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Military And Security Developments
Nov 07.
- Israel-Kazakhstan: Accession to Abraham Accords will drive opportunities in defence and minerals. On 6 November, US President Donald Trump announced that Kazakhstan will join the Abraham Accords, a framework for diplomatic normalisation between Israel and several Muslim-majority states. While Kazakhstan already maintains formal diplomatic relations with Israel, the move likely reflects an effort to strengthen Israel’s international standing after two years of conflict in Gaza. The decision will likely strengthen Israel’s industrial resilience, creating opportunities in defence and critical mineral supply chains and encouraging growth in the industrial, manufacturing and engineering sectors. In particular, deepening Israel-Kazakhstan relations will possibly strengthen Israel’s efforts to develop its domestic arms manufacturing capabilities, increasing opportunities for Western defence companies with operations in Israel. Iran will likely interpret the move as an encroachment into its strategic space, possibly reducing the scope of its joint naval activities with Kazakhstan in the Caspian Sea. We assess that Iran will possibly respond to this move through grey-zone activities such as cyber attacks, increasing operational and reputational risks for Israel-based firms. Nevertheless, the US will continue to seek to expand the Abraham Accords, with new membership further increasing its legitimacy and driving the likelihood of states such as Saudi Arabia joining in the long term.
- US-Syria: New military base signals possible security deal with Israel. On 6 November, international media reported that the US will establish an airbase near the capital Damascus to help supervise a potential security pact between Israel and Syria. Unnamed Syrian officials said that talks with the US had focused on humanitarian operations, logistics, refuelling and surveillance. The reports signal likely progress towards an interim deal in the US-backed Israel-Syria security talks, possibly by the end of 2025. Any such deal will likely involve the demilitarisation of parts of Daraa, Quneitra and Suwayda governorates. A trilateral security co-ordination against rogue Islamist groups in southern Syria, as well as Iran-linked drugs and arms smuggling networks operating across each of Syria’s borders, is also likely to be part of the deal. There is also a realistic possibility that the deal will involve guarantees from regional actors such as the UAE. Nevertheless, this deal is unlikely to evolve into a full normalisation in the coming months, due to the risk of backlash from Syrian President Ahmed al-Sharaa’s Islamist base.
Nov 06.
ISRAEL-LEBANON: IDF STRIKES IN LEBANON
EVENT
At approximately 1600hrs (local time) earlier on 6 November, the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) began conducting waves of airstrikes targeting Lebanese Hizballah (LH) facilities in southern Lebanon. Prior to the strikes, the IDF issued evacuation orders for Ayta al-Jabal and Taybeh (both Nabatieh governorate) as well as Tayr Debba (South governorate). At the time of writing, airstrikes remain largely concentrated in these locations.
SIGNIFICANCE
- The strikes come amid rising regional tensions linked to the Lebanese government’s efforts to disarm LH as part of the Israel-LH ceasefire. Although Lebanon has agreed to a US-backed disarmament roadmap that would see LH’s total disarmament by 31 December 2025, Israel and the US have repeatedly called for more assertive disarmament efforts to meet this deadline.
- In recent weeks, the IDF has increased the frequency of airstrikes targeting LH personnel in southern Lebanon and conducted an overnight raid in Blida (Nabatieh governorate) on 29 October, underscoring efforts to increase pressure on the Lebanese authorities to disarm LH.
FORECAST
Further evacuation warnings and limited strikes in southern Lebanon are likely in the coming weeks; ground operations along the Israel-Lebanon border remain a realistic possibility. We assess that Israel will likely continue increasing military pressure on the Lebanese government to disarm LH via sporadic, limited strikes in southern Lebanon in the coming days and weeks. However, while Israel is prepared for a multi-day conflict with LH, military officials have emphasised that the IDF is not looking for an escalation; this moderates the likelihood of a wide-range, continuous and intense airstrike campaign. While limited IDF ground operations within southern Lebanon along the border with Israel remain a realistic possibility, we assess that large-scale ground operations, particularly pushing deeper into Lebanese territory, are currently unlikely.
LH is unlikely to respond to the IDF strikes in the coming days; however, a ceasefire collapse is possible in the event of deeper and major IDF strikes against LH strongholds across Lebanon and/or a large ground incursion in a protracted operation. LH is currently reluctant to pursue any action that will result in domestic accusations that they are responsible for dragging Lebanon into a war, which would further erode its already diminished popularity and political influence before nationwide general elections in 2026. However, there is a possibility that LH will launch retaliatory strikes if the current Israeli operation protracts for more than two weeks. Retaliation is also likely if the IDF conducts deeper substantive airstrikes targeting LH leaders and strongholds in the capital Beirut, central areas north of the Litani River such as Sidon (South governorate) or Baalbek-Hermel and Beqaa governorates. Large-scale Israeli ground incursion in southern Lebanon or from Syria’s Mount Hermon area (Quneitra governate) will also likely prompt renewed armed conflict, but this is currently unlikely.
While large-scale IDF strikes on LH assets in Beirut are unlikely, with the IDF primarily targeting LH operatives, assets, weapons depots and tunnels in southern Lebanon, a limited strike in the capital remains a possibility. Such strikes will most likely be in Nabatieh and South governorates, possibly including pinpoint strikes in major cities such as Jezzine, Sidon and Tyre (all South governorate). While major strikes on LH’s strongholds in the capital during this operation remain unlikely in the coming days, a limited strike on a single target in Beirut’s Dahieh suburb is possible. In such an event, LH will be unlikely to respond to a highly targeted strike. However, if the current IDF operation continues for a week, there is a possibility that the Lebanese government will temporarily suspend disarmament efforts targeting LH arsenals in the south, as well as halting security co-ordination with the US and Israel in order to pressure a cessation of the strikes. Such a move will increase diplomatic tensions and uncertainty.
- Iraq: Airstrike certification to strengthen security capabilities, increase misidentification risks. On 4 November, the US Central Command (CENTCOM) announced that the Iraqi security forces have been certified to conduct airstrikes independently, after a US-led task force validated their combat strike capabilities. This validation is a key step in Iraq’s transition to assuming regional operations without support from the US or the NATO Mission Iraq (NMI; also known as the Coalition). As the US continues its phased withdrawal, Iraq needs to improve its security capabilities to moderate long-term risks of attack and ethno-religious violence linked to militant activity. Despite the competence suggested by the certification, we assess that rising Islamic State (IS) activity and decreased US oversight will likely increase the risk of target misidentification and unintended strikes over the next 12 months. This will sustain collateral security risks on the ground, particularly in IS hotspots such as Al Anbar, Diyala and Kirkuk governorates. Additionally, intelligence gaps, slower strike approval processes and political interference in the absence of US oversight will possibly enable IS cells to regroup and expand operations across key areas.
- Egypt-Israel: Security rules will reduce cross-border smuggling, but raise threats to bilateral relations. On 5 November, Israeli Minister of Defense Israel Katz instructed the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) to declare the Israel-Egypt border a closed military zone. The IDF will also adjust its rules of engagement to strike any unauthorised party that penetrates the area. This comes amid rising rates of weapon and drug smuggling along the border, mainly with drones. Notably, Katz added that Israel will establish a system of deterrence against these smugglers, similar to the one employed against Lebanese Hezbollah (LH) in Lebanon. Katz did not specify what such a system of deterrence will entail, but the statement is highly likely to increase ongoing political tensions with Cairo. Despite this rhetoric, the border security co-ordination between the two countries is unlikely to break down. We assess that the new instructions are likely to reduce smuggling operations from the Sinai Peninsula (which are mainly conducted by Bedouin communities). However, while Israeli strikes against smugglers inside Egypt are currently unlikely, this risk will increase over time if smuggling does not decrease. Such a move will likely trigger the further worsening of diplomatic relations between Egypt and Israel, possibly resulting in the suspension of bilateral security agreements.
Nov 05.
KEY DEVELOPMENTS
IRAN
- The Iranian security forces continue to engage in efforts to improve their combat readiness and infrastructural resilience, underscoring sustained risks of conflict resumption with Israel in the medium term.
- Iran released two detained French nationals following negotiations with France, underscoring persistent risks of detention for foreign nationals.
ISRAEL
- Israel-Lebanon: Lebanese Hizballah’s (LH’s) allegedly escalating efforts to rehabilitate forces in southern Lebanon is driving tensions with Israel, though an imminent resumption of conflict in Lebanon is currently unlikely.
PALESTINIAN TERRITORIES
- GAZA STRIP: The escalating IDF campaign to destroy militant tunnels within the Israeli-occupied ‘yellow line’ will drive attack and collateral damage risks.
- GAZA STRIP: Hamas’ offer to secure the remains of deceased hostages in exchange for the release of militants trapped in the Israeli-occupied ‘yellow zone’ will raise tensions, increasing the risks of armed clashes in southern Gaza.
- GAZA STRIP: Militants continue to seize aid convoys, highlighting sustained risks to NGO and logistics staff.
- GAZA STRIP: The UN Security Council (UNSC) will likely vote to establish the Board of Peace and the ISF in the coming weeks, though security and governance conditions are unlikely to improve imminently.
- WEST BANK: Israeli settlers employed a drone to harass Palestinian olive farmers, underscoring increasing threats to civilians, activists and journalists in the central West Bank.
IRAN
- The Iranian security forces continue to engage in efforts to improve their combat readiness and infrastructural resilience, underscoring sustained risks of conflict resumption with Israel in the medium term. On 30 October, Iranian state media announced that Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei had appointed Brigadier General Ahmad Vahidi – formerly a commander in the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps’ (IRGC’s) Quds Force – to serve as the deputy chief of the Armed Forces’ General Staff (AFGS). Vahidi replaces Brigadier General Mohammad Reza Ashtiani (an Artesh officer, i.e. Iran’s conventional armed forces) and will serve under AFGS chief Major General Abdolrahim Mousavi (who was formerly the commander-in-chief of the Artesh). Vahidi’s appointment underscores the entrenchment of the IRGC’s central role within Iran’s broader security co-ordination architecture, amid efforts to reconstitute capacity following the Israel-Iran war. After his appointment, Vahidi and two IRGC commanders conducted inspections of eight military facilities, underscoring Iran’s continued efforts to improve combat readiness amid concerns that Israel will resume airstrikes targeting nuclear facilities in the medium-to-long term. On 31 October, Iran’s Passive Defence Organisation (PDO) announced that it would conduct stress tests on Iran’s public warning systems, national communication infrastructure and banking networks in the coming weeks. The tests form part of Iran’s broader efforts to improve its infrastructure resilience, following broad disruption during the Israel-Iran war, particularly in the banking and communications sectors (see Sibylline Middle East Crisis Update – 19 June 2025). Taken together, these events underscore continued Iranian efforts to strengthen resilience amid sustained concerns of conflict re-escalation.
- Iran released two detained French nationals following negotiations with France, underscoring persistent risks of detention for foreign nationals. On 4 November, French President Emmanuel Macron announced that the Iranian authorities had released Cécile Kohler and Jacques Paris, two French nationals detained on suspicion of espionage in 2022. In early October, Iran’s Foreign Minister Abbas Argachi announced that France and Iran were close to reaching an agreement to exchange Kohler and Paris for an Iranian national that had been detained in France for promoting terrorism on social media. We assess that in the coming months, Iran is highly likely to continue attempting to leverage the detention of foreign nationals to secure the releases of Iranian nationals detained abroad, as well as to gain periodic sanctions relief amid increasing pressure on socio-economic health conditions. As economic pressure increases, foreign nationals in Iran will face increasingly acute risks of surveillance, harassment and arbitrary detention, particularly those from states enforcing sanctions. Such conditions will increase regional tensions and the risks of targeted countries adopting human rights-based sanctions on Iran, further compounding compliance concerns for regionally engaged firms.
ISRAEL
- Israel-Lebanon: Lebanese Hizballah’s (LH’s) allegedly escalating efforts to rehabilitate forces in southern Lebanon is driving tensions with Israel, though an imminent resumption of conflict in Lebanon is currently unlikely. Between 27 October and 2 November, the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) targeted and killed eight LH operatives. Additionally, the IDF conducted airstrikes against LH military infrastructure (such as rocket launchers) as well as civilian reconstruction projects and equipment, which the IDF alleged were fronts for LH military reconstruction projects. These operations come amid increasingly belligerent rhetoric by Israeli military officials and decision-makers, warning against the continued reconstruction of LH’s presence in southern Lebanon. Israeli military officials also indicated that the IDF is preparing for a multi-day round of fighting with LH and targeting LH defences north of the Litani River if LH attacks Israeli forces. This rhetoric is likely aimed at increasing pressure on the Lebanese government to engage with Israel on its disarmament plan for LH without preconditions. As such, we assess that a resumption of war in Lebanon remains unlikely in the coming week. However, if there are no further developments on negotiations or disarmament, such a scenario will become increasingly likely over the coming weeks. Furthermore, further IDF air strikes (and possibly ground operations) against alleged LH infrastructure in southern Lebanon are likely in the coming weeks. These strikes will be particularly likely around construction sites, which are at an elevated risk of being identified as an LH operation.
PALESTINIAN TERRITORIES
- GAZA STRIP: The escalating IDF campaign to destroy militant tunnels within the Israeli-occupied ‘yellow line’ will drive attack and collateral damage risks. In recent weeks, Palestinian militants appear to have adopted more rigorous anti-personnel procedures in response to attempts by the IDF’s ground forces to destroy underground tunnels. In addition to rigging tunnel shafts and adjacent axes with explosives, militants now routinely launch three to four anti-tank missiles accompanied by sniper fire at the IDF troops working to destroy tunnels. Such tactics have contributed to the IDF’s increasing reliance on airstrikes and artillery fire to destroy underground infrastructure. These airstrikes are likely to increase in intensity and frequency over the coming weeks, as the IDF attempts to destroy all tunnels in its area of control before withdrawing to the second fallback line, as per the ceasefire’s second phase. However, this phase is still under negotiations and Hamas has yet to fulfil its first-phase commitments. Therefore, there is a realistic possibility that the second phase will not be implemented until January or February 2026. The IDF is also increasingly utilising airstrikes to intercept armed militants’ daily attempts to cross the ‘yellow line’, particularly in northern and southern Gaza. This reliance on air operations will increase the risks of misidentification and exposure to shrapnel and secondary explosions for personnel operating near the yellow line.
- GAZA STRIP: Hamas’ offer to secure the remains of deceased hostages in exchange for the release of militants trapped in the Israeli-occupied ‘yellow zone’ will raise tensions, increasing the risks of armed clashes in southern Gaza. In the past week, Hamas has offered to increase its efforts to locate the bodies of deceased hostages and soldiers in return for the release of 200 militants, who are trapped within the Israeli-occupied yellow line in al-Janina neighbourhood in Rafah (southern Gaza). Allegedly, Israel’s Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu initially favoured the offer, though reports indicate that he is shifting away from the proposal in response to criticism and threats by right-wing coalition members who oppose the move. There is a realistic possibility that Netanyahu will reject the deal, resulting in an escalation in IDF strikes against militants trapped in Rafah. Such a scenario will elevate the risk of retaliatory attacks by Hamas, threatening the ceasefire’s viability. Nevertheless, we assess that US and international pressure will moderate the risk of a complete breakdown in the ceasefire.
- GAZA STRIP: Militants continue to seize aid convoys, highlighting sustained risks to NGO and logistics staff. On 31 October, a US drone recorded alleged Hamas militants seizing an aid truck in Khan Yunis (southern Gaza). The risk of militants attacking and looting aid convoys will remain elevated in the coming weeks, driving security risks for NGO personnel and drivers involved in aid deliveries. The looting incidents will also likely delay and hamper efforts to alleviate and stabilise humanitarian conditions in Gaza, sustaining food, population health and water security risks in the coming months. There is a realistic possibility that the international parties monitoring the ceasefire will attempt to mitigate looting by adding security personnel to the aid convoys or using aircraft to attack militants. However, such actions will significantly elevate the risks of misfire and misidentification, further increasing security risks near aid convoys. We assess that the International Stabilization Force (ISF; see below) will likely be tasked with securing aid convoys once it is deployed, probably in the first quarter (Q1) of 2026. However, the ISF’s deployment will elevate risks of armed clashes between ISF personnel and militants, compounding security risks near aid convoys and distribution centres.
- GAZA STRIP: The UN Security Council (UNSC) will likely vote to establish the Board of Peace and the ISF in the coming weeks, though security and governance conditions are unlikely to improve imminently. Since 3 November, numerous media sources have reported that the US is preparing a draft resolution for the UNSC to formalise the post-war governance environment in Gaza. The resolution aims to establish a Board of Peace to function as a transitional government administration for Gaza with the authority to establish the ISF. The ISF will be tasked with protecting civilians and humanitarian aid operations, with an initial two-year deployment. The document specifies that the ISF will have an enforcement mandate, enabling it to employ greater force than conventional peacekeeping forces under UN mandates. Although the US has not formally proposed the resolution and it remains unclear when the vote will take place, the UNSC is highly likely to adopt the resolution in the coming weeks. Nevertheless, the Board of Peace’s establishment is unlikely to immediately improve governance conditions within Gaza. Moreover, negotiations on the ISF’s composition will likely delay its deployment until at least Q1 2026, sustaining security risks for locally engaged staff. Upon its deployment, we assess that the ISF will likely face substantial co-ordination issues, particularly in the first weeks of deployment. This will sustain critical risks across Gaza, particularly as Hamas will highly likely resist efforts to enforce the ceasefire agreement’s disarmament clause, possibly triggering clashes with ISF units. The risk of continued clashes between Hamas militants, IDF personnel and ISF personnel will sustain risks of civilian and bystander exposure to crossfire; it will also compound pressure on the broader peace process, sustaining risks of conflict re-escalation in the medium-to-long term.
- WEST BANK: Israeli settlers employed a drone to harass Palestinian olive farmers, underscoring increasing threats to civilians, activists and journalists in the central West Bank. On 3 November, civilian security officers from the Revava settlement (Salfit governorate) employed a commercial drone to harass Palestinian farmers harvesting olives in Deir Istiya (Salfit governorate). The settlers flew the drone approximately 2m above the ground in an attempt to disperse the farmers, resulting in the injury of an Israeli activist from the T’ruah organisation, which often accompanies Palestinians engaging in agricultural work to deter Israeli settler attacks. The drone subsequently fell to the ground. Two settlement security officers (dressed in IDF fatigues) carrying firearms approached the farmers and activists; they discharged their weapons into the air while recovering the drone. The incident underscores the increasing risks of settler violence during the ongoing olive harvesting season, particularly in central West Bank areas (see Sibylline Middle East Crisis Update – 29 October 2025). As the olive harvest continues, Israeli settlers will likely continue intensifying attacks targeting Palestinian civilians, employing drones, firearms and physical intimidation to harass and disperse agricultural workers. The settlers will also almost certainly continue conducting arson attacks targeting Palestinian agricultural holdings, vehicles and properties, driving localised threats to the assets and property of locally engaged staff, particularly those living and working near Israeli settlements. Activists and journalists accompanying Palestinians or attempting to document settler violence will also face significantly elevated risks of harassment and targeted violence, while risks of detention and deportation by the Israeli security forces will also remain elevated in the coming months. The escalating settler violence will almost certainly compound already elevated ethno-religious tensions within the West Bank. Such tensions will likely increase Palestinian militant groups’ radicalisation and recruitment efforts in the coming weeks. This will sustain elevated risks of attacks targeting Israeli security force positions in the West Bank and within Israel, particularly during the upcoming Hanukkah festivities (between 14 and 22 December).
REGIONAL AND GLOBAL DEVELOPMENTS
• Iraq-Iran: Iran has reportedly encouraged several of its proxies in Iraq to shift their focus from armed resistance to political engagement, in order to mitigate against likely US sanctions against these groups and the Iraqi economy in 2026. Similarly, the Iraqi government has allegedly encouraged Iran-backed Iraqi militias, who are still not fully integrated within the Popular Mobilisation Forces (PMF) umbrella group, to prioritise their political activities following the upcoming parliamentary elections on 11 November. However, militia-affiliated sources indicate that there is some reluctance to pursue this course due to groups’ concerns over loss of autonomy. Therefore, Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammed Shia’ al-Sudani (who we assess will likely return following the 11 November polls) will have to continue to balance Iranian and US interests in the post-election period (see Sibylline Situation Update Brief – 4 November 2025). However, if al-Sudani secures a large parliamentary bloc, he will be able to form a reformist government through which he can pursue efforts to reduce the autonomy of Iran-backed militias. This will likely be done through a mix of institutional incentives and selective coercion, while also increasing Iraq’s security co-ordination with the US. However, even if Iraq implements policies favouring US interests, al-Sudani’s controversial electoral alliance with the National Contract Party (NCP), which is led by Faleh al-Fayyadh (the head of the Iran-aligned PMF), will sustain the risks of US sanctions in 2026. Any such sanctions will primarily target governmental institutions and/or public entities that are linked to Iran-backed militias and individuals. This will increase compliance risks for the shipping, finance and logistics sectors in particular, given that militia influence is strong in these sectors.
Nov 03.
- Israel: Corruption investigation will elevate reputational risks, impact investor confidence, stocks. Earlier on 3 November, the Israeli police arrested several senior officials – including the chairman and officials from public companies – from the General Federation of Labour (Histadrut), on suspicions of bribery, breach of trust, fraud, money laundering and tax offences. The arrests follow a two-year undercover investigation, during which time the police detained and questioned senior officials connected to the municipalities of Ashdod (Southern district), Kiryat Bialik (Haifa district), Rishon LeZion and Rosh HaAyin (both Central district), as well as to El Al airlines and Israel Railways. Among the allegations, the police are investigating connections between the business community and public office appointments, as well as possible allegations of electoral fraud. We assess that the investigation will likely increase reputational risks for companies that are involved or affiliated with the affected suspects and businesses. There is a realistic possibility that senior employees in large Israeli companies will be forced to resign, causing economic instability, possibly impacting shares in the Israeli stock exchange and investor confidence. The investigation also highlights the elevated corruption, supervision and regulatory risks in Israel, possibly impacting the construction and insurance sectors.
- Iran: Critical water levels to drive operational risks, elevated anti-government sentiment in Tehran. On 2 November, Iranian state media reported that Amir Kabir Dam (Alborz province), the main source of drinking water for the capital Tehran, is at 8% capacity and could run dry within the next two weeks. No additional details were provided about the city’s other four reservoirs; however, water levels in Tehran’s dams are at their lowest in over a century (see Sibylline Situation Update Brief – 8 August 2025). Although the authorities have already asked residents to reduce water use, more stringent measures are likely in the coming days, including intermittent closures of public offices and scheduled water cuts, driving supply chain and operational disruptions due to delays in administrative processes. Water pressure will also likely continue to drop in the coming days, resulting in unstable access to potable water across the city and possibly increasing the prevalence of infectious diseases. The crisis has almost certainly been intensified by decades of government mismanagement and corruption. As a result, anti-government sentiment and incidents of small-scale protests, as well as corresponding crackdowns, will possibly increase in Tehran over the coming weeks, raising security risks for local personnel. (Source: Sibylline)
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