News in Brief

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26 Nov 25. Finland seeks to secure Arctic footprint in new defense strategy. Finland has released a new Arctic security strategy that seeks to define the country’s growing role in a region facing overlapping claims by friends and foes alike. The document, published Nov. 25 as an update to a previous version from 2021 when Finland was still outside of NATO, dances around managing relationships with the United States under President Donald Trump as a fellow Arctic nation, in particular.

“The U.S. is increasingly viewing the Arctic through the lens of global competition, shaped by the ‘America First’ policy— it prioritizes national security, economic cooperation, and critical minerals and has shifted away from climate change mitigation and sustainable development,” the document reads.

It mentions that statements made by U.S. officials, who have argued that Washington should exercise greater control over Greenland, have raised questions for Finland. Nearly one-third of Finland’s land mass lies above the Arctic Circle, in the region of Lapland. There are eight countries with territory within or north of the Arctic Circle that are members of the Arctic Council: Canada, Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, Russia, Sweden and the United States. This week, the Danish news outlet Politiken reported that the Trump administration has on several occasions tried to set up high-level meetings with Greenlandic authorities without Denmark present. Meanwhile, Finland, Canada and the United States are involved in the Icebreaker Collaboration Effort, or ICE Pact, dedicated to the joint development of icebreakers. Since signing a memorandum of understanding in 2024, the three countries have announced a series of new contracts under this partnership: the U.S. launched its fleet renewal initiative last month, with a total plan of up to 11 icebreakers that will involve both Canadian and Finnish shipyards and companies. On Nov. 18, the ICE Pact partners signed a joint statement of intent in Washington intended to strengthen trilateral cooperation on Arctic icebreaker construction and capabilities into 2026. Finland’s latest Arctic security policy also highlights the growing role that the new NATO Forward Land Force unit, inaugurated in October in Northern Finland, will play in the alliance’s deterrence in the High North. In a state of emergency, the FLF will oversee the planning, command and control of land operations and defense across the wider Arctic region. A significant portion of the strategy document is devoted to the activities of the Arctic Council, which remains the sole intergovernmental cooperation framework for all Arctic states. Although the forum is not in charge of security policy issues, the Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2022 deeply changed the nature of its collaboration.

“Russia remains a member, but no political level meetings or meetings of senior Arctic officials are held among Arctic States – expert and research cooperation continues within working groups,” the policy document said. The Finnish government stated that Arctic cooperation should continue within the framework of the Arctic governance body.

Several non-Arctic countries have applied or are considering applying for observer status in the Arctic Council, which would allow them to attend meetings, access documents, and contribute to working groups. (Source: Defense News)

 

26 Nov 25. Subsea pipelines, power cables, offshore platforms, and sensor arrays have become critical to modern society — and increasingly vulnerable. The Joint Declaration of Baltic Sea Security, signed on 20 November, provides a platform for regional collaboration and protection. KONGSBERG welcomes this initiative. The 2022 sabotage of gas pipelines in the Baltic Sea marked a turning point: maritime infrastructure is no longer seen as a passive utility, but as a strategic asset at risk of disruption. The Joint Baltic Declaration on Security in the Baltic Sea was signed on November 20 by the Norwegian State Secretary Marte Gerhardsen, in the presence of the Polish Deputy Prime Minister, Minister of Defense, Władysław Kosiniak-Kamysz.

Positive and hopeful for action

Arne Rinnan, Kongsberg Discovery’s Executive Vice President for Strategy and Technology, welcomes the declaration and hopes for further action.

“This is a positive and the right move for securing the maritime domain in the Baltic Sea. We have experienced great interest in the Oslofjord Test Bed that was opened in June this year. Here we are coordinating expertise across KONGSBERG to develop a unified solution,” he says.

He explains that the Oslofjord Test Bed integrates subsea autonomy, land-based and satellite sensors surveillance, traffic monitoring, real-time advanced analytics and decision support into one scalable system — redefining how nations and industries protect their underwater infrastructure.

“I see this declaration as a goal to pursue additional measures. We’ve had significant attention and visits from government officials both abroad and at home who are interested in our technology. However, the central issue remains: in the event of an incident, who truly holds responsibility?” Rinnan says.

KONGSBERG to become industrial partner

According to an official statement by the Norwegian State Secretary, Marte Gerhardsen, the declaration marks an important step towards closer cooperation and strengthened preparedness in the region. In addition, on the same day, Kongsberg Defence and Aerospace became part of The Green Industrial District – Kashubia Project in Poland, agreeing with local authorities to establish operations related to the project.

“This is a good example of how Norway and our partners are committed to strengthening Europe’s security through both diplomacy and industry”, Gerhardsen said.

Declaration for securing cooperation and security

The declaration, which has now been signed by Norway, aims to:

• Strengthen military cooperation between the countries in the region to improve defense preparedness
• Improve interoperability and conduct joint exercises and mobilisation capacity
• Ensure common democratic values, rule of law and human rights in the face of security threats
• Increase stability and security in the Baltic Sea region, especially in view of geopolitical tensions and threats from Russia
• Promote regional cooperation and contribute to stronger European security

Critical maritime infrastructure covers a wide and complex landscape. Below the surface, this includes subsea oil/gas wellheads and risers, gas pipelines, fibre-optic communications cables, high-voltage power lines and renewables installations. Above the surface, it extends to floating production units, platforms, ports and other coastal facilities. Each element serves a vital function in energy security, economic continuity and national resilience – and each requires tailored, domain-specific monitoring.

About Kongsberg Discovery

Kongsberg Discovery develops advanced technology to explore the ocean, manufacturing acoustic instruments for seabed mapping at various depths. The company is part of Kongsberg Gruppen ASA, a Norwegian multinational corporation that supplies high-technology systems to customers in the merchant marine, defense, aerospace, offshore oil and gas industries, and renewable and utilities industries.

 

21 Nov 25. Campaign groups sue Leonardo, Italy government over arms sales to Israel. A group of seven Italian civil society groups has filed a lawsuit against state-controlled defence group Leonardo (LDOF.MI) and Italy’s government, seeking to annul any contract for the sale and supply of arms to Israel. The complaint – lodged at the end of September with a Rome-based court – argues that Leonardo, one of the world’s largest arms producers, continued to supply the Israel Defence Forces, going against both Italy’s Constitution and international law, the NGOs said late on Thursday.

“Israel carries out in the West Bank and Gaza a military occupation and systematic apartheid that are fed with weapons supplied by foreign partners,” their statement said.

Leonardo dismissed the lawsuit saying it complied with all laws on arms exports, and vowed to defend its position in court. Any suggestion its actions were linked to Gaza was “a serious distortion without legal basis,” it added in a statement. The government was not immediately available for comment. The lawsuit was presented by a Palestinian citizen and the Italian groups, including A Buon Diritto, which provides free legal assistance and support for migrants and refugees, Italian Christian workers association ACLI and NGO Un Ponte Per. Under Italian law, arms exports are banned to countries that are waging war and those deemed to be violating international human rights. In 2023, Rome announced a halt to its weapons exports to Israel amid escalating violence in Gaza. Defence Minister Guido Crosetto later said previously approved orders were still being fulfilled after checks were carried out to ensure the weapons would not be used against civilians in the Palestinian enclave. At the end of September, Leonardo Chief Executive Roberto Cingolani said no new export licenses to Israel had been issued since the war began and ties were limited to two longstanding maintenance contracts for unarmed training aircraft. He acknowledged concerns over the company U.S. DRS, majority-owned by Leonardo, and its Israeli radar unit, but said these operate under foreign jurisdictions. The lawsuit comes as the EU tightens arms export rules, requiring member states to block sales where there is a risk of human rights abuses or violations of international law. (Source: Reuters)

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Founded in 1987, Exensor Technology is a world leading supplier of Networked Unattended Ground Sensor (UGS) Systems providing tailored sensor solutions to customers all over the world. From our Headquarters in Lund Sweden, our centre of expertise in Network Communications at Communications Research Lab in Kalmar Sweden and our Production site outside of Basingstoke UK, we design, develop and produce latest state of the art rugged UGS solutions at the highest quality to meet the most stringent demands of our customers. Our systems are in operation and used in a wide number of Military as well as Homeland Security applications worldwide. The modular nature of the system ensures any external sensor can be integrated, providing the user with a fully meshed “silent” network capable of self-healing. Exensor Technology will continue to lead the field in UGS technology, provide our customers with excellent customer service and a bespoke package able to meet every need.

A CNIM Group Company

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Sponsored by Bertin Exensor

 

www.exensor.com

 

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19 Nov 25. The International Institute for Strategic Studies has published the IISS Armed Conflict Survey 2025, which offers in-depth analysis on both the growing financial and human cost of conflict, and the increasing shifts in global power dynamics in the period from 1 July 2024 to 30 June 2025. Its findings illustrate the intensity of conflict and its impact on populations, in terms of casualties and forced migration. This is set in the context of dwindling humanitarian support, cut back by many major donors including the US and in Europe.

The IISS Armed Conflict Survey 2025 finds:

* Nearly 240,000 people were killed in violent events, a 23% increase year on year. Ukraine and Palestine were the most violent conflict theatres, with 82,298 and 20,990 fatalities respectively. Civilian deaths rose by 40%, reaching almost 50,000 in 2024, with Gaza alone accounting for 80% of global child casualties and 70% of female casualties.

* Forced displacement reached a historic 122 m people by April 2025, including 73.5m internally displaced persons (IDPs). Sudan alone saw 14.3m displaced, the world’s largest current displacement crisis.

* A growing divide between humanitarian needs and assistance. Despite escalating humanitarian needs, OCHA reduced the target for urgent assistance from nearly 300m to 114.4m people in March 2025, reflecting the widening gap between global needs and available funding. However, by June 2025, only 18.5% of the required US$29 bn (about US$5.5bn) had been secured, as major donors such as the US, France, Germany, Switzerland and the UK redirected development budgets toward other priorities.

Other findings include:

The return of geopolitics in modern conflict: Geopolitics has complicated prospects for durable peace amid intensifying great-power competition, growing geopolitical fragmentation and the adoption of independent foreign policies by a rising number of emerging powers. This trend – already evident in the growing internationalisation of civil wars over the past two decades – has, in recent years, escalated into outright inter-state conflicts, with Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022 marking a decisive inflection point.  Declining multilateralism and the fracturing of the rules-based international order means a growth in independent or multi-aligned foreign policy approaches by many non-Western countries, and the growing erosion of global governance structures and institutions. The UN Security Council, paralysed by major-power rivalries, is routinely bypassed. UN peacekeeping shrank, with large missions in Mali and the DRC wound down, replaced by more fragile, regionalised security arrangements. The US under Trump disengaged sharply from multilateral norms, cutting foreign aid, abandoning development initiatives and intensifying unilateralism. The West’s perceived double standards – particularly around Israel’s actions in Gaza – further eroded legitimacy. Non-State Armed Groups (NSAGs) have gained prominence as quasi-state and geopolitical actors in armed conflicts, exerting control and governance over territories. As of June 2025, the ICRC recorded over 380 active armed groups of humanitarian concern, with approximately 204m people living under their full or contested control. Their expanding transnational operations, strategic alliances and economic portfolios have significantly augmented their reach and political influence. This evolution complicates traditional state-centric frameworks of conflict analysis and presents new challenges for international security and peacebuilding efforts. The economics of NSAGs: Although these actors take many different forms, their sustainability and political influence often rest on successful economic strategies. The 2025 edition places particular emphasis on the shifting and diverse economic models these groups adopt across regions, which are explored in depth through the Regional Spotlight essays. Topics covered include the diversification of drug-trafficking organisations from cocaine to human trafficking and illicit gold mining, among other activities, in the Americas section; the emerging arms-trafficking activities stemming from Ukraine, and the economic incentives driving organised-crime groups’ involvement, in the Europe and Eurasia section; the economic strategy underpinning Hayat Tahrir al-Sham’s (HTS) evolution from NSAG to leader of the transitional government in Syria in the MENA section; M23’s smuggling of minerals from the eastern DRC, in the Sub-Saharan Africa section; and the geopolitics of Southeast Asia’s cyber-scamming crisis in the Asia section.

Regional highlights include:

Americas: NSAGs dominate the conflict landscape as they compete over lucrative economies and confront state authorities for territorial control. Latin American criminal syndicates have expanded globally from drugs trafficking to extortion, illegal mining, fuel theft, human and wildlife trafficking, counterfeiting and money laundering.

Europe and Eurasia: The Russia–Ukraine conflict dominates the agenda and continues to heighten instability in the Caucasus and Balkans. In the Western Balkans, the break-up of Yugoslavia remains a root cause of unrest, especially between Kosovo and Serbia. However, Armenia and Azerbaijan moved towards a peace deal, and Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan signed an important border-dispute resolution in early 2025, reflecting some progress towards regional stability.

Middle East and North Africa: The Israel–Iran war of June 2025 was the most consequential conflict in the region during the reporting period. The Israel–Hamas war has been at the core of conflict dynamics since October 2023 with over 55,000 Palestinian deaths and an estimated 1,700 Israeli deaths, and 50 hostages still held in Gaza as of June 2025. Hamas’s allies launched attacks against Israel, prompting Israeli and Western military responses such as Operation Poseidon Archer. In autumn 2024, full-scale war erupted between Israel and Hizbullah in Lebanon, ending in a US-brokered ceasefire and significantly weakened Hizbullah. This also destabilised Syria. Following the ceasefire between Israel and Hizbullah, the HTS group captured Damascus and the government of Bashar al-Assad collapsed.

Sub-Saharan Africa: Armed conflicts and fatalities have been rising sharply since 2014. While no new armed conflict broke out during the reporting period, the region witnessed either the continuation of or an increase in armed violence in all conflict-affected countries, in particular the DRC, Sudan and Sahelian countries, accompanied by immense human suffering.

Asia: Multiple protracted armed conflicts continue. While some remain internal (such as the insurgencies in central India, Indonesia, the Philippines and Thailand), others, including those along the Afghanistan–Pakistan, India–Pakistan and India–Myanmar borders, have repercussions for regional security. The India–Pakistan dispute over Kashmir re-emerged as the region’s key flashpoint during the reporting period. From 7–10 May 2025, the two nuclear powers fought their most intense conventional conflict since the turn of the century.

 

19 Nov 25. Mali: Mass killings underscore significant human rights concerns, attack risks. On 18 November, Human Rights Watch reported that the Malian armed forces (FAMA) executed over 30 civilians during counter-insurgency operations in Balle and Kamona (both Ségou region) in early October. The villages are majority-Fulani and are located within the al-Qaeda-affiliated Jama’at Nasr al-Islam wal-Muslimin’s (JNIM’s) area of operations (AO). FAMA and the allied Dozo militia reportedly engaged in mass executions and indiscriminate property destruction, almost certainly as part of efforts to deter civilian co-operation with JNIM militants. Amid JNIM’s ongoing fuel blockade (see Sibylline Situation Update Brief – 14 October 2025) FAMA counter-insurgency operations will almost certainly entail continued indiscriminate violence targeting Fulani communities within JNIM’s AO. Such operations will significantly increase threats to local staff, particularly those operating in rural areas in Kayes, Koulikoro, Mopti and Ségou regions. However, indiscriminate violence targeting Fulani communities will also likely compound ethno-religious tensions and bolster JNIM recruitment, ultimately increasing the group’s capacity to enforce the fuel blockade and conduct attacks, including in the vicinity of the capital Bamako. (Source: Sibylline)

 

17 Nov 25. India: Probe focus on domestic elements will limit risk of armed conflict with Pakistan in short term. On 16 November, the National Investigation Agency (NIA) announced that it had arrested Amir Rashid Ali as a suspected accomplice in the blast in Delhi national capital territory on 10 November. The NIA alleges that Amir helped buy the vehicle that was used by Umar Un Nabi in the incident, with the statement labelling Umar as a ?suicide bomber?; no motive was mentioned. Investigations are ongoing, mostly focused on Faridabad (Haryana state) and Jammu and Kashmir union territory. On 16 November, the Red Fort reopened to visitors amid heightened security, along with the nearby Lal Quila subway station. Meanwhile, on 14 November, nine people were killed and 32 were injured when explosives seized in a raid before the Dehi blast exploded at Nowgam police station (Jammu and Kashmir union territory). The authorities quickly stated that the explosion was an accident and dismissed the claims of responsibility by a proxy of Jaish-e-Mohammed (JeM). So far, the authorities have continued to avoid implicating Pakistan in the Delhi blast, with the investigation remaining focused on domestic elements. We assess that this will limit the risk of a resumption of cross-border military exchanges in the immediate term (Source: Sibylline)

 

17 Nov 25. DRC-Rwanda: Framework agreement highly unlikely to lessen security risks in eastern regions. On 15 November, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) government and the Rwanda-backed M23 rebels signed a framework agreement aimed at ending the conflict in North Kivu and South Kivu regions. The framework follows a previous declaration of principles signed in July and another deal in October covering the monitoring mechanisms of an eventual ceasefire. However, the framework does not constitute a comprehensive peace agreement; six of the eight agreed protocols require further negotiations over their implementation. Additionally, the framework does not address control of M23-occupied territory which, despite opposition from the Congolese government, M23 is highly unlikely to totally relinquish. Another sticking point concerns the composition and mandate of an interim security force, which will likely be subject to delays and disputes. As such, we assess that the current agreement is highly unlikely to compel either the Congolese military or the M23 rebels to significantly moderate their activity in eastern DRC, evidenced by M23’s capture of Maimingi village (South Kivu region) following an attack on military positions. This will sustain risks of attacks, clashes and sexual violence therein, including for locally engaged staff and NGO personnel. (Source: Sibylline)

 

14 Nov 25. US-Region: Operation Southern Spear will increase tensions in Latin America, Caribbean. On 13 November, the Secretary of War Pete Hegseth announced the start of a military operation to target drug trafficking networks in the western hemisphere. Operation ?Southern Spear? aims to defend US interests in the region, including by targeting drug trafficking operations. Southern Spear will be led by the Joint Task Force Southern Spear in conjunction with the US Southern Command (USSOUTHCOM) and the US 4th Fleet. The mission will integrate robotic and autonomous systems with traditional naval and aviation forces. The announcement follows a build-up of US military assets in the Caribbean region since August. We assess that the deployment of unmanned weapon systems will likely strengthen the US? capabilities to detect suspected drug trafficking vessels operating in the Caribbean region and the Pacific Ocean. The deployment of interceptors will possibly increase the number of interdictions of suspected traffickers, though military strikes targeting go-fast boats are highly likely to persist. The enhancement of military efforts will likely continue straining regional tensions with states that are adverse to the ongoing military deployment, such as Colombia and Mexico. (Source: Sibylline)

 

14 Nov 25. Taiwan-US: US military sale approval signals continued support for Taiwanese defence capabilities. On 13 November, the Pentagon announced that the US has approved a possible USD 330 m sale of fighter jet spare and repair parts to Taiwan. This is the first arms sale to Taiwan announced under President Donald Trump’s current administration. Taiwan’s Ministry of National Defense stated that the sales were expected to take effect within one month. The parts will be used to support Taiwan’s F-16 and C-130 jets, alongside other aircraft, sustaining Taiwan’s fighter fleet capacity for frequent deployment to counter China’s military activity around the island. The Pentagon stated that helping Taiwan maintain credible defence capabilities is in line with US national, economic, and security interests. The move signals that the US will highly likely retain its broadly supportive stance for Taiwan in the short-to-medium term, despite the recent easing of trade disputes with China. China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs has objected to the sale, though we assess that as the scale of the sale is not out of the ordinary, it is unlikely to elicit a significantly overt reaction. Furthermore, a more radical shift in political recognition, such as an explicit acknowledgement of Taiwan’s independence, is highly unlikely under Trump. (Source: Sibylline)

 

14 Nov 25. Sudan: Drone strikes likely to escalate as RSF shifts focus to Kordofan front. On 13 November, the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) intercepted several Rapid Support Forces (RSF) drones targeting the Merowe Dam, Merowe Airport (MWE) and Merowe?s army command headquarters (all Northern state). The strikes come amid reports of mounting RSF deployments near El Obeid (the SAF-occupied capital of North Kordofan state) and escalating conflict in South Kordofan state. Following the RSF?s capture of El Fasher (North Darfur state), the last major SAF-held city in the Darfur region, the RSF has shifted resources to the Kordofan Front, seeking to push across southern Sudan and back towards the capital Khartoum. To bolster its prospects, the RSF will likely utilise drone strikes on positions behind the frontline to disrupt SAF army logistics, increasing the risk of drone strikes across Sudan, including Khartoum and Port Sudan (Red Sea state) over the coming months. This will disrupt rebuilding efforts in Khartoum and elevate strike and collateral risks to aid and logistics staff and assets. (Source: Sibylline)

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Founded in 1987, Exensor Technology is a world leading supplier of Networked Unattended Ground Sensor (UGS) Systems providing tailored sensor solutions to customers all over the world. From our Headquarters in Lund Sweden, our centre of expertise in Network Communications at Communications Research Lab in Kalmar Sweden and our Production site outside of Basingstoke UK, we design, develop and produce latest state of the art rugged UGS solutions at the highest quality to meet the most stringent demands of our customers. Our systems are in operation and used in a wide number of Military as well as Homeland Security applications worldwide. The modular nature of the system ensures any external sensor can be integrated, providing the user with a fully meshed ‘silent’ network capable of self-healing. Exensor Technology will continue to lead the field in UGS technology, provide our customers with excellent customer service and a bespoke package able to meet every need.

A CNIM Group Company

—————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————-

Sponsored by Bertin Exensor

 

www.exensor.com

 

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Military And Security Developments

Nov 21.

• Iran’s adversaries will face heightened security risks from cyber-enhanced kinetic action. On 19 November, the technology company Amazon reported that two Iranian state-sponsored groups (‘Imperial Kitten’ and ‘MuddyWater’) have used cyber operations to support kinetic action since at least January 2024. On 27 January 2024, Imperial Kitten reportedly compromised the automatic identification system (AIS) on a specific ship. The same vessel was then targeted by the Iran-backed Houthis in a missile strike on 1 February 2024, highlighting the potentially premeditated and targeted nature of the initial cyber compromise. Earlier this year in May, MuddyWater set up infrastructure that subsequently enabled the group to infiltrate live closed-circuit television (CCTV) feeds in Jerusalem district (Israel) in June. This preceded a series of Iranian missile strikes on Israel in late June. Israeli officials confirmed that these strikes were fine-tuned using footage from compromised cameras, illustrating how cyber-enabled compromises support physical attacks. We assess that Iran will pose increased security risks to its perceived adversaries amid the continuous evolution of its cyber strategy.

Nov 19.

KEY DEVELOPMENTS

IRAN

* Iran seized a vessel in the Persian Gulf, underscoring the increasing risk of disruption facing commercial shipping amid mounting economic pressure.

* The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) will likely adopt a resolution calling for Iran to improve co-operation with the agency, compounding regional tensions over the status of Tehran’s nuclear programme.

ISRAEL

* Growing radicalisation among the Arab-Israeli community and the possible spillover of terrorism from the West Bank (Palestinian Territories) will elevate the risk of attacks across Israel.

* A delay to Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s corruption hearing will not drive immediate political risks; however, the postponement will likely extend proceedings, and therefore lead to a period of heightened coalition tensions.

PALESTINIAN TERRITORIES

* GAZA STRIP: A return of a deceased Israeli soldier’s body by Hamas without the reciprocal release of its militants trapped in tunnels under Rafah will elevate tensions and the risk of a ceasefire collapse.

* GAZA STRIP: The reopening of the Zikim border crossing on 12 November to facilitate the passage of aid deliveries is unlikely to alleviate humanitarian risks in Gaza significantly.

* WEST BANK: Escalating Israeli settler violence underscores the elevated ethno-religious tensions across the West Bank, as well as the increased security and compliance risks facing proximate entities.

* WEST BANK: The evacuation of an Israeli settlement outpost will possibly trigger protests in Jerusalem district (Israel), while compounding ethno-religious tensions in the West Bank.

* Saudi Arabia-US: Military deals are unlikely to prompt Riyadh to join Abraham Accords in short term. On 18 November, the US designated Saudi Arabia as a major non-NATO ally during Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman’s visit to Washington DC. The designation is part of a defence agreement which will increase bilateral co-operation and the sharing of military technology. US President Donald Trump also confirmed future deliveries of F-35 fighter jets and 300 tanks to Saudi Arabia. Furthermore, the two countries signed a joint declaration on the completion of negotiations on civil nuclear energy co-operation. The new deals will almost certainly strengthen Saudi Arabia’s military capabilities, likely augmenting existing tensions with Iran. The deals are also likely to further fuel regional competition between Saudi Arabia and the UAE in various sectors, particularly in the civil nuclear field and artificial intelligence (AI). Nevertheless, despite the new military deals, we assess that Saudi Arabia is unlikely to join the Abraham Accords in the short term as it still insists on a clear path to Palestinian statehood as the main condition for such a deal.

* Syria: Memorandum of understanding will reduce energy security risks; drive investment opportunities. On 18 November, Syria’s state-owned Syrian Petroleum Company (SPC) signed a memorandum of understanding (MoU) with US-based hydrocarbons and energy firms ConocoPhillips and Novaterra. The MoU outlines the exploration and development of new and existing gas fields; domestic gas output is expected to increase by between 4 and 5 m cubic metres per day within a year, rising more than 50% from current levels. In the long term, the deal will reduce critical energy security risks nationwide, with increased supply possibly coming into effect in the next 12 to 24 months. We assess that this will moderate business operational risks, especially in energy-intensive sectors like manufacturing, which will almost certainly play a significant role in Syria’s reconstruction. Additionally, a decrease in blackouts will ease operational risks for NGOs providing humanitarian and medical assistance, alleviating broader socio-economic health risks. Consequently, domestic unrest and anti-government sentiment will likely subside, moderating government instability. Syria will likely pursue further such agreements to support long-term redevelopment, driving investment opportunities in energy and related industries in the coming months.

Nov 18.

* Palestinian Territories: New international force will elevate risks of re-escalation in Gaza. On 17 November, the UN Security Council (UNSC) approved a resolution mandating a transitional administration (known as the Board of Peace) and an International Stabilisation Force (ISF) in Gaza. The Board of Peace will oversee the reconstruction and economic recovery of Gaza, while the ISF will secure borders and humanitarian aid as well as the demilitarisation of Gaza by decommissioning weapons and destroying military infrastructure. While Hamas has rejected the resolution, claiming that it would impose an international trusteeship on Gaza and an un-neutral ISF, the creation and implementation of these bodies will proceed over the coming months. The ISF is unlikely to deploy to Gaza in December, as uncertainty regarding its composition will likely delay its formation until the first quarter of 2026. Even upon its deployment, we assess that the ISF will likely face substantial co-ordination issues in the first weeks. This will sustain critical security risks across Gaza, particularly as Hamas and allied militias are highly likely to resist forced disarmament attempts, possibly triggering clashes with ISF units. This will also compound pressure on the broader peace process in Gaza, sustaining risks of conflict re-escalation in the first half of 2026.

* Turkey: Gülenist crackdown will sustain labour flexibility, operational risks for affected businesses. Earlier on 18 November, the capital Ankara’s Chief Prosecutor issued arrest warrants for 22 individuals accused of ties to the outlawed Gülen movement (FETÖ), targeting what the authorities have described as the group’s secret ‘mahrem’ network within the Turkish Land Forces. The move comes after the security forces detained 71 people during simultaneous raids across 27 provinces on 17 November, including both public and private sector workers accused of previous ties to FETÖ-linked companies. These operations broadly follow an established trend and are unlikely to signal an immediate escalation in wider security crackdowns. However, as early elections are possible within the next 18 months, we assess that the frequency of such raids will increase as the authorities use national security narratives as a political tool and exploit the presence of clandestine networks to justify crackdowns on the political opposition. The ongoing operations against FETÖ will continue to pose detention and legal risks for personnel in Turkey, while driving limited labour flexibility risks and operational disruption for affected businesses.

* Israel: Iranian threat actors pose long-term cyber espionage risks to high-value targets. On 17 November, international news outlets reported that an Iranian state-sponsored group (‘APT42’) is targeting senior defence and government officials in Israel in an ongoing cyber espionage operation. The group typically uses social engineering attacks to infiltrate targeted systems. It reportedly spends weeks prior to the attacks gathering intelligence on and building relationships with the intended victims, highlighting the highly targeted and long-term nature of this operation. Victims are tricked into opening a malicious document that purports to provide information on upcoming conferences but covertly downloads a backdoor (‘TameCat’) onto compromised systems. TameCat enables APT42 to establish communication with command-and-control (C2) infrastructure, perform system reconnaissance, exfiltrate data and execute additional malicious payloads. The payload also displays multiple sophisticated detection evasion mechanisms, showcasing the operation’s stealth. We assess that Iranian state-sponsored groups will continue to pose significant cyber espionage risks to high-value targets in Israel amid long-term geopolitical hostilities.

Nov 17.

Key points

* The Lebanese Hizballah (LH) disarmament process remains in a precarious position; the deadline for its implementation is 31 December.

* Israeli and US pressure will likely compel the Lebanese government to accelerate disarmament efforts cautiously in the coming weeks, raising the risk of localised clashes and further Israeli intervention.

* Israel will likely intensify military operations against LH targets in the coming weeks; however, we assess that the ceasefire is likely to hold in the short term.

* New anti-money-laundering (AML) sanctions are likely in the coming weeks; any such initiatives are liable to include new US Treasury and EU designations against LH-associated banks and hawala networks.

Context

On 6 November, Israel launched a wave of airstrikes against southern Lebanon. It targeted LH infrastructure in towns such as Ayta al-Jabal, Taybeh (both Nabatieh governorate) and Tayr Debba (South governorate). Overnight on 6 November, the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) conducted ground raids into Houla (South), demolishing several buildings used by LH. On 7 November, Israeli drones struck multiple vehicles in southern Lebanon. In the ensuing days, Israel pressed the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) to conduct house-to-house searches of private homes; however, the LAF refused, citing domestic unrest risks.

These developments unfolded after Lebanese President Joseph Aoun instructed the LAF on 30 October to confront any future Israeli incursion into southern Lebanon following an Israeli operation in Blida (Nabatieh) in which a municipal worker was killed. The order marks a notable shift in posture since the Israel-LH ceasefire took effect on 27 November 2024. It also comes amid increasing Israeli and US pressure on Lebanon to uphold its commitment to disarm LH fully by 31 December (2025), as agreed under the US-mediated LH disarmament roadmap. On 6 November, the US imposed new sanctions against LH-linked financiers moving funds from Iran into Lebanon.

The Lebanese government has achieved only limited progress on the ground, though it has taken formal steps towards compliance. These steps include endorsing a phased LAF plan to consolidate state control over weapons stocks and instructing the central bank (BDL) to block transactions involving LH-linked hawala networks and development banks. Nevertheless, Israeli airstrikes and cross-border raids continue to target LH assets in southern Lebanon, undermining confidence in the ceasefire?s durability (and signalling Israel?s impatience with Lebanon?s slow implementation of the disarmament process with less than two months to go until the deadline.

Forecast

The Lebanese government will likely cautiously accelerate its disarmament efforts in the coming months, raising the risk of localised clashes and increased external intervention

Israeli military pressure and US diplomatic pressure will likely compel the Lebanese government to accelerate its disarmament efforts in the coming weeks, even if only symbolically. Economic incentives will play a central role in driving the government’s cautious acceleration of disarmament. A substantial US economic assistance package reportedly worth several hundred m USD is contingent on demonstrable progress under the roadmap, while a Saudi- and Qatari-backed investment initiative exceeding USD 10 bn is also conditional on Lebanese compliance. If secured, these funds would likely help to stabilise Lebanon’s deteriorating socio-economic environment; they would also ease energy security challenges and foster more favourable conditions for investment. US assistance would also likely improve the LAF’s capabilities, reinforcing the state?s claim to a monopoly on the legitimate use of force and moderately reducing the long-term risk of an LH resurgence.

Despite these pressures and incentives, LH remains firmly opposed to disarmament and, while Israeli forces operate in Lebanese territory, will likely frame this opposition as a means of defending Lebanese sovereignty. Consequently, a forceful state-led push is likely to provoke resistance and trigger a broader Shia backlash, raising the risk of protests and militia mobilisation (while also heightening ethno-religious tensions and domestic unrest risks). External state actors such as Iran will possibly also seek to influence the outcome of the process, increasing the risk of indirect or proxy-driven escalation involving Israeli or LAF units. Consequently, the Lebanese government is likely only to pursue a gradual approach towards disarmament in the coming weeks; it will likely seek to signal compliance through symbolic LAF deployments and selective enforcement actions without provoking confrontations with LH. We assess that the government and the LAF will likely seek to extend the disarmament timeline over the next 12 months to mitigate against broader conflict risks.

However, even a gradual approach to disarmament is liable to raise the risk of clashes in southern Lebanon. The Lebanese government’s signalling to Israel and the US is likely to include expanding the LAF’s presence in areas traditionally dominated by LH, particularly south of the Litani River, as well as in the Beqaa Valley (Baalbek-Hermel and Beqaa governorates) and the capital Beirut’s Dahieh suburb. This will heighten the risk of violent clashes with LH members and limited skirmishes with Israeli forces stationed in southern Lebanon, driving staff exposure to crossfire. Structural LAF weaknesses including limited air and naval capabilities, personnel constraints and political divisions within the LAFwill likely further constrain the disarmament’s implementation, raising the risk of further Israeli military activity targeting LH assets in the coming months.

The ceasefire is likely to hold over the coming weeks; however, Israel will likely continue to intensify military pressure on LH as the disarmament deadline approaches

Israel will likely increase its rate of targeted airstrikes and limited cross-border incursions into southern Lebanon in the coming weeks, focusing on LH logistics routes, weapons sites and command infrastructure. Recent intensified operations indicate that Israel is likely shifting towards a routine tactical enforcement of the ceasefire rather than occasional deterrent strikes. As such, the ceasefire is more vulnerable to short-term destabilisation even if its outright collapse remains unlikely, raising conflict escalation risks in the coming weeks. President Aoun’s 30 October directive instructing the LAF to confront any Israeli incursion has increased the prospect of sporadic ? though likely limited armed clashes between the IDF and LAF, particularly in towns such as Aitaroun, Blida (both Nabatieh) and Marwahin (South) along the Israel-Lebanon border. Any miscalculation during encounters involving both sides would possibly trigger short but intense flare-ups, elevating crossfire and misidentification risks for NGO personnel and civilians operating near the border.

Despite the recent escalation in kinetic activity, we assess that a return to full-scale conflict before the end of 2025 remains unlikely. Israel continues to apply measured tactical pressure to accelerate the disarmament process, but is not seeking to initiate a broader confrontation. LH lacks both the political will and military capacity for a sustained escalation with Israel. LH?s operational capacity is already severely depleted; as such, the group will likely continue to respond in a limited and controlled manner, moderating the risk of significant rocket fire into northern Israel in the coming weeks. Amid such a pattern of low-intensity confrontation, businesses and NGOs with exposure in southern Lebanon are likely to face periodic disruption to overland movement; this would in turn drive temporary interruptions vis-a-vis logistics and staffing, as well as short-term suspensions of field activity during localised escalations.

LH’s ongoing refusal to disarm, coupled with intensifying US pressure and financial scrutiny, has increased the likelihood of further AML sanctions in the coming weeks

LH’s ongoing refusal to comply with the US-brokered disarmament roadmap, combined with the Lebanese government’s cautious approach to asserting control over LH-linked institutions, has heightened US and European scrutiny of Lebanon?s financial sector. Recent US sanctions on 6 November targeting LH-linked financiers highlight Washington DC?s readiness to escalate parallel financial pressure alongside Israel?s tactical military enforcement of the ceasefire. Western governments continue to express frustration with Beirut?s limited enforcement of AML and counter-terrorist financing (CTF) standards; these governments are likely to respond with further targeted sanctions in the next six to eight weeks. These will possibly include the application of new US Treasury and EU designations to LH-associated banks, hawala networks and NGOs, alongside domestic enforcement by BDL through licence suspensions, account freezes and tighter controls on high-risk transactions. These measures will increase compliance and operational risks for Lebanese banks and international organisations operating in the country.

Consequently, international firms and NGOs will possibly experience payment delays, increased due diligence requirements and stricter transaction monitoring, especially in LH-administered municipalities or when partnering with local NGOs. Non-compliance with sanctions will possibly drive legal exposure, including licence revocations, asset freezes and account suspensions, raising regulatory and reputational risks for firms operating in the country. While expanded AML and CTF enforcement is likely to limit LH’s access to funds over time, it is unlikely to reduce short-term conflict escalation risks significantly given ongoing Israeli operations. Despite recent US sanctions on Iranian-linked laundering networks, LH retains access to regional financial channels, and domestic enforcement remains politically constrained. Nevertheless, credible progress by Lebanon regarding disarmament benchmarks and financial transparency would likely encourage renewed international engagement with Lebanese markets and a gradual restoration of investor confidence over the next 12 to 24 months.

* Iran-UAE: Threat of vessel seizure in Persian Gulf, proximate waters will likely rise in coming months. On 14 November, Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) seized the Singapore-bound, Marshall Islands-flagged oil tanker MV Talara, approximately 22 nautical miles (approximately 41km) off the coast of Khor Fakkan (UAE), before redirecting it to Iranian territorial waters. The IRGC claimed that the tanker was carrying unauthorised cargo. While this incident possibly relates to a commercial dispute, we assess that such seizures are increasingly likely over the coming months, as the reimplementation of pre-2015 UN sanctions increases strains on the Iranian economy, driving seizures as a form of sanctions relief and revenue generation (see Sibylline Sanctions Watch ? 31 October 2025). This will drive threats to commercial shipping and supply chains utilising the Gulf of Oman, the Persian Gulf and the Strait of Hormuz, particularly for vessels associated with states implementing sanctions. It will also drive security risks associated with aggressive boarding operations and prolonged detentions within Iran, including threats to crew welfare and psychological harm. As diplomatic tensions between Iran and the West escalate amid stalled nuclear negotiations, the likelihood of further Iranian vessel seizures will increase, along with the risk of retaliatory Western sanctions targeting Iranian shipping entities, related logistics networks, insurers and associated operators servicing the region.

* Syria: Rocket attack on capital Damascus underscores sustained security gaps, instability. On 14 November, two Katyusha rockets struck a residential building in the capital Damascus? Mezzeh district, injuring one civilian. The rockets were launched from Damascus outskirts; no group has claimed responsibility so far. The Syrian security authorities have stated that they are still investigating the incident. While no further details have been disclosed, there is a possibility that the perpetrators aimed the rockets at a governmental or military target; the projectiles possibly deviated and hit a residential building. The attack underscores the sustained physical security threats across Damascus, despite the augmented presence of the General Security Service (GSS) and the relative stability compared to other parts of Syria. However, this augmented presence by the authorities is largely concentrated in the central Damascus districts and not in the peripheries. As such, these security gaps will continue to leave the capital vulnerable to such attacks by several rogue groups, including organised crime elements, Assadists and Iran-backed cells throughout the first half of 2026. (Source: Sibylline)

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Military And Security Developments

Nov 21.

Proposed Ukraine Peace Plan Executive summary

* A US-proposed 28-point peace plan to resolve the Russo-Ukrainian war marks the most significant development in the peace process to date. However, various uncertainties mean that further negotiations and clarifications are likely to be necessary before the war can end.

* If Ukraine (or Russia) refuses to sign the deal before the proposed US deadline of Thanksgiving (27 November), we foresee two main scenarios (PSB).

* In our most likely scenario, the proposed US deadline proves flexible, with the peace plan forming the basis of a new phase of negotiations that protract into 2026. However, the war continues in the meantime.

* In our less likely (though still realistically possible) scenario, the US doubles down on its deadline, leveraging all economic, military and political levers to coerce both sides into signing and agreeing to a ceasefire before the end of the year. However, its implementation remains extremely challenging.

Context

On 20 November, various media outlets published leaked drafts and copies of a 28-point peace agreement penned by US and Russian negotiators. US officials have indicated that Washington DC expects both Russia and Ukraine to sign the agreement and thereby end the Russo-Ukrainian war. The plan has reportedly been drafted by US Special Envoy to the Middle East Steve Witkoff and the CEO of the Russian Direct Investment Fund, Kirill Dmitriev (the principal Russian negotiator liaising with the US). Ukraine and Europe were reportedly not part of the drafting process. Various US officials have stated that provisions within the plan will be discussed with Ukraine and Europe, and that they could still change – indicating this will possibly prove to be a working document, rather than a definitive plan. The plan’s vagueness indicates that further negotiations will highly likely be required in any case, including with Russia, as Moscow has also stated that it has yet to receive ‘anything official’ from the US.

Nevertheless, according to unnamed US officials, the White House expects Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky to sign the agreement ‘before Thanksgiving’, rendering 27 November a possible ‘deadline’. The Trump administration has issued various such ‘deadlines’ over the past several months in relation to Russian and Ukrainian peace negotiations; almost all have been missed. It therefore remains unclear whether this is a genuinely hard deadline. However, the likely need for further consultations on a range of issues means that talks will likely continue beyond this deadline, even if Kyiv (and Moscow) nominally agrees to the plan as it currently stands (which we assess remains unlikely in the short term).

Zelensky has stated that he ‘appreciated the efforts of President Trump’ and would discuss the plan with him in the coming days. However, he also stated separately that he will not ‘betray Ukraine’s national interest’, warning that the next week would be very difficult for the country as it will possibly face a choice between losing its ‘key partner’ or its dignity. At the time of writing, numerous contradictory and unconfirmed media reports are circulating, including around senior Ukrainian officials allegedly agreeing to the terms and making revisions to various articles. While we cannot confirm this, it ultimately remains our assessment that further negotiations and revisions will be required before this becomes a formal, workable peace agreement.

 

* Russia-EU: Use of Russian immobilised assets will likely trigger retaliation against Western firms. On 20 November, Russia’s State Duma passed a resolution warning that any EU attempt to use immobilised Russian assets for the benefit of Ukraine will prompt retaliatory action. According to the Duma, Russia could respond by seizing the assets of non-residents from so-called ‘unfriendly states’ as compensation. Since the start of the Russo-Ukrainian war, Russia has taken control of foreign-owned assets, including the Russian operations of several major Western companies. Moscow has also redirected an undisclosed volume of foreign-held funds into ‘type-C’ accounts, which cannot be accessed without the government’s authorisation; retaliatory moves could therefore target such accounts. These developments come at a critical moment in the war, as the US has recently floated a peace proposal that is widely viewed as unfavourable to Ukraine (which we will report on in further detail in a Sibylline Situation Update Brief). Ultimately, the latest developments underscore Russian efforts to deter any EU decision to use frozen Russian assets, threatening Western companies that have operations or immobilised assets in Russia with tit-for-tat seizure measures.

Nov 19.

• Poland: Railway sabotage allegation underscores persistent Russian grey-zone threat. On 18 November, Prime Minister Donald Tusk stated Russia orchestrated the recent sabotage of the railway line running between the capital Warsaw and Lublin (Lublin voivodeship). According to Tusk, an unspecified Russian intelligence agency recruited two Ukrainian nationals to carry out the attack; the perpetrators allegedly immediately fled to Belarus. He added that one of the suspects unsuccessfully attempted to derail a train by attaching a clamp to the railway line, while the other successfully used an explosive device which caused only minor damage. This sets a notable precedent for Russian-backed, non-cyber sabotage of a European rail line. We previously assessed that Russia had likely orchestrated the sabotage, which is consistent with Russia’s intent and capability to carry out attacks in Poland. We assess furthermore that Poland will remain among the key targets of Russian grey-zone operations in the coming year. This will sustain the risk of sporadic sabotage incidents targeting critical national infrastructure. However, higher-likelihood threats are sporadic arson attacks on less-well protected buildings such as retail outlets or warehouses, particularly those with links to Ukraine.
• Russia-Ukraine-US: War unlikely to end in short-to-medium term despite renewed peace talks. Earlier on 19 November, Axios reported that the US, in co-ordination with Russia, has been developing a new plan to end the war. The draft reportedly contains 28 points across four areas: peace in Ukraine, security guarantees, European security arrangements and future US relations with both Russia and Ukraine. US President Donald Trump’s special envoy, Steve Witkoff, is leading the effort and has been in contact with Kirill Dmitriev, the Russian president’s special representative for investment and international economic co-operation. Witkoff is expected to meet Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky in Turkey later on 19 November to relaunch the peace dialogue. Despite peace talks initiated by Trump earlier this year, neither side has indicated a willingness to compromise to the extent likely needed to end to war. Although these latest developments mark a resumption of the peace process, we assess that the conflict is unlikely to end within the next six months. (For further analysis and scenario planning around how the war will evolve in 2025 and beyond, see our updated.
• Poland: Planned troop deployments will likely bolster protection of critical national infrastructure. On 19 November, the Polish government announced that it plans to deploy 10,000 members of the armed forces to protect critical national infrastructure (CNI). Additionally, the authorities plan to launch an app that will allow the public to report potential cases of sabotage. The announcement comes as a response to the alleged Russian-orchestrated sabotage of a railway line in Mika (Masovian voivodeship) earlier this week, though Russia has been accused of perpetrating numerous attacks and acts of espionage in Poland since 2022. The planned deployment will require the authorisation of nationalist President Karol Nawrocki, who is aligned with the opposition. However, the two rival blocs in Poland, led by the conservative Law and Justice (PiS) party and Prime Minister Donald Tusk’s centre-right coalition, are broadly aligned on national security questions. We assess that this likely deployment – enabled by Poland having over 216,000 active military personnel – will enhance the safety of logistical routes used to transport equipment to Ukraine. The measure will also augment wider cross-sector resilience.
• Russia-Ukraine-US: Ukraine is unlikely to accept unfavourable terms; war is likely to continue. Over the past 24 hours, media reports based on unnamed sources have outlined elements of an unconfirmed 28-point US framework to end the Russo-Ukrainian war, which US officials have not confirmed. Broadly, the unconfirmed proposals would reportedly require Kyiv to relinquish full control of Luhansk and Donetsk oblasts. Areas currently under Ukrainian control would be designated as a demilitarised zone where Moscow would be barred from deploying troops. The plan also reportedly proposes to freeze the current lines of control in Kherson and Zaporizhzhia oblasts and impose limits on the size of Ukraine’s armed forces and its long-range weapons, in exchange for unspecified US security guarantees. The unconfirmed proposals strongly align with earlier Russian demands for a ceasefire and, if confirmed, would indicate that Washington DC may well pressure Kyiv into accepting unfavourable terms quickly. However, we assess that Kyiv is unlikely to agree to such conditions in the short term and is therefore unlikely to end the conflict definitively in the short term.

Nov 18.

KEY DEVELOPMENTS

* ZAPORIZHZHIA: Russian forces have made significant advances in the direction of Huliaipole (Zaporizhzhia oblast) in recent weeks, likely influenced in part by Ukraine’s reinforcement of Pokrovsk to the north

* STRIKES: Russia continues its daily strike campaign against Ukraine, launching episodic large-scale attacks, as evidenced by the strike on 13 to 14 November which focused much of its impact on the capital, Kyiv

* ENERGY: Ukraine has signed an agreement to import US LNG via Greece to cover the country’s winter energy requirements, but despite significant recovery in overall gas production levels, blackouts will continue amid Russian strikes

* FORECAST: The Ukrainian government is facing the largest and most politically impactful corruption scandal since the start of the full-scale war, centred on the country’s energy sector, which will drive questions over how foreign aid is overseen

* POKROVSK: Russian forces in the Pokrovsk sector (Donestk oblast) continue attempts to fix Ukrainian troops within the city while pressing for an encirclement, though they have yet to achieve this. Although elements of Russia’s 51st Combined Arms Army (CAA) are struggling to conduct encirclement operations to the north and north-east, the 2nd CAA has managed to make advances both within Pokrovsk and to the west of the city. However, Russian forces have still not succeeded in achieving a full encirclement, likely in part due to high losses as well as Ukrainian counter-attacks.

* POKROVSK: Despite these challenges, Russia likely remains committed to maintaining pressure on Ukraine’s flanks in an effort to prevent them from conducting an orderly and co-ordinated withdrawal. This was evidenced by the launch of a mechanised assault on 11 November, involving light vehicles along the Selydove–Pokrovsk highway (located to the south of Pokrovsk). Ukrainian forces reported that the assault achieved ‘partial success’, and that Russian troops incurred numerous losses in and around the city. Ukrainian forces also continue to report that Russian troops are not operating within Myrnohrad (Donetsk oblast), though there are indications that they are at least operating at the edges of the town. Nevertheless, on 13 November, President Volodymyr Zelensky acknowledged the increasingly difficult situation for Ukrainian forces. He stated that any decision regarding a withdrawal will be made by the commanders on the ground. This potentially sets the conditions for an eventual decision to withdraw in the coming weeks, if Russian forces continue to threaten Ukraine’s weakening flanks and increasingly vulnerable ground lines of communication.

* ZAPORIZHZHIA: Russian forces have made significant advances in the direction of Huliaipole (Zaporizhzhia oblast) in recent weeks, likely influenced in part by Ukraine’s reinforcement of Pokrovsk to the north. On 15 November, Ukraine’s Southern Defence Forces confirmed that they had withdrawn troops from Novovasylivske, a village located north-east of Huliaipole, to ‘more favourable positions’. Geolocated footage posted on 15-16 November indicates that Russian forces recently seized control of Rivnopillia village, located north-east of Huliaipole, and will enable Russian forces to place further pressure on the town from the north-east. Russian forces have also advanced along both the T-0401 Pokrovske–Huliaipole highway and the O-080618 Huliaipole–Malynivka highway. The recent advances place Russian forces approximately two miles (4km) east of Huliapole and 5 miles (8km) north-east of the town.

* ZAPORIZHZHIA: Over the last month at least, advances towards Huliapole have represented the most notable and successful front according to territory seized by Russian forces. Ukrainian forces have likely had to commit additional reinforcements to defending the Pokrovsk sector in recent months. This has likely exposed weaknesses elsewhere which Russian forces are attempting to exploit, such as towards Huliapole.

* STRIKES: Russia continues its daily strike campaign against Ukraine, launching episodic large-scale attacks, as evidenced by the strike on 13 to 14 November. The attack involved 430 drones, three Kh-47M2 Kinzhal ballistic missiles fired from Ryazan oblast (Russia), one Tsirkon anti-ship missile, six Iskander-K/Kalibr cruise missiles and nine Iskander-M/KN-23 ballistic missiles. Ukrainian authorities reported that Russia focused the attack on the capital Kyiv. A Russian missile reportedly damaged the Azerbaijani embassy in Kyiv. We have previously reported that Russia frequently concentrates its very large salvos on the capital. Despite Kyiv having the densest air defence system in the entire country, such attacks nonetheless inflict damage through the sheer volume of projectiles. Such attacks significantly degrade Kyiv’s security environment, leaving even well-protected areas at high risk of sustaining strikes, which further compound growing energy insecurity risks (see Energy below for further analysis).

* STRIKES: On 16 to 17 November, Russian forces struck the port of Izmail in Odesa oblast, hitting a Turkish-flagged gas tanker. Turkish vessels account for roughly 40% of maritime traffic through the so-called Black Sea corridor connecting Ukraine’s ports to global shipping lanes. The attack was likely part of Moscow’s broader strategy to undermine shipping to Ukrainian ports and disrupt energy supplies to Kyiv. However, it remains unlikely that this will cause a major diplomatic incident between Russia and Turkey (particularly as the Turkish government is likely attempting to reinvigorate the stalled Istanbul talks). Nevertheless, the incident underscores the omnipresent threats to shipping of all kinds operating in Ukrainian waters, including vessels flagged by neutral states.

* STRIKES: Ukraine has reportedly used its domestically produced FP-5 Flamingo cruise missiles for the second time. Ukraine’s general staff reported that overnight on 12-13 November, its forces conducted a long-range strike using Flamingo missiles and long-range drones, without specifying the targets. A Ukrainian source reported that one missile struck the city of Oryol (Oryol oblast, Russia), with geolocated footage indicating damage to infrastructure for the Oryol Thermal Power Plant. However, this has yet to be corroborated. The development likely illustrates Ukraine’s emerging domestic deep missile strike capabilities, which will complement its already-established long-range drone capabilities.

POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS

* AID: On 17 November, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky and French President Emmanuel Macron signed a letter of intent for Ukraine to purchase 100 French Rafale F4 jets during a bilateral meeting in the French capital Paris. The letter of intent also includes purchases of new SAMP/T air-defence systems, drones and radars, which will reportedly be newly produced equipment rather than material drawn from French military stocks. According to the two leaders, the purchases would be paid for through a mix of EU financing and bilateral funding; the EU is yet to agree on seizing frozen Russian assets to finance such aid. While joint production of interceptor drones will reportedly begin before 2026, the deliveries of the Rafale F4s are to be completed by 2035, underscoring that the agreement is unlikely to have a significant impact on Ukraine’s medium-term military capabilities. Nonetheless, the agreement is strategically important for Ukraine insofar as it ensures a continued source of military support to bolster its medium-to-long term defensive capabilities.

* ENERGY: On 16 November, Ukraine signed an agreement to import US liquefied natural gas (LNG) via Greece to cover the country’s winter energy requirements. The deal, signed between Ukrainian energy company Naftogaz and the Greek energy company DEPA Commercial will cover the December 2025 to March 2026 period, with deliveries beginning in January 2026. The precise quantities of LNG have not been specified. The agreement comes after Russian strikes on Ukrainian energy infrastructure disabled up to 60% of Ukraine’s gas production in October, though a credible source has indicated that production has rapidly recovered, having risen from approximately 25 m cubic metres per day (mcm/d) of production down several weeks ago to only 6-9 mcm/d currently. Nonetheless, the agreement underscores Ukraine’s continued reliance on external partners to help bolster its energy security amid ongoing Russian strikes on its energy infrastructure this winter, which will continue to trigger blackouts in the coming months.

* ENERGY: By contrast, on 13 November Reuters reported that Russia’s oil processing has decreased by just 3% so far in 2025 despite Ukraine’s strike campaign, underscoring that Russia’s strategic depth puts it at an advantage in terms of offsetting the impact of strikes. The finding is based on a combination of Reuters data and industry sources. During the most intense period of Ukraine’s strike campaign between August and October, attacks and planned maintenance meant that up to 20% of Russia’s refinery capacity was offline. However, according to industry sources who spoke to Reuters, Russia’s refineries were operating below full capacity before Ukraine’s strikes.  The sources claim that the authorities were able to offset the impact of these strikes by restarting spare units at both damaged and unaffected sites, as well as repairing the units hit by strikes and bringing them back online. While we cannot confirm the findings, they do highlight the likely limitations of Ukraine’s strike campaign, which has so far failed to mirror the widescale damage inflicted by Russia on Ukraine’s energy grid and production rates.

FORECAST

CORRUPTION: The Ukrainian government is facing the largest and most politically impactful corruption scandals since the start of the full-scale war, centred on the country’s energy sector. Last week, the National Anti-Corruption Bureau (NABU) revealed that an investigation has been underway for 15 months into an extensive embezzlement scheme at Energoatom, the state-owned nuclear power company. NABU investigators uncovered an alleged USD 100 m scheme involving kickbacks of up to 15% on contracts – including contracts to build protections for Ukraine’s energy infrastructure against Russian strikes.

Prominent figures suspected of involvement include the justice minister and former energy minister Herman Halushchenko, former defence minister Rustem Umerov, several unnamed senior officials and Tymur Mindich, a former business partner of President Zelensky. The case has already resulted in the temporary suspension of Halushchenko and the resignation of current energy minister Svitlana Grynchuk. Other implicated government officials are likely to face suspension or be forced to resign, sustaining moderate risks to government stability in the coming weeks. Mindich, meanwhile, has fled the country, likely due to a tip-off about his forthcoming arrest warrant.

Despite the government’s attempts to ensure greater transparency in the energy sector, the domestic backlash will likely remain severe, with further allegations and revelations remaining as triggers for protests. On 15 November, President Zelensky pledged to overhaul the management of state-owned energy companies and to maintain full co-operation with anti-corruption bodies. His statements are almost certainly aimed at containing public anger over the scandal, particularly as the population continues to face worsening energy insecurity due to Russia’s long-range strikes on critical infrastructure. Meanwhile, NABU has claimed that the investigation faced strong government resistance and attempts at obstruction which will likely further fuel public distrust. The scandal will likely further erode confidence in the government. Additional revelations that implicate senior officials are likely to sustain the risk of localised protests in key cities, including Kyiv. (For further analysis on the government legislation that threatened to severely curtail the independence of NABU, likely in relation to this ongoing investigation.

More broadly, the case will raise concerns among Western partners about the management of financial aid, though allies are likely to remain committed to supporting the country. Politico reported last week that the corruption case has alarmed EU partners, prompting renewed demands for greater transparency in how foreign funds are overseen. The scandal comes at a critical moment for Ukraine’s finances as it finalises its state budget and faces widening funding gaps that are only deepening its reliance on external support. Despite the scale of the ongoing corruption scandal, we assess that the EU will likely remain committed to providing aid, as supporting Ukraine against Russia remains its key strategic priority. At the same time, Russia-friendly countries such as Hungary and Slovakia are likely to use the scandal to justify their opposition to further assistance, which will continue to pose an obstacle in EU decision-making.

* Ukraine-EU: EU alternatives to frozen Russian assets will likely slightly improve 2026 financial outlook. On 17 November, media reports indicated that the European Commission has devised alternative options to financially support Ukraine if the bloc fails to reach an agreement on using frozen Russian assets. These options include providing Ukraine with a EUR 90 bn grant where each EU member state would make a voluntary contribution to the EU budget, determined by the strength of its economy. The contributions would broadly range between 0.16% and 0.27% of member states’ gross domestic product (GDP) and would have an immediate impact on their public finances. The second option would require the EU to borrow on financial markets and lend the money to Ukraine, on the condition that Ukraine repays the loan only if it receives war reparations from Russia. The IMF and the Ukrainian authorities have estimated that Ukraine will need EUR 135.7 bn between 2026 and 2027, assuming the war ends by late 2026. Consequently, even if no consensus is reached on using Russian frozen assets, alternative financial support will be available, which we assess will improve Ukraine’s financial stability in 2026.

Nov 17.

* Poland: Alleged railway sabotage likely perpetrated by Russian-recruited network. Earlier on 17 November, Prime Minister Donald Tusk stated that a railway line used to supply weapons to Ukraine between the capital Warsaw and Lublin (Lublin voivodeship) was sabotaged. Tusk stated that the damag discovered on 16 November ? was the result of an explosive charge. At the time of writing, the authorities have not officially attributed the incident to a specific actor. However, we assess that a Russian-backed actor was likely responsible. In 2023, the authorities disrupted a Russian military intelligence (GRU) network carrying out reconnaissance operations with the intention of sabotaging the rail network. Given that an estimated 90% of military aid to Ukraine passes through Poland, the rail network almost certainly remains a strategic target. However, Russia’s grey-zone campaign also extends to less strategic targets. In the coming months, we assess that there is a realistic risk of further arson attacks on Ukraine-linked facilities and retail sites across Poland, as well as incendiary devices being sent to courier companies. This campaign will highly likely continue into 2026. (Source: Sibylline)

 

21 Nov 25.  Zelenskiy ready for ‘honest’ work on US-backed plan as Europeans push back.

• Summary
• US plan would require Kyiv to give up land, plan shows
• Kyiv would also have to accept curbs on military – plan
• US Army chief says Kyiv agrees to move quickly towards a deal
• White House says US working on plan for about a month
• French minister says peace cannot mean capitulation

President Volodymyr Zelenskiy said after talks with a top U.S. Army official on Thursday he was ready for “honest” work with Washington on a plan to end the war in Ukraine, while European allies pushed back against punishing concessions to Russia. According to the U.S.-backed plan, seen by Reuters, Kyiv would be required to give up the entire Donbas region and significantly downsize its military, conditions long seen by Ukraine’s allies as tantamount to capitulation. The plan says Ukraine would have to limit its army to 600,000 troops and that it would “receive robust security guarantees,” without providing further details. It makes several concessions to Russia, including that Crimea, Luhansk and Donetsk will be recognized as de facto Russian by the United States and that Ukrainian forces will withdraw from part of the Donetsk region that they control.

“This plan was drawn up immediately following discussions with one of the most senior members of President Zelenskiy’s administration, Rustem Umerov, who agreed to the majority of the plan, after making several modifications, and presented it to President Zelenskiy,” a senior U.S. official said.

KYIV READY FOR ‘CONSTRUCTIVE’ WORK

Zelenskiy, whose office said he had received a draft of the plan, said after meeting U.S. Army Secretary Daniel Driscoll in Kyiv that Ukraine and Washington would work together on elements of it.

“Our teams – Ukraine and the USA – will work on the points of the plan to end the war,” Zelenskiy wrote on Telegram. “We are ready for constructive, honest and prompt work.”

Zelenskiy’s office did not comment directly on the content of the 28-point plan, which has not been officially published, but said he had “outlined the fundamental principles that matter to our people.”

“In the coming days, the President of Ukraine expects to discuss with President Trump the existing diplomatic opportunities and the key points required to achieve peace,” it said.

The plan seen by Reuters also states that a non-aggression agreement would be concluded between Russia, Ukraine and Europe.

It says that NATO would neither expand further nor station troops in Ukraine and that Russia would be reintegrated into the global economy, with the lifting of sanctions “agreed upon in phases and on a case-by-case basis.”

Russia would be invited to rejoin the G8 and the United States would enter into an agreement with Moscow covering energy, natural resources, infrastructure, artificial intelligence, data centers and rare earth metals extraction in the Arctic.

White House press secretary Karoline Leavitt told a news briefing that Secretary of State Marco Rubio and U.S. special envoy Steve Witkoff had been quietly working on the plan for about a month and that Trump supports the plan.

“This plan was crafted to reflect the realities of the situation, after five years of a devastating war, to find the best win-win scenario, where both parties gain more than they must give,” she said in a comment on Thursday evening after media outlets reported additional details from the plan.

‘PEACE CANNOT BE CAPITULATION,’ FRANCE SAYS

European Union foreign ministers meeting in Brussels earlier in the day did not comment in detail about the reported U.S. plan, but indicated they would not accept demands for Kyiv to make punishing concessions.

“Ukrainians want peace – a just peace that respects everyone’s sovereignty, a durable peace that can’t be called into question by future aggression,” said French Foreign Minister Jean-Noel Barrot. “But peace cannot be a capitulation.”

Zelenskiy’s office said Driscoll had presented him with the plan only on Thursday, and several sources told Reuters and other media outlets that the plan was the fruit of backchannel conversations between Witkoff and Kirill Dmitriev, the special envoy of Russian President Vladimir Putin.

In a message on X on Wednesday, Rubio said the U.S. “will continue to develop a list of potential ideas for ending this war based on input from both sides of this conflict” and that peace will require concessions from both Kyiv and Moscow.

Zelenskiy, who met Driscoll alone and then met with the full U.S. delegation, agreed to move quickly towards agreement and the signing of a plan, said Colonel Dave Butler, U.S. army chief of public affairs.

The United States, he said, wanted to ensure that this is “a good plan for the Ukrainian people.”

The acceleration in U.S. diplomacy comes at an awkward time for Kyiv, with its troops on the back foot on the battlefield and Zelenskiy’s government undermined by a corruption scandal. Parliament fired two cabinet ministers on Wednesday.

GENERAL SAYS RUSSIA CONTROLS KUPIANSK

Moscow played down any new U.S. initiative.

“Consultations are not currently under way. There are contacts, of course, but there is no process that could be called consultations,” Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov said.

He said Russia had nothing to add beyond the position Putin laid out at a summit with Trump in August, adding that any peace deal must address the “root causes of the conflict,” a phrase Moscow has long used to refer to its demands.

With another winter approaching in the nearly four-year war, Russian troops occupy almost one-fifth of Ukraine and are slowly advancing while bombarding Ukrainian energy supplies and cities as the cold winter sets in.

The Kremlin said Putin had visited the command post of the Russian forces’ “West” grouping on Thursday, where he met the chief of Russia’s general staff, Valery Gerasimov, and other top military brass.

Gerasimov told Putin that Russian forces had taken control of the Ukrainian city of Kupiansk, a city Moscow sees as an important target in its westward push through central and eastern Ukraine.

Ukraine’s military denied Russian claims it controls Kupiansk in northeastern Ukraine or 70% of the ruined railway hub of Pokrovsk in eastern Ukraine.

Reuters could not independently verify either statement, although video released by Russia’s defence ministry on Thursday showed its troops moving freely through the southern part of Pokrovsk, patrolling deserted streets lined with charred apartment blocks. (Source: Reuters)

 

20 Nov 25. Ukraine allows key companies to have air defence teams, minister says. Ukraine’s government has authorised energy, communications and transport companies to purchase and use air defence equipment to improve their effectiveness in combating Russian air attacks, defence minister Denys Shmyhal said on Wednesday.

Russia has significantly intensified its air strikes on Ukrainian infrastructure, focusing on energy, transport and facilities that support the functioning of cities.

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“Enterprises will be able to purchase or receive air defence equipment by decision of the military command or through supply procedures agreed with the Ministry of Defence,” Shmyhal said on the Telegram messenger.

He said the air defence groups at enterprises would act solely on the orders of the military, would receive information from the military, and that the members of the groups would be vetted by the national security service.

The groups will consist of “proven employees of enterprises”, he noted, saying that the decision will make civil air defence more effective and protect strategically important facilities from threats. (Source: Reuters)

 

20 Nov 25. Ukraine allows key companies to have air defence teams, minister says. Ukraine’s government has authorised energy, communications and transport companies to purchase and use air defence equipment to improve their effectiveness in combating Russian air attacks, defence minister Denys Shmyhal said on Wednesday. Russia has significantly intensified its air strikes on Ukrainian infrastructure, focusing on energy, transport and facilities that support the functioning of cities. Read about innovative ideas and the people working on solutions to global crises with the Reuters Beacon newsletter. Sign up here. “Enterprises will be able to purchase or receive air defence equipment by decision of the military command or through supply procedures agreed with the Ministry of Defence,” Shmyhal said on the Telegram messenger. He said the air defence groups at enterprises would act solely on the orders of the military, would receive information from the military, and that the members of the groups would be vetted by the national security service. The groups will consist of “proven employees of enterprises”, he noted, saying that the decision will make civil air defence more effective and protect strategically important facilities from threats. (Source: Reuters)

 

18 Nov 25. Spain rolls out $946m Ukraine aid package during Zelenskiy visit. Spain pledged 817m euros ($946m) in military and other aid for Ukraine on Tuesday during President Volodymyr Zelenskiy’s visit as he aims to bolster Kyiv’s air defences against Russia’s invasion. The bulk of the aid, in which defence equipment will amount to 300m euros, is part of a 10-year bilateral security and defence agreement signed in May 2024 that envisages an annual 1 bn euros. As part of the package, Spain will purchase U.S. military equipment worth 100 m euros under NATO’s Prioritised Ukraine Requirements List (PURL) initiative, Spanish Prime Minister Pedro Sanchez told a joint news conference. It also includes 200 m euros in credit for companies investing in the reconstruction of Ukraine, with a particular focus on energy, transport and water management. “First, for the Ukrainian army to protect the territorial integrity of Ukraine from the invader, secondly to protect the civilian population, and finally to give an impulse to reconstruction,” Sanchez said about the package. (Source: Reuters)

 

11 Nov 25. Ukraine shares lessons learned in drone defence with UK House of Lords. Ukraine’s Deputy Minister of Defence of Ukraine Anna Gvozdiar shared insights from the battlefield during a UK parliamentary discussion “Drone Protection for UK Soldiers – Learning from Ukraine” at the House of Lords last week.

“Over nearly four years, our air defence system has evolved from a relatively expensive, classical model into a flexible, multi-tiered structure in which high-tech complexes operate in synergy with mass, cost-effective solutions,” Gvozdiar said. “This is a story of adaptability and ingenuity — Ukrainians are not merely defending themselves but setting new standards of security for future wars.”

Indeed, Ukraine’s air defence architecture, integrating traditional capabilities with interceptor drones and networked systems, is reshaping modern warfare. ‘Eyes in the sky’ is the new ‘boots on the ground’. During the event, British parliamentarians, defence sector representatives and Ukrainian innovators discussed Ukraine’s practical experience in countering drones and how this experience could be applied within NATO and the UK.  Gvozdiar emphasised that the Ukrainian approach is based on practicality, rapid implementation of solutions and the ability to continuously adapt to new challenges. She expressed gratitude to the House of Lords for its consistent and systematic support for Ukraine, in particular for facilitating the transfer of interceptor systems for air defence and for supporting the development of Ukrainian interceptor drone production. The Deputy Minister of Defence further underlined that close collaboration in technological development strengthens both Ukrainian and British militaries and enhances global security. (Source: www.unmannedairspace.info)

 

19 Nov 25. Cuashub.com said today that Ukrainian drone strike hits Russian UAV hub in occupied Crimea. Ukrainian forces have struck the Kirovske airbase in Russian-occupied Crimea, damaging infrastructure critical to Russia’s Orion drone operations. The attack, carried out on November 13 by the 1st Center of Unmanned Systems, targeted facilities used for deployment and maintenance of Orion reconnaissance-strike drones. Satellite imagery released by open-source intelligence group Dnipro Osint shows scorched areas near drone hangars and destroyed ground equipment. Photos dated November 17 reveal burn marks and debris around structures supporting the Orion program, including a visible scar on the tarmac where an Orion UAV was positioned. The Kirovske airbase has served as a strategic hub for Russian drone activity, enabling surveillance of Ukraine’s coastal zones and strikes against maritime drones. Ukrainian forces also hit a helicopter parking area during the same operation. The Orion UAV, developed by Russia’s Kronshtadt Group, is a medium-altitude, long-endurance drone with a 16-meter wingspan and 8-meter length. It can carry up to 200 kg of payload, operate for 24 hours at altitudes up to 7,000 meters, and has an estimated range of 1,000–1,500 km. Equipped with four hardpoints, it can deploy guided munitions, including the S8000 “Banderol” cruise missile. Russia has relied on Orion drones to counter Ukraine’s naval drone attacks in the Black Sea, which have repeatedly targeted Russian assets in Crimea and the Kuban region. Footage released by Ukrainian commander Robert “Madyar” Brovdi reportedly shows the moment FP‑2 drones struck the airfield. The strike is yet another example Ukraine’s growing ability to disrupt Russian aerial operations deep inside occupied territory, potentially impacting Russia’s reconnaissance and strike capabilities in the region. https://cuashub.com/en/content/ukrainian-drone-strike-hits-russian-uav-hub-in-occupied-crimea/ (Source: https://cuashub.com/

 

13 Nov 25. Ukraine as the “architect of a European drone wall.” Ukrainian news portal Novyny Live has published a column by Anatolii Amelin, Deputy Head of the National Association of Defence Companies, in which he argues for a European drone wall and says Ukraine could be the architect.

“The European ‘wall’ is a network of surveillance, classification and neutralisation over movement corridors and critical infrastructure,” Amelin writes. “At its core is the C-UAS circuit, integrated into the C4ISR scheme. For the EU, it also means data standards, compatible interfaces and joint personnel training. We fit organically into this structure. The war has reduced the ‘discover – test – update’ cycle to months. Thousands of operators work in dense electronic warfare every day, tactics and tools are born in the field and immediately return to engineering. It is this circulation of knowledge that makes our experience suitable for EU civilian tasks.”

He continues that the offer from Ukraine is for “hardware plus service and responsibility” and that the implementation stages are clear: “threat audit, circuit design, sensor and C2 installation, connection of electronic warfare, interception units and firepower, team training and launch accompanied by the operational shift”.

“Open pilots, public metrics, localised service in EU countries and joint training are needed,” Amelin writes. “The deployment model has four levels: national level with early warning systems and policies; regional level with personnel training and exercises; facility level with turnkey circuits for airports, ports and energy; and an operational level with 24/7 support, updates and response.”

He adds that this approach is consistent with NATO’s Eastern Sentry initiative, which “consolidates C-UAS surveillance and integration capabilities on the eastern flank and opens up opportunities for Ukrainian participation”.

“When the customer sees a managed intercept economy, agreed protocols and trained teams, the architecture is perceived as a standard, not a one-off purchase. Ukraine is the architect of the European Drone Wall, if we act now.” (Source: www.unmannedairspace.info)

 

17 Nov 25. Ukraine plans to acquire 100 Rafale fighters from France. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy is in France on an official visit as he seeks advanced air defence capabilities.

* Ukraine has taken the first steps to acquire Rafale fighters from France, along with advanced air defence systems

* The move comes weeks after Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy agreed with Sweden to purchase Gripen fighters

* Ukraine is under considerable pressure as Russia continues nightly attacks on Ukrainian cities and critical infrastructure

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy has signed a letter of intent with French President Emmanuel Macron to purchase Rafale F4 fighter jets and advanced air defence systems, as part of a landmark deal during an official visit to France. Posting on social media platform X on 17 November 2025, the Palais de l’Élysée stated that Ukraine would acquire Rafale fighters and SAMP/T NG air defence platforms, without stating the value of the deal nor delivery timelines. It was reported by French news outlet TFI Info that President Zelenskyy confirmed that Ukraine would seek to acquire 100 Rafale fighters. It was initially unclear whether the Rafales would be existing stock from the French Air Force or if Ukraine would acquire new builds. However, President Zelenskyy subsequently posted on X that the 100 Rafale fighters would be delivered by 2035, indicating the potential for a mix of in-service and new build aircraft. Such a sizeable fleet would augment Ukraine?s air combat capabilities significantly, with the Rafale considered to be a 4.5 generation multirole aircraft, similar in capability to the Eurofighter Typhoon. Rafale to be added to Ukraine?s mixed future fleet Ukraine has long-sought Western aircraft to modernise its Air Force, which currently operates the Russian-origin MiG-29 multirole fighters, Su-14/25/27 series ground attack platform, as well as older French Dassault Mirage 2000 fighters, which first began to arrive in 2025. Kyiv has also been promised around 85 F-16 fighters from various Western countries, typically of the older C/D variants. The letter of intent for the Rafale acquisition comes hot on the heels of a similar deal signed in October between Ukraine and Sweden for the delivery of between 100-150 Gripen fighters. Should all of these acquisition plans come to fruition, Ukraine will operate a mixed fleet of around 100 Rafales from France, a similar number of F-16s from various sources, and over 100 Gripen fighters from Sweden, in addition to the existing Russian-origin platforms and the older Mirage 2000s. Ukraine is seeking to boost its air defence capabilities as Russia continues to bombard its cities and energy infrastructure with nightly cruise missile and glide bomb attacks, with an increasing number of attacks thought to be getting through Ukrainian defences. (Source: airforce-technology.com)

 

14 Nov 25. Cuashub.com said today that Zelensky announces new drone defense program for border cities. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky has announced the launch of a new government-backed program designed to protect border cities from Russian drone attacks, starting with Kherson. Speaking at a briefing on November 7, Zelensky said the initiative was developed by the Unmanned Systems Forces Command and is fully prepared for deployment. The program introduces a comprehensive set of measures aimed at detecting, intercepting and neutralizing hostile drones that pose a threat to civilian and critical infrastructure in frontline areas.

“In Kherson, the program is already ready to begin its work,” the president said, noting that similar systems will be rolled out to other high-risk border towns.  “These initiatives are part of a broader strategy to strengthen the protection of our border territories.”

The move is part of Ukraine’s continued focus on countering Russian aerial threats, which have targeted both military and civilian sites with increasing frequency. Earlier, on November 3, Zelensky said that by the end of this month Ukraine could reach a production capacity of between 600 and 800 interceptor drones per day, a significant step in boosting the country?s defensive capabilities amid ongoing conflict. Officials say the new defense network will combine early-warning technologies, rapid-response interceptor units and electronic warfare systems to improve resilience against incoming attacks. Kherson, located near the Dnipro River and close to Russian-occupied territories, has faced repeated drone and artillery strikes since its liberation in 2022. The government expects the border protection program to serve as a model for strengthening defense readiness in other vulnerable regions along Ukraine’s frontiers.

Zelensky announces new drone defense program for border cities

(Source: https://cuashub.com/

 

14 Nov 25. Ukraine begins mass production of interceptor drones to bolster air defence. Ukraine has started mass production of its new domestically developed interceptor drones to strengthen air defences, the Ukrainian defence ministry said on Friday. As the war with Russia approaches the four-year mark, Ukrainian cities and towns far from the frontline are under nearly daily assault from hundreds of Russian drones. In the latest attack on Ukraine, 430 drones were used, Ukrainian officials said. The ministry said that the first three manufacturers have already started production, and 11 more were preparing to set up production lines. The drones would be based on a domestically developed technology called ‘Octopus”. The ministry said the technology to intercept Shahed drones was tested in combat and proved that it was working “at night, under jamming, and at low altitudes.” President Volodymyr Zelenskiy has said that the goal was to manufacture up to 1,000 of the interceptors a day. Russia is investing heavily in long-range drones and has been steadily increasing the number of drones it uses in a single strike on Ukraine. Interceptor drones, which cost a few thousand dollars each, are also important for Ukraine as it can save its more expensive missiles for faster, deadlier cruise and ballistic threats. (Source: Reuters)

 

14 Nov 25. Russia plans to make up to 120,000 glide bombs this year, Ukrainian intelligence says. Russia plans to manufacture up to 120,000 of its cheap and devastating glide bombs this year, a senior Ukrainian intelligence official said, including 500 of a new, longer-range version which can reach more towns and cities. Russia has ramped up arms production massively since the full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, with defence plants operating around the clock. It does not disclose details of military output, which are classified as secret. Reuters was unable to verify the 2025 target, which Major General Vadym Skibitskyi, deputy head of Ukraine’s Defence Intelligence disclosed in an interview. He did not say how he had obtained the figure or give earlier data, but it would indicate a vast increase in the manufacture of glide bombs, which use wings, and sometimes engines, to fly dozens of kilometres to their targets. The 120,000 number includes new munitions and existing bombs upgraded to glide. Skibitskyi said Russian forces are firing between 200 and 250 glide bombs every day. Last month, the daily average was about 170, according to data from the defence ministry

“It is possible to shoot them down, but the quantity of these aerial bombs produced in the Russian Federation … is enormous,” Skibitskyi said. “This is a threat. A threat that will require us to respond appropriately.”

RUSSIA IS BOOSTING GLIDE BOMB RANGE

The bombs, whose range was previously estimated to be up to 90 km (56 miles), can breach Ukrainian defences without sending planes across front lines where they would be shot down. They are much cheaper and more plentiful than missiles and their several hundred kilograms of explosive can blast through buildings and fortifications. They have pummelled frontline cities such as Kharkiv and Kherson. Russia is launching mass production of a new glide bomb capable of flying up to 200 km (125 miles) from the point of release from a fighter jet, Skibitskyi said, adding that it plans to make about 500 by the end of this year. Ukraine also believes that Russia is working on modifications so such bombs can fly up to 400 km, allowing Moscow to target even more Ukrainian towns and cities without using missiles, he said. October glide bomb attacks on Mykolaiv, Poltava and Odesa regions, which are at least dozens of kilometres from the nearest front lines, have already demonstrated the increasing reach of the weapon. The Russian defence ministry did not immediately respond to a request for comment. Russia denies targeting civilians, but thousands have been killed and injured in the invasion. Moscow argues that Kyiv’s moves to ally with the West pose a threat to Russia and must be stopped.

INTENSIFYING ATTACKS AIMED AT FORCING KYIV’S HAND IN TALKS

Skibitskyi also gave estimates for Russian drone production, which he said had enabled it to target Ukraine’s energy system more effectively. In 2025 Russia would make a total of about 70,000 long-range drones, he said, including 30,000 Shahed craft which are the workhorse of Russia’s attacks.

“They started with 30 drones per month, now 30 can fly to a single target,” he said, expecting the attacks on gas and energy infrastructure to continue into the winter.

“They definitely want to break us. This is destabilising the internal situation,” he said. Skibitskyi described it as one of the tools to pressure Ukraine into a more compliant position in any possible peace negotiations.

He also said that should Russian troops capture the besieged city of Pokrovsk, where street battles are currently raging, they would likely press towards the boundaries of Donetsk region, their long-held goal.

“It’s their next direction of movement, it’s obvious.”

NORTH KOREA MAKING ITS OWN DRONES

The shipment of millions of rounds of artillery shells from North Korea helped Russia keep up rates of fire on the battlefield in 2024, but Skibitskyi said the number had more than halved this year as Pyongyang’s stocks ran low. He cited a total supply of 6.5 m artillery shells to Russia since 2023 from North Korea, which seized on an opportunity to build close ties with the Kremlin after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.

He said there were no shell deliveries recorded from North Korea in September, but some were recorded in October and that about half the shells supplied by Pyongyang were so old that they needed to go to plants in Russia to be improved.

Skibitskyi added that North Korea had launched mass production of small, short-range First Person View (FPV), as well as larger medium-range battlefield attack drones, on its own soil, although he did not specify the scale.

“They are learning, they are studying their experience (in this war) in order to expand production in their own territory,” he said.

Thousands of North Korean troops fought last year alongside Russian forces in Russia’s Kursk region after an incursion by Ukraine to try to ease pressure on its forces elsewhere and create leverage in peace talks. North Korea has acknowledged its involvement in Ukraine, arguing that its role helps to preserve world peace in the face of aggression by the West but it has not given any details or responded to requests for comment on its involvement. (Source: Reuters)

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Founded in 1987, Exensor Technology is a world leading supplier of Networked Unattended Ground Sensor (UGS) Systems providing tailored sensor solutions to customers all over the world. From our Headquarters in Lund Sweden, our centre of expertise in Network Communications at Communications Research Lab in Kalmar Sweden and our Production site outside of Basingstoke UK, we design, develop and produce latest state of the art rugged UGS solutions at the highest quality to meet the most stringent demands of our customers. Our systems are in operation and used in a wide number of Military as well as Homeland Security applications worldwide. The modular nature of the system ensures any external sensor can be integrated, providing the user with a fully meshed ?silent? network capable of self-healing. Exensor Technology will continue to lead the field in UGS technology, provide our customers with excellent customer service and a bespoke package able to meet every need.

A CNIM Group Company

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Sponsored by Bertin Exensor

 

www.exensor.com

 

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07 Nov 25. Marine Corps Celebrates 250 Years of ‘First to Fight.’ As America’s expeditionary force in readiness since Nov. 10, 1775, Marines have been proud to be the “first to fight” in the “air, on land and sea,” as mentioned in the Marines’ Hymn.

The Marine Corps began at Tun Tavern in Philadelphia, where two battalions were recruited to serve aboard ships as sharpshooters and participate in amphibious assaults.

The first amphibious landing took place March 3, 1776, when the Marines gained control of Fort Montagu and Fort Nassau from the British in the Bahamas. The raid was led by Capt. Samuel Nicholas, who was also the first Marine commandant and the first commissioned Marine.

Besides serving aboard ships during the Revolutionary War, Marines also fought alongside soldiers and participated in some of the land battles, including the Battle of Princeton on Jan. 3, 1777.

The Continental Marine Corps was disbanded in April 1783, near the end of the Revolutionary War and reactivated as the U.S. Marine Corps in August 1797.

Its first combat action was the First Barbary War, 1801 to 1805, against Barbary pirates in the Mediterranean Sea and in North Africa. Marines overtook the fort at Derna, forcing the surrender of the city and the capitulation of the Bey of Tripoli. This decisive victory is why “To the shores of Tripoli” became part of the Marines’ Hymn.

During the War of 1812, Marines served on land and sea, including the Battle of Bladensburg in 1814 and the Battle of New Orleans the following year.

Until 1834, the Marines were an independent service. President Andrew Jackson wanted to make the Corps part of the Army. However, the Marine Corps commandant at the time, Archibald Henderson, had proven that Marines were important in landing party operations, not just ship-to-ship battles, so Congress decided to put the Navy and Marine Corps into one department, forever linking these two “sister services.”

In 1835, Marines participated in the Seminole Wars in Florida, and from 1846 to 1848, in the Mexican-American War, including the assault on Mexico City. The Marines raised the American flag in the Halls of Montezuma in Mexico City — “and the Halls of Montezuma” became part of the Marines’ Hymn.

During the Civil War, 1861 to 1865, Marines played a relatively minor role. Notably, Marines in the seceding states formed the Confederate Marine Corps.

During the Spanish–American War in 1898, Marines fought in the Philippines, Cuba and Puerto Rico. Marines seized Guantánamo Bay, Cuba, where they are still stationed today.

From 1899 to 1916, the Marine Corps participated in many expeditions, including the Philippine–American War, the Boxer Rebellion in China, Panama, Morocco, Mexico, Santo Domingo, Haiti and Nicaragua.

During World War I, 1917 to 1918, Marines served as a part of the American Expeditionary Force. At the Battle of Belleau Wood in France, Marines stopped the German advance on Paris, making it their most famous battle of the war.

In World War II, the Marines served in the Pacific Theater, making amphibious landings on Guadalcanal, Bougainville, Tarawa, Guam, Tinian, Cape Gloucester, Saipan, Peleliu, Iwo Jima and Okinawa.

The flag raising on Iwo Jima became the most iconic photo and film of the war, and possibly of the century, and served to inspire the design of the statue at the Marine Corps War Memorial in Arlington, Virginia. Before TV stations broadcast 24/7, the film clip was used when they signed off the air at night.

The Korean War, 1950 to 1953, found the Marines making an amphibious landing in Inchon, South Korea, in 1950 and later in Seoul and the mountains of North Korea.

In 1958, Marines landed in Lebanon and returned there from 1982 to 1984.

In the 1960s and early 1970s, Marines were back in East Asia, this time in South Vietnam. On March 8, 1965, Marines conducted an amphibious landing in Da Nang. Later battles included Hue and Khe Sanh.

Also in 1965, Marines made an amphibious landing in the Dominican Republic.

Marines also participated in the evacuation of embassy personnel and others from Saigon in April 1975.

In 1991, during Operation Desert Storm, Marines provided a large expeditionary force that contributed to the liberation of Kuwait from the Iraqi invaders.

From 2001 to 2021, Marines operated in Afghanistan, and from 2003 to 2011 in Iraq, performing duties similar to soldiers.

The Marine Corps is currently focused on a great power competition with peer adversaries, including China and Russia, pivoting back to its amphibious roots.

Besides preparing for military operations, Marines participate in humanitarian missions, particularly in the natural disaster-prone Indo-Pacific region. Marines also guard U.S. embassies worldwide.

Semper Fidelis, Latin for “Always Faithful,” is the Marine Corps’ motto. The unofficial motto is: “No Better Friend. No Worse Enemy.” (Source: U.S. DoD)

 

13 Oct 25. Navy Celebrates 250th Birthday. The U.S. Navy celebrates 250 years of service today; it was founded on Oct. 13, 1775, as the Continental Navy.

In 1783, at the end of the Revolutionary War, the service was disbanded. In 1794, Congress passed the Naval Act, creating the Navy and funding six heavy frigates.

The Navy and Navy Reserve, along with the Marine Corps, fall under the Department of the Navy.

Today, the Navy maintains security and deterrence through sustained forward presence and owns the most survivable arm of the nuclear triad, with its fleet of nuclear-armed submarines. The Navy also provides sealift for the other services.

Interesting Facts About the Navy

* President John F. Kennedy, a former Navy patrol torpedo officer, is the only president to have been awarded the Purple Heart. He sustained injuries in the Pacific Theater during World War II. Lyndon B. Johnson, Richard Nixon, Gerald Ford, Jimmy Carter and George H.W. Bush also served in the Navy before becoming president.

* Launched in 1797, the heavy frigate USS Constitution, also known as “Old Ironsides,” is the world’s oldest commissioned naval warship still sailing. The three-masted sailing ship, crewed by 75 active-duty sailors, participates in special events year-round. The vessel participated in the War of 1812, capturing numerous British merchantmen and warships.

* During the Civil War, the U.S. Navy fought the smaller Confederate States Navy. The U.S. Navy’s role in the war was to blockade the southern coast and support the U.S. Army with gunboats on the Mississippi River and rivers in northern Virginia.

* In the early 1880s, the Navy began replacing sailing ships with steel-hulled, steam-powered warships that ran on coal. The first four, known as the “ABCD” ships, are the USS Atlanta, USS Boston, USS Chicago and USS Dolphin. The ABCD cruisers retained their masts and could thus also operate under sail.

* The battleship USS Maine, commissioned in 1895, exploded and sank in Havana Harbor, Cuba, Feb. 15, 1898. The sinking, thought to be the work of the Spanish, was a contributing factor in the outbreak of the Spanish-American War that year. The USS Maine Mast Memorial, located in Arlington National Cemetery, features the main mast of the USS Maine, honoring the 261 sailors and Marines killed in the explosion or shortly thereafter.

* The Navy’s first modern submarine was the USS Holland, commissioned in 1900 and used as a training vessel for future submariners. It had a crew of six and could dive to 75 feet. The Holland never saw combat and was scrapped in 1932.

* For the first time in history, at the June 1942 Battle of Midway, a naval battle was fought by aircraft from carriers and not cruisers or battleships. All four Japanese carriers were sunk by planes from three American carriers, one of which was lost. The battle is considered the turning point of the war in the Pacific, with the U.S. and its Allies clawing back islands and land that Japan had seized.

* Navy Adm. Hyman Rickover is known as the “Father of the Nuclear Navy” because he directed the development of naval nuclear propulsion for ships and submarines. In 1952, Jimmy Carter was interviewed for two hours by Rickover before being accepted into the new nuclear submarine program as an officer. Carter later became president.

* The caramel-coated popcorn and peanut snack, Cracker Jack, has featured mascots Sailor Jack and his dog Bingo on its packaging since around World War I.

* Yeomen in the Navy perform administrative work. Historically, they managed storerooms for the ship’s gunners, carpenters and boatswains. With the transition from sail to steam, yeomen were assigned as engineers. The term “yeoman’s work” is sometimes used by both military personnel and civilians to refer to someone who works hard, efficiently and is productive.

Popeye the Sailor Man, a fictional character from comics, TV and film that debuted in 1929, was inspired by a sailor and became a pop culture icon. (Source: U.S. DoD)

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Founded in 1987, Exensor Technology is a world leading supplier of Networked Unattended Ground Sensor (UGS) Systems providing tailored sensor solutions to customers all over the world. From our Headquarters in Lund Sweden, our centre of expertise in Network Communications at Communications Research Lab in Kalmar Sweden and our Production site outside of Basingstoke UK, we design, develop and produce latest state of the art rugged UGS solutions at the highest quality to meet the most stringent demands of our customers. Our systems are in operation and used in a wide number of Military as well as Homeland Security applications worldwide. The modular nature of the system ensures any external sensor can be integrated, providing the user with a fully meshed ?silent? network capable of self-healing. Exensor Technology will continue to lead the field in UGS technology, provide our customers with excellent customer service and a bespoke package able to meet every need.

A CNIM Group Company

———————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————

Sponsored by Bertin Exensor

www.exensor.com
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20 Nov 25. UK: Usage of lasers against RAF points to incremental escalation of Russia’s grey-zone tactics. On 19 November, Defence Secretary John Healey stated that for the first time, the Russian vessel Yantar has directed lasers at pilots from the Royal Air Force (RAF) near UK territorial waters. The incident reportedly took place within the last two weeks. The Yantar is an intelligence gathering ship operated by Russia’s Main Directorate of Underwater Research (GUGI); it has likely been used for mapping European and UK underwater infrastructure. The incident took place as RAF P-8 Poseidon maritime patrol aircraft were tracking the ship off the coast of Scotland. The vessel’s use of lasers, likely to dazzle the pilots, points to an escalation in Russian grey-zone tactics against the UK. It also indicates Russia’s readiness to use provocative actions against UK and European military forces to protect reconnaissance operations and to test the boundaries of their defence. Healey called the move ‘deeply dangerous’. He also confirmed that he had changed the Royal Navy’s rules of engagement so that it can follow the Yantar more closely when in the UK’s ‘wider waters’; this is likely a reference to the UK’s exclusive economic zone (EEZ). This points to a further escalation of tensions between the UK and Russia. (Source: Sibylline)

 

20 Nov 25. The UK will publish its highly anticipated Autumn Budget this week. Concerns around defence spending persist, especially since the UK’s Defence Investment Plan is still yet to be published (it was expected around September-October). However, Secretary of State for Defence John Healey implied this week that his department could be protected, noting that there will be no return to “hollowed out and underfunded” forces. It follows a recent parliamentary report which criticised a lack of investment, over-reliance on the US, and said that the country’s defence industrial base was “not yet configured” for sustained conflict. (Source: Clarion)

 

19 Nov 25. Germany will not reach defence spending target of 3.5% in 2029. Germany will not hit its own 3.5% defence spending target in 2029, Defence Minister Boris Pistorius said on Wednesday, as the country ramps up spending in the wake of Russia’s war with Ukraine.
Germany’s defence spending will only be 3.05% of gross domestic product that year, Pistorius said in Munich. That is less than the 3.5% pledged by Finance Minister Lars Klingbeil earlier this year. A NATO summit in The Hague this year agreed that allies will reach a new spending target of 5% of GDP by 2035. The target is made up of 3.5% in the defence budget, and another 1.5% of defence-related spending. (Source: Reuters)

 

19 Nov 25. UK: Alert to Parliament underscores sustained Chinese espionage targeting public, private sectors. On 18 November, the MI5 security service issued an espionage alert to Parliament over sustained recruitment efforts by the Chinese Ministry of State Security (MSS), targeting MPs and parliamentary staff. The MI5 warned that MSS is using professional networking sites, recruitment agents and consultants to collect information and lay the groundwork for long-term relationships. The MI5 also named two specific LinkedIn profiles who have already connected with an extensive list of officials and staffers across multiple institutions. In addition to state-focused espionage efforts, China is attempting to recruit professionals across multiple industries in the UK and throughout Europe. Universities, research centres and innovation-driven companies are prime targets, especially those engaged in artificial intelligence (AI), hypersonic technology, biotechnology, semiconductors, robotics, aerospace and quantum engineering. However, consultancies are also being targeted. We assess that China will likely continue using intermediaries for recruitment, relying on both financial incentives (including paid trips and speaking opportunities) and social engineering tactics. (Source: Sibylline)

 

18 Nov 25. Joint Statement by UK and Italian Foreign and Defence Ministers.  Statement from UK and Italian Foreign and Defence Ministers Yvette Cooper, Antonio Tajani, John Healey and Guido Crosetto following a virtual meeting. Today, meeting virtually between the HMS Prince of Wales, at anchor in Naples, and the Italian Defence Ministry in Rome, we – Foreign Ministers Yvette Cooper and Antonio Tajani, and Defence Ministers John Healey and Guido Crosetto – reaffirmed the deep and growing partnership between Italy and the United Kingdom. We underscored our shared commitment to European security, cooperation within NATO, and support for Ukraine. The presence of the F-35-equipped UK Carrier Strike Group in Naples underlines deep British-Italian defence ties. Complex joint exercises during the deployment have further enhanced the interoperability of our Armed Forces. We discussed our united stance on global issues, from the Middle East to the Western Balkans, as well as the humanitarian crisis in Sudan, and underlined shared ambitions, including on the Global Combat Air Programme, European security and confronting the long-term threat posed by Russia, including by working together to tackle hybrid threats. We reaffirmed our unwavering commitment to strengthening Ukraine’s military, political, energy and economic resilience.
We reaffirmed our commitment to tackling illegal migration, recognising its links to conflict and instability in affected regions. Building on the UK’s recent contribution of up to £5.75m to the Rome Process, we agreed to cooperate to tackle the upstream drivers of migration and to use all available tools to tackle organised criminality. Together, we are building a future of closer strategic alignment, deeper defence collaboration, and unwavering support for international peace and stability. (Source: https://www.gov.uk/)

 

17 Nov 25. Boost to warfighting readiness as Britain’s aircraft carrier fully ’mission ready’ and committed to NATO for the first time. The Royal Navy’s powerful aircraft carrier HMS Prince of Wales and her advanced fighter jets are under NATO command, the Defence Secretary has announced.
* HMS Prince of Wales first aircraft carrier with most advanced 5th generation F-35 fighter jets committed to NATO.
* Defence Secretary and Foreign Secretary meet their Italian counterparts on the carrier, strengthening European security ties as part of NATO-first approach.
* Exercise Falcon Strike saw UK and Italian F-35s operating side-by-side in powerful demonstration of NATO’s strength.
The Royal Navy’s powerful aircraft carrier HMS Prince of Wales and her advanced fighter jets are under NATO command, the Defence Secretary has announced.
In a first for Europe, this significant milestone sees the Carrier Strike Group reach Full Operating Capability with advanced 5th generation jets, airborne surveillance, and vital support ships to keep the UK secure at home and strong abroad, and support European security.
The announcement comes as the Defence Secretary and Foreign Secretary host their Italian counterparts today (Monday 17 November) aboard HMS Prince of Wales, off the coast of Naples, during a visit to the historic maritime city.
In line with the UK’s NATO-first approach, as set out in the Strategic Defence Review, HMS Prince of Wales and her strike group will drastically increase NATO’s lethality and readiness. The move also means that for the first time, NATO will have a carrier strike group under its command with the most advanced 5th generation F-35 fighter jets.
Off the coast of Naples, John Healey MP and Yvette Cooper MP will host a UK-Italy ministerial meeting with Italian Defence Minister Guido Crosetto and Foreign Minister Antonio Tajani. Talks will centre on deepening defence and security cooperation, including joint efforts to counter hybrid warfare threats and bolster European security in the face of
We are in a new era of threat that demands a new era for defence. Our strength comes from hard power and strong alliances, so it is fitting to mark this moment alongside one of our closest NATO allies in Italy. Their F-35s have been operating from the carrier to demonstrate the deep partnership between our militaries.
Ships and aircraft from the UK’s Carrier Strike Group, the largest international carrier strike group the UK has ever assembled, will now work with allies for the major NATO exercise Neptune Strike.
This exercise in the Mediterranean will test NATO’s ability to strike targets at sea and includes carrier-based air missions and amphibious landings. It will also see anti-submarine drills, where personnel will practice for scenarios like ensuring freedom of navigation and securing maritime chokepoints.
Secretary of State for Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Affairs, Yvette Cooper MP said: “The partnerships we build abroad make us stronger at home. With Italy we are developing the fighter jets of the future, supporting thousands of British jobs, and delivering security for NATO in the Mediterranean and across Europe.
These joint exercises in the Bay of Naples are the clearest demonstration of how the UK is working with our Allies to keep our continent safe, deterring our adversaries and enhancing our ability to respond together to emerging threats.”
The Carrier Strike Group’s return to the Mediterranean follows five months of operations, engagements and defence diplomacy in the Indo-Pacific. As well as joint training and exercises with key regional partners, including Australia, Japan, and India, the deployment has also boosted UK economic growth supporting major industry and trade events across the region.
During this latest stage, the Carrier Strike Group is conducting a series of engagements with NATO allies including through port visits to Greece, Albania, Italy and Spain.
HMS Prince of Wales has the largest ever number of 5th generation F-35 jets from a single nation on a carrier. Over 4,000 UK military personnel, alongside Norway, NATO, and regional partners have also played a vital role during the deployment.
Throughout, the use of logistics drones for resupplying ships has been a major step forward in incorporating uncrewed systems on the UK’s aircraft carriers. There have been over 50 uncrewed air landings on HMS Prince of Wales alone. (Source: https://www.gov.uk/)

 

14 Nov 25. EU nations boost drone defense, pledge more US weapons for Ukraine. Top officials from Europe’s five largest military spenders met in Berlin today to reaffirm their commitment to Ukraine’s defense and announce a number of measures designed to strengthen Europe’s eastern flank. Among the planned moves is the deployment of counter-drone forces to Finland and Belgium and new military and financial support for Ukraine, defense leaders from Germany, the U.K., France, Poland, Italy and the EU announced today.
Germany committed to delivering at least ?€150m ($175 m) in U.S.-made military equipment to Kyiv under a program designed to make available to Ukraine weapons that only America produces. This is on top of German military aid for Ukraine approved by the country’s parliament this week. In 2026, Germany plans to spend €11.5bn ($13.4bn) to support the Eastern European nation €3bn more than in the current year. A key topic of discussion among the so-called Group of Five was the escalating hybrid warfare that Europe has observed in the form of sabotage, unidentified drone sightings, cyber warfare and airspace incursions, among other tactics. British Secretary of State for Defence John Healey said his country had joined Germany in sending military advisers to Belgium last weekend to assist in combating the sudden influx of unidentified drones over that country. The U.K. has also deployed anti-drone combat units to Finland on NATO’s northeastern flank, Healey revealed. Finland shares the longest border with Russia of any NATO country.
German Defense Minister Boris Pistorius said that his country, too, remains deployed in Belgium with anti-drone troops? of the German air force that had been moved there on just a few hours? notice. He made a connection between the ongoing discussions to use frozen Russian assets held in Belgium to support Ukraine and the emergence of the mysterious drone threat.
Drone defense is set to remain a key topic for the five leading European military nations. Pistorius said work is underway to present a signature-ready proposal for cost-effective drone defense at the ministers next meeting, scheduled to take place in Warsaw early in the new year.
Meanwhile, the officials shared intelligence according to which 93% of Russian strikes in Ukraine hit civilian targets. The estimate was mentioned on three separate occasions by the Italian and German defense ministers, as well as the EU’s High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, Kaja Kallas. “A full and immediate ceasefire remains the bloc’s goal,” Kallas said. But Russia does not want to negotiate at all,” she added.
Kallas raised the possibility of confiscating frozen Russian state assets in Western banks. “Ukraine will need funding next year,” she said, and using immobilized Russian assets is the most clear-cut way.”
Domestically, the EU is developing plans to improve roads, railways and bridges to facilitate military mobility, Kallas said, with Brussels coordinating closely with NATO to meet collective objectives. (Source: Defense News)
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Founded in 1987, Exensor Technology is a world leading supplier of Networked Unattended Ground Sensor (UGS) Systems providing tailored sensor solutions to customers all over the world. From our Headquarters in Lund Sweden, our centre of expertise in Network Communications at Communications Research Lab in Kalmar Sweden and our Production site outside of Basingstoke UK, we design, develop and produce latest state of the art rugged UGS solutions at the highest quality to meet the most stringent demands of our customers. Our systems are in operation and used in a wide number of Military as well as Homeland Security applications worldwide. The modular nature of the system ensures any external sensor can be integrated, providing the user with a fully meshed ‘silent’ network capable of self-healing. Exensor Technology will continue to lead the field in UGS technology, provide our customers with excellent customer service and a bespoke package able to meet every need.

A CNIM Group Company
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13 Nov 25. South African Defence budget increases by R1.8bn but remains stretched. The Department of Defence (DoD) has had its budget for 2025/26 increased by R1.8 bn but the adjusted allocation (R59bn) is barely sufficient for improving equipment serviceability or achieving flying hour and sea hour targets. The Medium Term Budget Policy Statement (MTBPS) was released by Finance Minister Enoch Godongwana to Parliament on Wednesday 12 November, revealing the R1.888bn increase: R657 m more for Force Employment, R1bn more for Landward Defence, R53m more for Military Health Support, and R54m more for Air Defence. The defence vote (Vote 23) noted an additional R439.078m allocated for expenses related to the implementation of the governmentwide early retirement programme to facilitate the exit of South African National Defence Force (SANDF) members. The allocation will cover expenses related to financial incentives and medical continuation. (Source: https://www.defenceweb.co.za/)

 

13 Nov 25. India-Pakistan: Risk of armed conflict will increase should New Delhi attribute blast to Islamabad. On 12 November, Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s cabinet announced that an investigation into the recent blast in Delhi union territory was underway. The police are continuing to search for individuals with connections to the ‘white collar’ terror cell in Faridabad (Haryana state). The authorities have also arrested several individuals in Assam state for ‘offensive’ social media posts following the blast in Delhi union territory. Given the possible existence of a wider network behind the explosion, we assess there is a realistic possibility of further such incidents – particularly in the National Capital Region (NCR) – in the coming weeks. However, the heightened security measures and ongoing raids will likely limit the scale of any such incident. Nonetheless, while India has not officially implicated any foreign power thus far, there is a realistic possibility that New Delhi will blame Pakistan, particularly given the alleged links of the arrested suspects to Jaish-e-Mohammed (JeM) and Ansar Ghazwat-ul-Hind (AGuH). Any such attribution would increase the risk of armed conflict between India and Pakistan. (Source: Sibylline)

 

11 Nov 25. Syria-US: Extended sanctions freeze will support investment, though long-term concerns will persist. On 10 November, the US Treasury extended its suspension of sanctions against Syria (imposed under the Caesar Act) for 180 days following a White House meeting between Syrian President Ahmed al-Sharaa and US President Donald Trump. Syria also entered a co-operation agreement (likely intelligence-based) in a bid to defeat Islamic State (IS), while the US reaffirmed its support for a Syria-Israel security agreement. The extension will likely continue to ease trade and investment restrictions, while also supporting gradual economic recovery, improving the delivery of humanitarian aid and ultimately moderating long-term socio-economic health risks in Syria. However, a full repeal by the US Congress remains unlikely in the short term (due to concerns over al-Sharaa’s jihadist past), especially in the run-up to the upcoming US midterm election cycle. We assess this will sustain investor uncertainty in the medium term. Meanwhile, co-operation against IS will likely involve a formalised, expanded intelligence partnership rather than a direct military pact, moderating Turkish security concerns and reducing regional conflict risks. A security agreement between Syria and Israel remains possible in the coming months, easing security risks in Syria’s south-western governorates. (Source: Sibylline)

 

11 Nov 25. Joint Statement from the Kingdom of Bahrain, United Kingdom and United States Defence Working Group. A Joint Statement from the Kingdom of Bahrain, United Kingdom and United States Defence Working Group (DWG). On November 1, 2025, representatives from the Kingdom of Bahrain and the United Kingdom, along with the United States, convened the Comprehensive Security Integration and Prosperity Agreement (C-SIPA) Defence Working Group (DWG) annual meeting hosted by the Kingdom of Bahrain. The meeting was attended by HH Shaikh Nasser bin Hamad Al Khalifa, National Security Advisor, Secretary General of the Supreme Defence Council of the Kingdom of Bahrain, together with Air Chief Marshal Sir Richard Knighton, Chief of the Defence Staff of the United Kingdom and Admiral Brad Cooper, Commander of the United States Central Command.

Joint Statement

DWG members welcomed the United Kingdom’s accession to C-SIPA and commended its wide-ranging contribution to advancing collective security efforts, noting that the UK’s expertise and longstanding commitment to regional and global stability significantly reinforce the strategic objectives of the Agreement. Participants reiterated the commitment of member states under Article (II) of the Agreement to treat any external aggression against the sovereignty, independence, and territorial integrity of any of the parties as a matter of grave concern to the other parties. They also expressed the importance of embracing a joint stance against hostile actors and malign activities that threaten regional security and international stability. The discussions underscored that C-SIPA’s robust framework and strategic coherence are set to strengthen a dependable deterrence posture and position it as a distinguished platform for advancing collective security. (Source: https://www.gov.uk/)

 

11 Nov 25. “Despite a large sovereign industry, there is a high level of dependence on foreign components and materials in Russian combat aircraft production. The industry is therefore vulnerable to disruption and delays because of the precise requirements of Sukhoi sub-systems.” This is according to Vulnerabilities in Sukhoi Production: Clipping Russia’s Wings, a new RUSI research report by Nikolay Staykov and Dr Jack Watling, which analyses Russia’s combat aircraft production ecosystem and the fragility of the Sukhoi supply chain, and considers the implications for global security and defence. The report says that Russia’s combat aircraft sector is struggling to maintain output and quality under sanctions, even as it remains a key pillar of Moscow’s war effort in Ukraine. The research outlines how dependencies on foreign machine tools, semiconductors and alloys mean manufacturing is vulnerable to targeted sanctions and attritional strikes. It says Sukhoi’s production of Su-30, Su-34, Su-35 and Su-57 aircraft has already “seen a range of disruptions largely arising from delays in the delivery of sub-systems from its complex supply chain.” The report concludes that NATO members have a strategic opportunity to degrade Russia’s aerospace capacity through strengthening sanctions implementation. It also calls for Western industry to improve its offerings in global combat aircraft export markets that then emerge, to better compete with China.

Key Findings

• Russia’s combat aviation remains a key threat. The report says: “Russian combat aircraft, while less capable than NATO or Chinese equivalents, fulfil distinct roles for the Russian military that present challenges to Russia’s adversaries, such that the size and capability of the VKS [Russian Aerospace Forces] should be a matter of concern.”
• High dependence on imported systems and components. “Within the second- and third-tier supply chains of Sukhoi production are a wide range of dependencies on foreign imports of materials, machine tooling and specialised equipment.”
• Limited success in import substitution. “Vulnerabilities in the Russian aerospace industry are likely to persist, as Russia has struggled and, in some cases, failed to achieve import substitution. In some areas dependence on foreign-made systems is increasing.”
• Declining export competitiveness and the risk of brain drain. “Russia’s competitiveness on the international market could fade over time and this trend could be accelerated if a brain drain can be encouraged from Russian industry, while disruption to production could undermine export customers’ faith in the reliability of Russian products, starving OAC [United Aircraft Corporation] of orders.”

Key Recommendations

• Tighten sanctions across the supply chain. “Realising this opportunity would require closing the gaps in sanctions to cover second- and third-tier suppliers. Enforcement of sanctions, moreover, must be properly enforced such that Russia cannot reliably obtain key equipment, spare parts and materials from Europe.”
• Link sanctions to Ukraine’s deep-strike campaign. “As Ukraine’s growing long-range strike campaign expands, it is also likely to target those production facilities the output of which threatens Ukraine. When such strikes occur … it will present opportunities for Ukraine’s international partners to disrupt Russia’s ability to acquire replacement machine tools.”
• Encourage the emigration of skilled Russian engineers. “It is desirable to build pathways for Russian engineers to emigrate. Although many will be approached by Russia’s Special Services and should therefore not be recruited in the defence sector, they represent skilled labour in the civilian sector.”
• Invest in Western aerospace export offerings to compete better with China. “It is necessary for NATO members to consider their offer to compete with Russia and more importantly China in those countries that must soon look to replace ageing combat air fleets. At present, NATO countries often fail on the grounds of price and, in some cases, politics.”

Conclusion

The report concludes that Russia’s aerospace industry is under mounting pressure from sanctions, supply disruption and workforce decline, yet continues to underpin Moscow’s battlefield operations and global influence. The research says that NATO states and partners should intensify coordinated economic, military and industrial pressure to weaken Russia’s long-term combat aviation capacity. It says that by addressing Western dependencies on Russia – such as the refining of titanium – and targeting the opaque networks supplying Russian avionics, policymakers can accelerate the degradation of Russian airpower. For Western defence industries, the research says that any vacuum left by a decline in Russian combat aircraft exports should not be ceded to Beijing. The report recommends that European aerospace companies “examine how they can develop an offer to compete with China to prevail in the event that Russia is displaced from key markets”.

Nikolay Staykov is a journalist, editor and open-source intelligence specialist focusing on anti-corruption, financial investigations and military supply chains. He co-founded Bulgaria’s Anti-Corruption Fund (ACF) and was recognised by the US Department of State as a Global Anti-Corruption Champion in 2021. Dr Jack Watling is Senior Research Fellow for Land Warfare at the Royal United Services Institute (RUSI). This report draws on open-source intelligence, company filings, and trade data, complemented by interviews with industry personnel and cross-referenced procurement records. For more information and media inquiries please email

 

10 Nov 25. Thailand-Cambodia: Ceasefire will likely hold despite landmine explosion, peace deal suspension. Earlier on 10 November, Thailand suspended the implementation of a joint agreement signed with Cambodia under the supervision of US President Donald Trump in the capital Kuala Lumpur (Malaysia) on 26 October. This comes after a landmine injured four Thai soldiers along the border with Cambodia in Kantharalak (Sisaket province) at around 0930hrs (local time). Thailand had previously accused Cambodia of planting new landmines, while the latter have maintained that these are remnants from previous conflicts. The Thai authorities stated that the preliminary findings suggest the landmines were newly planted; the incident remains under investigation at the time of writing. Although Cambodia has pledged its ‘unwavering commitment’ to peace, Thailand will halt the release of 18 detained Cambodian soldiers, which was due on 21 November. While this incident has increased the risk of renewed hostilities, we assess that the ceasefire (which both countries agreed to in July) is likely to hold in the short term, not least due to the threat of US tariffs. However, mutual mistrust and the continued presence of heavy weaponry along the border (as the withdrawal process began last week) will highly likely delay the reopening of the border. (Source: Sibylline)

 

10 Nov 25. Ethiopia: Rising tensions increase risk of clashes between federal and Tigray forces in coming weeks. On 7 November, the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF) leader Debretsion Gebremichael claimed that the federal Ethiopian forces had conducted a drone strike on Tigray forces near Milka military camp (Tigray region) along the Afar regional border. No casualty figures have been released and the claim has not been verified, but Gebremichael has stated the incident breaches the 2022 Pretoria peace agreement. The development comes after the Afar government claimed that Tigray forces had temporarily captured six villages in Afar’s Magale district on 5 November. The Tigray Interim Authority (TIA) has denied the allegation, but it is likely that cross-border clashes did take place between TPLF forces and the Tigray Peace Forces (TPF). The TPF are associated with the ousted TPLF member and interim Tigray president Getachew Reda and are based along the Afar border (see Sibylline Situation Update Brief – 1 September 2025). With the TIA closely aligned with the TPLF, rising tensions will increase the likelihood that the federal forces will move to exert greater control over Tigray region in the coming weeks. Attempts to deploy large forces to Tigray or replace the TIA leadership will likely trigger clashes between the federal and Tigray forces, increasing exposure to crossfire in the regional capital Mekele and other urban centres in eastern and southern Tigray.  (Source: Sibylline)

 

07 Nov 25. Pakistan-Afghanistan: Border fire exchange underscores risk of renewed hostilities. On 6 November, Pakistan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs stated that ‘firing was initiated from the Afghan side, to which our security forces responded immediately in a measured and responsible manner’. Afghan Taliban spokesperson Zabihullah Mujahid stated that ‘unfortunately, this afternoon Pakistani forces once again opened fire on Spin Boldak, causing concern among the local population’. The statements come as the two sides exchanged fire along the border between Chaman (Balochistan province, Pakistan) and Spin Boldak (Kandahar province, Afghanistan). This incident occurred while representatives from Afghanistan and Pakistan were engaged in a third round of talks in Istanbul (Turkey), aimed at finalising a truce following deadly clashes last month. Negotiations reached an impasse last week after each side accused the other of being unwilling to co-operate on finalising ceasefire details. We assess that the risk of ceasefire violations is highly likely to persist despite ongoing talks, with a realistic possibility of sporadic border clashes in the coming days. This will sustain the risk of renewed hostilities and continue to restrict cross-border travel and trade. Additionally, given the elevated mistrust and recent incendiary rhetoric from both sides, long-term peace along the border is unlikely in the near term. (Source: Sibylline)

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Founded in 1987, Exensor Technology is a world leading supplier of Networked Unattended Ground Sensor (UGS) Systems providing tailored sensor solutions to customers all over the world. From our Headquarters in Lund Sweden, our centre of expertise in Network Communications at Communications Research Lab in Kalmar Sweden and our Production site outside of Basingstoke UK, we design, develop and produce latest state of the art rugged UGS solutions at the highest quality to meet the most stringent demands of our customers. Our systems are in operation and used in a wide number of Military as well as Homeland Security applications worldwide. The modular nature of the system ensures any external sensor can be integrated, providing the user with a fully meshed “silent” network capable of self-healing. Exensor Technology will continue to lead the field in UGS technology, provide our customers with excellent customer service and a bespoke package able to meet every need.

A CNIM Group Company

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Sponsored by Bertin Exensor

 

www.exensor.com

 

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Military And Security Developments

Nov 14.

• Israel-Palestinian Territories: Rising settler violence will drive security risks, diplomatic response. On 13 November, dozens of Israeli settlers set fire to a mosque near Deir Istiya (Salfit governorate) in the West Bank. The fire was contained, causing limited damage and no injuries. The attack comes days after a large-scale arson attack on industrial and agricultural property near Beit Lid (Tulkarm governorate) on 11 November, amid a broader surge in settler violence during the ongoing olive harvest season (from October to approximately early December). We assess that the increased rate of attacks on Palestinian agricultural, industrial and residential property is likely to continue in the coming weeks, with many incidents likely going unpunished by the security forces. Consequently, a reciprocal escalation is possible, increasing physical security risks for business and NGO personnel and assets situated in or near Palestinian communities and Israeli settlements. The rising settler violence will possibly prompt Western governments to maintain or expand sanctions on Israeli entities operating in the West Bank in the coming weeks, elevating compliance and reputational risks for companies and individuals with direct or indirect exposure to West Bank supply chains and markets (see Sibylline Middle East Crisis Update – 12 November 2025).

Lebanon-Saudi Arabia: Restoration of trade ties will partially ease socio-economic pressure. On 13 November, media reported that unnamed Saudi officials had stated Saudi Arabia will imminently strengthen commercial ties with Lebanon, due to the Lebanese authorities having demonstrated efficacy in curbing drug smuggling to Saudi Arabia. The Saudi officials added that a delegation will soon visit Lebanon to discuss resolving the barriers hindering Lebanese exports. Since 2021, Saudi Arabia has banned all imports from Lebanon, citing the smuggling of captagon. However, we assess that the main reason for the planned easing of commercial ties is primarily political, after the Lebanese government’s approval in September of an unprecedented plan to disarm Lebanese Hizballah (LH) starting south of the Litani River. Despite the plan’s slow implementation and the political barriers hindering full LH disarmament, Riyadh is likely to offer Beirut several financial packages and trade deals contingent upon progress in nationwide disarmament throughout 2026. We assess that the resumption of trade with Lebanon is highly likely to ease socio-economic pressure on Beirut, driven by a likely increase in Lebanese agricultural and fresh produce exports, which are in high demand in the Saudi market.

Nov 13.

KEY DEVELOPMENTS

IRAN

• Iran is unlikely to meet nuclear commitments despite diplomatic signals, sustaining the risk of further sanctions and the prospect of military confrontation in the coming months.
• An alleged Iranian plot to assassinate the Israeli ambassador to Mexico underscores the risk of Iran-Israel tensions spilling over into the international community, elevating security and compliance risks for Israeli-affiliated entities on a global scale.

ISRAEL

• Growing radicalisation among the Arab-Israeli community and the possible spillover of terrorism from the West Bank (Palestinian Territories) will elevate the risk of attacks across Israel.

PALESTINIAN TERRITORIES

• GAZA STRIP: The return of a deceased Israeli soldier’s body by Hamas without the reciprocal release of its militants trapped in tunnels under Rafah will elevate tensions and the risk of a ceasefire collapse.
• GAZA STRIP: The reopening of the Zikim border crossing on 12 November to facilitate the passage of aid deliveries is unlikely to alleviate humanitarian risks in Gaza significantly.
• WEST BANK: Escalating Israeli settler violence underscores the elevated ethno-religious tensions across the West Bank, as well as the increased security and compliance risks facing proximate entities.
• PALESTINIAN TERRITORIES: Palestinian Authority (PA) President Mahmoud Abbas’ dismissal of the PA’s finance minister highlights the ongoing governance risks in the West Bank and the possibility of financial restrictions being imposed against the PA.

IRAN

• Iran is unlikely to meet nuclear commitments despite diplomatic signals, sustaining the risk of further sanctions and the prospect of military confrontation in the coming months. On 11 November, Iranian Deputy Foreign Minister Saeed Khatibzadeh stated that his country seeks a peaceful nuclear agreement with the US that does not compromise its national security. The comments came a day after Iranian state media announced that International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspectors had visited the country the previous week. The announcement likely aimed to underscore Iran’s commitment to its obligations under the NPT (Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons). The timing of the statement and inspections likely reflects Iranian efforts to ease diplomatic tensions with Israel and the West, especially as domestic socio-economic pressures threaten regime stability (they also come as Iran looks to rebuild its military capacity following the Iran-Israel war in June). However, we assess that such an agreement remains highly unlikely in the coming weeks; Iranian references to its ‘national security’ likely indicate that Tehran remains unwilling to concede to US demands for Iran to halt its domestic uranium enrichment activity. Stasis on this issue will drive the risk of a diplomatic breakdown in the coming months, particularly if the IAEA experiences no tangible improvement in Iranian co-operation (such as inspectors being granted access to declared and suspected enrichment sites and the resumption of real-time surveillance). This would most likely result in further sanctions being imposed on Iran’s energy, shipping and banking sectors, but would also raise the possibility of targeted strikes against Iranian nuclear facilities. The possibility of such strikes is consistent with recent reports quoting an Israeli official as stating that Israel aims to topple the Iranian regime by the end of the current US administration’s term in 2029.
• An alleged Iranian plot to assassinate the Israeli ambassador to Mexico underscores the risk of Iran-Israel tensions spilling over into the international community, elevating security and compliance risks for Israeli-affiliated entities on a global scale. On 7 November, US officials disclosed information about an Iranian plot to assassinate Israel’s ambassador to Mexico, Einat Kranz-Neiger. The plot was reportedly ‘active’ during the first half of 2025. The operation was allegedly orchestrated by Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and involved recruiting operatives through Iran’s embassy in Venezuela. US officials stated that the plot had been contained and that there is currently no threat. Tehran has denied the accusations, calling them an attempt to undermine Iran’s relations with friendly states. Mexico’s foreign ministry claimed that it had received no information regarding the alleged plot despite allegations by Israeli officials that the Mexican security services had neutralised the network. Whether it is substantiated or not, media coverage of the alleged plot highlights the global spillover risks stemming from Iran-Israel tensions, as well as the persistent risk of grey-zone activity being waged between the two states. Israeli and Israeli-affiliated assets and individuals remain at an elevated risk of being affected by such operations, globally. Further such incidents will also increase the likelihood of retaliatory grey-zone incursions against Iranian targets abroad, including through cyber attacks. Continued tit-for-tat escalation will heighten security risks for affiliated personnel, including private companies’ staff, NGO workers and diplomats. There is a low-level possibility that sustained escalation in Iran’s asymmetric strategy will prompt Israeli retaliation against Iranian proxy networks in Iraq, Lebanon and Syria, increasing the risk of miscalculation and threatening conflict escalation. Intensified Iranian covert activity will possibly drive Israel’s Western allies to target the IRGC and associated entities with broader sanctions, in turn elevating regulatory and compliance risks for exposed businesses.

ISRAEL

• Growing radicalisation among the Arab-Israeli community and the possible spillover of terrorism from the West Bank (Palestinian Territories) will elevate the risk of attacks across Israel. On 12 November, the State Attorney’s Office filed an indictment against two brothers (aged 18 and 21) from the Arab-Israeli town of Tira (Central district, Israel) for producing IEDs. According to the indictment, the two brothers produced ten pipe bombs (the security forces also found an additional eight bombs in a barn near their home during the arrest operation). Additionally, on 12 November, the State Attorney’s Office filed a separate indictment against an 18-year-old man from the Arab-Israeli town of Tayibe (Central) for planning an Islamic State (IS)-inspired attack against Jewish people. The suspect downloaded guides on how to produce weapons, including IEDs; the security forces also found four pistols and ammunition in the suspect’s home. The indictments highlight growing radicalisation among the Arab-Israeli community, particularly its younger demographics. They will compound existing terror risks driven by the ongoing threat of cross-border attacks and militant operations spilling from the West Bank into Israel. Currently, the Israeli security agencies broadly remain able to foil developing plots, mitigating against the risk of complex or sophisticated attacks. However, growing radicalisation threatens to stretch Israel’s security resources, increasing the risk of terror attacks in Israeli cities in the coming months – particularly in the event of a ceasefire collapse in the Gaza Strip (Palestinian Territories).

PALESTINIAN TERRITORIES 

• GAZA STRIP: The return of a deceased Israeli soldier’s body by Hamas without the reciprocal release of its militants trapped in tunnels under Rafah will elevate tensions and the risk of a ceasefire collapse. On 9 November, Hamas returned the body of Lieutenant Hadar Goldin (who was killed in 2014) to Israel. This comes amid efforts by Hamas to secure safe passage for approximately 200 of its operatives trapped in tunnels under the Israeli-controlled ‘yellow zone’ in Rafah. On 4 November, the Israel Defense Forces’ (IDF’s) Chief of General Staff, Eyal Zamir, stated that he was willing to consider granting the operatives’ safe passage in return for Goldin’s body. However, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu later claimed that he gave no such promise. At the time of writing, the Hamas operatives remain trapped in the tunnels. It is likely that Israel will seek to continue using these operatives as a bargaining chip, while also demanding their surrender and arrest. However, it is unlikely that the operatives will surrender, increasing the risk of further clashes between IDF personnel and Hamas operatives trying to escape the tunnels (see Sibylline Middle East Crisis Update – 5 November 2025). Such clashes and possible allegations that Israel reneged on previous promises to grant safe passage will elevate the risk of an (at least temporary) ceasefire breakdown in the coming weeks.
• GAZA STRIP: The reopening of the Zikim border crossing on 12 November to facilitate the passage of aid deliveries is unlikely to alleviate humanitarian risks in Gaza significantly. Aid deliveries will undergo security checks by the Land Crossing Authority of the Israeli defence ministry before they cross into Gaza; this is likely to cause bottlenecks and delays. Furthermore, Israel retains limits on certain items being delivered into the strip, such as syringes. Together with the persistent looting of aid convoys by militants, NGOs and other aid organisations operating within Gaza will likely continue to suffer from severe shortages of key goods. This will undermine their capacity to meet heightened demands for their services, driving threats to local staff and exacerbating public health risks across the strip in the coming months.
• WEST BANK: Escalating Israeli settler violence underscores the elevated ethno-religious tensions across the West Bank, as well as the increased security and compliance risks facing proximate entities. On 11 November, dozens of Israeli settlers launched a large-scale arson attack on Palestinians in Beit Lid (Tulkarm governorate) and Deir Sharaf (Nablus governorate). The rioters vandalised and set fire to Palestinian properties, including the al-Junaidi milk factory and agricultural and residential property belonging to the Bedouin community. The settlers also attacked soldiers and an IDF military vehicle. While the IDF detained six suspects, four others escaped before the Israeli police arrived. Israeli President Isaac Herzog condemned the violence, attributing it to a handful of ‘dangerous’ individuals. The arrests represent an uncommon instance of the Israeli authorities taking enforcement action in response to settler-related violence in the West Bank (which has increased in frequency in recent weeks). These recent surges in ethno-religious violence in the West Bank are likely driven by rising radicalisation – particularly among younger demographics – and escalating cyclical hostilities. In the coming days, further unrest is likely across Nablus and Tulkarm, sustaining elevated physical security risks for nearby personnel and assets, as well as incidental threats in the vicinity of Muslim and Jewish religious sites. Escalating global tensions over Israel’s settlement policy and rising levels of settler violence are likely to prompt Western governments to maintain or expand sanctions against Israeli entities operating in the West Bank, including businesses involved in the construction and utilities sectors (and individuals linked to right-wing organisations). Such measures are liable to heighten compliance and reputational risks for companies and individuals with direct and indirect exposure to West Bank supply chains and markets.
• PALESTINIAN TERRITORIES: Palestinian Authority (PA) President Mahmoud Abbas’ dismissal of the PA’s finance minister highlights the ongoing governance risks in the West Bank and the possibility of financial restrictions being imposed against the PA. On 10 November, Abbas dismissed PA Finance Minister Omar al-Bitar, reportedly for authorising welfare payments to Palestinians in Israeli prisons through the Palestinian Martyrs Fund (a programme often referred to as ‘pay-for-slay’). Abbas had previously issued a decree on 10 February cancelling the programme in an effort to improve diplomatic relations with the US amid threats of reduced international financial support (see Sibylline Middle East Crisis Update – 13 February 2025). The decision follows claims by Israeli Foreign Minister Gideon Sa’ar on 27 October that Palestinian prisoners, including those released under the Gaza ceasefire deal, continue to receive payments under the outdated policy. The move likely aims to demonstrate the PA’s apparent determination to comply with international demands and to strengthen its credibility as a political representative for both Gaza and the West Bank during Palestinian reconstruction efforts. However, it also underscores ongoing supervision and governance risks within the West Bank, including risks related to corruption and weak regulatory oversight. Furthermore, it exposes the PA to renewed accusations of terror financing, which will possibly prompt Israel to withhold financial transfers to the PA; we assess that any such move would exacerbate socio-economic health and security risks across the West Bank in the short term.

RED SEA

• The Iranian-backed Houthis’ letter to Hamas has confirmed that a halt in military operations is due to the Israel-Hamas ceasefire; it also underscores that a ceasefire collapse would act as a key trigger for a resumption in attacks. On 11 November, Hamas published a letter from the Iranian-backed Houthis in which the latter indicate that they are ready to resume military activities against Israel if it ‘renews its aggression against Gaza’. The letter confirms our previous assessment that the Houthis paused their attacks against Israel and Red Sea shipping in response to the Israel-Hamas ceasefire (see Sibylline Situation Update Brief – 29 October 2025). Furthermore, the letter also confirms the possible resumption of Houthi attacks in retaliation for Israeli military operations in Gaza. As such, we continue to assess that the risk of sporadic Houthi attacks against Israel and/or Israeli-affiliated vessels in the Red Sea will increase following Israeli strikes against Gaza. Furthermore, a full resumption of the Houthis’ campaign against Israel is highly likely in the event of a complete ceasefire collapse. Even so, we continue to assess that even if the Houthis were to relaunch such a campaign, it would be unlikely to increase security risks across Israel significantly (though it would drive moderate business disruption risks due to staff having to observe warning sirens/evacuation orders.

REGIONAL AND GLOBAL DEVELOPMENTS

• Israel-Lebanon: The uptick in Israeli strikes on Lebanese Hizballah (LH)’s assets in southern Lebanon will likely continue into 2026. On 6 November, the IDF conducted a series of major strikes against LH facilities in several locations across southern Lebanon, including the towns of Ayta al-Jabal and Taybeh (both Nabatieh governorate), as well as Tayr Debba (South governorate – see Sibylline Alert – 6 November 2025). The IDF stated that it primarily targeted assets belonging to LH’s elite Radwan Force. The strikes follow a prolonged impasse in the Lebanese armed forces’ efforts to disarm LH, as the Lebanese government remains relatively reluctant to risk a military confrontation with LH. As such, it is likely that the escalation in the frequency of Israeli airstrikes on LH personnel in southern Lebanon since mid-October is designed to pressure the Lebanese authorities into pursuing LH’s disarmament more proactively. We assess that the Lebanese government is unlikely to secure LH’s disarmament in the coming months. As such, strikes are likely to increase in scope and frequency throughout the remainder of 2025 and into early 2026; limited ground operations along the Israel-Lebanon border are also possible. While we assess that LH is unlikely to respond to the IDF strikes in the coming weeks, a ceasefire collapse is possible in the event of major IDF strikes against LH strongholds in Beirut (Lebanon), as well as central areas north of the Litani River, such as Sidon (South governorate), Baalbek-Hermel and/or Beqaa governorates. Large-scale Israeli ground incursions into southern Lebanon and/or from Syria’s Mount Hermon area (Quneitra governorate, Syria) would also likely prompt renewed armed conflict. However, we assess that this scenario is currently unlikely. Furthermore, while large-scale IDF strikes on LH assets in Beirut are unlikely in the coming weeks, with the IDF primarily targeting LH operatives, assets, weapons depots and tunnels in southern Lebanon, a limited strike against the Lebanese capital remains possible. Any such pinpoint strike is highly likely to be conducted against a single target in the Dahieh suburb, and will likely be preceded by an evacuation warning to minimise collateral damage.
• Iraq: Absence of definitive majority win will increase political instability during next two months. On 12 November, Iraq’s Independent High Electoral Commission announced that the Reconstruction and Development Coalition (RDC), led by the incumbent Prime Minister Mohammed Shia al-Sudani, came first in Iraq’s parliamentary elections. However, the RDC did not achieve a majority that would allow it to form a government on its own. As such, the RDC will need to forge alliances with several Sunni, Shia and Kurdish parties to form an administration, increasing policy risks and political instability during at least the next two months (see Sibylline Situation Update Brief – 4 November 2025). Any government led by al-Sudani or other RDC figures will likely seek to balance between the US and Iran’s interests in Iraq throughout 2026. However, the RDC includes figures that President Donald Trump’s administration is unlikely to approve of, such as the head of the Iran-backed Popular Mobilisation Forces (PMF), who is sanctioned by the US. This will sustain the risks of US sanctions against the new government or public companies tied to Iran’s proxies in 2026, particularly in the logistics, finance and transport sectors.
• Iran: Official misconduct investigation into self-immolation will elevate anti-government sentiment. On 12 November, the mayor of Ahvaz (Khuzestan province) resigned and several officials were dismissed following the death of a man who set himself on fire the previous week in protest against the local authorities closing his family’s food stand. Iran’s interior ministry has launched an investigation into the conduct of the officials, amid public outcry at allegations that some encouraged his actions. The backlash underscores the elevated levels of anti-government sentiment at government corruption and misconduct, compounded by the cost-of-living crisis and the lingering impact of the Iran-Israel conflict earlier this year. Deteriorating socio-economic health risks will likely compound this trend and further undermine the regime’s legitimacy in the coming weeks. Worsening water shortages will deepen food insecurity and increase the spread of infectious diseases (see Sibylline Situation Update Brief – 8 August 2025), possibly triggering sporadic anti-government protests. The authorities will almost certainly respond to unrest with force, raising security risks for personnel in proximity to large crowds in towns and cities, increasing the likelihood of additional Western sanctions.

Nov 11.

* Egypt: Pro-government victory is highly likely to facilitate removal of presidential term limits. On 10-11 November, Egypt will hold the first phase of its parliamentary elections across 14 governorates. The second phase will take place across the remaining 13 governorates on 21-22 November; the final results are due by mid-December. The first day of voting recorded a significantly low turnout, which we assess will almost certainly continue through the second day. Media outlets have also reported instances of paid and coerced voting nationwide, underscoring the persistent corruption and the risk of harassment facing local staff. Given the authorities’ tight control of the election process and the lack of free speech, we assess that pro-government parties will almost certainly win at least 95% of the seats, including the newly formed National Front (NF). As such, the new parliament is highly likely to propose constitutional amendments by mid-2026, which will abolish the term limits for the presidency. This will allow the incumbent president, Abdelfattah al-Sisi, to run in the 2030 elections. Nevertheless, major reactionary anti-government protests and domestic unrest remain unlikely.

*Syria-US: Extended sanctions freeze will support investment, though long-term concerns will persist. On 10 November, the US Treasury extended its suspension of sanctions against Syria (imposed under the Caesar Act) for 180 days following a White House meeting between Syrian President Ahmed al-Sharaa and US President Donald Trump. Syria also entered a co-operation agreement (likely intelligence-based) in a bid to defeat Islamic State (IS), while the US reaffirmed its support for a Syria-Israel security agreement. The extension will likely continue to ease trade and investment restrictions, while also supporting gradual economic recovery, improving the delivery of humanitarian aid and ultimately moderating long-term socio-economic health risks in Syria. However, a full repeal by the US Congress remains unlikely in the short term (due to concerns over al-Sharaa’s jihadist past), especially in the run-up to the upcoming US midterm election cycle. We assess this will sustain investor uncertainty in the medium term. Meanwhile, co-operation against IS will likely involve a formalised, expanded intelligence partnership rather than a direct military pact, moderating Turkish security concerns and reducing regional conflict risks. A security agreement between Syria and Israel remains possible in the coming months, easing security risks in Syria’s south-western governorates.

Nov 10.

• Iraq: Parliamentary elections will elevate widespread security risks, business, transport disruption. On 11 November, Iraq will hold parliamentary elections. The security forces started voting earlier on 10 November to facilitate deployment on polling day, highlighting the increased security risks surrounding the vote. The elections come amid widespread voter apathy in a sectarian-dominated political system, where incumbent Prime Minister Mohammed Shia’ al-Sudani’s coalition will likely emerge as the frontrunner (see Sibylline Situation Update Brief – 4 November 2025). Over the next 24 to 48 hours, we assess that sporadic incidents of political violence and ethno-religious attacks will possibly occur near polling stations and government buildings in the capital Baghdad and Basra, Dhi Qar and Maysan governorates; intercommunal clashes will possibly break out in Diyala, Kirkuk, Nineveh and Saladin governorates. Crossfire and misidentification during clashes, as well as direct exposure during attacks, will elevate security risks for nearby personnel. The heightened security measures will likely persist through 11 November and possibly in subsequent days; the restrictions on heavy truck and motorcycle movements near polling stations will disrupt local transport and supply chains. Furthermore, election day will be a national holiday, with most public services remaining closed, driving business disruptions for locally engaged firms.
• Tunisia: Hunger strikes underscore persistent political unrest, sustaining risk of further protests. On 8 November, several prominent Tunisian opposition figures announced that they would join a collective hunger strike in solidarity with jailed politician Jawhar Ben Mbarek, whose hunger strike protesting his detention has reached its ninth day. Issam Chebbi, the imprisoned leader of the centrist Al-Joumhouri party, is among the politicians joining the strike; he was convicted in the same mass trial as Ben Mbarek earlier this year. The developments underscore the significant political tensions in Tunisia, with tens of other imprisoned political dissidents in the country possibly joining the strike in the coming weeks. Nevertheless, we assess that the Tunisian president is unlikely to reduce the frequency and scope of his crackdown on dissidents, triggering further anti-government protests in the capital Tunis throughout the remainder of 2025. The deteriorating economic conditions will likely drive participation in protest action by groups such as public sector workers and unions. This will increase turnout, raising the risk of exposure to clashes with the police and tear gas, while increasing disruption to public services and logistics networks. (Source: Sibylline)

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Military And Security Developments

Nov 14.

• Ukraine: Anti-corruption efforts will remain crucial to secure critical foreign funding. On 13 November, German Chancellor Friedrich Merz urged Ukraine to intensify its anti-corruption efforts. His comments come as Ukraine faces a major energy sector corruption scandal involving prominent current and former government officials. Earlier on 14 November, Politico reported that the graft case has raised concerns among EU partners regarding the potential misuse of their financial assistance, prompting demands for greater transparency in the management of foreign funds. The scandal comes at a critical financial moment for Ukraine, as it is in the process of approving its state budget and is facing funding gaps that will deepen its reliance on external support. Meanwhile, EU member states are expected to decide in December on whether to issue a loan for Ukraine backed by frozen Russian assets. A failure by the EU to reach an agreement would be highly detrimental to Ukraine’s ability to finance its war effort in 2026. We assess that Ukraine’s sustained anti-corruption efforts will be essential for reassuring international partners and securing the critical funds.
• Russia: Foreign companies face ongoing sanctions compliance pressure, asset seizure risks. According to a Reuters article on 13 November, the CEO of an Italian bank has warned of the risk that its Russian subsidiary could be nationalised by the Russian state. He also highlighted the challenges of navigating Russia’s complex international sanctions regime; he ruled out selling the bank’s Russian operations due to the punitive measures imposed on foreign entities seeking to exit the country. Since the onset of the Russo-Ukrainian war, the Kremlin has imposed significant barriers to leaving the Russian market. These include restrictions on buy-back options and requirements to sell assets at steeply discounted prices relative to market value. Meanwhile, since the start of the war, Moscow has placed several foreign-owned assets under state management, resulting in a de facto asset seizure. Notable examples include the Russian subsidiaries of Carlsberg Group and Danone, both of which were in the process of exiting the Russian market. Ultimately, we assess that foreign companies that continue to operate subsidiaries in Russia will face sustained pressures, including rigorous sanctions compliance obligations and the ongoing risk of asset seizure.

Nov 11.

KEY DEVELOPMENTS  

• POKROVSK: The intensity of Russian attacks in and around Pokrovsk (Donetsk oblast) has reduced in recent days, as Russia is likely waiting for additional reinforcements; however, attacks will likely increase
• MOBILISATION: Russian President Vladimir Putin has signed multiple laws which we assess are part of a phased process to normalise the mobilisation of active reservists, first for ‘domestic’ infrastructure protection and later likely for combat
• STRIKES: Russia has reportedly deployed long-range jet-powered glide bombs, which are capable of reaching areas well behind the frontline; this will increase the vulnerability of numerous cities across the south and east of the country
• FORECAST: Over the past week, Ukraine’s energy security has continued to deteriorate as a direct result of Russia’s co-ordinated strike campaign against critical infrastructure, with widespread blackouts increasing across the country
• POKROVSK: The frequency and intensity of Russian attacks in and around Pokrovsk (Donetsk oblast) has reduced in recent days, as Russia is likely waiting for additional reinforcements; however, attacks will likely increase again in the coming days. Ukraine’s 7th Rapid Reaction Corps (which is fighting in the area) has reported that prior to this reduction in tempo, Russian forces launched a platoon-sized mechanised assault near Myrnohrad (located to the east of Pokrovsk; Donestk oblast) on 5 November, which resulted in Ukrainian forces destroying three vehicles. While we cannot confirm this, mechanised assaults around Pokrovsk have remained relatively infrequent and have achieved little. It remains unclear whether Russian forces are experimenting with mechanised tactics in a bid to make more rapid advances, in tandem with their infantry and drone infiltration tactics which currently dominate the fighting.
• POKROVSK: Nevertheless, Russian forces have continued to make steady advances at the flanks, both within Pokrovsk and increasingly inside Myrnohrad. Earlier on 11 November, Ukraine’s 7th Rapid Reaction Corps reported that 300 Russian troops have now infiltrated Pokrovsk itself; these troops have been using fog and low visibility in recent days to increase their footprint in the area, which we assess is likely in preparation for the further intensifications of assaults in the coming days. Geolocated footage published throughout the last week has confirmed a growing Russian presence along the E-50 highway, which cuts through Pokrovsk. Meanwhile, footage has also confirmed that Russian forces have now likely penetrated the outskirts of northern Myrnohrad in at least two places, as well as making further progress in the city’s southern district. On 10 November, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky assessed that Russia has committed some 170,000 personnel to the Pokrovsk offensive. We assess that reinforcements will likely allow Russia to continue high-intensity operations in the coming weeks.
• POKROVSK: Amid the likely temporary slowdown of Russian assaults, Ukrainian forces have continued to counter-attack, stabilising sections of the frontline. On 10 November, prominent Ukrainian military analyst Kostyantyn Mashovets claimed that Ukrainian forces have cleared Rodynske (Donetsk oblast), a frontline town located due north of Pokrovsk. While we cannot confirm this, it is likely that Ukrainian counter-attacks have prioritised the area in recent weeks, given its importance to maintaining Ukraine’s ground lines of communication (GLOCs) into the pocket around Myrnohrad, where Ukrainian forces are at the greatest risk of encirclement. For further analysis on the Pokrovsk salient, see Sibylline Ukraine Update – 4 November 2025.
• MOBILISATION: This week, Russian President Vladimir Putin signed multiple laws which we assess set the stage for a greater use of Russia’s active reserve; they will likely facilitate a transition away from the extremely expensive (and ultimately unsustainable) ‘volunteer’ recruitment strategy. The first law allows military conscription to occur all year round, in contrast to the current system which only allows for two distinct conscription cycles, in the spring and autumn. While the conscripts are not assigned to fight in Ukraine, the expansion of conscription-related administrative processes (including allowing medical examinations) will likely allow the authorities to process more individuals at a faster pace; it will also potentially set bureaucratic conditions to call up larger numbers of personnel.
• MOBILISATION: A law signed this week allows active reservists to undergo special training and deployments to protect critical infrastructure across Russia. Notably, the law does not restrict deployments to reservists’ respective home regions, as Russian officials had originally claimed, thereby paving the way for a much wider use of such reservists. This could theoretically include the four annexed regions of Ukraine, given that Donetsk, Kherson, Luhansk and Zaporizhzhia oblasts are de jure Russian territory according to Russian law. The involuntary call-ups of active reservists have already begun, with Kommersant reporting on 10 November that at least 19 regions have started training active reservists to form new units that will nominally protect Russian critical infrastructure. The report also indicates that the Russian authorities intend to deploy these new units to border regions near Ukraine. We assess that this will likely ease Russia’s personnel constraints and free up conscripts and regular forces for redeployment elsewhere.
• MOBILISATION: We assess that the latest Russian laws are part of a phased process to normalise the mobilisation of active reservists, first for ‘domestic’ infrastructure protection and later likely for eventual combat deployments in Ukraine. For further analysis on this potential new Russian recruitment strategy to sustain its attritional war, see Sibylline Ukraine Update – 14 October 2025.
• STRIKES: On 5 November, the Financial Times reported on Russia’s deployment of long-range jet-powered glide bombs, which are capable of reaching areas well behind the frontline. In October, glide-bomb strikes were reported for the first time against the southern Odesa and Mykolaiv oblasts; these attacks were likely conducted using the latest long-range variant of the weapon. Previously, glide bombs had a range of up to 50 miles (80km) and were mainly employed against frontline targets. However, the addition of jet engines has reportedly extended the bombs’ range to nearly 124 miles (200km). The development of this new variant represents a cheaper alternative to more expensive projectiles, such as cruise missiles. However, the new variant’s payloads are smaller and the bomb is only propelled during part of its flight. Nevertheless, the extended range allows Russian aircraft to launch glide bombs from well inside Russian-controlled territory, reducing their exposure to Ukrainian air defences. We assess that this will increase the already growing strike threats facing cities across Ukraine’s south and east.
• STRIKES: Over the past week, Ukraine’s strike campaign has targeted numerous energy infrastructure sites in Russia. On 9 November, Russian Telegram channels claimed that the Voronezh combined heat and power (CHP) plant had been struck by Ukrainian drones. The facility is the main energy supplier for residential buildings and industrial consumers in Voronezh (Voronezh oblast). The local authorities did not directly comment on the attack, though they issued warnings over a missile and drone threat.
• STRIKES: Overnight on 8-9 November, the Russian authorities also reported an attack on a thermal power plant in Belgorod oblast (which borders Ukraine), leaving more than 20,000 residents without electricity. Additional drone strikes against electricity infrastructure were reported in Kursk oblast (also bordering Ukraine), causing temporary outages in several districts. Previously on 8 November, regional officials in Volgograd oblast stated that energy infrastructure in four districts had been damaged by Ukrainian drone attacks. The latest attacks likely reflect a new Ukrainian strategy, aimed at replicating Russia’s attacks on its critical energy assets. The Russian regions bordering Ukraine are likely to be heavily affected by such attacks and will therefore experience growing energy security risks. However, Ukraine’s heavy reliance on drones, which are typically less destructive than missiles, means that its strikes will inflict significantly less serious and lasting damage, in contrast to Russia’s intensifying long-range campaign (see FORECAST below).

POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS

• AID: The prolonged shutdown of the US government has delayed over USD 5 bn of arms exports, some of which are likely bound for Ukraine. According to a report from Axios on 9 November, the shutdown has affected the delivery of Advanced Medium-Range Air-to-Air Missiles (AMRAAMs), Aegis combat systems and High Mobility Artillery Rocket Systems (HIMARS). An unspecified senior US State Department official said those capabilities were earmarked for Croatia, Denmark and Poland; however, the ultimate destination of the exports is unclear due to the scheme which allows NATO member states to purchase US weapons for Ukraine’s benefit. While we cannot confirm the extent to which military assistance for Ukraine has been affected by the shutdown, it is possible that it has moderately impeded Ukrainian military planning and resource allocation.
• AID: Ukraine is reportedly in ‘positive’ talks with the US to purchase Tomahawk missiles, as well as other long-range and short-range capabilities, though we assess their provision remains unlikely in the short term. Olha Stefanishyna, Ukraine’s new envoy to the US, disclosed on 6 November that many unspecified delegations are working to increase the available financial resources to procure more military equipment from the US. The details of the talks come days after US President Donald Trump stated that he is not considering providing Tomahawk missiles to Ukraine at present. We continue to assess that their provision in the near term is unlikely (especially in significant quantities). Instead, discussions about Kyiv obtaining the capability are likely aimed at encouraging Moscow to engage constructively in the peace process. (For further analysis, see Sibylline Ukraine Update –  14 October 2025).
• AID: Zelensky wants to order 27 Patriot air-defence systems from the US, though this is highly likely to be overly ambitious in the near term. Zelensky made the remarks during an interview published on 9 November, adding that Ukraine is looking to borrow the systems from its European allies in the meantime. The current number of Patriot systems in Ukraine is unknown, though air defences are stretched, with the capital Kyiv and Kyiv oblast likely boasting the strongest air defence coverage. Zelensky did not specify why Ukraine wants this precise number, though he disclosed in September that his country and the US were preparing a contract for 25 Patriot systems, which would significantly bolster Ukraine’s air-defence network. As of July 2024, building a Patriot radar system was estimated to take 12 months, but acquiring all the necessary parts would take 24 months. These timelines underscore the difficulties in ramping up production in short timeframes.
• ASSETS: The EU’s inability to provide a loan backed by Russian frozen assets is likely to threaten Ukraine’s ability to procure defence equipment in the coming months and undermine its financial outlook for 2026. On 13 November, finance ministers of EU member states are set to convene in Brussels (Belgium) to discuss potential financial support for Ukraine. They will consider two options: borrowing funds from the markets or issuing a loan secured by frozen Russian assets, the majority of which are held by a depository in Belgium. According to EU sources, the latter option remains more favourable. However, Belgium continues to express opposition, fearing potential liability in the event of a successful lawsuit from Russia. Additionally, the Russia-friendly Slovakian Prime Minister Robert Fico has indicated that he would block any attempt to utilise Russian frozen assets. The ultimate decision will rely on an agreement among all EU leaders, who are expected to meet in mid-December. However, even if the EU reaches a consensus, it may take several months before the loans can be issued.

FORECAST

ENERGY: Over the past week, Ukraine’s energy security has continued to deteriorate steadily as a direct result of Russia’s co-ordinated strike campaign against critical infrastructure. The scale of the challenge facing Ukraine’s energy system was illustrated during a large-scale attack overnight on 7-8 November, which involved 458 drones and 45 missiles, including 32 ballistic systems. Although Ukraine intercepted most of the drones (406), it downed only nine missiles; this allowed the remaining projectiles, especially the ballistic missiles, to inflict significant damage on the country’s energy system. The low interception rate of missiles reflects the growing pressure on Ukrainian air defences this winter.

Ukraine’s state-owned energy company Centrenergo reported that all its thermal power plants (TPPs) have been disabled following the latest strikes. The company operates the Trypilska TPP in Kyiv oblast and the Zmiivska TPP in Kharkiv oblast; the latter previously underwent major repairs after being completely destroyed in a Russian attack in spring 2024. Meanwhile, Ukraine’s largest private energy company, DTEK, likewise reported severe damage to one of its TPPs. Russian forces also notably struck energy substations supplying the nuclear power plants (NPPs) in Khmelnytskyi (Khmelnytskyi  oblast) and Rivne (Rivne oblast), though without affecting their operations. The Ukrainian authorities stated that the overnight attack on 7-8 November had reduced the country’s generating capacity to ‘zero’, causing prolonged power outages of up to 16 hours, including in Kyiv.

The choice of targets almost certainly reflects Russia’s aim to trigger cascading blackouts by disabling major elements of Ukraine’s power generation network. The overnight attack on 7-8 November demonstrates Russia’s readiness to strike energy substations linked to nuclear facilities alongside thermal and gas production plants, which have remained consistent targets throughout its campaign.

Until now, Russia had conducted limited strikes against NPP-associated power stations; consequently, NPPs came to form an increasingly crucial element in the stability of Ukraine’s energy grid. This latest shift in targeting clearly indicates Russia’s growing interest in threatening Ukraine’s nuclear generation capabilities, likely aimed in part to signal the Kremlin’s willingness to escalate further. We assess that Russian forces are highly unlikely to strike NPPs directly with cruise or ballistic missiles (the likelihood that drones will be used for this purpose in the future remains low). Even if such an attack did take place, the safety procedures and back-up systems would highly likely prevent an imminent meltdown or major nuclear incident (for further analysis on nuclear safety risks in Ukraine, see Sibylline Special Report – 19 July 2023). Nevertheless, frequent strikes against NPP-linked power infrastructure, such as distribution facilities or substations, will likely undermine nuclear energy output and further exacerbate energy insecurity. Furthermore, such attacks will increase Ukraine’s reliance on energy imports, particularly from the EU, which reached its highest levels of the year in October.

Meanwhile, the restoration of two external power lines at the Zaporizhzhia NPP (ZNPP; Zaporizhzhia oblast) following a temporary localised ceasefire to allow for repairs will not improve Ukraine’s energy security in the near term. The UN’s nuclear watchdog, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), helped arrange localised ceasefires for repair works after the ZNPP lost all off-site power on 23 September. The plant has been under Russian control since the early phases of the full-scale invasion. The ZNPP currently does not produce any electricity; it needs external power to cool nuclear fuel to avoid the risk of a meltdown. Nevertheless, the station’s Russian operators announced that the second power line, which had been down since early May, was repaired on 8 November. They said that this development ‘significantly increases the stability of the station’s power system’.

Prolonged power outages (both planned and unplanned) will highly likely continue over the coming autumn and winter period, likely driving some of the most severe operational disruption and downtime for firms since the 2022/3 winter. The impact will be most acutely felt by entities engaging in energy-intensive industries, such as manufacturing, though prioritisation of energy resources and back-up generators will offset the impact to varying extents for critical industries and services. Nevertheless, reduced working hours and productivity as a result of blackouts will increase the risk of revenue loss and significant production delays for companies operating in Ukraine.

• Ukraine: High-profile corruption scheme will remain trigger for societal backlash. In an interview released earlier on 11 November, the head of Ukraine’s National Anti-Corruption Bureau (NABU) Oleksandr Abakumov provided further details on the large corruption scheme that was recently uncovered in the energy sector. Abakumov stated that the scheme involved four unnamed former members of Ukraine’s cabinet; he did not provide any further details. He also highlighted the leading role of NABU detective Ruslan Mahamedrasulov in the investigation. In July, Mahamedrasulov was arrested by Ukraine’s State Security Service (SBU) on the suspicion of assisting Russia, raising concerns about the government’s attempts to obstruct NABU’s activities. On 10 November, NABU disclosed that it was conducting searches at the residences of former energy minister Herman Haluschenko and President Volodymyr Zelensky’s former business partner Tymur Mindich, as well as at Energoatom (Ukraine’s state-owned nuclear power company). NABU has alleged that the case involves a USD 100 m kickback scheme. We assess that the high-profile corruption case, combined with the perceptions of government interference in anti-corruption efforts, is likely to trigger strong societal backlash and to increase the risk of localised (but peaceful) protests, particularly in the capital Kyiv.

Nov 10.

• Ukraine: Large-scale anti-corruption probe into energy sector will drive domestic backlash risks. Earlier on 10 November, Ukraine’s National Anti-Corruption Bureau (NABU) announced an ongoing investigation into a major corruption scheme within the energy sector. NABU detectives reportedly conducted searches at the residences of former energy minister Herman Haluschenko and President Volodymyr Zelensky’s former business partner Tymur Mindich, as well as at Energoatom, the state-owned nuclear power company. NABU disclosed that the investigation has been underway for 15 months and reveals a broad scheme to take control of strategic state-owned enterprises, including Energoatom. According to sources cited by the Kyiv Independent, the probe into Mindich was allegedly one of the factors behind the authorities’ attempt to curtail NABU’s independence in July. The investigation also coincides with a sharp deterioration in Ukraine’s energy situation due to Russia’s long-range strikes on critical infrastructure. We assess that the findings are likely to trigger domestic backlash, particularly if evidence of government interference emerges. However, the physical response will likely remain limited, with small-scale protests remaining a realistic possibility. (Source: Sibylline)

 

12 Nov 25. Ukraine targets recruits and retention with new military contracts. A new military salary scheme will be introduced in 2026 that includes limited mobilisation exemption.

• Ukraine will introduce new pay scales for military contracts in early 2026, adding new perks
• In excess of one m personnel are currently in active service, with the government keen to retain skills
• The latest operational updates from the war show Russian forces continuing to press into Pokrovsk

Ukraine will move to increase base service payment for military personnel signing on for new service contracts, with the expectation that the new system will be ready for implementation in early 2026. During a recent meeting between Minister of Defence Denys Shmyhal and President Volodymyr Zelenskyy earlier in November, aspects of the new military contract were outlined, which include payments that now range from 50,000 – 60,000 UAH ($1,188 – $1,426), a duration range from two to five years, and a 12-month deferral from mobilisation upon contract completion. This latter element is likely going to be particularly attractive, as it prevents personnel who have completed their contracts in being called up again in the event of large-scale mobilisation of the population within a 12-month period. The Ukrainian military has had to be increasingly creative in tempting citizens into – or back to – service, with the basic military renumeration prior to Russia’s 2022 invasion was thought to be around 13,000 UAH. This was already nearly twice the average civilian monthly income of about 7,000 UAH. Further, the proposed new contract standard permits new recruits to choose a specific brigade and role, although it is likely that this will have limitations in order to fill gaps in units and skills that suffer a high attrition rate. Additional increments are also available, such as higher combat payments and a signing bonus that rises depending on contract duration. These ‘bonus’ payments are often tens or even hundreds-of-thousands of Ukrainian Hryvnia, with information from December 2024 stating personnel would receive 70,000 UAH for carrying out combat or special forces operations on the frontline or inside Russian-held territory.  As of December 2024, the renumeration for a basic recruit in Ukraine’s Ground Forces was 20,130 UAH. Ukraine’s military has dramatically increased in scale since 2022, with more than one m personnel now actively serving in its armed forces. Efforts to digitise recruitment and some administrative and training functions through initiatives such as Impulse and the Reserve+ app are intended to streamline processes and bring increased efficiency. Such digitisation could also help the Ukrainian government better track citizens who are eligible for recruitment and those that have valid deferral reasons.

Combat continues around Pokrovsk

Combat operations along the Ukraine-Russia frontline are ongoing, although primary focus in recent weeks has centred on the city of Pokrovsk, located along the Vuhledar – Kurakhove – Kramatorsk axis. Providing its daily update on 12 November, the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) stated that Russian advances in the Pokrovsk remained “relatively slow”, citing a lack of geolocation footage over the preceding 24 hours showing significant movements. Prior to that, Russian forces had infiltrated southeastern Pokrovsk and nearby Myrnohrad, the ISW said. The UK Ministry of Defence notably neglected to mention Pokrovsk in its own daily intelligence update on 11 November, instead referencing operations around Zmiinyi Island.Meanwhile, the Ukraine Ministry of Defence claimed a further 162 tactical level drones intercepted throughout Ukraine over the preceding 24 hours. In addition, Ukraine claimed to have inflicted 1,000 combat casualties on Russian forces during this period, taking the total to 1.154 m since February 2022.(Source: army-technology.com)

 

13 Nov 25. Sweden buy and test copies of Russian attack drones.

“We can train against the threat we ourselves risk facing,” says an FMV technical unit specialist.

• Sweden have bought and tested two copies of Russian drones
• MACE is equivalent to the Russian Lancet, while STORK shares features of the Orlan-10 and Supercam S350
• Ukrainian troops tested both drones at a new UAS testing facility in Karlsborg

In a unique move to get inside the head of the adversary, Sweden have purchased copies of Russian drones from the Ukrainian drone builder UAC to replicate and understand the tribulations of the unceasing Russian drone tactics.

“We have purchased two types of drones that correspond to Russian capabilities,” confirmed Anders Hedman, head of the FMV’s test and evaluation ground area.

It was at the FMV’s newly established UAS testing facility in Karlsborg, which lies on the shore of lake Vättern, where Ukrainian troops taught their Swedish counterparts how to fly the system on the ground, but also in some limited cases, in a maritime space.

“By purchasing copies of Russian systems, we can train against the threat we ourselves risk facing,” argued Michael Ledenius, head of the technical unit at FMV for testing and evaluating land systems.

Loitering munitions

The MACE one-way attack drone is a dual X-shaped wing system that is launched from a pneumatic catapult and powered by an electric motor. The uncrewed aerial system (UAS) has a runtime of up to 60 minutes and has a cruising speed of 100 kilometres per hour, but with a top speed of 300kmph. It appears the loitering munition shares the same features as Russia’s ZALA Lancet system. Experts from the London think tank, the Royal United Services Institute (RUSI), found that the destruction of a target might be reasonably accomplished by launching two or three Lancet-3M systems per target from different axes. While there is no cost breakdown available for the MACE system, the RUSI report indicates that the cost of a single Lance-3M is around $30,000 compared to just one air-to-ground munition, such as the AGM-179 Joint Air-to-Ground Missile, which can cost up to $319,000 per missile. With their 35km range, Lancets are known to have been used as part of Russia’s hybrid salvos comprising various missile and drone types against Ukrainian infrastructure to compensate for their slow territorial gains. Now, Ukraine is realising some success in kind by targeting Russian oil fields by the same means. It is said that Ukrainian long-range drone attacks have struck oil refineries as far afield as Ryazan, Saratov, and Volgograd in the west of the country and even Tyumen in Siberia, as well as fuel depots, pumping stations, and other logistical hubs.

ISR drones

The second system, manufactured by the same company, is the STORK LR reconnaissance drone. Among other uses, the electric-powered, fixed-wing system is used to map terrain and adjust artillery fire much like Russia’s Orlan-10 or Supercam S350 systems used for intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR). Tactical strike and reconnaissance drones pose a deadly threat in the so-called ‘kill zone’ as the systems map movements below across the frontline. But interestingly, as Russian patrol drones are likely deterred from conducting ISR by Ukraine’s short range air defences, they have been repurposed in some recent cases this year. In August 2025, the Institute for the Study of War reported that Ukrainian forces shot down an Orlan drone that functioned as a mothership and carried two first-person-view UAS for the first time. Orlan-10s have, therefore, allowed Russia to significantly increase the range of its drone strikes in the near rear. (Source: army-technology.com)

 

13 Nov 25. Nordic and Baltic countries team up to fund US arms for Ukraine. The Nordic and Baltic countries are teaming up to pay for a $500m United States military support package of weapons and munitions for Ukraine, they said on Thursday. Norway will contribute the lion’s share at 2 bn Norwegian kroner, or about $200m, while Sweden will provide $60 m and Denmark around 400m Danish kroner ($53m) in funding, the countries said in separate statements. U.S. President Donald Trump and NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte in July announced a financial arrangement called the Prioritised Ukraine Requirements List to provide military aid to Ukraine. Through the initiative, NATO allies excluding the U.S. pool funds to pay for $500-m batches of American weapons, munitions and equipment requested by the embattled country.

“This will help Ukraine get high-priority military equipment quickly,” Norway’s Defence Minister Tore O. Sandvik said in a statement. “The feedback I have received from the Ukrainians is that PURL delivers on time and that they are satisfied with the content of the military aid packages.”

Trump said on Tuesday the U.S. is no longer spending any money on Ukraine, “now they pay us through NATO.” The Nordic-Baltic Eight countries – Norway, Sweden, Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia – published a joint statement on Thursday saying they’ll maintain long-term military aid for Ukraine, with the $500m PURL package a demonstration of their support.

“Russia’s war of aggression is a long-term threat to European security, the transatlantic community and the rules-based international order,” the joint statement said. “We will not allow it to succeed. Ukraine’s security is directly connected to ours.”

The package paid for by the Nordic and Baltic countries will contain weapons and ammunition, according to Norway, which said specific contents are not made public for security reasons. Sweden said the package will strengthen Ukraine’s air-defense capabilities.

As of mid-October, NATO partners had funded four PURL packages, according to the alliance, which administers the initiative. That included the first package paid for by the Netherlands, a second one financed by Denmark, Sweden and Norway, a third funded by Germany and a fourth paid for by Canada. The first two PURL packages included missiles for the Patriot air-defense system and HIMARS rocket artillery, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy said in September, with the first aid reportedly arriving that month. Since August, the PURL initiative has provided about 75% of the missiles for Ukraine’s Patriot systems and about 90% of the missiles for other air defense systems supplied by partner countries, Ukrainian Minister of Defense Denys Shmyhal said in a social media post. Together with the PURL package announced by the Nordic and Baltic countries, Ukraine will receive long-range 155mm artillery shells, HIMARS rockets and guided aerial bombs, according to the minister.

“This tranche of aid is critical for Ukraine’s defense and the protection of our citizens,” Shmyhal said. (Source: Defense News)

 

12 Nov 25. Cuashub.com said today that Ukrainian troops train for drone warfare in new virtual reality simulator. Ukrainian soldiers are now training for drone combat in a fully virtual environment, as engineering company Atmaraksi unveils Duel, a new virtual reality simulator designed to mirror the dynamics of modern battlefield encounters. The system places one soldier in control of an FPV drone while another takes the role of a shooter, creating a digital duel that tests reflexes, decision-making and tactical awareness. Atmaraksi says Duel accurately replicates real-world physics and combat logic within a customizable VR arena. Instructors can alter locations, swap weapons and change drone types to simulate a variety of operational conditions. Soldiers face realistic, high-pressure scenarios where they must decide when to move, take cover or engage. Unlike conventional VR systems that end before impact, Duel continues through to the moment of engagement, allowing both the pilot and the shooter to experience the full intensity of drone confrontation. Performance data and analytics are automatically recorded, giving instructors tools to refine training programs based on measurable results. To improve realism, Atmaraksi collaborated with government agencies and police training centers. One such partnership led to the inclusion of a “checkpoint roadblock” scenario for close-quarters engagement. The company says its systems meet international standards and align with NATO training protocols, ensuring interoperability with partner forces. According to Atmaraksi, Duel and its other VR training systems are already being used by more than 100 Ukrainian units.

Ukrainian troops train for drone warfare in new virtual reality simulator

(Source: https://cuashub.com/

 

11 Nov 25. The last six weeks of drone war in Ukraine: lasers, converted general aircraft and fast interceptors. Laser counter-UAS systems are starting to appear on both sides of the war in Ukraine, along with a new generation of fast, cheap intercept drones and light aircraft converted into drone hunters, according to the latest update of C-UAS systems and companies listed in the Unmanned Airspace 2025 Global Counter-UAS Systems Directory. Last month Russia’s Shvabe holding company, part of the Rostec State Corporation presented its first mobile laser for countering drones at the Interpolitex 2025 exhibition, seven months after Ukrainian officials announced the first successful use of their domestic Tryzub laser weapon system against a drone. Currently there are around 20 countries in the world developing and deploying over 50 laser-based counter-UAS systems, in broadly, four areas: airborne, tactical, naval and infrastructure protection, with system capabilities ranging from 2kW to over 500 kW. These are just some of the new systems listed in the latest, November 2025 edition of the Unmanned Airspace 2025 Global Counter-UAS Systems Directory, the world’s only comprehensive, updated directory of global C-UAS companies and systems. It itemises over 1,000 products and services with performance details, company sales and partnerships arrangements. It is updated every month and broken down into niche sub-sectors to give C-UAS procurement and industry personnel a unique perspective of global C-UAS technical capabilities and market positions – and is available in word, excel and PDF formats. (Source: www.unmannedairspace.info)

 

11 Nov 25. Ukraine’s $2,500 Drones Down 1,000 Russian Shaheds in 4 Months. Ukraine’s battle against Russia’s relentless drone assaults has found a powerful counter in the STING interceptor drone, a compact, fast, and cost-effective weapon designed to neutralize enemy UAVs mid-air. Developed by the Ukrainian team “Wild Hornets,” the STING has already proven its effectiveness in combat, marking a significant step forward in the evolution of drone warfare.

The Drone that Hunts Shahed Drones

The STING interceptor, showcased in a new video released by the Wild Hornets team, is described as a “massive, affordable, and effective” FPV (first-person view) drone capable of downing Russian attack UAVs, including Shaheds, Lancets, Zala, and SuperCam models. Built for agility and speed, the STING can be deployed in less than 15 minutes and launched from virtually any surface without the need for a catapult. If a target is not located, the drone autonomously returns to base, a feature that saves valuable resources during operations. With an engagement range of up to 25 kilometers, it is designed for rapid response to aerial threats, offering Ukrainian forces a flexible defensive option against swarms of incoming attack drones. Equipped with the Hornet Vision system and a 360° antenna ground station, the STING remains operational even under electronic warfare conditions. The system works seamlessly with both analog and digital FPV stations, ensuring real-time video transmission and night operation capabilities. As described in the video, “no evasion system can save a Shahed,” highlighting the precision and speed of the drone. A distinct dome atop the STING’s frame houses its camera system and explosive payload. Operated via VR goggles, the pilot experiences a first-person view of the flight, enabling high-speed maneuvering and pinpoint accuracy, often culminating in a mid-air collision with its target. Compact yet lethal, the drone embodies Ukraine’s shift toward smart mass-produced weaponry. Simple to maintain, fast to deploy, and deadly effective.

Training and Deployment

A dedicated instructor unit, known as the “Night Hornets,” is responsible for training new STING operators. According to the Wild Hornets, “by day, they train soldiers to operate STING. By night, they hunt Shaheds alongside them.” This continuous cycle of training and combat ensures that the frontline experience directly informs new recruits, rapidly expanding Ukraine’s corps of skilled FPV drone pilots. In just four months since serial production began, STING claims to have destroyed over 1,000 enemy targets. This would make the Wild Hornets initiative one of Ukraine’s most successful combat drone programs to date.

Toward a Drone-Driven Defence

As Business Insider reports, President Volodymyr Zelenskyy announced that the country aims to reach a daily production rate of 600 to 800 interceptor drones by the end of November. Although lower than his initial target of 1,000 per day, Zelenskyy noted,

“We believe that by the end of November, there will be 600 to 800 interceptor drones produced per day, if nothing goes wrong.”

The move comes amid escalating Russian attacks using waves of Shahed-136 drones and missile salvos meant to overwhelm Ukrainian air defenses. Traditional anti-air systems, such as Western-supplied surface-to-air missiles, can cost ms per unit, far exceeding the price of the drones they are used to destroy. In contrast, interceptor drones like STING provide a far cheaper and more scalable solution. (Source: UAS VISION/Interesting Engineering)

 

10 Nov 25. Zelenskyy seeks US Patriot systems against Russia’s power grid attacks. KYIV, Ukraine (AP) — President Volodymyr Zelenskyy said Monday he wants to order 25 Patriot air defense systems from the United States, as Ukraine desperately tries to fend off relentless Russian aerial attacks that have brought rolling blackouts across Ukraine on the brink of winter. Zelenskyy acknowledged that the Patriot systems are expensive and that such a large batch could take years to manufacture. But he said European countries could give their Patriots to Ukraine and await replacements, stressing that “we would not like to wait.” Combined missile and drone strikes on the power grid have coincided with Ukraine’s frantic efforts to hold back a Russian battlefield push aimed at capturing the eastern stronghold of Pokrovsk. Meanwhile, international peace efforts appear to have dissipated, nearly four years after Russia invaded its neighbor. Zelenskyy said Ukraine recently received more Patriot systems from Germany. It is not known how many Patriot systems are in Ukraine. But on the whole air defenses remain stretched thin across wide expanses of Ukrainian territory, and the threat to the provision of heating and running water in the bitter winter is acute. NATO is coordinating regular deliveries of large weapons packages to Ukraine. European allies and Canada are buying much of the equipment from the United States. The Trump administration is not giving any arms to Ukraine, unlike the previous Biden administration. Russia’s attacks on energy infrastructure have grown more effective. It launches hundreds of drones, some equipped with cameras to improve targeting, that overwhelm Ukraine’s air defenses, especially in regions where protection is weaker. Also, this year it is striking region by region, hitting local switchyards and substations, instead of taking aim at the centralized national grid. Ukraine’s Energy Ministry said Monday that Russian attacks caused more damage to its power infrastructure, resulting in scheduled blackouts in most of the country’s regions. It urged Ukrainians to rationalize their use of electricity, especially during peak consumption hours in the mornings and evenings. Meanwhile, the two sides were locked in a battle for control of Pokrovsk, in Ukraine’s eastern Donetsk region where Zelenskyy says Russia has assembled 170,000 troops for a renewed push. There has been a relative lull in fighting in recent days, according to reports gathered by the Institute for the Study of War. But the Washington-based think tank said it expected Russian forces to quicken the tempo of their attacks in coming days as they move more troops into the city. (Source: Defense News)

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Founded in 1987, Exensor Technology is a world leading supplier of Networked Unattended Ground Sensor (UGS) Systems providing tailored sensor solutions to customers all over the world. From our Headquarters in Lund Sweden, our centre of expertise in Network Communications at Communications Research Lab in Kalmar Sweden and our Production site outside of Basingstoke UK, we design, develop and produce latest state of the art rugged UGS solutions at the highest quality to meet the most stringent demands of our customers. Our systems are in operation and used in a wide number of Military as well as Homeland Security applications worldwide. The modular nature of the system ensures any external sensor can be integrated, providing the user with a fully meshed “silent” network capable of self-healing. Exensor Technology will continue to lead the field in UGS technology, provide our customers with excellent customer service and a bespoke package able to meet every need.

A CNIM Group Company

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Sponsored by Bertin Exensor

 

www.exensor.com

 

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10 Nov 25. Secretary of War Announces Acquisition Reform. The following memorandums were referenced by Secretary of War Pete Hegseth during his remarks at the National War College on Fort McNair, Washington, D.C., on Friday, November 7. These directives outline the Department’s next phase of acquisition. The memorandums—”Transforming the Defense Acquisition System into the Warfighting Acquisition System to Accelerate Fielding of Urgently Needed Capabilities to Our Warriors,” “Reforming the Joint Requirements Process to Accelerate Fielding of Warfighting Capabilities,” and “Unifying the Department’s Arms Transfer and Security Cooperation Enterprise to Improve Efficiency and Enable Burden-Sharing”— direct sweeping reforms across the Department of War to strengthen deterrence, rebuild the industrial base, and accelerate capability delivery to the warfighter.

Together with the newly released Acquisition Transformation Strategy, these memorandums redefine how the Department develops requirements, manages programs, and engages industry to ensure America’s warfighters receive critical capabilities at the speed of relevance.

For more information the strategy and memorandums can be found here:

Acquisition Transformation Strategy: chrome-extension://efaidnbmnnnibpcajpcglclefindmkaj/https://media.defense.gov/2025/Nov/10/2003819441/-1/-1/1/ACQUISITION-TRANSFORMATION-STRATEGY.PDF

“Transforming the Defense Acquisition System into the Warfighting Acquisition System to Accelerate Fielding of Urgently Needed Capabilities to Our Warriors”: chrome-extension://efaidnbmnnnibpcajpcglclefindmkaj/https://media.defense.gov/2025/Nov/10/2003819439/-1/-1/1/TRANSFORMING-THE-DEFENSE-ACQUISITION-SYSTEM-INTO-THE-WARFIGHTING-ACQUISITION-SYSTEM-TO-ACCELERATE-FIELDING-OF-URGENTLY-NEEDED-CAPABILITIES-TO-OUR-WARRIORS.PDF

“Reforming the Joint Requirements Process to Accelerate Fielding of Warfighting Capabilities”: chrome-extension://efaidnbmnnnibpcajpcglclefindmkaj/https://media.defense.gov/2025/Nov/10/2003819439/-1/-1/1/TRANSFORMING-THE-DEFENSE-ACQUISITION-SYSTEM-INTO-THE-WARFIGHTING-ACQUISITION-SYSTEM-TO-ACCELERATE-FIELDING-OF-URGENTLY-NEEDED-CAPABILITIES-TO-OUR-WARRIORS.PDF

“Unifying the Department’s Arms Transfer and Security Cooperation Enterprise to Improve Efficiency and Enable Burden-Sharing”:chrome-extension://efaidnbmnnnibpcajpcglclefindmkaj/https://media.defense.gov/2025/Nov/10/2003819440/-1/-1/1/UNIFYING-THE-DEPARTMENTS-ARMS-TRANSFER-AND-SECURITY-COOPERATION-ENTERPRISE-TO-IMPROVE-EFFICIENCY-AND-ENABLE-BURDEN-SHARING.PDF (Source: U.S. DoD)

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Founded in 1987, Exensor Technology is a world leading supplier of Networked Unattended Ground Sensor (UGS) Systems providing tailored sensor solutions to customers all over the world. From our Headquarters in Lund Sweden, our centre of expertise in Network Communications at Communications Research Lab in Kalmar Sweden and our Production site outside of Basingstoke UK, we design, develop and produce latest state of the art rugged UGS solutions at the highest quality to meet the most stringent demands of our customers. Our systems are in operation and used in a wide number of Military as well as Homeland Security applications worldwide. The modular nature of the system ensures any external sensor can be integrated, providing the user with a fully meshed “silent” network capable of self-healing. Exensor Technology will continue to lead the field in UGS technology, provide our customers with excellent customer service and a bespoke package able to meet every need.

A CNIM Group Company

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Sponsored by Bertin Exensor

 

www.exensor.com

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13 Nov 25. The European Union wants its own intelligence branch. The European Union is working to establish an intelligence unit under Commission President Ursula von der Leyen, a move that could raise questions about the division of sovereignty between national capitals and Brussels on a key national security issue. The idea was first reported by the Financial Times on Nov. 11 and subsequently confirmed to other publications by EU spokespeople. The new unit will aim to better coordinate intelligence information collected by national services and the European Union itself. This would help inform joint positions as the EU maneuvers on the global stage, the proposal goes. An EU spokesperson told the German press agency DPA that the plans were still in a “very embryonic” stage and that the final unit would likely consist only of a handful of experts recruited from national agencies. No specific timeline has been set yet, according to a commission spokesperson cited by FT. The plan, which Financial Times reports has not yet been coordinated with the EU’s 27 member countries, is likely to bring fierce debate about authorities and sovereignty. The EU already has an intelligence unit, which is housed in its External Action Service — effectively, the bloc’s foreign ministry — whose officials are reportedly opposed to the idea of the new unit directly under von der Leyen. They have voiced concerns that the office may duplicate the work of their Intelligence and Situation Centre. National security is explicitly reserved as a national issue under the EU’s key treaties. While the war in Ukraine has provided an impetus for European integration in defense, member countries’ capitals continue to guard these areas of sovereignty. Pushback from member states seems likely, not least because intelligence sharing has long been a touchy subject given the differing political allegiances across the bloc, with some members maintaining at least lukewarm relations with Russia. (Source: Defense News)

 

10 Nov 25. Italian Navy leads NATO maritime presence in Mediterranean. Standing NATO Maritime Group Two (SNMG2), led by the Italian Navy, has begun a new operational phase in the Mediterranean Sea after departing Taranto, Italy, as part of NATO’s ongoing maritime security operations. SNMG2 is one of four permanent multinational maritime task groups that make up the Alliance’s high-readiness Allied Reaction Force. Operating under NATO’s Allied Maritime Command in Northwood, UK, the group maintains a continuous presence across the Mediterranean to support freedom of navigation, deter potential threats, and enhance regional cooperation. Commanded since July by Rear Admiral Francesco Iavazzo of the Italian Navy, SNMG2 currently consists of the Italian frigate ITS Carlo Bergamini, the Canadian frigate HMCS St. John’s, and the Spanish support ship ESPS Cantabria. Its multinational staff includes officers from Bulgaria, Greece, Italy, Romania, Spain, Türkiye and the United Kingdom. According to NATO, the group’s deployment reinforces collective security and provides an immediately available maritime force capable of responding to crises. Rear Admiral Iavazzo said the activity at sea “demonstrates NATO’s capability to operate as one integrated multinational force” and sends “a clear signal of Allied cohesion, determination and readiness.” SNMG2 has conducted patrols and joint exercises throughout the Mediterranean in recent months, including engagements with partners in North Africa. A recent visit to Alexandria, Egypt, underlined NATO’s long-running cooperation with Mediterranean Dialogue countries, a partnership forum launched in 1994 that includes Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Mauritania, Morocco and Tunisia.

“Partnerships matter,” Iavazzo said. “Egypt’s regional experience and security expertise make it a valuable partner. Stability, security and cooperation in the Mediterranean are in everyone’s interest.” (Source: UKDJ)

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Founded in 1987, Exensor Technology is a world leading supplier of Networked Unattended Ground Sensor (UGS) Systems providing tailored sensor solutions to customers all over the world. From our Headquarters in Lund Sweden, our centre of expertise in Network Communications at Communications Research Lab in Kalmar Sweden and our Production site outside of Basingstoke UK, we design, develop and produce latest state of the art rugged UGS solutions at the highest quality to meet the most stringent demands of our customers. Our systems are in operation and used in a wide number of Military as well as Homeland Security applications worldwide. The modular nature of the system ensures any external sensor can be integrated, providing the user with a fully meshed “silent” network capable of self-healing. Exensor Technology will continue to lead the field in UGS technology, provide our customers with excellent customer service and a bespoke package able to meet every need.

A CNIM Group Company

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Sponsored by Bertin Exensor

 

www.exensor.com

 

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06 Nov 25. Ecuador-US: Increasing military co-operation would decrease security forces risks, regional tensions. On 5 November, the US expressed interest in establishing Department of Homeland Security (DHS) offices in Ecuador. The announcement came during a meeting between US Secretary of Homeland Security Kristi Noem and Ecuadorian President Daniel Noboa at Elay Alfaro International Airport (MEC) in Manabí province (Ecuador). The announcement comes ahead of a referendum on 16 November, in which Ecuadorians will vote on whether to permit the return of foreign military bases to their territory, together with three other questions. Previously, the US military operated a forward operating location (FOL) at Eloy Alfaro airport, until Ecuador changed its constitution to ban foreign military bases in 2009. President Noboa supports the return of US military presence to Manabí province in order to strengthen Ecuador’s fight against drug trafficking and organised crime. However, current polling indicates that voters will possibly reject the proposal. This interest in DHS offices in Ecuador signals deepening bilateral security co-operation between the US and Ecuador, decreasing regional tensions. We assess that if the offices are established or if the referendum on foreign bases passes, enhanced US support for Ecuador’s counter-narcotics operations will decrease security forces risks. (Source: Sibylline)

 

06 Nov 25. Russia: Threat of nuclear war remains very low despite presidential order for potential nuclear tests. On 5 November, Russian President Vladimir Putin instructed officials to draft proposals for a possible test of nuclear weapons. This comes after US President Donald Trump ordered the military to resume testing nuclear weapons in late October. Russian Minister of Defence Andrei Belousov told President Putin that recent actions from the US meant that it was advisable to ‘prepare for full-scale nuclear tests’ immediately. However, the Kremlin later claimed that President Putin has not set a deadline for any proposals; it remains unclear whether the tests will involve warhead tests (which have not taken place in decades). Moscow typically increases its nuclear rhetoric amid periods of heightened tensions with the West, as part of its reflexive control campaign. In September, President Putin offered an extension of the last remaining nuclear arms deal (the New START Treaty) with the US in September. However, there have been limited indications that the treaty will be renewed before it expires on 5 February 2026. While current tensions are increasing the likelihood of nuclear arms activity, including testing and proliferation, we assess that the chance of a major nuclear escalation remains remote. (Source: Sibylline)

 

06 Nov 25. Sudan: Peace agreement is highly unlikely in coming months, sustaining armed conflict risks. On 5 November, the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) rejected a US proposal for a three-month ceasefire and submitted a counter-proposal calling for the dismantling of the Rapid Support Forces (RSF). The US, along with Egypt, Saudi Arabia and the UAE (known collectively as the Quad) have intensified pursuit of a peace deal in recent months. However, both the RSF and SAF are highly unlikely to substantively engage in peace talks until they believe they have achieved an optimal military position. This deadlock has been exacerbated by the RSF’s capture of El Fasher (North Darfur state), which has effectively partitioned western Sudan. The SAF is highly unlikely to accept any form of agreement that gives the RSF space to consolidate its control over western Sudan and preserves the RSF’s influence in national institutions over the long term. As such, a substantive peace agreement or any prolonged ceasefire is highly likely in the coming months. This will sustain critical humanitarian, human rights and security risks into 2026, particularly across the Kordofan region, where conflict is likely to increasingly shift following El Fasher’s capture. (Source: Sibylline)

 

04 Nov 25. Cambodia-Thailand: Withdrawal of heavy weaponry from border will reduce armed conflict risks. On 3 November, Thai officials confirmed that Thailand and Cambodia had begun withdrawing heavy weapons and carrying out de-mining operations along the disputed border. This is in line with the agreement the two countries signed last week in Malaysia. The withdrawal of heavy weapons is set to occur in three phases, starting with rocket systems. The first phase will take three weeks, with a meeting to be held on 15 November to assess its implementation; the whole process is scheduled to run until the end of the year. The successful completion of the process will ease armed conflict risks along the border. However, a spokesperson for the Thai government claimed that the 18 detained Cambodian soldiers will not be released and that the border will not be opened until Cambodia is deemed to adhere to the agreement. Given that the re-opening of the border is not imminent, we assess that socio-economic health risks will persist in Cambodia in the short term, as the country is reliant on the import of essential goods and parts for manufacturing supply chains from Thailand.  (Source: Sibylline)

 

03 Nov 25. Nigeria-US: Threats of unilateral military action unlikely to materialise in short term. On 1 November, US President Donald Trump threatened to deploy US military forces to Nigeria due to the government’s alleged failure to protect Christians from ‘Islamic terrorists’. An adviser to Nigeria’s President Bola Tinubu subsequently rejected Trump’s allegations but stated that the government would welcome US co-operation in counter-insurgency operations. Christians are largely exposed to violence in Nigeria stemming from the ongoing Islamist insurgency in northern Nigeria as well as intercommunal conflict over land use in the Middle Belt and southern regions. Given the entrenched nature of these conflicts, it is highly unlikely that the Nigerian government will be able to take sufficient action to negate criticism from the US. However, the US is unlikely to engage in unilateral airstrikes or ground operations due to existing bilateral and multilateral military co-operation agreements. Rather, the US will possibly intensify its activities under existing agreements that focus on repelling the ongoing Boko Haram and Islamic State–West Africa Province (ISWAP) insurgencies in the short term. There is also a realistic possibility Tinubu’s government will seek to mitigate criticism by encouraging greater US investment in Nigeria’s energy and mineral sectors, amid ongoing trade negotiations. (Source: Sibylline)

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Founded in 1987, Exensor Technology is a world leading supplier of Networked Unattended Ground Sensor (UGS) Systems providing tailored sensor solutions to customers all over the world. From our Headquarters in Lund Sweden, our centre of expertise in Network Communications at Communications Research Lab in Kalmar Sweden and our Production site outside of Basingstoke UK, we design, develop and produce latest state of the art rugged UGS solutions at the highest quality to meet the most stringent demands of our customers. Our systems are in operation and used in a wide number of Military as well as Homeland Security applications worldwide. The modular nature of the system ensures any external sensor can be integrated, providing the user with a fully meshed “silent” network capable of self-healing. Exensor Technology will continue to lead the field in UGS technology, provide our customers with excellent customer service and a bespoke package able to meet every need.

A CNIM Group Company

————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————–

Sponsored by Bertin Exensor

 

www.exensor.com

 

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Military And Security Developments

Nov 07.

• Israel-Kazakhstan: Accession to Abraham Accords will drive opportunities in defence and minerals. On 6 November, US President Donald Trump announced that Kazakhstan will join the Abraham Accords, a framework for diplomatic normalisation between Israel and several Muslim-majority states. While Kazakhstan already maintains formal diplomatic relations with Israel, the move likely reflects an effort to strengthen Israel’s international standing after two years of conflict in Gaza. The decision will likely strengthen Israel’s industrial resilience, creating opportunities in defence and critical mineral supply chains and encouraging growth in the industrial, manufacturing and engineering sectors. In particular, deepening Israel-Kazakhstan relations will possibly strengthen Israel’s efforts to develop its domestic arms manufacturing capabilities, increasing opportunities for Western defence companies with operations in Israel. Iran will likely interpret the move as an encroachment into its strategic space, possibly reducing the scope of its joint naval activities with Kazakhstan in the Caspian Sea. We assess that Iran will possibly respond to this move through grey-zone activities such as cyber attacks, increasing operational and reputational risks for Israel-based firms. Nevertheless, the US will continue to seek to expand the Abraham Accords, with new membership further increasing its legitimacy and driving the likelihood of states such as Saudi Arabia joining in the long term.
• US-Syria: New military base signals possible security deal with Israel.  On 6 November, international media reported that the US will establish an airbase near the capital Damascus to help supervise a potential security pact between Israel and Syria. Unnamed Syrian officials said that talks with the US had focused on humanitarian operations, logistics, refuelling and surveillance. The reports signal likely progress towards an interim deal in the US-backed Israel-Syria security talks, possibly by the end of 2025. Any such deal will likely involve the demilitarisation of parts of Daraa, Quneitra and Suwayda governorates. A trilateral security co-ordination against rogue Islamist groups in southern Syria, as well as Iran-linked drugs and arms smuggling networks operating across each of Syria’s borders, is also likely to be part of the deal. There is also a realistic possibility that the deal will involve guarantees from regional actors such as the UAE. Nevertheless, this deal is unlikely to evolve into a full normalisation in the coming months, due to the risk of backlash from Syrian President Ahmed al-Sharaa’s Islamist base.

Nov 06.

ISRAEL-LEBANON: IDF STRIKES IN LEBANON

EVENT

At approximately 1600hrs (local time) earlier on 6 November, the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) began conducting waves of airstrikes targeting Lebanese Hizballah (LH) facilities in southern Lebanon. Prior to the strikes, the IDF issued evacuation orders for Ayta al-Jabal and Taybeh (both Nabatieh governorate) as well as Tayr Debba (South governorate). At the time of writing, airstrikes remain largely concentrated in these locations.

SIGNIFICANCE

• The strikes come amid rising regional tensions linked to the Lebanese government’s efforts to disarm LH as part of the Israel-LH ceasefire. Although Lebanon has agreed to a US-backed disarmament roadmap that would see LH’s total disarmament by 31 December 2025, Israel and the US have repeatedly called for more assertive disarmament efforts to meet this deadline.
• In recent weeks, the IDF has increased the frequency of airstrikes targeting LH personnel in southern Lebanon and conducted an overnight raid in Blida (Nabatieh governorate) on 29 October, underscoring efforts to increase pressure on the Lebanese authorities to disarm LH.

FORECAST

Further evacuation warnings and limited strikes in southern Lebanon are likely in the coming weeks; ground operations along the Israel-Lebanon border remain a realistic possibility. We assess that Israel will likely continue increasing military pressure on the Lebanese government to disarm LH via sporadic, limited strikes in southern Lebanon in the coming days and weeks. However, while Israel is prepared for a multi-day conflict with LH, military officials have emphasised that the IDF is not looking for an escalation; this moderates the likelihood of a wide-range, continuous and intense airstrike campaign. While limited IDF ground operations within southern Lebanon along the border with Israel remain a realistic possibility, we assess that large-scale ground operations, particularly pushing deeper into Lebanese territory, are currently unlikely.

LH is unlikely to respond to the IDF strikes in the coming days; however, a ceasefire collapse is possible in the event of deeper and major IDF strikes against LH strongholds across Lebanon and/or a large ground incursion in a protracted operation. LH is currently reluctant to pursue any action that will result in domestic accusations that they are responsible for dragging Lebanon into a war, which would further erode its already diminished popularity and political influence before nationwide general elections in 2026. However, there is a possibility that LH will launch retaliatory strikes if the current Israeli operation protracts for more than two weeks. Retaliation is also likely if the IDF conducts deeper substantive airstrikes targeting LH leaders and strongholds in the capital Beirut, central areas north of the Litani River such as Sidon (South governorate) or Baalbek-Hermel and Beqaa governorates. Large-scale Israeli ground incursion in southern Lebanon or from Syria’s Mount Hermon area (Quneitra governate) will also likely prompt renewed armed conflict, but this is currently unlikely.

While large-scale IDF strikes on LH assets in Beirut are unlikely, with the IDF primarily targeting LH operatives, assets, weapons depots and tunnels in southern Lebanon, a limited strike in the capital remains a possibility. Such strikes will most likely be in Nabatieh and South governorates, possibly including pinpoint strikes in major cities such as Jezzine, Sidon and Tyre (all South governorate). While major strikes on LH’s strongholds in the capital during this operation remain unlikely in the coming days, a limited strike on a single target in Beirut’s Dahieh suburb is possible. In such an event, LH will be unlikely to respond to a highly targeted strike. However, if the current IDF operation continues for a week, there is a possibility that the Lebanese government will temporarily suspend disarmament efforts targeting LH arsenals in the south, as well as halting security co-ordination with the US and Israel in order to pressure a cessation of the strikes. Such a move will increase diplomatic tensions and uncertainty.

• Iraq: Airstrike certification to strengthen security capabilities, increase misidentification risks. On 4 November, the US Central Command (CENTCOM) announced that the Iraqi security forces have been certified to conduct airstrikes independently, after a US-led task force validated their combat strike capabilities. This validation is a key step in Iraq’s transition to assuming regional operations without support from the US or the NATO Mission Iraq (NMI; also known as the Coalition). As the US continues its phased withdrawal, Iraq needs to improve its security capabilities to moderate long-term risks of attack and ethno-religious violence linked to militant activity. Despite the competence suggested by the certification, we assess that rising Islamic State (IS) activity and decreased US oversight will likely increase the risk of target misidentification and unintended strikes over the next 12 months. This will sustain collateral security risks on the ground, particularly in IS hotspots such as Al Anbar, Diyala and Kirkuk governorates. Additionally, intelligence gaps, slower strike approval processes and political interference in the absence of US oversight will possibly enable IS cells to regroup and expand operations across key areas.
• Egypt-Israel: Security rules will reduce cross-border smuggling, but raise threats to bilateral relations. On 5 November, Israeli Minister of Defense Israel Katz instructed the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) to declare the Israel-Egypt border a closed military zone. The IDF will also adjust its rules of engagement to strike any unauthorised party that penetrates the area. This comes amid rising rates of weapon and drug smuggling along the border, mainly with drones. Notably, Katz added that Israel will establish a system of deterrence against these smugglers, similar to the one employed against Lebanese Hezbollah (LH) in Lebanon. Katz did not specify what such a system of deterrence will entail, but the statement is highly likely to increase ongoing political tensions with Cairo. Despite this rhetoric, the border security co-ordination between the two countries is unlikely to break down. We assess that the new instructions are likely to reduce smuggling operations from the Sinai Peninsula (which are mainly conducted by Bedouin communities). However, while Israeli strikes against smugglers inside Egypt are currently unlikely, this risk will increase over time if smuggling does not decrease. Such a move will likely trigger the further worsening of diplomatic relations between Egypt and Israel, possibly resulting in the suspension of bilateral security agreements.

Nov 05.

KEY DEVELOPMENTS

IRAN

• The Iranian security forces continue to engage in efforts to improve their combat readiness and infrastructural resilience, underscoring sustained risks of conflict resumption with Israel in the medium term.
• Iran released two detained French nationals following negotiations with France, underscoring persistent risks of detention for foreign nationals.

ISRAEL

• Israel-Lebanon: Lebanese Hizballah’s (LH’s) allegedly escalating efforts to rehabilitate forces in southern Lebanon is driving tensions with Israel, though an imminent resumption of conflict in Lebanon is currently unlikely.

PALESTINIAN TERRITORIES

• GAZA STRIP: The escalating IDF campaign to destroy militant tunnels within the Israeli-occupied ‘yellow line’ will drive attack and collateral damage risks.
• GAZA STRIP: Hamas’ offer to secure the remains of deceased hostages in exchange for the release of militants trapped in the Israeli-occupied ‘yellow zone’ will raise tensions, increasing the risks of armed clashes in southern Gaza.
• GAZA STRIP: Militants continue to seize aid convoys, highlighting sustained risks to NGO and logistics staff.
• GAZA STRIP: The UN Security Council (UNSC) will likely vote to establish the Board of Peace and the ISF in the coming weeks, though security and governance conditions are unlikely to improve imminently.
• WEST BANK: Israeli settlers employed a drone to harass Palestinian olive farmers, underscoring increasing threats to civilians, activists and journalists in the central West Bank.

IRAN

• The Iranian security forces continue to engage in efforts to improve their combat readiness and infrastructural resilience, underscoring sustained risks of conflict resumption with Israel in the medium term. On 30 October, Iranian state media announced that Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei had appointed Brigadier General Ahmad Vahidi – formerly a commander in the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps’ (IRGC’s) Quds Force – to serve as the deputy chief of the Armed Forces’ General Staff (AFGS). Vahidi replaces Brigadier General Mohammad Reza Ashtiani (an Artesh officer, i.e. Iran’s conventional armed forces) and will serve under AFGS chief Major General Abdolrahim Mousavi (who was formerly the commander-in-chief of the Artesh). Vahidi’s appointment underscores the entrenchment of the IRGC’s central role within Iran’s broader security co-ordination architecture, amid efforts to reconstitute capacity following the Israel-Iran war. After his appointment, Vahidi and two IRGC commanders conducted inspections of eight military facilities, underscoring Iran’s continued efforts to improve combat readiness amid concerns that Israel will resume airstrikes targeting nuclear facilities in the medium-to-long term. On 31 October, Iran’s Passive Defence Organisation (PDO) announced that it would conduct stress tests on Iran’s public warning systems, national communication infrastructure and banking networks in the coming weeks. The tests form part of Iran’s broader efforts to improve its infrastructure resilience, following broad disruption during the Israel-Iran war, particularly in the banking and communications sectors (see Sibylline Middle East Crisis Update – 19 June 2025). Taken together, these events underscore continued Iranian efforts to strengthen resilience amid sustained concerns of conflict re-escalation.
• Iran released two detained French nationals following negotiations with France, underscoring persistent risks of detention for foreign nationals. On 4 November, French President Emmanuel Macron announced that the Iranian authorities had released Cécile Kohler and Jacques Paris, two French nationals detained on suspicion of espionage in 2022. In early October, Iran’s Foreign Minister Abbas Argachi announced that France and Iran were close to reaching an agreement to exchange Kohler and Paris for an Iranian national that had been detained in France for promoting terrorism on social media. We assess that in the coming months, Iran is highly likely to continue attempting to leverage the detention of foreign nationals to secure the releases of Iranian nationals detained abroad, as well as to gain periodic sanctions relief amid increasing pressure on socio-economic health conditions. As economic pressure increases, foreign nationals in Iran will face increasingly acute risks of surveillance, harassment and arbitrary detention, particularly those from states enforcing sanctions. Such conditions will increase regional tensions and the risks of targeted countries adopting human rights-based sanctions on Iran, further compounding compliance concerns for regionally engaged firms.

ISRAEL 

• Israel-Lebanon: Lebanese Hizballah’s (LH’s) allegedly escalating efforts to rehabilitate forces in southern Lebanon is driving tensions with Israel, though an imminent resumption of conflict in Lebanon is currently unlikely. Between 27 October and 2 November, the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) targeted and killed eight LH operatives. Additionally, the IDF conducted airstrikes against LH military infrastructure (such as rocket launchers) as well as civilian reconstruction projects and equipment, which the IDF alleged were fronts for LH military reconstruction projects. These operations come amid increasingly belligerent rhetoric by Israeli military officials and decision-makers, warning against the continued reconstruction of LH’s presence in southern Lebanon. Israeli military officials also indicated that the IDF is preparing for a multi-day round of fighting with LH and targeting LH defences north of the Litani River if LH attacks Israeli forces. This rhetoric is likely aimed at increasing pressure on the Lebanese government to engage with Israel on its disarmament plan for LH without preconditions. As such, we assess that a resumption of war in Lebanon remains unlikely in the coming week. However, if there are no further developments on negotiations or disarmament, such a scenario will become increasingly likely over the coming weeks. Furthermore, further IDF air strikes (and possibly ground operations) against alleged LH infrastructure in southern Lebanon are likely in the coming weeks. These strikes will be particularly likely around construction sites, which are at an elevated risk of being identified as an LH operation.

PALESTINIAN TERRITORIES 

• GAZA STRIP: The escalating IDF campaign to destroy militant tunnels within the Israeli-occupied ‘yellow line’ will drive attack and collateral damage risks. In recent weeks, Palestinian militants appear to have adopted more rigorous anti-personnel procedures in response to attempts by the IDF’s ground forces to destroy underground tunnels. In addition to rigging tunnel shafts and adjacent axes with explosives, militants now routinely launch three to four anti-tank missiles accompanied by sniper fire at the IDF troops working to destroy tunnels. Such tactics have contributed to the IDF’s increasing reliance on airstrikes and artillery fire to destroy underground infrastructure. These airstrikes are likely to increase in intensity and frequency over the coming weeks, as the IDF attempts to destroy all tunnels in its area of control before withdrawing to the second fallback line, as per the ceasefire’s second phase. However, this phase is still under negotiations and Hamas has yet to fulfil its first-phase commitments. Therefore, there is a realistic possibility that the second phase will not be implemented until January or February 2026. The IDF is also increasingly utilising airstrikes to intercept armed militants’ daily attempts to cross the ‘yellow line’, particularly in northern and southern Gaza. This reliance on air operations will increase the risks of misidentification and exposure to shrapnel and secondary explosions for personnel operating near the yellow line.
• GAZA STRIP: Hamas’ offer to secure the remains of deceased hostages in exchange for the release of militants trapped in the Israeli-occupied ‘yellow zone’ will raise tensions, increasing the risks of armed clashes in southern Gaza. In the past week, Hamas has offered to increase its efforts to locate the bodies of deceased hostages and soldiers in return for the release of 200 militants, who are trapped within the Israeli-occupied yellow line in al-Janina neighbourhood in Rafah (southern Gaza). Allegedly, Israel’s Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu initially favoured the offer, though reports indicate that he is shifting away from the proposal in response to criticism and threats by right-wing coalition members who oppose the move. There is a realistic possibility that Netanyahu will reject the deal, resulting in an escalation in IDF strikes against militants trapped in Rafah. Such a scenario will elevate the risk of retaliatory attacks by Hamas, threatening the ceasefire’s viability. Nevertheless, we assess that US and international pressure will moderate the risk of a complete breakdown in the ceasefire.
• GAZA STRIP: Militants continue to seize aid convoys, highlighting sustained risks to NGO and logistics staff. On 31 October, a US drone recorded alleged Hamas militants seizing an aid truck in Khan Yunis (southern Gaza). The risk of militants attacking and looting aid convoys will remain elevated in the coming weeks, driving security risks for NGO personnel and drivers involved in aid deliveries. The looting incidents will also likely delay and hamper efforts to alleviate and stabilise humanitarian conditions in Gaza, sustaining food, population health and water security risks in the coming months. There is a realistic possibility that the international parties monitoring the ceasefire will attempt to mitigate looting by adding security personnel to the aid convoys or using aircraft to attack militants. However, such actions will significantly elevate the risks of misfire and misidentification, further increasing security risks near aid convoys. We assess that the International Stabilization Force (ISF; see below) will likely be tasked with securing aid convoys once it is deployed, probably in the first quarter (Q1) of 2026. However, the ISF’s deployment will elevate risks of armed clashes between ISF personnel and militants, compounding security risks near aid convoys and distribution centres.
• GAZA STRIP: The UN Security Council (UNSC) will likely vote to establish the Board of Peace and the ISF in the coming weeks, though security and governance conditions are unlikely to improve imminently. Since 3 November, numerous media sources have reported that the US is preparing a draft resolution for the UNSC to formalise the post-war governance environment in Gaza. The resolution aims to establish a Board of Peace to function as a transitional government administration for Gaza with the authority to establish the ISF. The ISF will be tasked with protecting civilians and humanitarian aid operations, with an initial two-year deployment. The document specifies that the ISF will have an enforcement mandate, enabling it to employ greater force than conventional peacekeeping forces under UN mandates. Although the US has not formally proposed the resolution and it remains unclear when the vote will take place, the UNSC is highly likely to adopt the resolution in the coming weeks. Nevertheless, the Board of Peace’s establishment is unlikely to immediately improve governance conditions within Gaza. Moreover, negotiations on the ISF’s composition will likely delay its deployment until at least Q1 2026, sustaining security risks for locally engaged staff. Upon its deployment, we assess that the ISF will likely face substantial co-ordination issues, particularly in the first weeks of deployment. This will sustain critical risks across Gaza, particularly as Hamas will highly likely resist efforts to enforce the ceasefire agreement’s disarmament clause, possibly triggering clashes with ISF units. The risk of continued clashes between Hamas militants, IDF personnel and ISF personnel will sustain risks of civilian and bystander exposure to crossfire; it will also compound pressure on the broader peace process, sustaining risks of conflict re-escalation in the medium-to-long term.
• WEST BANK: Israeli settlers employed a drone to harass Palestinian olive farmers, underscoring increasing threats to civilians, activists and journalists in the central West Bank. On 3 November, civilian security officers from the Revava settlement (Salfit governorate) employed a commercial drone to harass Palestinian farmers harvesting olives in Deir Istiya (Salfit governorate). The settlers flew the drone approximately 2m above the ground in an attempt to disperse the farmers, resulting in the injury of an Israeli activist from the T’ruah organisation, which often accompanies Palestinians engaging in agricultural work to deter Israeli settler attacks. The drone subsequently fell to the ground. Two settlement security officers (dressed in IDF fatigues) carrying firearms approached the farmers and activists; they discharged their weapons into the air while recovering the drone. The incident underscores the increasing risks of settler violence during the ongoing olive harvesting season, particularly in central West Bank areas (see Sibylline Middle East Crisis Update – 29 October 2025). As the olive harvest continues, Israeli settlers will likely continue intensifying attacks targeting Palestinian civilians, employing drones, firearms and physical intimidation to harass and disperse agricultural workers. The settlers will also almost certainly continue conducting arson attacks targeting Palestinian agricultural holdings, vehicles and properties, driving localised threats to the assets and property of locally engaged staff, particularly those living and working near Israeli settlements. Activists and journalists accompanying Palestinians or attempting to document settler violence will also face significantly elevated risks of harassment and targeted violence, while risks of detention and deportation by the Israeli security forces will also remain elevated in the coming months. The escalating settler violence will almost certainly compound already elevated ethno-religious tensions within the West Bank. Such tensions will likely increase Palestinian militant groups’ radicalisation and recruitment efforts in the coming weeks. This will sustain elevated risks of attacks targeting Israeli security force positions in the West Bank and within Israel, particularly during the upcoming Hanukkah festivities (between 14 and 22 December).

REGIONAL AND GLOBAL DEVELOPMENTS

• Iraq-Iran: Iran has reportedly encouraged several of its proxies in Iraq to shift their focus from armed resistance to political engagement, in order to mitigate against likely US sanctions against these groups and the Iraqi economy in 2026. Similarly, the Iraqi government has allegedly encouraged Iran-backed Iraqi militias, who are still not fully integrated within the Popular Mobilisation Forces (PMF) umbrella group, to prioritise their political activities following the upcoming parliamentary elections on 11 November. However, militia-affiliated sources indicate that there is some reluctance to pursue this course due to groups’ concerns over loss of autonomy. Therefore, Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammed Shia’ al-Sudani (who we assess will likely return following the 11 November polls) will have to continue to balance Iranian and US interests in the post-election period (see Sibylline Situation Update Brief – 4 November 2025). However, if al-Sudani secures a large parliamentary bloc, he will be able to form a reformist government through which he can pursue efforts to reduce the autonomy of Iran-backed militias. This will likely be done through a mix of institutional incentives and selective coercion, while also increasing Iraq’s security co-ordination with the US. However, even if Iraq implements policies favouring US interests, al-Sudani’s controversial electoral alliance with the National Contract Party (NCP), which is led by Faleh al-Fayyadh (the head of the Iran-aligned PMF), will sustain the risks of US sanctions in 2026. Any such sanctions will primarily target governmental institutions and/or public entities that are linked to Iran-backed militias and individuals. This will increase compliance risks for the shipping, finance and logistics sectors in particular, given that militia influence is strong in these sectors.

Nov 03.

• Israel: Corruption investigation will elevate reputational risks, impact investor confidence, stocks. Earlier on 3 November, the Israeli police arrested several senior officials – including the chairman and officials from public companies – from the General Federation of Labour (Histadrut), on suspicions of bribery, breach of trust, fraud, money laundering and tax offences. The arrests follow a two-year undercover investigation, during which time the police detained and questioned senior officials connected to the municipalities of Ashdod (Southern district), Kiryat Bialik (Haifa district), Rishon LeZion and Rosh HaAyin (both Central district), as well as to El Al airlines and Israel Railways. Among the allegations, the police are investigating connections between the business community and public office appointments, as well as possible allegations of electoral fraud. We assess that the investigation will likely increase reputational risks for companies that are involved or affiliated with the affected suspects and businesses. There is a realistic possibility that senior employees in large Israeli companies will be forced to resign, causing economic instability, possibly impacting shares in the Israeli stock exchange and investor confidence. The investigation also highlights the elevated corruption, supervision and regulatory risks in Israel, possibly impacting the construction and insurance sectors.
• Iran: Critical water levels to drive operational risks, elevated anti-government sentiment in Tehran. On 2 November, Iranian state media reported that Amir Kabir Dam (Alborz province), the main source of drinking water for the capital Tehran, is at 8% capacity and could run dry within the next two weeks. No additional details were provided about the city’s other four reservoirs; however, water levels in Tehran’s dams are at their lowest in over a century (see Sibylline Situation Update Brief – 8 August 2025). Although the authorities have already asked residents to reduce water use, more stringent measures are likely in the coming days, including intermittent closures of public offices and scheduled water cuts, driving supply chain and operational disruptions due to delays in administrative processes. Water pressure will also likely continue to drop in the coming days, resulting in unstable access to potable water across the city and possibly increasing the prevalence of infectious diseases. The crisis has almost certainly been intensified by decades of government mismanagement and corruption. As a result, anti-government sentiment and incidents of small-scale protests, as well as corresponding crackdowns, will possibly increase in Tehran over the coming weeks, raising security risks for local personnel. (Source: Sibylline)

————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————-

Founded in 1987, Exensor Technology is a world leading supplier of Networked Unattended Ground Sensor (UGS) Systems providing tailored sensor solutions to customers all over the world. From our Headquarters in Lund Sweden, our centre of expertise in Network Communications at Communications Research Lab in Kalmar Sweden and our Production site outside of Basingstoke UK, we design, develop and produce latest state of the art rugged UGS solutions at the highest quality to meet the most stringent demands of our customers. Our systems are in operation and used in a wide number of Military as well as Home land Security applications worldwide. The modular nature of the system ensures any external sensor can be integrated, providing the user with a fully meshed “silent” network capable of self-healing. Exensor Technology will continue to lead the field in UGS technology, provide our customers with excellent customer service and a bespoke package able to meet every need.

A CNIM Group Company

———————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————

Sponsored by Bertin Exensor

www.exensor.com

————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————-
Military And Security Developments

Nov 07.

Ukraine: Wiper malware highlights sustained destruction risks from Russian threat actors. On 6 November, the cyber security company ESET reported that renowned Russian state-sponsored group ‘Sandworm’ had targeted key sectors in Ukraine in destructive cyber attacks between April and September. Sandworm relied on another suspected Russian state-sponsored group (‘UAC-0099’) to obtain access to targeted organisations. The group then deployed two data wipers in April to corrupt and/or delete files within the systems of an unnamed Ukrainian university. Between June and September, Sandworm also targeted entities within the government, energy, logistics and grain sectors with multiple wiper variants. The grain sector presents a new target for Sandworm; it likely aims to disrupt Ukraine’s primary economic export, highlighting the continuous evolution of Russia’s targets. Sandworm’s destructive activity spiked during the initial phase of the Russo-Ukrainian war and later decreased to prioritise cyber espionage. Nevertheless, we assess that Russian threat actors simultaneously continue to carry out destructive malware operations to support ongoing kinetic action.

Nov 05.
KEY DEVELOPMENTS
• STRATEGY: NBC reported that a recent US intelligence assessment concluded that Russian President Vladimir Putin is ‘more determined than ever to carry on the war’, which strongly aligns with our own ongoing assessment
• PERSONNEL: The departure of young 18-22 year old Ukrainian men will highly likely compound not only short-term labour shortages, including in sectors such as hospitality and retail, but also medium-to-longer term manpower shortages
• ENERGY: The ‘heating season’ in Ukraine officially commenced on 28 October, with energy security risks likely to be particularly heightened this year amid upticks in the intensity and lethality of Russian long-range strikes
• FORECAST: The situation for Ukrainian forces in Pokrovsk is steadily deteriorating as Russian forces expand their presence within the city, threatening Ukrainian ground lines of communication
• STRATEGY: On 28 October, NBC reported that a recent US intelligence assessment concluded that Russian President Vladimir Putin is ‘more determined than ever to carry on the war’, which strongly aligns with our own ongoing assessment. The intelligence assessment was reportedly provided to members of the US Congress in October. It underscored that US intelligence agencies have detected no signs that Russia is willing to compromise to end the war in Ukraine, in line with our assessment. According to unnamed senior US congressional officials, President Putin is reportedly committed to securing more territory in Ukraine in order to justify the war’s human and financial costs to date. It is possible that this intelligence assessment influenced US President Donald Trump’s decision to levy sanctions on Russia’s two oil giants last month. It remains our assessment that the Kremlin is prepared for Russia to suffer even worse economic costs in a bid to achieve its objectives in Ukraine; it is likely doubling down on its attritional strategy ahead of 2026.
• LYMAN: In recent months, Russian forces have made slow but steady progress along the southern part of the Oskil-Kreminna axis, advancing slowly towards the key town of Lyman (Donetsk oblast). Over the last two years, Russian progress in reclaiming the territory lost in this area during Ukraine’s 2022 Kharkiv counter-offensive has been extremely slow. However, some notable advances have been made in recent months, including the consolidation of the Serebryanske forest on the northern (left) bank of the Siverskyi Donets River. The Russian forces are now operating in the eastern half of Yampil (Donetsk oblast), a town located around six miles (10km) to the south-east of Lyman and to the west of the Serebryanske forest.
• LYMAN: The spokesperson for Ukraine’s 11th Army Corps reported on 2 November that Russian forces are accumulating in the Serebryanske forest and are exploiting the terrain to bypass Ukrainian positions. Russian forces are also reportedly establishing artificial embankments across the Siverskyi Donets River to facilitate the transport of vehicles to reinforce their forward positions. We previously reported on possible Russian improvements in their amphibious tactics in recent months, after disastrous crossing attempts in this area made in 2022. Russian forces have nevertheless seemingly successfully used the forest throughout the summer and autumn to support their advances towards Lyman, but the loss of foliage cover in the winter will likely reduce its utility in the coming months. This will only underscore the importance of drone operations in facilitating further Russian advances in this sector.
• LYMAN: Ukraine’s 3rd Army Corps spokesperson reported on 30 October that Russian forces are continuing to attack in small infantry groups in the Lyman sector, but their intensity and frequency reduces when poor weather conditions limit Russia’s drone effectiveness. This is notable as Ukrainian soldiers fighting in the area have observed an increase in Russian drone activity, particularly heavy bomber drones. This includes the newly deployed Koschei drone with a payload capacity of 15kg (which as a result is a very capable logistics drone in resupplying forward Russian positions). Elsewhere along the frontline, Russian forces have appeared to favour attacking during poor weather, as this also hampers Ukraine’s drone capabilities. This possibly indicates growing Russian reliance upon drones to make advances in the Lyman direction.
• LYMAN: While it remains unclear if and when Russian forces will move on Lyman, pressure is clearly mounting despite Ukrainian counter-attacks successfully limiting some Russian advances. Geolocated footage published on 29 October indicated that Russian forces had likely infiltrated south-eastern Lyman for the first time since the 2022 Kharkiv counter-offensive. While unlikely to be a permanent presence, the development underscores Russia’s improvements in infiltration tactics and their ability to (temporarily) exploit gaps in Ukraine’s defences in this area, likely to prepare the ground for more concerted assaults in the coming weeks.
• PERSONNEL: Politico reported on 29 October that the relaxation of border rules for young Ukrainian men has precipitated an influx of 18 to 22 year olds to Germany and Poland in recent months. As of late August, restrictions have been lifted on Ukrainian men aged 18 to 22 which had prevented them from leaving the country (see Sibylline Ukraine Update – 28 August 2025). According to data from the Polish Border Guard, nearly 45,300 Ukrainian men in this age group crossed the border to Poland from the beginning of 2025 until the easing of restrictions in late August. In the following two months alone, that number grew to 98,500 (or 1,600 per day). Meanwhile, the number of Ukrainian men in this age range entering Germany rose from 19 per week in mid-August to between 1,400 and 1,800 per week in October.
• PERSONNEL: While we cannot confirm the figures, we assess that the departure of young Ukrainian men will highly likely compound not only short-term labour shortages in Ukraine, including in sectors such as hospitality and retail, but also medium-to-long-term manpower shortages. We assess that manpower remains the perennial and defining weakness of the Ukrainian war machine. Efforts to bolster recruitment and conscription have achieved diminishing returns at a time when Russia is beginning to slowly expand the size of its forces deployed to Ukraine. The conscription age in Ukraine starts from 25 years old, so an exodus of young men will lower Ukraine’s available pool of future manpower. While many European countries remain largely welcoming to Ukrainian refugees, influxes of young Ukrainian men will possibly fuel concerns about strains on housing and infrastructure in host nations. In turn, this will realistically drive Ukraine scepticism among sectors of society in these countries over the coming months.
• STRIKES: Russian strikes continue to include significant barrages launched on a semi-regular basis. On 30 October, Russia launched a particularly large airstrike, including 52 missiles and 653 drones, which hit multiple power plants across several regions. DTEK, Ukraine’s largest private energy company, stated that this was the third such major strike on its thermal power plants in October. Such large-scale attacks, along with relatively smaller salvos, will exert significant pressure on Ukraine’s energy security (see ENERGY below for further analysis).
• STRIKES: On 3 November, Bloomberg reported that the UK had recently resupplied Ukraine with British-made Storm Shadow cruise missiles. The number of missiles remains unknown as well as the exact date of their delivery. On 21 October, Ukraine conducted a strike on a chemical plant in Russia’s Bryansk oblast using a Storm Shadow missile. While representing a significant offensive capability, the effectiveness of Storm Shadows at range will partly depend on the provision of targeting data from the US. The missile is capable of striking targets independently using GPS but doing so increases its vulnerability to electronic warfare (EW) and air defence interception. Ultimately, the sustained provision of US geospatial intelligence is likely to remain uncertain amid US President Donald Trump’s oscillating foreign policy regarding Ukraine. Additionally, the impact of these strikes is unlikely to be a game changer due to the likely limited number of missiles available.
• STRIKES: Ukrainian strikes continue to heavily target oil facilities, adding growing pressure on Russia’s oil sector. On 31 October, Vasyl Maliuk, the head of Ukraine’s Security Service (SBU), said that between September and October, Ukrainian forces struck 20 oil production and refining facilities. According to Maliuk, there have been a total of 160 strikes since the start of the year. The official further assessed that Ukraine’s strike campaign has caused a 20% deficit in Russia’s domestic fuel market and temporarily shut down 37% of the country’s refining capacity.
POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS
• ENERGY: The ‘heating season’ in Ukraine officially commenced on 28 October, with energy security risks likely to be particularly heightened this year. Previously, Russia has typically intensified its long-range strikes against Ukrainian energy infrastructure in the autumn and winter months, likely in part to demoralise the Ukrainian population and also to undermine military-industrial production and resiliency. We assess that the heightened energy insecurity will increase the risk of scheduled and unplanned blackouts for both domestic and industrial customers over the coming months.
• ENERGY: Earlier on 4 November, Ukraine’s Ministry of Energy reported that scheduled rolling blackouts and restrictions on electricity usage will be in effect across certain regions for industrial consumers. The Ministry specified that such measures are planned to be in place from 0800hrs to 1100hrs and from 1500hrs to 2200hrs (all local time). Such continuous blackouts and energy restrictions will increase the risk of operational disruption over the coming months, particularly for energy-intensive industries. This could realistically result in operational delays, operational downtime and revenue loss for companies. For further analysis on why energy security risks this autumn and winter in Ukraine are likely to differ from previous years, see Sibylline Ukraine Monthly Forecast – 24 October 2025.
• DIPLOMACY: The Kremlin’s comments on 2 November that there is ‘no need’ for a meeting between President Putin and President Trump highly likely reaffirm Moscow’s limited willingness to work towards ending the war in good faith. Plans for a second Putin-Trump summit in 2025 were shelved in October (see Sibylline Ukraine Update – 21 October 2025). According to a report from the Financial Times (FT) on 31 October, the US cancelled the meeting after the Russian Foreign Ministry sent a memorandum outlining the same demands to address what Russia refers to as the ‘root causes’ of its full-scale invasion. These included demands for Ukraine to make territorial concessions, a reduction in Ukraine’s armed forces and guarantees that the country will never become a member of NATO.
• DIPLOMACY: While we cannot confirm the FT’s report, it is highly likely credible given that President Trump previously stated that he did not want the meeting to be in vain. Ultimately, the contents of the memorandum contain some of Russia’s long-standing terms on which it seeks to end the war, which reinforces our assessment that it has not largely deviated from its core objectives in Ukraine. On 3 November, the Deputy Chairman of Russia’s Security Council, Dmitry Medvedev, claimed that the more the West supports Ukraine, the more Ukrainian territory that will return to its ‘native Russia’. Such comments indicate that Russia has greater territorial ambitions in Ukraine beyond the lands it currently occupies and that the Kremlin remains unwilling to make significant compromises for peace, supporting our ongoing assessment (see STRATEGY above).
• BELARUS: Belarusian President Alyaksandr Lukashenka confirmed on 31 October that Russia will deploy its intermediate-range ballistic Oreshnik missile system in Belarus in December. President Lukashenka stated that the missile system will be placed on combat duty; he sought to portray the deployment as a warning to Western adversaries. The missile reportedly featured in the joint Belarusian-Russian ‘Zapad 2025’ military drills in September; Belarus had previously announced Russia’s plans to deploy multiple Oreshnik missile systems to Belarus by the end of the year. Russia first used the Oreshnik missile against Ukraine in Dnipro (Dnipropetrovsk oblast) in November 2024 (see Sibylline Ukraine Update – 25 November 2024).
• BELARUS: While we continue to assess that the Oreshnik’s military capability remains limited, the Kremlin almost certainly sees its primary utility as a strategic deterrence weapon; its deployment supports Russia’s reflexive control campaign aimed at deterring the West from expanding military support to Ukraine. We assess that further demonstrative strikes against Ukraine are possible in the coming months during periods of high geopolitical tension. Nevertheless, we continue to assess that such strikes are unlikely to present a marked increase in threat in comparison to existing ballistic missiles (such as Iskander-M or air-launched Kinzhal missiles).
FORECAST
POKROVSK: The situation for the Ukrainian forces in Pokrovsk (Donetsk oblast) is steadily deteriorating as Russian forces expand their presence within the city, threatening Ukrainian ground lines of communication. While a complete encirclement of Pokrovsk has not been achieved, steady Russian gains are raising concerns about the viability of Ukrainian logistics and evacuation routes, which are increasingly threatened by Russian drones as well as ground infiltrations. Ultimately, Pokrovsk retains significant strategic value; it would likely facilitate future Russian offensives in Donetsk oblast, particularly targeting the region’s so-called fortress-belt of cities to the north-east (Druzhkivka, Kostiantynivka, Kramatorsk and Sloviansk).
On 1 November, Ukrainian Commander-in-Chief Oleksandr Syrskyi assured the public that Russian forces have not encircled Pokrovsk and its nearby satellite town Myrnohrad (Donestk oblast), located to the east. However, he also noted that Russian units operating in the Pokrovsk agglomeration are systematically attempting to cut off supply routes. Geolocated footage over the past week has confirmed some notable Russian advances inside Pokrovsk, as well as in Myrnohrad to the east and Rodynske (Donetsk oblast) to the north, underscoring the growing threat on three exposed flanks. Syrskyi stated that the city’s defence will be reinforced with additional personnel, weapons and equipment, including drones.
The Russian forces have likely succeeded in infiltrating hundreds of soldiers inside Pokrovsk, amid a significant concentration of forces in the wider Pokrovsk region. On 29 October, Ukraine’s 7th Rapid Reaction Corps reported that Russian forces have concentrated an additional 11,000 personnel for the Pokrovsk effort alone; President Volodymyr Zelensky estimates that around 170,000 Russian personnel have concentrated across the wider Pokrovsk sector. It is almost certain that Russian forces significantly outnumber and overmatch Ukrainian forces, despite Ukraine’s successful counter-attacks to date. In particular, Ukrainian forces have successfully pushed back Russia’s positions to the north of Pokrovsk and to the east of Dobropillia, where a notable Russian penetration took place back in August. As of 2 November, it is highly likely that Ukrainian forces have retaken a significant proportion of the territory originally seized. This reflects Ukraine’s likely prioritisation of counter-attacking in this direction, likely in a mutually reinforcing operation aimed at relieving pressure on its forces defending Pokrovsk-Myrnohrad to the south.
The recent deployment of the Ukrainian special forces in the Pokrovsk sector reflects Ukraine’s capability to launch sophisticated counter-attacks, but it also likely highlights the growing concern among Ukrainian decision-makers as to the medium-term viability of its forward positions. On 31 October, Ukraine reportedly conducted a heliborne assault to insert special forces from the military intelligence (GUR) west of Pokrovsk. Ukrainian military intelligence sources told a Ukrainian outlet that the areas targeted by the operation had previously been claimed by Russian forces; the territory is critical for Ukrainian logistics. Russian sources, including the Russian Ministry of Defence (MoD), have denied Ukraine’s account, claiming that the operation was repelled and asserting that there were significant Ukrainian losses. While we cannot confirm how successful the operation was, the fact that it was launched (as confirmed by geolocated footage) raises questions about the density of Russia’s air defence umbrella around Pokrovsk. The density of drones should provide Russian forces with significant intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities, but these seemingly did not prevent the assault from taking place.
The gains made by Russian troops in Pokrovsk likely highlight continued improvements in their urban tactics compared with previous battles, such as in Avdiivka (Donetsk oblast; 2023-2024) and Bakhmut (Donetsk oblast; 2022-2023). A prominent Ukrainian military observer noted that Russian forces are taking a more systematic approach by mapping Ukrainian defences to identify logistics routes, drone teams and vulnerabilities. They then launch co-ordinated insertions into identified gaps to disrupt command-and-control (C2), logistics and strike operations rather than merely occupying ground. This was confirmed by a Ukrainian officer who stated on 31 October that Russian forces in Pokrovsk are deliberately targeting Ukrainian drone and mortar units to degrade Ukraine’s strike and counter-battery capabilities. Russian forces are also exploiting adverse weather, which limits Ukrainian drone efficiency, to penetrate Pokrovsk with groups of up to 30 to 40 personnel.
Ultimately, Russia’s gains are likely to increase pressure on Ukrainian decision-makers to either commit to a risky, protracted defence or organise a withdrawal to conserve capability. The deployment of GUR units likely indicates Kyiv’s determination to continue defending the city in the short term, given its strategic importance, as well as to facilitate evacuations and secure supply routes. However, failure to withdraw in time could produce a similar outcome to the final phase of the battle for Avdiivka in 2024, where a delayed retreat resulted in notable Ukrainian losses and the taking of prisoners.
Pokrovsk’s capture would likely provide Russian forces with an opportunity to build a semi-encirclement of Donetsk oblast’s so-called fortress-belt cities of Kramatorsk and Sloviansk further to the north in 2026. It ultimately remains unclear how strong Ukraine’s second-line defences are behind Pokrovsk or whether Russian forces will have exhausted themselves before opportunities emerge to advance further if the city falls. Capturing Pokrovsk would nevertheless provide opportunities for Russian forces to disrupt crucial Ukrainian military supply lines in arguably less advantageous, more rural terrain. Concurrently, the fall of Pokrovsk would enable Russia to continue operations towards Ukraine’s Dnipropetrovsk oblast, where it has already established a small foothold along the border with Donetsk oblast.
Beyond the battlefield, the Kremlin would highly likely use the capture of Pokrovsk to support its information operations aimed at Western leaders, including President Trump, to suggest that supporting Ukraine is not viable and that a Russian victory is inevitable. However, even if Pokrovsk does fall in the coming weeks and months, the battle will have been ongoing for over a year. Given that the battles for Bakhmut and Avdiivka before it were multi-year operations, it remains unlikely that Russian forces will be able to make much quicker progress in the much larger (and more heavily defended and defensible) fortress-belt cities of Donetsk oblast in the coming months.
Russian Cyber Strategy
Key points
• The development of Russia’s tactics, techniques and procedures (TTPs) will highly likely sustain cyber espionage risks to Ukraine’s government, critical national infrastructure (CNI) and defence sectors, as well as European NGOs in the long term.
• The current geopolitical landscape will highly likely continue to encourage a redirection of Russian cyber operations towards European countries. This trend will increase cyber espionage risks to government, CNI, defence, diplomatic and academic entities.
• European CNI will also face heightened operational risks as pro-Russia hacktivist groups increasingly demonstrate their intent and capability to compromise operational technology (OT) systems.
Context
In the first half (H1) of 2025, Ukraine recorded a total of 3,018 cyber incidents by Russian threat actors, which marked a 17.2% increase compared to the number of incidents (2,575) recorded in late 2024. During these attacks, Russian threat actors largely adopted new techniques of collecting data and informing ongoing kinetic action, highlighting a broader de-prioritisation of causing larger-scale disruption to Ukrainian CNI. At the same time, the US’ shifting stance towards NATO and Ukraine has precipitated an increase in Russian cyber operations against Europe, raising security and espionage risks for the region. These risks will likely persist over the medium-to-long term as the geopolitical landscape continues to inform Russia’s objectives in the cyber domain.
Forecast
The ongoing evolution of Russia’s TTPs will sustain cyber espionage risks to Ukrainian entities as the war persists
A cyber espionage operation (‘PhantomCaptcha’) targeted Ukrainian regional government administrations and NGOs involved in war relief efforts in October. Preparations for the campaign reportedly started in March and continued through to October, though the campaign itself was active for only one day, highlighting its-pre-meditated and surgical nature. In February, multiple Russia-backed groups infiltrated devices used by members of the Ukrainian military likely to exfiltrate tactical intelligence, further illustrating the increasingly targeted nature of data collection attacks.
At the same time, the PhantomCaptcha operation also employed a new social engineering technique (‘ClickFix’) to trick users into executing a remote access trojan (RAT) after completing a fake CAPTCHA verification page. This further highlights a broader technical and methodical shift in Russian operations. This shift was exemplified by two cyber attacks on at least two Ukrainian organisations by a Russia-backed group (‘Seashell Blizzard’) between June and August. Seashell Blizzard used Living-off-the-Land (LotL) techniques, typically considered uncommon for Russian threat actors, to avoid installing custom malware payloads and to enhance the operation’s stealth. As a result, the group was able to maintain prolonged persistence to facilitate reconnaissance, lateral movement and data exfiltration, marking a departure from previous resource-intensive operations.
The adaptation of Russia’s TTPs was also corroborated by a report published in July by the Computer Emergency Response Team of Ukraine (CERT-UA) that stated that a Russia-backed group (‘APT28’) had deployed an artificial intelligence (AI)-generated payload onto compromised systems in Ukraine. Later in October, CERT-UA confirmed that Russia is increasingly incorporating AI into its cyber operations, highlighting its adoption of modern technologies to streamline malware development. As a consequence, Ukrainian entities will face sustained cyber espionage and data-theft risks as Russia dynamically adapts its TTPs to the fluctuating demands of the war.
Russia will pose increased cyber espionage risks to European entities amid shifting geopolitical demands
In May, a joint investigation by Germany, France, the UK and the US revealed that a Russia-backed group (‘APT28’) had targeted European organisations involved in supplying defence, IT services and logistics support to Ukraine. In the same month, another Russia-backed group (‘Void Blizzard’) was reported to have targeted government and defence sector organisations across Europe in a cyber espionage operation that had been ongoing since at least 2024. Throughout the campaign, the group extracted emails, files and chat messages to collect strategic information pertaining to the war in Ukraine and Europe’s security posture. Later in October, the technology company Google also warned that another group (‘COLDRIVER’) had upgraded its malware, after it had been discovered by security researchers, to continue infiltrating European systems within the government and defence sectors, as well as journalists, think tanks and NGOs.
Europe’s continued support for Ukraine, alongside US President Donald Trump’s hostile rhetoric towards NATO and its shifting stance towards Ukraine, have likely influenced an incremental redirection of Russia’s cyber efforts towards the bloc. It is highly likely that this geopolitical landscape will continue to inform Russia’s cyber strategy in the medium term, therefore heightening cyber espionage risks to the aforementioned entities. These risks will also likely apply to European entities operating within Russia in light of a cyber attack on foreign diplomatic entities and embassies in the capital Moscow in February. During the attack, threat actors intercepted telecommunications and internet service providers (ISPs) to install malware and monitor communications, highlighting the increased infection risks stemming from an organisation’s supply chain.
In September, another Russia-backed group (‘APT29’) targeted Europe-based academics and other individuals who have been critical of Russia in a cyber espionage campaign that likely aimed to gather information and monitor communications. This operation aligns with a broader attempt by Russia to stifle anti-Russia dissent across Europe. Such operations are also likely to continue in the medium term.
• Global: Stealthy technique highlights heightened cyber espionage risks for Russia’s strategic targets. On 4 November, international news outlets reported that a Russian state-sponsored group (‘Curly COMrades’) had exploited the legitimate Microsoft feature Hyper-V to conduct stealthy cyber espionage operations since at least July. Reportedly, Curly COMrades enabled Hyper-V after infiltrating targeted systems, in order to deploy a lightweight Linux-based virtual machine (VM) within an organisation’s virtual environment. The group then used the VM to store two malicious payloads (‘CurlyShell’ and ‘CurlCat’), while simultaneously evading detection by traditional endpoint detection and response (EDR) mechanisms. Curly COMrades also renamed the VM after a legitimate Windows system to make malicious traffic appear legitimate, thereby enhancing the operation’s stealth. The group also employed PowerShell scripts to maintain prolonged persistence while the two payloads facilitated traffic obfuscation and command execution, highlighting the likely long-term nature of these attacks. We assess that Russia’s strategic targets face heightened security and cyber espionage risks amid the continuous evolution of Russia’s cyber capabilities.
Nov 03.
• Ukraine: Failure to secure EU loan backed by frozen Russian assets will worsen public finances. Earlier on 3 November, news outlet Politico reported that the EU’s failure to issue a loan to Ukraine backed by frozen Russian assets will reduce the likelihood of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) providing financial support to Kyiv. Anonymous EU officials cited by Politico stated that securing the loan is essential to convince the IMF that Ukraine remains financially viable in the coming years and to unlock further support from the international institution. However, Belgium has long opposed the use of Russian frozen assets for Ukraine’s benefit. IMF experts are expected to visit Ukraine in November to discuss a three-year support programme, with a decisive IMF meeting on the issue planned for December. EU leaders will also debate the use of Russian frozen assets on 18 to 19 December. Even if the EU agrees to such a loan, it will likely come too late to influence the IMF’s decision. Ultimately, failure to secure this crucial aid will highly likely undermine Ukraine’s fragile public finances, which are already projected to face a USD 19bn deficit.
• Ukraine: Democratic backsliding, particularly on corruption, will remain major bar to EU integration. On 3 November, the European Commission urged Ukraine to reverse a recent downturn in its anti-corruption efforts, while praising the country’s continued commitment to joining the EU. In July, President Volodymyr Zelensky signed a law that limited the independence of two anti-corruption agencies, triggering the largest protests since the start of Russia’s full-scale invasion in February 2022. These protests prompted Zelensky to withdraw the legislation and submit a new bill aimed at restoring the agencies’ independence (see Sibylline Special Report – 31 July 2025). The move threatened to seriously undermine the independence of the bodies, which together with recurring corruption cases, underscores the longstanding governance challenges facing the country’s EU integration. Embroiled in conflict with Russia and under martial law, Ukraine’s political system has undergone significant centralisation of power under the presidency, sparking criticism about the risks this poses to the country’s democratic standards. Ultimately, failure to improve governance and strengthen institutional independence will continue to undermine Ukraine’s already-limited prospects of EU membership but will also further erode public and private sector investor confidence in the meantime. (Source: Sibylline)

 

04 Nov 25. Exclusive: inside Ukraine’s new defence procurement structure.
In a bid to speed up delivery of key equipment, Ukrainian brigades are able to procure directly from manufacturers.
Oksana Ferchuk, Deputy Minister of Defence of Ukraine for Digital Development, Digital Transformation and Digitalization. Credit: IT Arena
• Dual-track procurement: traditional channels for lethal gear and DOT-Chain marketplace for rapid non-lethal buys
• Local funding, DOT-Chain, and “unique” postal service cut delivery from months to days
• Digitised administration (Army+, Reserve+, Impulse) improves recruitment, tracking, and real-time testing
As much as the Ukraine-Russia conflict is teaching Western nations about changing operational concepts on the modern-day battlefield, Ukraine is also able to demonstrate a new approach in equipment procurement and sustaining units in the field.
In an exclusive interview with Army Technology, Oksana Ferchuk, Deputy Minister of Defence of Ukraine for Digital Development, Digital Transformation and Digitalization discussed Ukraine’s evolved military procurement practises during a war where time is of the essence.
“Doing it [via traditional Western European procurement], you would spend months, years [waiting for delivery]. Now you are able to test in a week’s time, adjust your products and delivery gap,” Ferchuk said, speaking to Army Technology in Lviv in late-September 2025.
Ukraine’s “unique” postal service is also able to deliver systems to units in the field without risk of being uncovered via a security weakness or a loose paper trail.
Maintaining a two-pillar procurement structure, where lethal capabilities are acquired through more traditional government-led structures, along with the rapid delivery of non-lethal systems, such as drones, sensors, and electronic warfare (EW) systems, to battlefield units via the DOT-Chain platform.
Through the DOT-Chain digital marketplace, certain Ukrainian brigades order drones and other equipment direct from the manufacturer. This allows defence start-ups and SMEs to pitch directly to the customer, who can then provide feedback and quickly iterate, a key requirement for Ukraine’s ever-evolving battlefields.
“Each brigade actually has their own budget, supplied from the local communities because brigades are paying a lot of taxes,” said Ferchuk. “It was a decision made by the country that a portion of those taxes and the local authorities will return to the military units as a donation. In such a way, our brigades currently have their own budget, which they are able to spend to the specific tasks.”
With this funding, selected Ukrainian brigades can acquire platforms outside the usual acquisition structures, that could otherwise take significantly longer to deliver.
“When the government noticed that such direct procurement is working effectively, they started to allocate directly from Ministry of Defence. This is the reason why the brigade can procure directly, not everything, but in areas where the general staff and army commanders decide that it’s wise. It is working very well,” Ferchuk explained.
While Army Technology was in Ukraine, the country’s Ministry of Defence revealed that within two months of the launch of the DOT-Chain initiative, the country’s military had ordered nearly 17,000 UAVs worth about UAH 600m ($14.3m). Currently, 12 combat brigades in key sectors, including Kharkiv, Zaporizhzhia, Donetsk, and Kherson, are participating in the pilot project.
The process enabled the delivery of drones to be reduced “from months to just a few days”, stated Denys Shmyhal, Minister of Defence of Ukraine, at the time.
This approach, described by Ferchuk as “absolutely unknown to the conventional military sector”, has produced “amazing results”, with drones and other electronic systems constantly being updated.
With Russia’s EW and tactical-level doctrine changing on a monthly, if not weekly basis, this helps keep Ukraine’s frontline units operationally relevant.
“The innovation is happening in Ukraine. If you would like to be relevant to the battlefield of the current, let’s say, decade, you have to be present in Ukraine.
“If you are not present in Ukraine, trying to sell products with the old conventional methodology, most probably you will be out of this market. Not next year, not three, five years, but in ten years,” Ferchuk contended.
Ukraine also has an advantage over Western European countries in being able to test new systems in real time and contested environments. Given this, Ukraine’s defence sector had a distinct advantage over European counterparts in being able to test and iterate capabilities, validating concepts before going to market.
“The Ukrainian Army is a frontier to other countries as well. This is a trained m-person army that knows how to conduct modern war. Other armies… are far behind the current processes, trends, technologies, and tactics. The only way for them to understand it is to come and to see how it’s working,” explained Ferchuk.
“We’ve tried a lot to explain how it works online, workshops, seminars, webinars. It doesn’t work. You have to be on the frontline to understand how it’s done in reality.”
Digitisation of Ukraine’s administration
As reported by Army Technology in 2024, Ukraine has taken strides in digitising much of the administrative processes of the miliary and reserve services, bringing efficiencies at a time when the system itself has had to expand exponentially to manage the demands of the war.
This includes the development and launch of the Army+ and Reserve+ digital apps, aiding training and administration for existing personnel as well as future recruitment.
Ferchuk, who prior to Russia’s 2022 large-scale invasion had executive experience inside Ukraine’s telecommunications sector, described the Reserve+ app as “really successful” in finding a way to “communicate with your potential audience” and help prepare those at initial or early stages of determining eligibility and recruitment.
The Army+ initiative has since evolved with the launch a new version, dubbed Impulse, which is in rollout and acts as an analytical database to catalogue skillsets and needs of the individual soldier.
While such digital systems are increasingly common in the civil sectors, the adoption by Ukraine’s government for defence purposes is a distinct non-traditional approach.
“It’s a really complicated task, but we have to perform it. There is no other way. If such data, such important data, do not exist online and you cannot rely on it, then your processes and decision making can lead to the incorrect solutions,” Ferchuk said.
Ukraine-Russia war: update
Despite the coming onset of the winter season, Russia continues to make incremental gains in sporadic areas across the frontline, which has changed little through 2025.
However, recent reports indicate that Russian forces have gained access to parts of Pokrovsk, with forces operating with “increased comfort” inside the city, according to the Institute for the Study of War.
Claims and counterclaims by both sides make exact understanding as to the situation on the ground in Pokrovsk difficult.
According to Ukraine’s Ministry of Defence, the intensity of combat operations along the front “remained high” throughout October, registering an increase in the number of recorded combat engagements compared to the previous month.
In a 3 November release, Ukraine’s MoD stated that its Armed Forces has reported 5,480 combat engagement in October, regularly exceeding 200 actions per day.
In addition, in October Russian forces conducted almost 140,000 artillery strikes, including 3,353 launched from multiple launch rocket systems.
(Source: army-technology.com)

 

06 Nov 25. Circus SE (ISIN: DE000A2YN355 / Symbol: CA1), a global technology leader in autonomous AI robotics systems, today announces that Circus Defence has signed a framework agreement with BRAVE1, the Ukrainian government’s defence technology platform. The program, initiated by the Ministry of Digital Transformation, Ministry of Defence, the Armed Forces of Ukraine, and Military Innovation Technology Solutions (MITS), aims to integrate and scale next-generation defence technologies in Ukraine.
The agreement establishes a collaboration to deploy autonomous ground infrastructure systems, starting with Circus AI robotics nutrition supply systems at BRAVE1 facilities, with deployments set to begin immediately. Circus Defence will additionally use the government-owned program’s expertise to grow its AI robotics product portfolio, expanding beyond meal supply to next-generation autonomous defence systems.
The first deployment marks both the first deployment under the newly formed Circus Defence entity and the world’s first use in active defence operations – starting in Ukraine. The deployment will provide Ukrainian partners with an operational logistics and efficiency advantage through fully autonomous nutrition systems.
The delivery to Ukraine marks Circus Defence’s operational market expansion where the company will leverage its global mass-production capabilities and the upcoming start of European high-volume production.
About BRAVE1
BRAVE1 is the official defence technology coordination platform of the Government of Ukraine, launched on 26 April 2023 to bring together innovative companies, startups, and research institutions developing technologies that can strengthen Ukraine’s defence capabilities. Founded jointly by the Ministry of Digital Transformation, Ministry of Defence, General Staff of the Armed Forces, National Security and Defense Council, Ministry of Strategic Industries, and Ministry of Economy, BRAVE1 serves as a hub for accelerating the development and deployment of cutting-edge defence innovations across multiple domains.
About Circus Defence
Circus Defence SE is part of Circus SE, a global leader in autonomous AI robotics and dual-use infrastructure systems. The company develops modular, AI-driven autonomous infrastructure solutions for mission-critical environments, building on Circus’s patented technologies and proven expertise in meal supply robotics. From its European engineering base, Circus Defence is advancing mobile, containerized systems for rapid setup and autonomous operation — developed and manufactured in Europe, for Europe.
About Military Innovation Technology Solutions (MITS)
MITS Capital – an American-Ukrainian investment group established in early 2024 to connect Western capital with Ukraine’s battlefield innovation. The firm combines a venture fund, accelerator, and financial advisory, uniquely positioning it to scale dual-use and defense technologies. Its platform includes the MITS Accelerator, MITS Lightning Fund, an investment advisory unit, and MITS LAB Initiative, with a mission to bring global capital into Ukraine’s defense industrial base.
(Source: BUSINESS WIRE)

 

04 Nov 25. Joint Statement: 19th Ukraine Defence Contact Group – National Armaments Directors. Joint Statement from the National Armaments Directors of Ukraine, Germany and the United Kingdom, co-chairs of the Ukraine Defence Contact Group (UDCG). On Friday 31 October, the 19th UDCG-NAD meeting took place at the NATO Headquarters in Brussels. National Armaments Directors (NADs) from over 40 nations and international agencies met, continuing to demonstrate the international resolve to provide enduring support to Ukraine through defence industrial cooperation and military assistance.
At the meeting, the Deputy Minister of Defence of Ukraine, Serhii Boyev, delivered an operational update on the current situation in Ukraine and their defence requirements. Significant time was also dedicated to discussing potential opportunities for future collaboration in supporting Ukraine’s defence needs, showcasing the groups continued and coordinated support.
NADs are now working together to ensure that commitments made in the Ministerial UDCG are rapidly delivered to ensure Ukraine’s long-term security and sovereignty. (Source: https://www.gov.uk/)

 

03 Nov 25. Ukraine gets more Patriot air defenses to counter Russian attacks — Ukraine has received more American-made Patriot air defense systems to help it counter Russia’s daily barrages, President Volodymyr Zelenskyy said, as Russian drones killed a man and injured five of his family members, including two children, in the latest nighttime attack.
Russia’s relentless pounding of urban areas behind the front line following its full-scale invasion of Ukraine nearly four years ago has killed thousands of civilians. It has also targeted the energy supply to deny civilians heat and running water in winter, as well as disrupt industrial production of Ukraine’s newly developed drones and missiles.
The sophisticated Patriot systems are the most effective weapon against Russian missiles. Zelenskyy has pleaded with Western partners to provide more of them, but production limitations and the need to maintain stockpiles have slowed their delivery.
“More Patriots are now in Ukraine and being put into operation,” Zelenskyy said on social media late Sunday. “Of course, more systems are needed to protect key infrastructure sites and our cities across the entire territory of our state.”
He thanked Germany and its Chancellor Friedrich Merz for the Patriots. Germany said three months ago it would deliver two more Patriot air defense systems to Ukraine. It agreed to the move after securing assurances that the U.S. will prioritize the delivery of new Patriots to Germany to backfill its stocks. Patriot systems are made only in the U.S.
NATO is coordinating regular deliveries of large weapons packages to Ukraine. European allies and Canada are buying much of the equipment from the United States, which has greater stocks of ready military materiel, as well as more effective weapons. The Trump administration is not giving any arms to Ukraine, unlike the previous Biden administration.
Russia launched 12 missiles of various types and 138 strike and decoy drones at Ukraine overnight from Sunday to Monday, Ukraine’s air force said. On some nights it has fired many hundreds of drones and missiles at Ukraine.
In Ukraine’s northeastern Sumy region, Russian drones hit a house where they killed a man and injured five members of his family, authorities said. Two women were also injured in a separate Sumy attack.
“The Russians cynically targeted people — deliberately, at night, while they were sleeping,” regional head Oleh Hryhorov wrote on Telegram in response to the attacks.
Russian missiles started a fire at a business in the central Dnipro region, injuring one man, regional head Vladyslav Haivanenko said.
Russian drones have also struck energy infrastructure in the southern Mykolaiv region.
At the same time, Ukraine has been trying to constrain Russia’s oil industry, a mainstay of its economy.
Ukrainian forces struck Russia’s Saratov oil refinery overnight and started a fire, according to Ukraine’s general staff. It was Ukraine’s fourth attack on the Saratov installation in almost seven weeks.
The refinery, located some 500 kilometers (300 miles) from the Ukrainian border, can process several m metric tons of oil a year.
Zelenskyy claimed last week that long-range strikes on Russian refineries have reduced Moscow’s oil refining capacity by 20%. (Source: Defense News)

 

31 Oct 25. Russia uses missile in Ukraine that led Trump to quit nuclear treaty, Kyiv says.
• Summary
• Russia uses 9M729 missile in Ukraine, Kyiv says
• The 9M729 was at heart of arms control dispute in 2019
• The missile can carry a conventional or nuclear warhead
Russia has in recent months attacked Ukraine with a cruise missile whose secret development prompted Donald Trump to abandon a nuclear arms control pact with Moscow in his first term as U.S. president, Ukraine’s foreign minister said.
Andrii Sybiha’s comments are the first confirmation that Russia has used the ground-launched 9M729 missile in combat – in Ukraine or elsewhere.
Russia has fired the missile at Ukraine 23 times since August, a second senior Ukrainian official told Reuters. Ukraine also recorded two launches of the 9M729 by Russia in 2022, the source said. (Source: Reuters)
——————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————
Founded in 1987, Exensor Technology is a world leading supplier of Networked Unattended Ground Sensor (UGS) Systems providing tailored sensor solutions to customers all over the world. From our Headquarters in Lund Sweden, our centre of expertise in Network Communications at Communications Research Lab in Kalmar Sweden and our Production site outside of Basingstoke UK, we design, develop and produce latest state of the art rugged UGS solutions at the highest quality to meet the most stringent demands of our customers. Our systems are in operation and used in a wide number of Military as well as Homeland Security applications worldwide. The modular nature of the system ensures any external sensor can be integrated, providing the user with a fully meshed “silent” network capable of self-healing. Exensor Technology will continue to lead the field in UGS technology, provide our customers with excellent customer service and a bespoke package able to meet every need.

A CNIM Group Company
—————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————–

Sponsored by Bertin Exensor

www.exensor.com
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04 Nov 25. Sweden host Nato conference on civil defence this week.
Sweden, which last year allocated nearly $4bn to civil defence, is among the best placed to impart their knowledge on the subject.
Sweden will host a Nato conference on civil defence for allied military and civilian leadership through the first half of this week (3-5 November 2025) in Stockholm led by Ministers for Defence and Civil Defence, Pål Jonson and Carl-Oskar Bohlin.
It appears the Scandinavian country, which last year allocated Skr37.5bn ($3.9bn) to civil defence, is among the best placed countries to impart their knowledge on the subject, so often overlooked by nations where the Russian threat perception seems less invasive.
The gathering follows the June 2025 summit in the Hague, where allies adopted guidance to strengthen and develop civilian planning efforts. This was reflected in their defence spending, which was raised to 5% of a nation’s gross domestic product, up to 1.5% of which can be allocated to civil concerns like protecting critical national infrastructure – an obvious area of vulnerability in Europe at the moment.
For Nato, ‘civil preparedness’ is tied closely to core defence, and covers three related functions: continuity of government services, continuity of essential services for the population, and ensuring civil support for military operations.
In the end, the objective of the conference is to inform and promote civil-military collaboration. Panel discussions will take place, one will divulge details of Sweden’s latest assessment: ‘Planning assumptions for the development of the Swedish total defence 2025-2030’ while other discussions will focus on exchange of experience.
Disparate perceptions
Sweden has displayed remarkable fluidity between its military and civil defence. Through their conscription service, which was reinstated in 2018, it was said that 8,000 people would be enlisted in 2024, a target Politico said had been reached in July 2024.
But civil society offers more than just manpower. Sweden’s infrastructure supports heavier military platforms. The Air Force, for example, are able to take off and land Gripen fighter jets on reinforced roads.
This contrasts with continental efforts to build a military corridor running to Nato’s eastern flank. European auditors found that tanks from one EU country cannot move through another if they are heavier than road traffic regulations allow. Under normal circumstances, an EU country currently requires 45 days’ notification of cross-border movement authorisations.
The UK has a strikingly dissimilar conception of civil defence. In discussions among military officials and experts at the Royal United Services Institute in December 2024, it was suggested that the country must move away from considering its reservists as an appendage to regulars.
General Jim Hockenhull, commander of Cyber and Specialist Operations Command, held that the military ought to see the strategic value inherent in the reserves in any case, not to lean on them on an ad hoc basis in times of crisis. (Source: naval-technology.com)

 

04 Nov 25. Spending watchdog issues qualified opinions on Ministry of Defence accounts.
• The MoD has not provided accounting records for ongoing capital projects carried out on its behalf by AWE, a non-departmental public body that helps deliver the UK’s nuclear deterrent.
• A material shortfall in the provisions the MoD recognised in the 2023-24 financial statements across two separate matters also meant that they had to be restated.
• The Comptroller and Auditor General has consequently qualified his opinions on the MoD’s financial statements for 2024-25.
• Read MoD annual report and accounts 2024-25
• Download the press notice (PDF)
A lack of accounting records for some ongoing capital projects and a materially significant shortfall in the provisions for liabilities in the previous year’s accounts have led Gareth Davies, the Comptroller and Auditor General (C&AG), to issue qualified opinions on the Ministry of Defence (MoD)’s 2024-25 financial statements.1,2
The MoD protects the people, territories, values and interests of the United Kingdom, at home and overseas, through the Armed Forces and in partnership with allies.
It is responsible for a number of associated agencies and public bodies, including the Atomic Weapons Establishment (AWE), a non-departmental public body that helps deliver the UK’s nuclear deterrent.
As at 31 March 2025, projects carried out by AWE on behalf of the MoD constituted £6.13bn of the value of the department’s assets under construction (or ongoing capital projects) that relate to property and associated equipment as opposed to military equipment.3 Of this total, £1.5bn was identified as relating to legacy projects.
However, the value of AWE’s legacy projects has remained unchanged for several years, and the MoD was unable to provide supporting evidence for audit purposes or any assurance that the continued recognition of this value was appropriate.
The NAO also identified several other balances within the £6.13bn that did not appear to meet the criteria for continued recognition in line with accounting standards.
As a result, the C&AG has limited the scope of his audit opinion on the MoD’s financial statements for 2024-25.4
The NAO has also identified a shortfall of £2.56bn in the provisions for legal and other liabilities that the MoD had recognised in its 2023-24 financial statements.
Two separate matters gave rise to this shortfall. The first related to compensation and costs to settle legal claims associated with personal injury claims, including noise-induced hearing loss.5
The second matter concerned compensation and resettlement costs relating to the Afghan Relocations and Assistance Policy (ARAP) and the Afghanistan Response Route (ARR).6,7
The MoD had been expensing costs relating to the ARAP and ARR as they were incurred. They had not considered whether a provision was required for their future obligations.
The MoD did not brief the NAO on the existence of a significant data breach and the consequential establishment of the ARR until after a super-injunction was lifted in July 2025. As a result, the NAO was not in a position to consider or challenge the accounting for these arrangements as part of its 2023-24 audit.
Taken together, these two matters constitute a material omission from the MoD’s 2023-24 accounts, necessitating their restatement. The MoD did not have appropriate authorisation from Parliament for this expenditure, which has resulted in a qualified regularity opinion.
1. The MoD annual report and accounts 2024-25 can be accessed here: https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/ministry-of-defence-annual-report-and-accounts-2024-to-2025
2. The MoD is required to prepare its financial statements in accordance with the Government Financial Reporting Manual (FReM) issued by HM Treasury. Under the FReM, the department is required to apply International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) as adapted or interpreted for the public sector.
3. Assets under construction (AUC) is a temporary classification that is used while capital projects are still in progress and not yet operational. Costs incurred on projects expected to result in a capital asset should be capitalised and included within the Statement of Financial Position only where they are directly attributable to the resultant asset. Costs relating to a project that do not meet the International Accounting Standard (IAS) 16 criteria should be expensed as they are incurred. In recognition that such capital projects can span a number of years, the carrying value of AUC should be reviewed on a regular basis to ensure that the costs capitalised continue to meet the criteria for capital recognition. Where a project is cancelled or the scope changes then any costs no longer contributing to the eventual capital asset should be removed from the AUC balance.
4. The MoD has commenced a programme of work, in conjunction with AWE, to review the £6.13 bn project costs recorded in the project ledger of AWE to determine the appropriate carrying value of these ongoing projects in the department’s accounts. The NAO will audit the outcome of this programme of work as part of its 2025-26 audit, and expects that the outcome of the programme will be reflected in those financial statements.
5. The MoD had previously recognised provisions for these on the basis of claims received. However, following a legal case in July 2024, it accepted a duty of care to those affected, after which it should have recognised a provision for their estimated exposure to both current and future claims.
6. ARAP is a scheme for Afghan citizens who worked for or with the UK government in Afghanistan in exposed or meaningful roles, and may include an offer of relocation to the UK for those deemed eligible by the MoD and who are deemed suitable for relocation by the Home Office. ARAP launched on 1 April 2021 and was closed to new applications on 1 July 2025.
7. In April 2024, the government launched the ARR scheme specifically for those whose personal information was leaked in a February 2022 data breach, who were ineligible for any of the other government resettlement schemes in operation, and who were at significant risk of reprisal by the ruling Taliban regime in Afghanistan. The ARR scheme was discontinued on 4 July 2025.

 

03 Nov 25. Steel sector changes have “low” impact on UK defence, says Minister of State. The UK is consciously ending traditional practices of producing virgin steel from iron ore for greener steelmaking methods with electric arc furnaces.
Upon an initial assessment, the Ministry of Defence (MoD) claim that the impact of changes in Britain’s steelmaking capacity on military programmes remains low.
Such changes in steelmaking refer to a transition in the UK from traditional blast furnaces for crude steel production to the use of electric arc furnaces (EAFs), which instead melt scrap steel, which produces less carbon and need fewer people to operate.
Of course, many platforms require various forms of steel from the forthcoming Dreadnought class of nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines to stealthy F-35 fighter jets. Yet the UK has made the conscious decision to end its traditional practices of producing virgin steel from iron ore with the closure of blast furnaces at Port Talbot in September 2024.
In doing so, according to one think tank, Britain will be the only economy in the G20 without this sovereign capability.
However, the Minister for Defence Readiness and Industry, Luke Pollard, is less concerned about the risk of reliance on scrap steel. In a parliamentary written response on 30 October, it was the Minister of State who intimated that the risk on defence is “deemed to be low.”
At the same time, the Defence Industrial Strategy, issued in September, underlined the need for action when it comes to cultivating a stronger domestic supply chain for steel.
Nevertheless, the government will continue to investigate the impact on UK defence more closely in another Steel Strategy as they look to ensure that, despite the changes, the country can cultivate a competitive and sustainable steel industry. (Source: army-technology.com)

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Founded in 1987, Exensor Technology is a world leading supplier of Networked Unattended Ground Sensor (UGS) Systems providing tailored sensor solutions to customers all over the world. From our Headquarters in Lund Sweden, our centre of expertise in Network Communications at Communications Research Lab in Kalmar Sweden and our Production site outside of Basingstoke UK, we design, develop and produce latest state of the art rugged UGS solutions at the highest quality to meet the most stringent demands of our customers. Our systems are in operation and used in a wide number of Military as well as Homeland Security applications worldwide. The modular nature of the system ensures any external sensor can be integrated, providing the user with a fully meshed “silent” network capable of self-healing. Exensor Technology will continue to lead the field in UGS technology, provide our customers with excellent customer service and a bespoke package able to meet every need.

A CNIM Group Company
———————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————

Sponsored by Bertin Exensor

www.exensor.com

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30 Oct 25. The United States has signed a 10-year defence framework agreement with India, U.S. Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth said on Friday. The framework is considered a cornerstone for regional stability and deterrence, enhancing coordination, information sharing and technological cooperation between the two nations, Hegseth posted on X after a meeting with his Indian counterpart, Rajnath Singh. (Source: Reuters)

 

30 Oct 25. Pakistan-Afghanistan: Significant easing in tensions is unlikely despite reported resumption in talks. Earlier on 30 October, reports emerged that Pakistan and Afghanistan will resume peace talks in Turkey. Reportedly, both countries have agreed to restart negotiations after Turkey’s request. This follows the second round of talks aimed at establishing a long-term peace, which ended without a resolution on 28 October. According to a Pakistani security official, Pakistan will push its central demand during the talks to request that the Taliban authorities take action against militants using Afghanistan to plan attacks inside Pakistan. Pakistan has long accused the Afghan Taliban of sheltering Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP). This development comes amid persistent TTP activity targeting the security forces in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province (Pakistan), including during recent talks between the two countries, as well as the reported recent killing of a senior TTP leader in Pakistan. However, given the Taliban’s reluctance to act against the TTP, the TTP’s ongoing activity and the deep mistrust between Islamabad and Kabul, we assess that the talks are unlikely to result in a major breakthrough, sustaining tensions and the risk of renewed hostilities (see Sibylline Situation Update Brief – 28 October 2025). However, an extension of the ceasefire remains a realistic possibility. (Source: Sibylline)

 

29 Oct 25. Brazil: Major security operation in Rio de Janeiro state will increase risk of armed clashes. On 28 October, at least 64 people died and 81 were arrested during a security operation in the Alemão and Penha complexes in Rio de Janeiro’s North Zone (Rio de Janeiro state). Four police officers were killed in the operation. The offensive was the deadliest in the city’s history. The authorities reportedly deployed 2,500 security forces personnel during the operation in order to execute around 250 warrants targeting the Red Command (CV) organised crime group (OCG). OCG members reportedly used grenade-laden drones to attack the security forces; they also commandeered at least 70 buses to blockade neighbourhoods. The operation caused significant disruption across Rio de Janeiro, cancelling classes at 46 schools and at the Federal University of Rio de Janeiro, closing medical facilities and precipitating substantial knock-on transit disruption across the city. In the immediate term, we assess that OCGs will almost certainly conduct retaliatory attacks against the security forces, increasing physical security and asset damage risks, particularly in the North Zone. Equally, the security forces will likely conduct retaliatory raids due to the police deaths during the operation. During the violent clashes, localised transit and operational disruption risks will increase, particularly for the education and transport sectors. (Source: Sibylline)

 

28 Oct 25. Russia donates equipment to UPDF. Russia had donated USD53 m in equipment to the Uganda People’s Defence Force (UPDF), it was announced on 26 October. The UPDF said President Yoweri Museveni received equipment that included obstacle clearance and trench digging machines, boats, and a coastal station during a ceremony held at the College of Logistics and Engineering (COLE) in Magamaga. It quoted Russian Ambassador to Uganda Vladlen Semivolos as saying the equipment donation was the first of two phases, with the second involving the construction of a maintenance and repair facility in Magamaga and a boat storage site and floating pier in Entebbe, with the work expected to be completed by September 2026. In a separate statement, Museveni said he inaugurated work on the new Military Mechanised Major Repair Facility in Magamaga and a workshop in Entebbe. Photographs of the event showed the donation included two IMR armoured engineering vehicles, a TMK-2 wheeled trench digger, two GAZ-66 trucks with shelters, two towed generators, and other equipment that could not be identified. The IMR uses the hull from the T-55 tank and has a bulldozer blade at the front and a telescopic arm that can be used to grab and move obstacles. The line-up also included what looked like the Project BL-820 boat that is used by Russian naval and security forces as well as two smaller rigid hull inflatables made by the Russian company Mnev & Co. Senior Russian and Ugandan officers were also awarded medals from each other’s military during the ceremony, further emphasising the close military ties between the two countries. (Source: Janes)

 

28 Oct 25. Pakistan-Afghanistan: Inconclusive talks will increase risk of renewed hostilities. Earlier on 28 October, talks between Afghanistan and Pakistan aimed at establishing long-term peace ended without a resolution. According to a Pakistani security source, the Afghan Taliban was unwilling to commit to restraining the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), which Pakistan accuses Afghanistan of providing with a safe haven. An Afghan source stated that the talks ended after ‘tense exchanges’ over the TTP. On 25 October, the two countries began a second round of talks in Turkey, mediated by Qatar and Turkey, after agreeing to a ceasefire during the first round of negotiations on 19 October. The discussions took place amid continued TTP activity targeting the security forces along the border districts of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province (Pakistan), as well as amid ongoing border closures disrupting trade and travel. At the time of writing, there are no indications of further scheduled talks. We assess that this inconclusive outcome will increase the risk of renewed hostilities along the border in the coming days. While there remains a realistic possibility of further rounds of mediated talks, they are unlikely to resolve tensions, barring major guarantees from the Taliban on key issues such as a commitment to restrain the TTP. (Source: Sibylline)

 

27 Oct 25. Cambodia-Thailand: Ceasefire agreement will ease armed conflict risks in short-to-medium term. On 26 October, Thai Prime Minister Anutin Charnvirakul and Cambodian Prime Minister Hun Manet signed a ceasefire agreement in Malaysia on the sidelines of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) summit, overseen by US President Donald Trump. The deal’s provisions include both sides ceasing all hostilities, the release of 18 detained Cambodian soldiers by Thailand, the withdrawal of heavy weaponry from border areas and the deployment of ASEAN observers to ensure implementation. The agreement comes after conflict along the Cambodia-Thailand border broke out in July, with tensions persisting in the subsequent months. If the deal’s provisions are met, the risk of armed conflict along the disputed border will ease in the short-to-medium term, increasing the prospects for cross-border economic activity to recover. However, Thailand’s foreign minister has avoided referring to the joint declaration as a ‘peace deal’; this underscores that the underlying border dispute remains unresolved and that the threat of renewed hostilities persists in the long term. (Source: Sibylline)

 

24 Oct 25. India’s DAC approves $9bn for armed forces enhancements. Acceptance of Necessity was granted to procure landing platform docks and advanced light weight torpedoes for the Indian Navy. India’s Defence Acquisition Council (DAC) has sanctioned proposals amounting to approximately Rs790bn ($9bn) during a meeting held in New Delhi on October 23, 2025. This approval will fund new acquisitions for the Indian Navy, Air Force, and Army. Under this proposal, Acceptance of Necessity (AoN) was accorded to procure Landing Platform Docks (LPD) and Advanced Light Weight Torpedoes (ALWT) for the Indian Navy. It also covers allocations for 30mm Naval Surface Gun (NSG), an Electro Optical Infra-Red Search and Track System, and Smart Ammunition for 76mm Super Rapid Gun Mount.
The LPDs will bolster the Navy’s amphibious operations alongside the Army and Air Force. Additionally, they will aid in peacekeeping missions and operations related to humanitarian assistance and disaster relief.
The ALWTs, developed by the Defence Research and Development Organisation’s (DRDO) Naval Science & Technological Laboratory, can target conventional, nuclear, and midget submarines.
Moreover, the addition of a 30mm NSG will bolster both the Indian Navy and Coast Guard’s abilities in Low Intensity Maritime Operations and anti-piracy roles.
The Indian Air Force has been granted the AoN for a Collaborative Long Range Target Saturation/Destruction System (CLRTS/DS) along with several other proposals.
The CLRTS/DS system is equipped with autonomous take-off, landing, navigation, detection, and payload delivery abilities within its mission area.
Similarly, for the Indian Army, the AoN has been sanctioned for the procurement of Nag Missile System (Tracked) Mk-II (NAMIS), Ground Based Mobile ELINT System (GBMES), and High Mobility Vehicles (HMVs) equipped with a Material Handling Crane.
NAMIS is developing its capability to neutralise enemy combat vehicles, bunkers, and other field fortifications while GBMES will offer electronic intelligence of enemy emitters around-the-clock.
According to the data and analytics company GlobalData, India is expected to spend around $543.1bn on defence from 2026 to 2030.  (Source: naval-technology.com)

 

27 Oct 25. Australia defense budget poised to grow at 5.9% CAGR between 2026 and 2030, forecasts GlobalData. Amidst escalating tensions in the Indo-Pacific, shifting geopolitical fault lines and growing strategic competition, Australia is accelerating efforts to modernize its military. Against this backdrop, Australia’s defense budget is set to increase at a compound annual growth rate (CAGR) of 5.9% from $44.6bn in 2026 to $56.2bn in 2030, driven in large part by the transformative trilateral security alliance named AUKUS, between Australia, the UK and the US, forecasts GlobalData, a leading data and analytics company.
GlobalData’s latest report, “Australia Defense Market Size and Trends, Budget Allocation, Regulations, Key Acquisitions, Competitive Landscape and Forecast, 2025–30,” highlights the country’s defense acquisition and R&D budget cumulatively grew from $10.2 bn in 2021 to $11.4 bn in 2025, underscoring investment in advanced capabilities.
Operations and maintenance is expected to increase from $14 bn in 2026 to $17.4bn in 2030 (5.6% CAGR), reflecting the growing demand in sustainment, infrastructure and equipment maintenance over the forecast period.
Akash Pratim Debbarma, Aerospace & Defense Analyst at GlobalData, comments: “AUKUS is a defining driver of Australia’s defense trajectory. The partnership not only enables the acquisition of nuclear-powered attack submarines (SSN) but also catalyzes broader modernization across maritime, air and land domains. The SSN program, built in close cooperation with the UK and US under AUKUS, will require significant new infrastructure and sustainment investment.
Government allocations for SSN program are set to increase from $2.4bn in 2025 to $5bn in 2030, reflecting the intensive support requirements of the future SSN fleet. These programs, from SSNs and the Hunter-class frigates to F-35 sustainment, MQ-4C Triton UAVs and next-generation land vehicles, are reshaping Australia’s force posture and industrial base.
Debbarma adds: “Rising US–China rivalry and China’s military assertiveness are contributing to a complex security landscape in the Indo-Pacific. Australia’s reliance on alliances like AUKUS, combined trade dependencies with China and climate-related domestic vulnerabilities, are shaping its defense priorities and risk assessments.”
The recent altercations with China at sea and in the air have highlighted the growing tensions and have amplified calls within Australian polity for enhanced maritime surveillance, patrol and deterrent capabilities. At the same time, supply-chain resilience is receiving attention: both Australia and partners are pursuing expanded processing capacity for strategic minerals and defense-related supply chains outside China, requiring substantial investment and active government participation.
Debbarma concludes: “Australia’s 2023 Defence Strategic Review and procurement pipeline demonstrate a clear commitment to sustained capability uplift and industrial participation. By investing across maritime, air and land domains and deepening interoperability with allies, Australia aims to strengthen deterrence, ensure regional stability and safeguard national interests in an increasingly contested Indo-Pacific.” (Source: GlobalData) Media Centre
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Founded in 1987, Exensor Technology is a world leading supplier of Networked Unattended Ground Sensor (UGS) Systems providing tailored sensor solutions to customers all over the world. From our Headquarters in Lund Sweden, our centre of expertise in Network Communications at Communications Research Lab in Kalmar Sweden and our Production site outside of Basingstoke UK, we design, develop and produce latest state of the art rugged UGS solutions at the highest quality to meet the most stringent demands of our customers. Our systems are in operation and used in a wide number of Military as well as Homeland Security applications worldwide. The modular nature of the system ensures any external sensor can be integrated, providing the user with a fully meshed “silent” network capable of self-healing. Exensor Technology will continue to lead the field in UGS technology, provide our customers with excellent customer service and a bespoke package able to meet every need.

A CNIM Group Company
—————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————-

Sponsored by Bertin Exensor

 

www.exensor.com

 

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Military And Security Developments

Oct 31.

• Syria: Attacks in capital Damascus highlight security risks, degraded security force capabilities. On 30 October, an armed group of over 30 individuals injured five civilians in an attack on residents of al-Zahriyat district in the capital Damascus, threatening to evict residents from their homes. This is this group’s second attack on al-Zahriyat residents since 26 October. The group is led by Abu Anas, who was appointed by the authorities on 28 October as the official responsible for security checkpoints in the area. The incident also comes amid increasing reports of kidnappings and other sporadic clashes between armed groups in Damascus over the past weeks, highlighting the security forces’ degraded capabilities in the capital. We assess that continued attacks and intimidation by government-appointed security officials will elevate the risks of domestic unrest and the possibility of local communities forming independent militias for their own defence, increasing the likelihood of armed clashes in Damascus in the coming months.
• Morocco-Algeria-Western Sahara: UN vote on mission to increase security risks, regional tensions. Later on 31 October, the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) will vote on a resolution to extend the peacekeeping mandate in Western Sahara. While the resolution is highly likely to pass, regional media outlets have reported that the US will propose a three-month extension rather than the usual one-year term. The vote comes amid the Trump administration’s heightened scrutiny of the Morocco-Algeria dispute over Western Sahara. The US will likely push for the implementation of Morocco’s autonomy plan in the coming weeks, while seeking to mediate tensions with Algeria, which supports Western Sahara’s independence. Despite US pressure, we assess that long-standing tensions between Morocco and Algeria will likely complicate efforts to reach an agreement. Bilateral tensions over this issue will possibly disrupt bilateral trade, which will most likely primarily impact Algerian exports to Morocco due to the perishable nature of tropical fruit, their biggest export. Morocco’s efforts to advance its autonomy plan will likely intensify hostilities with Western Sahara’s local population, raising the risk of sporadic clashes and exposing local personnel to crossfire, particularly in the logistics sector.

Oct 30.

• Israel-Lebanon: Elevated risks of armed clashes, Israeli strikes in south Lebanon following IDF raid. Earlier on 30 October, Lebanese President Joseph Aoun ordered the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) to oppose any Israeli incursion into southern Lebanon, after the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) killed a municipal employee during a raid in Blida (Nabatieh governorate) overnight on 29 October. The IDF claimed it was operating to destroy Lebanese Hizballah (LH) military infrastructure in the area and was reacting to an imminent threat to the force. The incident comes amid increasing tensions between Lebanon, Israel and the US, with the latter two claiming the LAF is not sufficiently enforcing the November truce which stipulated the disarmament of LH. As such, in the coming months, the IDF will likely increase its airstrikes and ground raids across southern Lebanon. Additionally, President Aoun’s order to the LAF will increase the risk of sporadic armed clashes between the IDF and LAF, escalating crossfire risks in southern Lebanon, particularly along the Israel-Lebanon border. However, while tensions are likely to increase, a ceasefire collapse and the escalation of hostilities between Israel and Lebanon into a broader war remains unlikely.

Oct 29.

KEY DEVELOPMENTS

IRAN

• Iran has reportedly increased discounts for Chinese buyers of its crude oil exports, underscoring increasing sanctions pressure on Iranian exports and increasing economic stability risks.
• New Zealand’s police are investigating an insurance firm for providing coverage to Iran’s ‘ghost fleet’ of oil tankers, underscoring sustained corporate governance risks for firms providing financial services to Iranian-linked entities
• An Iranian-linked threat network conducted surveillance and mounted attacks targeting Israeli-linked entities in Australia, Germany and Greece, underscoring sustained infiltration and targeted violence risks.

ISRAEL

• An ultra-Orthodox protest against military conscription will elevate ethno-religious tensions and domestic unrest risks across Israel in the coming weeks.

PALESTINIAN TERRITORIES

• GAZA STRIP: Israeli airstrikes in Gaza following a militant attack on Israeli forces and the subsequent resumption of the ceasefire highlight the enduring security risks across the Strip.
• GAZA STRIP: Hamas’ failure to return the bodies of several deceased hostages as per the ceasefire agreement is increasing the risk of more substantive Israeli action than airstrikes, though such a move is unlikely to happen without US approval.
• WEST BANK: Israeli settlers’ attacks on Palestinian villages are likely to escalate over the olive harvest period, increasing ethno-religious tensions and radicalisation risks.

IRAN

• Iran has reportedly increased discounts for Chinese buyers of its crude oil exports, underscoring increasing sanctions pressure on Iranian exports and increasing economic stability risks. Earlier on 29 October, trade sources reported that an oversupply of Iranian crude is triggering deeper discounts on its exports to China. Iranian Light crude is reportedly trading at approximately USD 10 per barrel below benchmark Brent crude prices, compared to the USD 3 per barrel discount reported in March. Iran has likely authorised the discounts on crude exports amid intensifying downward pressure on prices. This pressure likely results from Chinese importers exhausting government-issued quotas for oil purchases (with increasing US sanctions pressure on Chinese refineries and port operators importing Iranian oil) and newly introduced US sanctions on major Russian oil exporters, triggering oversupply on discounted oil markets. In the coming months, Iran will likely continue offering steep discounts on crude exports to China in order to retain access to critical foreign currency inflows, amid increasing sanctions pressure following the re-imposition of UN sanctions in September (see Sibylline Middle East Crisis Update – 29 September 2025). However, deepening discounts will likely further undermine the profitability of Iranian oil exports, undermining its long-term economic stability and compounding broader fiscal pressures. Long-term Iranian dependence on crude exports to China will also sustain broader economic vulnerability to fluctuations in Chinese demand for Iranian crude, as well as price volatility on global markets, further undermining Iran’s long-term economic resilience.
• New Zealand’s police are investigating an insurance firm for providing coverage to Iran’s ‘ghost fleet’ of oil tankers, underscoring sustained corporate governance risks for firms providing financial services to Iranian-linked entities. On 28 October, Reuters reported that the New Zealand-based Maritime Mutual insurance firm allegedly provided coverage to a number of oil tankers within Iran’s ‘shadow fleet’, thereby facilitating the transport and sale of sanctioned Iranian, Russian and Venezuelan oil exports. Although Maritime Mutual has denied the allegations, the Reuters investigation states that the New Zealand Police raided the firm’s offices on 16 October, indicating that it is likely under investigation for sanctions violations. The allegations highlight the sustained corporate governance and sanctions exposure risks for maritime insurance providers, particularly those providing coverage to oil tankers frequenting Chinese and Indian port facilities associated with sanctioned oil imports. In the coming months, the US and allied states will likely continue expanding and enforcing sanctions targeting Iranian oil exports, increasing the sanctions exposure risks and due diligence requirements for regionally engaged financial, insurance, reinsurance and shipping firms.
• An Iranian-linked threat network conducted surveillance and mounted attacks targeting Israeli-linked entities in Australia, Germany and Greece, underscoring sustained infiltration and targeted violence risks. On 26 October, the Mossad announced that Sardar Ammar, an Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) Quds Force commander, had overseen an international network of foreign nationals and organised criminal elements responsible for surveillance operations and attacks targeting Jewish and Israeli institutions in numerous states. Ammar’s network was reportedly responsible for surveillance operations targeting Jewish individuals and institutions in Germany in 2025; arson attacks targeting Jewish-owned hotels and a synagogue in Greece in 2024; and a series of arson attacks targeting synagogues and a Kosher restaurant in Australia in 2024 (see Sibylline Middle East Crisis Update – 28 August 2025). The Mossad also stated that the IRGC-linked network attempted to perpetrate ‘dozens’ of other attacks in various jurisdictions, which were foiled by Mossad or local security force operations. The announcement underscores Iran’s continued efforts to develop and co-ordinate hybrid threat activity targeting Jewish and Israeli individuals and institutions worldwide. Iran will almost certainly continue to escalate these efforts in the coming months and years, sustaining risks of further attacks targeting Israeli embassies, Jewish religious institutions and associated entities. Israeli and Jewish individuals will also face elevated risks of surveillance, harassment and targeted violence from Iranian-linked threat actors, increasing the threat to staff, particularly high-profile individuals who have publicly criticised Iran. Although states with high-capacity security and police forces will likely continue to pre-emptively disrupt Iranian-linked attacks and threat activity, risks of low-capacity and sporadic attacks will continue to remain elevated in Australia, Europe and North America throughout 2025.

ISRAEL 

• An ultra-Orthodox protest against military conscription will elevate ethno-religious tensions and domestic unrest risks across Israel in the coming weeks. A large ultra-Orthodox protest is planned for 1430hrs (local time) on 30 October, near the Chords Bridge at the entrance to Jerusalem (Jerusalem district) from Highway 1. Thousands of participants are likely to attend, as the demonstration marks the first incident in years in which almost all factions and movements (including different Hasidic sects) will co-operate to protest military conscription and the arrest of Yeshiva members. The protest is almost certain to cause significant congestion in Jerusalem, impacting the movement of both staff and goods. These risks will be particularly acute in the protest’s immediate vicinity, as participants are highly likely to block movement from Highway 1 into the city. Incidents of vandalism are likely, such as setting bins on fire; there is also a realistic possibility of violence against property, such as attacks against passing or stationary vehicles. Demonstrators’ clashes with the security forces and counter-protesters are also a realistic possibility, compounding threats to the safety of proximate personnel. There is a realistic possibility of further smaller protests in Jerusalem and other large ultra-Orthodox population centres such as Bnei Brak (Tel Aviv district), prolonging domestic unrest risks throughout the coming weeks. Ultra-Orthodox demonstrations against conscription will also elevate ethno-religious tensions and the risks of organised counter-protests across Israel, particularly in Jerusalem and Tel Aviv (Tel Aviv district), compounding domestic unrest and travel disruption risks.

PALESTINIAN TERRITORIES 

• GAZA STRIP: Israeli airstrikes in Gaza following a militant attack on Israeli forces and the subsequent resumption of the ceasefire highlight the enduring security risks across the Strip. On 28 October, Gazan militants killed an Israeli-American Israel Defense Force (IDF) serviceman in an attack on an IDF position within the Israeli-controlled ‘yellow line’ in Rafah (southern Gaza). According to the initial investigation, the attack was launched from an underground tunnel and militants were armed with rocket-propelled grenades (RPGs). Following the attack and with the US’ permission, the IDF conducted retaliatory airstrikes across Gaza, which killed at least 104 people according to the Hamas-controlled Health Ministry. Earlier on 29 October at 1000hrs (local time), the IDF announced that it had resumed the ceasefire. This is the second incident of a deadly militant attack within the yellow line followed by Israeli retaliation since the ceasefire entered into force (see Sibylline Middle East Crisis Update – 22 October 2025). As the IDF continues to pursue the destruction of militant tunnels beyond the yellow line, we assess that similar attacks, initiated by militants trapped within these tunnels, are likely in the coming weeks. These will drive sporadic security risks emanating from further Israeli retaliatory airstrikes, particularly if attacks result in Israeli casualties. While we assess that the ceasefire will likely hold for at least the coming 72 hours due to the US’ involvement, such continued violations will sustain and gradually elevate the risk of ceasefire collapse.
• GAZA STRIP: Hamas’ failure to return the bodies of several deceased hostages as per the ceasefire agreement is increasing the risk of more substantive Israeli action than airstrikes, though such a move is unlikely to happen without US approval. There is a possibility that Israel will seek to limit the flow of aid entering Gaza; however, the US is unlikely to agree to a reduction of humanitarian aid and the closure of crossings used for aid. A more viable option would possibly be Israel’s expansion of its ‘yellow line’ of control further into Gaza, which is more likely to garner US support. A less likely option would be a limited resumption of combined ground and air operations in specific areas within Gaza. While this is less likely than a limited expansion of the ‘yellow line’, the likelihood of an operational escalation will increase if Hamas prolongs its refusal to disarm and escalates its campaign against dissidents in Gaza. Such operations would be viewed by Israel as a violation of the ceasefire agreement, which envisions a substantially reduced role for Hamas in the post-conflict settlement. To establish a justification for combined operations inside Gaza, Israel and the US would likely establish a narrative outlining Hamas’ operations as a critical threat to the ceasefire process before launching an operation. Regardless of the framing for their actions, such operations by the US and Israel would significantly increase the risk of a ceasefire collapse.
• WEST BANK: Israeli settlers’ attacks on Palestinian villages are likely to escalate over the olive harvest period, increasing ethno-religious tensions and radicalisation risks. In the past two weeks, there has been a significant spike in attacks by Israeli settlers and extremists against Palestinians and Palestinian villages in the West Bank. The IDF Central Command recorded over ten attacks by Israeli settlers in less than 24 hours on 25 October. These included incidents of arson against Palestinian vehicles, homes and crops, as well as physical violence against farmers. Attacks have been largely concentrated within the Bethlehem and Ramallah and al-Bireh governorates and come amid the olive harvest season (October to December), during which they will likely continue to escalate. These will elevate exposure to violence, including from crossfire and cases of mistaken identity across the West Bank, particularly near Palestinian population centres. Elevated ethno-religious tensions will increase the risks of radicalisation within Palestinian communities, driving retaliatory attacks on settler communities in the West Bank, particularly during the Hanukkah holiday (14 to 22 December) and around key roads near Israeli settlements.

RED SEA

• RED SEA: There is a realistic possibility that Israeli strikes in Gaza will prompt the Iran-backed Houthis to resume attacks against Israel. If such incidents continue to increase in frequency, this will raise the likelihood of Houthis fully resuming their campaign against Israel. In the event of either sporadic attacks by the Houthis or a full restoration of their campaign, we assess that the strikes are unlikely to significantly elevate security risks across Israel. Such attacks would present moderate operational disruption risks for businesses due to staff observance of warning sirens. Furthermore, Houthi attacks against Israel would elevate the risks of Israeli retaliation, particularly in the event that a Houthi attack succeeds in breaching Israeli air defences. The potential Israeli strikes are most likely to target Houthi positions and dual-use infrastructure (including ports) in Yemen (see Sibylline Situation Update Brief – 29 October 2025).

REGIONAL AND GLOBAL DEVELOPMENTS

• Spain-Israel: Spain’s recently adopted arms embargo on Israel will sustain compliance concerns for metals exporters amid continued scrutiny from pro-Palestine activists. On 24 October, Spain’s Audiencia Nacional (National Court) announced that it had launched an investigation into Sidenor, a privately owned steel manufacturer, for allegedly selling steel to an Israeli weapons manufacturer. The prosecuting judge alleges that Sidenor sold steel to a subsidiary of the Israel-based company Elbit Systems for the purposes of weapons production, thereby violating the arms embargo adopted by Parliament on 8 October. The investigation underscores the increasing compliance risks for Israel-linked entities operating in Spain, particularly firms tendering contracts for supplying metals, engineering components and dual-use materials to Israeli businesses. Despite the Israel-Hamas ceasefire, we assess that Spain is highly unlikely to repeal its arms embargo on Israel in the short term, while broader restrictions on imports from Israeli settlements in the West Bank (Palestinian Territories) will also likely remain in place. Such conditions will sustain corporate governance and reputational concerns tied to business exposure to possible investigations, driven by continued scrutiny from pro-Palestine activists. The court has summoned three Sidenor executives to testify on 12 November; this increases the risks of pro-Palestine protests in the vicinity of the Audiencia Nacional in the capital Madrid, temporarily increasing localised travel disruption risks.
• On 10 October, Israel and Hamas agreed to a ceasefire; this has seemingly prompted the Iran-backed Houthis to pause hostilities targeting vessels in the Red Sea and Israeli territory in the short term.
• If the Israel-Hamas ceasefire holds, the Houthis are unlikely to re-escalate attacks, moderating security risks in Israel and the Red Sea.
• As the ceasefire remains fragile, we assess that a resumption in Houthi attacks remains possible, sustaining risks of long-term operational and global supply chain disruption.
• Any resumption of Houthi hostilities will likely draw a heavy response by the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) targeting port and dual-use infrastructure in Yemen, exacerbating the humanitarian crisis.
• Regardless of whether the ceasefire holds, it will likely take months for traffic across the Red Sea to normalise; as well as for markets, insurance premiums and freight rates to adjust to pre-crisis levels.

Context

Shortly after the outbreak of the Israel-Hamas war in October 2023, the Houthis launched a maritime attack campaign targeting vessels in the Red Sea, together with missile and drone strikes targeting Israel nearly weekly. Although the Houthis have claimed to primarily target Israel-linked vessels, the group has effectively engaged in indiscriminate strikes targeting maritime traffic, significantly disrupting global supply chains. However, these attacks have become less frequent in recent months, likely in part due to the degradation of Houthi capabilities as a result of Israeli and US airstrikes. On 10 October, Israel and Hamas agreed to a ceasefire, initiating the first phase of a US-backed peace initiative. Although the Houthis have not explicitly declared the cessation of hostilities against Israel and Israel-linked shipping in the Red Sea, the trends observed during prior ceasefires suggest that the group will pause operations. At the time of writing, there have been no confirmed Houthi attacks since the ceasefire came into force. The Houthis have distanced themselves from the 18 October incident in the Gulf of Aden, when a fire aboard a Cameroon-flagged container ship killed two crew members. Nevertheless, the Israel-Hamas ceasefire remains fragile, sustaining the possible resumption of Houthi hostilities against Israel and shipping in the Red Sea.

Forecast

There is a realistic possibility that the Israel-Hamas ceasefire will hold in the short term, sustaining a de-escalation in Houthi attacks on Israel and Israeli-affiliated vessels in the Red Sea

As regional tensions continue to ease, the Houthis are unlikely to resume strikes on Israeli territory, which previously targeted cities such as Eilat (Southern district) and Tel Aviv (Tel Aviv district). This reduces associated security risks to personnel and assets nationwide, including the threats of direct drone or missile strikes and shrapnel resulting from successful interception. The frequency of evacuations from offices, residences and hospitality venues will also likely decrease, easing business disruption and lowering the risk of injuries caused by crowd surges during emergency evacuations.

The Houthis will also likely cease attacks on Israeli-affiliated vessels in the Red Sea, reducing the likelihood of critical vessel damage, operational failures and cargo loss. A decrease in Houthi missile and drone launches will also likely result in fewer Israeli interceptions over the Red Sea, thereby reducing secondary risks to vessels, crews and cargo transiting in the region. A halt in Houthi attacks will possibly ease disruption along the Red Sea’s major shipping lanes, reducing the risks of operational and financial losses for shipping and associated logistics companies. However, due to concerns over conflict re-escalation in the medium term, insurance providers are highly unlikely to immediately suspend war premiums for ships operating in the Red Sea, sustaining elevated operating costs for firms transiting the area. Although a decrease in the attack frequency will likely moderate the psychological pressure on crews navigating high-risk areas such as the Bab-el-Mandeb Strait in the short term, latent safety concerns will likely persist and sustain risks of labour turnover.

The Israel-Hamas ceasefire is unlikely to hold in the long term; Houthi attacks on Western-affiliated vessels in the Red Sea will likely resume thereafter

The Houthis are likely to respond to a breakdown in the ceasefire between Hamas and Israel by resuming their attacks on Israel and associated shipping, re-escalating threats to vessels traversing the Bab-el-Mandeb Strait. In such a scenario, the Houthis’ likely use of unmanned surface vehicles (USVs) will drive exposure to high-capacity attacks successfully targeting vessels that operate proximate to Houthi-controlled territory. The affected vessels will face significantly elevated risks of damage, sinking, cargo loss and crew fatalities. The attacks will almost certainly continue to drive logistics firms to divert vessels via the Cape of Good Hope (South Africa). This will sustain lengthier transit times and increased vessel fuel usage for intercontinental supply chains, compounding inflationary pressures on consumers and manufacturers. We assess that broader transport, operation and supply chain disruption risks will be particularly acute for firms based in Europe that rely on just-in-time (JIT) production. Ports throughout the Red Sea will also likely continue to experience below-average use, increasing financial risks for logistics providers, trucking companies and rail networks that are reliant on port traffic. Additionally, the Red Sea cruise industry will likely continue to be impacted by Houthi attacks in the region, deteriorating Egypt and Jordan’s tourism sectors and compounding broader socio-economic health concerns.

A resumption in Houthi attacks on Israel will increase personnel security risks both from direct Houthi strikes and from shrapnel from interception in regional airspace. The Houthis’ ability to evade air defences, particularly around Eilat, will pose sustained security threats to personnel, clientele and infrastructure. This sustained risk of attack exposure will likely trigger an increase in event and travel cancellations, resulting in financial losses for the hospitality and tourism sectors. Increased incidents of evacuations due to sirens will increase personnel exposure to crushes and crowd surges, while undermining operational continuity across central and southern Israel.

The IDF will likely respond to any further Houthi attacks on Israel by targeting port and dual-use infrastructure in Yemen with airstrikes, compounding security risks and humanitarian concerns

If Houthi attacks on Israel resume, Israel will likely retaliate with airstrikes on Houthi-controlled territory, primarily targeting dual-use facilities and port infrastructure such as Hudaydah and Ras Isa (both Al Hudaydah governorate). Israeli strikes will also possibly target the Houthis’ political wing and associated infrastructure, increasing the risk of broader conflict escalation. These operations will also increase security risks for locally engaged staff, resulting from the direct impact of airstrikes and the resultant disorder during emergency evacuations. Repeated IDF strikes on port facilities will also likely worsen humanitarian conditions within Houthi-controlled territory, exacerbating the already critical food, water and energy security conditions for local populations and NGO staff. In response to this, the Houthis will likely escalate hostilities targeting Israel and Israeli-affiliated vessels in the Red Sea, prolonging regional instability and operational disruption.

In the unlikely event of a sustained de-escalation, it will likely take months for Red Sea shipping traffic to normalise and for markets, insurance premiums and freight rates to adjust

As the Israel-Hamas ceasefire remains fragile and the Houthis have not formally ended their campaign, international concerns about the possibility of conflict re-escalation will remain elevated in the coming months. Shipping carriers will likely remain broadly reluctant to resume transit through the Red Sea, while insurance providers will likely maintain war risk premiums for vessel operators. Even if a sustained de-escalation takes place, we assess that the shipping sector will likely remain in a transitional phase marked by elevated costs, rerouted traffic and persistent risk premiums until a prolonged cessation in Houthi attacks restores confidence among operators and insurers. However, shipping companies will possibly continue to see downward pressure on stock prices in the coming weeks, as investors anticipate a decline in freight rates and a moderation of the elevated profits seen during the Red Sea crisis. These secondary financial effects will likely impact associated businesses, including the ports, logistics hubs and adjacent local economies that have benefitted from rerouted trade during the crisis.

• Israel-Palestinian Territories: Ceasefire violations highlight sustained security, Houthi attacks risks. On 28 October, Gazan militants killed an Israeli-American Israel Defense Forces (IDF) serviceman during an attack on an IDF position within the Israeli-controlled ‘yellow line’ in Rafah (southern Gaza), which comprised rocket-propelled grenades (RPGs) and sniper fire. Following the attack and with the US’ permission, the IDF conducted retaliatory airstrikes across Gaza, which killed at least 104 people according to the Hamas-controlled Health Ministry. Earlier on 29 October at 1000hrs (local time), the IDF announced that it had resumed the ceasefire. This is the second incident of a deadly militant attack within the yellow line followed by Israeli retaliation since the ceasefire entered into force . As the IDF continues to pursue the destruction of militant tunnels beyond the yellow line, we assess that similar attacks, initiated by militants trapped within these tunnels, are likely in the coming weeks. These will drive sporadic security risks emanating from further Israeli airstrikes, particularly if attacks result in Israeli casualties. Such violations will elevate the risks of a ceasefire collapse, as well as of retaliatory missile and drone attacks against Israel by the Iran-backed Houthis. Nevertheless, due to the US’ involvement, we assess that the ceasefire will likely hold for at least the coming 72 hours.
• Tunisia: Suspension of civil society groups underscores mounting threats to NGO operations. On 28 October, a Tunisian court ordered a one-month suspension of Mnemty, a Tunisian anti-racism NGO. This comes after the authorities imposed a similar suspension on a prominent migrant rights group on 27 October. These decisions likely reflect the government’s efforts to divert attention from ongoing domestic issues, including protests over pollution from a state-run chemical plant in Gabès (Gabès governorate). The widespread crackdowns on public dissent and on the independence of civil society organisations reflect the broader democratic backsliding in Tunisia. This will possibly undercut the brand image of businesses working closely with the Tunisian state, increasing their exposure to boycotts and reduced consumer interest. The government will likely continue to crack down on civil society groups, driving the risk of license revocation and suspension orders for NGOs that are active in fields deemed contrary to government objectives, such as those supporting migrant communities. Furthermore, the government will possibly seek to arrest individuals linked to prohibited organisations who attend the ongoing demonstrations. As such, arbitrary detention and security risks will remain elevated for NGO personnel in the coming days, arising from exposure to heavy-handed security operations near protests.

Oct 28.

• Israel: Ultra-Orthodox protests will increase travel disruption, security risks near protest locations. On 30 October, a large ultra-Orthodox protest is planned to take place in Jerusalem (Jerusalem district) at 1430hrs (local time) near the Chords Bridge, located at the entrance to the city from Highway 1. For the first time in years, almost all factions and movements (including different Hasidic sects) will co-operate, protesting military conscription and arrests of Yeshiva members, likely resulting in thousands of protesters. As such, we assess that severe travel disruption is almost certain across Jerusalem and particularly at the protest location, with demonstrators highly likely to block the entrance into the city. Incidents of vandalism such as setting bins on fire are likely; there is also a realistic possibility of further violence, such as attacks against cars passing or parking in the area. Clashes with the security forces are also a realistic possibility, as well as with counter-protesters, exacerbating security risks for personnel and bystanders. Domestic unrest risks will remain elevated throughout the coming weeks, with further protests throughout Jerusalem remaining a realistic possibility.

Oct 27.

• Turkey-Iraq: PKK withdrawal will moderate security risks, sustain difficulties for political integration. On 26 October, the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) announced the withdrawal of its fighters from Turkey to northern Iraq as part of the ongoing co-ordinated disarmament and political integration process, which began in May. Most PKK fighters are likely to comply with the initiative; however, splinter groups will likely sustain latent security risks in south-eastern Turkey and near government sites in major cities, including the capital Ankara. The PKK has long operated from the Qandil Mountains in northern Iraq’s Erbil and Duhok governorates, where the most significant threats of factional violence will likely emerge. This will sustain the risk of sporadic clashes between the Turkish security forces and PKK elements in northern Iraq, increasing security risks to personnel from exposure to airstrikes and crossfire. Despite calls for political integration for the PKK, participation in Turkish politics will likely remain limited, with the electoral authorities unlikely to allow known ex-PKK members to hold office within national governance systems, raising the long-term risks of the process collapsing and conflict re-escalation. (Source: Sibylline)

 

23 Oct 25. Israeli jets strike Hezbollah training camp, missile manufacturing facility in Lebanon. The IDF reported identifying terrorist operatives at the training camp. The release stated that Hezbollah terrorists were trained to shoot and use a variety of weapons at the camp. IAF fighter jets struck a series of Hezbollah terrorist targets, including a training camp, in the Bekaa Valley of southern Lebanon on Thursday, the IDF reported. The Bekaa Governorate is located next to the Lebanese border with Syria, north of the Golan Heights. The IDF’s Military Intelligence Directorate had identified terrorist operatives at the training camp who were trained to shoot and use various weapons, the IDF said. (Source: https://www.sofx.com/)

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Military And Security Developments

Oct 31.

• Ukraine: Expanding military recruitment will face resistance, isolated clashes with security forces. On 30 October, clashes broke out between personnel from the Territorial Recruitment and Social Support Centre (TCR) and civilians near an open-air market outside Odesa (Odesa oblast). The confrontation began when TCR personnel conducted mobilisation activities in the area, which met with strong resistance from civilians and quickly escalated into violence. The crowd reportedly used physical force, tear gas and batons, attacking TCR servicemen and inflicting injuries, as well as damaging a service vehicle. The authorities have launched an investigation and are working to identify all participants. The incident underscores growing public resistance to Ukraine’s mobilisation efforts; the country continues to face a chronic shortage of military personnel. The war will likely continue at its current intensity for at least another year. As such, we assess that expanding efforts to mobilise military-aged men will likely be met with growing public opposition and a heightened risk of isolated violent confrontations involving recruitment officials.

Oct 30.

• Emergency power outages highly likely to increase in frequency in coming months. Earlier on 30 October, Ukraine’s state-owned energy grid operator Ukrenergo announced emergency power outages across multiple regions following Russia’s latest large-scale airstrike and urged citizens to use electricity sparingly. Russia launched a particularly large attack involving 52 missiles and 653 drones, which struck multiple power plants across several regions. DTEK, Ukraine’s largest private energy company, stated that this was the third major strike on its thermal power plants this month. The latest attack forms part of Russia’s systematic strike campaign against Ukraine’s energy grid. Unlike in previous years, Russia is adopting a more co-ordinated strategy this winter, aimed at disabling the country’s energy infrastructure by systematically targeting transmission, distribution and generation facilities. We assess that the intensity and increasing lethality of Russian strikes are likely to place significant pressure on Ukraine’s energy grid, with nationwide power outages likely to become increasingly frequent in the coming months. (For further analysis of Russia’s current strike campaign against Ukraine’s energy sector, see Sibylline Ukraine Monthly – 24 October 2025).
• Cyber operations highlight sustained security, espionage risks from Russian threat actors. On 29 October, the software company Symantec reported that a Russian state-sponsored group (‘Seashell Blizzard’) had used Living-off-the-Land (LotL) techniques to conduct cyber attacks on at least two Ukrainian organisations between June and August. The first infection reportedly started on 27 June when threat actors likely exploited software vulnerabilities to infiltrate targeted systems. Seashell Blizzard then deployed two web shells to establish communication with command-and-control (C2) infrastructure, conduct reconnaissance and move laterally through the network. In the following days, the group enumerated all system files and used scheduled tasks and ‘PowerShell’ to maintain prolonged persistence and to facilitate data exfiltration. It also disabled security mechanisms and avoided installing custom malware to enhance the operation’s stealth. As a result, we assess that Ukrainian organisations will face sustained security and cyber espionage risks, as Russia’s cyber strategy continuously adapts to the ever-changing demands of the war in Ukraine.

Oct 28.

KEY DEVELOPMENTS

• POKROVSK: The battle for Pokrovsk (Donetsk oblast) has entered a highly dynamic and intense phase, as Russian forces intensify their efforts to infiltrate the city and encircle Ukrainian defenders
• MISSILES: Russian President Vladimir Putin reported that Russia had successfully tested the nuclear-powered (and nuclear capable) Burevestnik cruise missile, likely as part of a wider strategic deterrence campaign
• STRIKES: Russian strikes continue to heavily target energy infrastructure, causing frequent blackouts and forcing Ukrainian regions to implement scheduled power outages for industrial consumers for the first time this winter
• FORECAST: The US decision to impose sanctions on two of Russia’s largest oil producers highly likely reflects growing frustration with Moscow’s lack of willingness to end the war, rather than a major policy shift from the Trump administration assess specific incidents on a given frontline as and when they occur.

• POKROVSK: The battle for Pokrovsk (Donetsk oblast) has entered a highly dynamic and intense phase, as the Russian forces intensify their efforts to infiltrate the city and encircle Ukrainian defenders. On 26 October, Ukraine’s General Staff acknowledged that approximately 200 Russian military personnel had entered Pokrovsk, engaging Ukrainian troops in small-arms and drone clashes. Reportedly, the Russian forces are specifically focusing on disrupting Ukrainian drone operations. According to the General Staff, the Ukrainian forces are working to prevent Russian troops from advancing further and consolidating their positions. Geolocated footage from 27 October indicates that Russian forces recently advanced along Nakhimova Street in western Pokrovsk.
• POKROVSK: The latest Russian advances have been carried out by elements of Russia’s 2nd Combined Arms Army (CAA), operating south and west of Pokrovsk. As previously reported, the 51st CAA, positioned north of Pokrovsk, remains engaged in heavy fighting around Dobropillia (Donetsk oblast) to the north-east of Pokrovsk, preventing it from pursuing encirclement operations in the area (see Sibylline Ukraine Update – 21 October 2025). However, if the 2nd CAA continues its advance to the north and north-east, the likelihood of a full encirclement of Pokrovsk will increase significantly. Nevertheless, Russian attempts to consolidate control of central Pokrovsk will likely be heavily contested by the Ukrainian forces. Meanwhile, pressure is also increasing to the east, with Russian forces having entered the south-east of Myrnohrad (Donestk oblast) this week, a city located east of Pokrovsk. We assess that the Ukrainian forces defending Myrnohrad are at the greatest risk of encirclement in the coming weeks if Russia makes further advances in Pokrovsk.
• POKROVSK: Russian operations are increasingly pressuring Ukrainian logistics in evacuation operations from Pokrovsk. On 27 October, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky highlighted the increasingly difficult situation in the Pokrovsk area, noting that Russia’s manpower advantage is roughly eight to one. Zelensky stressed that Pokrovsk is not encircled; however, its key logistical hub is surrounded on three sides, leaving a corridor of roughly nine miles (15km) for the Ukrainian forces to bring in troops and supplies. A Ukrainian military medical officer also reported that all bridges into Pokrovsk have been destroyed, severely complicating resupply and the evacuation of the wounded. The frontline is very difficult to pin down given the fluid nature of the contested city centre and its surrounding areas; the Russian and Ukrainian forces are launching deep infiltration operations that are disrupting the consolidation and clearing operations of both sides.
• MISSILES: On 26 October, Russian President Vladimir Putin reported that Russia had successfully tested the nuclear-powered (and nuclear capable) Burevestnik cruise missile. Putin claimed that the missile travelled around 8,700 miles (14,000km) and stayed airborne for over 15 hours during its testing on 21 October. The Burevestnik’s nuclear-powered propulsion theoretically provides the missile with an unlimited range; it is reportedly capable of flying at extremely low altitudes for prolonged periods of time. Putin claims that it can pierce any air defence system in the world due to these features. Nevertheless, the practical capabilities of the Burevestnik are unconfirmed.
• MISSILES: The timing of Putin’s announcement is perhaps deliberately aimed at deterring further US pressure, as it comes shortly after the US’ imposition of new sanctions against Russia’s two largest oil companies, Rosneft and Lukoil. Moscow regularly falls back on nuclear sabre-rattling and weapons tests during periods of heightened tensions, as it seeks to leverage strategic deterrence capabilities to influence decision-makers abroad, in this case likely in Washington DC and Europe. The announcement also follows pre-planned strategic missile drills on 22 October, which saw Russia test capabilities from all arms of its nuclear triad. Nevertheless, these tests happen every year around the same week in October; they are therefore unlikely to have been deliberately timed to influence US decision-making.
• MISSILES: US President Donald Trump stated that Russia should end the war in Ukraine instead of testing new weapons, implying that the US already has nuclear-armed submarines within striking distance of Russia in an apparent response to Russia’s own implicit nuclear threats. We assess that Russian nuclear threats are unlikely to significantly influence the Trump administration in the short term. Nevertheless, the development could realistically reflect a slight pivot in Russian strategic communications towards the US, which have framed the country in more openly adversarial terms this week after refraining to do so since Trump’s inauguration. Putin openly stated on 23 October that the new sanctions were an ‘unfriendly act toward Russia’. The fact that principal Russian negotiator Kirill Dmitriev reportedly relayed information about the Burevestnik test to US officials during his visit to the US last week likely indicates that the test was at least in part directed towards deterring the US. See FORECAST below for further analysis.
• MISSILES: The latest test underscores the Kremlin’s determination to continue allocating significant resources towards the development of new missiles and weapon systems, which will have very little utility for the conventional war in Ukraine. The deployment of the Oreshnik intermediate-range ballistic missile in November 2024 also reflects this approach, which highly likely forms part of Russia’s strategic deterrence campaign. Unlike the Oreshnik, the deployment of the Burevestnik against Ukraine is highly unlikely in the short-to-medium term, as the weapon’s primary utility is at the strategic deterrence level. Nevertheless, together with other strategic weapons in development, including the Avangard hypersonic glide vehicle (HGV) and the Poseidon nuclear-armed underwater unmanned vehicle (UUV), these missiles will continue to demand significant resources that could otherwise be spent on conventional capabilities for use in Ukraine.
• STRIKES: Russian strikes continue to heavily target energy infrastructure, causing frequent blackouts and forcing Ukrainian regions to implement scheduled power outages for industrial consumers for the first time this winter. The schedules for power outages are available on the official websites of regional power distribution companies (the full list can be found here). Ukraine’s Ministry of Energy has also reported that the Russian forces are deploying loitering drones over damaged energy facilities, in order to prevent repair efforts. For further analysis of Russia’s current strike campaign against Ukraine’s energy sector, see Sibylline Ukraine Monthly – 24 October 2025.
• STRIKES: Russia’s intense strike campaign is increasing pressure on businesses, even in well-defended areas such as the capital Kyiv. During the overnight strike on 24-25 October, a warehouse complex and the offices of Ukraine’s second-largest pharmaceutical company, Optima-Pharm, were destroyed. This was the second time that the company’s warehouses have been hit in 2025, following a previous attack on 28 August. We assess that the latest strike was likely deliberate, possibly driven by Russia’s perception that the facilities were linked to Ukraine’s military-industrial complex. Further such targeted strikes against major industrial sites are highly likely throughout the winter; foreign-owned sites will also remain at risk.
• STRIKES: Meanwhile, Ukraine has continued its strike campaign targeting Russian oil infrastructure and military facilities. The head of Ukraine’s military intelligence, Kyrylo Budanov, stated that these strikes are primarily intended to disrupt Russia’s oil revenues and to hinder its military production. Simultaneously, Ukraine continues to demonstrate its expanding drone capabilities, as illustrated by a large-scale strike involving 193 unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) on 27 October. A total of 34 drones reportedly targeted the capital Moscow. Following the attack, various reports indicated GPS jamming in Moscow, likely in an attempt by the Russian authorities to counter further Ukrainian drone strikes against the city.
• STRIKES: On 22 October, The Wall Street Journal reported that the Trump administration has lifted restrictions on Ukraine’s use of Western-supplied missiles against Russia, citing unnamed US officials. This followed Ukraine’s reported strike on a chemical plant in Russia’s Bryansk oblast on 21 October using British-supplied Storm Shadow missiles. However, Trump has dismissed these claims as ‘fake news’, sustaining enduring uncertainty over the US’ policy regarding Ukrainian strikes with Western-provided missiles. Regarding UK-supplied Storm Shadow missiles, the possible US authorisation pertains to the provision of geospatial intelligence, which facilitates more complex and lethal strikes. While Storm Shadow is capable of striking targets independently using GPS, it is at an increased risk of electronic warfare (EW) and air defence interception when doing so. Ultimately, even if the Trump administration changes its position regarding these authorisations, we assess that the uncertainty over the steady supply of Western missiles will continue to constrain Ukraine’s ability to launch a systematic strike campaign against Russia with such assets.

POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS

• ASSETS: EU leaders failed to agree to use frozen Russian assets for Ukraine’s benefit at a summit on 23 October in Brussels (Belgium). While the bloc agreed to ask the European Commission to present ‘options for financial support’ for Ukraine, it stopped short of greenlighting the usage of the immobilised funds. Belgium has raised concerns with plans for a reparations loan worth EUR 140 bn (USD 163.2 bn) backed by frozen Russian assets. One of Belgium’s demands is that other member states commit to a ‘full mutualisation’ of the risk, in case Russia makes claims on the assets.
• ASSETS: Belgium holds 86% of all Russian state assets in the EU in the financial clearing house Euroclear, meaning that its approval is crucial for any such move. EU leaders will likely attempt to address remaining concerns at another summit in December. However, we assess that the risk of Russian retaliatory asset seizures and legal action, as well as EU members’ concerns that using such assets will reduce investor confidence, will possibly further delay progress on the loan.
• DIPLOMACY: On 21 October, Bloomberg reported that European countries are working with Ukraine on a 12-point proposal to end the Russo-Ukrainian war along the current frontlines, though it is highly unlikely to facilitate a breakthrough towards peace. As part of the proposal, Ukraine would receive security guarantees, funds for reconstruction and a roadmap to joining the EU. Meanwhile, sanctions on Russia would be lifted gradually, though its frozen central bank assets would only be returned once the Kremlin agrees to contribute to reconstructing post-war Ukraine. Under this proposal, the two warring countries would negotiate on the governance of Russian-occupied Ukrainian territories, though neither Europe nor Ukraine would legally recognise any land as Russian. Several details of the plan are non-starters for Russia, as it continues to oppose an immediate ceasefire in Ukraine. We assess that Russia will highly likely maintain its demand that Ukraine cede the entirety of the Donbas region as a condition for a ceasefire over the coming months, though the Russian forces do not occupy it fully.

FORECAST

SANCTIONS: The US’ decision to impose sanctions on two of Russia’s largest oil producers highly likely reflects a growing frustration with the Kremlin’s lack of willingness to end the war, rather than a major policy shift from the Trump administration. On 22 October, the US Treasury announced punitive measures against Lukoil and Rosneft, alongside several of their subsidiaries, due to Russia’s ‘lack of serious commitment’ to the peace process. The move came a week after the UK similarly sanctioned the same companies. These are the first sanctions directly imposed against Russia by the US during Trump’s second term; they highly likely reflect the administration’s preference for using economic tools to achieve its foreign policy objectives. Washington DC has remained highly reluctant to impose economic penalties against Moscow up until now, including by excluding it from its global tariffs regime. Nevertheless, the US remains likely to continue to prioritise diplomatic and economic means to influence the Kremlin, rather than to dramatically ramp up military support for Ukraine to maximise pressure on Russia on the battlefield in the short-to-medium term. These latest measures will likely undermine Russia’s ability to generate revenue from its historically lucrative oil trade over the coming months. Some estimates claim that Lukoil and Rosneft account for around two-thirds of the 4.4 m barrels of crude Russian exports per day. In 2022, many European countries stopped importing Russian crude following the full-scale invasion of Ukraine; they have subsequently sought to reduce their energy dependence on Russia (see Sibylline Daily Analytical Update – 23 October 2025), with China and India becoming two of Russia’s largest oil purchasers. However, Reuters has reported that Chinese state oil majors have suspended purchases of seaborne Russian crude after the US imposed measures against Lukoil and Rosneft. Similarly, Reliance Industries (India’s main buyer of Russian crude) reportedly plans to either reduce or cease imports of Russian oil, including by suspending purchases under its long-term deal with Rosneft. If China and India permanently curtail Russian oil purchases, this will likely further strain Russia’s federal revenues in the coming months; however, it is unlikely to lead to an economic collapse. Lukoil’s announcement that it plans to sell its assets abroad due to the sanctions will likely impact Russia’s oil trade over the longer term. An unnamed former Lukoil executive has claimed that the move could lead the company’s revenues and profits to fall by around 30%. However, Russia has shown a clear capability to circumvent sanctions at scale over the last decade. Indirect oil exports via intermediaries, a ‘shadow fleet’ and ‘blending’ oil with third-party producers will potentially provide future loopholes for China and India to continue purchasing Russian oil, though at lower prices than the current ones. Additionally, if global oil prices spike in the future (which is unlikely in the short term), this could realistically encourage Washington DC to repeal the sanctions as a quick way to keep oil prices low, which has remained a key domestic priority for the Trump administration. Repealing the sanctions could also realistically be used as an incentive for future talks, meaning that it remains unclear for how long the measures will be in place. For further analysis on Lukoil’s announcement. Despite the sanctions’ economic impact, they are unlikely to encourage Moscow to cease hostilities in the near term. On 23 October, Putin stated that Russia would not yield to the US’ attempts to exert pressure, while numerous high-ranking officials have sought to downplay the impact of the sanctions. Ultimately, the sanctions will have an impact on federal revenues, but it remains our assessment that Russia will continue to find the money to sustain its attritional war from other sources, though this will come at an increasing economic cost to Russian businesses and tax payers. As long as the Russian forces continue to grind forwards on the battlefield and the Kremlin believes that the war’s attritional logic will cause Ukraine’s collapse before its own, Russia will highly likely continue the war. We continue to assess that the Kremlin is willing for Russia to endure significant economic hardship to achieve its war objectives, which have largely remained unchanged despite being the most heavily sanctioned state in history. Therefore, we assess that economic measures alone are unlikely to result in a significant shift in Russia’s war goals in Ukraine in the short term. Nevertheless, Russian officials have sought to deter the US from issuing further measures against Russia given their clear economic impact. On 26 October, the Kremlin press secretary Dmitry Peskov described the issuance of the punitive measures as an ‘unfriendly move’ which harmed the prospect of reviving bilateral relations. However, Peskov also claimed that the new measures do not mean that Moscow and Washington DC should abandon efforts to restore ties. Similarly, Dmitriev criticised former US president Joe Biden’s use of sanctions to weaken the Russian economy. Such comments and comparisons are highly likely aimed at appealing to Trump to not pursue further sanctions, given that his administration had sought to restore relations with Russia, including by floating sanctions relief and economic co-operation. Looking ahead, the US will possibly issue further punitive measures against Russia if it shows no genuine efforts towards ending the war; however, the Trump administration will likely wait for signals from the Kremlin before taking such action. According to a report from Reuters on 25 October, the US has prepared additional sanctions that it could leverage; these target Russia’s banking sector and infrastructure used to supply Russian oil to global markets.

Oct 27.

• Russia: New rate cuts are unlikely to improve growth forecast in medium-to-long term. On 24 October, Russia’s Central Bank (CBR) cut interest rates by 0.5%, setting them at 16.5%. Following the start of the war in Ukraine, the CBR steadily increased rates in response to a sharp rise in inflation, reaching 21% in late 2024, its highest level since the early 2000s. This peak was followed by a gradual series of rate reductions from June 2025 onwards. Although the CBR has noted that some inflationary drivers – such as demand growth – are easing, it has raised its 2026 inflation forecast from 4% to between 4% and 5%. The latest rate decision also follows the government’s recent proposal to increase VAT in 2026; this is highly likely to sustain inflationary pressure. Meanwhile, last week US President Donald Trump imposed sanctions on major Russian oil companies, which are highly likely to disrupt Russia’s vital oil revenues, adding further fiscal pressure and constraining economic growth. As such, although the latest rate cut will modestly reduce borrowing costs for businesses, it is unlikely to improve Russia’s overall growth outlook in the medium-to-long term.
• Grievances with war, wartime restrictions will drive threat of violence directed at authorities. On 24 October, an unnamed man detonated an explosive device at a railway station in Ovruch (Zhytomyr oblast) at approximately 1050hrs (local time) during a document check, killing himself and three women. Two border guard officials and ten civilians also sustained injuries; one of the deceased was also a border guard. The perpetrator was a 23-year-old resident of Kharkiv oblast who had recently been detained while trying to cross the border illegally in western Ukraine. The Ukrainian authorities have not provided a motive for the incident nor suggested that it could have been Russian sabotage. Given the perpetrator’s profile, the incident is likely to be connected to grievances with Russia’s ongoing war against Ukraine and wartime restrictions. In August, an unnamed man in Cherkasy (Cherkasy oblast) threatened military recruitment officials with a grenade after they stopped him to check his military registration documents. We assess that similar violent incidents directed towards the authorities will likely persist for the duration of the war. (Source: Sibylline)

 

27 Oct 25. How is Ukraine looking to attract foreign defence companies?

Schemes such as the Build in Ukraine programme is intended to attract Western companies to move into Ukraine.

Ukraine wants to attract foreign defence companies to the country. Credit: hyotographics via Shutterstock

• Ukraine is keen to attract Western defence companies to Ukraine to help scale up supply and maintenance capabilities
• Companies like BAE Systems, Northrop Grumman, Rheinmetall, and Saab are among the more than 20 already established in-country
• Russia is continuing its bombardment of Ukrainian cities, focussing against on energy infrastructure as winter close in

Amid the destructive reality of the Ukraine-Russia war, opportunity exists for overseas defence companies to locate key manufacturing, maintenance, and supply capabilities into Ukraine, which is keen to attract Western investment. Detailed in a 22 October 2025, release from Ukraine’s Ministry of Defence (MoD), it was restated that 25 international companies were listed as “progressing through various stages of localising their operations in Ukraine”, part of an ongoing ‘Build in Ukraine’ initiative.  This reiterates a similar call made in the previous month on Western defence companies moving into Ukraine. Through the initiative, the Ukrainian government is encouraging foreign defence companies to establish production facilities in Ukraine, partly to reduce the logistics line to supplying and maintaining its own forces, but also with an aspiration to make Ukraine a “full-fledged player” in the global defence market. According to the MoD, a number of Western companies are currently operating or expanding in-country production, including BAE Systems (joint production and maintenance of L119 howitzers; Rheinmetall (establishment of repair and production facilities for armoured vehicles; Saab (agreements on joint production of air defence systems; and Northrop Grumman (agreements on joint production of ammunition). Ukraine’s MoD added that the country was attracting companies specialising in uncrewed systems, cybersecurity, and counter-drone capabilities. In September 2025, Sergiy Boyev, Deputy Minister of Defence of Ukraine, met with German company Flensburger Fahrzeugbau Gesellschaft (FFG), to discuss a joint project on armoured vehicle repairs that includes an in-country repair hub. Specifically, the project relates to the repair of Leopard main battle tanks by FFG in Ukraine, which have been donated in significant numbers by European allies. The same month Ukraine’s Minister of Defence Denys Shmyhal said the Ukrainian government would offer alternative structures to accommodate Western defence companies seeking to establish themselves in Ukraine.

“We offer our partners various models of cooperation, including the ‘Danish model’ and the ‘Build with Ukraine / Build in Ukraine’ initiative. The priority is that the main share of companies’ production be directed to the needs of the Ukrainian military,” Shmyhal stated.

In addition, in order to “minimise risks” for investors and joint ventures, Ukraine will establish Defence City, a legal framework that provides tax incentives, streamlined customs procedures, expanded state financial support, among other benefits.

“We call on foreign companies to invest in Ukraine and set up their production here,” Shmyhal said at the time.

During a trip to Ukraine in September, Army Technology reported the establishment of joint ventures was a prime way for Ukrainian defence companies to work with Western counterparts in building up internal capacity while also accessing the wider European defence market.

Russian bombardment of Ukraine continues

With the coming winter bringing a change in conditions on the ground, Russia has kept up its bombardment of Ukrainian cities, using Shahed drones, and cruise and hypersonic missiles. On 26 October, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy said over the previous week more than 1,200 attack drones and missiles had been launched against Ukraine. Through September and October Russia has struck major cities throughout the country, including western regions such as Lviv. Meanwhile in a 24 October intelligence update from the UK Ministry of Defence (MoD), it was revealed that North Korean (DPRK) military personnel had been conducting reconnaissance operations to enable Russian strikes on Ukrainian forces in the Kursk region. While DPRK forces were primarily being used for offensive assaults on Ukrainian positions, it was described as “highly likely” that they were also adapting to use tactical drones, which are emerging as a dominant capability on the battlefield. The UK MoD added DPRK forces has sustained around 6,000 casualties in operations against Ukraine, more than half of the 11,000 personnel originally sent by Pyongyang. (Source: army-technology.com)

 

25 Oct 25. “Ukraine’s Piranha Tech launches new range of C-UAS systems for city protection.” Ukraine’s Defender Media reports Ukrainian defence company Piranha Tech has launched a new range of electronic warfare systems and software solutions to protect large areas from small strike and reconnaissance drones.  The idea is to create an ecosystem capable of protecting an entire city, or at least build first and second rings of EW defence around a city,” Anatolii Khrapchynskyi, Deputy Director of Piranha Tech, said during the presentation, quoted in the article. “Piranha Tech is developing networked scenarios where EW interacts with radars, early-warning systems, and command posts. This approach enables wider area coverage, better sector coordination, and faster response to emerging threats, the company says…The key novelty of the presentation was the Sky Defender system, which integrates radars, detection modules, dome-based solutions, and remote jamming units…all components are synchronised via a command post and remotely controlled from the operator’s console.” “According to Ruzhynskyi, the software is fairly straightforward. The main radar defines directions and distributes zones of responsibility between devices. When an enemy UAV enters a zone, the system automatically calculates the effective ranges and response algorithms for each element—detection, jamming, or interception. The software is scalable, assigning operator roles (for instance, an interceptor operator controls only their module, while an EW operator works on their panel), yet all roles are integrated into a unified control system.” (Source: www.unmannedairspace.info)

 

27 Oct 25. AIRO Group and Bullet to Form Joint Venture Advancing Ukraine-Developed Interceptor Drones. AIRO Group Holdings, Inc. and Bullet (Degree-Trans LLC), a Ukrainian developer of turbojet unmanned interceptor systems, announced that they have signed a Letter of Intent to establish a 50/50 joint venture to produce and deploy Bullet’s combat-proven fixed-wing UAV technology across the United States, NATO defense markets and Ukraine. AIRO will integrate Bullet’s high-speed, modular interceptor drone platform into U.S. manufacturing and defense infrastructure. The advanced interceptor drone achieves remarkable speeds of up to 300 mph (450 km/h), establishing it as one of the fastest unmanned aerial defense systems available. With a substantial flight range of up to 200 km and versatile payload capacity ranging from 2.5 to 9 kg, this interceptor drone represents a significant advancement in aerial defense capabilities. The platform’s modular design allows for rapid deployment and adaptation across various mission profiles, making it an ideal solution for modern defense requirements.

“This partnership unites the innovation and front-line experience of Ukrainian engineers with AIRO’s manufacturing and program-management expertise,” said Dr. Chirinjeev Kathuria, Executive Chairman of AIRO Group. “Together we will bring advanced aerial-defense capabilities to our allies while supporting Ukraine’s defense industry. Recent U.S. government policy updates emphasizing investment in domestic drone manufacturing align perfectly with our joint venture objectives, positioning us to meet critical national security needs while strengthening America’s defense industrial base.”

“Joining forces with AIRO allows Bullet to expand our proven interceptor technology into new markets,” added Viacheslav Lvovych, Director of Bullet. “Our shared objective is to deliver rapid, reliable air-defense solutions that strengthen Ukraine and the wider NATO alliance.”

“For those who serve on the front lines, every second matters,” said Joe Burns, CEO of AIRO Group. “By bringing combat-proven Ukrainian technology into U.S. manufacturing, we’re not only building a faster, more agile interceptor platform – we’re giving our troops and allies the tools they need to respond decisively to aerial threats and protect lives.”

The venture will focus on expanding production capacity for these high-speed interceptor drones in the United States and Ukraine, accelerating research and development of next-generation interceptor and strike configurations, and pursuing qualified contracts with the U.S. Department of War, NATO, and allied ministries of defense. The 300 mph capability of the interceptor drone platform provides unprecedented response times for aerial threats, while its proven combat effectiveness in Ukrainian operations demonstrates real-world reliability. The joint venture will coordinate closely with Ukraine’s Ministry of Defense and pursue qualified contracts with the U.S. Department of War, NATO, and allied ministries. The partners expect to finalize definitive agreements within 60 days. (Source: UAS VISION)

 

​24 Oct 25. UK Expands Missile Production to Supply 5,000 Multipurpose Missiles to Ukraine. British Prime Minister Keir Starmer announced an expansion of missile production to strengthen Ukraine’s air defenses ahead of the winter season. The United Kingdom will significantly expand its missile production program to deliver 5,000 lightweight-multirole missiles to Ukraine, British Prime Minister Keir Starmer announced on October 24, during the Coalition of the Willing meeting. The initiative aims to bolster Ukraine’s air defense capabilities ahead of the coming winter, when russia is expected to intensify aerial strikes on critical infrastructure. According to Keir Starmer, the decision reflects both a strategic commitment to Ukraine’s defense and a broader effort to strengthen the UK’s domestic defense industry. The missiles in question are expected to serve dual roles in both air defense and battlefield support, capable of intercepting aerial threats such as drones and cruise missiles while also being adaptable for ground-based targets. By supplying these systems, the UK aims to enhance Ukraine’s layered defense network, particularly against the waves of Russian drone and missile attacks that typically intensify during the winter months. The production increase is part of a wider initiative under the Coalition of the Willing, a multilateral framework uniting Western nations in coordinated military and industrial support for Ukraine. The UK has remained a leading member of this coalition, providing the Storm Shadow long-range missiles, Challenger 2 tanks, and extensive training for Ukrainian troops since the start of Russia’s full-scale invasion. As Defense Express previously reported, Ukraine should not expect Swedish Gripen fighter jets to appear in its skies in the near future, officials from the Ukrainian Air Force have cautioned. According to Yurii Ihnat, Head of the Communications Department of the Ukrainian Air Force, the production and transfer of such advanced aircraft is a complex and lengthy process that no nation can accelerate overnight. (Source: News Now/https://en.defence-ua.com/)

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Founded in 1987, Exensor Technology is a world leading supplier of Networked Unattended Ground Sensor (UGS) Systems providing tailored sensor solutions to customers all over the world. From our Headquarters in Lund Sweden, our centre of expertise in Network Communications at Communications Research Lab in Kalmar Sweden and our Production site outside of Basingstoke UK, we design, develop and produce latest state of the art rugged UGS solutions at the highest quality to meet the most stringent demands of our customers. Our systems are in operation and used in a wide number of Military as well as Homeland Security applications worldwide. The modular nature of the system ensures any external sensor can be integrated, providing the user with a fully meshed “silent” network capable of self-healing. Exensor Technology will continue to lead the field in UGS technology, provide our customers with excellent customer service and a bespoke package able to meet every need.

A CNIM Group Company

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Sponsored by Bertin Exensor

 

www.exensor.com

 

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29 Oct 25.  US will share tech to let South Korea build nuclear submarine: Trump. The United States will share closely held technology to allow South Korea to build a nuclear-powered submarine, President Donald Trump said on social media Thursday after meeting with the country’s president. President Lee Jae Myung stressed to Trump in their Wednesday meeting that the goal was to modernize the alliance with the U.S., noting plans to increase military spending to reduce the financial burden on America. The South Korean leader said there might have been a misunderstanding when they last spoke in August about nuclear-powered submarines, saying that his government was looking for nuclear fuel rather than weapons. Lee said that if South Korea was equipped with nuclear-powered submarines, that it could help U.S. activities in the region. Trump said in a separate post that the country would build its nuclear-powered submarine in the Philly Shipyard, which was bought last year by South Korea’s Hanwha Group. It was unclear what the size or cost of the sub project would be, but South Korea had said as part of talks with Trump that it had committed $150bn to invest in America’s shipbuilding capacity. U.S. nuclear submarine technology is widely regarded as some of the most sensitive and highly guarded technology the military possesses. The U.S. has been incredibly protective of that knowledge, and even a recently announced deal with close allies the United Kingdom and Australia to help the latter acquire nuclear submarine technology doesn’t feature the U.S. directly transferring its knowledge. Trump’s post on social media comes ahead of his meeting with Chinese President Xi Jinping, whose country possesses nuclear submarines, and after North Korea in March unveiled for the first time a nuclear-powered submarine under construction. It is a weapons system that can pose a major security threat to South Korea and the U.S. As Trump visited South Korea, North Korea said Wednesday that it conducted successful cruise missile tests, the latest display of its growing military capabilities. Pentagon officials didn’t immediately respond to questions about Trump’s announcement on sharing the nuclear sub technology with South Korea. (Source: Defense News)

 

30 Oct 25.  Legal challenges to National Guard deployments sustain elevated domestic unrest risks. On 29 October, the Portland (Oregon) police testified that US President Donald Trump’s order to deploy National Guard troops has inflamed protests and increased violence. This testimony was given in a trial aiming to determine whether demonstrations outside immigration detention facilities constitute a rebellion or prevent federal agents from enforcing the law, thereby justifying a military deployment. Portland Police Commander Franz Schoening alleged that federal agents have used excessive force to drive demonstrators away from the Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) headquarters building. Furthermore, on 29 October, the Supreme Court of the United States (SCOTUS) requested more information from the Trump administration and from Illinois officials to assess whether the administration can deploy hundreds of National Guard troops in Chicago (Illinois). Also on 29 October, US officials signalled that the National Guard is planning to train hundreds of troops in each state in order to create a rapid response force focused on civil disturbance missions in 2026. These developments underscore elevated judiciary-executive branch tensions related to National Guard deployments. In the near term, these tensions will likely sustain elevated domestic unrest risks in Democratic-led urban centres, specifically targeting ICE facilities and personnel. (Source: Sibylline)

 

30 Oct 25. Trump tells Pentagon to immediately resume testing US nuclear weapons.

• Summary
• Decision follows China’s nuclear stockpile expansion
• Russia’s recent nuclear tests include Poseidon super torpedo
• China’s arsenal expected to exceed 1,000 by 2030, CSIS says

U.S. President Donald Trump ordered the U.S. military on Thursday to immediately resume testing nuclear weapons after a gap of 33 years, minutes before beginning a meeting with Chinese President Xi Jinping. Trump made the surprise announcement on Truth Social while he was aboard his Marine One helicopter flying to meet Xi for a trade negotiating session in Busan, South Korea. He said he was instructing the Pentagon to test the U.S. nuclear arsenal on an “equal basis” with other nuclear powers. (Source: Reuters)

——————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————–

Founded in 1987, Exensor Technology is a world leading supplier of Networked Unattended Ground Sensor (UGS) Systems providing tailored sensor solutions to customers all over the world. From our Headquarters in Lund Sweden, our centre of expertise in Network Communications at Communications Research Lab in Kalmar Sweden and our Production site outside of Basingstoke UK, we design, develop and produce latest state of the art rugged UGS solutions at the highest quality to meet the most stringent demands of our customers. Our systems are in operation and used in a wide number of Military as well as Homeland Security applications worldwide. The modular nature of the system ensures any external sensor can be integrated, providing the user with a fully meshed “silent” network capable of self-healing. Exensor Technology will continue to lead the field in UGS technology, provide our customers with excellent customer service and a bespoke package able to meet every need.

A CNIM Group Company

———————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————-

Sponsored by Bertin Exensor

 

www.exensor.com

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30 Oct 25. UK and Qatar step up defence relationship with new agreement

Britain’s security will be strengthened through a new defence agreement signed with Qatar.

Britain’s security will be strengthened through a new defence agreement signed with Qatar on Wednesday.

The agreement was signed by the Defence Secretary during his visit to Doha, where he met with the Amir of Qatar, His Highness Sheikh Tamim bin Hamad Al Thani.   The new enhanced Defence Assurance Arrangement deepens the UK’s defence partnership with Qatar, paving the way for enhanced interoperability across land, air and sea.   The agreement sees the UK and Qatar commit to increasing interoperability between our Armed Forced and conducting joint planning on threat scenarios to ensure we can better face the threats of tomorrow together. It underlines the UK’s unwavering commitment to supporting the defence of Qatar as a key partner in the region, and to strengthen the wider strategic partnership between Qatar and the UK. Britain’s partnership with Qatar extends beyond defence. UK exports to Qatar reached £4.4 bn in 2025, whilst Qatari investment in Britain stands at more than £40 bn, supporting jobs across fintech, life sciences, renewable energy and cyber security sectors throughout the UK.   Whilst Qatar is a key regional security partner, defence investment leader, it is also a big investor in the UK with their investment in our country currently standing at approximately £40 bn.   While in Qatar, the Defence Secretary also joined His Excellency Sheikh Saoud Bin Ali Al-Thani in co-chairing a discussion covering the latest security developments in the region.

Defence Secretary, John Healey MP, said: “Qatar and the UK are close partners with historic defence ties going back decades. This partnership bolsters the national security of both our nations and supports stability in the Gulf region.   Today, we build on that proud legacy by starting a new chapter in our partnership, as we strengthen the bonds between our militaries and defence industries. This is part of our drive to strike new defence deals to strengthen our alliances and our UK defence industry.”

Later in the day, the Defence Secretary visited Al Udeid Air Base where he met with Group Captain Jim Mastin, Deputy Air Component Commander, and personnel from the Royal Air Force’s 83 Expeditionary Air Group.   During the visit, he was briefed on recent operational developments and toured the Combined Air Operations Centre.  The arrangement builds on the success of the UK-Qatar Joint Typhoon Squadron, the UK’s first joint fighter jet squadron since the Second World War. This unique partnership will provide to foundation to jointly enhance our air defence capabilities and strengthen operational cooperation between British and Qatari armed forces.   Aligning with the government’s Plan for Change, the agreement demonstrates how Britain’s global partnerships strengthen national security through modernised armed forces and international cooperation whilst delivering tangible benefits at home through job creation and economic growth. (Source: https://www.gov.uk/)

 

29 Oct 25. The US draws down some troops on NATO’s eastern flank. The United States has informed its NATO allies that it will scale back its troop presence along Europe’s eastern border with Ukraine as it focuses on security priorities elsewhere in the world, Romania’s defense ministry said on Wednesday. The U.S. Army later confirmed the move, but denied it was a sign of lessened commitment to NATO. Depending on operations and exercises, around 80,000-100,000 U.S. troops are usually present on European soil. NATO allies have expressed concern that the Trump administration might drastically cut their numbers and leave a security vacuum as European countries confront an increasingly aggressive Russia. The administration has been reviewing its military “posture” in Europe and elsewhere, but U.S. officials have said that the findings of the review were not expected to be known before early next year. NATO has recently been bulking up its defensive posture on its eastern flank bordering Belarus, Russia and Ukraine after a series of airspace violations by drones, balloons and Russian aircraft.The Romanian defense ministry said that the U.S. decision will “stop the rotation in Europe of a brigade that had elements in several NATO countries,” including at a base in Romania. It said in a statement that about 1,000 U.S. troops will remain stationed in Romania. As of April, more than 1,700 U.S. military personnel were estimated to be deployed there. A brigade usually numbers anywhere from 1,500 to 3,000 troops. Romania’s Defense Minister Ionut Mosteanu said the decision reflects Washington’s shift “toward the Indo-Pacific” region, and that allied troop numbers would remain above the number before Russia’s full-scale invasion of neighboring Ukraine.

“Our strategic partnership is solid, predictable, and reliable,” he said in a news conference.

In a post on X, U.S. Ambassador to NATO Matthew Whitaker said the U.S. “remains committed to Romania.”

“Our strong presence in and enduring commitment to Europe remains steadfast, including support for Eastern Sentry,” a NATO operation along the eastern flank, he wrote. He did not mention the troop drawdown.

After the war started in 2022, NATO bolstered its presence on Europe’s eastern flank by sending additional multinational battle groups to Romania, Hungary, Bulgaria and Slovakia. Many more European troops are now stationed there. The ministry statement said that the U.S. “decision also took into account the fact that NATO has strengthened its presence and activity on the Eastern Flank, which allows the United States to adjust its military posture in the region.”

101st Airborne troops to fly out

In a statement later on Wednesday, U.S. Army Europe and Africa said that the 2nd Infantry Brigade Combat Team of the 101st Airborne Division will return to its base in Kentucky as previously planned but that no other U.S. troops would rotate into Europe to replace it.

“This is not an American withdrawal from Europe or a signal of lessened commitment to NATO and Article 5,” it said, in a reference to the collective security guarantee in the organization’s treaty that an attack on one ally should be considered an attack on all 32.

“Rather this is a positive sign of increased European capability and responsibility. Our NATO allies are meeting President Trump’s call to take primary responsibility for the conventional defense of Europe,” it said.

It insisted that the move “will not change the security environment in Europe.”

Government officials in Poland and Lithuania, which lie further north along Europe’s eastern flank, said they had not been informed of any U.S. troop drawdown in their countries. Asked about the move, a NATO official said that “adjustments to U.S. force posture are not unusual.” Under the terms of their employment contract, the official is permitted to speak to reporters but only on condition that they not be named. The official said that even with this new adjustment, about which NATO was informed in advance, the American “force posture in Europe remains larger than it has been for many years, with many more U.S. forces on the continent than before 2022.” The official played down any security concerns, saying that “NATO and U.S. authorities are in close contact about our overall posture – to ensure NATO retains our robust capacity to deter and defend.” (Source: Defense News)

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