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Military And Security Developments
23 Jan26.
Russian areas of occupation prior to the 2022 invasion are shown in orange; estimated areas of Russian control since the invasion are shown in yellow; a proposed Russian 18.6-mile (30km) ‘sanitary zone’ along the international border is shown with a bright red dashed line
Executive summary
- In our updated Strategic Risk Forecast, we put forward various scenarios concerning the trajectory of the Russo-Ukrainian war in the next 12 months. Our baseline scenario is that the war will likely continue in some form without a definitive resolution; there is also a realistic possibility of a fragile ceasefire that will fail to stop the fighting entirely.
- Over the last month, diplomatic attention has drifted away from Ukraine amid numerous global crises that have dominated decision-makers’ attention, from Venezuela and Iran to Greenland. As such, negotiations over Ukraine are unlikely to have made any significant progress, despite the US remaining engaged and organising various meetings. The most significant development this month was the so-called ‘coalition of the willing’ summit, which resulted in a UK-France declaration of intent to send troops to Ukraine in the event of a peace deal. However, we assess that this remains a non-starter for the Russian authorities, who have consistently opposed any NATO troop deployments to Ukraine.
- Looking ahead to the coming month, maritime threats are likely to increase. On 22 January, France announced that it had boarded a sanctioned Russia-linked tanker in the Mediterranean Sea in tandem with allies. If the UK, France or other European states proceed with further plans to seize Russia-flagged or -linked shadow fleet vessels, the threat of Russian retaliation will increase. This will include not only grey-zone threats to land-based assets but also the harassment of Europe-linked shipping.
- Since our last report, Russia has intensified its strikes against Ukraine’s energy infrastructure, resulting in the harshest heating season the country has experienced since the start of the full-scale war. The capital Kyiv remains particularly affected; the mayor has declared a state of emergency and encouraged residents to leave the city given the scale of the strikes’ impact.
- Key triggers, warnings and indicators (TWIs) to watch for in February include high-profile negotiations (though a major breakthrough towards peace remains unlikely) and the evolving energy crisis across Ukraine, including in Kyiv, which is facing temperatures as low as -20 C (-4 F) without heating.
The interception rate of ussian strikes by attack type; in recent months, Ukraine has not reported any drones intercepted through electronic warfare (EW) measures; we will therefore no longer report EW / lost drones from January onwards; the category is retained in the visual to account for those months in which EW activity was recorded; sources: Ukraine’s air force, Sibylline
Jan 20.
KEY DEVELOPMENTS
- STRIKES: Russia continues its systematic strike campaign against Ukraine’s energy infrastructure, with the aim of disabling the country’s remaining power-generation capabilities; strikes on substations of nuclear plants are highly unlikely to trigger a nuclear incident
- NEGOTIATIONS: A significant breakthrough towards peace during the World Economic Forum (WEF) between 19 and 23 January is highly unlikely, particularly amid increased intra-NATO tensions over Greenland
- POLITICS: Zelensky’s recent meetings with potential political rivals, including Valeriy Zaluzhnyi, are likely aimed at strengthening his position as the prospect of elections in the coming months grows more likely
- FORECAST: Mykhailo Fedorov has been appointed as Ukraine’s new minister of defence, as part of Kyiv’s latest extensive cabinet overhaul; systemic manpower shortages are set to remain among the largest challenges for the new minister
- DONETSK: The Russian forces have been steadily building pressure on Kostiantynivka, operating close to the southern outskirts of the city. Kostiantynivka is the southernmost part of the so-called fortress belt in Donetsk oblast and is therefore a key objective for Russian operations. On 18 January, a Ukrainian military observer confirmed that, over a 24- to 48-hour period, Russian forces conducted assaults immediately east of Kostiantynivka, as well as near three villages – Yablunivka, Berestok and Illinivka – located to the south.
- DONETSK: According to the Ukrainian source, the Russian command is amassing assault infantry in preparation for more intensive infiltration operations in Kostiantynivka, akin to the offensive campaign against Pokrovsk further south in Donetsk oblast. However, Russia reportedly does not retain sufficient resources to intensify infiltration operations in the immediate term (likely due to its continued focus on Pokrovsk to the south). Instead, at this stage, Russian forces are more likely to focus on identifying and probing Ukrainian defensive weaknesses in preparation for a future, more substantial infiltration campaign, targeting areas to the south, south-east and east of Kostiantynivka. Ultimately, manpower shortages will shape Ukrainian defensive capabilities in the sector.
- DONETSK: Further south, despite a slowdown in Russian advances in the Pokrovsk sector, the Russian command is reportedly taking steps to accelerate the full capture of Pokrovsk and, to its immediate east, Myrnohrad. On 19 January, Ukrainian Commander-in-Chief Oleksandr Syrskyi warned that the situation in the Pokrovsk-Myrnohrad sector remains critical, with the Russian forces reportedly increasing pressure by redeploying reserves towards the area. Ukrainian forces still control the northern part of Pokrovsk and maintain defensive positions in Myrnohrad. Ultimately, the quantity and quality of reinforcements will determine whether Russia can achieve the full capture of the Pokrovsk and Myrnohrad in the coming weeks.
- STRIKES: Russia continues its systematic strike campaign against Ukraine’s energy infrastructure, with the aim of disabling the country’s remaining power-generation capabilities. Overnight on 19-20 January, Russia launched a high-intensity combined strike involving several aerial projectiles, targeting substations connected to Ukraine’s nuclear power plants (NPP). The Ukrainian authorities, however, stated that the attacks on these facilities were unsuccessful. This is not the first time that Russia has targeted NPP-linked substations; such attacks occurred in November 2025, but the Ukrainian authorities did not specify whether they were damaged.
- STRIKES: On 17 January, Ukraine’s military intelligence (GUR) warned that Russia was planning strikes against substations linked to Ukraine’s three remaining operational nuclear power plants in its western and southern regions. Years of Russian attacks against its energy infrastructure have significantly increased Ukraine’s reliance on nuclear power generation. We previously assessed that Russian forces would strike nuclear power plant-linked substations and that wider power infrastructure related to nuclear plants remains a high-priority target for Moscow. While the Ukrainian authorities have likely reinforced the protection of these facilities over the last year, the risk of damage will remain elevated. We continue to assess that Russian forces are unlikely to strike nuclear reactor buildings directly with missiles (though drone strikes remain possible given their more limited payload). However, even if strikes do hit these locations, the safety features therein mean that a catastrophic nuclear incident remains highly unlikely. Instead, such strikes would likely be aimed at forcing a shutdown of the plants.
POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS
- NEGOTIATIONS: A significant breakthrough towards peace during the World Economic Forum (WEF) between 19 and 23 January is highly unlikely, particularly amid increased intra-NATO tensions over Greenland (semi-autonomous territory of Denmark). On 14 January, Politico reported that Ukraine and its European partners were hoping that US President Donald Trump would commit to US-backed security guarantees during the WEF, citing two unspecified European officials. Meanwhile, two other unnamed officials stated that Ukraine and Europe are aiming to secure Trump’s endorsement of an economic plan supporting Ukraine’s post-war recovery. While details of the initiative remain limited, the plan aims to mobilise USD 800 bn in public and private investments over ten years to rebuild Ukraine and kick-start long-term economic growth.
- NEGOTIATIONS: Various meetings between key stakeholders, including Russia’s principal negotiator, Kirill Dmitriev, Trump’s son-in-law Jared Kushner and US envoy Steve Witkoff, are likely to take place over the coming days. The meetings come after Trump said his Ukrainian counterpart, Volodymyr Zelensky, is stalling peace, rather than Russian President Vladimir Putin, who continues to show no willingness to make genuine steps towards ending the war.
- NEGOTIATIONS: We assess that the US’ efforts to increase pressure on its NATO allies to acquire Greenland will almost certainly distract attention away from the Ukraine peace process. Heightened tensions between Europe and the US over Greenland will likely further strain transatlantic ties. Ultimately, Russia will highly likely seek to leverage fractures in Europe-US relations to undermine unity on supporting Ukraine over the coming weeks and months. We continue to assess that Moscow calculates that its attritional war strategy will outlast Western resolve, particularly as the West faces competing geopolitical priorities.
- POLITICS: Zelensky’s recent meetings with potential political rivals are likely aimed at strengthening his position, as the prospect of elections in the coming months grows more likely. On 15 January, Zelensky met with former commander-in-chief Valeriy Zaluzhnyi, who currently serves as Ukraine’s ambassador to the UK. Zaluzhnyi was dismissed from his position in 2024 amid a rift between him and Zelensky. Zaluzhnyi is a popular former military commander and is widely considered a potential frontrunner in a future presidential election. However, Zaluzhnyi has previously denied harbouring plans to launch a political party and opposes holding elections during wartime.
- POLITICS: Before holding talks with Zaluzhnyi, Zelensky also met with Serhiy Prytula and Serhiy Sternenko, who are involved in activism supporting Ukraine’s armed forces. Zelensky stated that the two men had agreed to work with him, without offering further specifics. This likely indicates Zelensky’s efforts to form alliances or strengthen ties with prominent public figures ahead of any potential vote. Notably, in November 2025, Sternenko criticised his country’s military and political leadership, warning that what he perceived as the authorities’ insufficient approach to defence could result in the loss of Ukrainian statehood.
- POLITICS: According to polling from the Kyiv International Institute of Sociology (KIIS) released on 19 January, Zaluzhnyi enjoys the highest level of trust (72%) of Ukrainian officials and public figures. Meanwhile, trust for Zelensky and Prytula stands at 62% and 46%, respectively. Sternenko was not listed in the polling. Prytula has previously been involved in politics; he ran in the Kyiv mayoral elections in 2020 as a member of the pro-European Holos (Voice) party. We assess that the US’ eagerness for Kyiv to hold elections following a peace deal will likely spur similar engagements between Zelensky and political contenders over the coming months, facilitating a ‘return of politics’ to Ukraine.
FORECAST
DEFENCE: On 14 January, the Ukrainian parliament (known as the Verkhovna Rada) voted in favour of appointing Mykhailo Fedorov as the new minister of defence, as part of Kyiv’s latest extensive cabinet overhaul. Fedorov previously served as the minister of digital transformation since 2019; he is the fourth person to lead Ukraine’s Ministry of Defence (MoD) since the beginning of the full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. Although Fedorov does not have a formal military background, he was instrumental in bolstering Ukraine’s drone capabilities and assisting with military technological advancements in his past tenure.
While technological expertise is almost certainly a factor influencing Fedorov’s appointment, we assess that underlying issues remain in the MoD which he is highly unlikely to remedy easily or in the short term. Prior to the parliamentary vote, Fedorov had informed lawmakers that his goals included reforming the army, improving frontline infrastructure, eradicating corruption within the ministry and fostering a new culture of trust – all of which will be extremely difficult to implement at pace. The Ukrainian MoD has previously been at the centre of corruption scandals; in September 2023, Zelensky dismissed defence minister Oleksiy Reznikov as part of a crackdown on corrupt practices in the institution. Meanwhile, Zelensky has listed strengthening air defences as Fedorov’s principal task, with the second priority being the use of technology to blunt Russian gains and resolve logistical issues on the frontline.
Fedorov will inherit a significant funding shortfall and chronic manpower shortages, which will highly likely continue to constrain Ukraine’s operational capability over the long term. On 14 January, Fedorov stated that the MoD is facing a deficit of UAH 300 bn (over USD 6.9 bn). An attempt at bridging this will highly likely require consultations with international partners. Separately, Fedorov disclosed that two m Ukrainian citizens are wanted for evading mobilisation, while 200,000 soldiers are absent without official leave (AWOL). Although Fedorov highly likely aims to offset manpower shortages with technological advances, we assess that technology is unlikely to resolve chronic personnel shortages significantly (especially not in the short-to-medium term).
In contrast, Russia will likely maintain recruitment strategies to reinforce its manpower advantage over Ukraine. On 16 January, Russia’s Security Council stated that the number of people signing contracts with the Russian military in 2025 dropped by 6% compared with 2024. While the exact reasons remain unclear, some Russian regions have reportedly reduced the size of their military sign-up bonuses in 2025 due to economic pressures. That said, an exiled Russian media outlet reported that the authorities in at least five regions have sharply increased sign-on bonuses for contract soldiers, having reduced them to the federal minimum in 2025. Although the regional authorities did not disclose the reasons for reintroducing lucrative sign-on bonuses, we assess that this is most likely due to pressure from the federal authorities, in a bid to maintain a steady flow of military recruits to sustain its highly attritional tactics.
Ultimately, we assess that Ukraine’s growing military personnel shortages will remain a key factor shaping its ability to resist Russian offensives, increasingly pressuring Kyiv to lower the mobilisation age. However, this remains a highly unpopular measure which, if implemented, would likely trigger a strong backlash against the current leadership. In the absence of such a policy change, mounting personnel constraints will significantly complicate Kyiv’s ability to defend multiple sectors of the frontline simultaneously. In response, Russia is highly likely to exploit these weaknesses by increasing pressure across several frontline areas over the medium-to-long term, as part of an attritional strategy that it believes will bear fruit in 2026.
- UK: Ongoing cyber attacks sustain CNI security, disruption risks from pro-Russia hacktivists. On 19 January, the UK National Cyber Security Centre (NCSC) reported that pro-Russia hacktivist groups are consistently targeting critical national infrastructure (CNI) and local government organisations in disruptive cyber attacks. The groups conduct distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) attacks, flooding targeted systems with high volumes of traffic to disrupt operations. One of these groups (‘NoName057’) reportedly operates a volunteer project (‘DDoSia’) that enables politically aligned affiliates to contribute resources and crowdsource attacks; we assess that this illustrates the group’s resilience and possible operational scale despite a previous takedown attempt in July 2025. NoName057 often aims to compromise operational technology (OT) environments within CNI, alongside information technology (IT) systems, to disrupt the provision of key services, cause temporary and/or permanent damage to equipment and instil panic and discontent among citizens. Consequently, we assess that this trend will sustain elevated security and disruption risks to key British sectors amid escalating geopolitical hostilities. (Source: Sibylline)
21 Jan 26. Ukraine Holds Off New Helsing HX-2 Drone Orders After Setbacks. Ukraine has paused additional orders of HX-2 strike drones from German defence technology firm Helsing after technical problems emerged during frontline testing, according to Bloomberg. The decision followed field trials by Ukraine’s 14th Regiment, a unit specializing in unmanned aerial systems. During the tests, the HX-2 reportedly experienced repeated difficulties at launch and during operation. An internal German military presentation dated Nov. 20 and reviewed by Bloomberg said several drones failed to take off and lacked some of the artificial intelligence features promised in the system’s design. The presentation, prepared by a unit reporting to General Gunter Schneider at the German Defense Ministry, said the HX-2 was expected to include AI-enabled terminal guidance, midcourse navigation, and visual target acquisition. However, not all of these functions were installed on the drones tested in Ukraine. People familiar with the trials said the drones also struggled under intense electronic warfare conditions near the front line, where jamming disrupted communications between the drone and its human operator. Mechanical problems with the launch catapult further reduced reliability during deployment attempts, according to the document and people briefed on the tests. As a result, Germany does not plan to place a follow-on order for HX-2 systems unless Ukraine formally signals renewed interest. The drones are funded by the German military and supplied to Ukraine as part of Berlin’s support package. Helsing, Europe’s most valuable defence technology startup, said it was not aware of the German military presentation and rejected several of its conclusions. The company denied claims of a high takeoff failure rate and said Ukrainian units continue to show interest in the HX-2. Helsing added that early hit-rate data was encouraging and argued it is too soon to draw firm conclusions from limited frontline testing. Unveiled in December 2024, the HX-2 is Helsing’s first in-house strike drone delivered to an active war zone. It features an X-wing design combining vertical takeoff with forward flight and is advertised as an AI-enabled system capable of operating at ranges of up to 100 kilometers. The setbacks underscore the rapid and unforgiving innovation cycle of the war in Ukraine, where systems are tested under combat stress and quickly refined or abandoned as battlefield conditions evolve. (Source: UAS VISION/Defence Blog )
21 Jan 26. Ukraine’s new defence minister vows data-driven overhaul of military
- Summary
- New minister says he will overhaul ministry management
- Mission control system for drones to be rolled out
- Kyiv to share wartime combat data with allies to train AI
- Ukraine to test home-grown DJI Mavic drone replacement
Ukraine’s new defence minister promised a sweeping, data-driven overhaul of Europe’s largest military to reward commanders achieving results on the battlefield and give Ukrainian forces the upper hand against Russia’s bigger and better-equipped army.
Mykhailo Fedorov – previously the digitalisation minister – took up his new post last week, tasked by President Volodymyr Zelenskiy with driving innovation and strengthening Ukraine’s defence of its frontline and its skies.
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In remarks to reporters over the weekend, cleared for release on Tuesday, Fedorov said he would start by overhauling the vast ministry’s management: “If people don’t demonstrate measurable results, they can’t remain in the system.”
Fedorov said his team had assembled “high-quality data” on where the ministry was spending money and where savings could be made as he seeks to address a large budget gap.
“It is very important that we have begun to calculate everything systematically,” he said, emphasising the importance of “the mathematics of war.”
Fedorov said his ministry would soon launch a mission control system for drone flights, which would increase the data available about crews’ performance and effectiveness. A similar system would be developed for artillery crews.
“We need to see the full picture to simplify and speed up management decision-making,” Fedorov said, adding that his aim was to increase Russia’s losses on the battlefield until they became unsustainable.
AI MODEL TRAINING
Fedorov said Ukraine will establish a system allowing its allies to train their artificial intelligence military models on Kyiv’s valuable combat data collected throughout the nearly four-year war with Russia.
Since Russia’s invasion in February 2022, Ukraine has gathered extensive battlefield information, including systematically logged combat statistics and ms of hours of drone footage captured from above.
Such data is important for training AI models, which require large volumes of real-world information to identify patterns and predict how people or objects might act. Fedorov previously described Kyiv’s wartime data trove as one of its “cards” in negotiations with other nations.
Fedorov has previously said Ukraine was using AI technology from U.S. data analytics firm Palantir.
Outlining his plans for the wartime defence ministry after his appointment, he said he wanted to “more actively” integrate allies into projects.
He said his team was receiving advice from the Center for Strategic and International Studies and RAND in the U.S., as well as Britain’s Royal United Services Institute.
MAVIC REPLACEMENT
Fedorov also said Ukraine would test its home-grown replacement for China’s DJI Mavic drone this month, which is widely used for aerial reconnaissance on the front lines by both sides. He did not disclose the manufacturer.
Ukraine has previously raised concerns about reliance on Beijing for drones and components, given China’s deepening diplomatic ties with Russia.
“We will have our own Mavic analogue: the same camera, but with a longer flight range,” Fedorov said. (Source: Reuters)
20 Jan 26. Ukraine’s new Air Force chief to build ‘anti-drone shield.’
The system will no longer respond post factum, but destroy threats while they are still in the air.
- Ukraine’s President has appointed Colonel Pavlo “Lazar” Yelizarov as Deputy Commander of the Air Force
- His promotion comes with a new responsibility to construct a counter-uncrewed air system (C-UAS) shield, which will provide coverage across the war-torn country
- The system will be designed not to respond post factum, but to destroy UAS threats while they are still en route
Ukraine has resolved to pre-empt Russian drones with the construction of an anti-drone shield with coverage extending across the war-torn nation. Last year, the Ministry of Defence determined that 100,000 Shahed drones and other drone types were used against Ukraine, damaging dozens of critical infrastructure facilities, hitting hundreds of residential buildings and causing casualties. Responding to this daily blitz, President Volodymyr Zelenskyy called for the transformation of Ukraine’s existing short-range air defence (SHORAD) units. To this end, the country’s Ministry of Defence (MoD) described its new vision as “a system designed not to respond post factum, but to destroy threats while they are still en route”. However, the government have not described how this will be achieved or what type of technology will be procured to enable the concept. But Ukraine’s Defence Minister Mykhailo Fedorov maintained that “we must change our approaches, structures, and work logic to ensure technologies deliver real results on the battlefield…” Should this lower-tier interception shield operate successfully, then it would prove detrimental to existing Russian tactics since drones now account for 80% of casualties in the conflict.
Lazar’s mobile fires group
The man who has been tasked to deliver the shield – with coverage across more than 233,000 square miles – is Colonel Pavlo “Lazar” Yelizarov, whom Zelenskyy has appointed the new Deputy Air Force Commander. Under his leadership, the “Lazar’s Group” unit emerged as one of the most effective units in the Armed Forces. The MoD claims that this mobile firing team alone destroyed enemy equipment valued at more than $13bn. It is said that one in every five destroyed Russian tanks is attributed to their work. In December alone, it destroyed 364 artillery systems and 12 multiple launch rocket systems.
Drone Shield: in practice
Ukraine is not the first to conceive such a concept: the Baltic States – Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania – are working together to establish SHORAD coverage in their “Drone Wall”. The cross-border system will be sourced from local defence industry, combining autonomous surveillance sensors, integrated drone countermeasure systems, multilayer sensor networks, interceptor drones and mobile C-UAS platforms.(Source: army-technology.com)
20 Jan 26. Czechs will not sell Ukraine jets to fight drones, prime minister says. The Czech Republic will not sell or donate to Ukraine light combat planes that could shoot down incoming drones, Prime Minister Andrej Babis said on Monday, rejecting a plan outlined by President Petr Pavel. Pavel said during a visit to Kyiv on Friday that his country could in a short time provide several planes, and added over the weekend that Ukraine had offered to buy some subsonic L-159 jets. Babis told a press conference after a cabinet meeting on Monday that the Czech army needed the planes and they could not be provided.
“The planes are not available and we do not have any other ones,” Babis said.
Pavel has been a strong supporter of Kyiv during Russia’s war in Ukraine. Babis has pledged not to provide military aid to Ukraine and opted out of the financial costs of a European Union loan to Kyiv in December.
The potential aircraft deal with Ukraine had been criticised by Babis’s coalition partners from the far-right, the pro-Russian SPD.
Babis said Prague’s position was not changing as the previous government, which had a more pro-Ukrainian stance, had also rejected the option of sending L-159 jets to Kyiv. (Source: Reuters)
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