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Military And Security Developments
Dec 23.
- Israel-Lebanon: Airstrike underscores conflict escalation risks ahead of LH disarmament deadline. On 22 December, Israel conducted an airstrike on a vehicle near Sidon (South governorate, Lebanon), killing three Lebanese Hizballah (LH) operatives. The attack follows Lebanese Prime Minister Nawaf Salam’s 20 December announcement that the country is close to completing LH’s disarmament south of the Litani River, ahead of the 31 December deadline. Salam also announced that Beirut is ready to move on to the second disarmament phase north of the Litani River. However, on 22 December, LH-aligned media reported the group’s intention to notify relevant parties that it will not disarm north of the river, sustaining short-term conflict re-escalation risks. We assess that Israel will likely increase military pressure on the country in the coming days, aiming to enforce disarmament through intensified airstrikes targeting LH militants, weapons stores and infrastructure in southern Lebanon, Baalbek-Hermel governorate and the capital Beirut. This will elevate security risks to nearby personnel from direct hits and exposure to shrapnel. Despite Salam’s claims, it is likely that the government will fail to disarm LH south of the Litani River by 31 December, possibly prompting Israel to engage in major operations targeting LH in the first quarter of 2026.
- Syria: New clashes in Aleppo governorate increase wider armed conflict risks in 2026. On 22 December, heavy clashes between the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) and the governmental forces in Aleppo (Aleppo governorate) killed at least four civilians. The clashes included tank deployment and mortar fire and took place in Aleppo’s Kurdish-controlled Ashrafieh and Sheikh Maqsood districts, prompting hundreds of residents to evacuate. Both sides have accused each other of triggering a new round of conflict, as hostilities had paused in October. Although the clashes have ceased and both parties have agreed to de-escalate, we assess that the ceasefire will remain highly vulnerable to a breakdown in the coming days and throughout January 2026. This is primarily due to the deadlock in talks over the SDF’s integration in the new Syrian army and internal forces. The resumption of clashes within Aleppo and its rural areas around Manbij and the Tishreen Dam remains a realistic possibility, sustaining security instability. Any new and prolonged clashes with ethnic-Kurd communities in the first quarter of 2026 will increase the risks of violence and escalation into a wider armed conflict between Damascus and the SDF along the Euphrates River.
Dec 22.
Wil The Yemen Civil War Resume?
Executive summary
- In our most likely scenario, the Southern Transitional Council (STC) consolidates its control of southern Yemen, triggering sporadic clashes with Saudi-backed tribal factions. However, conflict escalation remains limited. The Saudi-backed National Shield Forces (NSF) retain their force posture, but do not engage militarily with the STC. The Presidential Leadership Council (PLC) survives but becomes politically defunct, with the STC assuming authority in the territory it controls. Yemen’s humanitarian crisis remains critical and its economy fragile.
- In our second and most dangerous scenario, the STC declares independence, triggering direct Saudi and UAE intervention and a return to widespread civil conflict. The PLC effectively dissolves, compounding governance failures in the south. The Houthis exploit the PLC’s fragmentation to launch offensives against factions aligned with the internationally recognised government (IRG) and the STC. The Houthis also relaunch missile campaigns against Saudi Arabia and the UAE. The conflict stops most legal economic output and exacerbates humanitarian risks.
- Our third scenario considers an alternative trigger for all-out conflict in Yemen. Here the Israel-Hamas ceasefire breaks down, prompting the Houthis to resume attacks on Israel and commercial shipping in the Red Sea. Israel responds with airstrikes on Houthi territory, which emboldens IRG-aligned groups and the STC to launch offensives on the Houthis. Civil conflict resumes with third-party involvement, triggering a further deterioration in security, governance and socio-economic conditions.
- In our least likely scenario, the STC maintains a stable force posture in the south but clashes with the Saudi-backed tribal forces subside. This facilitates the emergence of relative political, military and economic stability over time. The STC dominates southern representation while operating under the PLC’s framework and stabilisation mitigates severe humanitarian and economic concerns.
Context
On 3 December, the UAE-backed Southern Transitional Council (STC) launched an operation in eastern Hadhramaut governorate. The move comes amid escalating tensions with Saudi-backed local forces, including elements aligned with the Hadhramaut Tribal Alliance (HTA). STC-aligned forces secured key facilities in Seiyun (Hadhramaut governorate), with fighting reported at Seiyun Airport (GXF) and near the presidential palace. Saudi-backed forces reportedly withdrew from some positions in Aden and Lahij governorates toward Marib governorate, while other reports indicate that they had also pulled back from several positions in al-Mahrah governorate, including al-Ghaydah Airport (AAY). By 7 December, over 10,000 STC troops had reportedly pushed into al-Mahrah, while STC-aligned forces also advanced eastward along major road networks towards Yemen’s border with Oman, carrying South Yemen flags. On 8 December, the STC expanded its presence across all of Yemen’s southern governorates, including the port city of Aden (Aden governorate), the seat of the internationally recognised government (IRG). On 15 December, the STC announced that it had launched a new military operation in southern Abyan governorate.
After these operations, the STC now exercises effective military control over most of the key population centres and transport corridors in Aden, Abyan, al-Mahrah, Dhale, Hadhramaut, Lahij and Shabwah governorates, as well as the Socotra archipelago. These governorates previously constituted South Yemen, an independent state from 1967 to 1990. Given the STC’s repeated calls for South Yemen’s secession, we assess that there is a realistic possibility of the STC declaring South Yemen’s independence in the coming weeks. Although nominally a member of the Presidential Leadership Council (PLC) – the executive body of the IRG – the STC’s objectives are at odds with those of the rest of the council; the PLC continues to seek a decisive victory over the Iran-backed Houthi-led government in the capital Sanaa while maintaining the territorial integrity of the Yemeni state. The STC has claimed that senior figures from other factions within the PLC have left Aden; if true, this would heighten government stability risks, increasing the likelihood of the PLC’s collapse and the emergence of the STC as the dominant governing and military force in southern Yemen. On 18 December, however, international media outlets reported that as many as 20,000 Saudi-backed National Shield Forces (NSF) have amassed on the Saudi-Yemen border in response to the STC advance, increasing international concerns over a possible Saudi-backed counter-offensive.
The Iran-backed Houthis continue to control Sanaa and north-western Yemeni provinces. Although a UN-brokered ceasefire was reached in 2022 (which remains in place de facto) largely ceasing the Saudi-led intervention, sporadic clashes have continued between the Houthis and IRG-aligned forces in several front-line and border zones. Since the outbreak of the Israel–Hamas war in October 2023, the Houthis have increasingly targeted Israeli- and Western-affiliated shipping in the Red Sea and launched numerous direct attacks on Israel, significantly disrupting global trade and compounding regional tensions. In response, Israel and US-led coalition forces conducted multiple strikes against Houthi military and dual-use infrastructure in 2024 and 2025, partially degrading Houthi capabilities. Since October 2025, however, the Houthis have paused their attacks on commercial vessels in the Red Sea, though this pause is conditional on the continued implementation of the Israel-Hamas ceasefire.
Yemen’s humanitarian crisis remains critical. Ms require assistance with access to food, clean water and healthcare remaining severely disrupted. Political crackdowns and human rights abuses persist, particularly in Houthi-controlled territories, including arbitrary detentions, forced disappearances and the targeting of civil society, media, UN and NGO personnel.
- Syria-US: Further joint security operations against Islamic State likely in coming days. On 19 December, the US Central Command (CENTCOM) forces struck more than 70 Islamic State (IS) targets on multiple locations across central Syria. These strikes were a direct retaliation for an attack by an IS-affiliated gunman who killed two US soldiers in Palmyra (Homs governorate) on 13 December. We assess that the US is unlikely to conduct similar large-scale strikes in Syria in the coming weeks. Rather, the CENTCOM will continue to conduct joint limited operations with the Syrian governmental forces against IS in central Syria, particularly in the Syrian desert (known as Badya). Furthermore, Syria’s General Security Service (GSS) is also likely to continue its crackdown on IS cells in the capital Damascus, as well as in Aleppo, Homs, Idlib and Raqqa governorates in the coming days. This will elevate security risks, including increasing the risks of sporadic clashes and staff exposure to crossfire. Risks of retaliatory attacks by IS and/or its affiliates against churches and Christian gatherings will also increase during the Christmas period, as well as in early January 2026.
- Iraq: Energy security risks will persist over next 12 months, sustaining anti-government sentiment. On 21 December, dozens of demonstrators blocked the road between Kirkuk and Dibis (both Kirkuk governorate), protesting against frequent power outages and a limited electricity supply. Meanwhile, the security forces mobilised in Najaf (Najaf governorate) following reports that demonstrators planned to block a nearby highway. These incidents highlight Iraq’s persistent energy security risks despite the government’s mitigation efforts, including increasing domestic energy production and reducing reliance on single suppliers such as Iran. In the coming 12 months, we assess that power cuts will likely persist in Iraq due to infrastructure mismanagement, the effects of a changing climate and the lack of diversification into renewable energy. Outages are likely to worsen during the summer months (i.e. May to October) amid sustained above-average temperatures. Energy supply shortages will likely drive operational challenges for businesses, including disruptions to communications and the public sector’s working hours, while elevating threats to medical infrastructure and supply chains. A persistent provision of poor public services will sustain anti-government sentiment over the coming months, elevating domestic unrest risks.
Dec 19.
- Israel: Violent riots underscore elevated ethno-religious tensions, spillover risks nationwide. On 18 December, hundreds of ultra-Orthodox protesters rioted in Jerusalem (Jerusalem district), attacked a bus, overturned a police car and injured at least 13 police officers. Later that day, ultra-Orthodox demonstrators blocked Highway 4 at several junctions near Ashdod (Southern district), after the police prevented them from entering the city to protest against military conscription. The Jerusalem riots began after the police attempted to arrest two ultra-Orthodox individuals for draft evasion and an attack on a municipal inspector who had issued them a parking ticket. Subsequently, the police deployed a helicopter and used stun grenades, tear gas and water cannons to disperse protesters. The incidents highlight the elevated ethno-religious tensions around military conscription. We assess that there is an elevated risk of violent domestic unrest and travel disruption near areas with a strong concentration of ultra-Orthodox communities (particularly in Jerusalem), increasing security risks for bystanders and assets near protests. Furthermore, the incidents highlight the elevated spillover risks of anti-conscription riots into other Israeli cities in the coming weeks. (Source: Sibylline)
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