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Military And Security Developments
Nov 14.
- Ukraine: Anti-corruption efforts will remain crucial to secure critical foreign funding. On 13 November, German Chancellor Friedrich Merz urged Ukraine to intensify its anti-corruption efforts. His comments come as Ukraine faces a major energy sector corruption scandal involving prominent current and former government officials. Earlier on 14 November, Politico reported that the graft case has raised concerns among EU partners regarding the potential misuse of their financial assistance, prompting demands for greater transparency in the management of foreign funds. The scandal comes at a critical financial moment for Ukraine, as it is in the process of approving its state budget and is facing funding gaps that will deepen its reliance on external support. Meanwhile, EU member states are expected to decide in December on whether to issue a loan for Ukraine backed by frozen Russian assets. A failure by the EU to reach an agreement would be highly detrimental to Ukraine’s ability to finance its war effort in 2026. We assess that Ukraine’s sustained anti-corruption efforts will be essential for reassuring international partners and securing the critical funds.
- Russia: Foreign companies face ongoing sanctions compliance pressure, asset seizure risks. According to a Reuters article on 13 November, the CEO of an Italian bank has warned of the risk that its Russian subsidiary could be nationalised by the Russian state. He also highlighted the challenges of navigating Russia’s complex international sanctions regime; he ruled out selling the bank’s Russian operations due to the punitive measures imposed on foreign entities seeking to exit the country. Since the onset of the Russo-Ukrainian war, the Kremlin has imposed significant barriers to leaving the Russian market. These include restrictions on buy-back options and requirements to sell assets at steeply discounted prices relative to market value. Meanwhile, since the start of the war, Moscow has placed several foreign-owned assets under state management, resulting in a de facto asset seizure. Notable examples include the Russian subsidiaries of Carlsberg Group and Danone, both of which were in the process of exiting the Russian market. Ultimately, we assess that foreign companies that continue to operate subsidiaries in Russia will face sustained pressures, including rigorous sanctions compliance obligations and the ongoing risk of asset seizure.
Nov 11.
KEY DEVELOPMENTS
- POKROVSK: The intensity of Russian attacks in and around Pokrovsk (Donetsk oblast) has reduced in recent days, as Russia is likely waiting for additional reinforcements; however, attacks will likely increase
- MOBILISATION: Russian President Vladimir Putin has signed multiple laws which we assess are part of a phased process to normalise the mobilisation of active reservists, first for ‘domestic’ infrastructure protection and later likely for combat
- STRIKES: Russia has reportedly deployed long-range jet-powered glide bombs, which are capable of reaching areas well behind the frontline; this will increase the vulnerability of numerous cities across the south and east of the country
- FORECAST: Over the past week, Ukraine’s energy security has continued to deteriorate as a direct result of Russia’s co-ordinated strike campaign against critical infrastructure, with widespread blackouts increasing across the country
- POKROVSK: The frequency and intensity of Russian attacks in and around Pokrovsk (Donetsk oblast) has reduced in recent days, as Russia is likely waiting for additional reinforcements; however, attacks will likely increase again in the coming days. Ukraine’s 7th Rapid Reaction Corps (which is fighting in the area) has reported that prior to this reduction in tempo, Russian forces launched a platoon-sized mechanised assault near Myrnohrad (located to the east of Pokrovsk; Donestk oblast) on 5 November, which resulted in Ukrainian forces destroying three vehicles. While we cannot confirm this, mechanised assaults around Pokrovsk have remained relatively infrequent and have achieved little. It remains unclear whether Russian forces are experimenting with mechanised tactics in a bid to make more rapid advances, in tandem with their infantry and drone infiltration tactics which currently dominate the fighting.
- POKROVSK: Nevertheless, Russian forces have continued to make steady advances at the flanks, both within Pokrovsk and increasingly inside Myrnohrad. Earlier on 11 November, Ukraine’s 7th Rapid Reaction Corps reported that 300 Russian troops have now infiltrated Pokrovsk itself; these troops have been using fog and low visibility in recent days to increase their footprint in the area, which we assess is likely in preparation for the further intensifications of assaults in the coming days. Geolocated footage published throughout the last week has confirmed a growing Russian presence along the E-50 highway, which cuts through Pokrovsk. Meanwhile, footage has also confirmed that Russian forces have now likely penetrated the outskirts of northern Myrnohrad in at least two places, as well as making further progress in the city’s southern district. On 10 November, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky assessed that Russia has committed some 170,000 personnel to the Pokrovsk offensive. We assess that reinforcements will likely allow Russia to continue high-intensity operations in the coming weeks.
- POKROVSK: Amid the likely temporary slowdown of Russian assaults, Ukrainian forces have continued to counter-attack, stabilising sections of the frontline. On 10 November, prominent Ukrainian military analyst Kostyantyn Mashovets claimed that Ukrainian forces have cleared Rodynske (Donetsk oblast), a frontline town located due north of Pokrovsk. While we cannot confirm this, it is likely that Ukrainian counter-attacks have prioritised the area in recent weeks, given its importance to maintaining Ukraine’s ground lines of communication (GLOCs) into the pocket around Myrnohrad, where Ukrainian forces are at the greatest risk of encirclement. For further analysis on the Pokrovsk salient, see Sibylline Ukraine Update – 4 November 2025.
- MOBILISATION: This week, Russian President Vladimir Putin signed multiple laws which we assess set the stage for a greater use of Russia’s active reserve; they will likely facilitate a transition away from the extremely expensive (and ultimately unsustainable) ‘volunteer’ recruitment strategy. The first law allows military conscription to occur all year round, in contrast to the current system which only allows for two distinct conscription cycles, in the spring and autumn. While the conscripts are not assigned to fight in Ukraine, the expansion of conscription-related administrative processes (including allowing medical examinations) will likely allow the authorities to process more individuals at a faster pace; it will also potentially set bureaucratic conditions to call up larger numbers of personnel.
- MOBILISATION: A law signed this week allows active reservists to undergo special training and deployments to protect critical infrastructure across Russia. Notably, the law does not restrict deployments to reservists’ respective home regions, as Russian officials had originally claimed, thereby paving the way for a much wider use of such reservists. This could theoretically include the four annexed regions of Ukraine, given that Donetsk, Kherson, Luhansk and Zaporizhzhia oblasts are de jure Russian territory according to Russian law. The involuntary call-ups of active reservists have already begun, with Kommersant reporting on 10 November that at least 19 regions have started training active reservists to form new units that will nominally protect Russian critical infrastructure. The report also indicates that the Russian authorities intend to deploy these new units to border regions near Ukraine. We assess that this will likely ease Russia’s personnel constraints and free up conscripts and regular forces for redeployment elsewhere.
- MOBILISATION: We assess that the latest Russian laws are part of a phased process to normalise the mobilisation of active reservists, first for ‘domestic’ infrastructure protection and later likely for eventual combat deployments in Ukraine. For further analysis on this potential new Russian recruitment strategy to sustain its attritional war, see Sibylline Ukraine Update – 14 October 2025.
- STRIKES: On 5 November, the Financial Times reported on Russia’s deployment of long-range jet-powered glide bombs, which are capable of reaching areas well behind the frontline. In October, glide-bomb strikes were reported for the first time against the southern Odesa and Mykolaiv oblasts; these attacks were likely conducted using the latest long-range variant of the weapon. Previously, glide bombs had a range of up to 50 miles (80km) and were mainly employed against frontline targets. However, the addition of jet engines has reportedly extended the bombs’ range to nearly 124 miles (200km). The development of this new variant represents a cheaper alternative to more expensive projectiles, such as cruise missiles. However, the new variant’s payloads are smaller and the bomb is only propelled during part of its flight. Nevertheless, the extended range allows Russian aircraft to launch glide bombs from well inside Russian-controlled territory, reducing their exposure to Ukrainian air defences. We assess that this will increase the already growing strike threats facing cities across Ukraine’s south and east.
- STRIKES: Over the past week, Ukraine’s strike campaign has targeted numerous energy infrastructure sites in Russia. On 9 November, Russian Telegram channels claimed that the Voronezh combined heat and power (CHP) plant had been struck by Ukrainian drones. The facility is the main energy supplier for residential buildings and industrial consumers in Voronezh (Voronezh oblast). The local authorities did not directly comment on the attack, though they issued warnings over a missile and drone threat.
- STRIKES: Overnight on 8-9 November, the Russian authorities also reported an attack on a thermal power plant in Belgorod oblast (which borders Ukraine), leaving more than 20,000 residents without electricity. Additional drone strikes against electricity infrastructure were reported in Kursk oblast (also bordering Ukraine), causing temporary outages in several districts. Previously on 8 November, regional officials in Volgograd oblast stated that energy infrastructure in four districts had been damaged by Ukrainian drone attacks. The latest attacks likely reflect a new Ukrainian strategy, aimed at replicating Russia’s attacks on its critical energy assets. The Russian regions bordering Ukraine are likely to be heavily affected by such attacks and will therefore experience growing energy security risks. However, Ukraine’s heavy reliance on drones, which are typically less destructive than missiles, means that its strikes will inflict significantly less serious and lasting damage, in contrast to Russia’s intensifying long-range campaign (see FORECAST below).
POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS
- AID: The prolonged shutdown of the US government has delayed over USD 5 bn of arms exports, some of which are likely bound for Ukraine. According to a report from Axios on 9 November, the shutdown has affected the delivery of Advanced Medium-Range Air-to-Air Missiles (AMRAAMs), Aegis combat systems and High Mobility Artillery Rocket Systems (HIMARS). An unspecified senior US State Department official said those capabilities were earmarked for Croatia, Denmark and Poland; however, the ultimate destination of the exports is unclear due to the scheme which allows NATO member states to purchase US weapons for Ukraine’s benefit. While we cannot confirm the extent to which military assistance for Ukraine has been affected by the shutdown, it is possible that it has moderately impeded Ukrainian military planning and resource allocation.
- AID: Ukraine is reportedly in ‘positive’ talks with the US to purchase Tomahawk missiles, as well as other long-range and short-range capabilities, though we assess their provision remains unlikely in the short term. Olha Stefanishyna, Ukraine’s new envoy to the US, disclosed on 6 November that many unspecified delegations are working to increase the available financial resources to procure more military equipment from the US. The details of the talks come days after US President Donald Trump stated that he is not considering providing Tomahawk missiles to Ukraine at present. We continue to assess that their provision in the near term is unlikely (especially in significant quantities). Instead, discussions about Kyiv obtaining the capability are likely aimed at encouraging Moscow to engage constructively in the peace process. (For further analysis, see Sibylline Ukraine Update – 14 October 2025).
- AID: Zelensky wants to order 27 Patriot air-defence systems from the US, though this is highly likely to be overly ambitious in the near term. Zelensky made the remarks during an interview published on 9 November, adding that Ukraine is looking to borrow the systems from its European allies in the meantime. The current number of Patriot systems in Ukraine is unknown, though air defences are stretched, with the capital Kyiv and Kyiv oblast likely boasting the strongest air defence coverage. Zelensky did not specify why Ukraine wants this precise number, though he disclosed in September that his country and the US were preparing a contract for 25 Patriot systems, which would significantly bolster Ukraine’s air-defence network. As of July 2024, building a Patriot radar system was estimated to take 12 months, but acquiring all the necessary parts would take 24 months. These timelines underscore the difficulties in ramping up production in short timeframes.
- ASSETS: The EU’s inability to provide a loan backed by Russian frozen assets is likely to threaten Ukraine’s ability to procure defence equipment in the coming months and undermine its financial outlook for 2026. On 13 November, finance ministers of EU member states are set to convene in Brussels (Belgium) to discuss potential financial support for Ukraine. They will consider two options: borrowing funds from the markets or issuing a loan secured by frozen Russian assets, the majority of which are held by a depository in Belgium. According to EU sources, the latter option remains more favourable. However, Belgium continues to express opposition, fearing potential liability in the event of a successful lawsuit from Russia. Additionally, the Russia-friendly Slovakian Prime Minister Robert Fico has indicated that he would block any attempt to utilise Russian frozen assets. The ultimate decision will rely on an agreement among all EU leaders, who are expected to meet in mid-December. However, even if the EU reaches a consensus, it may take several months before the loans can be issued.
FORECAST
ENERGY: Over the past week, Ukraine’s energy security has continued to deteriorate steadily as a direct result of Russia’s co-ordinated strike campaign against critical infrastructure. The scale of the challenge facing Ukraine’s energy system was illustrated during a large-scale attack overnight on 7-8 November, which involved 458 drones and 45 missiles, including 32 ballistic systems. Although Ukraine intercepted most of the drones (406), it downed only nine missiles; this allowed the remaining projectiles, especially the ballistic missiles, to inflict significant damage on the country’s energy system. The low interception rate of missiles reflects the growing pressure on Ukrainian air defences this winter.
Ukraine’s state-owned energy company Centrenergo reported that all its thermal power plants (TPPs) have been disabled following the latest strikes. The company operates the Trypilska TPP in Kyiv oblast and the Zmiivska TPP in Kharkiv oblast; the latter previously underwent major repairs after being completely destroyed in a Russian attack in spring 2024. Meanwhile, Ukraine’s largest private energy company, DTEK, likewise reported severe damage to one of its TPPs. Russian forces also notably struck energy substations supplying the nuclear power plants (NPPs) in Khmelnytskyi (Khmelnytskyi oblast) and Rivne (Rivne oblast), though without affecting their operations. The Ukrainian authorities stated that the overnight attack on 7-8 November had reduced the country’s generating capacity to ‘zero’, causing prolonged power outages of up to 16 hours, including in Kyiv.
The choice of targets almost certainly reflects Russia’s aim to trigger cascading blackouts by disabling major elements of Ukraine’s power generation network. The overnight attack on 7-8 November demonstrates Russia’s readiness to strike energy substations linked to nuclear facilities alongside thermal and gas production plants, which have remained consistent targets throughout its campaign.
Until now, Russia had conducted limited strikes against NPP-associated power stations; consequently, NPPs came to form an increasingly crucial element in the stability of Ukraine’s energy grid. This latest shift in targeting clearly indicates Russia’s growing interest in threatening Ukraine’s nuclear generation capabilities, likely aimed in part to signal the Kremlin’s willingness to escalate further. We assess that Russian forces are highly unlikely to strike NPPs directly with cruise or ballistic missiles (the likelihood that drones will be used for this purpose in the future remains low). Even if such an attack did take place, the safety procedures and back-up systems would highly likely prevent an imminent meltdown or major nuclear incident (for further analysis on nuclear safety risks in Ukraine, see Sibylline Special Report – 19 July 2023). Nevertheless, frequent strikes against NPP-linked power infrastructure, such as distribution facilities or substations, will likely undermine nuclear energy output and further exacerbate energy insecurity. Furthermore, such attacks will increase Ukraine’s reliance on energy imports, particularly from the EU, which reached its highest levels of the year in October.
Meanwhile, the restoration of two external power lines at the Zaporizhzhia NPP (ZNPP; Zaporizhzhia oblast) following a temporary localised ceasefire to allow for repairs will not improve Ukraine’s energy security in the near term. The UN’s nuclear watchdog, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), helped arrange localised ceasefires for repair works after the ZNPP lost all off-site power on 23 September. The plant has been under Russian control since the early phases of the full-scale invasion. The ZNPP currently does not produce any electricity; it needs external power to cool nuclear fuel to avoid the risk of a meltdown. Nevertheless, the station’s Russian operators announced that the second power line, which had been down since early May, was repaired on 8 November. They said that this development ‘significantly increases the stability of the station’s power system’.
Prolonged power outages (both planned and unplanned) will highly likely continue over the coming autumn and winter period, likely driving some of the most severe operational disruption and downtime for firms since the 2022/3 winter. The impact will be most acutely felt by entities engaging in energy-intensive industries, such as manufacturing, though prioritisation of energy resources and back-up generators will offset the impact to varying extents for critical industries and services. Nevertheless, reduced working hours and productivity as a result of blackouts will increase the risk of revenue loss and significant production delays for companies operating in Ukraine.
- Ukraine: High-profile corruption scheme will remain trigger for societal backlash. In an interview released earlier on 11 November, the head of Ukraine’s National Anti-Corruption Bureau (NABU) Oleksandr Abakumov provided further details on the large corruption scheme that was recently uncovered in the energy sector. Abakumov stated that the scheme involved four unnamed former members of Ukraine’s cabinet; he did not provide any further details. He also highlighted the leading role of NABU detective Ruslan Mahamedrasulov in the investigation. In July, Mahamedrasulov was arrested by Ukraine’s State Security Service (SBU) on the suspicion of assisting Russia, raising concerns about the government’s attempts to obstruct NABU’s activities. On 10 November, NABU disclosed that it was conducting searches at the residences of former energy minister Herman Haluschenko and President Volodymyr Zelensky’s former business partner Tymur Mindich, as well as at Energoatom (Ukraine’s state-owned nuclear power company). NABU has alleged that the case involves a USD 100 m kickback scheme. We assess that the high-profile corruption case, combined with the perceptions of government interference in anti-corruption efforts, is likely to trigger strong societal backlash and to increase the risk of localised (but peaceful) protests, particularly in the capital Kyiv.
Nov 10.
- Ukraine: Large-scale anti-corruption probe into energy sector will drive domestic backlash risks. Earlier on 10 November, Ukraine’s National Anti-Corruption Bureau (NABU) announced an ongoing investigation into a major corruption scheme within the energy sector. NABU detectives reportedly conducted searches at the residences of former energy minister Herman Haluschenko and President Volodymyr Zelensky’s former business partner Tymur Mindich, as well as at Energoatom, the state-owned nuclear power company. NABU disclosed that the investigation has been underway for 15 months and reveals a broad scheme to take control of strategic state-owned enterprises, including Energoatom. According to sources cited by the Kyiv Independent, the probe into Mindich was allegedly one of the factors behind the authorities’ attempt to curtail NABU’s independence in July. The investigation also coincides with a sharp deterioration in Ukraine’s energy situation due to Russia’s long-range strikes on critical infrastructure. We assess that the findings are likely to trigger domestic backlash, particularly if evidence of government interference emerges. However, the physical response will likely remain limited, with small-scale protests remaining a realistic possibility. (Source: Sibylline)
12 Nov 25. Ukraine targets recruits and retention with new military contracts. A new military salary scheme will be introduced in 2026 that includes limited mobilisation exemption.
- Ukraine will introduce new pay scales for military contracts in early 2026, adding new perks
- In excess of one m personnel are currently in active service, with the government keen to retain skills
- The latest operational updates from the war show Russian forces continuing to press into Pokrovsk
Ukraine will move to increase base service payment for military personnel signing on for new service contracts, with the expectation that the new system will be ready for implementation in early 2026. During a recent meeting between Minister of Defence Denys Shmyhal and President Volodymyr Zelenskyy earlier in November, aspects of the new military contract were outlined, which include payments that now range from 50,000 – 60,000 UAH ($1,188 – $1,426), a duration range from two to five years, and a 12-month deferral from mobilisation upon contract completion. This latter element is likely going to be particularly attractive, as it prevents personnel who have completed their contracts in being called up again in the event of large-scale mobilisation of the population within a 12-month period. The Ukrainian military has had to be increasingly creative in tempting citizens into – or back to – service, with the basic military renumeration prior to Russia’s 2022 invasion was thought to be around 13,000 UAH. This was already nearly twice the average civilian monthly income of about 7,000 UAH. Further, the proposed new contract standard permits new recruits to choose a specific brigade and role, although it is likely that this will have limitations in order to fill gaps in units and skills that suffer a high attrition rate. Additional increments are also available, such as higher combat payments and a signing bonus that rises depending on contract duration. These ‘bonus’ payments are often tens or even hundreds-of-thousands of Ukrainian Hryvnia, with information from December 2024 stating personnel would receive 70,000 UAH for carrying out combat or special forces operations on the frontline or inside Russian-held territory. As of December 2024, the renumeration for a basic recruit in Ukraine’s Ground Forces was 20,130 UAH. Ukraine’s military has dramatically increased in scale since 2022, with more than one m personnel now actively serving in its armed forces. Efforts to digitise recruitment and some administrative and training functions through initiatives such as Impulse and the Reserve+ app are intended to streamline processes and bring increased efficiency. Such digitisation could also help the Ukrainian government better track citizens who are eligible for recruitment and those that have valid deferral reasons.
Combat continues around Pokrovsk
Combat operations along the Ukraine-Russia frontline are ongoing, although primary focus in recent weeks has centred on the city of Pokrovsk, located along the Vuhledar – Kurakhove – Kramatorsk axis. Providing its daily update on 12 November, the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) stated that Russian advances in the Pokrovsk remained “relatively slow”, citing a lack of geolocation footage over the preceding 24 hours showing significant movements. Prior to that, Russian forces had infiltrated southeastern Pokrovsk and nearby Myrnohrad, the ISW said. The UK Ministry of Defence notably neglected to mention Pokrovsk in its own daily intelligence update on 11 November, instead referencing operations around Zmiinyi Island.Meanwhile, the Ukraine Ministry of Defence claimed a further 162 tactical level drones intercepted throughout Ukraine over the preceding 24 hours. In addition, Ukraine claimed to have inflicted 1,000 combat casualties on Russian forces during this period, taking the total to 1.154 m since February 2022.(Source: army-technology.com)
13 Nov 25. Sweden buy and test copies of Russian attack drones.
“We can train against the threat we ourselves risk facing,” says an FMV technical unit specialist.
- Sweden have bought and tested two copies of Russian drones
- MACE is equivalent to the Russian Lancet, while STORK shares features of the Orlan-10 and Supercam S350
- Ukrainian troops tested both drones at a new UAS testing facility in Karlsborg
In a unique move to get inside the head of the adversary, Sweden have purchased copies of Russian drones from the Ukrainian drone builder UAC to replicate and understand the tribulations of the unceasing Russian drone tactics.
“We have purchased two types of drones that correspond to Russian capabilities,” confirmed Anders Hedman, head of the FMV’s test and evaluation ground area.
It was at the FMV’s newly established UAS testing facility in Karlsborg, which lies on the shore of lake Vättern, where Ukrainian troops taught their Swedish counterparts how to fly the system on the ground, but also in some limited cases, in a maritime space.
“By purchasing copies of Russian systems, we can train against the threat we ourselves risk facing,” argued Michael Ledenius, head of the technical unit at FMV for testing and evaluating land systems.
Loitering munitions
The MACE one-way attack drone is a dual X-shaped wing system that is launched from a pneumatic catapult and powered by an electric motor. The uncrewed aerial system (UAS) has a runtime of up to 60 minutes and has a cruising speed of 100 kilometres per hour, but with a top speed of 300kmph. It appears the loitering munition shares the same features as Russia’s ZALA Lancet system. Experts from the London think tank, the Royal United Services Institute (RUSI), found that the destruction of a target might be reasonably accomplished by launching two or three Lancet-3M systems per target from different axes. While there is no cost breakdown available for the MACE system, the RUSI report indicates that the cost of a single Lance-3M is around $30,000 compared to just one air-to-ground munition, such as the AGM-179 Joint Air-to-Ground Missile, which can cost up to $319,000 per missile. With their 35km range, Lancets are known to have been used as part of Russia’s hybrid salvos comprising various missile and drone types against Ukrainian infrastructure to compensate for their slow territorial gains. Now, Ukraine is realising some success in kind by targeting Russian oil fields by the same means. It is said that Ukrainian long-range drone attacks have struck oil refineries as far afield as Ryazan, Saratov, and Volgograd in the west of the country and even Tyumen in Siberia, as well as fuel depots, pumping stations, and other logistical hubs.
ISR drones
The second system, manufactured by the same company, is the STORK LR reconnaissance drone. Among other uses, the electric-powered, fixed-wing system is used to map terrain and adjust artillery fire much like Russia’s Orlan-10 or Supercam S350 systems used for intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR). Tactical strike and reconnaissance drones pose a deadly threat in the so-called ‘kill zone’ as the systems map movements below across the frontline. But interestingly, as Russian patrol drones are likely deterred from conducting ISR by Ukraine’s short range air defences, they have been repurposed in some recent cases this year. In August 2025, the Institute for the Study of War reported that Ukrainian forces shot down an Orlan drone that functioned as a mothership and carried two first-person-view UAS for the first time. Orlan-10s have, therefore, allowed Russia to significantly increase the range of its drone strikes in the near rear. (Source: army-technology.com)
13 Nov 25. Nordic and Baltic countries team up to fund US arms for Ukraine. The Nordic and Baltic countries are teaming up to pay for a $500m United States military support package of weapons and munitions for Ukraine, they said on Thursday. Norway will contribute the lion’s share at 2 bn Norwegian kroner, or about $200m, while Sweden will provide $60 m and Denmark around 400m Danish kroner ($53m) in funding, the countries said in separate statements. U.S. President Donald Trump and NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte in July announced a financial arrangement called the Prioritised Ukraine Requirements List to provide military aid to Ukraine. Through the initiative, NATO allies excluding the U.S. pool funds to pay for $500-m batches of American weapons, munitions and equipment requested by the embattled country.
“This will help Ukraine get high-priority military equipment quickly,” Norway’s Defence Minister Tore O. Sandvik said in a statement. “The feedback I have received from the Ukrainians is that PURL delivers on time and that they are satisfied with the content of the military aid packages.”
Trump said on Tuesday the U.S. is no longer spending any money on Ukraine, “now they pay us through NATO.” The Nordic-Baltic Eight countries – Norway, Sweden, Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia – published a joint statement on Thursday saying they’ll maintain long-term military aid for Ukraine, with the $500m PURL package a demonstration of their support.
“Russia’s war of aggression is a long-term threat to European security, the transatlantic community and the rules-based international order,” the joint statement said. “We will not allow it to succeed. Ukraine’s security is directly connected to ours.”
The package paid for by the Nordic and Baltic countries will contain weapons and ammunition, according to Norway, which said specific contents are not made public for security reasons. Sweden said the package will strengthen Ukraine’s air-defense capabilities.
As of mid-October, NATO partners had funded four PURL packages, according to the alliance, which administers the initiative. That included the first package paid for by the Netherlands, a second one financed by Denmark, Sweden and Norway, a third funded by Germany and a fourth paid for by Canada. The first two PURL packages included missiles for the Patriot air-defense system and HIMARS rocket artillery, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy said in September, with the first aid reportedly arriving that month. Since August, the PURL initiative has provided about 75% of the missiles for Ukraine’s Patriot systems and about 90% of the missiles for other air defense systems supplied by partner countries, Ukrainian Minister of Defense Denys Shmyhal said in a social media post. Together with the PURL package announced by the Nordic and Baltic countries, Ukraine will receive long-range 155mm artillery shells, HIMARS rockets and guided aerial bombs, according to the minister.
“This tranche of aid is critical for Ukraine’s defense and the protection of our citizens,” Shmyhal said. (Source: Defense News)
12 Nov 25. Cuashub.com said today that Ukrainian troops train for drone warfare in new virtual reality simulator. Ukrainian soldiers are now training for drone combat in a fully virtual environment, as engineering company Atmaraksi unveils Duel, a new virtual reality simulator designed to mirror the dynamics of modern battlefield encounters. The system places one soldier in control of an FPV drone while another takes the role of a shooter, creating a digital duel that tests reflexes, decision-making and tactical awareness. Atmaraksi says Duel accurately replicates real-world physics and combat logic within a customizable VR arena. Instructors can alter locations, swap weapons and change drone types to simulate a variety of operational conditions. Soldiers face realistic, high-pressure scenarios where they must decide when to move, take cover or engage. Unlike conventional VR systems that end before impact, Duel continues through to the moment of engagement, allowing both the pilot and the shooter to experience the full intensity of drone confrontation. Performance data and analytics are automatically recorded, giving instructors tools to refine training programs based on measurable results. To improve realism, Atmaraksi collaborated with government agencies and police training centers. One such partnership led to the inclusion of a “checkpoint roadblock” scenario for close-quarters engagement. The company says its systems meet international standards and align with NATO training protocols, ensuring interoperability with partner forces. According to Atmaraksi, Duel and its other VR training systems are already being used by more than 100 Ukrainian units.
Ukrainian troops train for drone warfare in new virtual reality simulator
(Source: https://cuashub.com/
11 Nov 25. The last six weeks of drone war in Ukraine: lasers, converted general aircraft and fast interceptors. Laser counter-UAS systems are starting to appear on both sides of the war in Ukraine, along with a new generation of fast, cheap intercept drones and light aircraft converted into drone hunters, according to the latest update of C-UAS systems and companies listed in the Unmanned Airspace 2025 Global Counter-UAS Systems Directory. Last month Russia’s Shvabe holding company, part of the Rostec State Corporation presented its first mobile laser for countering drones at the Interpolitex 2025 exhibition, seven months after Ukrainian officials announced the first successful use of their domestic Tryzub laser weapon system against a drone. Currently there are around 20 countries in the world developing and deploying over 50 laser-based counter-UAS systems, in broadly, four areas: airborne, tactical, naval and infrastructure protection, with system capabilities ranging from 2kW to over 500 kW. These are just some of the new systems listed in the latest, November 2025 edition of the Unmanned Airspace 2025 Global Counter-UAS Systems Directory, the world’s only comprehensive, updated directory of global C-UAS companies and systems. It itemises over 1,000 products and services with performance details, company sales and partnerships arrangements. It is updated every month and broken down into niche sub-sectors to give C-UAS procurement and industry personnel a unique perspective of global C-UAS technical capabilities and market positions – and is available in word, excel and PDF formats. (Source: www.unmannedairspace.info)
11 Nov 25. Ukraine’s $2,500 Drones Down 1,000 Russian Shaheds in 4 Months. Ukraine’s battle against Russia’s relentless drone assaults has found a powerful counter in the STING interceptor drone, a compact, fast, and cost-effective weapon designed to neutralize enemy UAVs mid-air. Developed by the Ukrainian team “Wild Hornets,” the STING has already proven its effectiveness in combat, marking a significant step forward in the evolution of drone warfare.
The Drone that Hunts Shahed Drones
The STING interceptor, showcased in a new video released by the Wild Hornets team, is described as a “massive, affordable, and effective” FPV (first-person view) drone capable of downing Russian attack UAVs, including Shaheds, Lancets, Zala, and SuperCam models. Built for agility and speed, the STING can be deployed in less than 15 minutes and launched from virtually any surface without the need for a catapult. If a target is not located, the drone autonomously returns to base, a feature that saves valuable resources during operations. With an engagement range of up to 25 kilometers, it is designed for rapid response to aerial threats, offering Ukrainian forces a flexible defensive option against swarms of incoming attack drones. Equipped with the Hornet Vision system and a 360° antenna ground station, the STING remains operational even under electronic warfare conditions. The system works seamlessly with both analog and digital FPV stations, ensuring real-time video transmission and night operation capabilities. As described in the video, “no evasion system can save a Shahed,” highlighting the precision and speed of the drone. A distinct dome atop the STING’s frame houses its camera system and explosive payload. Operated via VR goggles, the pilot experiences a first-person view of the flight, enabling high-speed maneuvering and pinpoint accuracy, often culminating in a mid-air collision with its target. Compact yet lethal, the drone embodies Ukraine’s shift toward smart mass-produced weaponry. Simple to maintain, fast to deploy, and deadly effective.
Training and Deployment
A dedicated instructor unit, known as the “Night Hornets,” is responsible for training new STING operators. According to the Wild Hornets, “by day, they train soldiers to operate STING. By night, they hunt Shaheds alongside them.” This continuous cycle of training and combat ensures that the frontline experience directly informs new recruits, rapidly expanding Ukraine’s corps of skilled FPV drone pilots. In just four months since serial production began, STING claims to have destroyed over 1,000 enemy targets. This would make the Wild Hornets initiative one of Ukraine’s most successful combat drone programs to date.
Toward a Drone-Driven Defence
As Business Insider reports, President Volodymyr Zelenskyy announced that the country aims to reach a daily production rate of 600 to 800 interceptor drones by the end of November. Although lower than his initial target of 1,000 per day, Zelenskyy noted,
“We believe that by the end of November, there will be 600 to 800 interceptor drones produced per day, if nothing goes wrong.”
The move comes amid escalating Russian attacks using waves of Shahed-136 drones and missile salvos meant to overwhelm Ukrainian air defenses. Traditional anti-air systems, such as Western-supplied surface-to-air missiles, can cost ms per unit, far exceeding the price of the drones they are used to destroy. In contrast, interceptor drones like STING provide a far cheaper and more scalable solution. (Source: UAS VISION/Interesting Engineering)
10 Nov 25. Zelenskyy seeks US Patriot systems against Russia’s power grid attacks. KYIV, Ukraine (AP) — President Volodymyr Zelenskyy said Monday he wants to order 25 Patriot air defense systems from the United States, as Ukraine desperately tries to fend off relentless Russian aerial attacks that have brought rolling blackouts across Ukraine on the brink of winter. Zelenskyy acknowledged that the Patriot systems are expensive and that such a large batch could take years to manufacture. But he said European countries could give their Patriots to Ukraine and await replacements, stressing that “we would not like to wait.” Combined missile and drone strikes on the power grid have coincided with Ukraine’s frantic efforts to hold back a Russian battlefield push aimed at capturing the eastern stronghold of Pokrovsk. Meanwhile, international peace efforts appear to have dissipated, nearly four years after Russia invaded its neighbor. Zelenskyy said Ukraine recently received more Patriot systems from Germany. It is not known how many Patriot systems are in Ukraine. But on the whole air defenses remain stretched thin across wide expanses of Ukrainian territory, and the threat to the provision of heating and running water in the bitter winter is acute. NATO is coordinating regular deliveries of large weapons packages to Ukraine. European allies and Canada are buying much of the equipment from the United States. The Trump administration is not giving any arms to Ukraine, unlike the previous Biden administration. Russia’s attacks on energy infrastructure have grown more effective. It launches hundreds of drones, some equipped with cameras to improve targeting, that overwhelm Ukraine’s air defenses, especially in regions where protection is weaker. Also, this year it is striking region by region, hitting local switchyards and substations, instead of taking aim at the centralized national grid. Ukraine’s Energy Ministry said Monday that Russian attacks caused more damage to its power infrastructure, resulting in scheduled blackouts in most of the country’s regions. It urged Ukrainians to rationalize their use of electricity, especially during peak consumption hours in the mornings and evenings. Meanwhile, the two sides were locked in a battle for control of Pokrovsk, in Ukraine’s eastern Donetsk region where Zelenskyy says Russia has assembled 170,000 troops for a renewed push. There has been a relative lull in fighting in recent days, according to reports gathered by the Institute for the Study of War. But the Washington-based think tank said it expected Russian forces to quicken the tempo of their attacks in coming days as they move more troops into the city. (Source: Defense News)
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