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Military And Security Developments
Oct 31.
- Syria: Attacks in capital Damascus highlight security risks, degraded security force capabilities. On 30 October, an armed group of over 30 individuals injured five civilians in an attack on residents of al-Zahriyat district in the capital Damascus, threatening to evict residents from their homes. This is this group’s second attack on al-Zahriyat residents since 26 October. The group is led by Abu Anas, who was appointed by the authorities on 28 October as the official responsible for security checkpoints in the area. The incident also comes amid increasing reports of kidnappings and other sporadic clashes between armed groups in Damascus over the past weeks, highlighting the security forces’ degraded capabilities in the capital. We assess that continued attacks and intimidation by government-appointed security officials will elevate the risks of domestic unrest and the possibility of local communities forming independent militias for their own defence, increasing the likelihood of armed clashes in Damascus in the coming months.
- Morocco-Algeria-Western Sahara: UN vote on mission to increase security risks, regional tensions. Later on 31 October, the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) will vote on a resolution to extend the peacekeeping mandate in Western Sahara. While the resolution is highly likely to pass, regional media outlets have reported that the US will propose a three-month extension rather than the usual one-year term. The vote comes amid the Trump administration’s heightened scrutiny of the Morocco-Algeria dispute over Western Sahara. The US will likely push for the implementation of Morocco’s autonomy plan in the coming weeks, while seeking to mediate tensions with Algeria, which supports Western Sahara’s independence. Despite US pressure, we assess that long-standing tensions between Morocco and Algeria will likely complicate efforts to reach an agreement. Bilateral tensions over this issue will possibly disrupt bilateral trade, which will most likely primarily impact Algerian exports to Morocco due to the perishable nature of tropical fruit, their biggest export. Morocco’s efforts to advance its autonomy plan will likely intensify hostilities with Western Sahara’s local population, raising the risk of sporadic clashes and exposing local personnel to crossfire, particularly in the logistics sector.
Oct 30.
- Israel-Lebanon: Elevated risks of armed clashes, Israeli strikes in south Lebanon following IDF raid. Earlier on 30 October, Lebanese President Joseph Aoun ordered the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) to oppose any Israeli incursion into southern Lebanon, after the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) killed a municipal employee during a raid in Blida (Nabatieh governorate) overnight on 29 October. The IDF claimed it was operating to destroy Lebanese Hizballah (LH) military infrastructure in the area and was reacting to an imminent threat to the force. The incident comes amid increasing tensions between Lebanon, Israel and the US, with the latter two claiming the LAF is not sufficiently enforcing the November truce which stipulated the disarmament of LH. As such, in the coming months, the IDF will likely increase its airstrikes and ground raids across southern Lebanon. Additionally, President Aoun’s order to the LAF will increase the risk of sporadic armed clashes between the IDF and LAF, escalating crossfire risks in southern Lebanon, particularly along the Israel-Lebanon border. However, while tensions are likely to increase, a ceasefire collapse and the escalation of hostilities between Israel and Lebanon into a broader war remains unlikely.
Oct 29.
KEY DEVELOPMENTS
IRAN
- Iran has reportedly increased discounts for Chinese buyers of its crude oil exports, underscoring increasing sanctions pressure on Iranian exports and increasing economic stability risks.
- New Zealand’s police are investigating an insurance firm for providing coverage to Iran’s ‘ghost fleet’ of oil tankers, underscoring sustained corporate governance risks for firms providing financial services to Iranian-linked entities
- An Iranian-linked threat network conducted surveillance and mounted attacks targeting Israeli-linked entities in Australia, Germany and Greece, underscoring sustained infiltration and targeted violence risks.
ISRAEL
- An ultra-Orthodox protest against military conscription will elevate ethno-religious tensions and domestic unrest risks across Israel in the coming weeks.
PALESTINIAN TERRITORIES
- GAZA STRIP: Israeli airstrikes in Gaza following a militant attack on Israeli forces and the subsequent resumption of the ceasefire highlight the enduring security risks across the Strip.
- GAZA STRIP: Hamas’ failure to return the bodies of several deceased hostages as per the ceasefire agreement is increasing the risk of more substantive Israeli action than airstrikes, though such a move is unlikely to happen without US approval.
- WEST BANK: Israeli settlers’ attacks on Palestinian villages are likely to escalate over the olive harvest period, increasing ethno-religious tensions and radicalisation risks.
IRAN
- Iran has reportedly increased discounts for Chinese buyers of its crude oil exports, underscoring increasing sanctions pressure on Iranian exports and increasing economic stability risks. Earlier on 29 October, trade sources reported that an oversupply of Iranian crude is triggering deeper discounts on its exports to China. Iranian Light crude is reportedly trading at approximately USD 10 per barrel below benchmark Brent crude prices, compared to the USD 3 per barrel discount reported in March. Iran has likely authorised the discounts on crude exports amid intensifying downward pressure on prices. This pressure likely results from Chinese importers exhausting government-issued quotas for oil purchases (with increasing US sanctions pressure on Chinese refineries and port operators importing Iranian oil) and newly introduced US sanctions on major Russian oil exporters, triggering oversupply on discounted oil markets. In the coming months, Iran will likely continue offering steep discounts on crude exports to China in order to retain access to critical foreign currency inflows, amid increasing sanctions pressure following the re-imposition of UN sanctions in September (see Sibylline Middle East Crisis Update – 29 September 2025). However, deepening discounts will likely further undermine the profitability of Iranian oil exports, undermining its long-term economic stability and compounding broader fiscal pressures. Long-term Iranian dependence on crude exports to China will also sustain broader economic vulnerability to fluctuations in Chinese demand for Iranian crude, as well as price volatility on global markets, further undermining Iran’s long-term economic resilience.
- New Zealand’s police are investigating an insurance firm for providing coverage to Iran’s ‘ghost fleet’ of oil tankers, underscoring sustained corporate governance risks for firms providing financial services to Iranian-linked entities. On 28 October, Reuters reported that the New Zealand-based Maritime Mutual insurance firm allegedly provided coverage to a number of oil tankers within Iran’s ‘shadow fleet’, thereby facilitating the transport and sale of sanctioned Iranian, Russian and Venezuelan oil exports. Although Maritime Mutual has denied the allegations, the Reuters investigation states that the New Zealand Police raided the firm’s offices on 16 October, indicating that it is likely under investigation for sanctions violations. The allegations highlight the sustained corporate governance and sanctions exposure risks for maritime insurance providers, particularly those providing coverage to oil tankers frequenting Chinese and Indian port facilities associated with sanctioned oil imports. In the coming months, the US and allied states will likely continue expanding and enforcing sanctions targeting Iranian oil exports, increasing the sanctions exposure risks and due diligence requirements for regionally engaged financial, insurance, reinsurance and shipping firms.
- An Iranian-linked threat network conducted surveillance and mounted attacks targeting Israeli-linked entities in Australia, Germany and Greece, underscoring sustained infiltration and targeted violence risks. On 26 October, the Mossad announced that Sardar Ammar, an Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) Quds Force commander, had overseen an international network of foreign nationals and organised criminal elements responsible for surveillance operations and attacks targeting Jewish and Israeli institutions in numerous states. Ammar’s network was reportedly responsible for surveillance operations targeting Jewish individuals and institutions in Germany in 2025; arson attacks targeting Jewish-owned hotels and a synagogue in Greece in 2024; and a series of arson attacks targeting synagogues and a Kosher restaurant in Australia in 2024 (see Sibylline Middle East Crisis Update – 28 August 2025). The Mossad also stated that the IRGC-linked network attempted to perpetrate ‘dozens’ of other attacks in various jurisdictions, which were foiled by Mossad or local security force operations. The announcement underscores Iran’s continued efforts to develop and co-ordinate hybrid threat activity targeting Jewish and Israeli individuals and institutions worldwide. Iran will almost certainly continue to escalate these efforts in the coming months and years, sustaining risks of further attacks targeting Israeli embassies, Jewish religious institutions and associated entities. Israeli and Jewish individuals will also face elevated risks of surveillance, harassment and targeted violence from Iranian-linked threat actors, increasing the threat to staff, particularly high-profile individuals who have publicly criticised Iran. Although states with high-capacity security and police forces will likely continue to pre-emptively disrupt Iranian-linked attacks and threat activity, risks of low-capacity and sporadic attacks will continue to remain elevated in Australia, Europe and North America throughout 2025.
ISRAEL
- An ultra-Orthodox protest against military conscription will elevate ethno-religious tensions and domestic unrest risks across Israel in the coming weeks. A large ultra-Orthodox protest is planned for 1430hrs (local time) on 30 October, near the Chords Bridge at the entrance to Jerusalem (Jerusalem district) from Highway 1. Thousands of participants are likely to attend, as the demonstration marks the first incident in years in which almost all factions and movements (including different Hasidic sects) will co-operate to protest military conscription and the arrest of Yeshiva members. The protest is almost certain to cause significant congestion in Jerusalem, impacting the movement of both staff and goods. These risks will be particularly acute in the protest’s immediate vicinity, as participants are highly likely to block movement from Highway 1 into the city. Incidents of vandalism are likely, such as setting bins on fire; there is also a realistic possibility of violence against property, such as attacks against passing or stationary vehicles. Demonstrators’ clashes with the security forces and counter-protesters are also a realistic possibility, compounding threats to the safety of proximate personnel. There is a realistic possibility of further smaller protests in Jerusalem and other large ultra-Orthodox population centres such as Bnei Brak (Tel Aviv district), prolonging domestic unrest risks throughout the coming weeks. Ultra-Orthodox demonstrations against conscription will also elevate ethno-religious tensions and the risks of organised counter-protests across Israel, particularly in Jerusalem and Tel Aviv (Tel Aviv district), compounding domestic unrest and travel disruption risks.
PALESTINIAN TERRITORIES
- GAZA STRIP: Israeli airstrikes in Gaza following a militant attack on Israeli forces and the subsequent resumption of the ceasefire highlight the enduring security risks across the Strip. On 28 October, Gazan militants killed an Israeli-American Israel Defense Force (IDF) serviceman in an attack on an IDF position within the Israeli-controlled ‘yellow line’ in Rafah (southern Gaza). According to the initial investigation, the attack was launched from an underground tunnel and militants were armed with rocket-propelled grenades (RPGs). Following the attack and with the US’ permission, the IDF conducted retaliatory airstrikes across Gaza, which killed at least 104 people according to the Hamas-controlled Health Ministry. Earlier on 29 October at 1000hrs (local time), the IDF announced that it had resumed the ceasefire. This is the second incident of a deadly militant attack within the yellow line followed by Israeli retaliation since the ceasefire entered into force (see Sibylline Middle East Crisis Update – 22 October 2025). As the IDF continues to pursue the destruction of militant tunnels beyond the yellow line, we assess that similar attacks, initiated by militants trapped within these tunnels, are likely in the coming weeks. These will drive sporadic security risks emanating from further Israeli retaliatory airstrikes, particularly if attacks result in Israeli casualties. While we assess that the ceasefire will likely hold for at least the coming 72 hours due to the US’ involvement, such continued violations will sustain and gradually elevate the risk of ceasefire collapse.
- GAZA STRIP: Hamas’ failure to return the bodies of several deceased hostages as per the ceasefire agreement is increasing the risk of more substantive Israeli action than airstrikes, though such a move is unlikely to happen without US approval. There is a possibility that Israel will seek to limit the flow of aid entering Gaza; however, the US is unlikely to agree to a reduction of humanitarian aid and the closure of crossings used for aid. A more viable option would possibly be Israel’s expansion of its ‘yellow line’ of control further into Gaza, which is more likely to garner US support. A less likely option would be a limited resumption of combined ground and air operations in specific areas within Gaza. While this is less likely than a limited expansion of the ‘yellow line’, the likelihood of an operational escalation will increase if Hamas prolongs its refusal to disarm and escalates its campaign against dissidents in Gaza. Such operations would be viewed by Israel as a violation of the ceasefire agreement, which envisions a substantially reduced role for Hamas in the post-conflict settlement. To establish a justification for combined operations inside Gaza, Israel and the US would likely establish a narrative outlining Hamas’ operations as a critical threat to the ceasefire process before launching an operation. Regardless of the framing for their actions, such operations by the US and Israel would significantly increase the risk of a ceasefire collapse.
- WEST BANK: Israeli settlers’ attacks on Palestinian villages are likely to escalate over the olive harvest period, increasing ethno-religious tensions and radicalisation risks. In the past two weeks, there has been a significant spike in attacks by Israeli settlers and extremists against Palestinians and Palestinian villages in the West Bank. The IDF Central Command recorded over ten attacks by Israeli settlers in less than 24 hours on 25 October. These included incidents of arson against Palestinian vehicles, homes and crops, as well as physical violence against farmers. Attacks have been largely concentrated within the Bethlehem and Ramallah and al-Bireh governorates and come amid the olive harvest season (October to December), during which they will likely continue to escalate. These will elevate exposure to violence, including from crossfire and cases of mistaken identity across the West Bank, particularly near Palestinian population centres. Elevated ethno-religious tensions will increase the risks of radicalisation within Palestinian communities, driving retaliatory attacks on settler communities in the West Bank, particularly during the Hanukkah holiday (14 to 22 December) and around key roads near Israeli settlements.
RED SEA
- RED SEA: There is a realistic possibility that Israeli strikes in Gaza will prompt the Iran-backed Houthis to resume attacks against Israel. If such incidents continue to increase in frequency, this will raise the likelihood of Houthis fully resuming their campaign against Israel. In the event of either sporadic attacks by the Houthis or a full restoration of their campaign, we assess that the strikes are unlikely to significantly elevate security risks across Israel. Such attacks would present moderate operational disruption risks for businesses due to staff observance of warning sirens. Furthermore, Houthi attacks against Israel would elevate the risks of Israeli retaliation, particularly in the event that a Houthi attack succeeds in breaching Israeli air defences. The potential Israeli strikes are most likely to target Houthi positions and dual-use infrastructure (including ports) in Yemen (see Sibylline Situation Update Brief – 29 October 2025).
REGIONAL AND GLOBAL DEVELOPMENTS
- Spain-Israel: Spain’s recently adopted arms embargo on Israel will sustain compliance concerns for metals exporters amid continued scrutiny from pro-Palestine activists. On 24 October, Spain’s Audiencia Nacional (National Court) announced that it had launched an investigation into Sidenor, a privately owned steel manufacturer, for allegedly selling steel to an Israeli weapons manufacturer. The prosecuting judge alleges that Sidenor sold steel to a subsidiary of the Israel-based company Elbit Systems for the purposes of weapons production, thereby violating the arms embargo adopted by Parliament on 8 October. The investigation underscores the increasing compliance risks for Israel-linked entities operating in Spain, particularly firms tendering contracts for supplying metals, engineering components and dual-use materials to Israeli businesses. Despite the Israel-Hamas ceasefire, we assess that Spain is highly unlikely to repeal its arms embargo on Israel in the short term, while broader restrictions on imports from Israeli settlements in the West Bank (Palestinian Territories) will also likely remain in place. Such conditions will sustain corporate governance and reputational concerns tied to business exposure to possible investigations, driven by continued scrutiny from pro-Palestine activists. The court has summoned three Sidenor executives to testify on 12 November; this increases the risks of pro-Palestine protests in the vicinity of the Audiencia Nacional in the capital Madrid, temporarily increasing localised travel disruption risks.
- On 10 October, Israel and Hamas agreed to a ceasefire; this has seemingly prompted the Iran-backed Houthis to pause hostilities targeting vessels in the Red Sea and Israeli territory in the short term.
- If the Israel-Hamas ceasefire holds, the Houthis are unlikely to re-escalate attacks, moderating security risks in Israel and the Red Sea.
- As the ceasefire remains fragile, we assess that a resumption in Houthi attacks remains possible, sustaining risks of long-term operational and global supply chain disruption.
- Any resumption of Houthi hostilities will likely draw a heavy response by the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) targeting port and dual-use infrastructure in Yemen, exacerbating the humanitarian crisis.
- Regardless of whether the ceasefire holds, it will likely take months for traffic across the Red Sea to normalise; as well as for markets, insurance premiums and freight rates to adjust to pre-crisis levels.
Context
Shortly after the outbreak of the Israel-Hamas war in October 2023, the Houthis launched a maritime attack campaign targeting vessels in the Red Sea, together with missile and drone strikes targeting Israel nearly weekly. Although the Houthis have claimed to primarily target Israel-linked vessels, the group has effectively engaged in indiscriminate strikes targeting maritime traffic, significantly disrupting global supply chains. However, these attacks have become less frequent in recent months, likely in part due to the degradation of Houthi capabilities as a result of Israeli and US airstrikes. On 10 October, Israel and Hamas agreed to a ceasefire, initiating the first phase of a US-backed peace initiative. Although the Houthis have not explicitly declared the cessation of hostilities against Israel and Israel-linked shipping in the Red Sea, the trends observed during prior ceasefires suggest that the group will pause operations. At the time of writing, there have been no confirmed Houthi attacks since the ceasefire came into force. The Houthis have distanced themselves from the 18 October incident in the Gulf of Aden, when a fire aboard a Cameroon-flagged container ship killed two crew members. Nevertheless, the Israel-Hamas ceasefire remains fragile, sustaining the possible resumption of Houthi hostilities against Israel and shipping in the Red Sea.
Forecast
There is a realistic possibility that the Israel-Hamas ceasefire will hold in the short term, sustaining a de-escalation in Houthi attacks on Israel and Israeli-affiliated vessels in the Red Sea
As regional tensions continue to ease, the Houthis are unlikely to resume strikes on Israeli territory, which previously targeted cities such as Eilat (Southern district) and Tel Aviv (Tel Aviv district). This reduces associated security risks to personnel and assets nationwide, including the threats of direct drone or missile strikes and shrapnel resulting from successful interception. The frequency of evacuations from offices, residences and hospitality venues will also likely decrease, easing business disruption and lowering the risk of injuries caused by crowd surges during emergency evacuations.
The Houthis will also likely cease attacks on Israeli-affiliated vessels in the Red Sea, reducing the likelihood of critical vessel damage, operational failures and cargo loss. A decrease in Houthi missile and drone launches will also likely result in fewer Israeli interceptions over the Red Sea, thereby reducing secondary risks to vessels, crews and cargo transiting in the region. A halt in Houthi attacks will possibly ease disruption along the Red Sea’s major shipping lanes, reducing the risks of operational and financial losses for shipping and associated logistics companies. However, due to concerns over conflict re-escalation in the medium term, insurance providers are highly unlikely to immediately suspend war premiums for ships operating in the Red Sea, sustaining elevated operating costs for firms transiting the area. Although a decrease in the attack frequency will likely moderate the psychological pressure on crews navigating high-risk areas such as the Bab-el-Mandeb Strait in the short term, latent safety concerns will likely persist and sustain risks of labour turnover.
The Israel-Hamas ceasefire is unlikely to hold in the long term; Houthi attacks on Western-affiliated vessels in the Red Sea will likely resume thereafter
The Houthis are likely to respond to a breakdown in the ceasefire between Hamas and Israel by resuming their attacks on Israel and associated shipping, re-escalating threats to vessels traversing the Bab-el-Mandeb Strait. In such a scenario, the Houthis’ likely use of unmanned surface vehicles (USVs) will drive exposure to high-capacity attacks successfully targeting vessels that operate proximate to Houthi-controlled territory. The affected vessels will face significantly elevated risks of damage, sinking, cargo loss and crew fatalities. The attacks will almost certainly continue to drive logistics firms to divert vessels via the Cape of Good Hope (South Africa). This will sustain lengthier transit times and increased vessel fuel usage for intercontinental supply chains, compounding inflationary pressures on consumers and manufacturers. We assess that broader transport, operation and supply chain disruption risks will be particularly acute for firms based in Europe that rely on just-in-time (JIT) production. Ports throughout the Red Sea will also likely continue to experience below-average use, increasing financial risks for logistics providers, trucking companies and rail networks that are reliant on port traffic. Additionally, the Red Sea cruise industry will likely continue to be impacted by Houthi attacks in the region, deteriorating Egypt and Jordan’s tourism sectors and compounding broader socio-economic health concerns.
A resumption in Houthi attacks on Israel will increase personnel security risks both from direct Houthi strikes and from shrapnel from interception in regional airspace. The Houthis’ ability to evade air defences, particularly around Eilat, will pose sustained security threats to personnel, clientele and infrastructure. This sustained risk of attack exposure will likely trigger an increase in event and travel cancellations, resulting in financial losses for the hospitality and tourism sectors. Increased incidents of evacuations due to sirens will increase personnel exposure to crushes and crowd surges, while undermining operational continuity across central and southern Israel.
The IDF will likely respond to any further Houthi attacks on Israel by targeting port and dual-use infrastructure in Yemen with airstrikes, compounding security risks and humanitarian concerns
If Houthi attacks on Israel resume, Israel will likely retaliate with airstrikes on Houthi-controlled territory, primarily targeting dual-use facilities and port infrastructure such as Hudaydah and Ras Isa (both Al Hudaydah governorate). Israeli strikes will also possibly target the Houthis’ political wing and associated infrastructure, increasing the risk of broader conflict escalation. These operations will also increase security risks for locally engaged staff, resulting from the direct impact of airstrikes and the resultant disorder during emergency evacuations. Repeated IDF strikes on port facilities will also likely worsen humanitarian conditions within Houthi-controlled territory, exacerbating the already critical food, water and energy security conditions for local populations and NGO staff. In response to this, the Houthis will likely escalate hostilities targeting Israel and Israeli-affiliated vessels in the Red Sea, prolonging regional instability and operational disruption.
In the unlikely event of a sustained de-escalation, it will likely take months for Red Sea shipping traffic to normalise and for markets, insurance premiums and freight rates to adjust
As the Israel-Hamas ceasefire remains fragile and the Houthis have not formally ended their campaign, international concerns about the possibility of conflict re-escalation will remain elevated in the coming months. Shipping carriers will likely remain broadly reluctant to resume transit through the Red Sea, while insurance providers will likely maintain war risk premiums for vessel operators. Even if a sustained de-escalation takes place, we assess that the shipping sector will likely remain in a transitional phase marked by elevated costs, rerouted traffic and persistent risk premiums until a prolonged cessation in Houthi attacks restores confidence among operators and insurers. However, shipping companies will possibly continue to see downward pressure on stock prices in the coming weeks, as investors anticipate a decline in freight rates and a moderation of the elevated profits seen during the Red Sea crisis. These secondary financial effects will likely impact associated businesses, including the ports, logistics hubs and adjacent local economies that have benefitted from rerouted trade during the crisis.
- Israel-Palestinian Territories: Ceasefire violations highlight sustained security, Houthi attacks risks. On 28 October, Gazan militants killed an Israeli-American Israel Defense Forces (IDF) serviceman during an attack on an IDF position within the Israeli-controlled ‘yellow line’ in Rafah (southern Gaza), which comprised rocket-propelled grenades (RPGs) and sniper fire. Following the attack and with the US’ permission, the IDF conducted retaliatory airstrikes across Gaza, which killed at least 104 people according to the Hamas-controlled Health Ministry. Earlier on 29 October at 1000hrs (local time), the IDF announced that it had resumed the ceasefire. This is the second incident of a deadly militant attack within the yellow line followed by Israeli retaliation since the ceasefire entered into force . As the IDF continues to pursue the destruction of militant tunnels beyond the yellow line, we assess that similar attacks, initiated by militants trapped within these tunnels, are likely in the coming weeks. These will drive sporadic security risks emanating from further Israeli airstrikes, particularly if attacks result in Israeli casualties. Such violations will elevate the risks of a ceasefire collapse, as well as of retaliatory missile and drone attacks against Israel by the Iran-backed Houthis. Nevertheless, due to the US’ involvement, we assess that the ceasefire will likely hold for at least the coming 72 hours.
- Tunisia: Suspension of civil society groups underscores mounting threats to NGO operations. On 28 October, a Tunisian court ordered a one-month suspension of Mnemty, a Tunisian anti-racism NGO. This comes after the authorities imposed a similar suspension on a prominent migrant rights group on 27 October. These decisions likely reflect the government’s efforts to divert attention from ongoing domestic issues, including protests over pollution from a state-run chemical plant in Gabès (Gabès governorate). The widespread crackdowns on public dissent and on the independence of civil society organisations reflect the broader democratic backsliding in Tunisia. This will possibly undercut the brand image of businesses working closely with the Tunisian state, increasing their exposure to boycotts and reduced consumer interest. The government will likely continue to crack down on civil society groups, driving the risk of license revocation and suspension orders for NGOs that are active in fields deemed contrary to government objectives, such as those supporting migrant communities. Furthermore, the government will possibly seek to arrest individuals linked to prohibited organisations who attend the ongoing demonstrations. As such, arbitrary detention and security risks will remain elevated for NGO personnel in the coming days, arising from exposure to heavy-handed security operations near protests.
Oct 28.
- Israel: Ultra-Orthodox protests will increase travel disruption, security risks near protest locations. On 30 October, a large ultra-Orthodox protest is planned to take place in Jerusalem (Jerusalem district) at 1430hrs (local time) near the Chords Bridge, located at the entrance to the city from Highway 1. For the first time in years, almost all factions and movements (including different Hasidic sects) will co-operate, protesting military conscription and arrests of Yeshiva members, likely resulting in thousands of protesters. As such, we assess that severe travel disruption is almost certain across Jerusalem and particularly at the protest location, with demonstrators highly likely to block the entrance into the city. Incidents of vandalism such as setting bins on fire are likely; there is also a realistic possibility of further violence, such as attacks against cars passing or parking in the area. Clashes with the security forces are also a realistic possibility, as well as with counter-protesters, exacerbating security risks for personnel and bystanders. Domestic unrest risks will remain elevated throughout the coming weeks, with further protests throughout Jerusalem remaining a realistic possibility.
Oct 27.
- Turkey-Iraq: PKK withdrawal will moderate security risks, sustain difficulties for political integration. On 26 October, the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) announced the withdrawal of its fighters from Turkey to northern Iraq as part of the ongoing co-ordinated disarmament and political integration process, which began in May. Most PKK fighters are likely to comply with the initiative; however, splinter groups will likely sustain latent security risks in south-eastern Turkey and near government sites in major cities, including the capital Ankara. The PKK has long operated from the Qandil Mountains in northern Iraq’s Erbil and Duhok governorates, where the most significant threats of factional violence will likely emerge. This will sustain the risk of sporadic clashes between the Turkish security forces and PKK elements in northern Iraq, increasing security risks to personnel from exposure to airstrikes and crossfire. Despite calls for political integration for the PKK, participation in Turkish politics will likely remain limited, with the electoral authorities unlikely to allow known ex-PKK members to hold office within national governance systems, raising the long-term risks of the process collapsing and conflict re-escalation. (Source: Sibylline)
23 Oct 25. Israeli jets strike Hezbollah training camp, missile manufacturing facility in Lebanon. The IDF reported identifying terrorist operatives at the training camp. The release stated that Hezbollah terrorists were trained to shoot and use a variety of weapons at the camp. IAF fighter jets struck a series of Hezbollah terrorist targets, including a training camp, in the Bekaa Valley of southern Lebanon on Thursday, the IDF reported. The Bekaa Governorate is located next to the Lebanese border with Syria, north of the Golan Heights. The IDF’s Military Intelligence Directorate had identified terrorist operatives at the training camp who were trained to shoot and use various weapons, the IDF said. (Source: https://www.sofx.com/)
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