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15 Jan 26. NATO nations send scouting teams to Greenland amid US annexation talk. Several NATO countries have announced they are sending troops to Greenland amid the Trump administration’s rhetoric of a potential annexation, continuing a balancing act of offering a win to Washington while preserving Denmark’s territorial integrity. Germany’s armed forces, the Bundeswehr, announced it would send an expeditionary group of soldiers to Greenland along with “further European countries” in a short statement late on Wednesday. Sweden, Norway and France, too, have confirmed they have ordered soldiers to the Arctic island. Additionally, the Netherlands and Canada will be deploying forces to the Danish territory in the high North, officially to take part in a planned NATO military exercise, Operation Arctic Endurance.
The operation does not appear to have any publicly communicated start or end dates, atypical for NATO exercises, which are usually communicated well in advance. There does not appear to be an online record of an operation by that name being publicly discussed prior to Jan. 14. A search of the NATO website similarly returned no results. Denmark, whose realm the self-administered territory is a part of, had previously announced it would “immediately” bolster its defenses there.
European capitals have been scrambling to make sense of the martial rhetoric out of the White House and find a potential route for de-escalation by touting their efforts to boost Arctic defenses against Russian and Chinese ships around Greenland. They have appealed to U.S. leaders to respect Danish sovereignty while boosting Arctic defenses under a joint NATO push.
At the same time, they have reaffirmed their commitment to Denmark’s territorial integrity, and the EU has said it is looking at potential countermeasures behind closed doors.
The German government initially said 13 Bundeswehr soldiers would depart for Nuuk aboard an A400M transport plane and remain there through Jan. 17. The plans changed on Thursday, with Germany saying its expeditionary team would now fly to Denmark instead and go from there to Greenland aboard a civilian aircraft on Friday, together with Danish forces.
“The aim is to explore the framework conditions for possible military contributions to support Denmark in ensuring security in the region,” the Bundeswehr said in its nocturnal press statement on Wednesday, “for example, for maritime surveillance capabilities.”
On Thursday, the German defense ministry said “specific skill contributions are not yet the focus” of the mission and that, instead, “the task is to gather fundamental insights into the local conditions for deployment and training opportunities” in preparation for further talks and planning within NATO.
In the latest statement, German Minister of Defense Pistorius also called out an alleged threat by Russia and China in the Arctic, in an apparent olive branch to the United States.
Danish officials have pushed back against the U.S. assertion that the waters around Greenland are swarming with Russian and Chinese vessels.
Pistorius had previously name-checked the country’s brand-new P-8A Poseidon maritime patrol aircraft in the context of a discussion about Greenland and protecting the high North.
Swedish Prime Minister Ulf Kristersson confirmed that Stockholm, too, had sent soldiers to Greenland as early as Wednesday, although the government maintains they were dispatched to “prepare for upcoming elements within the framework of the Danish exercise Operation Arctic Endurance.”
Both Sweden and Germany said Denmark had requested that the allied countries’ armed forces be sent.
Norway has confirmed two military service members have been sent to Greenland “to map out the further cooperation between (NATO) allies,” Tore Sandvik, Oslo’s defense minister, said in an email to Reuters.
French President Emmanuel Macron confirmed his country’s sending of troops 18 minutes past midnight local time on Thursday, saying on X that “at the request of Denmark, I have decided that France will participate in the joint exercises organized by Denmark in Greenland.” At the time, he said that “the first French military elements are already on their way. Others will follow.”
On Wednesday, representatives of Greenland, Denmark, and the United States met at the White House, but the meeting failed to resolve the standoff.
“We agreed to disagree,” Danish foreign minister Lars Lökke Rasmussen told reporters after the “frank but constructive” talks concluded. He said there was a “fundamental disagreement” between Copenhagen and Washington about the future of the world’s largest island.
The countries agreed to create a high-level working group tasked with finding a common path forward, while Trump reiterated his intention for the U.S. to take possession of the island after the meeting concluded. (Source: Defense News)
15 Jan 26. Danish and Greenlandic representatives travelled to Washington to dissuade the US from seeking the territory of Greenland. Even among the Nordics, the Danes are known for their characteristic directness. This might explain the rationale behind the Prime Ministers of Denmark and Greenland’s gambit to send their Foreign Ministers to Washington to confront, head-on, President Donald Trump’s desire to own Greenland. While the meeting ended in an agreement to disagree and establishment of a high-level working group to manage the issue, this move was not without risk and could have easily ended badly. No doubt stirring in the casements of Elsinore Castle, Holger the Dane – the legendary Viking who will awaken, it is said, from his long slumber if Denmark is ever threated – is preparing to bare his sword.
Denmark and Greenland’s relative success in Washington was not easily achieved. Behind it lies months of careful, well-orchestrated diplomacy that validates the value of statecraft and offers important lessons on how deal with the current US administration and its single-minded President.
The first lesson is in how Denmark and Greenland reclaimed the narrative. In the run-up to the meeting, the White House launched an information operation designed to portray Denmark as delinquent in its constitutional responsibility to provide for the security of Greenland. In fact, in 2025 alone, Denmark allocated $13.7bn to initiatives and capabilities for operations in the Arctic and North Atlantic including maritime patrol aircraft, surface vessels and satellite surveillance. The US also falsely claimed that there has been an increase in Russian and Chinese presence in and around Greenland, with a post from the White House X account depicting Greenland’s failure to choose the US over Denmark as the equivalent of walking into Russia and China’s hands. Actually, there has been little to no Chinese and Russian military activity around Greenland over the last decade. As Norwegian Foreign Minister Espen Barth Eide reminded, what Russian or Chinese presence there is in the Arctic is located on the Russian side at Russian bases in the Kola peninsula, which is much closer to the coast of Norway.
A second skilful step was for Finland and Greenland to call on friends and seek strength in numbers. Many European nations, as well as Canada and Australia, voiced support for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Kingdom of Denmark, underscoring that the future of Greenland is a matter for the people of Greenland and Denmark to decide. Still others – including France, Germany, Norway, Sweden and the UK – pledged to send troops to Greenland for exercises to address the alleged security gap and, ostensibly, act as a deterrent against US military action. This show of solidarity and commitment is important, but it must be followed through upon to avoid giving the US yet another example of European talk without action, and continued dependence on the US for its security.
Yet perhaps the most powerful brake on Trump’s Greenland ambition is found in the US, where Denmark and Greenland have garnered significant support. Polls show that only 4% of Americans support taking Greenland by military force. Of US efforts to acquire the country, far more disapprove (73%) than approve (17%). Bipartisan support from the US Congress has been even more forceful and impactful. Senators Thom Tillis (R-NC) and Jeanne Shaheen (D-NH), leaders of the Senate NATO Observer’s Group, issued a joint statement noting that, ‘The United States must honour its treaty obligations and respect the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Kingdom of Denmark.’ Senator Mitch McConnell (R-KY) stated that the use of force to seize the sovereign territory of a US ally would be ‘an especially catastrophic act of strategic self-harm’. Ahead of Denmark and Greenland’s meeting with US counterparts, another bipartisan group of US Senators introduced legislation prohibiting military action against fellow NATO members. While less public, Denmark has also benefited from significant support among the US military, many of whom fought and bled alongside Danish soldiers in Iraq and Afghanistan. US forces also work side-by-side with their Danish and Greenlandic counterparts on exercises and joint operations in the region and operations at Pituffik Space Base, a relationship that dates to the 1951 Mutual Defense Agreement between the US and Denmark.
The final element that delivered success was unity between Denmark and Greenland. While Greenland retains its long-term ambition for full independence from Denmark, Prime Minister Jens-Frederik Nielsen made clear Greenland’s preference to remain part of the Kingdom of Denmark for the foreseeable future, noting that now is not the time for internal discussion and divisions, but rather a time for to stand together. Since the 2009 Act on Greenland Self-Government, Greenland has acquired more autonomy at home and, more recently, a greater voice in its foreign and security policy. Going forward, it is vital that Denmark, supported by its NATO and EU partners, continue to respect Greenland’s voice and support it on the path to eventual independence. If not, US threats of annexation may gain new momentum, forcing the great sleeping Viking hero to awake. (Source: )
13 Jan 26. Colombia: Guerrilla attacks in Cauca, Chocó departments increase physical security, transit risks. On 14 January, an explosive-laden drone detonated near Alto del Oso (Chocó department), injuring ten patrolling soldiers. Reports indicate that the Ernesto ‘Che’ Guevara Front of the National Liberation Army (ELN) guerrilla group conducted the attack. Reportedly, this was a retaliation against a recent security forces operation in the area on 4 January, which killed local ELN leader Hernán Chica Palacios (alias ‘Santiago’). Meanwhile, also on 14 January, the security forces clashed with unidentified armed actors in Suárez (Cauca department). Reportedly, unidentified armed actors assaulted the Suárez police station with small arms and crashed a drone near the building; the security forces repelled the attack without casualties. The authorities suspect that dissident factions of the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC-D) perpetrated the attack. We assess that the security forces will highly likely reinforce Alto del Oso and Suárez in the coming days and escalate their operations. Consequently, the risks of armed clashes and retaliatory attacks will increase, elevating physical security and transit risks. (Source: Sibylline)
15 Jan 26. Philippines-Japan: Military resupply pact supports joint exercises, bolsters China deterrence. Earlier on 15 January, Japan and the Philippines signed an Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreement that will allow the tax-free provision of ammunition, fuel, food and other necessities during joint military training. The agreement still awaits ratification from the Japanese legislature. This agreement supports an earlier Reciprocal Access Agreement (RAA) between the two countries that streamlined procedures for troops to enter each other’s territory for drills and defence co-operation. The Japanese foreign minister, referring to Chinese assertiveness, stated that the two countries oppose ‘unilateral attempts’ to change the status quo by coercion in the East and South China seas. Philippine and Chinese vessels frequently clash in disputed waters of the South China Sea, while Japan and China dispute the ownership of the Senkaku Islands (Japan) / Diaoyu Islands (China) Islands in the East China Sea. To deter Chinese influence, the two parties are likely to finalise their agreement to bolster military information-sharing within the year. The Philippines is also almost certain to expand visiting forces agreements with European partners. This is likely to sustain tensions with China but highlights the Philippines’ strategy to diversify its security partners. (Source: Sibylline)
15 Jan 26. Cameroon: Security risks in Anglophone regions will remain elevated through 2026. On 14 January, Anglophone secessionists killed 14 civilians during an attack in Guiado (Northwest region). The attack follows an intensification in violence since October 2025; a month that marks the anniversary of Anglophone separatist groups’ proclamation of Ambazonian independence, typically triggering an uptick in secessionist activity. The separatist movement is increasingly fragmented following successful security forces operations in 2024, undermining its capacity to conduct attacks. However, the government’s reluctance to offer political concessions to the English-speaking Northwest and Southwest regions will sustain the elevated risk of attacks, particularly Bamenda (Northwest) and Akwaya, Buea, Kumba, Mbonge and Muyuka (all Southwest). We assess that attacks will likely fall in the first quarter of 2026 (as per historical precedent), while entrenched ethno-religious tensions will sustain security risks across Cameron’s Anglophone regions. Attacks will likely include IEDs, small-arms and kidnap-for-ransom (KFR) targeting government and security facilities, driving sporadic exposure to crossfire and blast risks for business and NGO staff. In the aftermath of attacks, retaliatory security force operations will elevate the risks of arbitrary detention and indiscriminate violence, exacerbating human rights concerns. (Source: Sibylline)
15 Jan 26. Denmark-Greenland-US: Disagreement over Greenland will sustain regional tensions in coming weeks. On 14 January, Danish foreign minister Lars Løkke Rasmussen stated that there is a ‘fundamental disagreement’ with the US over the latter’s stated aim to control Greenland (semi-autonomous territory of Denmark). This statement followed a meeting between Rasmussen, Greenland’s foreign minister Vivian Motzfeldt, US Vice President JD Vance and US Secretary of State Marco Rubio in the US capital Washington DC. While the meeting was reportedly constructive, no breakthrough was reached. Parties agreed to establish a high-level working group in the coming weeks to explore a possible compromise regarding Greenland’s future. Denmark and Greenland are open to a major expansion of US military presence on the island, acknowledging that security measures to counter Russian and Chinese interests should be increased. However, we assess that this posture will remain insufficient for US President Donald Trump’s administration, which will highly likely continue to push for a deal providing the US with territorial control. Consequently, negotiations will likely protract in the coming months. Additionally, preparations by several European partners – including France, Germany, Sweden and the UK – to send small military and reconnaissance teams to Greenland are unlikely to address US concerns. (Source: Sibylline)
15 Jan 26. Military trade union maintains SANDF fails on equipment, planning and post deployment care. An anonymous South African soldier’s claims of major deployment what the country’s largest military labour organisation was told about the South African contribution to the Southern African Development Community Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo (SAMIDRC).
The claims, seemingly from a 2 SA Infantry (SAI) Battalion soldier, were published by DefenceWeb earlier this week (12 January). Under the headline “An SANDF soldier’s experience with SAMIDRC” the infantryman details the sorry state of the deployment.
South Africa, in the form of its SA National Defence Force (SANDF), along with troop and equipment contributions from Malawi and Tanzania, comprised the mission to eastern Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). The mission was deployed in mid-December 2024 with official withdrawal starting on 29 April 2025, well ahead of the officially announced mandate finish of 15 December 2025.
Responding to the anonymous soldier’s claims, Sandu (the SA National Defence Union), said it could not verify all operational details, but confirmed “core issues” were previously raised with it by paid-up union members. “In turn, we [Sandu] made these public and reported on them before, during and after the deployment.”
“Long prior to the events at Sake and Goma, Sandu formally placed on record serious shortcomings in equipment provisioning, force protection, logistic readiness, allowance structures and post-deployment care,” the Arcadia, Pretoria, headquartered military trade union told DefenceWeb.
“We specifically warned that the SANDF’s approach to combat-related trauma support was inadequate and fragmented.
“The [trade union’s] Healing Heroes campaign was launched in 2025 precisely because these concerns were being raised with us and we anticipated that returning members would not receive appropriate care. Members who have difficulty in accessing medical care due trauma – whether physical or mental – are encouraged to contact Sandu so that we can assist them in enforcing their right to proper care.
“A dedicated helpline has been set up where members can report their needs in this regard (WhatsApp only on 066 06 7354).”
On what Sandu terms “systemic failure issues” – some raised by the anonymous soldier, the military labour organisation has it “reports of soldiers being compelled to self-fund essential equipment, operate with outdated peacekeeping allowances in a peace enforcement mission and receiving minimal post-return psychological support” shows them up and reinforces what had “consistently” been raised on behalf of members.
“Institutional failure to properly equip soldiers, failure to plan realistically for a combat mandate and failure to adequately care for members once they return home should never be accepted.
“Sandu continues to call for a transparent review of the SAMIDRC deployment, urgent improvements to structured long-term psychological support, an end to soldiers self-funding basic equipment and a serious reassessment of allowances and force protection for external deployments,” the union told DefenceWeb.
Sandu members’ experiences tie in with research by Stellenbosch University, funded by the Open Society Foundations, revealing that SANDF soldiers on missions in Mozambique and the DRC felt neglected due to logistical failures, inadequate training, equipment shortages, and organisational issues, impairing mission performance, safety, and welfare.
Researchers found that pre-deployment training lacks realism for environments like DRC jungles, and budget cuts dilute exercises. Organisational and logistical failures hamper not just training but deployments. Short notice and hastily planned deployments resulted in insufficient time to obtain uniforms and equipment. The widespread lack of equipment was cited as a major problem, including vehicles, night vision goggles, maps, weapons, bullet-resistant jackets etc. – for example, soldiers sometimes had to take turns wearing body armour on patrols as there was not enough for everyone. Soldiers have been routinely forced to purchase their own boots, tents and personal equipment.
The SANDF suffers from obsolete equipment, Stellenbosch University researchers said, with a notable lack of surveillance equipment, night vision goggles, unmanned aerial vehicles, electronic communications, electronic warfare equipment etc. In the DRC, troops said opposing forces were often better armed and equipped than they were (possessing high calibre weapons, missiles, and long-range mortars), and that South African troops were outgunned from the start.
Researchers recommended the SANDF enhance realistic training and interoperability; modernise equipment and overhaul logistics/supply chains; improve intelligence sharing, command structures, and civil-military ties; ensure air evacuation, morale, and welfare support; and isolate unreliable military partners in mission theatres. (Source: https://www.defenceweb.co.za/)
13 Jan 26. U.S., Regional Partners Establish New Air Defense Operations Cell in Qatar. U.S. Central Command and regional partners opened a new coordination cell at Al Udeid Air Base in Qatar this week to enhance integrated air and missile defense.
The new Middle Eastern Air Defense — Combined Defense Operations Cell is located in the Combined Air Operations Center on base and comprised of personnel from the U.S. and regional partners.
The Qatar-based operations center, established more than 20 years ago, currently includes representatives from 17 nations who coordinate the employment of military air assets across the Middle East. The new operations cell is designed to enhance coordination and integration for air and missile defense efforts among regional partners.
“This is a significant step forward in strengthening regional defense cooperation,” said Navy Adm. Brad Cooper, Centcom commander. “This cell will improve how regional forces coordinate and share air and missile defense responsibilities across the Middle East.”
U.S. Air Force Central service members will work alongside regional counterparts at the operations cell in planning multinational exercises, conducting drills and responding to contingencies. The cell will also be responsible for sharing information and threat warnings.
“The creates a consistent venue to share expertise and collectively create new solutions together with our regional partners,” said Air Force Lt. Gen Derek France, U.S. Air Force Central commander. “This strengthens our integrated air and missile defense throughout the region.”
The formation of the cell follows the opening of two bilateral combined command posts last year for air and missile defense. The new facilities, opened by U.S Army Central in partnership with Qatar and Bahrain, will serve as hubs for integrated air defense planning, coordination and operations. (Source: U.S. DoD)
13 Jan 26. Uganda: General election will undermine operational continuity, elevate security risks. On 13 January, the authorities cut internet access and limited mobile services nationwide ahead of the general election on 15 January (see Sibylline Alert – 13 January 2026). The authorities almost certainly restricted communications services to undermine opposition leader Robert Kyagulanyi Ssentamu’s (known as Bobi Wine) ability to mobilise protests. Such outages will likely persist throughout the election period, disrupting communication with on-the-ground staff. We assess that President Yoweri Museveni will almost certainly utilise authoritarian tactics such as ballot box stuffing and falsifying tallies to secure re-election, while his National Resistance Movement (NRM) party will likely secure a majority in the legislative elections. In anticipation, the authorities deployed the military to strategic locations throughout the capital Kampala. However, we assess that this is unlikely to prevent well-attended protests in major cities and opposition strongholds such as Kampala, Luweero and Mukono (all Central region) in the coming days. The security forces are highly likely to employ heavy-handed tactics to disperse protesters, including baton charges, tear gas and rubber bullets, elevating security risks to staff and assets therein. (Source: Sibylline)
13 Jan 26. Colombia: President rejects guerrilla negotiation proposal, increasing risk of retaliatory attacks. On 12 January, Colombian President Gustavo Petro rejected a proposal by the National Liberation Army (ELN) guerrilla group for a ‘National Accord’ to combat poverty and drug trafficking. Furthermore, Petro has suggested that Colombia and Venezuela would carry out joint military operations against the ELN if the group does not re-enter peace negotiations and vacate Venezuelan territory. Meanwhile, reports indicate that Washington DC and Bogotá have also explored conducting joint operations against the ELN. In the near term, Petro’s rejection of the ELN’s proposal will likely trigger retaliatory attacks. In this event, the ELN will highly likely target the security forces, elevating physical security risks proximate to army patrols, police stations and military bases. In the longer term, if Colombia carries out joint military operations against the ELN, with Venezuela or the US, the risk of armed clashes and forced displacements will increase significantly in key guerrilla strongholds, such as Norte de Santander department. (Source: Sibylline)
12 Jan 26. Moldova-Romania: Unification is highly unlikely in long term despite presidential support. In an interview on 12 January, Moldovan President Maia Sandu stated that she would vote in favour of unification with Romania if a referendum on the matter ever took place. Sandu named geopolitical developments occurring globally and near Moldova (likely referring to Russia’s ongoing full-scale invasion of Ukraine) as one of her reasons for supporting joining Romania, a neighbouring NATO state and EU member. Although Moldova shares close cultural and linguistic ties with Romania, the majority of Moldovan nationals oppose unification. In a poll by the Moldovan Institute of Marketing and Opinion Surveys (IMAS) released in February 2025, 56% of respondents believed Moldova should remain independent, compared to 31% who would support unification. Despite Sandu’s support for unification and her pro-West stance, we assess that the two countries will highly unlikely unify in the long term. Nevertheless, discussions about joining Romania will likely maintain societal polarisation in Moldova, which will encourage Russian and pro-Russia destabilisation efforts.(Source: Sibylline)
12 Jan 26. Armenia: Russian destabilisation risks remain elevated; military action remains remote possibility. On 12 January, an Armenian state news outlet reported that Armenia’s foreign ministry had summoned the Russian ambassador to Armenia over hawkish comments made by Kremlin-aligned television presenter Vladimir Solovyov. During a Russian television broadcast, Solovyov criticised Armenia’s shift away from Russia’s sphere of influence and suggested a possible Russian ‘special military operation’ targeting the country. The Russo-Ukrainian war remains Russia’s primary priority and continues to absorb most of its military and political resources. Therefore, we assess that a Russian military operation against Armenia remains a remote possibility in the foreseeable future. Instead, Russia is more likely to intensify grey-zone and influence operations aimed at destabilising Armenia’s pro-Western leadership. Such efforts are likely to increase ahead of Armenian parliamentary elections, scheduled for 7 June. In our most dangerous (and highly unlikely) scenario, Russia could facilitate or back a coup aimed at ousting the current leadership, though an invasion remains a remote possibility in the medium term. (Source: Sibylline)
12 Jan 26. Pakistan: Jet sales talks underscore efforts to expand defence exports, diversify economy. On 12 January, news reports citing security officials stated that Indonesia’s Defence Minister Sjafrie Sjamsoeddin met Pakistan’s Air Force Chief Marshal Zaheer Ahmed Baber Sidhu to discuss a potential deal involving the sale of combat jets and drones to Indonesia. Reportedly, the talks focused on strengthening communication between defence institutions, as well as the sale of JF-17 jets (a combat aircraft jointly developed by Pakistan and China) and drones. This follows Pakistan’s sale of fighter jets to the Libyan National Army and Azerbaijan in 2025, alongside reports of ongoing talks to sell jets to Bangladesh, Saudi Arabia and Sudan. Pakistan’s military development programme has experienced a surge in interest, following the perceived success of JF-17 jets during the conflict with India in May 2025. While no deal has been finalised, we assess that the ongoing talks highlight Pakistan’s efforts to capitalise on the positive sentiment towards its air force to expand weapons sales to other countries. If these arms deals materialise, they will help mitigate fiscal strain over the medium-to-long term by increasing and diversifying exports. (Source: Sibylline)
13 Jan 26. South Sudan: Removal of vice president’s allies will compound tensions, elevating risk of clashes. On 12 January, President Salva Kiir dismissed 11 members of the opposition Sudan People’s Liberation Movement – In Opposition (SPLM-IO) from the Transitional National Assembly; the individuals were loyal to imprisoned Vice President Riek Machar. Subsequently, Kiir appointed 11 new members affiliated with the SPLM-IO’s anti-Machar faction, almost certainly in an effort to factionalise the party further. This move is likely to compound tensions following renewed clashes between SPLM-IO-affiliated forces and government forces in Jonglei state, with the SPLM-IO pledging to advance to the capital Juba. On 12 January, the SPLM-IO issued an evacuation warning for civilians and NGO staff covering Ayod, Bor, Gaatdiang and Poktap (all Jonglei), citing the risk of imminent clashes. This will almost certainly elevate collateral risks and threats to life for NGO staff therein, particularly near military installations. While we assess it is unlikely that the SPLM-IO has sufficient mobilisation capacity to launch a substantive assault on Juba, an intensified conflict will almost certainly deteriorate nationwide security conditions. This will compound NGO staff exposure to crossfire and violent crime. (Source: Sibylline)
12 Jan 26. Venezuela-US: Internal regime power struggle underscores elevated government stability risks. As of 11 January, the Venezuelan regime has released 18 political prisoners since the US’ capture of former president Nicolás Maduro. Human rights groups estimate that approximately 811 political prisoners remain in Venezuela, including approximately 80 foreign nationals. US President Donald Trump and Venezuela’s acting President Delcy Rodríguez have indicated that prisoners’ releases are a gesture of peace, following the US military’s operation in Venezuela on 3 January. We assess that such prisoner releases will decrease regional tensions, thereby reducing the risk of further US military action in Venezuela (see Sibylline Special Report – 4 January 2026). However, reports indicate that an internal power struggle between Rodríguez and Minister of Interior, Peace and Justice Diosdado Cabello has stalled further prisoner releases. Reportedly, Cabello has blocked the execution of court orders authorising the freedom of prisoners. If Cabello continues to oppose Rodríguez, government stability risks will increase significantly. We also assess that if Cabello continues to subvert the Trump administration’s expectations of the Venezuelan regime, regional tensions and the risk of further US military action will increase. (Source: Sibylline)
12 Jan 26. Bangladesh-Myanmar: Intensifying conflict will drive border security, displacement risks. Earlier on 12 January, Border Guard Bangladesh (BGB) announced that it was on ‘high alert’ due to fighting across the border in neighbouring Myanmar. It also announced that 53 members of the Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army (ARSA) had been detained for entering Bangladesh. The increased security along the border with Myanmar’s Rakhine state has been prompted by intensifying conflict between ARSA and the Arakan Army (AA), while Myanmar’s junta has continued carrying out airstrikes in the area in an effort to reclaim territory from the AA. Significant gunfire and shelling have increased security risks in Bangladeshi villages near the border. A nine-year-old girl was critically injured by a stray bullet in Teknaf upazila of Cox’s Bazar district (Chattogram division, Bangladesh) on 11 January. Security risks will likely remain elevated in the coming weeks, as the ongoing elections in Myanmar (which will run until 28 January) drive greater conflict. The situation also risks driving greater displacement of Rohingya refugees into Bangladesh and further straining resources in Cox’s Bazar. (Source: Sibylline)
12 Jan 26. Thailand: Security measures will be elevated in Deep South region following bomb attacks. At around 0100hrs (local time) on 11 January, IEDs exploded at 11 petrol stations across Thailand’s southern Narathiwat, Pattani and Yala provinces, injuring at least four people. Following this, the local authorities increased security measures at road checkpoints and border controls along the Golok River. The authorities also imposed a night curfew in Narathiwat, which was lifted earlier on 12 January. While Thai security agencies did not confirm a motive behind the incidents, they have referred to local elections occurring that day. Separatist militants are active in Thailand’s Deep South region, though attacks have become less frequent in recent years. We assess that there is an elevated risk of attacks in southern provinces ahead of general Thai elections on 8 February and during the Ramadan period (i.e. 17 February to 18 March). Any attacks will most likely take the form of an arson or bomb attack targeting police, Buddhist sites or petrol stations. However, a heightened security force posture will mitigate the risk of mass-casualty incidents. (Source: Sibylline)
12 Jan 26. Mali: Attack on industrial sites underscores increasing threats to local staff, assets. On 11 January, over 150 militants attacked and destroyed three industrial facilities located along the N22 highway in Kayes region. The militants targeted a cement factory in Gangonteri, an industrial coating facility in Groundapé and a limestone production plant in Karaga (all Kayes region). We assess that al-Qaeda-affiliated Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM) almost certainly conducted the attacks, given the substantial expansion of its operations in Kayes in recent months. The attacks underscore the growing threats to assets outside Mali’s major cities, as the government concentrates its military resources on securing fuel deliveries to the capital Bamako. In the coming months, JNIM will likely continue expanding and developing its operations in western Mali, increasing the risk of similar attacks targeting industrial facilities, mining operations and vehicles during overland movement. Locally engaged staff will almost certainly continue facing elevated risks of kidnap attacks, particularly individuals linked to businesses or states known to pay ransoms for hostages. More broadly, JNIM’s increasing presence in western Mali will likely continue to facilitate the group’s pursuit of a nationwide fuel embargo, undermining energy security conditions, operational continuity and government stability. (Source: Sibylline)
12 Jan 26. Burundi-Congo (DRC): Sustained conflict will drive displacement, straining humanitarian resources. On 10 January, the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) stated that at least 53 refugees fleeing conflict in eastern DRC have died in Burundi, including 25 who died of a cholera outbreak. Following the Rwanda-backed M23 rebels’ capture of Uvira (DRC) in December 2025, at least 100,000 Congolese nationals have fled to Burundi. While M23 declared a unilateral withdrawal from Uvira in December 2025, its forces reportedly continue to control the city. M23 is unlikely to withdraw from Uvira; it has accused pro-Congolese government forces of exploiting the withdrawal to launch attacks on M23 forces. Such statements are likely to drive further clashes (including airstrikes) with Congolese forces (and to a lesser extent Burundian forces), likely triggering further waves of displacement into Burundi. We assess that this is likely to intensify pressure on strained aid resources, leading to shortages of water and sanitation resources (particularly in refugee camps along the border with Tanzania). This is likely to trigger further water-borne disease outbreaks, compounding deteriorating humanitarian conditions and increasing staff exposure risks. (Source: Sibylline)
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Founded in 1987, Exensor Technology is a world leading supplier of Networked Unattended Ground Sensor (UGS) Systems providing tailored sensor solutions to customers all over the world. From our Headquarters in Lund Sweden, our centre of expertise in Network Communications at Communications Research Lab in Kalmar Sweden and our Production site outside of Basingstoke UK, we design, develop and produce latest state of the art rugged UGS solutions at the highest quality to meet the most stringent demands of our customers. Our systems are in operation and used in a wide number of Military as well as Homeland Security applications worldwide. The modular nature of the system ensures any external sensor can be integrated, providing the user with a fully meshed “silent” network capable of self-healing. Exensor Technology will continue to lead the field in UGS technology, provide our customers with excellent customer service and a bespoke package able to meet every need.
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