market volatility is unlikely in the near term due to the presence of numerous well-supplied tankers currently anchored near China, though seizure events are likely to precipitate minor short-term uncertainty. However, if the US sustains the blockade and oil tanker seizures in the longer term, critical oil market volatility will become increasingly likely. (Source: Sibylline)

 

23 Dec 25. Cambodia-Thailand: Talks raise prospect of ceasefire in short-to-medium term. On 22 December, after an ASEAN Special Foreign Ministers’ Meeting in Malaysia involving the Cambodian and Thai foreign ministers, Thailand claimed that a General Border Committee (GBC) meeting would be convened on 24 December to discuss a ceasefire. Cambodia has asked for these talks to be held in Malaysia rather than Thailand for safety reasons. The resumed talks under the GBC mechanism are set to last two days. If they proceed, it will raise the possibility that the two sides will recommit to a ceasefire that was agreed in July. However, the likelihood of a lasting resolution to the border dispute being found remains low (see Sibylline Situation Update Brief – 19 December 2025). We assess that security risks near the border will remain elevated despite the talks, with Cambodia accusing Thailand of carrying out airstrikes in Cambodia on 22 and 23 December; Thailand accused Cambodia of firing around 200 BM-21 rockets mainly at Sa Kaeo province (Thailand) in the same period.  (Source: Sibylline)

 

23 Dec 25. “The salience of nuclear weapons – that is, their importance in the doctrines and practices of nuclear-armed states – has been increasing in the Euro–Atlantic and Indo–Pacific regions… Existing and emerging non-nuclear capabilities can offer tools for crafting a credible deterrence posture responding to a range of scenarios without threat of nuclear retaliation.” This is according to Reducing Global Reliance on Nuclear Deterrence by Lukasz Kulesa, a new RUSI research report which examines whether states can reduce their dependence on nuclear weapons at a time when nuclear risks are growing. The report comes amid intensifying strategic competition between nuclear-armed states, the erosion of arms control frameworks, and the impending expiry of the New START Treaty in February 2026. With no successor agreement in place and no active bilateral negotiations underway, the prospect of unconstrained growth in US and Russian nuclear arsenals has become increasingly plausible, with significant implications for global strategic stability. The report says that nuclear weapons have assumed an expanded political and military role, particularly in the Euro–Atlantic and Indo–Pacific regions, even as their political, legal and humanitarian risks have become more pronounced. This report assesses ways to reduce the salience of nuclear weapons – that is their importance in the doctrines and practices of nuclear-armed states – without undermining deterrence. Rather than advocating immediate disarmament, it makes the case for narrowing or moderating these nuclear doctrines. The research says that while nuclear weapons continue to be seen as the ultimate deterrence against existential threats, many of the other strategic roles they currently fulfil – such as deterrence against chemical and biological or large conventional attack – could be credibly performed by non-nuclear means. It also urges investment in nuclear risk reduction and arms control, as well as improved crisis communications channels to avoid inadvertent escalation.

Key Findings

• Nuclear weapons are becoming more central to security doctrines. The report says: “The salience of nuclear weapons – that is, their importance in the doctrines and practices of nuclear-armed states – has been increasing in the Euro–Atlantic and Indo–Pacific regions.”
• Not all nuclear deterrence roles are indispensable. “The second-tier functions could be partially or fully substituted by other means, thus offering a path towards nuclear reductions.”
• Non-nuclear deterrence options are increasingly viable. “Existing and emerging non-nuclear capabilities can offer tools for crafting a credible deterrence posture responding to a range of scenarios.”
• Risk reduction remains essential to prevent escalation. “There is a continuous need to invest in measures to stabilise the antagonistic relations between nuclear possessors and reduce the likelihood of accidental or inadvertent escalation.”

Key Recommendations

• Narrow the circumstances for nuclear use. The report calls for “explicit narrowing of the conditions for the use of nuclear weapons.”
• Replace selected nuclear roles with conventional capabilities. It recommends: “the substitution of nuclear weapons by conventional ones” in some roles.
• Strengthen nuclear risk reduction and dialogue. The paper says “increase the effectiveness of crisis communication and address the dangers of accidental or inadvertent escalation to nuclear level.”
• Pursue incremental, realistic change. It argues that a “realistic option may be to recommend a gradual narrowing down of the roles played by nuclear weapons.”

Conclusion

Reducing Global Reliance on Nuclear Deterrence offers a pragmatic response to a deteriorating global nuclear landscape. At a moment marked by rising geopolitical tension, nuclear sabre-rattling by Russia, a Chinese nuclear build-up, modernisation of nuclear arsenals and the looming end of New START, the report cautions against further expansion of nuclear roles. Instead, it sets out a credible pathway for reducing nuclear risks through doctrinal restraint, strengthened non-nuclear deterrence and renewed focus on arms control and risk reduction. While nuclear weapons are likely to remain a core deterrent against nuclear attack for the foreseeable future, the report demonstrates that their broader functions are neither fixed nor unavoidable.

Lukasz Kulesa is former Director of the Proliferation and Nuclear Policy programme at the Royal United Services Institute (RUSI). His research focuses on nuclear deterrence, arms control, non-proliferation and strategic stability. The report draws on a joint project between RUSI and the Hiroshima Organization for Global Peace (HOPe), Envisioning Global Security Without Reliance on Nuclear Deterrence, which included three regional online working groups (Indo–Pacific, Euro–Atlantic and Middle East), expert interviews, analysis of nuclear doctrines and strategic documents, and a conference held in Hiroshima in June 2024. For more information or for any media enquiries please email

 

26 Dec 25. China sanctions 20 US defense companies over arms sales to Taiwan. Beijing imposed sanctions on Friday against 20 U.S. defense-related companies and 10 executives, a week after Washington announced large-scale arms sales to Taiwan. The sanctions entail freezing the companies’ assets in China and banning individuals and organizations from dealing with them, according to the Chinese foreign ministry. The companies include Northrop Grumman Systems Corporation, L3Harris Maritime Services and Boeing. Among the defense executives sanctioned is Anduril Industries’ founder Palmer Luckey, who can no longer do business in China and is barred from entering the country. Those sanctioned in the East Asian country have also had assets frozen. The recent announcement of the U.S. arms-sale package for Taiwan, valued at more than $10bn, has drawn an angry response from China, which claims Taiwan as its own and says it must come under its control. If approved by the American Congress, it would be the largest-ever U.S. weapons package to the self-ruled territory.

“We stress once again that the Taiwan question is at the very core of China’s core interests and the first red line that must not be crossed in China－U.S. relations,” the Chinese foreign ministry said in a statement on Friday. “Any company or individual who engages in arms sales to Taiwan will pay the price for the wrongdoing.”

The ministry also urged the U.S. to stop what it called “the dangerous moves of arming Taiwan.” Taiwan is a major flashpoint in U.S.-China relations that analysts worry could explode into military conflict between the two powers. China says the U.S. arms sales to Taiwan would violate diplomatic agreements between China and the U.S. China’s military has increased its presence in Taiwan’s skies and waters in the past few years, holding joint drills with its warships and fighter jets on a near-daily basis near the island. Under American federal law, the U.S. is obligated to assist Taiwan with its self-defense, a point that has become increasingly contentious with China. Beijing already has strained ties with Washington over trade, technology and other human rights issues. (Source: Defense News)

 

26 Dec 25. Japan’s Cabinet OKs record defense budget that aims to deter China. Japan’s Cabinet on Friday approved a record defense budget plan exceeding 9tn yen ($58bn) for the coming year, aiming to fortify its strike-back capability and coastal defense with cruise missiles and unmanned arsenals as tensions rise in the region. The draft budget for fiscal 2026, beginning April, is up 9.4% from 2025 and marks the fourth year of Japan’s ongoing five-year program to double annual arms spending to 2% of gross domestic product.

“It is the minimum needed as Japan faces the severest and most complex security environment in the postwar era,” Defense Minister Shinjiro Koizumi said, stressing his country’s determination to pursue military buildup and protect its people.

“It does not change our path as a peace-loving nation,” he said.

The increase comes as Japan faces elevated tension from China. Japanese Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi said in November that her country’s military could get involved if China were to take action against Taiwan, the self-governing island that Beijing says must come under its rule.

Takaichi’s government, under U.S. pressure for a military increase, pledged to achieve the 2% target by March, two years earlier than planned. Japan also plans to revise its ongoing security and defense policy by December 2026 to further strengthen its military.

Missiles and drones will add to southwestern island defense

Japan has been bolstering its offensive capability with long-range missiles to attack enemy targets from a distance, a major break from its post-World War II principle limiting the use of force to its own self-defense. The current security strategy, adopted in 2022, names China as the country’s biggest strategic challenge and calls for a more offensive role for Japan’s Self-Defense Force under its security alliance with the U.S. The new budget plan allocates more than 970bn yen ($6.2bn) to bolster Japan’s “standoff” missile capability. It includes a 177bn-yen ($1.13bn) purchase of domestically developed and upgraded Type-12 surface-to-ship missiles with a range of about 1,000 kilometers (620 miles). The first batch of the Type-12 missiles will be deployed in Japan’s southwestern Kumamoto prefecture by March, a year earlier than planned, as Japan accelerates its missile buildup in the region. In part due to Japan’s aging and declining population and its struggles with an understaffed military, the government believes unmanned weapons are essential. To defend the coasts, Japan will spend 100bn yen ($640m) to deploy “massive” unmanned air, sea-surface and underwater drones for surveillance and defense under a system called “SHIELD” planned for March 2028, defense ministry officials said.

For speedier deployment, Japan initially plans to rely mainly on imports, possibly from Turkey or Israel.

Tension with China grows

The budget announcement comes as Japan’s row with China escalates following Takaichi’s remark in November about Taiwan. The disagreement escalated this month when Chinese aircraft carrier drills near southwestern Japan prompted Tokyo to protest when Chinese aircraft locked their radar on Japanese aircraft, which is considered possible preparation for firing missiles. The Defense Ministry, already alarmed by China’s rapid expansion of operations in the Pacific, will open a new office dedicated to studying operations, equipment and other necessities for Japan to deal with China’s Pacific activity.

Two Chinese aircraft carriers were spotted in June almost simultaneously operating near the southern Japanese island of Iwo Jima for the first time, fueling Tokyo’s concern about Beijing’s rapidly expanding military activity far beyond its borders and areas around the disputed East China Sea islands.

In Beijing, China’s Foreign Ministry spokesperson Lin Jian said the Takaichi government has “noticeably accelerated its pace of military buildup and expansion” since taking office.

“Japan is deviating from the path of peaceful development it has long claimed to uphold and is moving further and further in a dangerous direction,” Lin said.

Japan plans joint development of frigates and jets

Japan is pushing to strengthen its largely domestic defense industry by participating in joint development with friendly nations and promoting foreign sales after drastically easing arms export restrictions in recent years. For 2026, Japan plans to spend more than 160 bn yen ($1 bn) to jointly develop a next-generation fighter jet with Britain and Italy for deployment in 2035. There are also plans for research and development of Artificial Intelligence-operated drones designed to fly with the jet. In a major boost to the country’s defense industry, Australia selected Mitsubishi Heavy Industries in August to upgrade the Mogami-class frigate to replace its fleet of 11 ANZAC-class ships.

Japan’s budget allocates nearly 10 bn yen ($64 m) to support industry base and arms sales.

Meeting targets but future funding uncertain

The budget plan requires parliamentary approval by March to be implemented as part of a 122.3trn yen ($784bn) national budget bill. The five-year defense buildup program would bring Japan’s annual spending to around 10 trillion yen ($64 bn), making it the world’s third-largest spender after the U.S. and China. Japan will clear the 2% target by March as promised, the Finance Ministry said. Takaichi’s government plans to fund its growing military spending by raising corporate and tobacco taxes and recently adopted a plan for an income tax increase beginning 2027. Prospects for future growth at a higher percentage of GDP remain unclear. (Source: Defense News)

 

19 Dec 25. Colombia: Guerrilla attack against military base increases physical security, transit disruption risks. On 18 December, an armed attack against a military base in Aguachica (Cesar department) killed six soldiers and wounded 28 more, according to Minister of Defence Pedro Sánchez. The authorities have attributed the attack to the National Liberation Army (ELN) guerrilla group. Reports indicate that the ELN used cylinder bombs, explosive-laden drones, high-calibre firearms and improvised mortars to conduct the attack. The security forces have since launched operations to secure the area. The attack comes after the ELN conducted a paro armado (‘armed strike’) nationwide between 14 and 17 December. During the paro armado, the ELN killed five people over 50 separate attacks and roadblocks across 20 departments. Reports indicate that the paro armado impacted primarily Antioquia, Chocó, Cesar and Norte de Santander departments. In the immediate term, follow-up security forces operations in the Aguachica area will increase transit disruption and physical security risks. In the medium-to-long term, we assess that the risk of armed clashes and guerrilla (explosive) attacks near security forces’ positions will be sustained, significantly increasing asset and collateral damage risks. (Source: Sibylline)

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Founded in 1987, Exensor Technology is a world leading supplier of Networked Unattended Ground Sensor (UGS) Systems providing tailored sensor solutions to customers all over the world. From our Headquarters in Lund Sweden, our centre of expertise in Network Communications at Communications Research Lab in Kalmar Sweden and our Production site outside of Basingstoke UK, we design, develop and produce latest state of the art rugged UGS solutions at the highest quality to meet the most stringent demands of our customers. Our systems are in operation and used in a wide number of Military as well as Homeland Security applications worldwide. The modular nature of the system ensures any external sensor can be integrated, providing the user with a fully meshed “silent” network capable of self-healing. Exensor Technology will continue to lead the field in UGS technology, provide our customers with excellent customer service and a bespoke package able to meet every need.

A CNIM Group Company

————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————-

Sponsored by Bertin Exensor

 

www.exensor.com

 

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Military And Security Developments

Dec 23.

• Israel-Lebanon: Airstrike underscores conflict escalation risks ahead of LH disarmament deadline. On 22 December, Israel conducted an airstrike on a vehicle near Sidon (South governorate, Lebanon), killing three Lebanese Hizballah (LH) operatives. The attack follows Lebanese Prime Minister Nawaf Salam’s 20 December announcement that the country is close to completing LH’s disarmament south of the Litani River, ahead of the 31 December deadline. Salam also announced that Beirut is ready to move on to the second disarmament phase north of the Litani River. However, on 22 December, LH-aligned media reported the group’s intention to notify relevant parties that it will not disarm north of the river, sustaining short-term conflict re-escalation risks. We assess that Israel will likely increase military pressure on the country in the coming days, aiming to enforce disarmament through intensified airstrikes targeting LH militants, weapons stores and infrastructure in southern Lebanon, Baalbek-Hermel governorate and the capital Beirut. This will elevate security risks to nearby personnel from direct hits and exposure to shrapnel. Despite Salam’s claims, it is likely that the government will fail to disarm LH south of the Litani River by 31 December, possibly prompting Israel to engage in major operations targeting LH in the first quarter of 2026.
• Syria: New clashes in Aleppo governorate increase wider armed conflict risks in 2026. On 22 December, heavy clashes between the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) and the governmental forces in Aleppo (Aleppo governorate) killed at least four civilians. The clashes included tank deployment and mortar fire and took place in Aleppo’s Kurdish-controlled Ashrafieh and Sheikh Maqsood districts, prompting hundreds of residents to evacuate. Both sides have accused each other of triggering a new round of conflict, as hostilities had paused in October. Although the clashes have ceased and both parties have agreed to de-escalate, we assess that the ceasefire will remain highly vulnerable to a breakdown in the coming days and throughout January 2026. This is primarily due to the deadlock in talks over the SDF’s integration in the new Syrian army and internal forces. The resumption of clashes within Aleppo and its rural areas around Manbij and the Tishreen Dam remains a realistic possibility, sustaining security instability. Any new and prolonged clashes with ethnic-Kurd communities in the first quarter of 2026 will increase the risks of violence and escalation into a wider armed conflict between Damascus and the SDF along the Euphrates River.

Dec 22.

Wil The Yemen Civil War Resume?

Executive summary

• In our most likely scenario, the Southern Transitional Council (STC) consolidates its control of southern Yemen, triggering sporadic clashes with Saudi-backed tribal factions. However, conflict escalation remains limited. The Saudi-backed National Shield Forces (NSF) retain their force posture, but do not engage militarily with the STC. The Presidential Leadership Council (PLC) survives but becomes politically defunct, with the STC assuming authority in the territory it controls. Yemen’s humanitarian crisis remains critical and its economy fragile.
• In our second and most dangerous scenario, the STC declares independence, triggering direct Saudi and UAE intervention and a return to widespread civil conflict. The PLC effectively dissolves, compounding governance failures in the south. The Houthis exploit the PLC’s fragmentation to launch offensives against factions aligned with the internationally recognised government (IRG) and the STC. The Houthis also relaunch missile campaigns against Saudi Arabia and the UAE. The conflict stops most legal economic output and exacerbates humanitarian risks.
• Our third scenario considers an alternative trigger for all-out conflict in Yemen. Here the Israel-Hamas ceasefire breaks down, prompting the Houthis to resume attacks on Israel and commercial shipping in the Red Sea. Israel responds with airstrikes on Houthi territory, which emboldens IRG-aligned groups and the STC to launch offensives on the Houthis. Civil conflict resumes with third-party involvement, triggering a further deterioration in security, governance and socio-economic conditions.
• In our least likely scenario, the STC maintains a stable force posture in the south but clashes with the Saudi-backed tribal forces subside. This facilitates the emergence of relative political, military and economic stability over time. The STC dominates southern representation while operating under the PLC’s framework and stabilisation mitigates severe humanitarian and economic concerns.

Context

On 3 December, the UAE-backed Southern Transitional Council (STC) launched an operation in eastern Hadhramaut governorate. The move comes amid escalating tensions with Saudi-backed local forces, including elements aligned with the Hadhramaut Tribal Alliance (HTA). STC-aligned forces secured key facilities in Seiyun (Hadhramaut governorate), with fighting reported at Seiyun Airport (GXF) and near the presidential palace. Saudi-backed forces reportedly withdrew from some positions in Aden and Lahij governorates toward Marib governorate, while other reports indicate that they had also pulled back from several positions in al-Mahrah governorate, including al-Ghaydah Airport (AAY). By 7 December, over 10,000 STC troops had reportedly pushed into al-Mahrah, while STC-aligned forces also advanced eastward along major road networks towards Yemen’s border with Oman, carrying South Yemen flags. On 8 December, the STC expanded its presence across all of Yemen’s southern governorates, including the port city of Aden (Aden governorate), the seat of the internationally recognised government (IRG). On 15 December, the STC announced that it had launched a new military operation in southern Abyan governorate.

After these operations, the STC now exercises effective military control over most of the key population centres and transport corridors in Aden, Abyan, al-Mahrah, Dhale, Hadhramaut, Lahij and Shabwah governorates, as well as the Socotra archipelago. These governorates previously constituted South Yemen, an independent state from 1967 to 1990. Given the STC’s repeated calls for South Yemen’s secession, we assess that there is a realistic possibility of the STC declaring South Yemen’s independence in the coming weeks. Although nominally a member of the Presidential Leadership Council (PLC) – the executive body of the IRG – the STC’s objectives are at odds with those of the rest of the council; the PLC continues to seek a decisive victory over the Iran-backed Houthi-led government in the capital Sanaa while maintaining the territorial integrity of the Yemeni state. The STC has claimed that senior figures from other factions within the PLC have left Aden; if true, this would heighten government stability risks, increasing the likelihood of the PLC’s collapse and the emergence of the STC as the dominant governing and military force in southern Yemen. On 18 December, however, international media outlets reported that as many as 20,000 Saudi-backed National Shield Forces (NSF) have amassed on the Saudi-Yemen border in response to the STC advance, increasing international concerns over a possible Saudi-backed counter-offensive.

The Iran-backed Houthis continue to control Sanaa and north-western Yemeni provinces. Although a UN-brokered ceasefire was reached in 2022 (which remains in place de facto) largely ceasing the Saudi-led intervention, sporadic clashes have continued between the Houthis and IRG-aligned forces in several front-line and border zones. Since the outbreak of the Israel–Hamas war in October 2023, the Houthis have increasingly targeted Israeli- and Western-affiliated shipping in the Red Sea and launched numerous direct attacks on Israel, significantly disrupting global trade and compounding regional tensions. In response, Israel and US-led coalition forces conducted multiple strikes against Houthi military and dual-use infrastructure in 2024 and 2025, partially degrading Houthi capabilities. Since October 2025, however, the Houthis have paused their attacks on commercial vessels in the Red Sea, though this pause is conditional on the continued implementation of the Israel-Hamas ceasefire.

Yemen’s humanitarian crisis remains critical. Ms require assistance with access to food, clean water and healthcare remaining severely disrupted. Political crackdowns and human rights abuses persist, particularly in Houthi-controlled territories, including arbitrary detentions, forced disappearances and the targeting of civil society, media, UN and NGO personnel.

• Syria-US: Further joint security operations against Islamic State likely in coming days. On 19 December, the US Central Command (CENTCOM) forces struck more than 70 Islamic State (IS) targets on multiple locations across central Syria. These strikes were a direct retaliation for an attack by an IS-affiliated gunman who killed two US soldiers in Palmyra (Homs governorate) on 13 December. We assess that the US is unlikely to conduct similar large-scale strikes in Syria in the coming weeks. Rather, the CENTCOM will continue to conduct joint limited operations with the Syrian governmental forces against IS in central Syria, particularly in the Syrian desert (known as Badya). Furthermore, Syria’s General Security Service (GSS) is also likely to continue its crackdown on IS cells in the capital Damascus, as well as in Aleppo, Homs, Idlib and Raqqa governorates in the coming days. This will elevate security risks, including increasing the risks of sporadic clashes and staff exposure to crossfire. Risks of retaliatory attacks by IS and/or its affiliates against churches and Christian gatherings will also increase during the Christmas period, as well as in early January 2026.
• Iraq: Energy security risks will persist over next 12 months, sustaining anti-government sentiment. On 21 December, dozens of demonstrators blocked the road between Kirkuk and Dibis (both Kirkuk governorate), protesting against frequent power outages and a limited electricity supply. Meanwhile, the security forces mobilised in Najaf (Najaf governorate) following reports that demonstrators planned to block a nearby highway. These incidents highlight Iraq’s persistent energy security risks despite the government’s mitigation efforts, including increasing domestic energy production and reducing reliance on single suppliers such as Iran. In the coming 12 months, we assess that power cuts will likely persist in Iraq due to infrastructure mismanagement, the effects of a changing climate and the lack of diversification into renewable energy. Outages are likely to worsen during the summer months (i.e. May to October) amid sustained above-average temperatures. Energy supply shortages will likely drive operational challenges for businesses, including disruptions to communications and the public sector’s working hours, while elevating threats to medical infrastructure and supply chains. A persistent provision of poor public services will sustain anti-government sentiment over the coming months, elevating domestic unrest risks.

Dec 19.

• Israel: Violent riots underscore elevated ethno-religious tensions, spillover risks nationwide. On 18 December, hundreds of ultra-Orthodox protesters rioted in Jerusalem (Jerusalem district), attacked a bus, overturned a police car and injured at least 13 police officers. Later that day, ultra-Orthodox demonstrators blocked Highway 4 at several junctions near Ashdod (Southern district), after the police prevented them from entering the city to protest against military conscription. The Jerusalem riots began after the police attempted to arrest two ultra-Orthodox individuals for draft evasion and an attack on a municipal inspector who had issued them a parking ticket. Subsequently, the police deployed a helicopter and used stun grenades, tear gas and water cannons to disperse protesters. The incidents highlight the elevated ethno-religious tensions around military conscription. We assess that there is an elevated risk of violent domestic unrest and travel disruption near areas with a strong concentration of ultra-Orthodox communities (particularly in Jerusalem), increasing security risks for bystanders and assets near protests. Furthermore, the incidents highlight the elevated spillover risks of anti-conscription riots into other Israeli cities in the coming weeks. (Source: Sibylline)

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Founded in 1987, Exensor Technology is a world leading supplier of Networked Unattended Ground Sensor (UGS) Systems providing tailored sensor solutions to customers all over the world. From our Headquarters in Lund Sweden, our centre of expertise in Network Communications at Communications Research Lab in Kalmar Sweden and our Production site outside of Basingstoke UK, we design, develop and produce latest state of the art rugged UGS solutions at the highest quality to meet the most stringent demands of our customers. Our systems are in operation and used in a wide number of Military as well as Home land Security applications worldwide. The modular nature of the system ensures any external sensor can be integrated, providing the user with a fully meshed “silent” network capable of self-healing. Exensor Technology will continue to lead the field in UGS technology, provide our customers with excellent customer service and a bespoke package able to meet every need.

A CNIM Group Company

————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————-

Sponsored by Bertin Exensor

 

www.exensor.com

 

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Military And Security Developments

Dec 23.

KEY DEVELOPMENTS

• OFFENSIVES: Russian forces launched a series of cross-border attacks into Sumy and Kharkiv oblasts; we assess they are likely aimed at presenting Russian forces as advancing on multiple fronts, and do not represent a genuine new offensive
• BELARUS: Belarusian President Alyaksandr Lukashenka stated that Russia has deployed the Oreshnik intermediate-range ballistic missile system in Belarus, though this does not change the military balance in the region
• STARLINK: Intelligence services of two unspecified NATO countries reportedly suspect that Russia is developing a new anti-satellite weapon to undermine Starlink terminals, though the likelihood of a major attack remains low in the short term
• FORECAST: Despite the approval of a large-scale loan to support Kyiv in 2026, developments indicate that fractures over the ‘Ukraine policy’ will undermine the EU’s position as a major geopolitical actor and influencer in negotiations next year
• OFFENSIVES: Between 20 and 21 December, Russian forces launched a series of cross-border attacks into Sumy oblast, as well as Kharkiv oblast to a lesser extent. Hrabovske (Sumy oblast) and Sotnytskyi Kozachok (Kharkiv oblast) became the focal points of the fighting. Hrabovske is now likely under Russian control, with Ukrainian units reportedly conducting a tactical withdrawal from surrounding areas. Meanwhile, Ukrainian forces have stated that they repelled the assault in Sotnytskyi Kozachok. These cross-border attacks occurred in an area where Russia has previously attempted to establish a buffer zone through limited incursions and raids. The Sumy sector had been relatively quiet since this summer, with fighting largely limited to sporadic shelling, drone strikes and small-scale reconnaissance or sabotage activity. While the latest attacks mark an uptick in hostilities, they do not constitute an operational breakthrough. At the time of writing, we assess that they are highly unlikely to presage a new major offensive.
• OFFENSIVES: The nature of these cross-border attacks deviates from Russia’s typical tactics observed elsewhere along the frontline, indicating that the operation is likely aimed at supporting Russia’s information campaign. The attack seemingly involved non-dispersed Russian troops, advancing in a highly unusual move that would ordinarily make them vulnerable to Ukrainian defensive fire. There is no indication that the Russian command has reinforced its Northern Grouping, which is responsible for operations in Sumy oblast. Furthermore, the incursions were not preceded by intensive drone or artillery strikes against Ukrainian logistics, a move that would normally prepare the ground for sustained assaults.
• OFFENSIVES: Further cross-border attacks are likely in the coming weeks, likely as part of the Kremlin’s efforts to probe Ukrainian defences and increase pressure on its defensive capabilities, particularly as Russia continues offensive efforts elsewhere along the frontline. Realistically, Moscow could also have ordered the attacks as per Russian President Vladimir Putin’s statement on 17 December that Russian forces are actively expanding so-called ‘buffer zones’. Russian commanders are likely keen to provide the Kremlin with some progress in previously quiet areas along the border.
• OFFENSIVES: Meanwhile, Russia is highly likely to use such attacks to reinforce the perception that it retains the initiative in the conflict and is able to sustain simultaneous offensive efforts at various points of the frontline. This supports its broader information effort aimed at influencing Western decision-makers to believe that Ukraine is losing the war, though there is currently no evidence to indicate that Ukrainian border defences will collapse.
• DONETSK: On 21 December, a Ukrainian military observer reported that Russian forces had completed the capture of Siversk (Donetsk oblast), following their reported entry into the town in mid-November. Siversk’s capture will likely provide the Russian forces with favourable positions to launch larger assaults on Lyman located to the north-west and advance to the east towards Sloviansk – a key node in Ukraine’s so-called ‘fortress belt of cities’ in Donetsk. However, Russian forces reportedly took approximately 41 months to advance around seven miles (12km) from Lysychansk to Siversk’s western boundary, underscoring the extremely slow pace of their progress. Any breakthrough towards Sloviansk will require an advance of roughly 18.6 miles (30km) west of Siversk and the capture of Lyman – progress towards the latter has also been made in recent weeks, albeit slowly.
• STRIKES: Over the past weeks, Russia has intensified its long-range strikes against Ukraine’s Odesa oblast. The attacks have heavily targeted energy facilities, transportation networks as well ports. The escalation is likely part of Russia’s retaliation for the frequent Ukrainian strikes against Russian civilian and military naval assets in recent weeks. We assess that the threat level will likely remain elevated in the region, with persistent security risks to energy infrastructure, transport and maritime operations.

POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS

• BELARUS: On 18 December, Belarusian President Alyaksandr Lukashenka said that Russia has deployed the Oreshnik intermediate-range ballistic missile system in Belarus. Lukashenka claimed that the system is on combat duty, though Defence Minister Viktor Khrenin contradicted this by stating that preparations were underway for it to be put on combat duty. Lukashenka clarified on 22 December that there would be a maximum of ten of the missiles stationed in Belarus. The deployment was expected, with Lukashenka announcing it in late October (see Sibylline Ukraine Update – 4 November 2025). We continue to assess that Russia views Oreshnik as a strategic deterrence weapon and as a form of leverage over the West to influence its decision-making on Ukraine. We assess that it does not change the nuclear or conventional balance in Belarus, as it is unlikely to have a viable conventional warhead, though it does signal the continued military integration of Belarus within Russia.
• STARLINK: The Associated Press (AP) reported on 22 December that the intelligence services of two unspecified NATO countries suspect that Russia is developing a new anti-satellite weapon to undermine Starlink terminals. AP claimed that the capability would release ‘hundreds of thousands of high-density pellets’ into space, which it warned would risk multiple satellites being disabled at once and cause collateral damage to other orbiting systems. The report claims that the fragments would be minuscule and would thus evade detection by ground- or space-based systems which track objects in space. However, the reported findings did not specify when Russia would realistically be capable of deploying such a system, nor how advanced work is on the capability.
• STARLINK: Starlink has become a vital capability for Ukrainian forces, including for battlefield communications. Russian forces also use Starlink terminals, and would therefore be impacted by any outage, though Ukraine is significantly more reliant on the system. While we cannot verify the AP report, in February 2024, the US briefed several NATO allies on a new Russian space-based anti-satellite capability (see Sibylline Ukraine Update – 15 February 2024). We assess that the new reports do not indicate an immediate threat to global communications and the world’s satellites, with Russia unlikely to deploy any such capability in the short-to-medium term. However, such systems could be leveraged as part of Russian deterrence efforts.

FORECAST

EU: Despite the approval of a large-scale loan to support Kyiv in 2026/27, recent developments indicate that fractures over Ukraine policy will undermine the EU’s position as a major geopolitical actor and an influential bloc in peace negotiations in 2026. On 19 December, EU leaders decided to lend Ukraine EUR 90bn (USD 105bn) after not reaching an agreement on whether to utilise frozen Russian assets. Instead, the money will be borrowed from the EU’s budget. The bid to use the immobilised funds – the majority of which are held in Belgium – was unsuccessful due to concerns raised by Belgian Prime Minister Bart De Wever about Russian retaliation. This indicates that Moscow’s deterrence campaign has been successful to an extent. France’s reported key role in the EU’s decision not to use frozen Russian assets likely indicates its efforts to reassert itself as a major European player. According to a report from Politico on 22 December, French President Emmanuel Macron ‘tipped the balance’ against using the assets at a crucial moment during the European Council summit held on 18 and 19 December. Three unspecified EU diplomats and an EU official claimed that France was ‘quietly working’ to ensure that the bloc chose the joint borrowing option. Previously, several countries had expressed opposition to using frozen Russian assets, including the Czech Republic, Hungary, Italy and Slovakia.

Macron’s position in the EU has been undermined by his ailing domestic popularity, providing Germany with an opportunity to expand and consolidate its growing geopolitical influence. In contrast to France, German Chancellor Friedrich Merz was a strong supporter of the plan to use frozen Russian assets. Under Merz, Berlin has sought to position itself as a more vocal Ukraine supporter and to strengthen its position and influence over the EU’s foreign policy – a realm traditionally dominated by Paris. We assess that Macron’s involvement in ensuring that frozen Russian assets were not used will likely strain Franco-German relations, with the two countries likely to continue to vie for influence in the EU in 2026. Such competition will undermine the EU’s unity on major policy issues, including Ukraine. For further analysis on relations between Berlin and Paris, see Sibylline Situation Update Brief – 11 November 2025.

Macron’s willingness to resume contact with Russia marks a break from the EU’s de facto position of not speaking with the Kremlin without Ukraine’s input. On 19 December, Macron said that Europe will need to find ways to ‘re-engage in a fulsome dialogue’ with Russia if the US-led peace talks fail; these negotiations are yet to produce a breakthrough. Macron and Putin last spoke in July, after nearly three years of no contact. Ukraine’s allies had criticised Macron previously for maintaining ties with Russia following its full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. However, the US’ perception that the EU is not prepared to engage in peace negotiations seriously has undermined the bloc’s credibility and influence over the US-led process.

Macron’s comments likely represent an acknowledgement that the EU’s current stance towards discussions with Russia to end the war should be recalibrated to bolster Europe’s credibility in the peace process. Moscow has frequently cast Europe as undermining the peace process and highly unlikely views the EU as a serious actor. Rather, Russia prefers to engage with countries it regards as ‘great powers’ (including the US and to a lesser extent France, Germany and the UK). Reportedly, Macron and Putin are expected to speak as early as this week to discuss peace prospects. Realistically, Macron’s willingness to engage directly with Putin could be an attempt to cement France’s involvement in the peace process in the coming year.

Executive summary

• In our last Strategic Risk Forecast, we put forward various scenarios concerning the trajectory of the Russo-Ukrainian war in the next 12 months. Our baseline scenario is that the war will likely continue in some form without a definitive resolution; there is also a realistic possibility of a fragile ceasefire that will fail to stop the fighting entirely.
• Despite intensive shuttle diplomacy and efforts by the US to propose various options for ending the war, we have seen little substantive change that would make the signing of a peace deal (or even a ceasefire) likely in the coming month. Russian President Vladimir Putin has repeatedly emphasised that Russia’s war goals in Ukraine have not – and will not – change, underscoring that the aims of his ‘special military operation’ will be met ‘unconditionally’, either by diplomacy or military action. Although this is possibly a negotiating tactic, we have seen little shift in the key strategic drivers that would likely make Russia amenable to peace or a ceasefire.
• Meanwhile, intense negotiations are continuing between the US, Europe and Ukraine over possible security guarantees that would form part of a potential peace deal. While the details remain unclear, the prospect of an Article 5-like arrangement would prove significant – if its terms can be agreed. However, Russia will almost certainly oppose the deployment of Western troops (under any aegis) in Ukraine.
• During a key European Council summit on 19 December, the bloc agreed to provide Ukraine with a EUR 90 bn (USD 106 bn) interest-free loan in 2026, which will help to stabilise Ukraine’s finances over the coming year; the decision came about due to disagreements over using frozen Russian assets for Ukraine’s benefit.
• Key triggers, warnings and indicators (TWIs) to watch for in January 2026 include the US leveraging new sanctions against Russia or withdrawing intelligence sharing / arms sales vis-à-vis Ukraine in the event that the administration is set on ramping up pressure to make further progress towards peace.
• Ukraine: Commercial debt restructuring will lower default risks in 2026. On 22 December, the credit rating agency Fitch upgraded Ukraine’s rating to ‘CCC’ from ‘restricted default’, citing the normalisation of Ukraine’s relations with most of its external commercial creditors. This followed Ukraine’s announcement on 18 December that it had reached an agreement with commercial creditors to swap so-called GDP warrants for bonds. Under the previous arrangement, Ukraine was required to make payouts linked to its economic performance in any year in which real GDP growth exceeded 3%, a mechanism likely to impose a significant financial burden on the country. For instance, Kyiv defaulted earlier in 2025 on a USD 665 m payment, which was linked to economic growth of 5.3% in 2023. In the context of a post-war recovery with strong growth potential, such payouts could have reached as much as USD 20 bn, according to the Ukrainian authorities. The new agreement is likely to improve Ukraine’s long-term debt sustainability and reduce default risks in 2026. However, the outlook for public finances remains highly uncertain, as Kyiv continues to rely heavily on external financial support.
• Portugal-Ukraine: Defence co-operation will increase risk of Russian grey-zone operations. On 20 December, Portuguese Prime Minister Luís Montenegro signed a partnership agreement with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky for the joint production of maritime drones. Portugal aims to leverage Ukraine’s battlefield experience to improve broader European maritime defence; sea drones have become a key component of Ukraine’s maritime defence since the 2022 Russian full-scale invasion. Sea drones are a relatively underdeveloped area in many EU navies. Joint production with Ukraine will help to narrow this gap, providing know-how and designs already tested in combat. We assess that Russia will possibly seek to retaliate with grey-zone operations targeting Portugal in 2026, a country which had not previously been a prime target of Russian hybrid activities. These will likely include reconnaissance of port operations, mapping and surveillance of cable routes and sabotage operations targeting the defence sector. Irregular drone flights in the vicinity of military bases, government buildings, airports, seaports and other critical national infrastructure (CNI) facilities are also possible.
• Russia: Assassination of senior general underscores persistent risk of attacks, including in capital. Earlier on 22 December, Lieutenant General Fanil Sarvarov was injured when an explosive device detonated in his car on Yasenevaya Street in the south-east of the capital Moscow at around 0700hrs (local time). Sarvarov, who headed the Russian Armed Forces’ operational training department, later died from his injuries. Russian investigative authorities stated that the explosion was caused by a device planted in the vehicle and have opened a criminal investigation, including into the possible involvement of Ukrainian intelligence services. While Ukraine has not commented on the incident, its security services have been linked to several high-profile assassinations and plots targeting senior Russian military figures in the last few years. For example, in April the deputy head of the main operations directorate of Russia’s general staff was killed in a car explosion; in December 2024 the head of the Russian Armed Forces’ radiation, chemical and biological defence troops was killed in an explosion at his Moscow residence. This latest attack is likely to heighten security concerns among senior Russian officials and will likely prompt retaliatory action from the Kremlin. More broadly, the incident underscores the persistent risk of attacks across Russia, including in major urban centres like Moscow. Short-term disruption to traffic is expected in the immediate vicinity of the incident, alongside enhanced security measures.

Dec 22.

• Denmark: Russian grey-zone attacks on key infrastructure highlight disruption, destruction risks. On 20 December, international news outlets reported that two pro-Russia hacktivist groups (‘Z-Pentest’ and ‘NoName057(16)’) had targeted Danish companies in disruptive and destructive cyber attacks in December 2024 and November 2025. In the first incident, Z-Pentest reportedly compromised a water utility company in Køge (Zealand region) and altered the water pressure to ultimately burst affected pipes, highlighting the destructive nature of this attack. Subsequently, in November 2025, NoName057(16) temporarily disrupted several local government websites with denial-of-service attacks ahead of the Danish municipal and regional council elections likely in an attempt to attract public attention and sow distrust. On 18 December, the Danish Defence Intelligence Service (DDIS) stated that both groups are likely connected to the Russian state amid a spike in Russian grey-zone operations targeting European and NATO countries since the beginning of 2025. As geopolitical tensions persist, we assess that these incidents underscore the elevated risk of disruption and destruction facing key sectors in Denmark.

Dec 19.

• EU: Ukraine loan increases financial exposure; decreases Belgium’s vulnerability to Russian retaliation. Earlier on 19 December, the European Council agreed to provide an interest-free loan of EUR 90bn (USD 105.7bn) to Ukraine for 2026 and 2027. The EU will borrow on capital markets and back the loan with the EU budget. Belgium – which hosts the largest share of frozen Russian assets – has opposed using these funds to finance the loan, citing legal and retaliatory risks. The country has faced an increased exposure to Russian grey-zone operations in recent months, which we assess will likely decrease now in intensity (though it is unlikely to stop entirely). This will lower operational risks for critical infrastructure operators which had faced an uptick in drone sightings. However, frozen Russian assets remain immobilised; the EU has not abandoned plans to use them in future. Consequently, Russia will likely continue targeting Belgian and wider European political and financial structures using intimidation tactics. While the loan will strengthen the EU’s credibility in the ongoing US-mediated peace negotiations on the Russo-Ukrainian war, it will also increase the financial exposure of the EU budget’s largest contributors, such as France, Germany and Italy. The unanimity on the loan was reached only after EU leaders agreed that the Czech Republic, Hungary and Slovakia will not incur any financial obligations related to the loan, exposing the bloc’s enduring internal divisions over Ukraine.
• Ukraine: EU funding is likely to improve 2026 financial outlook, though financing gaps will persist. Earlier on 19 December, the European Council approved a EUR 90bn loan for Ukraine, financed through EU borrowing on capital markets. The loan is expected to be issued from the second quarter of 2026, when Ukraine is estimated to face a cash shortfall. The financing is likely to prove critical for Ukraine’s budget; it is intended to enable the procurement of military equipment. However, the loan does not cover Ukraine’s full financing needs for the 2026/27 fiscal year, which the EU has estimated at approximately EUR 135bn (around USD 158.2bn). Furthermore, once the EU disburses the first tranches, weapons procurement will likely face delays related to contract negotiations and equipment delivery timelines. Therefore, the loan’s disbursement is unlikely to have an immediate impact on Ukraine’s operational military capabilities, though it will help Ukraine’s war effort in 2026. Overall, we assess that while the loan will improve Ukraine’s financial outlook for 2026, financing gaps are likely to persist. Kyiv’s operational situation is expected to remain tense, particularly in the first quarter of 2026. (Source: Sibylline)

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Founded in 1987, Exensor Technology is a world leading supplier of Networked Unattended Ground Sensor (UGS) Systems providing tailored sensor solutions to customers all over the world. From our Headquarters in Lund Sweden, our centre of expertise in Network Communications at Communications Research Lab in Kalmar Sweden and our Production site outside of Basingstoke UK, we design, develop and produce latest state of the art rugged UGS solutions at the highest quality to meet the most stringent demands of our customers. Our systems are in operation and used in a wide number of Military as well as Homeland Security applications worldwide. The modular nature of the system ensures any external sensor can be integrated, providing the user with a fully meshed “silent” network capable of self-healing. Exensor Technology will continue to lead the field in UGS technology, provide our customers with excellent customer service and a bespoke package able to meet every need.

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