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19 Nov 25. The International Institute for Strategic Studies has published the IISS Armed Conflict Survey 2025, which offers in-depth analysis on both the growing financial and human cost of conflict, and the increasing shifts in global power dynamics in the period from 1 July 2024 to 30 June 2025. Its findings illustrate the intensity of conflict and its impact on populations, in terms of casualties and forced migration. This is set in the context of dwindling humanitarian support, cut back by many major donors including the US and in Europe.
The IISS Armed Conflict Survey 2025 finds:
* Nearly 240,000 people were killed in violent events, a 23% increase year on year. Ukraine and Palestine were the most violent conflict theatres, with 82,298 and 20,990 fatalities respectively. Civilian deaths rose by 40%, reaching almost 50,000 in 2024, with Gaza alone accounting for 80% of global child casualties and 70% of female casualties.
* Forced displacement reached a historic 122 m people by April 2025, including 73.5m internally displaced persons (IDPs). Sudan alone saw 14.3m displaced, the world’s largest current displacement crisis.
* A growing divide between humanitarian needs and assistance. Despite escalating humanitarian needs, OCHA reduced the target for urgent assistance from nearly 300m to 114.4m people in March 2025, reflecting the widening gap between global needs and available funding. However, by June 2025, only 18.5% of the required US$29 bn (about US$5.5bn) had been secured, as major donors such as the US, France, Germany, Switzerland and the UK redirected development budgets toward other priorities.
Other findings include:
The return of geopolitics in modern conflict: Geopolitics has complicated prospects for durable peace amid intensifying great-power competition, growing geopolitical fragmentation and the adoption of independent foreign policies by a rising number of emerging powers. This trend – already evident in the growing internationalisation of civil wars over the past two decades – has, in recent years, escalated into outright inter-state conflicts, with Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022 marking a decisive inflection point. Declining multilateralism and the fracturing of the rules-based international order means a growth in independent or multi-aligned foreign policy approaches by many non-Western countries, and the growing erosion of global governance structures and institutions. The UN Security Council, paralysed by major-power rivalries, is routinely bypassed. UN peacekeeping shrank, with large missions in Mali and the DRC wound down, replaced by more fragile, regionalised security arrangements. The US under Trump disengaged sharply from multilateral norms, cutting foreign aid, abandoning development initiatives and intensifying unilateralism. The West’s perceived double standards – particularly around Israel’s actions in Gaza – further eroded legitimacy. Non-State Armed Groups (NSAGs) have gained prominence as quasi-state and geopolitical actors in armed conflicts, exerting control and governance over territories. As of June 2025, the ICRC recorded over 380 active armed groups of humanitarian concern, with approximately 204m people living under their full or contested control. Their expanding transnational operations, strategic alliances and economic portfolios have significantly augmented their reach and political influence. This evolution complicates traditional state-centric frameworks of conflict analysis and presents new challenges for international security and peacebuilding efforts. The economics of NSAGs: Although these actors take many different forms, their sustainability and political influence often rest on successful economic strategies. The 2025 edition places particular emphasis on the shifting and diverse economic models these groups adopt across regions, which are explored in depth through the Regional Spotlight essays. Topics covered include the diversification of drug-trafficking organisations from cocaine to human trafficking and illicit gold mining, among other activities, in the Americas section; the emerging arms-trafficking activities stemming from Ukraine, and the economic incentives driving organised-crime groups’ involvement, in the Europe and Eurasia section; the economic strategy underpinning Hayat Tahrir al-Sham’s (HTS) evolution from NSAG to leader of the transitional government in Syria in the MENA section; M23’s smuggling of minerals from the eastern DRC, in the Sub-Saharan Africa section; and the geopolitics of Southeast Asia’s cyber-scamming crisis in the Asia section.
Regional highlights include:
Americas: NSAGs dominate the conflict landscape as they compete over lucrative economies and confront state authorities for territorial control. Latin American criminal syndicates have expanded globally from drugs trafficking to extortion, illegal mining, fuel theft, human and wildlife trafficking, counterfeiting and money laundering.
Europe and Eurasia: The Russia–Ukraine conflict dominates the agenda and continues to heighten instability in the Caucasus and Balkans. In the Western Balkans, the break-up of Yugoslavia remains a root cause of unrest, especially between Kosovo and Serbia. However, Armenia and Azerbaijan moved towards a peace deal, and Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan signed an important border-dispute resolution in early 2025, reflecting some progress towards regional stability.
Middle East and North Africa: The Israel–Iran war of June 2025 was the most consequential conflict in the region during the reporting period. The Israel–Hamas war has been at the core of conflict dynamics since October 2023 with over 55,000 Palestinian deaths and an estimated 1,700 Israeli deaths, and 50 hostages still held in Gaza as of June 2025. Hamas’s allies launched attacks against Israel, prompting Israeli and Western military responses such as Operation Poseidon Archer. In autumn 2024, full-scale war erupted between Israel and Hizbullah in Lebanon, ending in a US-brokered ceasefire and significantly weakened Hizbullah. This also destabilised Syria. Following the ceasefire between Israel and Hizbullah, the HTS group captured Damascus and the government of Bashar al-Assad collapsed.
Sub-Saharan Africa: Armed conflicts and fatalities have been rising sharply since 2014. While no new armed conflict broke out during the reporting period, the region witnessed either the continuation of or an increase in armed violence in all conflict-affected countries, in particular the DRC, Sudan and Sahelian countries, accompanied by immense human suffering.
Asia: Multiple protracted armed conflicts continue. While some remain internal (such as the insurgencies in central India, Indonesia, the Philippines and Thailand), others, including those along the Afghanistan–Pakistan, India–Pakistan and India–Myanmar borders, have repercussions for regional security. The India–Pakistan dispute over Kashmir re-emerged as the region’s key flashpoint during the reporting period. From 7–10 May 2025, the two nuclear powers fought their most intense conventional conflict since the turn of the century.
19 Nov 25. Mali: Mass killings underscore significant human rights concerns, attack risks. On 18 November, Human Rights Watch reported that the Malian armed forces (FAMA) executed over 30 civilians during counter-insurgency operations in Balle and Kamona (both Ségou region) in early October. The villages are majority-Fulani and are located within the al-Qaeda-affiliated Jama’at Nasr al-Islam wal-Muslimin’s (JNIM’s) area of operations (AO). FAMA and the allied Dozo militia reportedly engaged in mass executions and indiscriminate property destruction, almost certainly as part of efforts to deter civilian co-operation with JNIM militants. Amid JNIM’s ongoing fuel blockade (see Sibylline Situation Update Brief – 14 October 2025) FAMA counter-insurgency operations will almost certainly entail continued indiscriminate violence targeting Fulani communities within JNIM’s AO. Such operations will significantly increase threats to local staff, particularly those operating in rural areas in Kayes, Koulikoro, Mopti and Ségou regions. However, indiscriminate violence targeting Fulani communities will also likely compound ethno-religious tensions and bolster JNIM recruitment, ultimately increasing the group’s capacity to enforce the fuel blockade and conduct attacks, including in the vicinity of the capital Bamako. (Source: Sibylline)
17 Nov 25. India: Probe focus on domestic elements will limit risk of armed conflict with Pakistan in short term. On 16 November, the National Investigation Agency (NIA) announced that it had arrested Amir Rashid Ali as a suspected accomplice in the blast in Delhi national capital territory on 10 November. The NIA alleges that Amir helped buy the vehicle that was used by Umar Un Nabi in the incident, with the statement labelling Umar as a ?suicide bomber?; no motive was mentioned. Investigations are ongoing, mostly focused on Faridabad (Haryana state) and Jammu and Kashmir union territory. On 16 November, the Red Fort reopened to visitors amid heightened security, along with the nearby Lal Quila subway station. Meanwhile, on 14 November, nine people were killed and 32 were injured when explosives seized in a raid before the Dehi blast exploded at Nowgam police station (Jammu and Kashmir union territory). The authorities quickly stated that the explosion was an accident and dismissed the claims of responsibility by a proxy of Jaish-e-Mohammed (JeM). So far, the authorities have continued to avoid implicating Pakistan in the Delhi blast, with the investigation remaining focused on domestic elements. We assess that this will limit the risk of a resumption of cross-border military exchanges in the immediate term (Source: Sibylline)
17 Nov 25. DRC-Rwanda: Framework agreement highly unlikely to lessen security risks in eastern regions. On 15 November, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) government and the Rwanda-backed M23 rebels signed a framework agreement aimed at ending the conflict in North Kivu and South Kivu regions. The framework follows a previous declaration of principles signed in July and another deal in October covering the monitoring mechanisms of an eventual ceasefire. However, the framework does not constitute a comprehensive peace agreement; six of the eight agreed protocols require further negotiations over their implementation. Additionally, the framework does not address control of M23-occupied territory which, despite opposition from the Congolese government, M23 is highly unlikely to totally relinquish. Another sticking point concerns the composition and mandate of an interim security force, which will likely be subject to delays and disputes. As such, we assess that the current agreement is highly unlikely to compel either the Congolese military or the M23 rebels to significantly moderate their activity in eastern DRC, evidenced by M23’s capture of Maimingi village (South Kivu region) following an attack on military positions. This will sustain risks of attacks, clashes and sexual violence therein, including for locally engaged staff and NGO personnel. (Source: Sibylline)
14 Nov 25. US-Region: Operation Southern Spear will increase tensions in Latin America, Caribbean. On 13 November, the Secretary of War Pete Hegseth announced the start of a military operation to target drug trafficking networks in the western hemisphere. Operation ?Southern Spear? aims to defend US interests in the region, including by targeting drug trafficking operations. Southern Spear will be led by the Joint Task Force Southern Spear in conjunction with the US Southern Command (USSOUTHCOM) and the US 4th Fleet. The mission will integrate robotic and autonomous systems with traditional naval and aviation forces. The announcement follows a build-up of US military assets in the Caribbean region since August. We assess that the deployment of unmanned weapon systems will likely strengthen the US? capabilities to detect suspected drug trafficking vessels operating in the Caribbean region and the Pacific Ocean. The deployment of interceptors will possibly increase the number of interdictions of suspected traffickers, though military strikes targeting go-fast boats are highly likely to persist. The enhancement of military efforts will likely continue straining regional tensions with states that are adverse to the ongoing military deployment, such as Colombia and Mexico. (Source: Sibylline)
14 Nov 25. Taiwan-US: US military sale approval signals continued support for Taiwanese defence capabilities. On 13 November, the Pentagon announced that the US has approved a possible USD 330 m sale of fighter jet spare and repair parts to Taiwan. This is the first arms sale to Taiwan announced under President Donald Trump’s current administration. Taiwan’s Ministry of National Defense stated that the sales were expected to take effect within one month. The parts will be used to support Taiwan’s F-16 and C-130 jets, alongside other aircraft, sustaining Taiwan’s fighter fleet capacity for frequent deployment to counter China’s military activity around the island. The Pentagon stated that helping Taiwan maintain credible defence capabilities is in line with US national, economic, and security interests. The move signals that the US will highly likely retain its broadly supportive stance for Taiwan in the short-to-medium term, despite the recent easing of trade disputes with China. China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs has objected to the sale, though we assess that as the scale of the sale is not out of the ordinary, it is unlikely to elicit a significantly overt reaction. Furthermore, a more radical shift in political recognition, such as an explicit acknowledgement of Taiwan’s independence, is highly unlikely under Trump. (Source: Sibylline)
14 Nov 25. Sudan: Drone strikes likely to escalate as RSF shifts focus to Kordofan front. On 13 November, the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) intercepted several Rapid Support Forces (RSF) drones targeting the Merowe Dam, Merowe Airport (MWE) and Merowe?s army command headquarters (all Northern state). The strikes come amid reports of mounting RSF deployments near El Obeid (the SAF-occupied capital of North Kordofan state) and escalating conflict in South Kordofan state. Following the RSF?s capture of El Fasher (North Darfur state), the last major SAF-held city in the Darfur region, the RSF has shifted resources to the Kordofan Front, seeking to push across southern Sudan and back towards the capital Khartoum. To bolster its prospects, the RSF will likely utilise drone strikes on positions behind the frontline to disrupt SAF army logistics, increasing the risk of drone strikes across Sudan, including Khartoum and Port Sudan (Red Sea state) over the coming months. This will disrupt rebuilding efforts in Khartoum and elevate strike and collateral risks to aid and logistics staff and assets. (Source: Sibylline)
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