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NEWS IN BRIEF – UKRAINE CONFLICT

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Military And Security Developments

Jan 09.

  • Russia-Ukraine: Risk of large-scale Russian retaliatory strikes will remain elevated in short term. Earlier on 9 January, Russia’s Ministry of Defence (MoD) announced that it launched an Oreshnik intermediate-range ballistic missile (IRBM) at Lviv City (Lviv oblast) overnight. The Oreshnik launch was part of a larger strike package, involving 242 drones and 36 missiles. The Russian MoD stated that the attack struck energy infrastructure and military facilities, and claimed the launch was retaliation for an alleged Ukrainian strike on one of Russia’s presidential residences (see Sibylline Alert – 30 December 2025). This attack followed shortly after the US confirmed its seizure of a Russian-flagged vessel in the Atlantic (see Sibylline Alert – 7 January). Given its timing, the Oreshnik missile strike is likely also a response to the vessel’s seizure, supporting our assessment that Russia would primarily seek to retaliate inside Ukraine, while avoiding direct confrontation with the US. The choice of Lviv is also significant as it is likely intended to demonstrate Russia’s ability to target anywhere in Ukraine, including close to NATO’s border. The risk of further intense strikes in the coming days remains elevated, including the capital Kyiv. However, the use of the Oreshnik system does not indicate a shift in overall threat levels as it performs similarly to other ballistic missile systems deployed against Ukraine.

Jan 08.

  • Russia-US-UK: Indirect Russian retaliation is more likely than major escalation after tanker seizure. On 7 January, the US, supported by UK forces, seized the Russian-flagged oil tanker Marinera (formerly Bella-1) in the North Atlantic Ocean near Iceland, moderately raising the threat of Russian harassment of shipping. US officials reported that Russian military vessels, including a submarine, were in the vicinity of the operation. However, it remains unclear how close these vessels were to the seizure. Russia’s official response has remained contained, denouncing the move as a violation of maritime law and demanding the safe return of the Marinera’s crew. This is consistent with our assessment that Moscow will seek to avoid a major diplomatic crisis with Washington DC (see Sibylline Alert – Russia-US-UK – 7 January 2026). As such, the risk of significant escalation remains low. Nevertheless, the risk of limited Russian tit-for-tat measures against Western-flagged vessels operating close to Russian waters has increased. This includes the harassment of vessels through buzzing by aircraft or drones, jamming attempts, intimidation by warships or possibly ‘constabulary’ boarding actions. Furthermore, if Russia intends to retaliate against US and/or UK interests, it is most likely to do this inside Ukraine; strikes against Western assets inside the country will be a realistic option for Russia.

08 Jan 26. 

Russia-US: Increased likelihood of new sanctions is unlikely to push Moscow to end war in near term. On 7 January, US Republican Senator Lindsey Graham announced that President Donald Trump has ‘greenlit’ a bipartisan bill that will impose new sanctions targeting Russia. Graham stated that the legislation may be voted on as early as next week. The bill envisions placing secondary sanctions on countries that purchase Russian energy (such as China and India), in order to undermine the Kremlin’s ability to sustain its war effort. The bill has been stalled for several months; Graham had stated previously that the measure would progress without any subsequent advancement. Nevertheless, Trump’s reported approval increases the likelihood that policy-makers will vote on the measure in the near term. If approved, the bill would allow Trump to increase pressure on Russia at his choosing, rather than to impose sanctions immediately. While the bill’s approval would likely be used as a negotiating tactic, our assessment remains that increased sanctions pressure will unlikely alter Russia’s calculus on continuing the war in the short-to-medium term. For further analysis, see Sibylline Strategic Risk Forecast – 6 January 2026.

Jan 07.

KEY DEVELOPMENTS

  • OFFENSIVES: In 2025, Russian forces occupied about 1,866 square miles (4,831 sq km) of Ukrainian territory (approximately 0.8% of Ukraine) and regained around 183 square miles (473 sq km) previously held by Ukraine in Kursk oblast (Russia)
  • STRIKES: In 2025, Russia’s strike campaign intensified markedly; a further intensification of long-range strikes is likely in 2026, together with increased targeting of railway infrastructure across Western Ukraine in the short term
  • PEACE: Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky unveiled details of a revised 20-point peace plan to end the Russo-Ukrainian war; this is highly likely to be a non-starter for Russia, which shows no indication of changing its negotiating position
  • FORECAST: The recent shake-up of the Ukrainian government and security services, including the appointment of a hawkish new head of the Presidential Office, is the most extensive reshuffle since the beginning of the full-scale invasion
  • OFFENSIVES: In 2025, Russian forces occupied 1,866 square miles (4,831 sq km) of Ukrainian territory (approximately 0.8% of Ukraine) and regained around 183 square miles (473 sq km) previously held by Ukraine in the Kursk oblast (Russia). By comparison, OSINT figures indicate that in 2024 Russian forces controlled 1,392 square miles (3,604 sq km). The increase in territorial gains in 2025 was largely driven by a shift in Russian tactics toward infiltration operations, supported by systematic battlefield air interdiction campaigns including elite drone units.
  • OFFENSIVES: These tactics also resulted in a slight reduction in casualty rates, though they remained high overall. According to OSINT estimates, Russian operational tempo in 2025 increased by a factor of 1.14 compared to 2024, while overall losses stayed roughly the same. This is likely due to the extensive use of infiltration tactics, which, particularly in urban areas, reduce Russian forces’ exposure to Ukrainian defensive drone operations. Meanwhile, Russia has significantly enhanced its drone capabilities, eroding Kyiv’s previous advantage in this domain and complicating Ukrainian defensive efforts. In particular, technological innovations extended the range of Russian drones significantly in 2025. Overall, it remains unclear whether Russian forces will be able to increase the intensity of its operations in 2026 still further, and if its rate of advance will increase.
  • OFFENSIVES: Ultimately, the pace of advance remains slow and efforts to seize the remainder of Donetsk oblast alone will take years at the current rate. However, we assess that Moscow hopes that its attritional strategy will begin to bear more fruit in 2026, with Ukrainian personnel shortages likely to steadily worsen and expose more areas of the frontline to Russian infiltration. The Pokrovsk-Myrnohrad sector (Donetsk oblast) will likely remain the priority for both sides in early 2026. Although Russian forces made steady gains here in 2025, they have not fully captured it. Ukrainian forces still pose an active defence despite Russia’s significant deployment of resources to the sector. Ultimately, we assess that growing strain on personnel will continue to weigh on Ukraine’s ability to sustain defence on multiple fronts, risking Russian advances in other areas.
  • ZAPORIZHZHIA: The situation in and around Huliapole (Zaporizhzhia oblast) in recent months, where Russia has made relatively quick gains, highlights the growing difficulties Ukrainian forces faced in defending various fronts simultaneously in 2025. At the end of December 2025, Russia claimed full control of Huliapole; however, Ukraine denied these claims. OSINT evidence confirms Russia’s presence within the city, but Moscow does not appear to control the entire urban centre. Some of the key causes of Ukrainian losses in this area likely included forces not being rotated or reinforced, leaving them vulnerable when Russian pressure intensified. Meanwhile, a lack of coherent command and the prioritisation of other fronts, such as Pokrovsk and Kupiansk, also likely contributed to the Ukrainian withdrawals in this area over the last couple of months.
  • STRIKES: In 2025, Russia’s strike campaign markedly intensified, with a further intensification of long-range strikes likely in 2026. According to the Ukrainian government-run platform United24, Russian forces launched over 60,000 glide bombs, 100,000 drones and 2,400 missiles of various types in 2025. By comparison, in 2023 and 2024 combined, Russian forces launched 15,000 drones. The sharp increase in drones (also observed to a certain extent for missiles) underscores the Kremlin’s success in mobilising its defence industrial base and expanding production to support its strike campaign. This has allowed Russia to pursue a strike saturation strategy, involving daily strikes as well as large semi-regular barrages (several hundred aerial threats in a single attack) to overwhelm Ukrainian air defences.
  • STRIKES: Russia continues to modify its drones to reduce their vulnerability to Ukrainian interception, which will further undermine Ukrainian air defence capabilities in 2026. A prominent Russian ‘milblogger’ reported that developers have added self-destruct features to some of their Shahed-type drones to allow for remote detonation. This modification aims to prevent Ukrainian forces from analysing the drones and reverse engineering them to develop new counter-measures. Meanwhile, Ukrainian sources have claimed that Russian forces are also equipping some of their drones with man-portable air defence systems (MANPADS) capable of targeting aircraft. If Russian engineers systematically incorporate such MANPADS, it is likely to complicate Ukraine’s interception efforts by increasing the threat to aircraft supporting air defence operations – including F-16s.
  • STRIKES: During the festive period, the Kremlin issued a warning that it would respond to an alleged Ukrainian drone attack on one of President Vladimir Putin’s residences in Novgorod oblast. We assessed that any retaliation would likely take the form of large-scale strikes, possibly launched consecutively (see Sibylline Alert – 30 December 2025). However, while Russia continued its air assault on Ukraine, such a response did not materialise, and long-range attacks remained consistent with prior trends. We assess that Russia sought to use these allegations to portray Ukraine as attempting to disrupt peace negotiations and to influence US President Donald Trump’s posture towards Kyiv. Additionally, Russia highly likely intended to exploit these claims as a pretext for escalating its long-range strike campaign.
  • STRIKES: More broadly, we assess that Russia is highly likely to seek further pretexts or prepare false flag operations to advance the objectives outlined above, including launching significant strikes. Russian officials renewed calls to intensify the strike campaign following accusations that Ukraine had targeted civilian sites in Russian-occupied territory in Kherson oblast on 1 January during New Year celebrations. Meanwhile, on 2 January, Ukraine’s Foreign Intelligence Service warned that the Kremlin is likely to orchestrate a false flag attack within Russia or in Russian-occupied territories in the run-up to or during Orthodox Christmas (7 January), aiming to undermine the US-mediated peace talks. The intelligence agency explained that this assessment was based on recent trends in the Kremlin’s disinformation campaign. For further analysis on the ongoing peace process, see PEACE below.
  • STRIKES: Russia continues to target Ukraine’s railway infrastructure heavily. Some of these attacks are being launched from Belarusian territory in a bid to bypass Ukrainian interception systems and reach infrastructure in central and western Ukraine. The Ukrainian authorities reported damage to railway infrastructure in Odesa, Sumy and Volyn oblasts from Russian strikes on 1 January. Last year, we reported on Russia’s frequent strikes against railway infrastructure, predominantly in eastern Ukraine; the latest attacks indicate greater efforts to target such infrastructure in western and southern regions. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stated that, on 26 December 2025, Russia used Belarusian territory to launch drone strikes against Ukrainian railway infrastructure in the west of the country, including in Lviv and Volyn oblasts. We assess that Ukrainian railway infrastructure will remain a priority target for Russian strikes, aimed at disrupting the flow of military equipment to the front and intensifying logistical challenges. Co-ordinated drone attacks from Belarusian territory are likely to increase the reach of these strikes, enabling them to target areas in western Ukraine and increasing the knock-on disruption risks for business operations there which are reliant upon railway systems.

POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS

  • PEACE: On 23 December 2025, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky unveiled details for the first time of a revised peace plan to end the Russo-Ukrainian war. Seemingly, the new 20-point plan has reworked the initial US-backed framework, which consisted of 28 points and was largely favourable to Russia. Zelensky has stated that the peace plan is ‘90% complete’.
  • PEACE: The current plan envisions a de facto line of contact determined by both sides’ military positions on the date that they sign the peace framework. Russia has demanded Ukraine’s withdrawal from Donbas region (i.e. Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts) repeatedly, with control over this territory remaining a principal Russian war objective. Consequently, Russia is highly unlikely to entertain proposals to create an ‘economic zone’ in Donbas as a compromise in the foreseeable future; the new proposals whereby the Ukrainian police would administer such a zone are almost certainly a non-starter for the Kremlin (see Sibylline Ukraine Update – 16 December 2025). There is a possibility that Moscow may be willing to make smaller, less strategically significant territorial concessions in Dnipropetrovsk, Kharkiv, Mykolaiv and Sumy oblasts as part of a peace deal. However, Russia is unlikely to agree to forfeit the Ukrainian regions that it has officially annexed (namely Donetsk, Kherson, Luhansk and Zaporizhzhia oblasts).
  • PEACE: Ukrainian and US proposals for territory and the Russian-occupied Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant (ZNPP; Zaporizhzhia oblast) do not align with Russia’s terms for ending the war; the Kremlin is highly unlikely to soften its stance on these issues in the near-to-medium term. The Trump administration has proposed the ZNPP to be equally and jointly operated by Russia, Ukraine and the US, with the latter serving as the primary overseer of the plant. By contrast, Ukraine has opposed Russian control of the ZNPP, instead advocating for joint US-Ukrainian management of the facility. As part of Kyiv’s proposition, 50% of the facility’s generated electricity would be distributed to Ukraine-controlled territories, with Washington DC able to determine where the remaining half of the electricity is sent. On 3 January, Russia-appointed ZNPP director Yuri Chernichuk claimed that the facility is Russian and ruled out the possibility of joint management.
  • PEACE: Remarks from the Russian Foreign Ministry reinforce our assessment that Moscow does not consider ceasing hostilities and signing a peace deal to be in its current interests. In an interview on 24 December 2025, Deputy Foreign Minister Sergei Ryabkov implied that reports detailing progress in peace negotiations should not be interpreted as a sign that Russia is prepared to ink any ‘packages of documents right now’. Furthermore, Ryabkov insisted that there is ‘no alternative’ to the terms discussed between Russian and US negotiators at the bilateral summit in Alaska (US) in August 2025. Details of the Alaska summit’s negotiations remain limited. We assess that Russian officials will likely continue to reference the terms allegedly agreed at the Alaska summit in the coming months, arguing that the newly proposed peace terms do not align with Moscow’s long-term objectives and minimal war aims.
  • VENEZUELA: We assess that the US’ military operation in Venezuela on 3 January will likely reinforce Russia’s lack of interest in reaching a peace agreement in the short-to-medium term. We have assessed repeatedly that Moscow is highly likely counting on outlasting the West, believing that time is on its side and that competing geopolitical crises will direct attention away from Ukraine. We assess that perceptions that the US’ attention is divided will further reduce Russia’s incentive to reach a deal. In the coming weeks, should Venezuelan opposition figures contest the leadership of acting President Delcy Rodríguez, or if she fails to co-operate satisfactorily with the Trump administration, this will likely push the US to focus on stabilising the situation. In this scenario, US efforts to end the war would likely lose momentum (at least temporarily), with Russia likely to continue feigning interest in peace talks while prioritising efforts to capture more territory in Ukraine.

FORECAST

RESHUFFLE: The recent shakeup of the Ukrainian government and security services is likely the most extensive and significant since the beginning of the full-scale invasion of Ukraine. On 2 January, President Zelensky appointed Kyrylo Budanov, the hawkish head of Ukraine’s military intelligence (GUR), to be the new presidential chief of staff. Budanov’s appointment follows a large-scale corruption scandal and the subsequent resignation of his predecessor, Andriy Yermak. We assess that Budanov’s appointment likely aims to reboot the influence of the Presidential Office after Yermak’s departure and restore public trust. During his tenure, Yermak amassed significant political influence, which had raised concerns about a growing centralisation of power and growing resentment among various sections of the government. We assess that, at least in the short term, Budanov is unlikely to wield the power and influence his predecessor Yermak did. Nevertheless, Budanov enjoys considerable support among the Ukrainian population and has been credited with overseeing several highly ambitious operations against Russia. A survey requested by the consulting firm American Political Services in October found that 57.6% of Ukrainians trust him.

Budanov’s appointment highly likely seeks to strengthen Ukraine’s negotiating position amid intensified US-led talks aimed at ending the war. As head of the Presidential Office, Budanov will be Ukraine’s top peace negotiator and lead discussions concerning Ukraine’s security guarantees and other defence issues. As he is known for being hawkish, Budanov may take a hardline approach to various issues and concessions. However, Budanov likely accepts the necessity of dealing with Washington DC and the growing pressure for Kyiv to illustrate its willingness to make concessions to end the war. Additionally, Budanov has notable connections with the US and has participated in a CIA-backed training programme. Budanov has also been involved in prisoner exchanges between Russia and Ukraine, underscoring his ability and willingness to engage successfully with the Kremlin (albeit on tactical prisoner exchanges). Ultimately, Budanov’s previous credentials as head of GUR, his ties to the US and previous involvement in negotiations are likely aimed at improving ties with the US amid a critical period of diplomacy. Furthermore, Budanov’s appointment will reduce the risk of the US suspending military intelligence sharing with Ukraine if talks break down or if Washington DC attempts to force Kyiv to accept unfavourable peace terms in the coming months.

The reshuffle is unlikely to weaken the operational capability of various Ukrainian intelligence services significantly in the short term. Budanov will be replaced by Oleh Ivashchenko as head of GUR. Ivashchenko is the current Foreign Intelligence Service (SZRU) chief; he served previously as the deputy chief of military intelligence between 2015 and 2024. Meanwhile, on 5 January, Zelensky announced that Vasyl Maliuk will step down as the head of the Security Service of Ukraine (SBU), the country’s de facto internal security and counter-intelligence agency (which also acts independently in the war alongside the GUR and the SZRU). Maliuk will remain in the SBU to focus on counter-espionage operations against Russia. Under Maliuk, the SBU conducted several high-profile operations deep inside de jure Russian territory, including Operation Spiderweb (see Sibylline Ukraine Update – 2 June 2025). Although two senior Ukrainian military commanders have warned against Maliuk’s dismissal due to concerns it could weaken the SBU, his possible replacement Yevheniy Khmara is an experienced special forces officer. This will likely mitigate against a significant decline in the SBU’s capabilities in the near term.

Another notable portfolio change concerns the defence ministry’s leadership. On 2 January, Zelensky proposed appointing Mykhailo Fedorov as Ukraine’s new defence minister. Fedorov has served as the Minister of Digital Transformation since 2019; he has no formal military background. We assess that his nomination likely indicates an effort to strengthen Ukraine’s military technological innovations, specifically regarding drones and digitalising procurement. We will continue to monitor the ongoing government reshuffle and its implications for Ukraine and peace negotiations.

  • Ukraine: Russian opposition will reduce likelihood of post-war troop deployments by France, UK. On 6 January, France and the UK signed a declaration of intent to send troops to Ukraine in the event of a peace deal, following a summit of the so-called Coalition of the Willing. French President Emmanuel Macron stated that if deployed after a ceasefire, such a force would aim to provide reassurance to Ukraine and that it would be positioned far from the line of contact. Meanwhile, UK Prime Minister Keir Starmer claimed that his country and France would ‘establish military hubs’ across Ukraine. However, details regarding the size of such a deployment remain unknown. France and the UK have been the most vocal European states in support of deploying troops to post-war Ukraine; this signed declaration likely formalises their commitment and paves the way for any such future action. However, we assess that in the foreseeable future, Russia will highly likely remain opposed to European troops’ presence in Ukraine following a ceasefire, reducing the likelihood of such a deployment.
  • Ukraine: Russian opposition will reduce likelihood of post-war troop deployments by France, UK. On 6 January, France and the UK signed a declaration of intent to send troops to Ukraine in the event of a peace deal, following a summit of the so-called Coalition of the Willing. French President Emmanuel Macron stated that if deployed after a ceasefire, such a force would aim to provide reassurance to Ukraine and that it would be positioned far from the line of contact. Meanwhile, UK Prime Minister Keir Starmer claimed that his country and France would ‘establish military hubs’ across Ukraine. However, details regarding the size of such a deployment remain unknown. France and the UK have been the most vocal European states in support of deploying troops to post-war Ukraine; this signed declaration likely formalises their commitment and paves the way for any such future action. However, we assess that in the foreseeable future, Russia will highly likely remain opposed to European troops’ presence in Ukraine following a ceasefire, reducing the likelihood of such a deployment.

Jan 05.

  • Ukraine: Extensive government reshuffle likely aims to restore domestic, international trust. On 2 January, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky announced a major restructuring of the government and security services. The changes include key government portfolios, such as in the ministries of defence and energy. Furthermore, Zelensky appointed the leader of Ukraine’s military intelligence (GUR) Kyrylo Budanov as the head of the Presidential Office. This move replaces Andriy Yermak, who resigned amid a major corruption investigation. The changes also affect key positions within Kyiv’s security apparatus; however, Zelensky stated that he is not considering replacing Commander-in-Chief Oleksandr Syrskyi. Zelensky’s reshuffle is likely the largest political reconfiguration since the Russo-Ukrainian war started; it is taking place during a critical period for the country amid intense diplomatic activity to end the conflict. We assess that Zelensky’s move highly likely aims to restore trust with Kyiv’s diplomatic partners and also domestically, as public trust has likely declined due to the recent corruption scandal involving high-ranking government personnel.

(Source: Sibylline)

 

08 Jan 26. Ukraine received no Gravehawk air defence systems from UK in 2025. Supply chains issues, training, and even the weather could have been potential factors that caused the delays.

  • Out of the public eye, the UK has been developing air defence systems for Ukraine for years, with platforms in-country since 2023
  • The Gravehawk and Raven GBAD systems have been developed by the UK, firing missiles known to be in Ukraine’s inventory
  • However, apparent delays to Gravehawk deliveries have been revealed following a release of a parliamentary note

Newly disclosed data by the UK Ministry of Defence (MoD) has revealed that Ukraine received no additional Gravehawk ground-based air defence systems (GBAD) from the UK last year, despite earlier assertions that 15 units would be delivered in 2025. In a 6 January parliamentary written response by Armed Forces Minister Al Carns, it was disclosed that the first batch of the 15 additional Gravehawk systems would be delivered “soon”. Two prototype systems of the secretive air defence capability were delivered to Ukraine in 2024, likely for testing and evaluation before rolling the programme out at scale. Loaded into the Gravehawk appear to be R-73 air-to-air missiles adapted for ground launch operations. Credit: UK DE&S. The cause for the apparent delay in delivery of Gravehawk to Ukraine has not been disclosed, but it is thought likely that factors such as delays to supplier part deliveries, training of Ukrainian personnel, and even potentially the weather, have been factors. Additionally, while the delivery timelines were not disclosed by Carns, the relative simplicity of the platform should enable, sans delivery issues, to produce the platforms in quick order. It is thought likely that the bulk of the additional Gravehawks will be delivered in Q1 2026, with the UK potentially completing the order by the end of the summer.

Gravehawk: GBAD in a box

The UK government had earlier described Gravehawk as a UK designed “mobile air defence system” the size of a shipping container and able to “retrofit” air-to-air missiles into a ground-based air defence role. The system was jointly funded with Denmark. Analysis of subsequently released imagery shows that the GBAD system is a containerised launch unit, appearing capable of firing the R-73 short range air-to-air missiles known to be in service with Ukraine. The R-73 Vympel, known as the AA-11 Archer in Nato, has an infrared homing sensor, speed of around Mach 2.5, and a range of around 30km.

UK completes Raven GBAD deliveries

However, more positively, the MoD confirmed that it had delivered five additional Raven GBAD systems to Ukraine between mid-May and the end of 2025, bringing the total number of the UK designed system to 13 platforms. In 2023, the UK delivered a first batch of eight Raven platforms. Similar in concept to Gravehawk, the Raven GBAD uses a Supacat HMT 600 platform as a host vehicle, mounting a launcher that can fire two ASRAAM short-range air-to-air missiles from the flatbed. Ukraine is desperate for additional air defence systems, with Russia transitioning in 2025 to the widespread use of long-range loitering munitions and missile strikes against civil and military targets throughout the country.

UK has been developing systems for Ukraine for years

Behind the public headlines, it is clear that the UK is continuing to provide significant technical and capability expertise to Ukraine, across a range of areas, particularly, but by no means limited to, air defence systems. As well as Gravehawk and Raven, UK forces have helped Ukraine adapt the UK’s own Brimstone land-attack missiles, provided in unknown quantities, into a vehicle-based ‘MLRS-like’ capability. As ever, assistance rendered by UK industry or military forces inside Ukraine comes at a significant risk to personal safety, a fact highlighted by the recent fatal accident of a UK soldier serving with the 1st Battalion, the Parachute Regiment (1 PARA), while observing Ukrainian personnel testing – according to the UK government – a “new defensive capability” away from the front lines. Highly trained, 1 PARA is permanently under the command of the British Army’s Director Special Forces. (Source: army-technology.com)

 

08 Jan 26. Ukraine’s New AIR Speed Interceptor Drone for Targeting Small-Sized Objects. A Ukrainian defence-tech company has unveiled the new AIR Speed interceptor drone, which expands its lineup of unmanned systems designed to counter aerial threats. The drone was developed by the General Cherry, a company known for its FPV drones and interceptor drone solutions. The AIR Speed is a new addition to the General Cherry AIR series. This drone is specifically designed to combat small, fast, and highly maneuverable enemy strike UAVs. Russia is actively using Shahed-type kamikaze drones and other models to attack Ukrainian cities and infrastructure. Their speed and unpredictable trajectories make interception a challenging task. The AIR Speed is built on a compact 8-inch frame, which reduces its size and enhances maneuverability. The drone’s maximum speed reaches 236 km/h. Unlike the AIR Pro version, the new drone performs different tasks. It complements the lineup of interceptors, expanding the range of tools for countering various types of aerial threats. The smaller size and high flight dynamics allow the AIR Speed to operate in scenarios where larger interceptors are limited due to inertia and insufficient speed buildup. The AIR Speed is designed for tasks where decisive factors are rapid approach speed, sharp maneuvers, and targeting small-sized objects. The company has announced that the AIR Speed is now available for orders on the Brave1 platform, which brings together Ukrainian defense-tech developments. It is worth noting that in December of last year, the Ukrainian interceptor drone General Cherry AIR destroyed one of the newest and rarest Russian reconnaissance UAVs – the Knyaz Veshchy Oleg. The successful interception of an aerial target was carried out by the crew of Hrim from the 55th Artillery Brigade “Zaporozhian Sich.” The Knyaz Veshchy Oleg drone is positioned by the Russian defense industry as the most advanced model for deep air reconnaissance. (Source: UAS VISION/MILITARNYI)

 

07 Jan 26. Ukraine showcases new procurement system with UAV acquisition changes. Ukraine’s Ministry of Defence (MoD) has combined various procurement management bodies into a single defence procurement entity as of 1 January 2026, according to a 1 January news release. Ukraine’s State Operator for Non-Lethal Acquisition – State Logistics Operator (Derzhavnuy Operator Tylu: DOT) has been merged into the Defence Procurement Agency (DPA). The plan for a unified acquisition agency, intended to centralise contracts for lethal and non-lethal equipment including clothing and food, was announced by Ukraine’s then Defence Minister Denys Shmyhal on 30 December 2025.  The DOT-Chain Defence system was highlighted as a key achievement in the Ukraine MoD’s 1 January news release. The system “digitised nearly 70%” of all documentation related to the supply of weapons and logistics, according to the MoD. DOT-Chain Defence is a digital platform designed to accelerate the supply of weapons to the Armed Forces of Ukraine (AFU) by allowing military units to independently select and order military equipment. It was launched in July 2025 and gives an opportunity for manufacturers to access direct feedback from military units based near the front line, according to a 7 July 2025 MoD press release. (Source: Janes)

 

07 Jan 26. US backs security guarantees for Ukraine at summit of Kyiv’s allies in Paris.

  • Summary
  • Commitment comes at ‘coalition of willing’ gathering
  • Security protocols ‘as strong as anyone has ever seen,’ Witkoff says
  • Guarantees would enter into force after ceasefire
  • Question mark hangs over Russian response

The United States for the first time on Tuesday backed a broad coalition of Ukraine’s allies in vowing to provide security guarantees that leaders said would include binding commitments to support the country if Russia attacks again. The pledge came at a summit in Paris of the “coalition of the willing” of mainly European nations to firm up guarantees to reassure Kyiv in the event of a ceasefire with Russia, which invaded its neighbour in 2014 and again at full scale in 2022. Read about innovative ideas and the people working on solutions to global crises with the Reuters Beacon newsletter. Sign up here. Unlike previous coalition meetings, the summit was also attended by U.S. envoys Steve Witkoff and Jared Kushner – President Donald Trump’s son-in-law – as well as America’s top general in Europe, Alexus Grynkewich, who a day earlier fleshed out details of security guarantees with European army chiefs. Witkoff, who has led talks with Russia, said after the summit that Trump “strongly stands behind security protocols”.

“Those security protocols are meant to … deter any attacks, any further attacks in Ukraine, and … if there are any attacks, they’re meant to defend, and they will do both. They are as strong as anyone has ever seen,” he said at a joint news conference with the French, German, British and Ukrainian leaders.

Kushner said that if Ukrainians were to make a final deal “they have to know that after a deal they are secure, they have, obviously, a robust deterrence, and there’s real backstops to make sure that this will not happen again.”

PROPOSAL FOR US TO LEAD CEASEFIRE MONITORING

A statement by coalition leaders also said that allies will participate in a proposed U.S.-led ceasefire monitoring and verification mechanism. Officials have said this would likely involve drones, sensors and satellites, not U.S. troops. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskiy, writing on Telegram after the meeting, said the agreements were “a signal of how seriously Europe and the entire coalition of the willing are ready to work for real security”. But he added that it remained to be determined how the monitoring would work and how the Ukrainian army would be supported and financed. He thanked the United States “for its readiness to be a backstop in all areas – security guarantees, monitoring a ceasefire and rebuilding.” He said the Ukrainian delegation would continue its talks on key issues on Wednesday. The statement was not explicitly endorsed by the United States and details of a U.S. role were watered down from an earlier draft, notably removing language that outlined the use of U.S. capabilities to support a multinational force in Ukraine. But European officials hailed the involvement of the U.S. envoys and their strong comments as evidence Washington stood behind the security framework.

Item 1 of 7 A firefighter works at the site of a residential complex damaged during an overnight Russian drone strike, amid Russia’s attack on Ukraine, in Zaporizhzhia, Ukraine, January 2, 2026. REUTERS/Stringer

[1/7]A firefighter works at the site of a residential complex damaged during an overnight Russian drone strike, amid Russia’s attack on Ukraine, in Zaporizhzhia, Ukraine, January 2, 2026. REUTERS/Stringer Purchase Licensing Rights

Talks to bring the almost four-year war to an end have accelerated since November. However, Moscow has yet to signal willingness to make concessions after Kyiv pushed for changes to a U.S. proposal that initially backed Russia’s main demands. Moscow has also given no public sign that it would accept a peace deal with the security guarantees envisaged by Ukraine’s allies. Russia has previously rejected any NATO members having troops inside Ukraine.

FOCUS ON LEGALLY BINDING SECURITY GUARANTEES

Until recently, much of the allies’ focus was on pledges of military aid for Ukraine’s forces and possible contributions to an international reassurance force. But attention has now shifted to legally binding guarantees to come to Kyiv’s aid in the event of another attack by Moscow. The possibility of a military response is likely to trigger debate in many European countries, diplomats say.

“These commitments may include the use of military capabilities, intelligence and logistical support, diplomatic initiatives, adoption of additional sanctions,” the leaders’ statement said, adding that they would now “finalise binding commitments.”

European leaders present at the meeting, including French President Emmanuel Macron, British Prime Minister Keir Starmer, Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk and Italy’s Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni stressed that the statement showed renewed unity between Europe and the United States on helping Ukraine.

Macron and Starmer brushed aside questions about whether they could rely on commitments by Trump, particularly given his renewed claims that the U.S. should take over Greenland, an autonomous part of NATO ally Denmark.

FRANCE, BRITAIN READY TO DEPLOY TROOPS AFTER CEASEFIRE

The leaders’ statement also pledged a European-led “Multinational Force for Ukraine … to support the rebuilding of Ukraine’s armed forces and support deterrence” with “the proposed support of the U.S”. France and Britain signed a declaration of intent on the future deployment of multinational forces once a ceasefire is reached. Macron said that could involve sending thousands of French troops.

“It paves the way for the legal framework under which British, French and partner forces could operate on Ukrainian soil, securing Ukraine’s skies and seas and regenerating Ukraine’s armed forces for the future,” Starmer said. (Source: Reuters)

 

06 Jan 26. Cuashub.com said today that Ukraine scales up production of counter-drone interceptors. Ukraine is producing between 500 and 800 counter-UAS interceptor drones per day, according to a report by The Kyiv Post, as part of a broader effort to strengthen layered defenses against Russian drone attacks. Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of Ukraine Oleksandr Syrsky said the production surge reflects the changing nature of the aerial threat, with Russian forces adapting their tactics and technology.

“The enemy is taking advantage of weather conditions, modernizing its strike drones and changing tactics, including attacks at ultra-low altitudes,” Syrsky was quoted as saying. “Accordingly, we are modernizing our countermeasures and adapting the system to achieve the necessary results.”

Syrsky said a key priority is expanding Ukraine’s interceptor drone capability, including increasing the number of drones, ground control stations, radars and trained crews. President Volodymyr Zelensky previously stated that Ukraine aimed to reach production levels of 500 to 800 interceptors per day by November, a target that now appears to have been met.

Incentive-based procurement model

Central to the expansion is Ukraine’s “Army of Drones Bonus” program, an incentive-based procurement system that allows service members to earn points by destroying or damaging enemy targets. These points can then be exchanged for drones and other equipment needed for combat missions. Procurement and delivery are managed by the Defence Procurement Agency (DPA) through the DOT-Chain Defence digital platform, which links military units directly with manufacturers. The system enables contract signing, prioritization of demand, and coordinated delivery to frontline units. According to a statement from Ukraine’s Ministry of Defence, the DPA added tactical interceptor drones to the DOT-Chain Defence marketplace in the autumn to counter enemy reconnaissance and strike UAVs. Contracts have been signed with six domestic manufacturers, and nearly 5,000 interceptor drones had been delivered to military units by the end of December.

Feedback-driven supply strategy

DPA Director Arsen Zhumadilov said the agency is shifting away from a top-down supply model toward one that incorporates frontline feedback.

“We are changing the logic of the supply process, focusing not only on delivering equipment to the military but also on their feedback and expertise,” Zhumadilov said.

He added that surveys of service members are used to identify which interceptor drone models are most effective in combat, with procurement decisions increasingly guided by operational performance.

The interceptor drones form a critical element of Ukraine’s evolving counter-drone architecture, which combines kinetic interception, electronic warfare, sensors and air-defense systems to counter the growing volume and sophistication of Russian drone operations. https://cuashub.com/en/content/ukraine-scales-up-production-of-counter-drone-interceptors/ (Source: https://cuashub.com/

 

02 Jan 26. Germany to host small-drones production line for Ukrainian forces. German drone maker Quantum Systems and Ukraine-based Frontline Robotics have announced the creation of a new mass-production line for small drones in Germany to supply the Ukrainian Armed Forces. The new joint venture, dubbed Quantum Frontline Industries (QFI), will manufacture the Zoom and Linza drone variants developed by the Ukrainian company. Production is expected to begin in the first quarter of 2026 and is envisioned in the longer term to reach 10,000 units per year, according to a Frontline Robotics spokesperson. The Linza is designed to perform strike and reconnaissance missions and is able to carry a maximum payload of two kilograms at ranges up to ten kilometers. It is equipped with a communication link resistant to electronic warfare. The Zoom is a reconnaissance drone developed for frontline use.

“Over 60 units [in Ukraine] trust our drones – their primary areas of application are: target acquisition and artillery fire adjustment, transmitting coordinates for combat planning, operating at night and under jamming conditions, and highly resistant to enemy EW,” the spokesperson said in an email to Defense News.

Under the partnership, Quantum Systems will establish a fully automated production line in Germany and Frontline Robotics will provide licensed production rights and additional support, including operator training. The project is expected to generate employment opportunities for Ukrainians in Germany. In a press release, the companies stated that this was the first initiative of Ukrainian drones to be produced on an industrial scale in Europe and called the transnational co-production “the new German Model.” Ukrainian forces have been operating the Quantum Systems-made Vector drones since 2022, with hundreds of units delivered since then, per a company statement. (Source: Defense News)

 

02 Jan 26. “Army of Drones” incentive scheme boosts Ukraine’s C-UAS interceptor production. According to a report in The Kyiv Post, Ukraine is producing between 500 and 800 C-UAS intercept drones a day as a key element in the country’s new layered counter drone defence networks, supported by a new procurement strategy. Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of Ukraine (AFU) Oleksandr Syrsky was quoted in the report as saying: “The enemy is taking advantage of weather conditions, modernizing its strike drones and changing tactics, including attacks at ultra-low altitudes…. Accordingly, we are modernizing our countermeasures and adapting the system to achieve the necessary results. Our key task at this stage is to strengthen the UAV interceptor direction – to increase the number of relevant drones, ground stations and radars, and to expand both the volume and quality of crew training,” he said. Previously, President Volodymyr Zelensky said Ukraine would be producing of 500 to 800 interceptors per day by November. At the heart of this increased procurement drive is “Army of Drones Bonus” incentive programme. Under this scheme, service members earn points for destroying and damaging enemy targets and exchange them for the drones and equipment they need to accomplish combat missions. The supply process is managed by the Defence Procurement Agency (DPA) through the DOT-Chain Defence digital system. Within it, contracts with manufacturers are concluded, and the direct delivery of drones and other equipment to military units is coordinated. According to a Ukraine defence ministry statement: “In the autumn, the DPA added tactical-level interceptor drones to the weapons marketplace, which help counter enemy reconnaissance and strike UAVs on the frontline. Overall, as part of supplying the military through its IT system, the DPA has signed contracts with six manufacturers of this type of UAV. As of the end of December, the military had received nearly 5,000 interceptor drones through DOT-Chain Defence.”

“We are changing the logic of the supply process, focusing not only on delivering equipment to the military but also on their feedback and expertise,” said Arsen Zhumadilov, Director of the DPA, quoted by the defence ministry. “ The DPA team conducted surveys among service members to identify the interceptor drone models they use and consider most effective. We therefore prioritize contracting with the manufacturers of these systems,”.

For more information: https://mod.gov.ua/en/news/anti-shahed-drones-to-be-supplied-to-the-military-through-dot-chain-defence (Source: www.unmannedairspace.info)

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