News in Brief

NEWS IN BRIEF – UNITED KINGDOM AND EUROPE

December 28, 2025 by

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18 Dec 25. EU flagship defense R&D in 2026 covers hypersonic defense, future tank. The European Defence Fund plans to allocate €1 bn ($1.2 bn) in funding for defense research and development in 2026, with the biggest chunk of money budgeted for work on air and missile defense, including countering hypersonic glide vehicles. The EDF annual work program includes €168 m for hypersonic counters and high-end endo-atmospheric interception, the European Commission wrote in a call for proposals published Wednesday. The other big-ticket item is ground combat, with €150m for work on future main battle tank platforms and a multiple rocket launcher. The fund was set up in 2021 to back collaborative defense R&D by European Union members and has so far invested around €4 bn in more than 200 projects. Some EDF-backed projects address critical capability gaps, such as Odin’s Eye II to build a satellite-based early warning system, or work that would be challenging for a single country to manage, such as hypersonic defense.

“Europe must strengthen collaboration in defense, with the European Defence Fund acting as a key foundation for this effort,” European Commissioner for Defence and Space Andrius Kubilius said. “For the sixth time, we are investing significant resources to incentivize and support research and development on major defense capabilities.”

The EDF has helped reduced duplication and boosted pan-European cooperation, but needs procedural simplification and closer integration with national planning, according to an interim evaluation by the European Parliamentary Research Service published in October.

Half of the 2026 EDF budget is earmarked for major defense capabilities, including developing an EU endo-atmospheric interceptor, a main battle tank, multiple rocket launcher and key technologies for next-generation air fighters, the commission said. A quarter will go to future defense technologies such as quantum-secured networks, artificial intelligence and robot and drone swarms. The 2026 work program includes €125m to develop future main battle tank systems with more survivability, superior firepower and the ability to operate with reduced crews and, later on, unmanned. Existing EU tank fleets are aging, and new MBT technologies need to be developed and tested in all future scenarios to maintain a technological edge, the commission said. The EDF is budgeting €100 m for high-end endo-atmospheric interception, building on previous work to mature key technologies to technology readiness level 6 and develop demonstrators for areas including the interceptor air frame, propulsion and lethality. The fund will also directly award an indicative €68 m, without a new call for proposals, to continue work on building, testing and flying a basic hypersonic glide vehicle demonstrator as part of efforts to counter the threat, with the work subject to EU secrecy requirements. Companies involved include MBDA, Airbus, Diehl, Hensoldt, Kongsberg, Indra Sistemas and Saab. The EDF work program includes €90m to study designs and enable prototypes of medium-sized, semi-autonomous surface vessels for defending coastal waters. The technology should be adaptable for new naval-warfare missions in the future. Next year’s budget further includes amounts of €20 m to €30 m for programs including a turbofan engine in the 25-35 kilonewton thrust range to power an unmanned loyal wingman aerial vehicle; radar to track unmanned hypersonic vehicles; automated air-to-air refueling; “enhanced cognitive EW” that uses AI to identify and respond to threats; and a multiple rocket launcher. (Source: Defense News)

18 Dec 25. Military Committee in Chiefs of Defence Session – 21-22 January 2026. NATO’s highest Military Authority, the Military Committee, will meet on 21-22 January 2026 in Brussels, at the Chiefs of Defence level. The Chair of the Military Committee (CMC), Admiral Giuseppe Cavo Dragone, will preside the meeting, with the participation of the 32 Allies, along with the Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR), General Alexus G. Grynkewich, and Supreme Allied Commander Transformation (SACT), Admiral Pierre Vandier. Allied Chiefs of Defence will also meet with counterparts from NATO Indo-Pacific Partners, Georgia and Ukraine. In the first session, SACEUR will brief the Chiefs of Defence on the status of NATO’s readiness to bolster the Alliance’s collective deterrence and defence posture in the face of our common security challenges. During the second session, SACT will address how NATO can accelerate the delivery of relevant capabilities by supporting Nations in adopting and fielding innovation, at the right scale and pace. In the NATO-Ukraine Council format, Chiefs of Defence will also discuss the situation on the ground in Ukraine and NATO continued support to Ukraine, including the NATO Security Assistance and Training for Ukraine (NSATU) and the Joint Analysis, Training and Education Centre (JATEC). The Chair of the EU Military Committee (CEUMC) is also invited to participate in this session. The following sessions will stress the strategic role of Partnerships to address interlinked and evolving global security challenges with counterparts from NATO Indo-Pacific Partners and Georgia.

Wednesday 21 Jan 2026

08:30 (CET) Opening remarks by:

Admiral Giuseppe Cavo Dragone, Chair of the NATO Military Committee.

Thursday 22 Jan 2026

17:30 (CET) Joint press conference with:

Admiral Giuseppe Cavo Dragone, Chair of the NATO Military Committee (CMC);
General Alexus G. Grynkewich, Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR);
Admiral Pierre Vandier, Supreme Allied Commander Transformation (SACT).

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NEWS IN BRIEF – REST OF THE WORLD

December 18, 2025 by

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18 Dec 25. Honduras: Armed forces’ security guarantees will sustain elevated government stability risks. On 17 December, President of the National Electoral Council (CNE) Ana Paola Hall called for additional security around the National Institute of Vocational Training (INFOP) in the capital Tegucigalpa, where a presidential recount of the set number of votes will occur. Hall called on the armed forces to guarantee the protection of people and electoral officials during the recount. The call comes amid small-scale protests in Tegucigalpa following the 30 November elections, largely conducted by supporters of the incumbent Liberty and Refoundation (LIBRE) party. President Xiomara Castro has called for additional protests, increasing domestic unrest risks near INFOP in the coming days and weeks. Meanwhile on 16 December, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Roosevelt Hernández declared that the armed forces will ‘guarantee the permanence of the government until 27 January 2026’. This statement likely aims to facilitate a transition after the recount, given that the CNE is obliged to declare a winner by 30 December. In the short term, government stability risks will remain heightened despite the armed forces’ assurances, while political polarisation will continue driving claims of electoral malpractice and concerns over military intervention. (Source: Sibylline)

18 Dec 25. Moldova: War risks, labour shortages will likely undermine socio-economic health improvement. On 17 December, the IMF issued a statement assessing that Moldova has a ‘unique opportunity’ for economic growth, but emphasising that the country needs decisive reforms. Mission Chief for Moldova at IMF Alina Iancu stated that the country’s EU accession prospects would help increase productivity, encourage long-term growth and improve living standards. At the same time, Iancu acknowledged that Moldova’s pro-West government must address structural shortcomings, as well as ensure strong macroeconomic management and policy-making to sustain reforms. Moldova remains one of Europe’s poorest countries; the spillover from Russia’s full-scale invasion of neighbouring Ukraine is compounding its already strained socio-economic health conditions. We assess that President Maia Sandu’s re-election in 2024 and the victory of her Party of Action and Solidarity (PAS) in parliamentary elections this September will highly likely ensure Moldova’s continued commitment to making the necessary reforms for EU membership. While this will likely increase investor confidence in the longer term, concerns about Russian destabilisation and labour shortages driven by large-scale emigration will remain obstacles to robust economic growth. (Source: Sibylline)

18 Dec 25. Taiwan-US: Proposed arms sales would strengthen Taiwan’s asymmetric defence capabilities On 17 December, the US announced eight arms sale packages worth around USD 11bn to Taiwan, including High Mobility Artillery Rocket Systems (HIMARS) and howitzers. If approved by Congress, the sales would surpass the combined value of all 19 military sales to Taiwan approved under former US president Joe Biden’s administration. China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) stated that it strongly opposes the plans, which ‘severely undermine Chinese sovereignty’. Last month, Taiwanese President Lai Ching-te announced a USD 40bn supplementary defence budget (for the period between 2026 and 2033). However, it is not guaranteed that the opposition-controlled Yuan (i.e. Taiwan’s unicameral legislature) will appropriate sufficient funds to purchase all the announced US arms sales, given opposition parties’ scepticism towards defence spending. In the short term, we assess that it is unlikely that Beijing will announce any major retaliatory action that would collapse the current US-China trade truce, as its current position is to stabilise ties with Washington DC ahead of US President Donald Trump’s scheduled state visit in April. However, we assess that China will continue to put pressure on Taiwan. y(Source: Sibylline)

18 Dec 25. “Four fundamental structural shifts – Russian aggression, the rise of China, an unpredictable US and European political instability – have coalesced to create the most acute security crisis in Europe since 1945… In the near future, credible conventional and nuclear deterrence must be the overarching priority to provide Europe with the time and space to rearm and build a resilient Euro-Atlantic security architecture.” This is according to The Future of the Euro-Atlantic Security Architecture, by Ed Arnold and Darya Dolzikova, which says that Europe is facing its most acute security crisis since 1945 and that the post-war Euro-Atlantic security architecture [EASA] – a complex system of institutions, treaties, norms and alliances – is no longer fit for purpose. It says strengthening NATO quickly is essential if Europeans are to “save NATO and continue to enjoy its protections”. It urges European allies to take greater ownership of NATO’s regional defence plans, prepare for scenarios in which the US is distracted or engaged elsewhere, and close key capability gaps. The report notes that the UK has a unique role to play in reforming current structures. The report identifies four structural shifts – the full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022 and sustained Russian aggression, advancements in China’s nuclear capabilities, growing US unpredictability, and deepening political instability and the growth of populism within Europe itself – for undermining key assumptions underpinning European security, including respect for sovereignty, arms control compliance and strategic stability. It says Russia’s repeated nuclear threats and the disintegration of arms control agreements have also raised escalation risks across Europe. The research says that while US nuclear commitments to Europe are expected to remain, conventional forces drawdown – particularly as the United States increasingly prioritises the Indo-Pacific – risks undermining the credibility of this extended nuclear deterrence. The report considers how UK and French nuclear capabilities can be better integrated with efforts to strengthen European conventional capabilities to bolster European defence and deterrence.

Key Findings

Europe faces the most acute security crisis since 1945: “The Euro-Atlantic security architecture is under the greatest external and internal pressure since its inception…The 2022 full-scale invasion of Ukraine was a violent attempt to overthrow and replace [the EASA]… The stasis of liberalism and the rise of populism within Europe and the US are creating unprecedented and simultaneous internal political instability, fraying Western unity and multilateral collective action.”
US leadership in Europe can no longer be assumed: “US leadership that upholds the EASA is no longer assured as the second President Donald J Trump administration dramatically realigns towards domestic priorities and the rise of China in the Indo-Pacific… While the US is not expected to decrease its nuclear commitments to Europe, that the US will undertake a conventional drawdown on the continent will have knock-on effects on the credibility of US extended nuclear deterrence on the continent. A withdrawal of – or unwillingness to engage in – conventional capabilities in defence of Europe will create destabilising gaps in Europe’s escalatory options.”
Political instability is forcing European governments to focus on domestic challenges. “The rise of populism… is straining unity and making it harder to manage multilateral security institutions. An increase in ‘spoiler countries’, such as Hungary, which can exploit the requirement of unanimity in both the EU and NATO to their advantage, is preventing strong collective multilateral action. Moreover, domestic political concerns, principally over immigration, are driving a distrust of international organisations and agreements, such as the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), which constitutes a central part of the current values-based EASA. Reform – the party is currently leading the polls in the UK – and the Conservative Party are both campaigning to withdraw from the ECHR. If the UK voluntarily left the Council of Europe, it would be outside the organisation, alongside Russia and Belarus who were expelled, and this would impact the values-based nature of the agreement.”

Key Recommendations

Strengthen NATO to function with reduced US leadership. The report says: “For Europeans to save NATO and continue to enjoy its protections, it must be strengthened quickly…European states must ensure that they can optimally operate within NATO even if the US is engaged elsewhere.”
Prioritise credible deterrence to buy time for long-term reform. “In the near future, credible conventional and nuclear deterrence must be the overarching priority to provide Europe with the time and space to rearm and build a resilient EASA…The bolstering of European advanced conventional capabilities is the most immediate way of addressing concerns over the credibility and effectiveness of nuclear deterrence.”
Consolidate minilateral security arrangements in Europe that complement NATO. “Bringing the E3 (UK, France and Germany) together with the Weimar Triangle (France, Germany and Poland) would develop the strongest European quad of powers, providing a strong leadership group and bridging NATO and the EU…Identifying opportunities for cooperation and coordination outside existing structures is particularly important for nuclear deterrence and assurance.”

Conclusion

The report concludes that without decisive European leadership, the continent risks strategic irrelevance at a moment when credible deterrence – nuclear and conventional – is essential. The report says the UK can play a critical leadership role in the new architecture given its nuclear capabilities, close relationship with the US, and central position within NATO. Europe must take greater responsibility for shaping its own defence and deterrence posture, yet without sustained political commitment and collective action, it risks falling behind strategically at a moment of profound global change.

The Future of the Euro-Atlantic Security Architecture is written by Ed Arnold, Senior Research Fellow for European Security, and Darya Dolzikova, Senior Research Fellow for Proliferation and Nuclear Policy at the Royal United Services Institute (RUSI). The research draws on expert-led meetings, semi-structured consultations with Euro-Atlantic policymakers and specialists, and extensive desk-based research of primary and secondary sources. The report forms part of RUSI’s Future Euro-Atlantic Security Architecture project, sponsored by the Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office’s Strategic Stability Programme.

16 Dec 25. Region-US: Escalating US military build-up in region underscores increasing tensions. On 15 December, US Southern Command (SOUTHCOM) stated that it conducted three strikes on suspected drug trafficking vessels in the eastern Pacific Ocean, killing eight people. Meanwhile, Trinidad and Tobago approved the transit of US military aircraft at its airports for logistics, resupply and personnel rotation purposes. In response, Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro announced the suspension of all energy agreements with Trinidad and Tobago. Furthermore, US President Donald Trump signed an executive order classifying fentanyl as a weapon of mass destruction, enhancing the US’ authority to combat drug trafficking. Meanwhile, US Secretary of State Marco Rubio and his Paraguayan counterpart (Rubén Ramírez Lezcano) signed a Status of Forces Agreement in order to combat organised crime groups (OCGs) that both countries have designated as terrorist organisations. On 13 December, the Dominican Republic authorised US military aircraft to land in the country. We assess that these developments point to an escalating build-up of US military assets in the Latin America and Caribbean region (as well as increasing regional tensions). We also continue to assess that a US strike targeting suspected drug traffickers on Venezuelan soil is a realistic possibility in the short-to-medium term. (Source: Sibylline)

16 Dec 25. Cambodia-Thailand: Thailand will heighten scrutiny on trade with Cambodia, blocking fuel, arms exports. Earlier on 16 December, the Thai National Security Council (NSC) approved tightened measures to prevent Thailand-flagged ships from moving fuel and strategic supplies to Cambodia. The authorities will warn Thai vessels who enter designated areas in the Gulf of Thailand that are considered to be ‘high-risk’. The Thai Maritime Enforcement Command Centre (Thai-MECC) and the Marine Department will work to inspect Thai vessels suspected of carrying shipments that could support Cambodia’s war effort. The Thai military has rejected characterisations of these naval inspections as a form of ‘blockade’, noting that it does not intend to ‘restrict all vessels of all nationalities’. The NSC’s decision follows the Thai suspension of fuel and military-related exports to Laos on 15 December via the Chong Mek border checkpoint (Ubon Ratchathani province), noting the suspected rerouting to Cambodia. We assess that Thai naval inspections are unlikely to affect unrelated third-country vessels, as this would drive international criticism and risk expanding the Cambodia-Thailand conflict. There is a realistic possibility that the Chong Mek route for fuel exports will resume in the short term, as Thailand and Laos are working on a framework to verify export purposes. (Source: Sibylline)

16 Dec 25. “This paper’s central conclusion is that, despite the concept’s strengths, it will need significant augmentation, beyond a network of relatively low mobility sensors, to be a significant deterrent to Russian maritime aggression.”

Introduction

This is according to The Atlantic Bastion, a new research report by the Royal United Services Institute which offers a comprehensive assessment of the UK’s emerging anti-submarine warfare (ASW) barrier and its prospective deterrent effect against Russian undersea forces.

Building on the UK’s 2025 Strategic Defence Review, the Atlantic Bastion is conceived as a layered network of uncrewed and autonomous systems, advanced sensors and more traditional assets, designed to ensure that Russian submarines cannot pass undetected through the Norwegian Sea and the Greenland–Iceland–UK gap. The report, by Sidharth Kaushal and Commander Edward Black, underscores that the Bastion is set to evolve over the coming years as new systems are procured and integrated.

However, the report says that deterrence by detection alone will not be enough. Drawing on Russian naval strategy, historic patterns of behaviour and interviews with senior Royal Navy personnel, the report concludes that Moscow is unlikely to be deterred simply by the risk of being tracked. Russian planners, it argues, may instead choose to surge submarines early in a crisis to draw NATO assets away from the High North, even if detection is expected.

The report asserts that the Atlantic Bastion should be understood not as a static sensor barrier but as a flexible, deeper and more geographically expansive construct. To be credible, it will need the ability to track contacts well beyond the Norwegian Sea; incorporate maritime strike capacity; integrate mine warfare; and operate effectively in both the Atlantic and Barents Sea.

The research highlights several critical trends, including Russia’s growing SSN (Nuclear-powered attack submarine) fleet and the projected delivery of six Yasen-class submarines to the Northern Fleet by the end of the decade, and the continued modernisation of its long-range strike systems. These developments reinforce the need for a more robust, manoeuvrable and multi-layered Bastion architecture that can raise the costs of Russian aggression and complicate its military planning. These findings present a compelling case for refining the Bastion’s design to ensure it fulfils its intended deterrence role.

Key Findings

Russia’s most likely response is to surge nuclear-armed submarines into the Atlantic. The report says: “The most likely RFN [Russian Federation Navy] response to the Atlantic Bastion is to surge nuclear-armed submarines into the Atlantic.”
Tracking beyond the Bastion is essential to prevent submarines from disappearing in the Atlantic. “This makes depth – the ability to track contacts beyond the Bastion – critical, considering that the Russians will seek to transit pre-conflict and lose tracking vessels in the Sargasso Sea.”
Maritime strike capability must be integral to the Bastion. “To enhance its deterrent effect, the Atlantic Bastion should include or be able to host a significant quantity of maritime strike capacity, most realistically in the form of missiles.”
European NATO navies will need to shoulder a significant share of strike responsibilities. “The UK and European NATO allies will need to provide a significant proportion of the maritime strike capacity within the Bastion to mitigate potential US re-tasking.”

Key Recommendations

Expand the Bastion east and west to counter early Russian surges. “The geographical scope of the Bastion should extend both westward into the Atlantic … and eastward into the Barents Sea.”
Integrate long-range strike assets directly into the Bastion architecture. “Punishment … conducted through conventional strike from the maritime domain, should be integral to the design of the Atlantic Bastion.”
Incorporate mine warfare and autonomous minelaying systems. “A key capability … is the potential for using protective and defensive minefields in peacetime…and offensive mining [in wartime].”
Develop long range and long duration submarine tracking using large, long-endurance uncrewed vessels. “Those USVs [Unmanned Surface Vessel] used in the Norwegian Sea must be large enough to support tracking to the west.”

Conclusion

The report concludes that the Atlantic Bastion is an essential element of the UK’s future maritime deterrent posture, but only if its design goes beyond a static defensive barrier. A narrowly defined Bastion, centred solely on low-mobility sensors in the Norwegian Sea, would risk becoming a “maritime Maginot Line” vulnerable to bypassing and early Russian surge tactics. Instead, the authors argue for a more dynamic, flexible and geographically expansive concept that integrates long range tracking capability, strike systems, mine warfare and enduring uncrewed platforms. Doing so would significantly complicate Russian strategic planning and strengthen the Bastion’s ability to deter both conflict and coercion.

Sidharth Kaushal is a Senior Research Fellow in Sea Power at RUSI, specialising in maritime doctrine, deterrence and the role of sea power in national strategy.

Edward Black is the First Sea Lord’s Visiting Fellow at RUSI and a serving Royal Navy mine clearance diving officer with extensive operational and diplomatic experience across several theatres.

The Atlantic Bastion, is based on qualitative analysis of primary and secondary literature, including Russian sources; assessments of past Russian behaviour; and interviews with UK naval staff and subject-matter experts. It integrates strategic theory with operational analysis to evaluate the Bastion’s deterrent potential and practical requirements.

This paper was researched and written based on information available up to August 2025. There have been significant developments since then, both in terms of the design of the Bastion, and the introduction of the Atlantic Strike and Atlantic Shield concepts. These were announced and outlined by General Sir Gwyn Jenkins, at the First Sea Lord’s Sea Power Conference on 8 December 2025. These initiatives speak to some of the issues analysed in the paper, and some of the concerns raised have therefore been overtaken by events. For more information and media inquiries please email

15 Dec 25. Cambodia-Thailand: Disruption, security risks remain high despite US president’s claims. Earlier on 15 December, Cambodia accused Thailand of expanding the conflict by carrying out airstrikes in Srei Snam (Siem Reap province, Cambodia) for the first time, approximately 44 miles (70km) into Cambodian territory. This development comes despite US President Donald Trump’s claim that he brokered a ceasefire on 12 December. Neither Cambodia nor Thailand have referenced a ceasefire in their follow-up statements, with Thai Prime Minister Anutin Charnvirakul explicitly rejecting this claim. At least 12 Cambodian civilians, 16 Thai soldiers and one Thai civilian were killed last week. We assess that the conflict is likely to continue in the short term; Anutin continues to state that Cambodia is the aggressor and considers continuous military action necessary. This stance aligns with the Thai military’s stated objective of degrading Cambodian military capabilities. The ongoing conflict will undermine trade and risk increased US tariffs. Earlier on 15 December, Thailand suspended fuel and military equipment exports to Laos via the Chong Mek checkpoint (Ubon Ratchathani province, Thailand), citing alleged rerouting to Cambodia. Delays along the border have been reported since this suspension came into effect. Additionally, the Royal Thai Navy has proposed restricting commercial maritime trade by Thai vessels to Cambodia. However, the navy clarified that the plan will not impact ships from other countries; the proposal will be considered on 16 December. (Source: Sibylline)

15 Dec 25. Congo (DRC): US criticism of Rwanda is unlikely to temper risk of armed conflict in eastern DRC. On 13 December, US Secretary of State Marco Rubio characterised Rwanda’s actions in eastern Congo (DRC) as ‘a clear violation’ of the US-backed peace agreement. The statement comes after the DRC and Rwanda ratified a US-backed peace and regional economic integration framework on 4 December. However, on 10 December, the Rwandan-backed M23 rebel group captured Uvira (South Kivu province) following a renewed offensive in South Kivu. The M23’s capture of the city underscores the persistent risk of armed conflict in eastern DRC, despite international mediation efforts. In the coming weeks, the M23 will highly likely continue to expand its territorial holdings to secure access to critical mineral deposits in the resource-rich eastern DRC; it will also attempt to maximise its leverage in further peace negotiations with the DRC. Rwanda is highly likely to continue supporting the M23 in these efforts, compounding bilateral tensions with the US. Yet despite escalating rhetoric, we assess that the US is unlikely to enact broad economic sanctions on Rwanda in the short term amid its broader efforts to consolidate access to critical mineral exports worldwide. (Source: Sibylline)

15 Dec 25. UK Defence Minister visits Baku to strengthen defence partnership.

Lord Vernon Coaker visited Baku for defence and security discussions. Security cooperation will be key pillar of the UK–Azerbaijan Strategic Partnership

UK Defence Minister Lord Coaker visited Baku for defence and security discussions
security co-operation will be key pillar of the UK–Azerbaijan Strategic Partnership, reflecting a shared understanding of the importance of regional stability and long-term peace
nations committed to working together on shared strategic interests as threats increase

The UK and Azerbaijan are working together on a shared vision for peace, stability and prosperity in the South Caucasus. In support of this objective, Defence Minister Lord Vernon Coaker, visited Baku on 4 December 2025 – the first UK Ministry of Defence Minister to visit since 2022. The visit deepens defence collaboration following significant developments in the bilateral relationship, including the intention to progress the relationship to a Strategic Partnership, made in August 2025. Defence cooperation will stand as a central pillar of this partnership, reflecting a shared commitment to regional security and strategic stability.

Lord Vernon Coaker meeting with President Ilham Aliyev

The UK appointed its first resident Defence Attaché to Azerbaijan in March. In October, the UK lifted its arms embargo on Azerbaijan and Armenia, in line with dissolution of the OSCE Minsk Group mechanisms. The two nations signed their most ambitious bilateral defence cooperation programme to date in London in October 2025. During his visit, Lord Coaker has attended bilateral meetings with His Excellency President Ilham Aliyev, Minister of Defence of The Republic of Azerbaijan Colonel General Zakir Hasanov, and the Minister of Defence Industry of the Republic of Azerbaijan Vugar Mustafayev on exploring further opportunities for the development of UK-Azerbaijan defence and security partnership. Lord Coaker attended the Graduation Ceremony of the British Military Advisory and Training Team Instructor Training Course held at the Azerbaijan Army Training and Education Centre. Participants of the intensive four-week course were coached and mentored by British and Czech instructors in accordance with UK’s approach to Defence Train the Trainer Course. (Source: https://www.gov.uk/)

12 Dec 25. Long term South African defence strategy a work in progress – Motshekga. A Parliamentary question on the review of South Africa’s long term defence strategy drew a lengthy response from Defence and Military Veterans Minister Angie Motshekga who basically said it remains a work in progress, and that doubling defence spending to 1.5% of GDP will take many years. The Economic Freedom Fighters’ Carl Niehaus asked Motshekga whether, considering that the last review of the SA National Defence Force (SANDF) was conducted 10 years ago in 2015, she has any plans to initiate another review of the state of the SANDF that will take into consideration the present realities. She elaborated that the 2023/24 financial year Ministerial Priorities set the Defence Minister the target of ‘Conducting an Evaluation of the Defence Review 2015 and Action Plan’ for completion by 31 October 2024.

“Furthermore, on 24 January 2024 the Department was tasked by the Commander-in-Chief [President Cyril Ramaphosa] to develop a strategy and plan for an interim force at 1.5% of GDP, including to capitalise the SDA [Strategic Defence Account] at 10% of the budget; and ring-fence a further 5% of budget for R&D [Research and Development]”.

The resulting work was delivered to the Presidency at the end of October 2024 and presented at a Ministerial Work Session in March 2025. This included a PESTEL (political, economic, social, technological, environmental and legal) analysis of the national, regional, continental, and global levels; a SWOT (strengths, weaknesses, opportunities and threats) analysis; a draft Defence Capstone Policy Concept for South Africa; a draft Military Capstone Strategising Concept for the defence and protection of South Africa; a draft South African Military Strategy, Force Design and Force Structure for 2025-2055; and the long-term SANDF capability development plan (Journey to Greatness) document covering 2025-2055. Furthermore, engagements were held with the SA National Security Secretariat (SANSS), the support body for the National Security Council (SANSC), to develop a report on reviewing the 2015 Defence Review and the considerations for investing in a sustainable modern defence force. An initial engagement was held in March and another engagement took place in June, where “positive support was expressed in terms of the 1.5% of GDP Defence Funding Target as set by the President.” Motshekga explained that the Directors-General directed that the Department of Defence engage in a process to develop a Defence Value Proposition in line with the President’s direction and a long-term defence funding trajectory (30 years) on the understanding that the allocation of 1.5% of GDP to defence constitutes the minimum funding threshold. At present, Motshekga told Niehaus, defence is funded to the tune of just .68% of GDP. A third engagement with the SANSS took place on 31 October, “wherein the abovementioned Long-Term Force Evolution Strategy and Planning Concept for the SANDF was presented to the Directors-General. The SANSS endorsed the work and referred the work to the National Security Council for its support and endorsement to Cabinet. The matter was tabled at the National Security Council in Cape Town on 4 November 2025. The matter was held over for a Special NSC, the date of which is still to be determined,” Motshekga’s reply, dated 5 December 2025, concluded.

Speaking to DefenceWeb at the SA Army’s Exercise Vukuhlome 2025 Distinguished Visitors’ Day last month, Motshekga acknowledged the Department of Defence (DoD) is facing challenges – primarily financial ones – and these are being addressed by Cabinet, Parliament, and the DoD. “We are doing all we can in our power to sustain this pride of the nation,” she said of the SANDF.

South Africa’s defence budget will increase, but gradually, with a 50% increase planned over the next five years, Motshekga explained. She cautioned that doubling spending to 1.5% of GDP can’t be done overnight and she does not want to increase spending too quickly as this will create all sorts of problems. Doubling the defence budget is achievable in phases, she said, with spending increasing to more than 1% of GDP taking at least five years.

Earlier this year, Motshekga in reply to a parliamentary question posed by Maliyakhe Shelembe of the Democratic Alliance, stated that spending 2% of GDP on defence would take 30 years.

Motshekga replied that “the incremental growth of the defence funding will happen over six multi Medium Term Strategic Framework Periods.” Each of these is five years long. The Minister added that defence spending would grow from the 0.67% at present to 1.35% over a period of six years and hit 2.40% on year 30.

“That the SANDF needs more money is beyond dispute,” said defence analyst Ricardo Teixeira. “The real question is how to spend it without wasting it. Throwing money at the problem is tempting but could be dangerous. Without the capacity to plan appropriately and account for and maintain equipment, a sudden influx of funding could easily be squandered. The outcome would be another round of headlines about mismanaged contracts, irregular procurement and expensive barely used hardware.” (Source: https://www.defenceweb.co.za/)

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NEWS IN BRIEF – MIDDLE EAST – CONFLICT

December 18, 2025 by

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Military And Security Developments

Dec 18.

Egypt-Israel: Major gas deal will likely ease diplomatic tensions, improve security co-ordination. On 17 December, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu announced that his government had approved a USD 35bn gas deal with Egypt. Under the agreement, the operating partners of the Leviathan offshore gas field will sell approximately 9.91 square miles (around 25.66 sq km) of gas to Egypt until 2040, or until the contract is fulfilled. Notably, Israel’s Ministry of Energy and Leviathan’s operating companies signed the deal in August, though the Israeli government delayed the final approval amid escalating political tensions with Egypt regarding the war in Gaza. This indicates a likely US-backed détente between the two countries, increasing their political co-ordination on border security in 2026 and regarding the ceasefire and peace plan in Gaza. Furthermore, the deal will almost certainly strengthen Egypt’s energy security throughout 2026, mitigating operational disruption risks to its electricity grid and easing risks for energy-intensive industries, particularly cement, fertilisers and steel manufacturing.
Syria: Counter-terrorism operations underscore persistent IS attack threat in run-up to Christmas. On 17 December, Syria’s interior ministry announced that the security forces arrested a suspected Islamic State (IS) member and seized drones and explosives during a raid on an IS cell in the Dummar district of the capital Damascus. On 16 December, the security forces also announced the arrest of eight IS members in Idlib (Idlib governorate) and Aleppo (Aleppo governorate). The operations came days after an IS-affiliated gunman killed two US military personnel and one civilian interpreter in Palmyra (Homs governorate). We assess that US pressure on Syrian President Ahmed al-Sharaa to intensify counter-terrorism operations across Syria will increase markedly. Further security operations are likely in al-Hasakah, Deir ez-Zor, Homs and Raqqa governorates in the coming days, increasing the risk of sporadic clashes and staff exposure to crossfire. Additionally, heightened ethno-religious tensions in the run-up to Christmas Day (25 December) will create a security environment wherein the likelihood of IS-linked attacks is elevated. This will especially affect areas near churches and within concentrated Christian population centres across Aleppo and Damascus, as well as along the Lebanon-Syria border.

Dec 17.

KEY DEVELOPMENTS

IRAN

Iran has likely prioritised re-developing its missile production capabilities in recent months, increasing risks of Israel engaging in airstrikes on military facilities in the medium term.
Amid mounting fiscal pressure, Iran increased fuel prices for purchases over 160 litres per month, increasing the risk of anti-government protests in the coming month.

ISRAEL

Israeli civilians attacked an ethnic-Arab Israeli woman in Jaffa (Tel Aviv district), increasing ethno-religious tensions and the risk of radicalisation among Israel’s Arab population.

PALESTINIAN TERRITORIES

GAZA STRIP: Israel’s strike targeting a top Hamas commander in Gaza is likely to be a ceasefire breach, highlighting sustained security risks across the strip and elevated tensions with the US.
WEST BANK: Two shooting incidents in Bethlehem governorate underscore risks of crossfire exposure during the Christmas holiday season, amid escalating settler violence and unrest risks.
WEST BANK: The Israeli government continues to approve the expansion of settlements throughout the West Bank, compounding ethno-religious and regional tensions.
Iraq: Operation targeting IS underscores group’s persistent threat in Iraq, resurgence concerns. Earlier on 17 December, the Iraqi Counter Terrorism Service (ICTS) announced the arrest of six Islamic State (IS) members in a series of operations conducted in co-ordination with the security forces in Kurdistan region. Four IS couriers and logistical suppliers were apprehended in Kirkuk governorate, while two additional suspects were detained in Mosul (Nineveh governorate) and the capital Baghdad. Separately, on 16 December, the authorities arrested a senior IS member specialising in bomb-making. These arrests underscore the persistent threat IS poses in Iraq, despite the group’s territorial defeat in 2017. The incidents also highlight security risks to personnel from attacks, assassinations and kidnappings, especially in Diyala, Kirkuk and Saladin governorates. The operations underscore heightened concerns over a potential IS resurgence, particularly following two high-level attacks in Syria over the past week. While IS activity in Iraq remains stable, we assess that the rising regional instability linked to the group will possibly deter foreign direct investment into Iraq in the coming months. This will increase financial risks for locally engaged businesses due to higher security costs and insurance premiums.

Dec 16.

Turkey-Eurasia region: Drone interception points to conflict spillover risks, operational disruption. On 15 December, Turkish F-16 fighter jets shot down a drone approaching Turkish airspace from the Black Sea over a ‘secure area outside residential zones’. While it remains unclear whether the interception occurred inside Turkish airspace, the defence ministry stated that the drone had lost control and posed a safety risk. Although ownership has not been confirmed, the drone was likely connected to Russian or Ukrainian military activity (though its operational purpose remains unknown). Regardless, the incident highlights increasing spillover risks facing Turkey from conflict in the Black Sea, with Ukraine also having targeted a tanker near Turkey’s northern coast on 2 December. These dynamics will likely continue to drive maritime and airspace disruption in northern Turkey, increasing risks for ships, port operations and regional logistics (while also exacerbating supply chain and operational risks for locally engaged businesses). We assess that heightened security concerns will possibly moderate footfall in some Turkish Black Sea destinations, including Samsun (Samsun province) and Trabzon (Trabzon province), marginally increasing financial risks therein. We do not assess that this risk extends to Istanbul (Istanbul province), at present.
Iran: Militant attacks will trigger further waves of security crackdown, arbitrary arrests. On 15 December, unidentified assailants killed three police officers and one civilian in an attack on a checkpoint at the entrance to the city of Fahraj (Kerman province). Notably, the attack comes a week after a similar gun attack in Zahedan (Sistan and Baluchestan province), which killed three Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) members. While no group has claimed responsibility for the incidents, we assess that both attacks are likely connected and were carried out by one of the local jihadist Sunni groups active in these provinces, including Ansar al-Fuqan and Jaysh al-Adl. There is also a possibility that the Islamic State Khurasan Province (ISKP) carried out the attack. As such, the authorities will highly likely maintain an augmented security presence in both provinces throughout the next four weeks at least. This will include checkpoints on provincial highways, particularly along the Fahraj-Zahedan road, triggering travel delays and increasing staff exposure to petty corruption. In the coming days, the attacks are also likely to drive a heavy security crackdown in Sistan and Baluchestan province, increasing the risks of arbitrary arrests and reactionary local protests, fuelling existing ethno-religious tensions.

Dec 15.

Morocco: Heavy rain will continue in coming days, sustaining transport disruption, health risks. On 14 November, heavy rain-induced flash flooding killed at least 37 people in the coastal city of Safi (Marrakesh-Safi region). The floods submerged around 70 homes and businesses; debris also blocked many roads. While water levels in Safi decreased by the evening of 14 November, moderate-to-heavy rain is expected to cover large parts of western Morocco – including Tangier (Tangier-Tétouan-Al Hoceima region) and the capital Rabat – in the early hours of 16 November. This will drive the risk of further flash flooding and associated threats to the wellbeing of staff, including due to potential injuries or deaths caused by debris from damaged infrastructure, as well as road traffic collisions and drowning. Flooding will also increase the risk of water contamination and spread of infectious disease, which localised instances of dehydration will almost certainly exacerbate. In Safi, we assess that damage to infrastructure and assets will likely drive supply chain, communication and operational disruption vis-à-vis the tourism sector – especially for hotels, restaurants and the local ceramics industry.
Syria-US: Deadly attack on US forces will elevate conflict risks in central and north-eastern Syria. On 13 December, a suspected gunman affiliated with Islamic State (IS) killed two US Army soldiers and one civilian interpreter near Palmyra (Homs governorate), while also injuring three other soldiers. The US has attributed the attack to IS, a claim consistent with the Syrian authorities’ statements that the individual had been reassigned from his role as a base security guard with the Internal Security Forces, due to suspected affiliations with IS. However, the group has not claimed responsibility for the attack at the time of writing. US officials have stated that they intend to retaliate, while the Syrian Interior Ministry confirmed the arrest of five people suspected of having links to the attack on 14 December. We assess that the attack will likely increase pressure on Syrian President Ahmed al-Sharaa to intensify counter-terrorism operations in Al-Hasakah, Deir ez-Zor, Homs and Raqqa governorates in the coming days, likely with US military support, which will drive exposure to armed conflict. Furthermore, the incident will likely drive internal scrutiny of Syria’s security forces, possibly compounding radicalisation among jihadist-aligned personnel at a risk of dismissal, driving long-term terrorism risks. (Source: Sibylline)

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NEWS IN BRIEF – UKRAINE CONFLICT

December 18, 2025 by

Sponsored by Bertin Exensor

www.exensor.com

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Military And Security Developments

Dec 18.

European leaders say a €90bn (£79bn) loan for Ukraine preserves EU unity while sending a signal to Moscow. The deal, struck after a day of tense talks in Brussels, is intended to cover Kyiv’s military and economic needs for the next two years as it faces a looming cash crunch. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky had pushed for the direct use of Russian funds, but opposition led by Belgium blocked the move. The agreement comes amid intensified diplomacy, with US and Russian-led talks expected this weekend. (Source: BBC)

Dec 17.
Key points
• The continuation of Russia’s cyber-supplemented military strategy will likely perpetuate disruption and destruction risks from Russian state-sponsored cyber threat groups to key sectors in Ukraine amid the ongoing war.
• Iran’s cyber-enhanced military strategy will pose heightened security and cyber espionage risks to its adversaries amid long-term regional hostilities; any geopolitical escalation will increase disruption risks to compromised entities that it deems adversarial.
• The widespread adoption of cyber-enhanced military operations will likely consolidate China’s pre-positioning strategy throughout 2026, increasing security, cyber espionage, pre-positioning and disruption risks to critical national infrastructure (CNI) sectors across the Asia-Pacific, Europe and North America regions
Context
In November, the technology company Amazon stated that Iranian state-sponsored actors had used cyber operations to enhance kinetic action throughout 2024 and 2025, amid geopolitical escalations with the US and Israel. Also in November, the cyber security company ESET reported that the renowned Russian state-sponsored group ‘Sandworm’ had targeted key sectors in Ukraine in destructive cyber operations between April and September. Similar to incidents during the Russo-Ukrainian war’s initial stages, these attacks aimed to disrupt key operations in Ukraine permanently to aid Russian kinetic action. This highlights the long-term cyber supplementation of Russia’s military strategy, despite threat actors’ shift in target choices. Cyber operations can cause significant disruption to Western sectors as well as facilitate less risky, more effective intelligence collection to bolster and tailor kinetic action. As this practice becomes more widespread across geopolitical hotspots, we assess that global CNI sectors will face increased security, cyber espionage, pre-positioning and disruption risks throughout 2026.
Forecast
Russian cyber-enhanced military operations will sustain disruption and destruction risks to key sectors in Ukraine amid the ongoing war
Russian state-sponsored groups started conducting disruptive cyber attacks on Ukrainian organisations’ systems at least one month before the full-scale invasion of Ukraine on 24 February 2022. These cyber attacks aimed to disrupt operations within key sectors to limit Ukraine’s ability to respond promptly and unitedly to the upcoming invasion, laying the groundwork for what later became a fine-tuned cyber-enhanced military strategy. Specifically, two cyber attacks preceded and facilitated Russia’s military invasion of Ukraine by deploying two wiper malware variants (‘HermeticWiper’ and ‘AcidRain’) to obstruct effective communication in Ukraine. The attacks occurred just a few hours before the invasion on 23 and 24 February 2022, highlighting the highly co-ordinated nature of Moscow’s strategy.
Throughout the rest of 2022, Russian state-sponsored groups continued to conduct destructive cyber attacks against IT systems in Ukraine to support kinetic action, utilising both wiper malware and ransomware variants. These operations continued to target key sectors, particularly focusing on energy during the winter months to capitalise on the cold weather and intensify war fatigue. In October 2022, Sandworm disrupted operational technology (OT) within a Ukrainian electrical substation. The attack caused a temporary power outage that supplemented the impact of Russian missile strikes on Ukraine’s energy infrastructure, further showcasing cyber operations’ complementary nature in the war. This attack also underscores the continuous development of Russian cyber tactics, as it marked the first attempt to disrupt OT rather than IT systems during the war.
In December 2023, a cyber threat group likely affiliated with Russia conducted a large-scale cyber attack against Kyivstar, Ukraine’s largest telecommunications provider. Reportedly, the attack disrupted air raid sirens, cellular networks, internet services and some financial services for several days. This highlights the role cyber attacks play in disrupting critical military communications. In March 2024, Sandworm used cyber attacks to disrupt the information and communication systems of at least 20 Ukrainian energy, heating and water organisations. During this same period, Ukrainian drone strikes on Russian power substations and oil refineries led to an intensification of Russian retaliatory physical attacks on Ukrainian energy infrastructure. We assess that Sandworm’s attacks likely aimed to aid the Kremlin’s plans to degrade Ukraine’s energy capacity. Furthermore, the Ukrainian authorities were forced to plan additional power outages to preserve the country’s remaining energy infrastructure, causing further disruption and endangerment to civilian life.
As above-mentioned, Sandworm continued to target key sectors in Ukraine in destructive cyber attacks earlier this year between April and September. In April, the group deployed two data wipers to corrupt and/or delete files within the systems of an unnamed Ukrainian university. Between June and September, Sandworm also targeted entities within the government, energy, logistics and grain sectors with multiple wiper variants. The grain sector presents a new target; Sandworm likely aims to disrupt Ukraine’s primary economic export, highlighting the continuous evolution of Russia’s cyber-enhanced kinetic strategy. Sandworm has played a significant role in supporting Russia’s military and strategic objectives with cyber operations since the war began. We assess that Sandworm and other Russian state-sponsored groups will likely continue conducting destructive attacks against key Ukrainian sectors amid the ongoing war, given the longevity and evolution of their cyber attacks.
• Europe region-North America region: Russian cyber tactics will increase security risks to CNI sectors. On 15 December, the technology company Amazon reported that suspected Russian state-sponsored actors have targeted critical national infrastructure (CNI) sectors across the Europe and North America regions in cyber operations since at least 2021. Throughout 2025, these threat actors reportedly started exploiting misconfigured network edge devices (such as routers and virtual private network services; VPNs) to infiltrate targeted systems. This marks a departure from their previous tactics, which focused on the exploitation of software vulnerabilities. While compromised misconfigured devices can achieve the same operational outcomes, they also improve obfuscation and resource expenditure, highlighting the continuous development of threat actors’ capabilities. The tactics used during this cyber operation shared commonalities with two renowned Russian state-sponsored groups (‘Sandworm’ and ‘Curly COMrades’). Therefore, we assess that this operation may possibly form part of a broader Russian state-sponsored campaign involving multiple groups. Consequently, this tactical shift will pose increased security risks to CNI sectors across Europe and North America amid ongoing geopolitical hostilities.
• Russia: Foiled terror attack at prison colony likely underscores persistent IS-K threat. Earlier on 17 December, Russia’s Federal Security Service (FSB) announced that it had thwarted a terrorist attack at a penal colony in Rostov oblast. Allegedly, the attack was planned by prisoners from Central Asian countries that were part of an unspecified entity designated as a terrorist organisation. Previously, a similar incident occurred in Rostov oblast in June 2024, with the perpetrators reportedly linked to the Islamic State Khorasan Province (IS-K), a regional branch of the global Islamic State (IS) terrorist group. We assess that the latest incident involved IS-K affiliates, underscoring the persistent activity of IS-K cells in the region. IS-K remains one of the most active Islamist terrorist groups in Russia; it was responsible for the March 2024 terror attack in Moscow oblast. This foiled terror attack highlights that Russia continues to face sustained threats from Islamist terrorist networks, particularly IS-K. However, since the March 2024 attack, the Russian security forces have likely enhanced their proactive monitoring of these groups significantly, likely limiting their ability to carry out further attacks.
• Russia-US: Possible new sanctions are unlikely to push Moscow towards peace in near term. Earlier on 17 December, Bloomberg reported that the US is preparing new sanctions targeting Russia’s energy sector if the Kremlin rejects a peace deal to end the Russo-Ukrainian war. According to unspecified people familiar with the matter, the US is considering imposing punitive measures against vessels in Russia’s shadow fleet of oil tankers (which Moscow uses to evade Western sanctions), as well as against traders who facilitate related transactions. Bloomberg reported that the new sanctions could be announced as early as this week. However, US President Donald Trump will make the final decision as to whether to issue the measures. In recent weeks, the US has reinvigorated efforts to broker an end to the war in Ukraine. Although Washington DC sanctioned two Russian oil majors in October, we assess that the Trump administration is likely seeking an eventual economic rapprochement with Moscow, which will decrease the likelihood of sweeping punitive measures in the near term. Nevertheless, if the US decides to issue new sanctions, such economic penalties will unlikely encourage Russia to cease hostilities in the near-to-medium term.
Dec 16.
KEY DEVELOPMENTS
• KUPIANSK: Ukrainian forces have counter-attacked and successfully advanced within and around Kupiansk (Kharkiv oblast), reflecting vulnerabilities in Russian forces and Ukraine’s ability to conduct (limited) offensive operations
• ENERGY: The Washington Post has cited unspecified officials and analysts who assessed that Russian long-range strikes are ‘pushing Ukraine’s energy grid to the brink of collapse’, with widespread blackouts likely
• ELECTIONS: Despite Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky’s stated willingness to hold a wartime presidential election, the likelihood of it occurring in the coming months is currently low due to security issues if no ceasefire is in place
• FORECAST: Shuttle diplomacy continues, but despite back-and-forth negotiations, Russia remains highly unlikely to adjust its minimum conditions, with proposals for a demilitarised zone in Donetsk oblast highly unlikely to be acceptable to Moscow
• KUPIANSK: Over the past week, Ukrainian forces counter-attacked and successfully advanced within and around Kupiansk (Kharkiv oblast). In November, Russia claimed that its forces fully controlled Kupiansk, with Russian President Vladimir Putin reiterating these claims in early December. However, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky was recently filmed at Kupiansk’s western entrance, denying such claims. Geolocated footage from recent days confirms that there have been Ukrainian advances in and around Kupiansk, marking a notable counter-attack operation. Ukrainian military officials reported that Russian supply routes have been cut and that up to 200 Russian troops are now encircled in the remaining areas. According to these officials, the remaining Russian troops rely on drones for resupplies; their logistical situation remains complicated and they are effectively surrounded. Numerous Russian milblogger sources have also acknowledged the difficult position Russian forces are in, as they have been pushed back at multiple points towards the Oskil River.
• KUPIANSK: The recent developments in Kupiansk likely highlight Russia’s difficulty in conducting sustained offensives across multiple sectors and the possible prioritisation of other frontlines. Russian forces made rapid advances around Kupiansk in early August using infiltration tactics, while Ukrainian counter-attacks reportedly began as early as September. The latest fighting indicates that Russian forces have faced difficulties in consolidating their earlier gains in Kupiansk, likely due to various logistical challenges and personnel shortages in comparison to other priority fronts. Additionally, this pattern of rapid Russian advances followed by swift Ukrainian counter-attacks resembles the dynamics following Russia’s tactical breach in Dobropillia (north of Pokrovsk; both Donetsk oblast) in August, where Ukrainian forces similarly contested and reversed initial Russian gains.
• KUPIANSK: Ultimately, Ukraine’s counter-attack also underscores that Ukrainian forces are able to launch complex offensive operations, albeit at a relatively tactical level. Ukrainian officials will almost certainly use this recent counter-attack to oppose Russia’s narratives that its military victory is inevitable. Rather, the Ukrainian military authorities will highlight this operation to claim that when properly provisioned, they are capable of pushing Russian forces back.
• TRANSNISTRIA: Russia is unlikely to use Moldova’s breakaway Transnistria region as a base for offensive operations against south-western Ukraine in the short-to-medium term. According to Ukrainian military intelligence (GUR) sources cited by several Ukrainian media outlets in recent days, Russia is increasing its covert and military activity in Transnistria. Reportedly, Russia is establishing drone production and training centres, calling up reservists to military formations and bringing out weapons from storage. GUR sources claim that these measures aim to destabilise Moldova and create tensions along the border with Ukraine, increasing the risk of sabotage groups infiltrating Ukrainian territory.
• TRANSNISTRIA: We assess that, due to limited resources, Transnistria is highly unlikely to play a significant role in Russia’s wider war effort against Ukraine. Theoretically, the region could serve as a base for drone operations targeting south-western Ukrainian areas such as Odesa and Mykolaiv oblasts. However, Transnistria is unlikely to become a significant launch-point, as Russia can conduct strikes against these areas from other locations, including Russian-occupied Crimea. Nevertheless, the recent uptick in Russian activity may also be aimed at encouraging Ukraine to screen its border with Transnistria, thereby drawing resources away from high-priority frontlines in the east. Ultimately, while Transnistria will continue to pose a threat to both Ukraine and Moldova, its military potential and capability remains low and it will likely only pose limited threats to the region.
• STRIKES: Over the past week, Russia continued targeting Ukrainian energy infrastructure heavily (see ENERGY below). Ukraine’s south-western Odesa oblast was heavily affected, particularly during the large-scale attack between 12 and 13 December, involving 495 aerial objects. Odesa oblast experienced severe power outages; the provincial capital Odesa was left without electricity, water and heating following the attack. Ukraine’s private energy operator DTEK reported damage to 20 power substations across Odesa oblast.
• STRIKES: Over the past few weeks, Ukraine has stepped up naval drone strikes against Russia’s so-called ‘shadow fleet’ of oil tankers in the Black Sea, complementing its attacks on oil refineries. On 10 December, Ukrainian naval drones struck a Russian oil tanker en route to the port of Novorossiysk (Krasnodar krai; Russia). Several similar attacks have occurred since late November. These operations form part of Ukraine’s ongoing campaign against Russian oil infrastructure. They are likely aimed at disrupting Moscow’s ability to export oil, thereby undermining its war-funding revenues.
• STRIKES: On 13 December, the Ukrainian Navy reported that Russian drones struck the Turkish vessel Viva near a Ukrainian port, reflecting the high threat to maritime vessels operating in Russian and Ukrainian waters. The vessel was reportedly transporting sunflower oil heading to Egypt. The Ukrainian authorities reported that the attack caused a fire, though the vessel was able to continue its journey. The recent increase in attacks on vessels in the Black Sea has likely deteriorated the operating environment for commercial shipping. This will likely sustain the risk of higher insurance premiums, especially in the event of repeated attacks. Earlier on 16 December, the Turkish authorities confirmed that a Turkish F-16 shot down an ‘uncontrolled drone’ approaching its airspace in the Black Sea. It remains unclear whether the drone was Russian or Ukrainian. Regardless, the incident underscores the growing threat that the recent uptick in attacks poses to the wider Black Sea region.
• STRIKES: On 15 December, Ukraine published footage showing an attack on a Russian Kilo-class attack submarine in dock at the port of Novorossiysk, using a new type of underwater drone called ‘Sub Sea Baby’ overnight on 14-15 December. The Russian authorities have denied the claim. At present, it appears that the Ukrainian drone struck the quay near the submarine, though it remains unclear whether the attack also damaged the aft of the submarine. Nevertheless, if confirmed, this would be the first attack of its kind in naval history, further highlighting Kyiv’s growing maritime drone capabilities and the ever-growing threat they pose to Moscow’s Black Sea Fleet.
POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS
• ENERGY: On 15 December, The Washington Post cited unspecified officials and analysts who assessed that Russian long-range strikes are ‘pushing Ukraine’s energy grid to the brink of collapse’. According to these sources, Russia’s attacks threaten to disable transmission systems that transfer electricity from the west to the east of Ukraine. The unspecified contributors argued that this could effectively divide Ukraine into two. We previously assessed that Russia’s strike campaign this autumn and winter season is likely aimed at creating a power deficit in eastern Ukraine and undermining the flow of electricity from the west to the east of the country.
• ENERGY: The continued Russian long-range attacks against Ukraine’s already degraded energy infrastructure will increase the risk of blackouts (both at the local and national level) over the coming weeks. At the same time, the Ukrainian authorities are increasingly likely to take further measures to prioritise which consumers receive uninterrupted energy. The authorities will prioritise any facilities deemed to be of critical importance, likely leading to knock-on business disruption for non-critical businesses.
• ASSETS: Russia’s move to sue Euroclear, the Belgium-based institution holding the majority of frozen Russian assets, is almost certainly aimed at deterring any action to use them for Ukraine’s benefit. On 12 December, the Central Bank of Russia (CBR) filed a lawsuit in a court in the capital Moscow against Euroclear, as the European Commission (EC) considers ways to use the assets. Notably, also on 12 December, the EU agreed to freeze indefinitely EUR 210 bn (over USD 247 bn) worth of Russian central bank assets held in Europe – whereas previously, member states had to agree to their extension every six months. The developments come ahead of a European Council summit on 18 and 19 December, which will prove crucial in determining how the bloc will provide long-term financial support to Ukraine. We assess that the timing of Russia’s lawsuit almost certainly aims to further undermine the EU’s cohesion on the use of frozen Russian assets; it also signals that future legal action is likely. For further analysis, see Sibylline Situation Update Brief – 16 December 2025.
• ELECTIONS: Despite Zelensky’s willingness to hold a wartime presidential election, the likelihood of it occurring in the coming months is low. On 9 December, Zelensky stated that Ukraine would be ready to hold elections in the next 60 to 90 days if US and European partners ensure its security. Although Ukraine cannot hold an election under martial law, Zelensky disclosed on 14 December that he expects lawmakers to develop options to hold a presidential election in the near future. We previously assessed that holding an election during wartime would entail a myriad of organisational and security challenges, with Russia highly likely to attempt to destabilise the vote. In practice, it is unclear how the EU and US could ensure elections’ stability; a serious move towards a vote remains unlikely.
• ELECTIONS: Although the US is increasing pressure on Ukraine to hold an election, the Ukrainian population remains opposed to this move before the war ends. According to polling published on 15 December by the Kyiv International Institute of Sociology (KIIS), 57% of respondents believe that any elections should be held after a peace agreement is reached and hostilities cease. In contrast, 25% of respondents advocated for an election to take place if it was held after a ceasefire and with security guarantees from international partners. Meanwhile, 9% of respondents argued that a presidential election should be held now, even in the absence of a ceasefire. Additionally, the survey found that trust in Zelensky remains high, at 61%.
• ELECTIONS: However, separate polling data indicates that only 20.3% of Ukrainian citizens would vote for Zelensky in a future presidential election. The poll from Info Sapiens was conducted in the wake of details emerging about Ukraine’s large-scale corruption scandal in November, which could have influenced its results. Nevertheless, Zelensky remained the most popular candidate, with former commander-in-chief Valeriy Zaluzhnyi ranking second (19.1%). Realistically, the two sets of polling could indicate that while support for Zelensky as a wartime leader remains robust, Ukrainian society seeks a different postwar leader.
FORECAST
NEGOTIATIONS: Despite continued US-led efforts and proposals aimed at ending the Russo-Ukrainian war, we continue to assess that Russia remains unwilling to compromise on its terms to facilitate an end to hostilities. As such, a major breakthrough towards peace remains unlikely in the near term. However, shuttle diplomacy continues; on 15 December, reports emerged that the US proposed providing a security guarantee akin to ‘Article 5’ (i.e. NATO’s collective defence principle) to Ukraine, though details remain limited.
Russia will highly unlikely deviate from its position that, at a minimum, Ukrainian forces should withdraw from the entirety of Donbas region for a ceasefire to take place in the coming weeks. On 12 December, Kremlin foreign policy aide Yuri Ushakov reiterated Russia’s determination to take full control of Donbas region (which comprises Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts), either through negotiations or military means. His comments came in response to reports of a US proposal to create a ‘free economic zone’ in Donbas region (see Sibylline Daily Analytical Update – 12 December 2025). As part of this proposal, Ukrainian and Russian forces would not be able to enter this zone.
Ushakov’s comments almost certainly indicate that Russia would seek to militarise any potential demilitarised zone in Donbas, thus rejecting the US’ proposal which likely sought to compromise on territorial concessions. Ushakov acknowledged that while Russian or Ukrainian troops may not be present in this proposed zone, the deployment of the National Guard (also known as Rosgvardia) and the enforcement of Russian law would be necessary to ‘maintain order and organise life’. Rosgvardia was created in 2016 as an internal security force, though its units participated in the initial full-scale invasion of Ukraine. In 2023, Russia passed a law allowing Rosgvardia to acquire and use heavy weaponry; the body currently has combined arms military experience and capability. As such, Ukraine would almost certainly not trust the Rosgvardia’s presence in any potential demilitarised zone (which remains highly unlikely to materialise in the near term). Ultimately, the Kremlin’s Rosgvardia deployment demand is likely aimed at portraying Russia as not fully ruling out the idea of a demilitarised zone. Nevertheless, Russia would not agree to such a proposal in practice; we assess it would seek to undermine any such arrangement.
Despite Putin’s previous statement that Kyiv must hold a referendum on territorial concessions, Moscow is currently unwilling to facilitate a ceasefire for such a vote to take place. On 11 December, Zelensky said that Ukrainian society must have a say in territorial issues either through elections or a referendum, thereby indicating that such a vote is possible in the future. In response, Kremlin press secretary Dmitry Peskov voiced his opposition to a ceasefire to allow for a referendum, viewing any pause in hostilities as potentially allowing Ukraine to regroup rather than as a step towards ending the war. Although Russian officials have frequently questioned the legitimacy of the Ukrainian authorities and demanded that Ukraine hold elections (see Sibylline Ukraine Update – 4 September 2025), Peskov’s rejection reinforces Russia’s opposition to a ceasefire in Ukraine. We continue to assess that the Kremlin does not deem a ceasefire to be in its tactical or strategic interests, given the pressure it has sought to build in recent months.
We assess that diplomatic activity between various stakeholders is likely to continue over the coming week, particularly as the US is reportedly interested in reaching a ‘full understanding’ of its peace plan by Christmas (25 December). While this timeline is highly unlikely to lead to the war’s end, Ukraine is showing some (caveated) flexibility in accepting concessions on key issues, such as possibly abandoning its ambitions to join NATO (see Sibylline Daily Analytical Update – 15 December 2025). Nevertheless, if the US is determined to make progress before Christmas, President Donald Trump’s administration is more likely to increase pressure on Ukraine rather than on Russia, given that its levers to influence Ukraine (such as threats to suspend intelligence sharing and arms sales) are much greater than the economic levers that could lead Russia to agree a peace deal. Therefore, we assess that negotiations will likely protract well into 2026.
Key points
• Ukraine will remain highly reliant on external funding in 2026 to cover its domestic expenditure and sustain its war effort.
• Belgium’s approval will remain crucial for the EU to issue a loan to Ukraine backed by frozen Russian sovereign assets.
• Alternative financing plans are likely to place significant pressure on EU member states’ economies, sustaining uncertainty over the bloc’s ability to remain Ukraine’s primary financial backer in the medium-to-long term.
Context
EU leaders will decide how to provide long-term financial support for Ukraine during the European Council’s summit on 18 and 19 December. The main option the European Commission (EC) is considering is the issuance of a ‘reparations loan’ guaranteed by frozen Russian sovereign assets worth EUR 165 bn (around USD 194 bn). On 12 December, EU governments agreed to immobilise these assets indefinitely for the first time, meaning that they will no longer require renewals every six months (a move that dissenting member states such as Hungary had repeatedly threatened to block). However, there is no consensus on how these assets can be used.
A large portion of these assets is held by Euroclear, a central securities depository based in Belgium. Under the proposal, Euroclear would issue a loan to the EU, which would then lend the funds to Kyiv. Ukraine would be required to repay the loan only if Russia ends the war and pays war reparations (a scenario that remains unlikely at present). Of the total figure, EUR 115 bn (approximately USD 135 bn) would be allocated to Ukraine’s defence needs, while the remaining EUR 50 bn (about USD 59 bn) would cover broader budgetary requirements.
The EU has become Ukraine’s primary financial backer, particularly as the US’ support has declined sharply under President Donald Trump. Ukraine’s economic situation remains severe, with its 2026 budget revealing substantial funding gaps, while conditions on the frontline continue to deteriorate. As a result, Kyiv remains heavily reliant on external financing, not only to cover domestic expenditure but also to sustain its war effort. The forthcoming EU decision will serve as a key test of the bloc’s ability to support Ukraine’s war effort and the Ukrainian authorities’ negotiating position in 2026.
Forecast
Due to significant budget gaps, Ukraine will remain highly reliant on external funding to cover its civilian and military expenditures in 2026
On 3 December, Ukraine’s parliament (known as Rada) approved the country’s 2026 budget, which presents an annual deficit equivalent to 18.5% of gross domestic product (GDP). While the budget’s parliamentary approval will help Kyiv secure an EUR 6.9 bn (USD 8.1 bn) loan from the IMF, Minister of Finance Serhiy Marchenko has emphasised that Ukraine requires EUR 38.3 bn (USD 45 bn) in external financing. The EU estimates Ukraine’s overall financing needs for the 2026/27 fiscal year at EUR 135 bn (USD 158.6 bn) in combined military and financial support. Without external funding, Ukraine is expected to run out of cash during the first half of 2026, according to some estimates. Ukraine’s socio-economic situation remains critical, as the country continues to bear the growing costs of nearly four years of war which have caused significant damage to national infrastructure.
Meanwhile, on the military front, Ukraine’s operational situation has deteriorated steadily. Russia continues to demonstrate its ability to sustain a highly attritional war, while Ukraine faces mounting pressure on personnel and equipment. On 10 December, the Kiel Institute noted that new aid commitments are at their lowest level since the start of the Russo-Ukrainian war. Annual allocations averaged approximately EUR 41.6 bn (USD 48.9 bn) between 2022 and 2024; by comparison, only EUR 32.5 bn (around USD 38.2 bn) were delivered in 2025. This downward trend has been particularly acute in the second half of 2025 and broadly reflects European states’ failure to offset the decline in US support. We assess that if the EU fails to deliver financial aid to Ukraine, this will limit the country’s ability to purchase crucial equipment. Even if EU member states agree on a financial aid package, it will highly likely take several months before funds are allocated, thereby enabling Ukraine to procure weaponry. The rapid deterioration of Ukraine’s military situation will undermine its fragile bargaining position in peace talks significantly.
• Germany-Ukraine: Deepening defence co-operation will sustain Russian grey-zone threat. On 15 December, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy announced that preparations are being made to open Kyiv’s first defence industry office in Berlin (Germany). The ‘Ukraine Freedom House’ office is due to focus on expanding weapons exports and joint research initiatives aimed at strengthening Ukraine’s defence industrial base. Also on 15 December, it was announced that the Ukrainian drone manufacturer Frontline Robotics will jointly develop combat drones with the German defence firm Quantum Systems in Germany. These developments underscore the growing importance of Germany as backer of Ukraine amid the scaling back of US support. We assess that Russia will likely seek to retaliate by ramping up its grey-zone or hybrid campaign against Germany (which is already among Moscow’s principal targets) in 2026. Bundeswehr sites, defence firms, logistics hubs and railway freight will likely remain strategic targets of sabotage. Irregular drone flights in the vicinity of critical national infrastructure (CNI), including airports, are also likely.
Dec 15.
• Russia-Ukraine: Chance of peace in short term is remote despite Kyiv’s readiness to drop NATO goal. On 14 December, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stated that his country is prepared to abandon its long-standing ambition to join NATO in exchange for robust security guarantees. Zelensky called for an arrangement between Ukraine and the US akin to NATO’s Article 5 collective defence clause, as well as guarantees from European partners and other allies like Canada and Japan. His comments come amid a renewed US push to broker an end to the Russo-Ukrainian war in recent weeks. While this marks a notable shift in Ukraine’s public messaging, we have long assessed that Ukrainian membership in NATO is highly unlikely to materialise. Russia has repeatedly demanded that Ukraine renounce its ambitions to join NATO; Moscow used the perceived threat of Ukraine joining the alliance to justify its full-scale invasion in 2022. While significant, we assess that Ukraine’s potential abandonment of its NATO membership ambitions is highly unlikely to be sufficient to accelerate the end of the war in the short term, with further shuttle diplomacy likely to continue in the coming weeks. (Source: Sibylline)

18 Dec 25. EU leaders face crunch decision on using frozen Russian assets for Ukraine.
• Summary
• Ukraine will run out of money next year without more financing
• EU leaders aim to counter Trump’s ‘weak’ Europe claim with Ukraine support plan
• Belgium seeks indefinite guarantees against potential Russian legal claims
• EU debates financing options amid strained national budgets and Hungary’s veto
European Union leaders will decide whether to use frozen Russian assets to lend billions of euros of cash to Ukraine to keep its war effort afloat at a summit on Thursday seen as a critical test of the group’s strength.
The EU sees Russia’s war as a threat to its own security and wants to keep Ukraine financed and fighting.
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“We just can’t afford to fail. We have to show that we are strong,” EU foreign policy chief Kaja Kallas said, adding that leaders would stay as long as needed at the Brussels summit to find a solution.
‘MONEY TODAY OR BLOOD TOMORROW’
The European Commission has proposed using frozen Russian central bank assets that are mostly held in a Belgian clearing house to secure a huge loan to Kyiv. But Belgium is deeply concerned about legal and financial risks, and other states including Italy have also expressed worries.
EU leaders arriving at the summit said it was imperative they find a solution. They were also keen to show European countries’ strength and resolve after U.S. President Donald Trump last week called them “weak”.
“Now we have a simple choice – either money today or blood tomorrow. And I am not talking about Ukraine only, I am talking about Europe,” Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk said. “All European leaders have to finally rise to this occasion.”
European Commission chief Ursula von der Leyen said she would not leave the summit without agreement on how to finance Ukraine over the next two years.
Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskiy was due to participate in the summit in person. He had previously been expected to join by video call, underlining the urgency of the situation as seen from Kyiv.
BELGIUM WANTS MORE GUARANTEES ON RISK SHARING
Belgian Prime Minister Bart De Wever told his country’s parliament early on Thursday that he had not yet seen guarantees that answered his concerns on legal and liquidity risks and that financing plans were still changing “as we speak”.
Russia’s central bank has said the EU plans to use its assets are illegal and reserved the right to use all available means to protect its interests. It filed a lawsuit in Moscow this week seeking $230 bn in damages from clearing house Euroclear.
The stakes are high because without the EU’s financial help Ukraine will run out of money in the second quarter of next year and most likely lose the war to Russia, which the EU fears would bring closer the threat of Russian aggression against the bloc.
Kallas said she saw chances of a deal on the assets at 50/50. German Chancellor Friedrich Merz said: “My impression is that we can come to an agreement.”
Sweden’s Prime Minister Ulf Kristersson said this was the most important EU summit since the war in Ukraine started.
“I believe and hope that we can find technical solutions to the issues that Belgium still has outstanding, but I would like to emphasize that we are not there yet,” he said.
REPARATIONS LOAN IS ‘ONLY GAME IN TOWN’
One of the financing options could be for the EU to borrow the needed amount against the security of the EU budget and then lend the money on to Ukraine, but such a move would require unanimity among the 27 EU countries and Moscow-friendly Hungary has already said it would veto it.
Another option would be for each willing EU country itself to raise money on the market and pass it on to Kyiv, but that would mean a rise in the already high debt and deficit levels and a lack of longer-term financing certainty for Ukraine.
Diplomats said the use of the Russian assets was therefore in practice “the only game in town” and favoured by most countries because it ensured a large sum for Ukraine without increasing national debts or any immediate fiscal effort.
But to use it, EU leaders first need to convince Belgium, which holds 185 bn euros of the total 210 bn euros frozen in Europe, that they will not leave it alone with the bill if Russia successfully sues in international courts over the plan.
The discussions among leaders on Thursday would focus on narrowing down the scope of the guarantees Belgium is asking for to a form that would also be acceptable to other EU countries, diplomats said, stressing a financing solution for Ukraine would be found. (Source: Reuters)

18 Dec 25. Putin says Russia will take more land in Ukraine if Europe sinks peace moves.
• Summary
• Putin urges Kyiv and Europe to engage over US proposals
• He casts European politicians as ‘young pigs’
• Russia spending 5.1% of GDP on war in 2025, slide shows
• Defence minister sees 2026 task of advancing faster
President Vladimir Putin said on Wednesday Russia would take more land in Ukraine by force if Kyiv and European politicians whom he cast as “young pigs” did not engage over U.S. proposals for a peace settlement.
The United States has held talks with Russia, and separately with Kyiv and European leaders, on proposals for ending the war in Ukraine but no deal has been reached. Kyiv and its European allies are concerned by demands for Ukrainian territorial concessions and Ukraine wants stronger security guarantees.

At an annual Defence Ministry meeting, Putin said Russia, which sent tens of thousands of troops into Ukraine in 2022, was advancing on all fronts and would achieve its aims by force or through diplomacy.
“If the opposing side and their foreign patrons refuse to engage in substantive discussions, Russia will achieve the liberation of its historical lands by military means,” Putin said.
Russia says it controls about 19% of Ukraine, including the Crimea peninsula which it annexed in 2014, as well as most of the eastern Donbas region, much of the Kherson and Zaporizhzhia regions, and slivers of four other regions.
Russia says Crimea, Donbas, Kherson and Zaporizhzhia are now parts of Russia. Ukraine says it will never accept that, and almost all countries consider the regions to be part of Ukraine.
Defence Minister Andrei Belousov said a task for 2026 was to increase the pace of Russia’s offensive. A slide shown during a speech he delivered said Russia was spending 5.1% of gross domestic product on the war in 2025.
PUTIN SAYS EUROPEAN LEADERS WHIP UP HYSTERIA
European leaders say they stand with Kyiv and that Russia should not be rewarded for the war in Ukraine, which followed several years of fighting between Russian-backed separatists and Ukrainian troops in the Donbas region.
Putin said former U.S. President Joe Biden’s administration had sought to destroy Russia and that European politicians had also been pursuing the same objective, a charge denied by European leaders.
He accused European politicians – whom he described as “shoats, or “young pigs” – of whipping up hysteria about a potential war with Russia by warning that Moscow could one day attack a country in the NATO military alliance.
“I have repeatedly stated: this is a lie, nonsense, pure nonsense about some imaginary Russian threat to European countries. But this is being done quite deliberately,” Putin said.
Some European leaders have accused Russia of having no real intention of engaging in peace talks. Directing similar criticism at Europe, Belousov said European powers were trying to scuttle attempts to end the war and talking of a war between Russia and NATO within a few years.
“Such a policy creates real prerequisites for the continuation of military operations next year, 2026,” he said. (Source: Reuters)

17 Dec 25. UK sends automated turrets and missiles to shoot down Russian drones, as part of £600 m air defence package for Ukraine.
The UK has committed £600m in air-defence capabilities, including cutting edge turrets that can shoot down Russian drones to support Ukraine through the winter.
• Over 1,000 UK-built air-defence missiles delivered since June, as Russia targets power stations and energy networks.
• New British systems including RAVEN and GRAVEHAWK and counter-Shahed turrets set to bolster Ukraine’s defences this winter.
• Defence Secretary co-chairs meeting of the Ukraine Defence Contact Group (UDCG) as UK further steps up support for Ukraine’s security and sovereignty.
The UK has committed £600m in air-defence capabilities, including cutting edge turrets that can shoot down Russian drones to support Ukraine through the winter, as Putin’s air campaign plunges homes, hospitals, and power stations into darkness.
The support has already seen more than 1,000 missiles delivered to Ukraine since June, a direct result of the UK Government’s biggest single-year investment in air defence for Ukraine.
The announcement comes as the Defence Secretary John Healey MP and his German counterpart, Boris Pistorius co-chair the 32nd meeting of the UDCG today (16th December 2025). In a virtual meeting of 50 nations, which will be attended by NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte and US Secretary of War Pete Hegseth, Ukraine’s supporters will discuss the country’s key military needs for 2026, share battlefield insights, plan equipment deliveries and the gaps that need to be addressed.
The UK is backing Ukraine for the long term, with more than twenty remotely guided counter-drone turrets, acquired from Estonia, set for delivery in 2026. These new systems, designed specifically to defeat Shahed-style attack drones at scale and at lower cost, form a crucial part of Ukraine’s future defensive capabilities.
Building on that momentum, five RAVEN air-defence systems — announced this summer — will now be handed over to Ukraine, giving frontline units a rapid-reaction shield against low-flying threats. Whilst the first GRAVEHAWK air-defence systems, announced in January and now being delivered, will reinforce Ukraine’s ability to protect key infrastructure from Russia’s deep-strike barrages.
In addition, the UK with funding from international partners, has delivered over 1,000 air defence missiles and over 250,000 rounds of air-defence ammunition in 2025.
Together, this represents a major step-change in Britain’s support, ensuring Ukraine can keep the lights on and keep civilians safe through the harshest months of the war.
Defence Secretary, John Healey MP said: “Ukrainians continue to fight with huge courage – military and civilians alike. The UK’s £600 m air defence investment this year is critical help to Ukrainians as they defend their towns, cities and energy infrastructure from Russia’s barbaric attacks. Alongside this 50-strong group of partners, we are working to deliver the vital support for Ukraine’s defence to put them in the strongest possible position to secure peace. Central to this boost is the final tranche of 650 Lightweight Multirole Missiles (LMM), delivered ahead of schedule last autumn and now playing a critical role in stopping Russia’s one-way attack drones and cruise-missile strikes.”
The announcement also builds on the landmark Octopus announcement between the UK and Ukraine. This will see a new state-of-the-art interceptor drone built in the UK ready to be deployed at scale on the front line at Ukraine.
Interceptor drones are considerably cheaper than regular air defence missiles and have proved to be highly effective in countering the waves of one-way attack drones Russia continue to launch at Ukraine’s cities.
This reaffirms how the UK’s support for Ukraine, drives investment and growth back in the UK, creating thousands of highly skilled jobs across the country.
Both the Prime Minister and Defence Secretary have been clear that the UK’s national security – the foundation of the Government’s Plan for Change – starts in Ukraine.
The UK remains committed to securing a just and lasting peace in Ukraine, with £4.5 bn being spent on military support to Ukraine this year – the UK’s highest ever level. (Source: https://www.gov.uk/)

16 Dec 25. US, Europe vow to secure Ukraine, as Kyiv asks for $60bn in 2026. Ukrainian, European and U.S. negotiators have wrapped up two days of talks here with what officials describe as the most substantial movement yet toward a political framework to end Russia’s full scale invasion, even as core territorial questions remain unresolved.
Meanwhile, Ukraine on Tuesday predicted the total costs for its defense at $120bn for 2026, of which half would have to come from foreign support.
According to Zelenskyy and Ukrainian officials, the discussions in Berlin focused on a package of five documents that would underpin an eventual peace deal, several of which are dedicated to long term security guarantees for Ukraine. Kyiv says parts of the package are intended to be legally binding, with an “Article 5-like” mutual defense commitment, a reference to NATO nomenclature, requiring U.S. congressional approval and backed by additional European pledges.
German officials describe Washington’s offer on legal and material guarantees as “truly remarkable” and a “very important step forward.” The conference marks the first major EU hosted attempt to shape the emerging security architecture around a potential ceasefire.
Europe, the U.S. and Ukraine “achieved a common sense of purpose” on Monday in their quest to end the war in Ukraine, German Defense Minister Boris Pistorius said during his opening remarks for the Ukraine Defense Contact Group on Tuesday. There had previously been significant differences between Europe and the U.S. regarding a peace plan proposed by Washington, which was perceived across the Atlantic as a capitulation to most of Moscow’s war aims.
The center of gravity has shifted toward Europe in the past months, as the continent is now single-handedly financing Ukraine’s continued defense against Russia following Washington’s suspension of military assistance since March 2025. Total European allocated aid since the start of Russia’s invasion now more than doubles U.S. support for Ukraine, according to the Kiel Institute, a Germany-based research organization.
Besides progress on security guarantees, negotiators reported no tangible advance on the question of territorial concessions.
Russian demands for formal recognition of its hold over parts of eastern Ukraine remain incompatible with Kyiv’s public position, and Berlin officials describe the road ahead on these questions as “very long.”
Ukrainian government officials have repeatedly stressed that suggestions of ceding Ukrainian-held territory remain off the table and that any deal must avoid freezing the conflict on terms favorable to Moscow. European leaders have said only Ukrainians can decide on a path forward in territorial questions, despite U.S. pressure in recent weeks for Kyiv to give up about a fifth of its land to Russia.
Zelenskyy has signaled that once the five document package is finalized with U.S. and European partners, Kyiv expects a direct meeting with President Donald Trump to test whether Moscow will accept the emerging framework.
European and U.S. officials alike are portraying the Berlin talks as “very positive,” saying there is consensus on key issues even if the outcome stopped short of a formal ceasefire proposal.
A European-led multinational peacekeeping force to be deployed in Ukraine once the war ends is a key pillar of the proposed deal.
On Tuesday, British Defence Minister John Healey reaffirmed his country’s commitment to such a mission, saying that London continues “to direct funding to prepare our U.K. troops and armed forces so that we are ready to deploy when peace comes, with troops on the ground and jets in the air.”
Ten European leaders, along with EU Commission President Ursula von der Leyen, issued a joint statement after the talks proposing a “multinational force for Ukraine” led by Europe and backed by the United States. The European proposal additionally called for “sustained and significant support to Ukraine to build its armed forces, which should remain at a peacetime level of 800,000.”
In the meantime, Ukraine will be reliant on support from its Western partners. Speaking at the Ukraine Defense Contact Group meeting on Tuesday, Denys Shmyhal, the Ukrainian minister of defense, said his country expected the war costs to total $120 bn next year, of which Ukraine would be able to cover half on its own.
“The remaining $60 bn must come from our partners,” Shmyhal said, asking the countries present to each allocate at least 0.25% of their 2026 economic power to Ukraine’s defensive effort. Air defense remains a priority, according to the defense minister.
“Strong and coordinated decisions will accelerate our path toward a just and lasting peace,” Shmyhal said. “Now is the moment to bring it closer.”
(Source: Defense News)

17 Dec 25. Quantum Systems and Frontline JV to produce 10,000 Zoom and Linza UAVs in 2026. Joint venture (JV) Quantum Frontline Industries, a partnership between Germany’s Quantum Systems and Ukraine’s Frontline Robotics, will produce at least 10,000 Zoom and Linza unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) in 2026 for Ukraine in Germany, a Quantum Systems spokesperson told Janes on 16 December.
The 2026 order is based on “the demands of the Armed Forces of Ukraine (AFU)” and “100% of the UAVs will be exclusively for Ukraine”, the spokesperson said. The production of Frontline’s Zoom and Linza UAVs will begin at the start of 2026. The JV will be able to sell excess UAVs to NATO and allies in 2027, after the 10,000 UAV order is completed. Germany has expressed interest in procuring Ukrainian battle-tested technology but “nothing concrete yet”, the spokesperson added. The German government is funding all of the production and delivery. “The facility, tools, [and] equipment are in place,” the spokesperson added. The decision for the JV to produce the UAVs was made after a number of “automated industry specialists were brought in” and a recommendation was made based on the UAVs being “easily mass-produced in a conveyor-type line”, explained the spokesperson. “Initially, we’ll assemble [the UAVs] manually,” he said, adding the automation process will be introduced gradually.
Zoom is an intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) UAV with a 10-inch airframe, a tactical range of 15 km, and a flight time of over 35 minutes, according to Frontline. The UAV has a gyro-stabilised daytime camera with a resolution of 1280×720 and 10x optical zoom. The gyro-stabilised thermal imager has a resolution of 640×512 and a 30 Hz video refresh rate. The cruising flight speed is 12–15 m/s (43.2–54 km/h). (Source: Janes)

15 Dec 25. For the first time, Ukrainian drones will be manufactured on an industrial scale in Europe, within the new “Build with Ukraine” Initiative, by the new German-Ukrainian defence joint venture, “Quantum Frontline Industries”.
Quantum Systems and Frontline Robotics today announced the creation of “Quantum Frontline Industries” (QFI), a German-Ukrainian joint venture that will establish Europe’s first fully automated, industrial-scale foreign production line for drones for the Ukrainian Armed Forces.
Under the Build with Ukraine initiative, the new venture will mass-produce battlefield-proven multi-use drones developed by the Ukrainian company Frontline Robotics. 100% of systems produced in Germany will be delivered to the Defence Forces of Ukraine in volumes defined by the Ukrainian Ministry of Defence. The production line will combine Ukrainian battlefield-proven technology with German industrial automation, creating a new model of cross-border defence co-production: the German Model. It will also open employment opportunities in Germany for Ukrainians. Quantum Systems will provide industrial infrastructure and production operations, while Frontline Robotics contributes licensed designs, training, and full lifecycle support in line with NATO standards.
“Ukrainians have revolutionized the drone war, now we will revolutionize the industrial war together. For Quantum Systems, this is the logical next step of our proven track record in support of Ukraine. Together with Frontline Robotics, we will build on our proven experience and create Europe’s first foreign production capacity at this scale for Ukraine.” said Sven Kruck, Co-CEO of Quantum Systems
“We see this as an important mission – to build the first Ukrainian-German defence joint venture with our partners Quantum Systems. We are confident that our example will pave the way for future collaborations of this kind. This cooperation will supply the Defenсe Forces of Ukraine with thousands of drones to drive back the Russian aggressor.” said Yevhen Tretiak, CEO of Frontline Robotics.
Matthias Lehna, Managing Director of the new Joint Venture, stated: “QFI has three goals: Scale, Expand, and Create. Our new Joint Venture will bring together German engineering excellence with Ukrainian sense of urgency to mass produce urgently needed drones for Ukraine, expand its portfolio, and create new products for end users to push the boundaries of what is possible.”
Matthias Lehna will serve as the Managing Director of Quantum Frontline Industries. The 37-year-old served as an infantry officer in the German Armed Forces before joining the Cyber innovation Hub in Berlin and later Quantum Systems, as Director Governmental Relations and Business Development in 2023.

12 Dec 25. Ondas to Invest up to $11m in Drone Fight Group to Access Advanced Ukrainian Drone Technology. Ondas Holdings Inc., a provider of autonomous aerial and ground robot intelligence through its Ondas Autonomous Systems (OAS) business unit and private wireless solutions through Ondas Networks, has announced its intent to invest up to $11m in Drone Fight Group (DFG), a Ukrainian developer of advanced unmanned aerial systems.
This investment—to be executed through the Company’s strategic advisory and investment platform, Ondas Capital—represents Ondas’ first planned capital deployment in support of battle-tested Ukrainian defence technologies.
DFG is a fast-scaling innovator in high-performance unmanned systems that have been forged and refined through intense combat in Ukraine. DFG’s platforms include strike-optimized FPV systems, ISR drones, autonomous mission technologies, and cutting-edge drone simulators. These reflect battlefield models of adaptability, mission effectiveness, and accelerated production cycles.
Through Ondas Capital, Ondas intends to support DFG’s global expansion, enabling broader adoption of Ukrainian unmanned capabilities across the United States and allied nations. This strategic relationship is designed and intended to support efforts to strengthen the defense industrial base across allied nations by opening new channels for combat-proven technologies that can complement emerging defense modernization initiatives and training tools.
“Ukraine has become the proving ground for modern unmanned systems, driving unprecedented innovation under real operational pressures,” said Eric Brock, Chairman and CEO of Ondas. “Our planned investment in Drone Fight Group represents a deliberate step to bring this combat-proven innovation into the United States and allied industrial base. Through Ondas Capital, we are building a bridge that accelerates access to high-impact autonomous capabilities that meet urgent mission needs.”
Ondas Capital will host DFG at a first-of-its-kind U.S. event in Silicon Valley where tech leaders, defense industry decision makers, and investors will get a behind-the-scenes look at a Ukrainian unmanned aerial system that has been tested and proven on the frontlines of the war. This will be the first time DFG’s drones are shown in the U.S., offering a unique chance to hear directly from the Ukrainian team that built and uses them in real operations, including their frontline instructor “Sasquatch.”
Ondas expects its support of DFG to help broaden the availability of agile, scalable unmanned systems tailored for defense and homeland security missions. In addition to capital, Ondas Capital will provide strategic support to help position DFG’s technologies for multi-year procurement programs in the U.S. and international markets.
This investment aligns with Ondas’ multi-domain unmanned systems strategy, expanding the Company’s technology ecosystem across aerial, ground, and counter-UAS platforms, and is subject to finalization of terms, entry into a definitive agreement and compliance requirements. By sourcing, supporting, and integrating high-value autonomous systems, the Company aims to deliver enhanced operational effectiveness and mission readiness for customers worldwide.
About Drone Fight Group
Drone Fight Group (DFG) is a Ukrainian military-technology company driving full-cycle unmanned aerial system innovation, from concept development through frontline deployment. Built around an integrated “innovation circle,” DFG combines advanced R&D, rapid-production manufacturing, AI-enhanced simulation and training, and combat-proven operational experience to deliver high-performance unmanned systems optimized for modern warfare.
DFG’s portfolio includes strike-optimized FPV platforms, ISR drones, autonomous mission technologies, and ultra-realistic FPV training simulation environments built on real battlefield data. This closed-loop development model enables DFG to iterate at high velocity—rapidly refining design, functionality, and survivability based on real-time combat feedback and evolving threat landscapes.
Today, DFG stands at the forefront of Ukrainian unmanned systems innovation, recognized for its adaptability, manufacturing speed, and mission effectiveness across sustained high-intensity operations. The company’s technologies reflect the practical realities of the modern battlefield and are increasingly relevant to defense forces seeking scalable, cost-effective, and operationally validated unmanned capabilities. (Source: UAS VISION)

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Founded in 1987, Exensor Technology is a world leading supplier of Networked Unattended Ground Sensor (UGS) Systems providing tailored sensor solutions to customers all over the world. From our Headquarters in Lund Sweden, our centre of expertise in Network Communications at Communications Research Lab in Kalmar Sweden and our Production site outside of Basingstoke UK, we design, develop and produce latest state of the art rugged UGS solutions at the highest quality to meet the most stringent demands of our customers. Our systems are in operation and used in a wide number of Military as well as Homeland Security applications worldwide. The modular nature of the system ensures any external sensor can be integrated, providing the user with a fully meshed “silent” network capable of self-healing. Exensor Technology will continue to lead the field in UGS technology, provide our customers with excellent customer service and a bespoke package able to meet every need.

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December 18, 2025 by

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18 Dec 25. Defence spending bill will increase opportunities for defence sector, capacity of US armed forces. On 17 December, the US Senate passed a USD 901bn defence policy bill with bipartisan support, sending the legislation to President Donald Trump, who has stated he will sign it into law. The 2026 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) includes a 4% pay rise for US troops and a ban on diversity, equity and inclusion (DEI) programmes in the Department of Defense, in line with Trump’s agenda. Furthermore, the bill blocks US forces from withdrawing from Europe, provides USD 800m for Ukraine and mandates that unedited videos of airstrikes in the Caribbean Sea must be sent to Congress. These initiatives deviate from Trump’s 2025 National Security Strategy (NSS), highlighting the Republican Party’s growing internal divisions over defence policy, specifically regarding Russia. Nonetheless, we assess that the bill’s passage will mitigate the risks of funding lapses and operational disruption for the US military. Additionally, the bill’s emphasis on the modernisation and streamlining of acquisition processes vis-à-vis weapons and supplies will likely present opportunities for the defence sector to obtain new contracts and funding. (Source: Sibylline)

17 Dec 25. Senate passes $901bn defense authorization bill with major acquisition reform push. The bill forces the Pentagon to adopt a “portfolio acquisition executive model” for managing programs and makes it easier for commercial firms to do business with the department. President Donald Trump’s $4.5trn tax cut bill prevailed in a crucial Senate test vote, a sign that Republican leaders are resolving the infighting over portions of the legislation and moving toward meeting a July 4 deadline the president has set for passage. The Senate has passed the fiscal 2026 defense authorization bill, setting the stage for sweeping changes to the nation’s defense acquisition to be encoded into law. Senators voted 77-20 on a bipartisan basis to send this year’s National Defense Authorization Act to the desk of President Donald Trump, who has indicated he will sign the bill. The NDAA, which was passed by the House on Dec. 10, authorizes $900.6 bn in defense funds, or about $8bn more than the White House’s request.

“We’re about to pass, and the President will enthusiastically sign, the most sweeping upgrades to these business practices in 60 years,” Senate Armed Services Committee Chairman Roger Wicker, R-Miss., said in a speech ahead of the vote. “This is a monumental achievement. The 21st Century poses threats that will require the most creative and innovative defenses. Americans are already building the technology to meet those threats, and these reforms will help the Pentagon tap into that energetic innovation ecosystem.”

In a statement of administration policy issued last week, the White House stated the NDAA will enable the Defense Department to make investments into key areas of the defense industrial base, such as critical mineral and refining projects.

“Section 804 authorizes the Secretary of War to enter into multiyear procurement contracts for critical munitions, providing the certainty needed to expand industrial capacity and delivering cost savings for the taxpayer,” the statement reads. “Further, the defense procurement system will now emphasize speed of delivery, production capacity, and innovation, revolutionizing the culture of the Department’s acquisition activities.”

Acquisition reform was the cornerstone of the NDAA this year, with both committees coming up with plans centered around speeding up the process and making it easier for new entrants to do business with the Defense Department.

In the end, the final language combined elements from both proposals, including the Senate’s bid to centralize management of weapons programs under broader “portfolio acquisition executives” instead of the current program executive officer model, as well as the House’s push to reform the requirements process. To entice new entrants and commercial companies to work with the Pentagon, the bill includes new requirements to look at off-the-shelf solutions and removes compliance requirements on small commercial firms. It also starts a new Defense Innovation Unit effort called the Bridging Operational Objectives & Support for Transition (BOOST) Program, which is aimed at helping companies with operationally viable tech to transition into production. However, “right to repair” provisions put forward in both the House and Senate bills were ultimately stripped from the final version. During a roundtable with reporters today, Sen. Tim Kaine, D-Va., said the elimination of those provisions is “one of the things … I’m unhappy about” but added that he didn’t know what led to the removal of that language. According to a fact sheet released by the HASC majority, the NDAA procurement plan includes $26 bn for shipbuilding, $38 bn for aircraft and $4 bn for ground vehicles and $25 bn for munitions. It also authorizes $400 m for Ukraine, as well as $175 m for the new Baltic Security Initiative. Those amounts, however, are merely recommendations, as it will be up to congressional appropriators to determine the final FY26 defense topline and how money is spent. In the realm of policy changes — which are backed by the force of law — the NDAA contains several key provisions outside of the major acquisition reform effort. It fences 25 percent of the funds in Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth’s travel budget until the Pentagon provides unedited video of the boat strikes in US Southern Command to the congressional armed services committees. It also softly pushes against changes to the US relationship with Europe as spelled out in the National Security Strategy, prohibiting the department from reducing US force structure in the region below 76,000 servicemembers until it has provided an assessment on the potential security impacts. (Source: Breaking Defense.com)

17 Dec 25. Pentagon Preparing to Merge Military Commands, Cut Generals, Says Report. Senior Pentagon officials are preparing to downsize key U.S. military headquarters and cut several top positions under a sweeping reorganization led by War Secretary Pete Hegseth, according to The Washington Post. The plan would cut combatant commands from 11 to eight. Central, European, and Africa Commands would merge into a new U.S. International Command, while Northern and Southern Commands would combine into “Americom,” overseeing the Western Hemisphere. Remaining commands would include Indo-Pacific, Cyber, Space, Strategic, Transportation, and Special Operations. The plan would also reduce the number of four-star generals and admirals reporting directly to Hegseth. People familiar with the plan told The Post that the changes would complement Trump administration efforts to shift resources away from the Middle East and Europe and toward the Western Hemisphere. The Post noted that the administration’s national security strategy, released this month, states that the “days of the United States propping up the entire world order like Atlas are over.” Chuck Hagel, former U.S. defense secretary, questioned the proposal, telling The Post: “You want commands that have the capability of heading off problems before they become big problems, and I think you lose some of that when you unify or consolidate too many.” Retired Vice Adm. Robert Murrett told Newsweek that the national security strategy could produce “reverberations for years to come and possible near term security challenges,” including what he described as “soft language regarding China.” Hegseth’s team declined to comment on what it called “rumored internal discussions.” It called any suggestion of a divide “completely false,” adding that “everyone in the Department is working to achieve the same goal under this administration.” (Source: https://www.sofx.com/)

12 Dec 25. V-22 Osprey at risk of more ‘catastrophic’ mishaps, Navy review finds. On the heels of 12 major mishaps in the last four years, the military’s first tiltrotor aircraft program must take “immediate and decisive action” to avoid more loss and tragedy, a new comprehensive review released Friday by the U.S. Navy finds. The V-22 Osprey, which the Navy uses for aircraft carrier onboard delivery missions, is overdue for a midlife upgrade, spending far too much on unscheduled maintenance and contending with undertrained maintainers — all of which spell increased risk for a platform that has faced intense scrutiny since its earliest days in the air. The 33-page review recommends the establishment of a readiness and safety steering board to report annually to top officials on the Osprey’s status; initiation of the overdue midlife upgrade; and changes to establish a “proactive safety system” to identify and address mechanical issues before mishaps occur.

“When the V-22 Enterprise does not actively manage risks with the potential for catastrophic outcomes, the risks compound, increasing the likelihood of a catastrophic event that, if left unaddressed, will ultimately occur,” the investigation concluded.

The Navy’s review — and a simultaneously released Government Accountability Office report — follow a November 2023 crash of an Air Force CV-22 Osprey that killed eight troops, ultimately attributed to a gear box failure. In the dozen mishaps since 2022 involving Marine Corps and Air Force personnel, four Ospreys have been destroyed and 20 personnel have been killed. The review determined that the Osprey is “accumulating safety risk” due to lagging timelines to fix identified problems; failure to follow airworthiness and flight safety procedures; missing airworthiness standards for some risks; and challenges related to differing safety standards and priorities between the three services that fly the Osprey. It also found the Osprey has suffered in readiness due to a failure to implement best practices across the services, persistent “reliability issues” and challenges in managing and delivering aircraft and parts inventory. While defenders of the V-22 have accurately pointed out that the aircraft, at least in the Marine Corps, has a lower mishap rate than fleet averages, the report highlights other concerning ways that the Osprey is an outlier. The V-22, it found, has the second-highest number of “catastrophic” risks of any naval aviation platform, meaning components at risk of failure with catastrophic outcomes. Parts at risk are also 70% older on the Osprey than on other Navy planes, it found.

“As the first and only military tiltrotor aircraft, it remains the most aero-mechanically complex aircraft in service and continues to face unresolved legacy material, safety, and technical challenges,” the investigation notes.

In maintenance concerns, the Osprey is again at odds with other platforms, requiring 100% more unscheduled maintenance than the Navy average and requiring about 22 maintenance man-hours per flight hour, compared with about 12 for other aircraft.

“Despite numerous initiatives aimed at improving procedural compliance, most efforts to date have not led to significant improvements in safety outcomes,” investigators found. “A critical gap remains in the form of specific, measurable, and enforceable action plans, complete with clear timelines and accountable owners, to address the root causes of non-compliance, improve procedural adherence, or mitigate the effects of non-compliance at the enterprise-level.”

Among recommendations already being implemented are a retrofit of prop-rotor gear boxes to address identified risks; the development of risk mitigation plans; and a midlife upgrade, which is listed as “in-work,” with no estimated completion date. Establishment of new proficiency standards for maintainers is also underway across services. Other recommendations, like the establishment of a readiness and safety steering board, have yet to be started. Anthony Krockel, a retired Marine Corps colonel who flew the Osprey from 2010 to 2018 and came to its defense earlier this year, saying its record “was not a safety outlier,” told Military Times he saw additional problems contributing to the aircraft’s woes. While he noted that the aircraft was full of sensors and that issues could arise from crews’ failure to address the equivalent of “check engine lights” on degrading parts, he also said the Osprey had a track record of parts that failed well before their anticipated service lives were up.

“If something was supposed to last, you know, 10,000 hours before it is being replaced, it’s lasting, like, 2,000 hours,” Krockel said. “And so that’s what’s driving these really high unscheduled maintenance rates.”

That, in turn, he said, had a “cascading effect” on maintenance backlogs.

“So now you have to spend time that wasn’t scheduled on the backs of these Marines to fix the plane and, oh, by the way, because these components are breaking more often, you’re depleting the spares inventory much faster than was originally anticipated,” he said. “And so now you don’t have any spares on the shelf because they’re being used systemically, higher than originally budgeted for.”

Krockel said he’d still like to see a thorough review take place of the top 10 “degraders to readiness” involving the V-22, including the parts that most frequently failed.

“Some of them are technically challenging to fix. Some of them are logistics challenges,” he said. “So there’s larger challenges, but if you get those top 10 degraders fixed and get the aircraft to higher mission capable rates, then everybody wins.” (Source: Defense News Early Bird/Military Times)

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NEWS IN BRIEF – UNITED KINGDOM AND EUROPE

December 18, 2025 by

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17 Dec 25. DIP – Sir Keir Starmer has asked military chiefs to rework aspects of the defence investment plan with the paper now expected to be delayed until 2026. (Source: FT.com)

17 Dec 25. Lithuania eyes state defense holding to steer all weapons needs. Lithuania is gearing towards record-high defense spending next year, and with major procurements of tanks, infantry fighting vehicles and other gear in the pipeline, the country is advancing plans to establish a state-owned defense holding for coordinating the manufacturing activities for weapons, equipment and ammunition. Vilnius is currently positioning local energy company EPSO-G as the backbone of Lithuania’s future defense industry, involving it in partnerships with foreign suppliers of technology. The company is to take over a 25.1% stake in Lithuania Defense Services, a joint venture established by KNDS Deutschland and Rheinmetall Landsysteme to assemble 44 Leopard 2A8 tanks for the country’s land forces. The facility where the tanks will be assembled is to be constructed in Kaunas, in the country’s central part, under an investment worth an estimated €50 m ($59 m). The plant will also handle their maintenance, repairs and servicing in the future. As Lithuania is readying to acquire 100 CV90 infantry fighting vehicles, it is likely EPSO-G will also take part in the procurement of BAE Systems Hägglunds’ product. On Dec. 15 the Lithuanian Ministry of National Defence said the decision to purchase 100 CV90s “was approved by the State Defence Council with a particular focus on commitment to production of technical components and CV90 MkIV maintenance service here in Lithuania to be included in subsequent acquisition contracts.” The Baltic State is advancing the acquisition alongside Estonia, Finland, the Netherlands, Norway and Sweden. A spokesperson for the National Defence Ministry told Defense News: “Lithuania aims to integrate domestic enterprises into the CV90 supply chain and assembly process, including plans for a significant portion of the vehicles to be assembled in Lithuania as part of the broader joint procurement. This industrial involvement is intended to create sustainable local participation in production and support services.” Under the plan, CV90 deliveries to Lithuania and other program participants are to begin in 2028, according to the ministry. The purchased Leopard 2A8 tanks are to be supplied to Vilnius between 2028 and 2030. The two types of tracked vehicles are set to become part of the Lithuanian Army’s new Infantry Division consisting of two battalions. Through its subsidiary EPSO-G Invest, the energy group is also involved in the project to launch a 155mm artillery ammunition factory in the Baltic State. The plant will be jointly owned by Rheinmetall, EPSO-G and Lithuanian state-owned ammunition producer AB Giraitės Ginkluotės Gamykla. The investment is expected to be worth at least €260 m. Giedrimas Jeglinskas, an opposition lawmaker and a member of the Foreign Affairs Committee of the Lithuanian parliament, told Defense News that increasing the country’s military expenditure to almost 5.4% of its GDP in 2026, or close to €4.8 bn, represents a cross-party consensus. The need to establish a state-owned defense holding that will represent the state in major procurements such as the Leopard 2A8 and CV90 purchases is also acknowledged across Lithuania’s political spectrum, he said.

“One way is to use EPSO-G as a core bone of this new structure behind the state holding, and then put further elements around it. For strategic defense investments, we require state funds, but also private capital,” said Jeglinskas, who represents the Union of Democrats for Lithuania. “We need the defense holding to be part of a system that works, acting as a co-owner of defense assets, factories that will produce both for Lithuania and for international sales.”

Last month, the Lithuanian Ministry of Finance set up a working group that is to coordinate strategic defense industry projects. In addition to a number of government entities, representatives of EPSO-G and AB Giraitės Ginkluotės Gamykla were also invited to the panel. The finance ministry said in a statement the group’s formation represents “the first step in the implementation of paragraph 322 of the Government Programme which provides for the establishment of a state-controlled defense industry holding company.” However, the country’s opposition believes that, as Lithuania’s neighbor Russia continues its invasion of Ukraine, the Baltic state has little time to lose in developing its defense industry, and the incumbent Cabinet should accelerate its efforts.

“One of the disappointing actions of the current government is that they announced they want to execute the creation of the state holding by the end of 2028, which is too late,” Jeglinskas said. “Defense and security must remain the top priority for both the government and the opposition of which I’m part of.” (Source: Defense News)

17 Dec 25. German budget committee clears 50bn euros in defence contracts. Germany’s parliamentary budget committee on Wednesday cleared more than 50bn euros ($58.60bn) in defence contracts over the next few years, as Russia’s war in Ukraine puts pressure on the nation to boost its military spending. Speaking to media in Berlin, Defence Minister Boris Pistorius said the decision put the government and parliament on track to meet ambitious defence commitments. The package, the largest to date for Germany’s armed forces, includes uniforms, tanks, drones and satellites. The following are projects covered by the plan, according to lawmakers on the committee:

About 21bn euros for military clothing and personal equipment for up to 460,000 soldiers and 80,000 civilian staff.
An order worth 4.2bn euros to increase the fleet of Puma armoured fighting vehicles by 200, including simulation systems for training
About 1.5bn euros for eight remotely-piloted aircraft known as MQ-9B SeaGuardian to spot submarines, using NATO’s Support and Procurement Agency
Some 1.55bn euros to expand the Patriot air defence system
About 1.76bn euros for a satellite surveillance system known as SPOCK to help a German tank brigade deployed in Lithuania
Some 1.3bn euros for the Iris-T SLM ground-based air defence system, using guided missiles
About 450m euros to upgrade the Taurus missile system ($1 = 0.8532 euros) (Source: Reuters)

17 Dec 25. Italy plans 2.4bn euros investment in frigates, document shows. Italy’s government has asked parliament to approve a 2.4bn-euro ($2.82bn) investment over 15 years for the maintenance and modernisation of its frigate fleet, a parliamentary document seen by Reuters showed. The plan comes as Italy moves to gradually increase its defence spending to comply with higher NATO targets, after the alliance members agreed to a U.S. demand to boost their annual defence budgets to 5% of gross domestic product. The programme, to 2039, is aimed at “the maintenance of operational conditions and logistical support” as well as the so-called ‘mid-life upgrade’ of FREMM-type frigate naval units, the document said. It stressed the need to ensure Italy continues to operate vessels capable of effectively monitoring maritime areas of national interest. FREMM frigates are multi-purpose warships jointly designed by Italy’s Fincantieri (FCT.MI), and France’s Naval Group. Last year, the shipbuilding joint venture, along with defence group Leonardo (LDOF.MI), won a contract worth about 1.5 bn euros to build two frigates for Rome. The document noted that cooperation with industry is expected to continue under existing arrangements, including through the European procurement agency OCCAR (Organisation for Joint Armament Co-operation). The new investment will be funded by both the Italian industry and defence ministries. The programme is described as “vital” and delivering “clear benefits in one of the sectors of highest strategic value for defence.” Parliament’s defence committees must approve the request by January 12, according to the lower house website. Other spending plans submitted to parliament involve drones, submarines and remotely piloted aircraft for the airforce. Opposition parties have criticised the government’s new defence spending plans – worth more than 3bn euros – arguing they were being pushed through despite an inadequate investment by the government in the country’s social services. “This seems to me like a real slap in the face of Italian families. A truly unpalatable Christmas gift,” Nicola Fratoianni, a lawmaker from the Green-Left Alliance party said on Tuesday. ($1 = 0.8498 euros) (Source: Reuters)

17 Dec 25. FCAS fighter jet “very unlikely” after ministers’ talks, source says. A meeting between the French, German and Spanish defence ministers last week failed to yield a breakthrough rescuing the troubled French-German-Spanish FCAS warplane programme, three people familiar with the matter said on Tuesday. The 100bn-euro-project project under which the three countries would jointly build a fifth-generation fighter jet to replace France’s Rafales and Germany and Spain’s Eurofighters was now “very unlikely”, one of the sources added. The sources said France was hoping to postpone into next year a decision Germany had hoped to see finalised by the end of 2025. An announcement that the project would be advanced to the next stage had previously been pencilled in for this week’s meeting of EU government heads in Brussels. Two further industry sources also said they expected talks on the programme’s next phase to slip into 2026 since there was nothing to be gained from having a public dispute now. The French and German defence ministries did not immediately comment on the matter. The three countries had also struggled to reach an agreement on the “combat cloud” and drone systems that are envisaged as part of the FCAS programme, which was intended to replace the existing fourth-generation fighters by 2040. At the core of the dispute is the desire of French military contractor Dassault (AM.PA) to take a leading role in the project ahead of Airbus (AIR.PA), the German partner – a position Germany regards as untenable, the sources said. One difficulty is that the two countries need the warplanes for different roles. France needs aircraft capable of carrying nuclear warheads and interoperating with its aircraft carrier, while Germany, which has no aircraft carriers, has already agreed to buy U.S. F-35 warplanes to carry NATO’s nuclear warheads. Earlier on Tuesday, the head of Dassault raised doubts over the future of the programme, saying it depended on whether Germany was willing to rethink its reliance on U.S. arms imports. (Source: Reuters)

17 Dec 25. European drone wall, other ‘flagship’ defence projects at risk in EU power struggle. The future of proposed EU “flagship” defence projects – including a counter-drone system initially called a drone wall – is in doubt as European Union leaders plan to snub a call to endorse them at a summit in Brussels next week. The plans are at the centre of a power struggle between the European Commission – which proposed them – and some national governments, which argue big defence projects are primarily a matter for them and the NATO military alliance, not for the EU’s executive body. EU heavyweights such as Germany, France and Italy – which have large defence industries and arms procurement departments – have made clear they prefer to work in coalitions to develop defence capabilities rather than on Commission-proposed projects. One EU diplomat said there was “clear scepticism” about the flagship idea but it was too soon to say whether it would survive – a view echoed by several other diplomats. Northern and eastern European countries aim to keep the projects alive by voicing support for them at a meeting of leaders from the bloc’s eastern flank in Helsinki on Tuesday, two days before the Brussels summit, diplomats say. The Commission proposed four flagship projects in October as part of a “roadmap” to get Europe ready to defend itself by 2030, reflecting growing concern over Russia after its 2022 invasion of Ukraine and doubts about U.S. commitments to European security under President Donald Trump. The projects comprise a European Drone Defence Initiative, originally called a drone wall, an Eastern Flank Watch to fortify the bloc’s eastern borders, a European Air Shield and a European Space Shield. The Commission roadmap called for EU leaders to endorse the flagships by the end of this year. But a first and second draft of conclusions for Thursday’s EU summit seen by Reuters – the latest dated Friday – contain no such endorsement. An item can only be included in the summit conclusions with the unanimous approval of all 27 EU leaders, which seems unlikely at this stage. That would leave the flagships in limbo – neither approved nor rejected by the leaders.

“The word ‘flagships’ is not mentioned because some member states are against the idea,” said an EU official, speaking on condition of anonymity. “However, some others want to proceed with them.”

The European Commission said it would “keep working with our member states to turn the European Flagships into reality because they are essential for Europe’s readiness by 2030”.

DRONE WALL ATTRACTED ATTENTION AFTER INCURSIONS

The drone wall proposal attracted widespread public and political attention following the incursion of some 20 Russian drones into Poland in September and a spate of other drone incidents in countries including Romania, Denmark and Germany. The Commission said the project would consist of a network of sensors, jamming systems and weapons to defeat drones. But EU members are also forming coalitions of countries to work on filling gaps in Europe’s defence capabilities, separately from the flagship proposals. Under that model, EU countries would jointly develop and procure anti-drone systems, for example, rather than work on a Commission-proposed flagship.

“The actual work will be done by member states,” predicted a second EU official.

The Commission proposed that flagships could be designated as European Defence Projects of Common Interest, making them eligible for EU funding. But officials said the coalitions of countries could also propose projects of common interest, and EU governments would ultimately decide on EU funding. The initial drone wall proposal ran into resistance from southern and western European countries, who said it was too focused on eastern Europe when drones posed a security challenge right across the continent. The Commission revamped the plan into a pan-European network, but some governments remained sceptical about the EU taking such an initiative. (Source: Reuters)

12 Dec 25. Estonia erects first of 600-strong Baltic bunker wall on Russia border. Estonia has begun installing the first concrete bunkers along its southeastern border with Russia as part of the Baltic Defense Line, marking a key milestone for the trilateral fortification project despite delays. Seven bunkers were awaiting installation as of this week, with Estonian officials targeting 28 bunkers in the ground by year’s end, according to Krismar Rosin, press officer for the Estonian Centre for Defence Investments. The initial batch represents the first phase of a 600-bunker network designed to strengthen the European Union’s and NATO’s eastern flank. In an interview with Defense News, Rosin acknowledged the timeline remains uncertain. The bunkers are being deployed in Setomaa municipality and southeastern Estonia, with 27 situated on government or municipal land and only one on private property. The deployment comes a year later than originally planned, following procurement complications that forced Estonian officials to restructure their approach. An initial tender for all 600 bunkers received bids exceeding legal cost limits because construction companies couldn’t accurately assess installation challenges without knowing the exact locations, which defense officials kept confidential for operational security, Rosin said.

“Since those companies did not know … does it have a boggy terrain, does it have some kind of forest terrain, how is the access – they offered very expensive bids,” Rosin explained.

Estonian officials solved the problem by scaling back to a 28-bunker pilot program and revealing approximate locations to bidders to obtain realistic cost estimates while gathering implementation lessons before the larger procurement. The remaining 572 bunkers are meant to be tendered by year’s end. As of Friday, Nov. 12, the bunkers were “currently being deployed but not yet fully ready,” the Estonian Center for Defense Investments said in an email. The bunkers, each approximately 35 square meters, are designed to withstand 152mm artillery shells. They represent one part of a layered defense system meant to stop a possible Russian invasion. All barbed wire and dragon’s teeth obstacles have been delivered and stored in pre-positioned areas awaiting installation if the need arises, Rosin said. Beyond procurement issues, the project faces coordination challenges requiring approval from multiple stakeholders, including the Estonian Defence Forces, Police and Border Guard, municipalities, and private landowners – all while adhering to peacetime environmental and safety regulations.

“We are building it in peacetime, which means that we have to follow the peacetime law,” Rosin said, contrasting this with wartime scenarios where military engineers could do things like digging anti-tank trenches “fast, within a few hours, probably.”

For instance, only 500 meters of a planned 3.4-kilometer test anti-tank trench has been completed, with additional construction delayed pending Border Guard approval, whose area of operations the test trench would cross through, said Rosin. Despite the setbacks, Estonia remains ahead of Latvia and Lithuania in physical implementation, according to Rosin. All three countries announced the coordinated Baltic Defense Line project, but are executing their national portions independently based on varying terrain and threat assessments, although they cooperate on concepts and knowledge-sharing. Estonia’s €60m ($70m) budget for the project – with approximately €30m spent to date – is significantly lower than Lithuanian and Latvian allocations, reflecting Estonia’s shorter border length and natural obstacles, including Lake Peipus and extensive bog areas. The Estonian project excludes air defense systems and advanced firepower that neighboring countries are incorporating. The Estonian Border Guard has already deployed a separate “drone wall” detection system along portions of the border, which is often confused with the Defence Forces’ Baltic Defense Line project but is a separate measure, Rosin said. (Source: Defense News)

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NEWS IN BRIEF – REST OF THE WORLD

December 12, 2025 by

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12 Dec 25 Disrupting Russian Air Defence Production: Reclaiming the Sky, “The paper seeks to highlight how Russia’s adversaries may degrade the quality and reliability of Russian air defences…Considering the vulnerabilities identified in this report Russia’s international customers for air defences should reassess the resilience of these systems to attacks, including cyberattacks, technical compromise and supply chain disruption.”

This is according to Disrupting Russian Air Defence Production: Reclaiming the Sky, a new RUSI research report co-authored Dr Jack Watling which argues that Russia’s formidable integrated air and missile defence architecture is far more vulnerable to disruption than generally understood.

The report, which presents the most detailed assessment of the Russian Federation’s air defence industrial ecosystem to date, shows that Russia’s air defence network—central to protecting its forces, shielding its industrial base and counteracting Ukraine’s long-range strike campaign—depends heavily on foreign microelectronics, imported raw materials, Western measuring equipment and foreign-made design software.

The research also notes that Russia is expending more air defence interceptors than it is producing, a critical imbalance that could be strategically widened through targeted disruption. At the same time, production for systems such as the S-400 and Pantsir remains geographically concentrated, creating vulnerabilities to kinetic strike that could be exploited as Ukraine expands its long-range strike capabilities over 2026.

The report highlights several critically significant structural industrial production weaknesses. It says that Russia’s domestic semiconductor industry cannot yet manufacture advanced microprocessors; that Russian radar producers rely extensively on high-performance US-made printed circuit board laminates; that over US$42m of Western measuring equipment was imported into Russia in 2024 despite sanctions; and that beryllium oxide ceramics—vital for high-power radar—are sourced almost entirely from a single plant in Kazakhstan.

The research says that exploiting these weaknesses could meaningfully degrade Russia’s ability to expand air defence production, increase the cost and time required for system modernisation, and ultimately help restore Ukraine’s capacity to strike Russia’s war-sustaining infrastructure. The findings raise broader questions for countries considering purchasing Russian air defence systems and highlight the urgency of coordinated international action to restrict Russia’s access to vital technologies.

Key Findings

Russia’s air defences, while formidable, face systemic industrial weaknesses. The report says: “Russia is currently expending more air defence interceptors than it is producing.”

Critical components rely on foreign-made microelectronics and materials. “Russian air defences use a wide range of foreign-sourced microelectronics that Russia has struggled to produce domestically.”

Russian radar production depends on imported high-performance PCB materials. “Printed Circuit Board laminates made by world-leading US company Rogers Corp are preferred by Russia’s radar engineers.”

Key production sites are geographically concentrated and vulnerable to kinetic disruption. “Russia’s air defence enterprise is also vulnerable to physical attack, largely because of its concentration of functions around some key concerns.”

The report assesses that Russia’s air defence production could be disrupted by:

Targeting Russia’s microelectronics supply chains through sanctions and enforcement. “Disruption to its operations would have a serious impact on the production of some of the most critical components of its air defence systems.”

Sanctioning and interdicting shipments of beryllium oxide ceramics and other critical materials. “Russia has no operating plants for the production of beryllium oxide ceramics.”

Preventing Russian access to Western-made calibration and measurement equipment. “Russian companies continued to import products made by Keysight and National Instruments mostly through China and Hong Kong.”

Exploiting cyber vulnerabilities stemming from Russia’s reliance on foreign software tools. “Suitable replacements for designing radio-electronic components and equipment were still not developed.”

Conclusion

Russia currently produces some of the most capable integrated air and missile defence systems (IAMDS) in the world and produces them in high volumes. Its air defence network remains a central pillar of its military strategy and helps sustain its war effort against Ukraine, and poses a threat to NATO and conventional deterrence. This report demonstrates that the apparent resilience of Russia’s air defence production masks critical dependencies and that exploiting these vulnerabilities could significantly constrain Russia’s ability to modernise and expand its air defence inventory, improving the effectiveness of Ukraine’s long-range strike campaign and contributing to the long-term balance of deterrence in Europe.

12 Dec 25. Brazilian defence exports rise 74% over 2024. Brazil recorded a 74% increase in defence exports in 2025, the Secretariat of Defence Products (SEPROD) of the Brazilian Ministry of Defence (MoD) said on 1 December. Brazilian firms exported USD3.1bn in products and services, compared with USD1.78bn in 2024, according to the MoD. This increase was largely driven by the sale of four Embraer C-390 Millennium airlifters to Sweden, a KC-390 to Portugal, an A-29 Super Tucano attack and training aircraft to Sierra Nevada Corporation (SNC), and four A-29 Super Tucanos to Panama, Janes understands. Other export contracts covered tactical trucks, ammunition, training equipment, spares and equipment for aircraft, small arms, and command-and-control systems, among others. The Brazilian defence industry contributes 2.9 million direct and indirect jobs and represents 3.49% of Brazilian GDP. Approximately 80 companies export defence products to around 140 countries, SEPROD said. There are currently 307 accredited companies and 2,219 classified products, according to SEPROD. Germany, Bulgaria, the United Arab Emirates, the United States, and Portugal are the largest importers of the Brazilian defence products, the MoD said. Exports are expected to exceed USD3.1bn in 2026 as Embraer is in negotiations to sell C-390 Millennium aircraft to several countries. Sales of air-launched general purpose bombs and 155 mm artillery ammunition are also expected to increase. (Source: Janes)

10 Dec 25. Guatemala: Armed clashes, security forces reinforcements will elevate physical security risks. On 10 December, Guatemalan President Bernardo Arévalo announced plans to significantly reinforce the armed forces’ presence along the Guatemala-Mexico border, following armed clashes between organised crime groups (OCGs) in Guatemalan territory. Reports indicate that the clashes took place primarily in Huehuetenango department and involved members of Mexico’s Chiapas and Guatemala Cartel (CCYG) and Sinaloa Cartel (CDS), as well as the Guatemalan security forces. At the time of writing, at least eight people have been killed during the clashes. Furthermore, on 8 December, the authorities uncovered ‘narcomantas’ (i.e. banners written by drug-trafficking groups) in Huehuetenango, allegedly left by CDS and threatening rival OCGs. We assess that Arévalo will likely sustain the border’s militarisation beyond 11 December. In the short term, the heightened military presence will likely prompt delays for cross-border transit and trade, heightening supply chain disruption risks for the agriculture and freight transport sectors. Additionally, the presence of narcomantas points to sustained attack and violent crime risks in areas along the Guatemala-Mexico border, increasing physical safety risks. (Source: Sibylline)

11 Dec 25. Myanmar: Junta airstrikes in Rakhine state ahead of elections will drive security risks. At around 2100hrs (local time) on 10 December, a junta airstrike on a hospital in Mrauk-U town (Mrauk-U township, Rakhine state) killed at least 34 people and wounded many others. The junta claims that it does not target civilians. Rakhine state is currently largely controlled by the Arakan Army (AA), an ethnic armed organisation (EAO). In recent weeks, the junta has increased the frequency and intensity of its airstrikes in EAO-controlled areas ahead of general elections scheduled to begin on 28 December. The AA declared in August that it would not permit the polls to be held in Rakhine. Voting will not take place in ten out of the 14 AA-controlled townships, including Mrauk-U. However, the junta is reportedly planning an imminent offensive to secure AA-controlled Ann district, Gwa township, Taungup district, and Thandwe district (all Rakhine state) so that polls can take place there. We assess that security risks will remain significantly elevated in these areas and across much of Rakhine over the coming weeks. (Source: Sibylline)

11 Dec 25. Venezuela-US: US seizes sanctioned oil tanker off Venezuelan coast, escalating regional tensions. On 10 December, the US Coast Guard seized a sanctioned oil tanker off the coast of Venezuela; Brent Crude prices increased immediately after the incident. Reports indicate that the seized vessel is the ‘Skipper’ and was sailing under the flag of Guyana. Guyanese authorities have stated that the vessel was ‘falsely flying’ the flag and ‘is not registered in Guyana’. The Skipper is suspected of ‘spoofing’ its position (broadcasting false locations) and has been under US Treasury Department sanctions since 2022. The seizure comes amid escalating US military pressure in the Caribbean Sea, including strikes on suspected drug trafficking boats and a buildup of military bases and warship deployments in the region. Reports indicate that the military helicopters used to conduct the seizure were launched from the USS Gerald Ford aircraft carrier. We assess that maritime logistics risks for legitimate (non-sanctioned) oil shipments are unlikely to increase following the seizure. However, oil price volatility will be sustained in the likely event of further sanctioned tanker seizures, escalating regional tensions. We continue to assess that a US strike on a suspected drug trafficking position in Venezuela is a realistic possibility in the short-to-medium term. (Source: Sibylline)

10 Dec 25. Cambodia-Thailand: Disruption, safety risks along border areas remain elevated amid hostilities. As of 10 December, the renewed fighting between Cambodia and Thailand along their disputed border continues on its fourth consecutive day (see Sibylline Situation Update Brief – 9 December 2025). Thai officials have claimed that 50 Cambodian rockets struck civilian areas in Thai border territory, forcing the closure of around 190 local health facilities. Cambodia has claimed that Thailand used artillery fire and armed drones in Pursat province and fired mortars in Battambang province (both Cambodia). US President Donald Trump, who mediated previous ceasefire talks between the two countries, has pledged to ‘make a phone call’ later on 10 December to pressure both sides to halt fighting. Trump will likely threaten to raise tariffs on Cambodia and to suspend trade talks with Thailand if the two sides fail to agree to a ceasefire. We assess that there is a realistic possibility that this strategy will be effective to create a temporary ceasefire. However, a long-term solution to the dispute remains highly unlikely, sustaining risks of further bouts of fighting over the coming weeks and months. Safety risks will remain elevated along the border while hostilities continue. (Source: Sibylline)

10 Dec 25. Congo (DRC): M23’s likely capture of Uvira will increase displacement, protest risks. On 9 December, the Rwandan-backed M23 rebel group entered Uvira (South Kivu province). The urban centre has acted as South Kivu’s capital since the M23 captured Bukavu. Although the DRC government has not commented on the situation at the time of writing, we assess that the M23 will likely capture Uvira in the coming hours, if it has not done so already. This development comes after DRC President Félix Tshisekedi and Rwandan President Paul Kagame ratified a US-brokered ceasefire on 4 December. Following the accord, however, the M23 launched a renewed southwards offensive towards Uvira, triggering intense clashes with government-backed militias (known as Wazalendo) and displacing over 200,000 civilians. Uvira’s likely capture will almost certainly trigger further displacement in the coming days, with displacement across the Burundi-DRC border increasing the risk of road congestion and cross-border supply chain disruption. Although the M23 is unlikely to expand its offensive beyond South Kivu in the short-to-medium term, mis-information campaigns claiming that an offensive on Haut-Katanga province – located over 580 miles (933km) south of Uvira – is imminent will increase the risk of anti-government protests in the coming days. Protest risks will also rise in the capital Kinshasa, increasing pressure on government stability. (Source: Sibylline)

09 Dec 25. Haiti: Reinforcements are unlikely to improve security force’s short-term capabilities. On 8 December, approximately 230 Kenyan police officers deployed to Haiti to support the UN-backed Gang Suppression Force (GSF). This marks the first reinforcement since the Multinational Security Support (MSS) mission transitioned into the GSF in September. Reports indicate that the deployment currently consists of approximately 980 GSF personnel; the mission is authorised to deploy up to 5,500 personnel in total. The Kenyan deployment is highly unlikely to significantly improve the security capabilities in Haiti, sustaining elevated security and police forces risks. Furthermore, the additional support is highly unlikely to be capable of retaking significant areas of gang territory in the Artibonite, Centre and Ouest departments in the short-to-medium term. Instead, operations will likely aim to deter further territorial expansion by gangs, likely in the peripheral neighbourhoods of the capital Port-au-Prince (such as Kenscoff; Ouest department) and in Dessalines, L’Estère and Saint-Marc communes (all Artibonite department). Associated clashes will increase attack and violent crime risks in the medium term. (Source: Sibylline)

09 Dec 25. Cambodia-Thailand: Military hostilities continue to sustain heightened security risks along border. At the time of writing on 9 December, fighting between Thailand and Cambodia continues along their disputed border. Clashes broke out on 7 December at multiple locations and have since spread to other areas along the border. Cambodia accused Thailand of firing artillery into civilian areas in Pursat province, while Thailand announced that it launched an operation to expel Cambodian troops from Trat province. Fighting continues along other parts of the border, with artillery, small arms, rockets and drones reportedly being used. The Royal Thai Air Force confirmed that it carried out airstrikes earlier on 9 December, claiming to have struck a BM-21 rocket depot in Oddar Meanchey province (Cambodia). Cambodia claims that seven civilians have died in the latest clashes, while Thailand has reported the deaths of three soldiers. Malaysian Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim – who helped broker the ceasefire agreement earlier in the year – has called on both sides to exercise restraint. However, we assess that the fighting is likely to continue in the coming hours and days, sustaining security risks along the Cambodia-Thailand border and rendering talks unlikely. (Source: Sibylline)

09 Dec 25. Sudan: Paramilitary capture of oil field will disrupt exports as conflict intensifies in Kordofan region. On 8 December, the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF) claimed to have captured the Heglig oil field (South Kordofan state; along the Sudan-South Sudan border). Although independent sources have yet to confirm this development, video footage shows RSF militants operating in the oil field’s vicinity in recent days. Consequently, if Heglig has not been captured yet, such a development is likely. The Heglig oil field is a key processing and storage facility for Sudanese oil exports via the Greater Nile Oil Pipeline; it is the central processing facility for South Sudan’s oil exports, which account for 90% of its government revenue. Given the RSF’s historical connections to South Sudan’s ruling party, Sudan People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM), we assess that they are unlikely to ban oil exports via the pipeline unilaterally. Instead, the RSF will likely implement a fee structure requiring payments from the Sudanese government to continue processing oil deliveries. The Sudanese authorities are highly unlikely to make such payments, disrupting oil exports and compounding fiscal pressure on both South Sudan and Sudan. As such, the Sudanese Armed Forces will likely launch a counter-offensive on the Heglig facility in the coming months, compounding export disruption risks. (Source: Sibylline)

08 Dec 25. China-Japan: Continuing tensions will drive rare earth supply concerns for Japanese firms. On 7 December, Japanese Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi stated that Japan will respond ‘calmly and resolutely’ after claiming that Chinese jets had locked radars on Japanese aircraft on two separate occasions during 6 December. The incidents allegedly occurred south of Japan’s Okinawa Islands (Okinawa prefecture) during a Chinese training exercise involving the Liaoning aircraft carrier. Beijing stated that the allegations were ‘inconsistent with the facts’ and claimed that Japanese jets had ‘maliciously followed and harassed’ its carrier strike group. This is the latest development amid heightened bilateral tensions, which were sparked by Takaichi’s comments relating to Taiwan last month. We assess that the stabilisation of bilateral tensions is unlikely in the near term. Japanese media outlets have reported that some Japanese firms have been experiencing delays in approval processes of critical mineral (including rare earth) exports from China. This is in light with our previous assessment that China’s tightening of rare export controls for Japanese firms was a realistic possibility (see Sibylline Situation Update Brief – 26 November 2025). However, we assess that an outright ban on these exports has grown less likely, as it would significantly alarm international business partners. (Source: Sibylline)

08 Dec 25. Thailand-Cambodia: Risk of military escalation increases amid renewed border clashes. Earlier on 8 December, Thailand launched airstrikes against military targets in Cambodia. This comes after clashes broke out between the two countries on 7 December and escalated earlier on 8 December at multiple areas along the disputed border, including in Oddar Meanchey and Preah Vihear provinces (Cambodia) and Buriram, Si Sa Ket and Ubon Ratchathani provinces (Thailand). Both sides have claimed that the other violated the ceasefire first. Cambodia has accused Thailand of using tanks and artillery fire, while Thailand has claimed Cambodia used BM-21 rockets to target Thai territory. Four Cambodian civilians and at least one Thai soldier have been killed in the renewed clashes, while Thailand has evacuated more than 385,000 civilians across four border provinces. Thai Prime Minister Anutin Charnvirakul announced that Bangkok will launch ‘all necessary military operations’ in response to Phnom Penh’s alleged provocations. Consequently, there is a high risk of further clashes in the coming hours and days, likely involving artillery and small arms fire along the border. (Source: Sibylline)

08 Dec 25. Benin: Failed coup attempt will moderate immediate security risks, increase opposition crackdown. On 7 December, President Patrice Talon stated that the armed forces had thwarted an attempted coup (see Sibylline Alert – 7 December 2025). Earlier that day a faction of the armed forces, the self-proclaimed ‘Military Committee for Refoundation’ (CMR), claimed to have ousted Talon, having stormed his residence and the national television station. However, following clashes in Cotonou (Littoral department) and the capital Porto Novo, including air strikes by the Nigerian Air Force, forces loyal to Talon regained control, moderating immediate-term security risks. The security forces will almost certainly maintain an elevated posture in Cotonou and Porto Novo in the coming days. This will likely include erecting roadblocks proximate to strategic locations (such as the presidential palace and government buildings), disrupting staff mobility. The government is also highly likely to launch a crackdown on elements of the military perceived to be disloyal. While we assess that this will moderate government stability risks, there is a realistic possibility that the government weaponises the attempted coup to crack down on opposition figures ahead of the upcoming legislative and presidential elections. This will increase the likelihood of anti-government unrest in major cities in the coming weeks. (Source: Sibylline)

08 Dec 25. Trump security roadmap omits North Korea reference, raising diplomacy hopes.

Summary
Trump has spoken of his willingness to sit down with Kim Jong Un
North Korean leader open to talks if recognised as a nuclear state
South Korea increases military spending amid regional tensions

U.S. President Donald Trump’s new global security roadmap has dropped any reference to denuclearising North Korea as a goal, fuelling speculation that Washington may be angling to boost the chances of a diplomatic breakthrough with Pyongyang in 2026. The target of ending North Korea’s nuclear threat had been a constant in the National Security Strategy of every U.S. president since the emergence of Pyongyang’s programme in 2003, but was conspicuously absent in Friday’s document. The omission of any mention of North Korea and its accelerating programme to build nuclear weapons that can be delivered by ballistic missiles capable of striking the mainland U.S. is fanning expectations of a potential revival of talks between Trump and Kim Jong Un, last held in 2019. Trump has spoken of his willingness to sit down with the North Korean leader in a “proactive” way, indicating he “wants to get something done by taking some action,” said Hong Min of the Korea Institute for National Unification.

“Then I think there is a certain degree of conscious intent there, that the idea of denuclearisation … really doesn’t need to be brought up here,” said Hong, an expert on Pyongyang’s strategic thinking.

In Trump’s previous security blueprint issued during his first term in 2017, North Korea was mentioned 16 times as a threat to “our homeland” and a rogue state that could “use a nuclear weapon against the United States.” This year’s document lays out Trump’s vision of “flexible realism”, which focuses on containing conflict with China over Taiwan by boosting the military power of its allies in Asia, chiefly South Korea and Japan.

KIM JONG UN’S VIEW

Both South Korea and the United States on Monday denied there was any policy shift on North Korea, stressing denuclearisation remains the goal. Still, Kim has made clear that the issue of whether he could come back for talks hinges on their nature, and that he and Trump would have to meet as equal leaders of nuclear states.

“The concept of ‘denuclearisation’ has already lost its meaning. We have become a nuclear state,” Kim told parliament in September. “I say ‘denuclearisation’ is the last, last thing to expect from us.”

“If the United States, freeing itself from its absurd pursuit of others’ denuclearisation and recognizing the reality, wants genuine peaceful coexistence with us, there is no reason for us not to come face to face with it,” Kim said.

Analysts say peace talks with Trump would cement Kim’s standing at home as a world leader and prove to his impoverished people that he had delivered on a promise that his father and grandfather were unable to keep. The pair held summits in 2018 and 2019 before negotiations collapsed over Pyongyang’s nuclear weapons arsenal. North Korea is under heavy international sanctions over those weapons and its ballistic missiles programme.

STARS ALIGNING FOR TALKS?

Since the U.S. document release, South Korea has emphasised that it believes the stars may align for the restart of talks with North Korea next year and that signals from key players, ranging from the U.S. to China and Japan, are good.

“What we’ve done so far has produced results in terms of creating the right conditions to advance the peace process on the Korean peninsula,” Wi Sung-lac, South Korea’s national security adviser, said on Sunday.

Meanwhile, South Korea has been quietly bolstering its own defensive power, pledging to boost military spending to 3.5% of GDP by 2035 with a 7.5% increase for next year in keeping with demands from Trump. U.S. Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth praised South Korea on Saturday for being a “model” ally that “will receive our special favour” for agreeing to “assume the leading role in … conventional defence. We are optimistic that other Indo-Pacific allies will follow suit.” In talks with Trump in October, South Korean President Lee Jae Myung won approval to build nuclear-powered submarines with U.S. help in supplying fuel, given Seoul’s commitment to be free of nuclear weapons. (Source: Reuters)

08 Dec 25. Thailand launches airstrikes at Cambodia as border tensions reignite.

. Summary

One Thai soldier killed, Thai army says
Cambodia says its military has not retaliated, 3 civilians wounded
Military facilities targeted in air strikes, says Thai Air Force
Cambodia ex-PM urges restraint against Thai ‘aggressors’
Over 385,000 civilians being evacuated in Thailand

Thailand said it launched airstrikes into Cambodia on Monday as fighting broke out in multiple areas along their disputed border, after both countries accused the other of breaching a ceasefire brokered by U.S. President Donald Trump. At least one Thai soldier had been killed and eight were wounded in the fresh clashes that intensified around 5:00 a.m. local time (2200 GMT), a Thai army spokesperson said, adding that air support was called in to hit Cambodian military targets. Thailand’s Air Force said that Cambodia mobilised heavy weaponry, repositioned combat units and prepared support elements that could escalate military operations.

“These developments prompted the use of air power to deter and reduce Cambodia’s military capabilities,” it said in a statement.

Cambodia’s defence ministry said in a statement that the Thai military had launched dawn attacks on its forces at two locations, following days of provocative actions, and added that Cambodian troops had not responded. Cambodia’s influential former longtime leader Hun Sen, father of current premier Hun Manet, said Thailand’s military was “aggressors” seeking to provoke a retaliatory response and urged Cambodian forces to exercise restraint.

“The red line for responding has already been set,” Hun Sen said on Facebook, without elaborating. “I urge commanders at all levels to educate all officers and soldiers accordingly.”

Three Cambodian civilians have been seriously injured in the fighting so far, according to a senior provincial official. Cambodia’s defence ministry said its forces had not retaliated. A simmering border dispute between the countries erupted into a five-day conflict in July, before a ceasefire deal brokered by Malaysian Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim and Trump, who also witnessed the signing of an expanded peace agreement between the two countries in Kuala Lumpur in October. Anwar, chair of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations bloc, urged both sides to exercise maximum restraint and maintain open channels of communication.

“The renewed fighting risks unravelling the careful work that has gone into stabilising relations between the two neighbours,” Anwar said in a post on X.

Southeast Asian countries have rarely engaged in military clashes among themselves in recent decades, with the use of cross-border air strikes even rarer.

Phichet Pholkoet, a resident of Thailand’s Ban Kruat district which adjoins Cambodia, said he has heard gunfire since early Monday morning.

“It startled me. The explosions were very clear. Boom boom!” he said via telephone. “I could hear everything clearly. Some are heavy artillery, some are small arms.”

In Thailand, more than 385,000 civilians across four border districts were being evacuated, with more than 35,000 already housed in temporary shelters, the Thai military said.

Across the border in Cambodia, opposition politician Meach Sovannara said civilians were also moving away from the fighting along the frontier.

“I heard the artillery shelling,” he told Reuters in an audio message from Samroang town, the capital of Oddar Meanchey Province, which abuts Thailand.

More than 1,100 families in Oddar Meanchey had been evacuated, authorities there said. At least 48 people were killed and an estimated 300,000 temporarily displaced during the July clashes, with the neighbours exchanging rockets and heavy artillery fire for five days.

LANDMINES AMONG CATALYSTS

Thailand and Cambodia have for more than a century contested sovereignty at undemarcated points along their 817-km (508-mile) land border, first mapped in 1907 by France when it ruled Cambodia as a colony. The long-standing dispute has occasionally exploded into skirmishes, such as a weeklong artillery exchange in 2011, despite attempts to peacefully resolve overlapping claims. Tensions began rising in May this year, following the killing of a Cambodian soldier during a brief exchange of gunfire, and steadily escalated into diplomatic spats and armed clashes. Although Anwar and Trump were able to halt the fighting within days and then cemented a ceasefire agreement at a regional summit in October. Thailand said it was halting the implementation of the truce with Cambodia last month, following a landmine blast that maimed one of its soldiers. Thailand has repeatedly accused Cambodia of planting fresh landmines along parts of their disputed border, which have seriously injured at least seven Thai soldiers since July. Phnom Penh denies the charge. Some of the mines found along the frontier were likely newly laid, Reuters reported in October, based on expert analysis of material shared by Thailand’s military. (Source: Reuters)

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NEWS IN BRIEF – MIDDLE EAST – CONFLICT

December 12, 2025 by

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Military And Security Developments

Dec 12.

Middle East, North Africa and Turkey: Increased Hamas-linked cyber espionage risks for public sector. On 11 December, the cyber security company Palo Alto reported that a Hamas-affiliated cyber threat group (‘Ashen Lepus’) has consistently targeted government entities in the Middle East, North Africa and Turkey region in cyber espionage operations since the onset of the Israel-Hamas war in late 2023 at least. The group deploys social engineering techniques to distribute a PDF file that tricks victims into downloading and opening a file archive. The archive contains a malicious loader that ultimately executes the main payload (‘AshTag’) onto compromised systems via a multi-phase process. AshTag acts as a backdoor to perform system reconnaissance, maintain prolonged persistence and execute remote commands likely for espionage. In recent operations, Ashen Lepus has used new domains which mimic legitimate services to allow their command-and-control (C2) infrastructure to obfuscate malicious traffic. Consequently, we assess that government entities in the region will face increased security and cyber espionage risks from the continued expansion of Ashen Lepus’ operations.
Israel-Lebanon: US warning highlights possible strikes in Lebanese capital Beirut in January 2026. On 11 December, Lebanese Hizballah (LH)-affiliated media reported that US envoy Morgan Ortagus has warned of Israeli strikes in the Beqaa Valley and the capital Beirut’s Dahieh suburb if LH fails to hand over its drones and precision missiles by 1 January 2026. This highlights Israel and the US’ increasing pressure and hostile rhetoric in response to the Lebanese government’s perceived lack of progress towards LH disarmament. The warning comes despite announcements by officials in the UN Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) that LH disarmament south of the Litani River is at 90% and will be finalised by the end of the year. We assess that Israel will likely intensify and increase the frequency of its strikes in early 2026, expanding their range and targets including into the Beqaa Valley (north of the Litani River). Furthermore, we assess that strikes in southern Beirut’s Dahieh suburb are a realistic possibility, elevating the risk of armed conflict. Nevertheless, the immediate collapse of the ceasefire with LH remains unlikely.
Israel-Lebanon: US warning highlights possible strikes in Lebanese capital Beirut in January 2026. On 11 December, Lebanese Hizballah (LH)-affiliated media reported that US envoy Morgan Ortagus has warned of Israeli strikes in the Beqaa Valley and the capital Beirut’s Dahieh suburb if LH fails to hand over its drones and precision missiles by 1 January 2026. This highlights Israel and the US’ increasing pressure and hostile rhetoric in response to the Lebanese government’s perceived lack of progress towards LH disarmament. The warning comes despite announcements by officials in the UN Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) that LH disarmament south of the Litani River is at 90% and will be finalised by the end of the year. We assess that Israel will likely intensify and increase the frequency of its strikes in early 2026, expanding their range and targets including into the Beqaa Valley (north of the Litani River). Furthermore, we assess that strikes in southern Beirut’s Dahieh suburb are a realistic possibility, elevating the risk of armed conflict. Nevertheless, the immediate collapse of the ceasefire with LH remains unlikely.
Israel-Palestinian Territories: Storm Byron will continue driving disruption, humanitarian risks. On 11 November, Storm Byron made landfall in Israel and the Palestinian Territories, causing widespread disruption in Israel and undercutting humanitarian conditions in Gaza. At least one person has died in Israel and one individual is reported missing. In Gaza, at least 12 people have died, with several buildings collapsing and informal shelters flooding. The heavy rains and strong winds are likely to continue until at least 13 December. The flooding on roads will increase disruption to overland transport and raise the risks of injuries and collisions from debris caused by damaged infrastructure. The increased disruption to supply chains will possibly affect aid deliveries to Gaza and complicate aerial military operations within the territory, reducing the outlook for helicopter and drone support. Furthermore, the flooding will heighten the risk of water contamination and the spread of infectious diseases, which will likely compound the already elevated health threats and humanitarian conditions across the strip. Power outages are likely across Israel, Gaza and the West Bank in the coming days, increasing energy security risks and business disruption.

Dec 10.

New Iraq government

Key points

A government led by current Prime Minister Mohammed Shia al-Sudani is the most likely outcome following Iraq’s parliamentary elections. However, there remains a possibility that a less contentious candidate from within the Coordination Framework (CF) alliance will be selected. Negotiations are likely to delay the formation of a government for two months.
This delay will substantially disrupt investment, impeding access to government and bureaucratic services, while the possible success of an Iran-backed candidate will raise policy risks and the prospect of more stringent US sanctions.
There has not been a meaningful decline in Shia cleric Muqtada al-Sadr’s influence, despite limited engagement with his election boycott. He will continue to use his position to augment anti-government protests, particularly over economic issues, as he attempts to burnish his credentials as an alternative authority figure.

Context

On 18 November, Iraq’s Independent High Electoral Commission (IHEC) announced that the Reconstruction and Development Coalition (RDC), led by the current caretaker Prime Minister Mohammed Shia al-Sudani, had secured 46 seats out of the 329 seats, making the largest party in the legislature (see Figure 1). Sizeable blocs were also won by the Progress party (Taqadum), led by Sunni former parliamentary speaker Mohammed al-Halbousi, and the State of Law coalition, led by Shia former prime minister Nouri al-Maliki. Notably, voter turnout significantly exceeded levels in the 2021 polls, reaching 56.11% despite a boycott by the Sadrists, the prominent Shia political and religious movement led by Muqtada al-Sadr. However, no party or bloc secured enough support to form a government, compelling an inevitable coalition-building process as we previously forecast (see Sibylline Situation Update Brief – 4 November 2025). Subsequently, the ruling Shia-led CF alliance (which includes the RDC) declared that it constituted the largest parliamentary bloc, positioning itself as a central force in government formation and parliamentary negotiations. By 28 November, the CF had already initiated the long process of nominating a candidate for the premiership.

Forecast

Despite al-Sudani’s relatively strong position, resistance from within the CF to the extension of his tenure will likely prolong government formation talks for the next two months. Al-Sudani’s role as head of the largest party within the CF will likely ensure his authority within the alliance and see him form the new government. However, the growth of significant rifts between him and other prominent Shia figures in the CF over the last three years will drive the possibility that the CF ultimately chooses another, less contentious political figure from within the alliance. The most prominent alternatives to al-Sudani are likely former prime minister Nouri al-Maliki; Basim al-Badri, head of the Accountability and Justice Commission; and the powerful Basra Governor Asaad al-Eidani, who was previously marketed by the CF as a reformist technocrat. An attempt to replace al-Sudani as head of the government is also likely to be supported by Iran, given al-Sudani’s attempts to limit the power of several Iranian proxy groups. However, there is a limited possibility that al-Sudani will mitigate this by seeking an arrangement with Tehran and its Iraqi proxies by appointing Iran-backed figures to strategic ministries (such as energy and finance). In any case, ongoing rifts within the CF, Iranian influence and the threat of US sanctions are likely to extend government formation talks to around two months. A prolonged government formation process will increase policy risks and disrupt business engagement with state services until the end of January 2026, impacting the flow of new foreign investment

Prolonged government formation negotiations, compounded by simultaneous talks among the Sunni and Kurdish blocs to choose the parliamentary speaker and the country’s president, respectively, will drive policy risks and disrupt business engagement with the state bureaucracy until at least the end of January 2026. Such conditions are likely to impact foreign direct investment (FDI) flows, partially delaying new deals and/or market entry attempts throughout the next two months and thereby increasing socio-economic pressure on the caretaker government. This delay in new FDI, as well as compliance risks for existing foreign investors, will significantly increase if the CF selects an Iran-backed figure to form a new government or appoints Tehran’s allies to strategic ministries and public companies. There is an increasing risk that the US will apply sanctions to any new Iran-backed government officials in 2026, as well as local companies in the energy, finance and logistics sectors, where Iran’s proxies still hold significant influence. Any new sanctions will likely impact Iraq’s energy exports, undercutting the new government’s primary source of revenues and, in turn, increasing the risk of domestic unrest and instability throughout 2026. However, a government led by al-Sudani will partially mitigate such risks, as he is highly likely to establish a balanced approach between Iranian and US interests in Iraq. This will likely be achieved by reducing the autonomy of the Iran-backed militias through a mix of institutional incentives and selective coercion, while also increasing Iraq’s security co-ordination with the US.

Muqtada al-Sadr will remain an influential figure, capitalising on governmental instability to bolster his image as an alternative source of authority, driving risks of unrest and sporadic intra-Shia clashes

Muqtada al-Sadr’s Sadrist political organisation and its military wing, Saraya al Salam (SAS), will likely ensure that he remains a prominent figure in Iraqi politics. Regardless of who leads the new government, al-Sadr will continue to position himself as an alternative source of national authority with cross-sectarian popularity in Iraq. His influence will likely primarily be exercised through calls for further protests against the new government as well as through associated Iranian proxies, in particular seeking to amplify socio-economic disruption by unions, students and public workers, which is likely to continue in 2026. Al-Sadr will also continue to widen his political base by demanding to abolish the Muhasasa power-sharing system, which distributes cabinet positions among the three main ethno-religious communities (Kurdish, Shia and Sunni) based on their share of parliamentary seats. Such unrest risks will likely be particularly elevated if the CF chooses an Iran-backed government in the coming months. This will drive the risk of intra-Shia political violence, including clashes, particularly around SAS offices and headquarters in Baghdad, as well as in Basra, Diyala and Najaf governorates.

KEY DEVELOPMENTS

IRAN

The Iranian rial (IRR) fell to a record low on 8 December, underscoring increasing threats to socio-economic health and government stability.
The trial of an unidentified European national in Iran underscores the persistent risk of surveillance, harassment and detention for foreign nationals.

ISRAEL

A car ramming of ultra-Orthodox protesters highlights the elevated ethno-religious tensions and increased risk of violence.

PALESTINIAN TERRITORIES

GAZA STRIP: Storm Byron will degrade humanitarian conditions further across the strip, driving population health and environmental impact risks.
WEST BANK: The Israeli police raided the offices of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA) in East Jerusalem, underscoring risks of further scrutiny and operational restrictions targeting the agency.
WEST BANK: The Israeli government’s proposed 2026 budget underscores increasing pressure on the implementation of the Oslo Accords amid broader efforts to bolster the IDF’s presence in the northern West Bank.
WEST BANK: The Israeli government’s budget allocations for settlement expansion will likely embolden settlers in pursuing violent confrontations with Palestinian communities in the northern West Bank.
PALESTINIAN TERRITORIES: The resumption of commercial deliveries from Jordan via the Allenby Bridge will moderate disruption to trade in the West Bank, though it is unlikely to improve humanitarian conditions in Gaza substantially.

Dec 09.

Yemen: STC operation raises government stability, conflict escalation risks; PLC collapse is possible. On 8 December, the UAE-backed Southern Transitional Council (STC) announced that it had expanded its presence across all of Yemen’s southern provinces, including Aden (Aden governorate), which is the seat of the internationally recognised government. Furthermore, thousands of STC-aligned troops have reportedly advanced into Al-Mahrah governorate in recent days, following a STC operation in eastern Hadhramaut governorate targeting Arabia Saudi-backed tribal forces. The local officials have reported that the Saudi-led coalition briefly closed Yemen’s airspace on 8 December; this was likely intended as a warning to STC separatists and to signal the possibility of third-party intervention. The STC has claimed that senior figures from other factions within the Presidential Leadership Council (PLC) have left Aden. If this information is accurate, this will heighten government stability risks, driving the PLC’s possible collapse and the emergence of the STC as southern Yemen’s dominant governing and military force. Such a development will significantly increase the likelihood of Yemen progressing towards partition, heightening conflict escalation risks among southern factions, as well as between southern factions and the Iran-backed Houthis in north-western Yemen.
Syria: Strike will increase operational disruption risks in coastal region throughout this week. On 8 December, ethnic-Alawites in several Alawite-majority areas of Latakia and Tartus governorates and across rural towns in Hama governorate launched a general strike, prompting several commercial businesses to close. The five-day strike was called by Alawite cleric Al-Sheikh Ghazal to denounce violence against the ethno-religious community, following clashes with government-aligned tribal groups in November and amid nationwide celebrations of Liberation Day beginning on 8 December (marking one year since former president Bashar al-Assad’s ousting). Groups from additional sectors are likely to join the strike in the coming days, including logistics and the public sector. As such, there is a realistic possibility of partial operational disruption in the port of Tartus (Tartus governorate) this week, particularly impacting the logistics and transportation sectors. We assess that this disruption risk and the security instability in Tartus and Latakia governorates will increase in the coming days. Clashes between Alawite and pro-government demonstrators remain a realistic possibility during Liberation Day celebrations, which are likely to continue into mid-December. Furthermore, violent clashes will likely prompt an extension of the strike, though it is currently unlikely.

Dec 08.

Syria: Visa’s return will increase investment confidence, though socio-economic pressure will persist. On 4 December, Syria’s central bank signed an agreement with Visa to resume its operations in the country after a decade-long pause. Visa stated that it will implement a roadmap designed to help Syria rapidly integrate into the modern global digital economy, including issuing payment cards and enabling digital wallets. Visa also announced that its immediate priority in Syria will be to help licensed financial institutions develop a robust and secure payments foundation. Notably, the move comes months after a similar agreement with Mastercard and the return of SWIFT operations to Syria, underscoring the authorities’ ongoing efforts to rebuild the financial ecosystem. These developments are a positive sign of economic recovery and will likely increase investor confidence. However, we assess that the country’s major security instability and persistent armed conflict risks in north-eastern and southern areas will likely sustain a highly volatile Syrian market throughout the first half of 2026. This is likely to partially hinder the flow of foreign capital to Syria throughout this period, sustaining overall socio-economic pressure
Tunisia: Anti-government protests highlight democratic backsliding, business reputational risks. On 6 December, hundreds of protesters in the capital Tunis demonstrated against President Kais Saied’s crackdown on opposition politicians, journalists and civil society groups. Protesters accused the president of using the judiciary and police to suppress his opponents; the demonstration came days after (28 November) authorities sentenced 40 opposition politicians to between five and 45 years on highly likely politicised charges. As the crackdown persists, further protests are likely in major urban centres such as Tunis, Sfax (Sfax governorate) and Sousse (Sousse governorate), increasing domestic unrest risks and the likelihood of sporadic clashes between the authorities and protesters. Additionally, Tunisia’s largest trade union, the Tunisian General Labour Union (UGTT), has called for a nationwide strike over repression and wages on 21 January, prolonging unrest risks. The security forces are likely to arbitrarily detain protesters, raising exposure risks to nearby personnel. Further detentions of opposition figures and journalists are possible in the coming weeks, heightening regulatory and compliance risks for businesses and individuals in the media sector. This will also raise reputational risks for state-associated businesses, increasing their exposure to boycotts and diminished consumer interest.

(Source: Sibylline)

06 Dec 25. UAE-Backed Forces Claim Full Control of Southern Yemen. The UAE-backed Southern Transitional Council (STC) claims full control of southern Yemen, including Aden, the seat of the internationally recognized government. STC official Amr al-Bidh said its forces now oversee all eight southern governorates and are consolidating power to stabilize the region and counter the Houthis.

“We are concentrating on unifying the operational theatre of our armed forces to enhance coordination and readiness to reinforce stability and security in the south, as well as combatting the Houthis should there be a willingness to head in this direction,” al-Bidh said.

Reports say the move could pave the way for the South to declare independence, potentially restoring Yemen to two separate states for the first time since 1990. Yemen’s Presidential Council head Rashad al-Alimi, who briefed diplomats in Riyadh on Sunday, said Monday that the STC’s actions in the south “undermine the legitimacy of the internationally recognised government” and breach power-sharing agreements. A UAE official told Reuters on Monday that the country’s position on Yemen “is in line with Saudi Arabia in supporting a political process” based on Gulf-backed initiatives and United Nations resolutions. The official did not comment directly on the STC’s actions in southern Yemen. (Source: https://www.sofx.com/)

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NEWS IN BRIEF – UKRAINE CONFLICT

December 12, 2025 by

Sponsored by Bertin Exensor

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Military And Security Developments

Dec 12.

Russia-Ukraine: Moscow is highly unlikely to compromise over Donbas in short-to-medium term. On 11 December, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky disclosed that the US is offering to create a ‘free economic zone’ in the Ukrainian-controlled areas of the Donbas. Under the proposal, Ukraine would withdraw from Donetsk oblast (one of the two regions which make up the Donbas). Russian forces would also not be able to enter this zone. However, Zelensky stated that it remains uncertain who would govern this territory. Reports on the matter have claimed that an international force would supervise the area, and that it would potentially include the US. Zelensky stated that Ukraine would need security guarantees to prevent Russian troops from seizing control of the zone after any potential Ukrainian withdrawal. The suggestion to create a ‘free economic zone’ is highly likely aimed at striking a compromise on territorial concessions, which remains one of the key sticking points in peace efforts. We assess that gaining full control of the Donbas (either through negotiations or military force) remains among Russia’s minimum and longest-standing war objectives. As such, Moscow is highly unlikely to agree to the proposal in the short-to-medium term.

Dec 10.

Ukraine: Energy security risks remain elevated amid unlikely truce over Russian strikes. On 9 December, Ukrainian Prime Minister Yulia Svyrydenko announced further restrictions on Ukrainians’ electricity consumption, as well as the need for additional energy imports. This follows intensified Russian strikes against the country’s energy infrastructure. Ukraine faces one of the harshest heating seasons since the start of the conflict, with Russian forces significantly increasing the scale and frequency of strikes on energy facilities. The impact of the campaign has been evidenced by nationwide rolling blackouts. Beyond causing extensive damage, Russia’s strikes are also complicating repair efforts on critical infrastructure. Amid Ukraine’s deteriorating energy security, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky signalled his willingness to reach a truce with Russia to encourage Moscow to refrain from targeting energy infrastructure. However, we assess that Russia is unlikely to accept such an arrangement in the short term, as energy attacks form a key component of its strategy to erode Ukraine’s resilience and weaken its political will to continue the war.

Dec 09.

KEY DEVELOPMENTS

KHARKIV: Russian forces are continuing to commit resources to facilitate advances in Kharkiv oblast, indicating Moscow’s clear desire to make further territorial gains in areas that it has not officially annexed or claimed
POKROVSK: Although the Ukrainian forces continue to hold positions in the Pokrovsk-Myrnohrad area (Donetsk oblast), incremental Russian gains are steadily increasing the risk of a full encirclement
US: The new National Security Strategy (NSS) further reinforces our assessment that President Donald Trump’s administration seeks a rapprochement with Russia, rather than a greater embroilment in the Russo-Ukrainian war
FORECAST: The European Commission has unveiled its proposals for a financial aid scheme for Ukraine for the next two years, but agreement over such a package remains highly uncertain, sustaining financial uncertainty
OFFENSIVES: The Russian authorities have claimed to have taken various towns across the frontline in recent weeks, likely in an effort to secure further concessions in the US-led peace process. However, we assess that a number of these claims are premature, with fighting ongoing in a number of these settlements. Claims of Russia’s seizure of Kupiansk (Kharkiv oblast) have been circulating online in particular, supported by likely AI-generated images on social media. However, we assess that much of the city remains in Ukrainian hands or at least heavily contested, with little evidence to support the Kremlin’s claims. Likewise, recent claims regarding the seizure of most of Siversk (Donetsk oblast) are also likely to be premature, with no confirmation at present that the Russian forces have pushed the Ukrainians out of the settlement entirely, though heavy fighting continues. Russian President Vladimir Putin made similar claims on 1 December that Russian troops had taken Pokrovsk, which we assess is not entirely accurate (see below for further analysis).
KHARKIV: Russian forces are continuing to commit resources to facilitate their advances at various points in Kharkiv oblast, indicating Moscow’s clear desire to make further territorial gains in areas that it has not officially annexed or claimed. This stands in contrast to ongoing offensive operations in the Donbas, as well as Kherson and Zaporizhzhia oblasts, which are regularly discussed in ongoing peace talks.
KHARKIV: Russian forces have struck the Pechenihy Reservoir Dam on the Siverskyi-Donets River. The dam is located 29 miles (46km) east of Kharkiv city; this has increased the risk of downstream flooding in areas to the south-east of the city. Ukraine’s 16th Army Corps reported on 7 December that Russian forces have been heavily striking the dam in recent days, using a combination of missiles, Shahed-type drones, guided glide bombs and other shorter-range drones. This clearly indicates that disrupting Ukrainian logistics along that stretch of the Siverskyi-Donets River is currently an operational priority for Russian forces. Numerous local authorities in Ukraine also reported on 7 December that Russian forces launched missile strikes against a bridge spanning the Siverskyi-Donets River near Staryi Saltiv, approximately 15 miles (25km) to the north of the dam.
KHARKIV: While it remains unclear how much damage has been caused to the dam, a breach remains a realistic possibility in the coming days. However, various Ukrainian authorities have underscored in recent days that contingency plans are in place if such a breach occurs. As such, evacuation procedures and alternative ground lines of communication (GLOCs) for Ukrainian forces will likely be established in the coming days. In the meantime, such strikes are liable to form part of Russian preparations for an intensification of offensive operations across Kharkiv, including against the larger cities of Kupiansk and Vovchansk.
POKROVSK: Although the Ukrainian forces continue to hold positions in the Pokrovsk-Myrnohrad area (Donetsk oblast), incremental Russian gains are steadily increasing the risk of a full encirclement. In recent days, Russian forces have advanced within Pokrovsk as well as to its north and north-east. These advances underscore ongoing Russian efforts to fully encircle Pokrovsk and Myrnohrad (located to the east). Earlier on 9 December, Russian Chief of the General Staff Valery Gerasimov stated that Russia’s main objective is to clear Ukrainian positions in Myrnohrad, which he claims has been encircled. We assess that Russia likely does not retain full control over Pokrovsk, where fighting likely continues in the northern outskirts, and has not completed its encirclement of the Pokrovsk-Myrnohrad area. Various Ukrainian sources maintain that Ukrainian forces in Myrnohrad continue to be resupplied by thin GLOCs, but these are increasingly vulnerable and are forces in the city are likely to be overwhelmingly reliant on drone drops, limiting the number of troops that can be supplied.
POKROVSK: Nevertheless, Russian advances are clearly putting pressure on Ukrainian forces to withdraw. Local military sources reported to Ukrainian media that Ukrainian troops had pulled back from several unspecified positions near Pokrovsk and Myrnohrad several weeks ago. On 2 November, a senior NATO official, quoted by Ukrainian media, stated that Myrnohrad was nearly encircled, with troops in the settlement relying on drone deliveries for supplies as a result of Russia’s intensive use of drones to interdict logistics in the area.
STRIKES: Russia’s strike on 5-6 December included 704 drones and missiles, underscoring Moscow’s ability to launch intense, large-scale barrages on a semi-regular basis. The attack heavily targeted railway and energy infrastructure and coincided with talks between US and Ukrainian officials on 6 December. Meanwhile, Ukraine has continued its own strike campaign, regularly targeting Russian oil infrastructure. In November, Ukraine targeted Russian oil refineries 14 times, setting a record, according to a recent Bloomberg report.

POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS

US: The new National Security Strategy (NSS) further reinforces our assessment that President Donald Trump’s administration seeks a rapprochement with Russia, rather than a greater embroilment in the Russo-Ukrainian war. On 4 December, the White House released its new NSS, which largely criticises the EU and European countries’ policies. Notably, the document states that ‘the Trump administration finds itself at odds with European officials who hold unrealistic expectations for the war’ in Ukraine. It also notes that while a ‘large European majority wants peace’, this is not translated into the region’s policy; this statement likely reflects the US’ lack of confidence in Europe’s input towards ending the war. The NSS also notes that many European governments regard Russia as an existential threat, but it does not list Russia as such (in contrast to the NSS published in 2022 under former president Joe Biden, which described Russia as a threat).
US: We continue to assess that Europe will almost certainly remain opposed to a serious re-engagement with Russia over the coming months while the war in Ukraine continues, in contrast to the Trump administration’s approach. Meanwhile, the US’ interest in a rapprochement with Russia will likely cause friction in the already strained transatlantic relations, undermining the West’s cohesion vis-à-vis Russia. The NSS outlines that managing European relations with Russia will require significant US diplomatic engagement to ‘re-establish strategic stability across the Eurasian landmass’ and to mitigate the risk of conflict between Russia and Europe. Moscow will almost certainly seek to exploit the apparent weaknesses in transatlantic relations over the coming months, in order to increase the likelihood of Washington DC offering peace terms that favour the Kremlin’s interests. Such attempts by Russia will likely include renewed statements that Europe (either certain European states or the EU) is undermining the peace process.
PEACE: Recent comments from Trump signal that the US will likely increase pressure on Ukraine in the coming weeks to reach a ‘peace’ deal, rather than on Russia. In an interview with Politico on 8 December, Trump argued that Russia has a stronger position in peace negotiations. Trump later said that Moscow has the ‘upper hand’ in the war because of its size, adding his assessment that typically, ‘at some point, size will win’. Such comments will likely incentivise Russia to continue with its current attritional strategy to achieve its war goals in the coming weeks, rather than to negotiate. Furthermore, Trump also stated that Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky will ‘have to get on the ball and start … accepting things’. We assess that Trump’s remarks moderately increase the likelihood that the US will attempt to enforce unfavourable ‘peace’ terms on Ukraine in the coming weeks and in early 2026. However, as Trump has made such comments before, it remains likely that back-and-forth negotiations will continue.
PEACE: Despite intensified efforts to broker an end to the Russo-Ukrainian war, several questions remain unresolved concerning territorial concessions and security guarantees for Ukraine. On 8 December, Axios reported that Russia is maintaining its position that Ukrainian forces must withdraw from the parts of the Donbas that are under Ukraine’s control (i.e. Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts). Axios cited unspecified insiders familiar with recent Ukraine-US negotiations and disclosed that US representatives are trying to develop new proposals to ‘bridge’ the issue. However, we assess that Russia is highly unlikely to soften its position on these territories in the short-to-medium term.
PEACE: Meanwhile, on 8 December, Zelensky reiterated Ukraine’s reluctance to cede territory to Russia. Zelensky stated that Ukraine has no ‘legal’ or ‘moral’ right to make territorial concessions, which would highly likely be unpopular in Ukrainian society. Ukraine’s constitution describes its territory as ‘indivisible and inviolable’ and stipulates that territorial issues must be resolved via referendum. We continue to assess that Kyiv and Moscow’s positions on territory are highly unlikely to converge in the foreseeable future, preventing a short-term breakthrough towards peace.

FORECAST

AID: On 3 December, the European Commission (EC) unveiled proposals for a financial aid scheme for Ukraine for the next two years. The first proposed option involves issuing a reparations loan guaranteed by frozen Russian sovereign assets worth EUR 165bn. Ukraine would only be required to repay the loan if Russia ends the war and pays war reparations (which we assess remains unlikely at present). EUR 115bn from the loan would be allocated to Ukraine’s defence needs, while EUR 50bn would cover the country’s wider budgetary needs. This proposal forms part of a wider EUR 210 bn package, with the remaining EUR 45bn intended to repay a G7 loan to Ukraine issued in 2024.

Since Belgium hosts the largest share of frozen Russian assets, it continues to request guarantees from other EU partners to share a potential liability if Russia launches a legal dispute. According to internal EU documents consulted by Politico, under the above-mentioned funding proposal, EU countries would need to contribute substantial amounts to cover the EUR 210 bn aid package. These financial guarantees would be divided proportionally among member states, with Germany expected to provide up to EUR 52 bn. German Chancellor Friedrich Merz has reassured Belgium that his government would cover 25% of the backstop, representing the largest share of any single country. However, if Russia‑friendly EU countries refuse to support the initiative, the burden on the remaining EU states would increase, unless non-EU countries choose to participate in the backing (such as the UK and Norway). Ultimately, it remains uncertain whether the reassurances provided by EU members will be sufficient to secure Belgium’s support.

Meanwhile, Bloomberg reported on 5 December that the US has been lobbying several European countries to oppose the EU’s proposed reparations loans using frozen Russian assets. According to European diplomats familiar with the matter who spoke on condition of anonymity, the US argues that the frozen assets should be used to help secure a peace deal between Russia and Ukraine, rather than to prolong the conflict. Another reason likely entails Washington DC’s willingness to allocate such funds in a way that supports US-aligned reconstruction efforts in Ukraine, as outlined in the initial 28-point peace draft revealed at the end of November. US lobbying will possibly reduce the number of EU states that support the reparations loans, increasing the burden on those that agree to financial guarantees. We continue to assess that the inclusion of frozen assets in US-proposed peace plans have further reduced the likelihood of the EU agreeing to use them; in such an event, Moscow would almost certainly claim that the EU is systematically sabotaging the US-led peace process.

The alternative option devised by the EC is a EUR 90 bn (USD105bn) loan financed by EU borrowing on capital markets, which would cover roughly two-thirds of Ukraine’s financial needs in 2026-27. Such a loan would require unanimous approval from all EU member states, with countries that have historically been reluctant to provide more support to Kyiv (such as Hungary) likely to veto the measure.

The EU Council summit scheduled for 18-19 December will be crucial for Ukraine’s ability to finance its war effort, as Ukraine’s recently adopted 2026 budget includes significant financial gaps. Ukraine’s finance ministry has reported that the country will require over USD 45bn in external funding in 2026, while the EU estimates that Ukraine will need approximately EUR 135bn (USD 157bn) in foreign aid for 2026-27. Without new funding commitments, Ukraine will possibly run out of cash in the first half of 2026, according to various estimates. Even if EU member states agree on a financial aid package, it is highly likely to take several months before funds are actually allocated (and Ukraine is able to purchase weaponry). Ultimately, the latest Ukrainian budget confirms that Kyiv will remain heavily reliant on external funding for the foreseeable future; this will continue to undermine its negotiating position without strong European financial backing.

Dec 08.

Ukraine: Immediate radiation leaks are highly unlikely at Chernobyl nuclear plant. On 5 December, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) reported that the protective shield covering the Chernobyl nuclear reactor (Kyiv oblast) has lost its primary safety functions (including its confinement capability) following a drone strike on the structure in February. The plant’s protective shield is designed to keep radioactive contaminants physically contained, so that they cannot escape into the environment. However, the IAEA noted that there is no permanent damage to the reactor’s load-bearing structures or monitoring systems and that temporary repairs have been carried out. The agency also stated that comprehensive restoration must take place in 2026. There have been no reports of radiation leaks since Russia’s drone strike in February. We assess that these initial repairs have highly likely limited the risk of any immediate radiation leakage. Therefore, the likelihood of an acute radiological incident remains very low. However, the loss of full confinement means that the shield’s complete restoration will be required to minimise long-term risks.
Russia-Ukraine-US: US is unlikely to withdraw from peace process entirely in coming weeks. On 7 December, US President Donald Trump’s son Donald Trump Jr stated that his father may abandon attempts to end the Russo-Ukrainian war. Since resuming the presidency in January, Trump’s engagement in ending the Russo-Ukrainian war has varied in intensity. Trump has used different levers to push the two warring countries to negotiate, including military aid supplies to Ukraine and sanctions against Russia. Nevertheless, Trump Jr’s comments come amid a renewed push for peace from the Trump administration, with ongoing negotiations occurring between various stakeholders. Officials in Trump’s administration have made similar threats in recent months, including Vice President JD Vance. We assess that Trump Jr’s comments highly likely reflect Washington DC’s frustration at the lack of a breakthrough towards ending the war, rather than indicate Trump’s intentions to withdraw from the peace process in the coming days or weeks. However, a scaling back of diplomatic efforts is possible. (Source: Sibylline)

10 Dec 25. Poland could give Ukraine MiG jets in swap for drone tech. Poland is in talks to transfer MiG-29 jets to Ukraine in exchange for access to Ukrainian drone technology, Defence Minister Wladyslaw Kosiniak-Kamysz said on public radio on Wednesday. “In some time, MiG-29 aircraft will no longer serve in the Polish Air Force due to their depleted service life,” the defence minister said.

“We are negotiating with the Ukrainian side about transferring the MiG-29s, but we are also discussing transferring technologies to Poland, such as drones. This solidarity must be two-way.”

The General Staff of the Polish Army said the potential transfer was linked to the lack of prospects for further modernisation of the ageing, Soviet-designed MiG-29 fighters.

“It will be an element of the allied policy of supporting Ukraine and maintaining the security of NATO’s eastern flank,” it said in a statement published on Tuesday evening, noting that the final decision had not yet been made.

Tasks currently performed by the withdrawn MiGs would be taken over by F-16 and FA-50 aircraft. The army added that, in connection with the transfer, talks were underway with Ukraine regarding the provision of selected drone and missile technologies to Poland. (Source: Reuters)

08 Dec 25. Drone strike resulted in damage to Chernobyl radiation shield. A team from the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) investigating the effects of military activity on energy infrastructure has found that the protective shield covering the Chernobyl nuclear reactor has been “severely damaged” in a drone strike that occurred in February 2025. The drone strike also caused a major fire in the outer cladding of the massive steel structure built to prevent any radioactive release from the reactor destroyed in the 1986 accident, IAEA said. As a result of the drone event, the shield lost its primary safety functions, including the confinement capability. The IAEA team found that there was no permanent damage to its load-bearing structures or monitoring systems.

“Limited temporary repairs have been carried out on the roof, but timely and comprehensive restoration remains essential to prevent further degradation and ensure long-term nuclear safety,” IAEA Director General Rafael Mariano Grossi said.

Another IAEA team is travelling across Ukraine this month to assess the status of electrical substations critical for nuclear safety and security, following recent military attacks targeting energy infrastructure. For more information: https://www.iaea.org/ (Source: www.unmannedairspace.info)

08 Dec 25. “Ukraine’s Contra Drone develops C-UAS ground robotic system NEO.” Ukraine’s Pravda news source reports that Ukrainian company Contra-Drone has developed a wheeled ground robot equipped with an expanded electronic warfare system, capable of protecting positions and military groups from drones during missions. Pravda reports that Oboronka, a defence industry project created by Mezha.Media, has learned the ground robotic system called NEO is equipped with a 10‑channel electronic warfare system capable of countering FPV and Mavic drones. “It has two types of antennas: a dome antenna (operating in all directions) and a directional antenna (operating only in the direction pointed by the operator but with greater power). The directional antenna, located at the front of the robot, is needed to counter drones such as the Mavic and Autel. The operator can adjust its angle to target an enemy drone performing reconnaissance or carrying a payload.”

“The (g)round robotic system can carry a 300‑kg load over 30 km and reaches speeds of up to 15 km/h,” continued the report. “The robot is equipped with tubeless tyres capable of withstanding an anti‑personnel mine blast. The Contra-drone NEO can rotate 360 degrees on the spot, turning in the required direction. The robot can be controlled via Starlink, which serves as the primary communication method. If the drone moves into bushes or forested areas and loses connection, the operator switches to radio control. The radio‑control range is 5 km.” (Source: www.unmannedairspace.info)

04 Dec 25. “Ukraine’s General Cherry launches uprated version of its C-UAS AIR interceptor.” Ukraine’s Defender Media reports Ukraine’s General Cherry has released an updated version of its first interceptor drone, Air — the General Cherry Air Pro. The UAV has already been codified and approved for use by Ukraine’s Security and Defence Forces, said the media outlet.

“As of 3 December, the model is available on the Brave1 Market and DOT-Chain Defence platforms.

“The Air Pro interceptor can reach speeds of over 200 km/h. It is designed to neutralise enemy reconnaissance and strike UAVs. Among Air Pro’s potential targets are hostile drones such as Mavic/Autel, Privet-82, Molniya, ZALA, Supercam, Orlan, Lancet, Geran, and their variants.

“Key specifications include:

Speed: 200+ km/h
Flight time: up to 35 minutes
Daytime target identification: up to 1,500 m
Payload: up to 0.8 kg
Maximum altitude: 6.8 km

For more information

General Cherry unveiled updated AIR Pro interceptor drone

(Source: www.unmannedairspace.info)

09 Dec 25. Ukraine Begins Production of Turbojet Engines for Drones. A Ukrainian-Australian company has launched the production of turbojet engines for drones, missiles, and guided bombs in Ukraine. The Australian partners developed the engines, and the Ukrainian firm invested its own funds in their production. The joint venture showcased its products at the Brave1 Components exhibition in Kyiv. The manufacturer has introduced two turbojet engines. They are already undergoing flight tests. The first, smaller one, was designed for interceptor drones. It can carry 10-15 kilograms and consumes about 350 milliliters of fuel per minute. The second, larger one, was created for installation on reusable interceptor drones, kamikazes, small cruise missiles, and for use as boosters to increase the range of guided aerial bombs. The joint venture plans to expand the line to two more engines. One will be an intermediate model between the existing models, and the other will be the largest in the line – it will allow for increased payload weight or increased flight range. The plant in Ukraine can already mass-produce both engine models. To do this, the company has purchased equipment and mastered modern production technology. The Ukrainian company produces engine housings and combustion chambers from stainless steel. When designing this chamber, it consisted of 38 different components that had to be manufactured separately. But thanks to the new technology, the company is able to immediately receive a finished product, which has significantly accelerated and reduced the cost of production. The production of all aluminum parts for engines was also localized in Ukraine. The company is currently working on localizing turbine production. Currently, this product is supplied by several foreign companies, which partially limits the production of engines. Two more imported components in the engine are the control board and a small starter motor that runs for the first 10 seconds to create air flow and start the main unit. Currently, the developers are looking for manufacturers who would undertake the production of these components in Ukraine. (Source: UAS VISION/Obronka)

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NEWS IN BRIEF – USA

December 12, 2025 by

Sponsored by Bertin Exensor

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10 Dec 25. Army Activates U.S. Army Western Hemisphere Command in Historic Transition Ceremony. The Army activated the U.S. Army Western Hemisphere Command in a ceremony held Dec. 5 at Fort Bragg, North Carolina — uniting U.S. Army Forces Command, U.S. Army North and U.S. Army South into a single, four-star operational headquarters. The ceremony also marked the casing of the U.S. Army Forces Command colors and the retirement of its commanding general, Army Gen. Andrew Poppas, who led the command since July 2022.

“Today we become something new, but ‘s spirit of readiness, resilience and warfighting strength will not fade. Rather, that spirit will radiate throughout the Army,” said Poppas, who retired after more than 37 years of service.

Army Gen. Joseph A. Ryan assumed command of West-Hemcom. He previously served as the Army’s deputy chief of staff for Operations, Plans and Training. The ceremony marked a significant moment in the Army’s transformation as the establishment of West-Hemcom is part of a broader transformation campaign to modernize Army command structures and improve operational agility. The newly established command is an operational warfighting theater command headquarters overseeing all Army plans, posture, operations and power projection in support of U.S. Northern and Southern Commands — and aligned with national strategic priorities.

“Western Hemisphere Command is designed for speed, flexibility and relevance to effectively respond to challenges in our complex times,” said Army Chief of Staff Gen. Randy George. “By consolidating these headquarters and aligning the theater, we will streamline processes, eliminate redundant efforts and free up talent and resources. This will allow us to better support our fighting formations.”

West-Hemcom unifies domestic-response capabilities from U.S. Army North, regional engagement expertise from U.S. Army South and large-scale readiness oversight from U.S. Army Forces Command. This integration delivers uninterrupted readiness, rapid force generation and expertise in homeland defense and civil support. It also enables the Army to respond more rapidly to crises and to continue building strong military alliances.

“Today is much more than a change of command ceremony,” Poppas said. “It’s a major step toward the merger of three powerhouse Army headquarters into one operational, transregional team that will face the nation’s top strategic priorities.”

The activation of West-Hemcom is the first step in a conditions-based transformation. By February 2026, the new command will reach its initial operational capability and will be assigned to Southcom and Northcom to prepare to accept theater Army authorities and responsibilities. Following initial operational capability, U.S. Army North and U.S. Army South will inactivate. If all conditions are met, West-Hemcom will reach full operational capability by summer 2026.

“Today, we continue in the Army’s rich history of transformation — combining Forces Command, Army North and Army South — to form the United States Army Western Hemisphere Command,” Ryan said. “The Army is making an enormous investment in this transformation, combining three important, effective and historically capable commands into one. It is our responsibility to deliver returns on that investment.” (Source: U.S. DoD)

08 Dec 25. Compromise NDAA protects Wedgetail, greenlights Black Hawk multiyear buys. Among other provisions in the FY26 NDAA, congressional authorizers would direct the defense secretary to explore possibilities for recapitalizing the military services’ executive airlift fleets. In keeping with tradition, lawmakers’ compromise fiscal 2026 defense policy bill released late Sunday tweaks several key Pentagon programs, with provisions aimed at aerospace like Air Force tankers and Army helicopters. The FY26 National Defense Authorization Act, if passed into law, would boost the Pentagon’s topline by $8 bn above what the Trump administration requested. While the NDAA holds significant sway over programmatic outcomes, funding will be formally decided by the budget process run by congressional appropriators. The final topline will “depend on what the appropriators work out,” Rep. Adam Smith, D-Wash., told Breaking Defense at the Reagan National Defense Forum over the weekend. “Mostly we like to follow their money, but since they didn’t put a number out there, we can’t move our bill forward with having a number.”

For now, here are some key NDAA provisions:

Up In The Air (And Space)

A top item that has garnered significant congressional pushback this year is the Air Force’s nascent E-7 Wedgetail program, which has faced the axe under the Trump administration. Along with provisions aimed at preventing the Wedgetail’s termination, in the NDAA lawmakers would also authorize a total of $846.7m to continue the radar plane’s development and procurement, according to a funding table included in the proposed legislation. The Air Force’s C-40 program, which seeks to add new jets for VIP transport and has previously faced skepticism from lawmakers, would get $250m authorized for one plane. The agreement would further direct a Pentagon-wide analysis of alternatives, with a deadline of April 2026, for recapitalizing the executive airlift fleets of each of the military services. Several of the bill’s provisions are aimed at the Air Force’s air refueling inventory, with a big change in the service’s minimum number of tankers: By October 2028 the Air Force would be required to keep at least 502 tankers in inventory, up from a current requirement of 466. Despite previously greenlighting the divestment of the KC-10 Extender, lawmakers would require the Air Force to preserve retired aircraft in storage. The bill would additionally slow some of the Air Force’s planned retirements, including by stopping the full divestment of the service’s A-10 fleet in FY26. The legislation would prevent the Air Force from retiring any F-15Es in FY26 as well. And though the bill doesn’t add any F-35 Joint Strike Fighters, it does include an extra $250m boost to spare parts procurement for F-35As and $125 m each for F-35Bs and Cs. It also trims over $300m collectively between Air Force, Marine Corps and Navy accounts for development of the jet’s Block 4 upgrade, citing delays.

Shifting to space, the bill directs the Air Force Secretary to coordinate with the DoD undersecretary for intelligence and security to study the “feasibility and advisability of establishing a program of record for tactical surveillance, reconnaissance, and tracking capabilities” (TacSRT) by July 31, 2026 — and granting such a program a nod of approval if the study is in favor. The congressional move to codify the Space Force’s pilot program for buying commercial remote sensing data follows a hard-fought agreement between the service and the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA) inked in May.

At the same time, lawmakers would require the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to submit an annual report for the next five years detailing all the requests made to NGA for space-based remote sensing products that includes how many were fulfilled, as well as how many were rejected and why. The first such report would be due in February.

Over At The Army

The bill gives the largest service, the Army, new multiyear procurement authority to buy Black Hawk UH-60s beginning in the fiscal year 2027. This comes after the Army’s Transformation Initiative has spurred cuts to its aviation portfolio as well as prioritized the Future Long-Range Assault Aircraft (FLRAA) program. Earlier this year Army Secretary Dan Driscoll and Chief of Staff Gen. Randy George sidestepped lawmakers’ questions related to the future of the Black Hawk. The duo instead focused on their priorities to accelerate the production of FLRAA — which is set, in part, to replace the Black Hawk. However, months later the Program Acquisition Executive of Maneuver Air, Maj. Gen. Clair Gill, told reporters at AUSA that “fundamentally, we’re not getting rid of Black Hawk anytime soon. We’re all going to be off this earth, and Black Hawk is still going to be flying.” He added that it’s not a matter of if Black Hawks will be a part of future fleets, but more the question of how many will fly. Further, Gill said at the time that when it comes to the Black Hawks, the service is primarily focused on the modernization of the fleet. It appears Gill’s wish came true, as the compromise NDAA authorizes an additional $100m for Black Hawk modernization. The bill also gave authorization to initiate early production of the FLRAA, stating that “[t]he Secretary of the Army may enter into contracts, in advance of full-rate production, for the procurement of future long-range assault aircraft as part of an accelerated low-rate early production effort for such aircraft.” The bill also calls for Driscoll to brief Congress no later than 180 days after the enactment of the NDAA on the implementation plan and timeline for the early production effort for FLRAA, the status of industrial base readiness and supply chain coordination for early production, and estimated long-term cost savings and operational benefits “expected to be derived from such early production effort.” (Source: Breaking Defense.com)

08 Dec 25. Proposed defense bill would fund Golden Dome, next-gen fighters. Congress’ proposed compromise National Defense Authorization Act would authorize $900.6bn in discretionary defense spending in fiscal 2026, which would be an $8bn increase over the Pentagon’s budget request this summer. The NDAA language, which lawmakers released Sunday night, would earmark $162bn for procurement spending, and another $146bn for research, development test and evaluation. It calls for $291bn for operations and maintenance and another $234bn for military personnel and health spending. The policy bill would fund several of President Donald Trump’s top defense priorities, including the sweeping Golden Dome missile defense program, the Air Force’s F-47 and Navy’s F/A-XX next-generation fighters, the B-21 Raider stealth bomber, Air Force drone wingmen referred to as collaborative combat aircraft, submarines and warships. But it does not contain language that would formally change the Defense Department’s official name to the War Department, Trump and Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth’s preferred moniker. Hegseth often emphasizes the adoption of the War Department name as signifying a shift in focus towards lethality, but it would take an act of Congress to officially rename it. In all, the NDAA would authorize more than $38 bn to develop, procure or modernize existing aircraft across the military. It would also authorize $26bn in shipbuilding funds to build or support the third Columbia-class ballistic missile submarine and one Virginia-class submarine, as well as advanced procurement for future submarines and future DDG-51 Arleigh Burke-class destroyers, full funding for the Ford-class aircraft carrier program, one anti-submarine warfare auxiliary ship and two ship-to-shore connector landing craft. It also would authorize more than $25bn to replenish the nation’s stock of critical munitions, including precision strike missiles, joint air-to-ground missiles, Naval Strike Missiles, Javelins, Stingers, Sidewinders, Tomahawks, Guided Multiple Launch Rocket Systems, Advanced Medium Range Air-to-Air Missiles, artillery rounds and joint direct attack munitions. The NDAA would authorize the Pentagon to buy 47 F-35 Joint Strike Fighters in total across the Air Force, Navy and Marine Corps. That is in line with the Pentagon’s original budget request released this past summer, and would be a reduction from the 69 the Pentagon had originally expected to buy this year. The military bought 74 F-35s in 2025. The Pentagon’s proposed 2026 budget said that the Air Force expected to buy 24 F-35A fighters, a little more than half of the 44 jets it bought in 2025. The department said this summer that instead of buying as many F-35s, it wanted to spend more money on sustaining the jets and making sure it had a strong supply base that can support operations and maintenance, as well as making sure the planned upgrades, known as Block 4, stay on track. The House Armed Services Committee said in an August report on its initial version of the NDAA that it supported the Pentagon’s decision to shift its focus more to sustainment and improvements, saying that approach is necessary to ensure the jets are ready to “fight tonight.” The compromise NDAA would require the military to build up its stockpile of spare F-35 parts, and have at least 90 days’ worth of parts on hand by the end of September 2028. The NDAA will also keep requiring the Government Accountability Office to evaluate the F-35 program each year, and for the secretary of defense to develop a plan to acquire and integrate open mission systems architecture into F-35 jets. The NDAA would provide a reprieve for the Air Force’s E-7 Wedgetail airborne battle management program, of which Hegseth has been skeptical and the Pentagon sought to kill in its budget proposal. Lawmakers would bar the Pentagon from canceling Boeing’s rapid prototype contract for the first two E-7s, or shutting down production lines of the jet, which is already flown by Australia. The bill would require the Air Force to keep at least 103 A-10 Warthog aircraft until the end of September 2026, as well as providing a report by the end of March on the service’s plans to retire the rest of the jets before fiscal 2029, and how they will be replaced. The bill would provide nearly $2.6bn for the Air Force’s F-47 next-generation fighter, in line with the service’s request. It would also require the Air Force secretary to send the House and Senate defense committees a report on the F-47 program by March 2027. This report would include a description of the F-47’s requirements and projected costs and schedule through 2034, and an acquisition strategy. Congress also wants to see a proposed strategy to field the F-47, including estimated force structure, construction and personnel training requirements; strategic basing considerations; and a strategy to integrate Air National Guard and Air Force Reserve units into F-47 operations. The Air Force would have to show Congress a plan to extend the life of its arsenal of roughly 400 LGM-30G Minuteman III intercontinental ballistic missiles until the successor LGM-35A Sentinel nuclear missile is fully operational. The bill would also bar the Air Force from reducing its arsenal of intercontinental ballistic missiles to fewer than 400, and keep at least 450 launch silos operational. And the Air Force would not be able to accept more than 188 KC-46A Pegasus aerial refueling tankers until the department shows Congress a plan to correct all of its remaining major deficiencies. (Source: Defense News)

08 Dec 25. U.S., Australian Cooperation on Land, Air, Sea, Industrial Base Top Topics at 40th AUSMIN. The U.S. and longtime ally Australia met at the State Department in Washington today for the 40th annual Australia-United States Ministerial Consultations.

“This is an incredibly strong alliance,” said Secretary of State Marco A. Rubio during remarks in advance of the talks. “In fact, as we were discussing a few moments ago, is our only ally that has fought with us in every war over the last — certainly over the last four or five decades — and we’re very grateful to them for that. And this is a very strong partnership. It’s a strong alliance, and what we want to do is continue to build on it.”

As part of the meeting, Rubio and Secretary of War Pete Hegseth met with their Australian counterparts, Deputy Prime Minister and Defense Minister Richard Marles and Foreign Affairs Minister Penny Wong. Hegseth noted work being done on enhanced force posture, which will benefit both nations, as a growing military-to-military partnership is central to maintaining the strong relationship between the U.S. and Australia.

“We’re upgrading the infrastructure on airbases in Queensland and the Northern Territory,” Hegseth said. “That allows for additional U.S. bomber rotations. We’re upgrading logistics and infrastructure in Darwin so more U.S. Marines can do rotational deployments and pre-positioning MV-22 Ospreys. This establishes new and resilient logistics networks across Australia.”

Another big issue for the U.S. and Australia is strengthening the defense industrial base, the collection of private-sector companies that design and manufacture hardware and supplies for militaries, including aircraft, ships, submarines, missiles, bombs, ammunition, firearms and combat vehicles.

“We’re deepening our cooperation on the defense industrial base — cooperation on guided weapons production and lethal capabilities, two-year roadmaps on Australia’s guided weapons and explosive ordinance enterprise, groundbreaking cooperative actions on things like — and precision strike missiles,” Hegseth said. “And we’re working towards coproduction and co-sustainment of hypersonic attack cruise missiles — co-sustainment air-to-air missiles cooperative programs across the board, including Mark 54 torpedoes.”

A key part of building weapons systems for both the U.S. and Australia is access to rare Earth and other critical minerals. In October, both nations signed a framework to support the supply of raw and processed critical minerals and rare earths, which are important to the commercial and defense industries of both countries.

“Critical minerals and rare earths are a huge part of ensuring both countries can operate the way we need to in that region and around the world,” Hegseth said.

The discussion also focused on the Australia, U.K. and U.S. trilateral security agreement, known as AUKUS, which has been in place for just over three years.

The War Department recently concluded a review of the AUKUS agreement meant to identify opportunities to strengthen it and ensure its long-term success, in alignment with the president’s “America First” agenda.

In October, President Donald J. Trump confirmed the U.S. is going “full steam ahead” on the AUKUS deal.

“As we move … full steam ahead on AUKUS, we applaud Australia’s upcoming delivery of an additional $1bn to help expand U.S. submarine production capacity,” Hegseth said. “We’re strengthening AUKUS so that it works for America, for Australia and for the U.K.”

The AUKUS agreement includes two pillars. The first pillar involves the delivery of a conventionally armed, nuclear-powered submarine capability to Australia, as well as significant investments in the industrial bases of all three partner nations. As part of that plan, Australia will buy three Virginia-class submarines from the U.S. to be delivered in the 2030s. Together, all three partner nations will also develop a new platform called “SSN-AUKUS,” which is expected to be ready for use by the U.K. in the 2030s and by Australia in the 2040s. The second AUKUS pillar involves enhancing joint capabilities and interoperability between the three nations. (Source: U.S. DoD)

06 Dec 25. Hegseth Outlines New National Defense Strategy During Speech at Reagan Library. During a keynote speech that one Pentagon official speaking on background said represented a preview of the War Department’s forthcoming National Defense Strategy, Secretary of War Pete Hegseth today outlined four distinct lines of effort for the department to take, so as to guarantee peace through strength for the U.S. and its allies in the coming years. While delivering his remarks at the Ronald Reagan National Library’s annual defense forum in Simi Valley, California, Hegseth underscored numerous parallels that he believes exist between the military strategies and policies of presidents Reagan and Donald J. Trump, while also emphasizing his view on the current president’s commitment to strengthening the U.S. military.

“Make no mistake about it: President Trump is hellbent on maintaining and accelerating the most powerful military the world has ever seen; the most powerful, the most lethal and American-made … the Arsenal of Freedom,” Hegseth said.

He added that the War Department is also working to get back to basics on the topics of restoring the warrior ethos, readiness, accountability, standards, discipline and lethality. Hegseth also said that the Trump administration and the War Department are committed to putting America first and avoiding getting into seemingly unending foreign entanglements, as well as prioritizing the nation’s security, freedom and prosperity of its citizens.

“We’re doing it in a way that leaves not only our nation better off, but the world. Out with utopian idealism, and in with hard-nosed realism,” he said.

To achieve those goals, Hegseth said it’s necessary to prioritize the aforementioned “four key lines of effort” at the War Department: defending the U.S. homeland and its hemisphere; deterring China through strength rather than force; increasing burden sharing between the U.S. and its allies and partners; and supercharging America’s defense industrial base.

Speaking on the first topic of defending the U.S. homeland and its citizens, Hegseth said that since Jan. 20 and under Trump’s direction, the War Department has made increasing security at the southern border and gaining 100% operational control a top priority.

“We did so by surging forces, where our troops partner with [the Department of Homeland Security] and [U.S Customs and Border Protection] to seal the border,” Hegseth said, adding that the number of illegal border crossings today is at virtually zero.

He added that the War Department is proud to support law enforcement in the deportation of dangerous criminals here illegally and that the War Department and its interagency partners are leaning on the U.S. Mexican counterparts to do their part to combat illegal immigration and drug trafficking. Hegseth also said that the U.S. border should be the last line of defense rather than the first, and that’s why the War Department is prioritizing combatting narco-terrorist throughout the Western Hemisphere.

“These narco-terrorists are the al-Qaida of our hemisphere, and we are hunting them with the same sophistication and precision that we hunted al-Qaida,” Hegseth said, adding that our allies in the region are also aiding in combating narco-terrorism.

On the issue of China, Hegseth said that, thanks to the leadership of President Trump, relations between the U.S. and China are stronger than they have been in many years.

“President Trump and this administration seek a stable peace, fair trade and respectful relations,” Hegseth said, adding that the War Department is committed to opening a wider range of military-to-military communications with China’s People’s Liberation Army aimed at deconfliction and de-escalation.

“This line of effort is based on flexible realism … an approach aimed not at domination, but rather a balance of power … that will enable all of us, all countries, to enjoy a decent peace in the Indo-Pacific, where trade flows openly and fairly, where we can all prosper and all interests are respected,” Hegseth said.

“That’s the world that we see in the Indo-Pacific, and that is what our approach is designed to produce,” he added.

On increasing burden sharing with U.S. allies around the world, Hegseth said that many who have shaped U.S. foreign policy have “lost the plot” when it comes to treating our allies as if they are incapable of helping themselves.

“That is, of course, patently ridiculous — not to mention insulting to our allies,” Hegseth said, adding that it’s important for America’s allies and partners to step up to do their part for our collective defense.

Noting that NATO countries have recently agreed to spend 5% of their gross domestic product on their defense, Hegseth said the Trump administration now hopes to apply that template to U.S. allies all around the globe.

“In a few years, thanks to President Trump’s visionary leadership, we will have our allies — which include some of the wealthiest and most productive countries in the world — once again fielding combat credible militaries and more state-revived defense industrial industries,” Hegseth said.

Along the fourth line of effort — defense industrial buildup — which he believes may be the the most important, Hegseth said that “supercharging” America’s defense industrial base underwrites all other lines of effort.

“Our objective is simple, if monumental: transform the entire acquisition system to rapidly accelerate the fielding of capabilities and focus on results,” he said.

Hegseth said the key to that objective is moving away from the current, prime contractor-dominated, low-competition defense industrial base to “a future powered by dynamic vendor space that accelerates production by combining investment at a commercial pace, with the uniquely American ability to scale and scale quickly.”

As his remarks concluded, Hegseth reiterated that the Trump administration is committed to putting America first by pursuing peace through strength.

“We’re reviving the warrior ethos, we’re rebuilding our great military and — every day — our warriors are reestablishing [deterrence],” Hegseth said.

“We owe safety, freedom and prosperity to the American people; and we will deliver.” (Source: U.S. DoD)

05 Dec 25. JIATF-401 Visits NCRCC, Emphasizes Data Sharing & Interagency Unity to Protect U.S. Airspace. Army Brig. Gen. Matt Ross, director of Joint Interagency Task Force 401, visited the National Capital Region Coordination Center this week to meet with senior leaders from the Department of Homeland Security, the Transportation Security Administration, the Federal Air Marshal Service and U.S. Air Force personnel who staff the center’s operational watch floor. The visit underscored how integrated data sharing, real-time information fusion and interagency coordination are essential to safeguarding the sovereignty of U.S. airspace and protecting the homeland. The NCRCC represents a cutting-edge model of interagency collaboration where military, law enforcement and homeland security professionals work side by side around the clock. During his visit, Ross observed the center’s watch floor and learned how sensors, intelligence feeds, aviation data and threat reporting are aggregated and fused into a shared operational picture which enables rapid, coordinated responses to potential threats.

“Our goal is to integrate sensors, effectors and mission command systems into a responsive, interoperable network that protects service members and American citizens alike” Ross said. ”Countering drones is not just a battlefield problem — it’s a homeland defense imperative.”

These statements reflect a shift in how the War Department approaches modern threats to the homeland. The integrated, information-driven approach ensures that decision-makers from across agencies see the same picture at the same time.

Real-Time Data Fusion and Information Sharing

During the visit, NCRCC leaders briefed Ross about the center’s processes for bringing a whole-of-government approach to establishing a unified air picture around the NCR. That consolidated view allows rapid detection and a timely, coordinated response to any potential threats. Ross emphasized that “success will be judged not by bureaucratic milestones, but by real-world capabilities and readiness.”

“The American people have a right to expect that the entire government is working together and in close coordination with local law enforcement to keep them safe,” he remarked.

Unified National Effort

As national stakeholders begin planning for America 250 and the 2026 World Cup, the types of threats faced in U.S. airspace will play a central role in the national security posture for each event. Mitigation efforts will be reinforced by the data-sharing architecture and coordination between the NCRCC, JIATF-401 and other relevant agencies. Ross noted that modern unmanned systems “are a defining threat for our time. Drones are prolific, inexpensive, evolving quickly and increasingly available to non-state actors and individuals.” He stressed that no single agency or organization can overcome this threat alone, necessitating a layered defense involving military assets, law enforcement, homeland security agencies, intelligence partners and first responders all working from a common operational picture.

Interagency Collaboration

The visit reinforced that the strength of national airspace defense lies not in any single agency, but in the synergy of many. The NCRCC’s watch floor brings together operators and analysts from numerous agencies creating a unified, 24/7 hub to keep Americans safe and providing an immediate response to any threats. Ross observed firsthand how an integrated model improves responsiveness and decision-making speed.

“When our agencies work together, there is no challenge we cannot meet,” he said.

By transforming a “community of interest” into a “community of action,” JIATF-401 and its partners are building a resilient, adaptive defense posture for U.S. airspace — one that adapts as threats evolve. Ross concluded his visit by reaffirming JIATF-401’s commitment to deepen interagency cooperation, expand data-sharing capabilities and build readiness. (Source: U.S. DoD)

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26 Nov 25. Sweden outlines procurement priorities. The five areas include air and missile defence, long-range capabilities, robust logistics, situational awareness, and maritime capabilities. The Swedish Armed Forces (SAF) has outlined its priority focus areas to the Government of Sweden following a review process triggered in late September. Announced by the SAF on 24 November, the proposals intend to help the country better fulfil NATO capability requirements. Sweden officially became a NATO member on 7 March 2024 and has since been taking steps to integrate with the alliance. The document, titled “Considerations on the Design of Military Defence” suggests a need for a long-range capability “to meet a qualified adversary in depth” as one of its five priorities. This likely refers to Russia, against which Ukraine is now using Franco-UK made Storm Shadow cruise missiles (which have a range of 250km), and US-made Army Tactical Missile Systems (ATACMS) with a 200km range. However, it is unclear as to whether this is the kind of long-range system sought, or whether a longer-range (1000km+) system like the Tomahawk cruise missile or Long Neptune. Another priority area outlined by SAF is ensuring control over the Baltic Sea. An area that is vital for troop mobility, reinforcements, and supplies, which demands protection from the sea and in the air. A series of NATO initiatives are already underway in the Baltic Sea, such as ‘Baltic Sentry’ which monitors undersea infrastructure, and ‘Baltic Air Policing’. Sweden is a key participant in both. The Swedish Defence Materiel Organisation – which manages procurements for the SAF – had not responded to DSEI Gateway’s request for comment on which additional capabilities might ensure Baltic Sea security, at the time of publication. Not-unrelated to this, is a need, as stipulated in the SAF’s proposal, to use multi-domain sensor networks to improve situational awareness. Along with supporting the military, it will also likely help augment NATO’s Common Operational Picture – which represents a shared, integrated battlefield picture. As is the case with many militaries currently, the SAF has identified a need to significantly bolster its air and missile defence. Noted as its fourth priority in the SAF’s proposal, the requirement is to protect its units and “strengthen the resilience of the northern flank”. The proliferation of drones in Ukraine, and Russia’s expertise in missile development are drivers of this demand. Notably, the day after these priorities were put forward, the Swedish Ministry of Defence committed SEK3.5bn (USD367m) to air defence capabilities. This includes acquiring IRIS-T SLS missiles from Diehl Defence – designed to protect ground troops – and Giraffe 1X short-range radars from domestic prime Saab. This particular announcement also highlighted a need for additional capabilities to counter “combat aircraft, helicopters, and drones”, but did not go as far as stating when they might be acquired. Finally, the SAF proposal stated that it requires a “robust logistics network”, targeting the sustainment of forces for extended periods of time. This includes leveraging infrastructure. Besides these five areas, the SAF also states that cyber defence remains a priority, as does drone development, civil defence, and the close protection of troops and facilities. Summarising the proposals, Lieutenant General (Lt Gen) Carl-Johan Edström, Chief of the Defence Staff, explained that “this is not a new plan. It is an assessment of what is required to strengthen our military capability”. Lt Gen Edström stressed that decisions now sit with politicians with regard to financing and actioning these priorities, which are intended to help fulfil the country’s Defence Resolution 2025-2030 and NATO commitments. (Source: Clarion)

08 Dec 25. Italy’s sudden defense-spending uptick lacks details, economist finds. Italy has juggled its definition of what constitutes defense spending to beef up its budget by €14bn ($16.3bn) this year, but has failed to explain how it did it, one of Italy’s leading economists has complained. Carlo Cottarelli said that Italy raised its spending, on paper, from around 1.5% of GDP in 2024 to 2% in 2025 “without a clear explanation” of how it did it. “Should we consider ourselves more secure than last year? We don’t know,” said Cottarelli, a former Italian senator and director with the International Monetary Fund who teaches at Milan’s Catholic University of the Sacred Heart. The Italian government first committed to hitting 2% in April, thus getting Italian spending to the level first promised to NATO in 2014 and never attained. The announcement was made ahead of the NATO conference in June when members agreed to raise spending again to 3.5% of GDP by 2035, plus another 1.5% on defense-related infrastructure spending. Rome released the first details of how it would hit 2% in October with the much-delayed release of its 2025 defense budget. The document said Italy would spend €31.3bn on defense this year, up 7.2% on last year, but added that various expenditures were being reclassified as defense spending to boost the budget further – at least on paper. Pension outlays would be included, as well as other budgets which would be given “a more military focus.” The document also stated that “military cooperation projects” would be factored in. Adding those outlays would make official spending shoot up by €14bn to €45.3bn, hitting the 2% target, the document stated. In a report produced by Cottarelli last month, the economist quoted a statement to parliament given this year by Italian Defense Minister Guido Crosetto in which the minister said reaching 2% had also involved including spending by Italy’s tax police and coast guard, as well as outlays on space and cyber defense.

“Just as other countries do,” Crosetto said.

But Cottarelli argued in his report the scant detail on the new spending was insufficient.

“It’s not clear from the words of the minister or from official documents what this reclassification consists of. Is it existing spending that now has a ‘more military’ connotation than in the past, or has it been understood that some spending is more military than previously thought? Additionally it is not known which spending is involved,” Cottarelli wrote.

He told Defense News no new information had been released since he wrote the report. The Italian defense ministry did not respond to requests for comment. Despite the complaint of lack of information about the massive leap to 2%, a NATO official told Defense News that NATO was satisfied with Italy’s reclassification of spending.

“The defense expenditures declared by Italy are consistent with the NATO definition of defense expenditure and the approach is also applied by other allies,” the official said.

Asked to give a breakdown of the spending Italy has reclassified as defense spending, the official stated, “I refer you to the Italian authorities, for any further comments in this respect.” (Source: Defense News)

08 Dec 25. Germany: Military service law will likely fuel far-left attacks on railway system, defence firms. On 5 December, the German Parliament (Bundestag) approved a new military service law designed to expand the size of the Bundeswehr (i.e. the German Armed Forces). The law will introduce voluntary military service; all 18-year-olds will be sent a request in January to gauge their interest and willingness to join the army, to which they will be required to respond. Furthermore, all men born after 1 January 2008 will be required to undergo medical valuation. There will also be financial incentives for joining the Bundeswehr. The law’s aim is to increase Germany’s number of active soldiers to between 255,000 and 270,000 by 2035. If voluntary recruitment fails to deliver sufficient numbers, the Bundestag can enable compulsory enlistment from 2027 onwards. We assess that this legislation is likely to fuel further anti-war activism in the coming months. This is likely to entail peaceful protests in urban centres, as well as far-left activism against defence and logistics companies. The sabotage of the railway system in opposition to wider German rearmament is likely, while the more sporadic sabotage of defence industrial sites is realistic. (Source: Sibylline)

05 Dec 25. Trump’s national security strategy slams European allies. President Donald Trump’s administration set forth a new national security strategy that paints European allies as weak and aims to reassert America’s dominance in the Western Hemisphere. The document released Friday by the White House is sure to roil long-standing U.S. allies in Europe for its scathing critiques of their migration and free speech policies, suggesting they face the “prospect of civilizational erasure” and raising doubts about their long-term reliability as American partners. It reinforces, in sometimes chilly and bellicose terms, Trump’s “America First” philosophy, which favors nonintervention overseas, questions decades of strategic relationships and prioritizes U.S. interests above all. The U.S. strategy “is motivated above all by what works for America — or, in two words, ‘America First,’” the document said. This is the first national security strategy, a document the administration is required by law to release, since the Republican president’s return to office in January. It is a stark break from the course set by President Joe Biden’s Democratic administration, which sought to reinvigorate alliances after many were rattled in Trump’s first term and to check a more assertive Russia. The United States is seeking to broker an end Russia’s nearly 4-year-old war in Ukraine, a goal that the national security strategy says is in America’s vital interests. But the document makes clear that the U.S. wants to improve its relationship with Russia after years of Moscow being treated as a global pariah and that ending the war is a core U.S. interest to “reestablish strategic stability with Russia.” The document also is critical of America’s European allies. They have found themselves sometimes at odds this year with Trump’s shifting approaches to the Russia-Ukraine war and are facing domestic economic challenges as well an existential crisis, according to the U.S. Economic stagnation in Europe “is eclipsed by the real and more stark prospect of civilizational erasure,” the strategy document said. The U.S. suggests that Europe is being enfeebled by its immigration policies, declining birthrates, “censorship of free speech and suppression of political opposition” and a “loss of national identities and self-confidence.”

“Should present trends continue, the continent will be unrecognizable in 20 years or less. As such, it is far from obvious whether certain European countries will have economies and militaries strong enough to remain reliable allies,” the document said. “Many of these nations are currently doubling down on their present path. We want Europe to remain European, to regain its civilizational self-confidence.”

Despite Trump’s “America First” maxim, his administration has carried out a series of military strikes on alleged drug traffickers in the Caribbean Sea and eastern Pacific Ocean while weighing possible military action in Venezuela to pressure President Nicolás Maduro. The moves are part of what the national security strategy lays out as “a ‘Trump Corollary’ to the Monroe Doctrine.” The 1823 Monroe Doctrine, formulated by President James Monroe, was originally aimed at opposing any European meddling in the Western Hemisphere and was used to justify U.S. military interventions in Latin America. Trump’s strategy document says the U.S. is reimagining its military footprint in the region even after building up the largest military presence there in generations. That means, for instance, “targeted deployments to secure the border and defeat cartels, including where necessary the use of lethal force to replace the failed law enforcement-only strategy of the last several decades,” it says. (Source: Defense News)

05 Dec 25. Drones fly over French strategic nuclear submarine base, media report. Several unidentified drones flew over France’s Ile Longue naval base, home to the country’s fleet of strategic nuclear missile submarines, according to Agence France-Presse, citing the gendarmerie police. Five drones were detected “by technical means” flying over the base on Thursday around 7:30 p.m. local time, and troops assigned to protect the base opened anti-drone fire several times, AFP said. The drones were “neutralized,” daily Liberation reported, with the newspaper saying the usual procedure involves jamming. The military prosecutor’s office in the city of Rennes has started an investigation after the overflight of several drones, Liberation reported, citing the maritime prefecture of the Atlantic. The drones for now appear to have been light and unarmed, Liberation said The drones were small models “that did not threaten sensitive infrastructure,” according to Frigate Capt. Guillaume Le Rasle, a spokesman for the maritime prefect, cited by Liberation. There was a previous drone overflight of the Crozon peninsula, of which Ile Longue is a part, in the night of Nov. 17 to 18, without flying over the military zone, according to the navy officer. The overflights are the latest in a string of drone incursions over military locations in Europe, with Denmark, the Netherlands and Belgium among the countries reporting unidentified unmanned aerial systems over military air bases. France is the European Union’s only nuclear-armed power, and together with the United Kingdom one of the two countries in European NATO to have its own nuclear weapons. Ile Longue is home to four nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines in the Le Triomphant class that make up the ocean-based part of French nuclear deterrence. French doctrine prescribes a continuous-at-sea presence with at least one nuclear-armed submarine on patrol at any given time. The airborne part of the French deterrent consists of Rafale jets armed with nuclear-tipped cruise missiles. France introduced a modernized version of its M51 submarine-launched strategic ballistic missile in October, with improved range, accuracy and capability to penetrate enemy defenses, according to the French Armed Forces Ministry. (Source: Defense News)

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04 Dec 25. Afghanistan-Pakistan: Inconclusive talks will increase risk of renewed hostilities. On 3 December, reports emerged that the latest round of talks between Afghanistan and Pakistan had failed to produce a breakthrough. However, both sides have agreed to maintain the previously established ceasefire. Saudi Arabia mediated the most recent round last weekend. This follows earlier talks mediated by Qatar and Turkey, which also ended inconclusively. Tensions have remained high between Afghanistan and Pakistan, particularly after the recent alleged Pakistani airstrikes in Afghanistan as well as Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) attacks in Pakistan’s capital Islamabad and Peshawar (Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province). Pakistan has long accused the Afghan Taliban of sheltering the TTP. We assess that inconclusive talks will increase the risk of renewed hostilities along the border in the coming days. While there remains a possibility of further rounds of mediated dialogue, they are unlikely to resolve long-standing issues. This is because the Taliban is unlikely to concede on key issues, such as a genuine commitment to restrain the TTP. (Source: Sibylline)

04 Dec 25. Ethiopia: Funding restriction to Tigray government will increase unrest, conflict risks. On 2 December, local officials in Tigray confirmed that it had been two months since the regional government had received its funding from the federal government. The announcement comes amid escalating tensions between the federal government and the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF), which indirectly leads the Tigray Interim Authority (TIA; see Sibylline Situation Update Brief – 1 September 2025). The federal government is unlikely to fully and unconditionally restore funding to the TIA before the 2026 general election, amid broader efforts to undermine support for the TPLF’s hardline factions. The funding restriction will almost certainly compound the TIA’s long-standing liquidity crisis, restricting its capacity to pay civil servants and provide basic services to internally displaced persons. This dynamic will likely exacerbate anti-government sentiment in Tigray and deepen polarisation along pro- and anti-TPLF lines, increasing the risk of aligned militant factions re-mobilising in the coming days and weeks. In this scenario, TPLF factions will likely attempt to take control of government offices, increasing the risk of clashes and exposure to crossfire, including in the regional capital Mekele. In the event of significant escalation in Tigray, the federal security forces will likely intervene to oppose TPLF hardliners, increasing the risk of conflict re-escalation in the coming months. (Source: Sibylline)

03 Dec 25. Philippines tests new battle plan for fending off invaders alone. The Philippine military will test a new defense plan to be spearheaded by a new command, as officials here game out what it would take to repel invaders without immediate help from allies.
The exercises take place amid heightened security concerns over China’s aggressive actions in the West Philippine Sea and regional developments involving Taiwan.
“We are looking at all possible scenarios and we are incorporating those into the exercises, so we are prepared for any eventuality,” Philippine military Chief of Staff Gen. Romeo Brawner Jr. told reporters during the launch of the exercise on Nov. 4.
The annual military drill, known as the Armed Forces of the Philippines Joint Exercise Dagat-Langit-Lupa (AJEX DAGIT-PA), will include training on integrated air and missile defense operations, defending gas and oil platforms, land defense, and amphibious exercises aimed at retaking islands, airfields and seaports.
Officials told Defense News that planners and strategists have studied hundreds of conflict scenarios, including potential missile attacks, and crafted the training program to assess troop response and spot defense gaps.
Like previous editions, the exercises will be conducted in the country’s northern and western borders.
A segment will be held in Thitu Island or Pag-asa Island, a Philippine-controlled territory in the South China Sea that is home to around 400 Filipinos. Experts and military officials have identified Thitu as a likely initial target in an invasion.
The country’s armed forces, dubbed AFP, have conducted special operations and civilian defense training there. The agenda for this year includes naval surface fire support drills, but the military declined to confirm if these will accompany amphibious landing exercises.
Unlike previous iterations, this year’s edition will engage fewer troops with only 2,000 compared to last year’s 3,000. Instead, the military reserve forces, the Philippine Coast Guard, and the Philippine National Police will participate to complement end strength, Brawner said.
The agenda will also include training on cyber, electronic, and space-related warfare.
“These are not just simulations,” Brawner said. “The exercises are strategic rehearsals for real-world contingencies, validating our concepts of operations … we will also test out the new unilateral defense plan,” he added.
Since 2023, the Philippine military has officially shifted to external defense and last year released a Comprehensive Archipelagic Defense Concept (CADC) to guide its defense doctrine.
Details of the strategy remain sparse, however, and it’s uncertain how the military would operationalize this concept given its limited resources and capabilities.
The AFP revealed a shift toward a new “unilateral defense plan” called Bantay Kalayaan late last year to implement the defensive concept, which was tested under the previous AJEX DAGIT-PA training program.
The current module builds on lessons learned from last year, officials said, as it includes a more streamlined command-and-control unit solely for territorial defense – a significant move to reflect the expanding defense focus.
The AFP established its Strategic Command in late October, the lead participating unit in the ongoing exercise. The unit will be responsible for areas outside the purview of joint command units. This includes exclusive economic zones, occupied territories in the South China Sea, and the aerial domain.
Gen. Brawner suggested the AFP Strategic Command may become the principal commanding unit of the fighting forces in wartime.
“The battle staff in the GHQ (General Headquarters) cannot transform into a full-blown battle staff to fight the war,” Brawner said. “That is why I was convinced that we have to organize an AFP Strategic Command … and we rushed toward establishing it so they could be the main participant in this exercise,” he said.
While the Philippines has joined hundreds of joint military drills with allies, the internal military exercise is crucial in beefing up the country’s defense, as Filipino troops will be “fighting the war by ourselves in the first part,” Brawner said.
Brawner explained that, should war break out, the armed forces must hold out for at least a month before possible reinforcements from allies.
“This exercise is crucial so we can see the limit of our defense architecture. If war breaks out, we will be the first to defend ourselves,” Brawner said, adding that despite the scenario, the Philippines is “also expecting help from our ally under our mutual defense treaty.” (Source: Defense News)

03 Dec 25. Armenia-Turkey: Likelihood of land border reopening in coming months is increasing modestly. On 3 December, Bloomberg reported that Turkey is considering reopening its land border with Armenia – which has been shut since 1993 – within the next six months. Unspecified individuals familiar with the matter have argued that any such move would potentially bolster Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan’s position ahead of parliamentary elections in early June 2026. According to these sources cited by Bloomberg, if Pashinyan wins another term, he could work with Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev to formalise a peace agreement. The anonymous individuals argued that Turkey would appoint an ambassador to Armenia to restore diplomatic relations only after an Armenia-Azerbaijan peace agreement is reached. In late November, Armenian and Turkish representatives held a second round of negotiations focused on restoring the Gyumri-Kars railway. While we cannot confirm the veracity of Bloomberg’s report, we assess that its findings and the regional developments in recent months modestly increase the likelihood of Turkey reopening its land border with Armenia in the medium term. However, Turkey conditions normalising ties with Armenia on the country reaching a peace agreement with Azerbaijan. Consequently, any significant improvement in regional connectivity will likely hinge on Armenia-Azerbaijan relations. (Source: Sibylline)

03 Dec 25. Sudan Offers Russia Red Sea Base in Exchange for Arms. Sudan has proposed giving Russia its first African naval base, potentially at Port Sudan, in return for military equipment to fight the Rapid Support Forces (RSF), a militia Moscow had initially backed, according to the Wall Street Journal. Under the agreement, Russia would gain mining concessions, while Sudan would receive anti-aircraft systems and other military hardware at preferential rates.
Military Watch Magazine says that the deal involves Sudan acquiring Su-30 and Su-35 fighter jets from Russia.
Officials said that while the deal would bolster Sudan’s military amid its ongoing conflict with the RSF, it could also heighten tensions with the U.S. and European Union given Russia’s strained relations with the West.
The reported agreement comes five years after Russia announced a nearly identical deal, which outlined a 25-year operation of a naval base capable of hosting 300 personnel and up to four vessels.
The earlier agreement also included automatic 10-year renewals unless either side raised objections. However, following the overthrow of longtime dictator Omar al-Bashir, Sudan’s new military ruling council placed the deal under review.
Sudan’s renewed engagement with Russia comes after the RSF captured El-Fasher, the capital of Darfur, in late October, consolidating control over much of western Sudan. (Source: https://www.sofx.com/)

02 Dec 25. China: General rare earth export licences signal relaxed supply for US non-defence sectors. Earlier on 2 December, reports claimed that China has permitted at least three rare earth magnet makers to export to selected customers based on its new export licensing regime. Media reports note that the Chinese producer JL MAG Rare Earth has received licences for most of its clients, while Ningbo Yunsheng and Beijing Zhong Ke San Huan High-Tech have obtained licences for selected clients. JL MAG Rare Earth serves both US and EU clients, and all three firms sell to the automotive industry. China agreed to streamline the rare earth licensing regime under the recent US-China trade deal. The US claimed China will issue ‘general licences’ for rare earth exports to US end users and suppliers. Although the Chinese Ministry of Commerce has not used the same term, it admitted that China is designing general permissions. It is likely that China will further expand its licence grants to US manufacturers and relevant suppliers, despite retaining tighter vetting procedures for defence-linked sectors; however, this will remain contingent on stable China-US relations. Additionally, it is likely that broad grants of ‘general licences’ directly benefitting EU firms will be less forthcoming in the short term, considering ongoing trade negotiations between China and the bloc. (Source: Sibylline)

02 Dec 25. Sudan: Military setbacks are unlikely to prompt army to pursue peace; conflict escalation is likely. On 1 December, the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) captured Babanusa (West Kordofan state). The RSF likely re-deployed military resources to Kordofan region’s fronts following the capture of El Fasher (North Darfur state). This operation, coupled with the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF)’s difficulties in re-supplying its forces by air, facilitated Babanusa’s capture. This capture violates the RSF’s self-declared three-month humanitarian truce, which was announced following the SAF’s rejection of a US-backed ceasefire proposal. Despite its military setbacks, the SAF has continued to indicate that it will pursue a military resolution to the conflict. The SAF recently stated that it will reject any ceasefire proposal by the Quad mediation group (comprised of Egypt, Saudi Arabia, the UAE and the US), which would leave the RSF intact. Instead, the SAF has revived its offer to provide Russia with a Red Sea naval base in exchange for anti-aircraft systems and fighter jets. While the repeatedly stalled Russian naval base proposal is unlikely to materialise in the medium term, it will likely serve to pressure the US to adopt a course that is more favourable to the SAF. This will delay the prospects for a ceasefire until the SAF has significantly improved its battlefield position. (Source: Sibylline)

02 Dec 25. China-Japan: Confrontation near disputed islands in East China Sea highlights elevated tensions. Earlier on 2 December, there was a close encounter between a Japanese fishing vessel and two China Coast Guard (CCG) ships near the uninhabited Senkaku Islands (Japan) / Diaoyu Islands (China), which are controlled by Japan and claimed by China. This comes amid elevated tensions following Japanese Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi’s controversial remarks on Taiwan last month (see Sibylline Situation Update Brief – 26 November 2025). Airlines have cancelled more than 40% of the scheduled flights from China to Japan in December after the Chinese authorities warned citizens against visiting Japan. We assess that there is a high risk that both countries will take further retaliatory actions. On 1 December, China warned that Japan will ‘bear all the consequences’ if Takaichi does not retract her comments (which she is highly unlikely to do). If tensions escalate further, China will likely increase its naval and CCG deployments around the Diaoyu/Senkaku islands, driving the risk of an accidental collision and a standoff. This will lead to growing public calls for boycotts of Japanese goods in China. (Source: Sibylline)

01 Dec 25. China’s military firms struggle as corruption purge bites, report says.
• Summary
• Revenue declines buck global uptrend amid corruption crackdown
• Downturn adds to uncertainty over China’s military modernisation
• Revenues of world’s 100 largest arms firms hit record in 2024, study says
Revenues at China’s giant military firms fell last year as corruption purges slowed arms contracts and procurement, according to a study released on Monday by a leading conflict think tank.
The Chinese declines contrast with strong revenue growth globally for big arms and military-services companies, fuelled by wars in Ukraine and Gaza, and global and regional tensions, the research by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute found.
“A host of corruption allegations in Chinese arms procurement led to major arms contracts being postponed or cancelled in 2024,” said Nan Tian, director of SIPRI’s Military Expenditure and Arms Production Programme.
“This deepens uncertainty around the status of China’s military modernisation efforts and when new capabilities will materialise.”
CHINA’S REVENUES DOWN 10%, JAPAN’S UP 40%
The People’s Liberation Army was one of the main targets of a broader corruption crackdown ordered by President Xi Jinping in 2012, reaching the upper levels of the military in 2023 when its Rocket Force was targeted.
Eight top generals were expelled from the ruling Communist Party on graft charges in October, including the country’s number two general, He Weidong. He had served under Xi on the Central Military Commission, China’s supreme military command organisation.
Asian and Western diplomats say they are still trying to gauge the impact of the crackdown on China’s ongoing military rise and how far down it reaches through the command chain.
Revenues of China’s top military firms fell 10% last year, while those in Japan surged 40%, Germany 36% and U.S. revenues rose 3.8%, SIPRI data shows.
Bar chart showing percentage change in the arms revenues of companies in the SIPRI Top 100, by country 2023-24
Revenues of the world’s 100 largest arms firms rose 5.9% to a record $679 bn, the report said, while China’s fall was enough to make Asia-Oceania the only region to post a revenue decline among its top arms firms.
China’s weapons revenue fell despite three decades of rising defence budgets in Beijing’s growing strategic rivalry with the United States, Asia’s traditional military power, and tensions over Taiwan and the hotly disputed South China Sea.
MID-, LONG-TERM INVESTMENT, MODERNISATION TO CONTINUE
The buildup is bearing fruit as China deploys the world’s largest naval and coast guard fleets – including a potentially advanced new aircraft carrier – a host of new hypersonic missiles, nuclear weapons and air and sea drones.
Revenue fell at AVIC, China’s largest arms maker, land-systems producer Norinco and aerospace and missile manufacturer CASC, all state-owned, according to the SIPRI research. Norinco experienced the steepest revenue decline, falling 31% to $14 bn.
Corruption-related personnel changes at the top of Norinco and CASC sparked government reviews and project delays, while deliveries of AVIC’s military aircraft slowed, the research found.
China’s defence ministry and the three companies did not immediately respond to faxed requests for comment from Reuters.
The timeline of advanced systems for the People’s Liberation Army’s Rocket Force, which handles its growing arsenal of ballistic, hypersonic and cruise missiles, could be exposed, along with aerospace and cyber programmes, said SIPRI researcher Xiao Liang.
This adds to uncertainties over the PLA’s target of getting key capabilities and war-fighting readiness in place for its 100th anniversary, Liang said. The PLA’s forerunner, Mao Zedong’s Red Army, was founded in 1927.
“However, in the medium and longer term, sustained investment in defence budgets and political commitment behind modernisation will continue, albeit with some programme delays, higher costs and tighter control of procurement,” Liang said. (Source: Reuters)

01 Dec 25. American and Syrian forces conduct airstrikes on ISIS weapons storage facilities, US military says. The U.S. military said on Sunday that it recently destroyed 15 sites containing Islamic State weapons caches in southern Syria.
U.S. Central Command said it and Syrian forces identified and destroyed the storage facilities across the Rif Damashq province during multiple airstrikes and ground detonations that were conducted from November 24 to November 2
“The combined operation destroyed over 130 mortars and rockets, multiple assault rifles, machine guns, anti-tank mines, and materials for building improvised explosive devices,” CENTCOM said in a statement.
Islamic State, the militant group that once imposed hardline Islamist rule over ms of people in Syria and Iraq, was largely crushed by a U.S.-led coalition several years ago, but has managed to rebuild and regroup.
Admiral Brad Cooper, CENTCOM commander, said on Sunday the operation “ensures gains made against ISIS are lasting.”
U.S. President Donald Trump vowed to do everything he could to make Syria successful after November 10 talks with Syrian President Ahmed al-Sharaa, a former al Qaeda commander who until recently was sanctioned by Washington as a foreign terrorist.
Syria carried out nationwide pre-emptive operations targeting Islamic State cells in the days before the talks in Washington, the Syrian government said at the time.
One of Sharaa’s chief aims in the meeting with Trump was to push for full removal of the toughest U.S. sanctions against the country.
During the meeting, the U.S. Treasury Department announced a 180-day extension of its suspension of enforcement of the so-called Caesar sanctions, but only the U.S. Congress can lift them entirely. (Source: Reuters)

01 Dec 25. New look Australian Defence Delivery Agency to shake up nation’s capability acquisition. Acting Prime Minister and Defence Minister Richard Marles and Defence Industry Minister Pat Conroy have announced a new look Defence bureaucracy to tackle the nation’s growing defence acquisition pipeline. The Albanese government has announced its most sweeping overhaul of Defence procurement in decades, unveiling plans for a new agency designed to tighten project delivery, strengthen accountability and ensure Australia gets maximum value from its record defence investment.
The reforms, framed as essential to meeting Australia’s increasingly complex strategic environment, will see the creation of a stand-alone Defence Delivery Agency, tasked with streamlining how the nation buys, builds and sustains military capability.
Minister Marles stressed the importance of standing up the Defence Delivery Agency, saying, “The establishment of the Defence Delivery Agency will elevate the professionalism and strategic focus of Defence capability acquisition and sustainment. It will drive stronger contestability, more accurate cost estimation, and clearer accountability for the delivery of major projects.”
Since coming to office in May 2022, the government has committed an extra $70 bn over the decade, the largest peacetime boost to defence spending in Australian history. Much of that funding is earmarked for major acquisition and sustainment programs, placing intense pressure on Defence to deliver outcomes on time and on budget.
The acting Prime Minister added, “As the Albanese government makes the biggest ever peacetime investment in Defence, it is important that we put in place the structures and systems to ensure Australia’s Defence Force can deliver the capabilities we need at speed and within budget.”
Under the changes, the new agency will consolidate three of Defence’s most important capability-delivery groups: the Capability Acquisition and Sustainment Group, the Guided Weapons and Explosive Ordnance Group, and the Naval Shipbuilding and Sustainment Group.
Supporting this, a newly appointed National Armaments director will head the agency, advising government on acquisition strategies and overseeing the delivery of major capability and sustainment projects once approved by cabinet.
By merging them under one structure with its own budget authority, the government aims to cut internal duplication, accelerate delivery schedules, and strengthen the national defence industrial base.
Crucially, the agency will report directly to ministers, an elevation designed to provide clearer lines of accountability for multi-bn-dollar procurement programs that are central to Australia’s future deterrence posture.
Minister Conroy expanded on the acting Prime Minister’s statement, saying, “The increasing complexity of Defence capabilities, systems and platforms requires a systematic rethink of the capability development and delivery system. This is about setting Defence up for success so we can modernise the ADF in line with the National Defence Strategy, while ensuring we spend taxpayers’ money wisely.”
In tandem with the procurement overhaul, Defence will centralise its capability development functions, tightening how new proposals are assessed, prioritised and integrated across the Australian Defence Force. The government said this will ensure investment decisions are aligned with an increasingly focused, integrated force design.
The reforms are expected to deliver stronger project and budget discipline, sharper cost estimation, and improved oversight across the full life cycle of defence capability.
Work on designing and standing up the Defence Delivery Agency will begin immediately, with extensive consultation planned across industry and other stakeholders, recognising the critical role of Australian industry in delivering sovereign capability.
Minister Conroy added, “The new agency will help ensure our industrial base is resilient, innovative and aligned with our strategic priorities. It will create more opportunities for Australian businesses and workers to contribute to Australia’s national security.”
The government said the overhaul builds on earlier improvements made since 2022 and is aimed squarely at ensuring the ADF has the tools, technology and industrial backing needed to safeguard Australia in a rapidly changing strategic environment.
(Source: Defence Connect)

01 Dec 25. India to pitch new arms deal with Russia during Putin visit, Bloomberg News reports. India plans to start discussions toward the purchase of Russian fighter jets and a missile defense shield during President Vladimir Putin’s visit this week, Bloomberg News reported on Sunday, citing people with knowledge of the matter. India and Russia have a Special and Privileged Strategic Partnership under which discussions for the purchase of Su-57 fighter jets and an advanced version of the missile defense shield S-500 are expected, the report said. Reuters could not immediately verify the report. (Source: Reuters)

01 Dec 25. Taiwan airline seeks role in ‘whole of society’ defence with surveillance flights to counter China.
• Summary
• Companies
• Taiwan seeking closer integration of civilian firms into defence
• Charter airline offers help to track Chinese ships
• Taiwan’s military stretched trying to monitor Chinese movements
Flying over the blue waters off Taiwan’s east coast, a light aircraft equipped with a powerful U.S.-made radar slung under its belly tracks Chinese warships, collecting data its operator is keen to provide to Taipei’s security forces.
Small Taiwanese operator Apex Aviation, better known for pilot training and charter flights, is pitching the surveillance flights to a government that has started engaging civilian firms in developing new technologies for its “whole of society resilience” initiative.
The government has invited businesses, research groups and other organisations to take on more active roles, including backing up communications and logistics, shoring up cyber defences and, potentially contributing to surveillance and intelligence-gathering.
While common in countries such as the United States, this joint military-civilian approach is new for Taiwan, whose armed forces are increasingly hard-pressed responding to daily Chinese incursions in the skies and waters around the island.
Taipei has said it aims to boost defence spending to 5% of GDP by 2030 and will introduce a $40 bn supplementary budget, including “significant” new U.S. arms purchases.
Apex is seeking a role in that build-up. But unlike companies that have received defence contracts so far, the airline wants to run its surveillance operation in-house, while remaining open to transferring equipment to authorities.
“These Chinese drills are happening more and more frequently, getting closer and closer. That’s what creates that sense of urgency. If we don’t jump in now, we might not even get the chance later,” Apex Chairman Wilson Kao told Reuters.
Apex declined to give estimates on potential revenue from such a deal.
OPEN TO NEW IDEAS
Taiwan’s defence ministry has so far been cautious about external partners, telling Reuters it is able to effectively monitor Chinese activities and currently has no plans for cooperation. But it said it was open to new ideas.
“The ministry welcomes discussions on ‘public-private collaboration’ to strengthen national defence build-up,” it said in a statement.
Taiwan’s coast guard said it is working to boost its own reconnaissance capacity and will prioritise drones before gradually expanding the effort to include manned aircraft.
Apex has spent more than T$400 m ($13.07 m) to convert an 11-seater Italian-made Tecnam P2012 Traveller propeller plane into a reconnaissance aircraft equipped with a U.S.-made synthetic aperture radar under its fuselage.
The company wants to feed data from the radar, which can detect objects as small as 0.09 square metres, to Taiwan’s military and the coast guard as they track Chinese ships around the island.
The business opportunity goes beyond Taiwan.
Apex said it could also market the relatively low-cost patrol service to friendly governments in the region that monitor Chinese activity, adding it can quickly build a reconnaissance fleet with both aircraft and drones.
LEGAL UNCERTAINTIES
Experts said authorities must establish a legal basis to allow civilian aircraft to engage in reconnaissance and also raised concerns about whether they would be made vulnerable to Chinese forces.
“Patrol aircraft involves the use of enforcement. Whether enforcement can be handed off to the private sector is a matter of legal debate,” Su Tzu-yun, a research fellow at Taiwan’s top military think tank, the Institute for National Defence and Security Research, said.
But the cost of flying a light aircraft on a reconnaissance mission could be as low as one-tenth of a military plane.
While Apex only operates in Taiwanese air space, one of its medical charter flights to Kinmen, which sits next to China’s coast, was repeatedly approached by Chinese military planes for three consecutive days in June.
The incident, condemned by Taiwan’s government, raised concerns about the safety of civilian aircraft facing China’s stepped up “grey-zone” harassment tactics.
Kao said Apex’s board had deliberated potential risks before taking on the project.
“I’m just doing the right thing. I’m just steadily moving forward. And I won’t back down just because of any harassment,” he said at Taitung airport on Taiwan’s east coast.
SEA DRONES AT THE FOREFRONT
Apex has been buoyed by a growing government push for companies with limited or no defence pedigree to develop products for military use.
One of the initiative’s biggest highlights is a new generation of sea drones developed by remote control model car, aircraft and boat producer Thunder Tiger.
The company’s SeaShark 800 drone can carry 1,200 kg (2,600 lbs) of explosives and travel up to 500 km (310 miles), and featured prominently at a summer “beauty show” where operators offered their wares to Taiwan’s military.
One senior Taiwan security official said joint military-civilian initiatives were an idea the government needed to take seriously.
“The operational stress on troops is extremely high. The Communist military is creating new forms of pressure, so we must develop new approaches to counter them.” (Source: Reuters)

28 Nov 25. Defence spending to increase, but gradually – Motshekga. South Africa’s defence budget will increase, but gradually, with a 50% increase planned over the next five years, Defence and Military Veterans Minister Angie Motshekga has said.
She was speaking at the Exercise Vuk’uhlome 2025 Distinguished Visitors’ Day at the SA Army Combat Training Centre on Wednesday 26 November. Motshekga acknowledged the Department of Defence (DoD) is facing challenges – primarily financial ones – and these are being addressed by Cabinet, Parliament, and the DoD. “We are doing all we can in our power to sustain this pride of the nation,” she said of the South African National Defence Force (SANDF). There has been much talk of doubling defence spending to 1.5% of GDP in recent times, particularly since President Cyril Ramaphosa issued such a directive in 2023. According to the Department of Defence, it is underfunded by at least 50%. Motshekga cautioned that doubling spending to 1.5% of GDP can’t be done overnight and she does not want to increase spending too quickly as this will create all sorts of problems. Doubling the defence budget is achievable in phases, she said, with spending increasing to more than 1% of GDP taking at least five years, Earlier this year, Motshekga in reply to a parliamentary question posed by Maliyakhe Shelembe of the Democratic Alliance, stated that spending 2% of GDP on defence would take 30 years. Motshekga replied that “the incremental growth of the defence funding will happen over six multi Medium Term Strategic Framework Periods.” Each of these is five years long. The Minister added that defence spending would grow from the 0.67% at present to 1.35% over a period of six years and hit 2.40% on year 30. Experts agree that suddenly increasing defence spending will not fix the SANDF’s issues. Songezo Zibi, Chairperson of the Standing Committee on Public Accounts (SCOPA) and leader of Rise Mzansi, earlier this year said that any increased defence funding for the SANDF is unjustifiable without urgent reform, generational renewal, and a credible national security strategy. “It is difficult to back significantly additional funding when the armed forces and the Department of Military Veterans do not manage the little money they get in accordance with the basic governance and the law,” he said.
“That the SANDF needs more money is beyond dispute,” said defence analyst Ricardo Teixeira. “The real question is how to spend it without wasting it. Throwing money at the problem is tempting but could be dangerous. Without the capacity to plan appropriately and account for and maintain equipment, a sudden influx of funding could easily be squandered. The outcome would be another round of headlines about mismanaged contracts, irregular procurement and expensive barely used hardware.” (Source: https://www.defenceweb.co.za/)

28 Nov 25. Tajikistan-Afghanistan: Periodic border clashes will highly likely persist; escalation risk remains low. On 27 November, Tajikistan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs confirmed that three Chinese citizens were killed in an attack launched from Afghanistan near the Afghan-Tajik border on the night of 26 November. The ministry did not disclose who it suspects orchestrated the attack, but it condemned the actions of ‘terrorist’ and ‘criminal’ groups on the Afghan side of the border. According to the ministry, the attack involved firearms and a drone equipped with grenades. Reports claim that the deceased were employees of a private Chinese-linked gold mining company. The Tajik authorities rarely comment on border incidents along Tajikistan’s frontier with Afghanistan, though the incident marks the second deadly attack on Chinese workers in the region in a year. We assess that the Afghan-Tajik border will highly likely remain a flashpoint for occasional clashes over the long term, with gold mining activity to represent a key trigger. Despite entrenched tensions between the Tajik and the Afghan Taliban authorities, the risk of escalation along the shared border will remain low over the coming months. (Source: Sibylline)
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Founded in 1987, Exensor Technology is a world leading supplier of Networked Unattended Ground Sensor (UGS) Systems providing tailored sensor solutions to customers all over the world. From our Headquarters in Lund Sweden, our centre of expertise in Network Communications at Communications Research Lab in Kalmar Sweden and our Production site outside of Basingstoke UK, we design, develop and produce latest state of the art rugged UGS solutions at the highest quality to meet the most stringent demands of our customers. Our systems are in operation and used in a wide number of Military as well as Homeland Security applications worldwide. The modular nature of the system ensures any external sensor can be integrated, providing the user with a fully meshed “silent” network capable of self-healing. Exensor Technology will continue to lead the field in UGS technology, provide our customers with excellent customer service and a bespoke package able to meet every need.

A CNIM Group Company
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NEWS IN BRIEF – MIDDLE EAST – CONFLICT

December 5, 2025 by

Sponsored by Bertin Exensor

www.exensor.com

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Military And Security Developments

Dec 05.

Libya: Clashes in western region underscore security instability throughout first half of 2026. On 4 December, armed clashes in Zawiya (Zawiya district) between the 103rd Infantry Battalion and the city’s ‘counter-security threat force’ temporarily shut down the critical coastal highway near Zawiya’s Al-Harsha area, killing at least four fighters from both sides. Notably, both parties are de facto law enforcement forces, nominally operating under the Government of National Unity (GNU), which is based in the capital Tripoli. The clashes underscore the persistent security instability in western Libya, as the GNU lacks full control over local militias, which often have conflicting agendas. This will sustain the risks of armed clashes in western Libya throughout the first half of 2026, including in Tripoli. In Zawiya district in particular, the risk of renewed clashes will remain elevated in the coming days; any wider clashes will disrupt businesses across the city, possibly including the operations at the Zawiya oil refinery.
Yemen: Attacks on vessel underscore elevated piracy risk, threats to on-board crew members. Earlier on 5 December, a bulk carrier was attacked twice by suspected pirates in the Strait of Bab-el-Mandeb; the ship was followed by several smaller vessels that opened fire, prompting a kinetic response from the armed guards on board. We assess that other vessels will possibly experience similar attacks in the coming weeks, as regional piracy rates have risen in 2025. This will increase the threat of surface-level and critical damage to ships and heighten the risk of physical harm to crew members. The successful boarding of vessels by pirates will possibly lead to asset seizures and kidnapping incidents, raising economic threats and endangering the physical and psychological wellbeing of onboard personnel. Furthermore, a rise in such incidents will possibly perpetuate rerouting away from the Red Sea and the Suez Canal, sustaining heightened operational disruption and supply chain costs for affected businesses.

Dec 04.

Yemen: STC operation underscores persistent security risks for personnel, threat of conflict renewal. On 3 December, the UAE-backed Southern Transitional Council (STC; a faction within Yemen’s Presidential Leadership Council) announced that it had launched an operation in Hadhramaut governorate. The move comes in response to a rebellion by the Saudi Arabia-backed Hadhramaut Tribal Alliance (led by Deputy Governor Amr bin Habrish). During the operation, STC-aligned forces took control of Seiyun (Hadhramaut governorate), with fighting reported at the city’s Seiyun Airport (GXF) and the presidential palace. This underscores the persistent security risks from crossfire and misidentification to nearby NGO personnel. The actions come after Habrish-aligned tribal fighters entered the government-owned PetroMasila oil company’s oilfield (Hadhramaut governorate) last week, demanding a greater share of revenue and forcing the firm to halt operations. The confrontation highlights a significant escalation between Saudi Arabia and UAE-backed forces in Yemen, raising the prospect of a resumption in conflict in the country’s civil war. The operation is likely to continue over the coming days and weeks, increasing operational risks to hydrocarbon businesses operating in Yemen, while posing knock-on supply chain and energy security risks to dependent parties.
Iraq: Efforts to mitigate US sanctions are unlikely to succeed given entrenched Iranian influence. Earlier on 4 December, Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammed Shia’ al-Sudani confirmed that a statement in Iraq’s official gazette on 3 December, designating Lebanese Hizballah (LH) and Yemen’s Iran-backed Houthis as terrorist organisations, was issued by mistake. If Baghdad had designated LH and Houthis as terror organisations, this would likely have increased the risk of domestic unrest and armed clashes nationwide. The reason for the erroneous statement is unclear, but such an error is essentially unprecedented. It possibly reflects a disagreement or misunderstanding within government amid discussions on how to avoid US sanctions against key Iraqi institutions linked to Iranian proxies, including the Central Bank and the state’s oil marketing company, in 2026. As such, policy moves to distance the state from such Iran-backed groups are possible in the coming weeks, raising unrest risks. Such moves are unlikely to fully mitigate risks of US sanctions in 2026 due to the Iran-backed Popular Mobilisation Forces (PMF), which yield significant influence in Iraq’s security apparatus and public institutions. Additionally, a government led by the Iran-aligned Coordination Framework (CF) coalition, which won the largest number of seats in the recent parliamentary elections, will sustain these risks.

Dec 03.

KEY DEVELOPMENTS

IRAN

Iran is hosting a five-day joint counter-terrorism exercise with the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO), though the pressure facing the capacity of its security forces will almost certainly remain acute.
Iran has increased the rate of its vessel seizures in the Strait of Hormuz amid a broader crackdown on fuel smuggling, increasing exposure risks for regionally engaged energy and shipping firms.
The Iranian authorities will likely intensify their enforcement of the Hijab and Chastity Law in the coming weeks, increasing the risk of anti-government protests and security force crack downs.

ISRAEL

An amendment to the weekly protest schedule is likely to reduce attendance levels, though travel disruption in the Tel Aviv metropolitan area will likely continue.
A new draft ultra-Orthodox military conscription law will reduce the risk of legislative stasis in the short term; however, it will drive domestic unrest and policy risks over the long term.
A proposal to adopt US President Donald Trump’s 20-point peace plan passed in the Knesset, though without the participation of the ruling coalition; Israel’s full adoption of the plan remains unlikely.

PALESTINIAN TERRITORIES

GAZA STRIP: The opening of the Rafah border crossing is unlikely to alleviate humanitarian conditions significantly; it is also likely to face delays.
WEST BANK: A shooting incident in Jenin (Jenin governorate) has increased the risk of unrest in Israel, as well as broader scrutiny of Israeli activities in the West Bank.
WEST BANK: Israeli settlers continue to attack Palestinian communities and pro-Palestine activists, underscoring the significant risks of violence and targeted harassment.

Dec 02.

Israel-Palestinian Territories: Increasing attacks will elevate travel disruption, military operations. Earlier on 2 December, a Palestinian lightly injured two Israel Defense Forces (IDF) personnel in a stabbing attack during a security check near the Israeli settlement Ateret (Ramallah and al-Bireh governorate). The incident comes following a car ramming attack against soldiers at the Beit Einun Junction (Hebron governorate) on Road 60 on 1 December, lightly injuring one service person. The incidents highlight an increase in attacks on Israeli security forces and civilians across the West Bank. This uptick follows a large IDF operation in the northern West Bank beginning on 25 November and ahead of the Hanukkah holiday period (from 14 to 22 December). We assess that attacks are likely to increase in frequency in the coming weeks ahead of Hanukkah, elevating security risks near Israeli settlements, the security forces’ positions and key roads (particularly against vehicles with Israeli license plates). The IDF is highly likely to impose temporary road closures near attack locations, including military cordons and search operations at nearby Palestinian population centres following attacks. This will elevate travel disruption and the risk of localised low-intensity armed clashes.
Yemen: Arrest of alleged spy network will increase physical security risks to NGO staff. On 1 December, the Iran-backed Houthis in Yemen referred 12 people to court on charges of spying for the US and Israel. The Houthis claimed that the alleged spy network has carried out espionage and sabotage activities for decades. This comes nearly a month after a Houthi court sentenced 17 people to death on the same charge. It also comes two weeks following a Houthi raid on the International Committee of the Red Cross’ office in the capital Sanaa, temporarily arresting its staff. These recent developments indicate an increasing rate of crackdowns and security campaigns by the Houthis amid a pause in hostilities with Israel. These campaigns are likely to continue for the next two months and to include further raids on NGO offices and international humanitarian organisations in Sanaa and other Houthi-controlled territories. Physical security threats to expats, NGO staff and Yemeni staff holding European passports will increase during this period, possibly driving a partial scale-down of humanitarian operations and increasing pressure on aid providers.

Dec 01.

Iraq: Clashes in Kurdistan region will increase domestic unrest risks. On 29 November, the Kurdish security forces killed at least two protesters and injured several others while using live ammunition to disperse demonstrators outside the Lanaz refinery (Erbil governorate). Security forces intervened after protesters (largely residents of the nearby Lajan village) demanding employment in the refinery, attempted to cut off the Erbil-Gwer road. Protests outside the refinery have subsided; however, we assess that Lajan residents and other members of the Harki tribe in Erbil governorate are likely to organise further protests outside the refinery this week, particularly after Friday prayers. This will drive risks of renewed armed clashes with the security forces outside the facility and elevate the risk of site invasions and attacks targeting the energy facility. Further attempts to disrupt the Erbil-Gwer road are also likely, triggering travel delays along the highway.
Turkey-Iraq: PKK commander’s statement presents peace talk impasse, possible conflict escalation. On 29 November, a senior Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) commander stated that the group will not proceed further with the peace process unless the Turkish government ‘constitutionally recognises Kurds’ and releases its founder Abdullah Öcalan. The PKK formally dissolved in May and began disarming in July. While it remains possible that the authorities will release Öcalan within the next 12 months, domestic political dynamics make this unlikely. Such a move would almost certainly require additional concessions from the PKK, including comprehensive disarmament. As such, the commander’s statement elevates the likelihood of a breakdown in negotiations with at least some PKK factions, increasing the risk of splinter groups emerging in the coming months. This will raise the risk of conflict resumption, Turkish military operations along the Iraq-Turkey border and in the Qandil Mountains (Iraq), outbreaks of intercommunal violence and attack risks in south-eastern Turkey, elevating security risks for personnel in these areas. (Source: Sibylline)

Founded in 1987, Exensor Technology is a world leading supplier of Networked Unattended Ground Sensor (UGS) Systems providing tailored sensor solutions to customers all over the world. From our Headquarters in Lund Sweden, our centre of expertise in Network Communications at Communications Research Lab in Kalmar Sweden and our Production site outside of Basingstoke UK, we design, develop and produce latest state of the art rugged UGS solutions at the highest quality to meet the most stringent demands of our customers. Our systems are in operation and used in a wide number of Military as well as Home land Security applications worldwide. The modular nature of the system ensures any external sensor can be integrated, providing the user with a fully meshed “silent” network capable of self-healing. Exensor Technology will continue to lead the field in UGS technology, provide our customers with excellent customer service and a bespoke package able to meet every need.

A CNIM Group Company

NEWS IN BRIEF – UKRAINE CONFLICT

December 5, 2025 by

Sponsored by Bertin Exensor

www.exensor.com

Military And Security Developments

Dec 05.

Ireland: Alleged drone activity during Ukrainian presidential visit points to security vulnerabilities. On 4 December, the Irish outlet The Journal reported that at least four unidentified ‘military style’ drones breached a no-fly zone near the capital’s Dublin Airport (DUB) during Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky’s arrival on 1 December. At approximately 2300hrs (local time), an Irish Naval Service vessel reportedly spotted the drones operating near the flight path of Zelensky’s aircraft. According to Irish media, the drones missed the aircraft’s approach and then circled the vessel, which had been secretly deployed in the Irish Sea for the duration of Zelensky’s state visit. Zelensky’s plane landed without incident. Given both the suspected target and the reported drone specifications, it is realistic that Russian or Russian-backed actors flew the drones. The incident is likely to revive concerns over Ireland’s security vulnerabilities arising from its neutrality and underinvestment in defence. These concerns are likely to mount in the coming months, as Ireland is due to host a summit of the European Political Community (EPC) in the autumn of 2026 and assume the rotating EU presidency in July 2026. We assess that increased UK naval deployments near Irish waters are likely during key meetings associated with Ireland’s above-mentioned diplomatic responsibilities.

Dec 04.

Ukraine: EU financial aid will remain critical to cover 2026 budget gap. On 3 December, Ukraine’s parliament (also known as Rada) approved the country’s 2026 budget, which President Volodymyr Zelensky is almost certain to sign. The new budget allocates 27.2% of GDP to defence spending. The bill was reportedly revised three times to increase defence funding, ultimately raising it by 17% compared to the initial draft. The budget projects UAH 4.8 trillion (USD 115 bn) in expenditures and UAH 2.9trn (USD 70bn) in revenues, resulting in an annual deficit equivalent to 18.5% of GDP. Minister of Finance Serhiy Marchenko stressed that Ukraine requires USD 45bn in external financing. The budget’s parliamentary approval will help Kyiv secure a USD 8.1 bn loan from the IMF. However, given that this support will remain insufficient to cover the substantial budget shortfall, we assess that continued external assistance from the EU will be critical to stabilise Ukraine’s 2026 financial outlook.

Dec 03.

Russia-Ukraine-US: Kremlin intransigence will remain key obstacle to conflict resolution. Overnight on 2-3 December, Russian President Vladimir Putin met US Special Envoy Steve Witkoff and US President Donald Trump’s son-in-law Jared Kushner to discuss proposals aimed at ending the war in Ukraine. According to Kremlin foreign policy adviser Yuri Ushakov, the talks failed to produce a compromise; Putin reportedly reacted negatively to several US suggestions. We assess that the US’ proposals likely required the Kremlin to reduce its long-standing territorial demands in Ukraine. The meeting forms part of a two-week period of intensified diplomatic activity surrounding Trump’s peace initiative. While the initial draft strongly aligned with Moscow’s interests, Washington DC subsequently produced an amended version in consultation with negotiators from Kyiv, toning down provisions that had favoured Putin. Overall, the Kremlin’s response to the latest talks underscores its continued unwillingness to make substantive concessions. In the absence of a settlement that accommodates its core demands, Russia is highly likely to remain committed to the war in Ukraine, as it believes that it can achieve its objectives by military means.

Dec 02.

KEY DEVELOPMENTS

OFFENSIVES: In November, Russian territorial gains accelerated, underscoring the steady deterioration of Ukraine’s operational situation
POKROVSK: Russia has claimed the capture of Pokrovsk (Donetsk oblast), though Ukraine has dismissed such claims, with the northern parts of city likely remaining a contested area
CORRUPTION: The resignation of the head of the Ukrainian presidential administration, Andriy Yermak, is the most high-profile official departure to date amid a large-scale corruption scandal
FORECAST: Despite continued diplomatic efforts from the US to end the Russo-Ukrainian war, a major breakthrough remains elusive in the short term, with Russia continuing to show its inflexibility on working towards peace
OFFENSIVES: According to Agence France-Presse (AFP)’s analysis of data from the US-based Institute for the Study of War (ISW), Russian forces captured approximately 270 square miles (701 sq km) in November. This marks the second-largest monthly advance in the Russo-Ukrainian war outside of its initial stages, which were characterised by a very dynamic frontline. AFP’s estimate includes areas under partial or contested Russian control, as well as confirmed Russian gains. In contrast, the Ukrainian OSINT group DeepState reported 195 square miles (505 sq km) of confirmed Russian gains. Nonetheless, these assessments highlight a significant acceleration in the Kremlin’s territorial advances, with DeepState noting that Russia captured about 90% more territory in November than in October.
OFFENSIVES: According to DeepState, roughly 40% of Russian advances occurred near Huliaipole in Zaporizhzhia oblast. By contrast, in the Pokrovsk direction (Donetsk oblast), Russia’s territorial gains accounted for only 11% of November’s overall advances. This likely points to the relative success of Ukraine’s active defensive operations in the Pokrovsk-Myrnohrad area, where Russia is committing significant resources and personnel in attempts to encircle both Pokrovsk and Myrnohrad.
OFFENSIVES: The need to defend multiple sectors of the frontline, including Pokrovsk-Myrnohrad and Dobropillia further to the north in Donetsk oblast, has likely diverted Ukrainian attention and resources away from Huliaipole, contributing to Russian advances there. The Ukrainian authorities have acknowledged operational challenges in the Huliapole sector, including uncoordinated withdrawals that have enabled Russian penetration of certain flanks. While these advances have not led to a breakthrough, they underscore the gradual erosion of Ukraine’s operational position, leading to growing difficulties in defending several fronts simultaneously.
POKROVSK: On 1 December, Russian President Vladimir Putin claimed the capture of Pokrovsk (Donetsk oblast) ahead of peace talks with US special envoy Steve Witkoff. The Ukrainian General Staff reported earlier on 2 December that fighting is still ongoing in parts of the city, dismissing the Russian claim. While Russia’s control over the western and southern parts of Pokrovsk has been confirmed, the northern areas of the city likely remain a contested zone. According to Ukrainian military officials, Ukrainian troops are still operating in the northern part of the city along the railway line and are eliminating Russian positions. The Ukrainian 7th Rapid Reaction Corps of the Air Assault Forces reported on 1 December that Russian forces are threatening logistics but that Ukrainian forces are organising other routes to Pokrovsk and Myrnohrad to resupply defensive forces.
POKROVSK: Although the situation in Pokrovsk remains unclear, the Kremlin’s claims of its capture are highly likely part of an information campaign to influence the US amid bilateral peace talks. For further analysis of the likely outcome of the bilateral meeting on 2 December, see FORECAST. Additionally, the increasingly critical situation in Pokrovsk will add to pressure on Ukrainian decision-makers to order a withdrawal from the area to conserve capability
STRIKES: Over the past week, Russia has continued to conduct large-scale airstrikes, as evidenced by the attack overnight on 28-29 November. The strike involved 596 drones and 36 missiles, resulting in direct hits to 22 locations, while falling debris was recorded in 17 locations. The attack heavily targeted energy infrastructure in Chernihiv, Kharkiv, Kyiv, Poltava and Sumy oblasts. The Ukrainian authorities reported that around 500,000 residents in the capital Kyiv and 100,000 in Kyiv oblast experienced power outages. Meanwhile, Ukrainian officials have reported that Russian forces are using operator-controlled Shahed drones piloted in real time near the front lines, which even allow them to engage Ukrainian aircraft.
STRIKES: Over the past week, Ukrainian naval drones struck two of Russia’s shadow fleet oil tankers in the Black Sea. On 28-29 November, naval drones hit two oil tankers (the Kairos and the Virat) while they were reportedly heading to Russia’s port of Novorossiysk (Krasnodar krai) to load oil. These strikes form part of Kyiv’s ongoing campaign against Russian oil infrastructure and are likely aimed at disrupting Moscow’s ability to export oil and thereby undermining its war-funding revenues. Such attacks are likely to increase the risk of Russian retaliation against vessels sailing to Ukrainian ports, which would ultimately drive higher war-risk insurance premiums.

POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS

CORRUPTION: The resignation of the head of the Ukrainian presidential administration Andriy Yermak on 28 November marks the country’s most high-profile departure to date in connection with a large-scale corruption scandal. It is currently uncertain who will replace Yermak. However, unnamed Ukrainian government sources have mentioned several possible contenders. These include Minister of Digital Transformation Mykhailo Fedorov, Defence Minister Denys Shmyhal, the head of Ukraine’s Main Directorate of Intelligence (GUR) Kyrylo Budanov, the deputy head of the presidential administration Pavlo Palisa and First Deputy Foreign Minister Serhiy Kyslytsia. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky has claimed that there will be a reset of the presidential administration; Yermak’s replacement is unlikely to wield similar levels of power (at least in the short term). For further analysis on the unfolding corruption scandal, see Sibylline Situation Update Brief – 28 November 2025.
POLITICS: A recent op-ed by former Ukrainian commander-in-chief Valeriy Zaluzhnyi possibly underscores how potential political rivals are seeking to capitalise on the recent corruption scandal to contest Zelensky’s leadership. In the article, published on 29 November, Zaluzhnyi stated that peace provides opportunities for ‘political change’ and ‘deep reforms’, as well as for recovery and economic growth. Zaluzhnyi also mentioned the possibility of ‘strengthening the foundations of justice through the fight against corruption’, thereby acknowledging the current political climate in Ukraine. Elsewhere, Zaluzhnyi has criticised Kyiv’s insufficient allocation of money to the military in 2021, arguing that this resulted in the Ukrainian forces being under-equipped with weapons and manpower when Russia launched its full-scale invasion in 2022.
POLITICS: Although Zaluzhnyi’s op-ed largely focuses on the need for Ukraine to obtain post-war security guarantees, it comes amid the unfolding corruption scandal, which is one of the most politically turbulent events of Zelensky’s presidency. Zaluzhnyi, who now serves as Ukraine’s ambassador to the UK, previously denied running a political campaign in October, though he is regarded as a leading presidential candidate in a possible future election. Nevertheless, the article could realistically indicate Zaluzhnyi’s longer-term political ambitions.

FORECAST

NEGOTIATIONS: US-led diplomatic efforts aimed at ending the Russo-Ukrainian war have continued at pace over the past few days, though a major peace breakthrough remains elusive in the near term. On 30 November, a Ukrainian delegation held talks with US officials on a peace plan backed by US President Donald Trump. Although both countries provided a positive assessment of the negotiations, neither side has disclosed specific details on the discussions’ outcome. According to an unspecified insider with knowledge of the recent bilateral talks in Florida (US), Ukraine and the US discussed ‘the most problematic aspects of the peace proposals in detail’, likely referring to territorial concessions and ensuring Ukraine’s post-war security.

On 26 November, Politico reported that Secretary of State Marco Rubio had told European partners that the US wants to reach a peace deal before it agrees to any security guarantees for Ukraine. Politico cited an unnamed European diplomat and another person familiar with the negotiations; it also reported that Rubio had identified several other issues that would be addressed after a deal, which the European side interpreted as Ukrainian territorial integrity and frozen Russian assets. While it remains unknown whether the US’ position has shifted since, given the above-mentioned US-Ukraine talks on 30 November, we assess that Ukraine almost certainly continues to seek clearly defined and robust security guarantees before signing a potential peace deal.

For Ukraine, post-war security arrangements must provide an effective deterrent against future renewed Russian aggression, particularly if Ukraine is to be barred from joining NATO under any peace agreement. Security guarantees, NATO membership and territorial integrity will highly likely remain the most politically fraught issues for Ukraine. Kyiv’s position on these matters is likely to remain at odds with Moscow’s for the foreseeable future. We assess that the absence of a consensus on these issues will reduce the likelihood of a peace deal in the short-to-medium term, with negotiations likely to continue over the coming weeks and months.

The US’ special envoy Steve Witkoff is meeting with Russian President Vladimir Putin later on 2 December, though Putin’s recent remarks reflect Moscow’s maximalist war objectives and lack of willingness to compromise. On 27 November, Putin reiterated his previous demand that as a precondition for a ceasefire, Ukrainian forces must withdraw from their current positions in territories that Russia has claimed as its own but does not fully occupy. Putin stated that if Ukraine does not withdraw, Russia will press its offensive. Such statements underscore that Russia is prepared to double down on its attritional strategy (despite significant losses) to gain more territory in eastern Ukraine.

At the same time, Putin claimed that it would be ‘pointless’ to sign any peace documents with the Ukrainian leadership, whose legitimacy the Kremlin has questioned repeatedly throughout the war. Putin claimed that while Russia wants to reach an agreement with Ukraine, it is currently ‘legally impossible’; he called for other willing and able powers to negotiate on the Ukrainian government’s behalf. Putin implied that Moscow needs any decisions on ending the war to be recognised by ‘major international players’. We assess that this highly likely represents an attempt to undermine input from Ukraine and its European allies, while advocating for Russia and other ‘great powers’ (likely meaning the US) to decide how the war ends.

Ultimately, Putin’s recent comments indicate that Russia is not prepared to relax its terms on which to end the war, with Russia-US talks unlikely to yield a breakthrough. We assess that Russia will highly likely reiterate its long-standing terms and possibly attempt to repackage its demands to give the impression that the Kremlin is offering concessions to the US without doing so in reality. Similarly, Russia will likely exaggerate its recent territorial gains (see OFFENSIVES above) to portray its victory as inevitable during the meeting with Witkoff, in a bid to influence US decision-making on peace.

Ukraine: Delays over EU loan will heighten socio‑economic uncertainty amid budget vote deadlock. On 1 December, a Ukrainian news outlet reported that the parliament (the Rada), dominated by the ruling Servant of the People party, will not adopt the 2026 budget on 2 December due to competing agendas within the party. Some lawmakers reportedly support the draft, others want amendments, while another faction is calling for an overhaul of the government and law enforcement institutions – possibly in relation to the ongoing large-scale corruption scandal. A timely adoption of the budget remains crucial for Ukraine to secure a loan from the International Monetary Fund (IMF). At the same time, disagreements among EU member states continue to complicate the bloc’s plan to grant a large support loan to Kyiv. Belgium remains opposed to using frozen Russian assets for a loan to Ukraine, due to concerns over Russian retaliation. If this persists it will significantly undermine efforts to finalise an EU-backed support package for Ukraine, adding uncertainty to Kyiv’s 2026 financial outlook and its efforts to finance its war effort.

Dec 01.

Key points

Weapons caches and disrupted terrorism plots indicate that Hamas is increasingly willing to carry out attacks across Europe; the disruption of these plans reflects the region’s effective counter-terrorism operations.
Israeli and/or Jewish institutions and individuals will likely remain Hamas’ primary targets.
Hamas operations in Europe increase the risk of an organised crime-Islamist extremism nexus, elevating the threats posed by criminals and terrorists.
The channelling of funds via charities increases the risk of terrorist financing exposure for the charity, NGO and financial sectors.
The higher complexity of Hamas’ plots involving the procurement of firearms will likely facilitate their disruption by European intelligence and security outfits.

Context

On 6 November, Austria’s domestic intelligence agency (DSN) announced that it had seized a Hamas weapons cache in the capital Vienna in September; the DSN suspects it was intended for potential terrorist attacks in Europe. Germany’s Federal Prosecutor’s Office (‘Bundesanwaltschaft’) stated that the weapons were transported from Germany to Austria during the summer of 2025. The weapons cache was discovered amid a spate of arrests of alleged Hamas members in Germany and the UK in October and November, who are accused of plotting attacks in Germany. Although these developments indicate Europe’s effective counter-terrorism operations, they also indicate Hamas’ increasing willingness to carry out attacks in the region, for which there is no known precedent.

The weapons cache in Austria is one of several hidden reserves allegedly established by Hamas in Europe; the three other known caches were established prior to the outbreak of the Israel-Hamas conflict in October 2023 for contingency purposes. Germany’s Bundesanwaltschaft and Israel’s national intelligence agency (‘Mossad’) have both stated that these caches were established for the purpose of carrying out attacks against Jewish and/or Israeli individuals in Europe. This aligns with a series of arrests for terror attack plots over the past two years. Reportedly, these plots have been directed by the Hamas leadership, which likely seeks new ways to carry out attacks on Israeli and/or Jewish targets given the setbacks it has faced in Gaza (Palestinian Territories). We assess that this trend could be exacerbated if the US-led peace plan involving the deployment of an international stabilisation force (ISF) is successful.

Ukraine: Resignation of presidential office head will erode trust in Ukrainian leadership. On 28 November, Andriy Yermak, President Volodymyr Zelensky’s chief of staff, resigned after anti-corruption investigators conducted searches at his residence earlier that day. Although the watchdogs have not brought any charges against Yermak, the searches took place amid an ongoing investigation into a large-scale corruption scheme in the energy sector involving senior government officials and a former business associate of Zelensky. The scandal has already led to the resignation of two senior cabinet ministers. Yermak has played a crucial role in Zelensky’s presidency, particularly in leading Ukraine’s diplomatic negotiations with Western partners since the start of the Russo-Ukrainian war. His resignation is likely an attempt to shield Zelensky from the scandal. However, it is likely to raise concerns about the president’s role or awareness of the corruption scheme. Furthermore, it will likely weaken Ukraine’s diplomatic negotiating team amid the ongoing US-led peace talks. (Source: Sibylline)

01 Dec 25. Ukraine’s Upsized FPV Drone Built for Heavier, Harder-Hitting Warheads. Ukraine’s drone makers are boosting frontline firepower with a new first-person view (FPV) drone designed for heavier payloads. Developed by Ptashka Drones, the 18-inch (46-centimeter) platform is reportedly the first of its size to enter full mass production in Ukraine. Test footage shows the drone carrying various munitions, proving it can handle real combat weight with ease. The upsized airframe lets operators pack larger warheads, giving units the ability to strike fortified positions and high-value targets that smaller FPV drones often struggle to reach. At present, most Ukrainian units still rely on 15-inch (38-centimetre) FPV drones, typically fitted with standard charges, grenade launchers, or improvised small-arms payloads. The bigger frame also supports a larger battery and fibre-optic coil, boosting flight time, stability, and operational range. Within its 5-kilometre (3-mile) operational window, pilots can circle targets, probe defences, and remain airborne longer before committing to a strike. Ptashka Drones positions the heavy-lift FPV as a force multiplier, complementing Ukraine’s existing fleet rather than replacing smaller drones. (Source: UAS VISION/NextGenDefense)

01 Dec 25. European defence startups have long faced challenges in accessing realistic operational environments where new technologies can be tested and validated with end users. 17Tech.fi is now opening a structured, and legally compliant pathway to Ukraine’s battlefield testing ecosystem, enabling innovators to gather direct insights from active front-line units and iterate mission-critical solutions faster than traditional procurement processes allow. Through structured collaboration with Ukrainian defence innovation bodies, including Defence Builder, 17Tech.fi provides a framework for controlled field testing, pilot deployments, and systematic front-line feedback. The approach significantly shortens development time, improves product relevance, and supports the alignment of European capabilities with urgent Ukrainian operational needs. 17Tech’s team brings extensive experience from defence industry knowledge and startup innovations and accelerations globally. The team has designed and operated accelerators in Europe and Asia, financed hundreds of early-stage companies, and supported defence forces in multiple countries in building new innovation models and technology evaluation frameworks.

Sami Luukkonen, Founding Partner at 17Tech and former Global Head of Defence, Aerospace & High Tech at the world’s largest consulting firm, emphasises the importance of structured access: “For years, European innovators have lacked a safe, legal, and operationally relevant environment to validate defence technologies. Ukraine offers a uniquely demanding testbed, and our role is to create a professional, transparent, and responsible pathway for companies to work with official defence counterparts. This is not about speed alone – it is about ensuring that the right technologies reach the right users with real data behind them.”

Perspective of an experienced accelerator manager

Antti Kosunen, an experienced accelerator manager and co-founder of 17Tech, emphasises the importance of operating at the intersection of defence innovation, startup financing, and rapid deployment cycles: “Over the past decade, I’ve seen hundreds of startups succeed or fail depending on how quickly they gain access to real users and real operational environments. Nowhere is this more critical than in defence technology. Ukraine provides an unmatched opportunity for structured, responsible, and data-driven testing that simply cannot be replicated in simulators or domestic training grounds. Our role is to ensure that companies enter this environment with the right preparation, the right partners, and a clear framework that benefits both innovators and front-line users.

This accelerator is, in my view, the most effective way for defence startups to find real product–market fit. In defence, true demand is defined by the battlefield—not by presentations, prototypes, or theoretical use cases. When companies receive direct feedback from units operating under real combat conditions, they quickly learn what works, what fails, and what must be improved. That level of validation shortens development cycles by months or even years and prevents teams from investing in the wrong features. Nothing brings a product to market readiness faster than exposure to actual operational needs.”

Application Pathway for Startups

Defence startups in Europe and allied countries can now apply for inclusion in the 17Tech Defence Tech Accelerator till December 15th, 2025. Selected companies will gain access to structured testing programs, front-line feedback loops, and opportunities to deploy prototypes in controlled operational scenarios in Ukraine as well as business support and access to several defence forces.

Startups interested in participating can apply at:

https://www.f6s.com/17tech-defense-tech-accelerator-2526

17Tech Oy, Helsinki, Finland 17tech.fi

Sami Luukkonen, +358 400 464 669

Antti Kosunen, +358 400 850 200

17TECH OY is a defence technology accelerator and a venture capital firm.

17Tech runs structured programs to help early- to mid-stage startups grow rapidly by providing investment, mentorship, workspace, and connections to investors, future users and a peer network in the defense industry. 17Tech provides up-to date knowledge for the situation and technolgies used on real battlefields in Ukraine.

28 Nov 25. Captured Russian Shahed-3 Reveals US Parts. Ukrainian Armed Forces have successfully captured a whole Russian-Iranian Shahed-3 suicide drone, including its camera, during recent operations. The drone was equipped with a modem for a Mesh network, used for transmitting control signals in real time. This network enables signals to be passed through a chain of drones, allowing the operator to control them over long distances without direct communication. This capture provides valuable insights into the drone’s technology and capabilities, according to Militarnyi. Earlier in September, the Ukrainian Military Intelligence Directorate (HUR) released an in-depth analysis of the design and components of the Shahed-3 drone. It features a Chinese-made Telefly JT80 turbojet engine and two fuel tanks, enabling flight speeds of 300-370 km/h and a range of up to 1000 km. The drone’s design closely resembles the previous Shahed-2 model, with electronic components such as the SADRA inertial navigation system, pressure measurement block (ADC), and power distribution unit (PDU) repeating from earlier versions. It also uses the “Comet-M12” satellite navigation system with a 12-element adaptive antenna array to resist countermeasures from Ukrainian electronic warfare systems, Militarnyi wrote. Additionally, the captured Shahed-3 includes a camera and video transmission system identical to those used in the Shahed-2 of the “Ъ” series. The drone contains 45 foreign-made components, half of which are sourced from the US, with others from China, Switzerland, Germany, the UK, and Japan. Previously, it was reported that Ukrainian long-range drones struck the VNIIR-Progress defense plant in the Russian city of Cheboksary, a key producer of Kometa satellite navigation antennas for Shahed-type drones and missiles. (Source: UAS VISION/UNITED24)

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December 5, 2025 by

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03 Dec 25. War Department Welcomes New Pentagon Press Corps. Nearly 20 War Department officials, both civilian and military, met today with more than two dozen members of the newly appointed Pentagon Press Corps during a series of more than 150 round-robin style one-on-one interviews. The event capped off three days of onboarding for new members of the Pentagon Press Corps, which includes more than 70 independent journalists, bloggers and social media influencers who entered the Pentagon for the first time this week to start their reporting on the War Department. Most of the newly appointed members of the Pentagon Press Corps are not associated with legacy media outlets, including print media such as newspapers and magazines, and broadcast media, such as cable television news. This “new media” operates differently than traditional media, and Pentagon leadership believes it is better equipped to inform a broader swath of the American public about what goes on inside the department, said Pentagon Press Secretary Kingsley Wilson.

“We really have seen a shift in the way people consume media,” Wilson said. “It’s not always through the mainstream outlets anymore. A lot of people are cutting the cord, and they don’t have cable news subscriptions. And a lot of young people are increasingly using social media and following their favorite influencers on YouTube, X and Instagram. It’s important for us to reach them too — to let them know about all the incredible things our warfighters are doing.”

Independent media outlets, such as those represented in this new Pentagon Press Corps, Wilson said, are growing in influence and reach.

“We want to make sure that we’re reaching as many Americans as possible,” she said.

Unlike other federal agencies, the War Department has had members of the press “resident” in its headquarters — the Pentagon — for decades. Credentialed members of the press corps have badges that allow them unescorted access to the building at any time of day. And some members choose to take up residence with a desk space.

In October, Pentagon leadership asked members of the press corps to sign an agreement, which Wilson said was both “common sense [and] very standard.” Most press corps members at the time chose not to sign the agreement, so they lost access to the building. In their place now is a new press corps that signed the new agreement. It is this new press corps that will now be responsible for the important job of learning what is happening within the War Department and reporting on that to the American people.

“We are excited to welcome people who were willing to sign the agreement here so we can continue that tradition of having resident media here in the building to hold us accountable and to help with our commitment to transparency,” Wilson said.

New members of the Pentagon Press Corps entered the building for the first time Dec. 1, kicking off a whirlwind of activity for Pentagon public affairs staff.

“A lot of planning went into these three days,” Wilson said.

Press corps members were issued building passes and press passes and given a tour of the building. And for those who will operate out of the building full time, they also got to see their new office space, Wilson said. The following day, the press corps attended its first press briefing, during which Wilson provided an update on War Department activities. Public affairs staff also provided press corps members with an unclassified briefing on U.S. Southern Command and a primer on combatant commands. Today, the press filled the Pentagon Briefing Room to meet with Secretary of War Pete Hegseth. Based on the questions she heard during the Dec. 2 press briefing, Wilson said she believes this new press corps is the right one to keep the American people informed about what its military is doing and to keep the department honest about its operations.

“I think great questions were asked yesterday in the briefing, a lot of tough questions; they definitely didn’t hold back,” Wilson said. “We’re going to continue to make sure that we’re transparent with them, and I know in turn, they will hold us accountable. They absolutely have said as much to me many times, and I’m glad to hear it, because our job in government is to be transparent and to make sure that we’re keeping everybody up to date on all the incredible things that this department and our warfighters are doing across the world.” (Source: U.S. DoD)

03 Dec 25. Hegseth put US troops, mission at risk with Signal use, AP sources say. Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth speaks during a roundtable in the State Dining Room of the White House, Oct. 23, 2025. (Evan Vucci/AP) The Pentagon’s watchdog found that Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth put U.S. personnel and their mission at risk when he used the Signal messaging app to convey sensitive information about a military strike against Houthi militants in Yemen, two people familiar with the findings said Wednesday. Hegseth, however, has the ability to declassify material and the report did not find he did so improperly, according to one of the people familiar with the report’s findings who spoke on condition of anonymity to discuss the information. CNN first reported the initial findings. The review by the Pentagon inspector general’s office was delivered to lawmakers, who were able to review the report in a classified facility at the Capitol. A partially redacted version of the report was expected to be released publicly later this week. The findings ramp up the pressure on the former Fox News Channel host after lawmakers had called for the independent inquiry into his use of the commercially available app. Lawmakers also just opened investigations into a news report that a follow-up strike on an alleged drug-smuggling boat in the Caribbean Ocean in September killed survivors after Hegseth issued a verbal order to “kill everybody.” Hegseth defended the strike as emerging in the “fog of war,” saying he didn’t see any survivors but also “didn’t stick around” for the rest of the mission and that the admiral in charge “made the right call” in ordering the second strike. He also did not admit fault following the revelations that he discussed sensitive military plans on Signal, asserting that the information was unclassified. Journalist was added to a chat where sensitive plans were shared In at least two separate Signal chats, Hegseth provided the exact timings of warplane launches and when bombs would drop — before the men and women carrying out those attacks on behalf of the United States were airborne. Hegseth’s use of the app came to light when a journalist, Jeffrey Goldberg of The Atlantic, was inadvertently added to a Signal text chain by then-national security adviser Mike Waltz. It included Vice President JD Vance, Secretary of State Marco Rubio, Director of National Intelligence Tulsi Gabbard and others, brought together to discuss March 15 military operations against the Iran-backed Houthis. Hegseth had created another Signal chat with 13 people that included his wife and brother where he shared similar details of the same strike, The Associated Press reported. Signal is encrypted but is not authorized for carrying classified information and is not part of the Defense Department’s secure communications network. Hegseth has said none of the information shared in the chats was classified. Multiple current and former military officials told the AP there was no way details with that specificity, especially before a strike took place, would have been OK to share on an unsecured device.

Lawmakers had called for inspector general to investigate

The revelations sparked intense scrutiny, with Democratic lawmakers and a small number of Republicans saying Hegseth posting the information to the Signal chats before the military jets had reached their targets potentially put those pilots’ lives at risk. They said lower-ranking members of the military would have been fired for such a lapse. The inspector general opened its investigation into Hegseth at the request of the Republican chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee, Sen. Roger Wicker of Mississippi, and the committee’s top Democrat, Sen. Jack Reed of Rhode Island.

Sen. Jack Reed, D-R.I., chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee, left, and ranking member Sen. Roger Wicker, R-Miss., during a Senate Armed Services Committee hearing on Capitol Hill, March 7, 2023. (Carolyn Kaster/AP)

Some veterans and military families also raised concerns, citing the strict security protocols they must follow to protect sensitive information.

It all ties back to the campaign against Yemen’s Houthis

The Houthi rebels had started launching missile and drone attacks against commercial and military ships in late 2023 in what their leadership had described as an effort to end Israel’s offensive against Hamas in the Gaza Strip. Their campaign greatly reduced the flow of trade through the Red Sea corridor, which typically sees $1 trillion of goods move through it annually. The U.S.-led campaign against the Houthis in 2024 turned into the most intense running sea battle the Navy had faced since World War II. A ceasefire in the Israel-Hamas war had begun in January before falling apart in March. The U.S. then launched a broad assault against the Houthis that ended weeks later when Trump said they pledged to stop attacking ships. The latest Gaza ceasefire began in October. Following the disclosure of Hegseth’s Signal chat that included the Atlantic’s editor, the magazine released the entire thread in late March. Hegseth had posted multiple details about an impending strike, using military language and laying out when a “strike window” starts, where a “target terrorist” was located, the time elements around the attack and when various weapons and aircraft would be used in the strike. He mentioned that the U.S. was “currently clean” on operational security.

Hegseth told Fox News Channel in April that what he shared over Signal was “informal, unclassified coordinations, for media coordinations and other things.” During a congressional hearing in June, Hegseth was pressed multiple times by lawmakers over whether he shared classified information and if he should face accountability if he did. Rep. Seth Moulton, a Massachusetts Democrat and Marine veteran, asked Hegseth whether he would hold himself accountable if the inspector general found that he placed classified information on Signal. Hegseth would not directly say, only noting that he serves “at the pleasure of the president.” (Source: Defense News)

02 Dec 25. Pentagon Provides Update on Operation Southern Spear, Reaffirms Socom Called for Second Strike on Drug Boat. The War Department provided an update today on the U.S. military’s counter-narco-terrorism campaign, Operation Southern Spear, including the casualties inflicted upon suspected narco-terrorists and a reemphasis on how the operation’s first kinetic boat strike unfolded. To date, a total of 21 kinetic strikes in U.S. Southern Command’s area of operations have taken place, resulting in 82 narco-terrorists having been killed, Pentagon Press Secretary Kingsley Wilson told the media.

“Each strike conducted against these designated terror organizations is taken in defense of vital U.S. national interests and to protect the homeland,” Wilson said.

She added that the legality of the strikes has been thoroughly vetted by the proper authorities.

“Our operations in the Southcom region are lawful under both U.S. and international law, with all actions in compliance with the Law of Armed Conflict. These actions have also been approved by the best military and civilian lawyers up and down the chain of command,” Wilson said.

Along the lines of legality, Wilson also underscored White House Press Secretary Karoline Leavitt’s statement yesterday that a “double tap” strike on an alleged Venezuelan narco-terrorism boat on Sept. 2 was ordered by U.S. Special Operations Command’s top leader, Navy Adm. Frank “Mitch” Bradley, and not Secretary of War Pete Hegseth.

A recent article published late last week claiming that Hegseth ordered the second strike has been a source of contention between President Donald J. Trump’s administration, some members of Congress and the media.

“As the White House confirmed yesterday, the decision to restrike the narco-terrorists’ vessel was made by Adm. Bradley, operating under clear and long-standing authorities to ensure the boat was destroyed and the threat to the United States was eliminated,” Wilson told the media.

“Let’s make one thing crystal clear: Adm. Mitch Bradley is an American hero, a true professional, and has my 100% support,” Hegseth said via a social media post yesterday.

“I stand by him and the combat decisions he has made — on the September 2 mission and all others since. America is fortunate to have such men protecting us,” he added.

Wilson ended the Operation Southern Spear portion of her briefing by reemphasizing the War Department’s commitment to protecting the American people.

“This department will defend our homeland. This is not a catchphrase; it’s a commitment,” she said. “And, as said: When it comes to killing narco-terrorists, we have only just begun.” (Source: U.S. DoD)

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NEWS IN BRIEF – UNITED KINGDOM AND EUROPE

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04 Dec 25. New projects bring German 2025 military-equipment spending near $40bn. Germany’s parliamentary budget committee has approved 11 major defense procurement projects worth more than €2.5bn ($3bn), bringing the country’s tally on equipment spending for 2025 to over €33bn across 73 major projects. The Dec. 3 approval includes a significant expansion of the Bundeswehr’s G95 assault rifle order, additional Joint Strike Missile purchases for future F-35A fighters and new artificial intelligence-powered surveillance systems. Among the more novel systems approved is URANOS AI, an artificial intelligence-powered surveillance platform designed to process large volumes of reconnaissance data from drones, satellites and radar stations along NATO’s eastern flank. The system will initially be integrated into Germany’s brigade in Lithuania − Panzerbrigade 45 − with plans to eventually equip all German army brigades. The AI system reflects growing German interest in autonomous battlefield intelligence following the employment of such capabilities in the Ukraine war. The committee also approved continued procurement of Kongsberg’s Joint Strike Missile for Germany’s incoming F-35A fighters, building on an initial order placed jointly with Norway in June. The long-range cruise missile is designed to be carried internally in the F-35’s weapons bay so as not to disturb the fighter’s stealth capabilities. Additional approvals include a framework contract for “a high three-digit number” of Aladin reconnaissance drones for close-range surveillance, more than 1,700 military all-terrain vehicles, and heavy transport trailers capable of moving Leopard 2 main battle tanks. Under German law, approval by the parliamentary budget committee is required for procurement projects that will cost more than €25m ($29m). The top ticket item in the latest shopping spree is the Bundeswehr’s expanded procurement of the G95 rifle system − Heckler & Koch’s HK416A8 model − beyond the approximately 120,000 units initially approved in late 2022. Bloomberg reported last week that the new order could bring the total to as many as 250,000 rifles, though the Defense Ministry has not disclosed the exact number. The ministry also approved procurement of laser light modules that enable the G95 to be used with night vision goggles in low-visibility conditions. This year’s spending surge comes as part of Germany’s declared goal of making the Bundeswehr Europe’s most powerful conventional army. This includes the expansion of the Bundeswehr to approximately 460,000 personnel − including up to 260,000 active troops − up from roughly 180,000 active soldiers currently. Defense Minister Boris Pistorius has committed to raising defense spending to 3.5% of GDP by 2029, which would solidify Germany’s position as the continent’s top military spender. (Source: Defense News)

04 Dec 25. UK and Norway to operate together to counter Russian undersea threat through major new defence agreement. Combined fleet of at least 13 warships, bolstered by autonomous systems, will hunt Russian submarines and protect critical infrastructure in the North Atlantic as part of new agreement. UK critical infrastructure will be protected from Russian submarines through a first-of-its-kind defence agreement that will see British and Norwegian navies operating side-by-side in the North Atlantic. The agreement comes as the Prime Minister welcomes Norwegian Prime Minister Jonas Støre to visit RAF Lossiemouth today. During the visit, the leaders will meet UK and Norwegian troops working together and thank them for their service over the Christmas period. The leaders will also hear firsthand from P-8 maritime patrol aircraft crews who have been tracking Russian vessels operating in UK waters – including the Russian intelligence ship Yantar, detected just weeks ago on the edge of UK waters north of Scotland. The new Lunna House Agreement will see the Royal Navy and Royal Norwegian Navy operate an interchangeable fleet of British-built Type-26 frigates. It follows a 30% increase in Russian vessels threatening UK waters in the past two years. At the heart of the agreement is the new joint fleet of Type-26 anti-submarine warfare frigates – eight British and at least five Norwegian – backed by the biggest British warship deal in history. The £10 bn deal between the UK and Norway, signed in September, is a major boost to British shipbuilding and supports over 4,000 high-skilled British jobs. Named after the Scottish headquarters of the Norwegian resistance during the Second World War – Lunna House in the Shetland Isles – the agreement builds on 75 years of UK-Norway cooperation – both founding NATO members. It demonstrates the UK stepping up on European security and together with major agreements with Germany and France, shows how the Government is rebuilding close alliances essential for keeping Britain safe in an increasingly dangerous world.

Prime Minister Keir Starmer said:   “At this time of profound global instability, as more Russian ships are being detected in our waters, we must work with international partners to protect our national security. This historic agreement with Norway strengthens our ability to protect our borders and the critical infrastructure our nations depend on. Through joint navy cooperation in the North Atlantic, we’re boosting security, supporting thousands of UK jobs, and showcasing Britain’s world-class shipbuilding on the global stage.”

Defence Secretary John Healey and his Norwegian counterpart Tore O. Sandvik are expected to sign the agreement at 10 Downing Street today. Following the signing, they will visit the Maritime Capability Coalition in Portsmouth – a jointly led initiative focused on delivering vital training, equipment, and infrastructure to bolster Ukraine’s maritime operations and strengthen its ability to operate at sea.

The powerful and advanced Type 26 warships will patrol the strategically vital gap between Greenland, Iceland and the UK, monitoring Russian naval activity and defending critical infrastructure such as underwater cables and pipelines, which carry vital communications, electricity and gas. Both navies will operate as one – sharing maintenance facilities, technology and equipment to create truly interchangeable forces able to deploy rapidly wherever needed.

Defence Secretary John Healey MP said: “In this new era of threat and with increasing Russian activity in the North Atlantic, our strength comes from hard power and strong alliances. When our critical infrastructure and waters are threatened, we step up.” For over 75 years, the UK and Norway have stood shoulder-to-shoulder on NATO’s northern flank, defending Europe and keeping our people safe. This partnership takes us further, making our nations more secure at home and strong abroad. Through this Lunna House Agreement, we will patrol the North Atlantic as one, train together in the Arctic, and develop the advanced equipment that will keep our citizens safe now and into the future. We are stepping up on European security and delivering on our NATO-first plan.”

The agreement will also see:

UK joining Norwegian programme to develop motherships for uncrewed mine hunting and undersea warfare systems.
Year-round training of Royal Marines in Norway, preparing them to fight in sub-zero conditions.
Royal Navy adopting advanced Norwegian naval strike missiles.
Deeper collaboration on Sting Ray torpedoes, helping to boost munitions stockpiles.
Joint wargaming between our Armed Forces.
UK and Norway leading NATO’s adoption of autonomous systems in the High North.

The Lunna House agreement will also see deeper industrial collaboration between the UK and Norway, supporting skilled jobs while enhancing warfighting readiness. The new agreement confirms that the UK will join Norway’s programme to develop innovative offshore support vessels, which will act as motherships for uncrewed mine hunting and undersea warfare systems. (Source: https://www.gov.uk/)

01 Dec 25. Europe ponders how to ready industry for war, without being at war. It’s a head-scratcher for European governments: getting their defense industries ready to pump out hundreds of thousands of drones or other pieces of armament in case of possible war, without ending up with warehouses full of obsolete kit. Europe has yet to resolve the conundrum, said Francois Arbault, the European Commission’s director for defense industry, at the Forum Innovation Défense in Paris last week.

“How can we be ready, in that we’re ready to embrace the scale that it takes to be at war, or in a conflict of whatever sort, without actually piling up equipment?” Arbault said. “That’s probably one of the most core questions that we need to be able to answer today. How is it to be defense-ready, when you are not yet at war?”

European leaders have been reluctant to adopt the dramatic rhetoric of French President Emmanuel Macron, who called for a shift to a “war economy” several months after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022. And while all European NATO members have lifted defense spending, none have retooled their economy to prioritize the war effort – France included.

Ukraine has something “essential and different from us, and that is they have a need to survive,” said Jérôme Cerisier, the chief executive officer of French night-vision equipment maker Exosens, speaking on a panel about future industry and the war economy. “We’re not as confronted as they are by the need to go very, very fast.”

Ukraine as a country at war “has no choice but to frantically scramble” to develop counters and offensive edges, and the same war mode cannot be expected from European countries, the European Commission’s Arbault said.

“But we have to be ready,” Arbault said. “And we see that innovation is going so fast that readiness doesn’t mean piling up thousand or hundreds of thousands of drones in a warehouse, because if one day we’re attacked, those drones will for sure be totally obsolete.”

The drone-development cycle in Ukraine is around eight to ten weeks, while product development in Western Europe is counted in months or years, according to André Loesekrug-Pietri, chairman of the Joint European Disruptive Initiative, a non-governmental organization looking to accelerate European innovation, who cited a recent visit to the country.

A way to circumvent the equipment stockpiling dynamic is having industrial and technological building blocks and components available “from which we’re going to make lots of possible systems,” said Marie Nicod, general partner at investment firm Jolt Capital. “From there, we have a mass of things, but which are not immobilized stock, and which will be used for many different use cases.”

Exosens has been scaling up its production capacity for drone cameras “little by little” in order to be ready to react quickly should the need arise, without taking too much initial risk, Cerisier said.

“We really need to talk about the war economy not necessarily in terms of implementation, but already in terms of preparation,” Cerisier said. He said companies need not just orders but also visibility on future demand to justify investments, something France’s military budget programming can bring.

The defense industry should prepare for a larger conflict by training scenarios of accelerated production to see where processes break down and to identify bottlenecks, said Sylvain Rousseau, CEO of Aresia, which makes aerospace equipment including weapon-release systems for aircraft.

“What’s stopping us from tripling our capacity, maybe it’s just a single machine, maybe just one piece of technology,” Rousseau said.

The European Union in March 2024 presented its first defense-industrial strategy, calling for “defense industrial readiness,” with then-European Commissioner Thierry Breton saying a few months later the European defense industries need to “move into a war economy mode,” one of the rare instances of the term being used at a European level.

Some European governments other than France have recently been pushing the industrial aspect of defense, with Dutch Defence Minister Ruben Brekelmans in March saying the war in Ukraine has become a war between industries, calling a strong defense industry “the backbone of our security.”

Sweden in June announced a new defense-industry strategy that specifically mentioned a goal of high production capacity.

Meanwhile, Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk said in March that Russia has started an arms race that Europe must win.

The comparison with Russia is problematic, because that country is at war “and that’s not the case for us,” said Olivier Lecointe, in charge of industrial policy at France’s Directorate General for Armament. While speeding up production is part of getting industry war-ready, France isn’t going to build stocks to last through a war, as use would be uncertain and stocks would expire.

“So what matters is ensuring that the industry is able to produce,” Lecointe said. “You can’t go from a few thousand to hundreds of thousands at the snap of your fingers. You have to renovate production facilities, buy machines, hire people. And that, of course, requires investment.”

The defense industry still has many old machines in operation that remain useful, but production rates would be higher with modern tools, according to Lecointe.

“We could obviously imagine putting in place budgets to purchase production capacity, but if we purchase production capacity and then orders don’t come in, it’s actually money down the drain,” Lecointe said. “In terms of public spending, I think no French citizen would appreciate that.

Machinery is expensive, and solutions will have to be found through the business plan, which comes down to companies receiving increased orders, Lecointe said.

The level of production required for a high-intensity conflict will also mean designing new systems that can be mass-produced, according to Lecointe. He said the DGA is working on this particularly in the field of drones, “but there may be other applications.”

The DGA is working with a few companies to look at how civilian industrial manufacturing lines “not at all designed for this” can be adapted to mass produce something else by modifying only a few tools, according to Lecointe. The directorate then acts as a go-between with the weapons industry, which provides a design that can be modified to become mass-producible.

“At some point, we will certainly sign a contract to test it, but again, before buying tens of thousands, we will need the budgets,” Lecointe said. “The goal in this case is to be ready for the day when the crisis level justifies placing this kind of order – today we are not there yet – but we will be able to press the button and start production.”

Shifting civilian manufacturing lines to military production “comes at a huge cost,” which raises the question who will pay for the preparation, which entails significant risk as long as there are no orders, according to Rousseau at Aresia.

While some companies may be willing to take on some of that risk, they will need financial support to prepare for “more significant scenarios,” as the economics won’t motivate firms to sacrifice production capacity for military purposes, according to Rousseau.

Lecointe said that while there are opportunities for automotive suppliers as defense subcontractors to help scale up arms manufacturing, car-industry volumes are typically tens of thousands of vehicles per year, whereas production of for example Caesar cannons is counted in dozens.

“We’re not at all on the same economic models, on the same volumes,” Lecointe said. “So we have to be realistic about what we’re talking about.”

Armed forces are increasingly willing to test new equipment, similar to how Ukraine tests material on the battlefield, according to Lecointe, who said that clashes with some of the habits of France’s defense-capacity programming. He said the testing feedback loop between users and manufacturers needs to become “much faster.”

“Today, we are no longer in a context where we fire a missile once every 10 years. If we are preparing for a high-intensity war, it is not the same thing at all, and so we need to find new ways of working and dialoguing with industry on equipment.” (Source: Defense News)

01 Dec 25. Awash with defense cash, Poland rolls out red carpet for US tech firms. Poland is working to expand its cooperation with Silicon Valley-rooted U.S. defense tech companies such as Palantir and Anduril, eyeing new unmanned and artificial-intelligence capabilities as well as local production of cruise missiles. The move comes in addition to Warsaw fostering ties with traditional American defense titans like as Lockheed, from which Poland is purchasing fighter jets, tanks, helicopters and missiles. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has pushed the government to boost its defense spending and accelerate acquisitions of new weapons and gear for the armed forces. With the Polish 2025 military budget expected to reach an unprecedented level in the nation’s history, at 4.7% of GDP, or PLN 186.6bn ($51.1bn), the two U.S. tech firms are joining an expanding lineup of defense groups supplying their products to Warsaw. Poland is seeking additional funds for military purchases, with the European Union recently allocating some €43.7 bn ($50.7 bn) in low-cost loans for Poland’s defense acquisitions under the bloc’s Security Action For Europe (SAFE) scheme. In the coming years, unmanned technology will be one of the priorities of the Polish Ministry of National Defence in the field of military procurement, according to senior government officials. Speaking at a Nov. 20 session of the National Defence Committee of the Sejm, the parliament’s lower chamber, Polish Deputy Defence Minister Cezary Tomczyk said the ministry aims to spend at least PLN 15 bn ($3.5 bn) on unmanned systems and anti-drone solutions over the next three years. At the same time, the ministry is intensifying its investments in AI with this year’s launch of the AI Implementation Center for the Polish military. On Oct. 27, the Polish ministry and Palantir signed a letter of intent to implement the company’s solutions in AI, information technology and cybersecurity in Poland’s military units. On the same day, the country’s state-run defense group PGZ signed an agreement with Anduril to cooperate on autonomous and missile systems. A spokesperson for the Polish ministry told Defense News the letter of intent with Palantir is an extension of the workshops and exercises that allowed defense officials to evaluate AI-based automation tools for the country’s military.

“The modern battlefield and the state-of-the-art combat equipment being introduced into service, combined with sensors, generate enormous amounts of data,” the spokesperson said. “With such a rich data pool, human perception, without automation, is unable to conduct effective analysis.”

Palantir’s wares, the hope goes, will help commanders make sense of it all. Experts from the Polish military are to implement Palantir’s tools into their activities, “ensuring full control over the security of the production environment and integrated information resources,” the defense spokesperson said. No “external entities” would be required to run the systems, meaning Poland is expected to retain control of all data being processed, they added. During the official signing event for the letter of intent here, Palantir CEO and co-founder Alex Karp said his company is interested in investing in Poland partly to develop dual-use technologies. In a social media post, Palantir said the letter of intent paves the way for the company’s “AI-enabled defense technology to begin rapidly supporting the country’s armed forces, as they innovate at the forefront of an increasingly complex threat environment and strengthen Poland’s position as a sovereign leader in defense.” In the United States, Palantir’s business with the Defense Department has grown substantially since 2019. That year, Palantir won in a heated competition with Raytheon, the company now branded as RTX, a U.S. Army contract to supply a new tactical version of its flagship intelligence analysis platform, Distributed Common Ground System-Army, or DCGS-A. Alongside the defense ministry’s strengthened cooperation with Palantir, Poland is also positioning PGZ, which supplies the vast majority of its output to the Polish military, as the local partner for Anduril Industries. PGZ’s October 2025 memorandum of understanding with Anduril follows the June visit of its CEO and co-founder Brian Schimpf to Warsaw. During a June 9 press briefing in the Polish capital, Schimpf said Anduril is interested in ramping up its presence in Poland through partnerships with local industry players. Under the October agreement, PGZ and Anduril will jointly develop and produce in Poland a variant of the Barracuda-M medium-range turbojet-powered cruise missile. This is to provide the country’s military with access to a new type of unmanned strike capabilities, but also develop the Polish defense industry’s AI prowess, the state-owned group said in a statement. Anduril says its Barracuda range comprises “air-breathing autonomous air vehicles” that are “purpose-built for hyper-scale production and mass employment.”

“Working with PGZ to localize production of the Barracuda demonstrates how allied industry and sovereign suppliers can deliver rapidly scalable, affordable capability to deter aggression,” Brian Moran, the vice president of Anduril Europe, was quoted in the statement. (Source: Defense News)

28 Nov 25. UK’s Carrier Strike Group completes hugely successful eight-month mission as ships and aircraft return home. Britain’s premier naval deployment of 2025 ends this weekend as the ships, jets and helicopters of the UK Carrier Strike Group returns home. Families and well-wishers are expected to gather at air and naval bases from the Lizard Peninsula to Norfolk to greet more than 2,000 military personnel – sailors, soldiers, aviators, Royal Marines, and civilians – back from their eight-month mission to the Indo-Pacific. The Strike Group has been led by the nation’s flagship HMS Prince of Wales, which sails into Portsmouth on Sunday afternoon accompanied by two of her escorts: destroyer HMS Dauntless and Norwegian frigate HNoMS Roald Amundsen. A third escort, frigate HMS Richmond, is returning to Plymouth, while the force’s aircraft have already flown – or are flying – home to their respective air bases: F-35B Lightning stealth fighters to RAF Marham in Norfolk, Merlin helicopters to RNAS Culdrose near Helston and RNAS Yeovilton in Somerset, and Wildcat helicopters to Yeovilton as well. Tanker RFA Tideforce, which supported the final month of the deployment, is returning to Portland, while her sister ship RFA Tidespring, which provided fuel for the force through three-quarters of the Highmast mission, remains deployed. In addition, Norway’s HNoMS Maud performed tanker duties during the opening weeks. The arrivals bring to an end the UK Carrier Strike Group’s 2025 mission, codenamed Operation Highmast, which took the force as far east as Japan and Australia. The strike group returns having been declared fully operational – and ready to assume NATO duties.

“It has been a privilege to lead the nearly 4,000 soldiers, sailors, aviators, and marines who have sailed over 40,000 nautical miles as part of the Strike Group, working with over 30 nations en route,” said Commodore James Blackmore, Commander UK Carrier Strike Group.

“Last week the Defence Secretary announced that the UK Carrier Strike Group had reached full operating capability. That is a testament to the hard work both on Operation Highmast and of those who have served before us to reach this milestone.

“The Strike Group has come home stronger for NATO than it departed and I am incredibly proud of all those who have taken part in Operation Highmast.”

Led by HMS Prince of Wales, the Carrier Strike Group has comprised a core defensive ring of steel, provided by HMS Dauntless (air defence), HMS Richmond and HNoMS Roald Amundsen (anti-submarine and surface defence).

HMS Richmond’s Executive Officer Lieutenant Commander James Callender, said he “could not be prouder” of his shipmates for all they had achieved.

“Whether it be supporting UN Security Council resolutions in the Yellow Sea or hosting dignitaries and VIPs for high level engagement, Richmond has continued to deliver in spades.

“We are now looking forward to the joy of homecoming and being reunited with the family and friends whose support has helped make this deployment possible.”

Throughout, warships and support vessels from ten nations – Australia, Canada, France, Italy, Japan, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain and the USA – have integrated themselves with the task group. Fifth-generation F-35B Lightning strike fighters of RAF 617 Squadron (The Dambusters) and the Royal Navy’s 809 Naval Air Squadron have provided the fast jet firepower, with up to 26 jets embarked at points. They have been supported by Merlin and Wildcat helicopters from 814, 815, 820, and 845 Naval Air Squadrons, plus drones from 700X which have been pushing the boundaries of uncrewed air operations, in particular transferring supplies between ships in the group. Since leaving the UK in April, the force has sailed more than 40,000 nautical miles – one and a half times around the world – with half the deployment spent east of Suez. The jets, helicopters, and drone/uncrewed aircraft have flown more than 2,500 sorties in support of the deployment which sought to demonstrate the UK’s commitment to global security with its allies. Highmast took the Task Group to northern Australia for the country’s largest military workout, Exercise Talisman Sabre, followed by a similarly-complex and large-scale exercise with the US and Japanese maritime forces.. In all the force has operated/exercised with nine different carrier groups, with its jets landing on four different aircraft carriers.

Commander Nick Smith led 809 Naval Air Squadron, nicknamed The Immortals, on its maiden deployment and said “the range and breadth of the activity the squadron have been part of is truly amazing”.

He continued: “I am incredibly proud of the Immortal Team who have done such a fantastic job in delivering everything asked of them throughout the year, but most importantly full operating capability of Carrier Strike. We have operated day and night, in fair weather and torrential downpours, from HMS Prince of Wales as well as the Japanese and Italian ships Kaga and Cavour. Our highlights include the many amazing places we have been lucky enough to visit, specifically Singapore, Australia, and Japan as well as participating in numerous large force exercises such as Talisman Sabre and Falcon Strike. Having successfully completed eight months away, we are all very much looking forward to getting home to our loved ones, families and friends. We are all incredibly excited to be home for Christmas and to take some well-earned leave, before regrouping in 2026 for another year of adventures.”

Ships have helped to enforce UN sanctions against North Korea, supported NATO security operations in the Mediterranean and promoted British interests and industry wherever they have visited. At its peak, Highmast involved more than 4,000 UK military personnel, either sailing with the task group or deployed in support of it and specific exercises. Personnel have been able to enjoy some unforgettable experiences and opportunities: climbing Mount Fiji in Japan, encountering crocodiles in northern Australia, a string of international cookery contests, sporting fixtures, and visits to some of the world’s great cities including Tokyo, Singapore, Ho Chi Minh City, Manila, Mumbai. There have been celebrations – the traditional naval ceremonies of Crossing the Line (Equator) and Trafalgar Night – while HMS Prince of Wales’ rock band were invited to play their debut public gig at Singapore’s Hard Rock Café. And there have solemn moments with commemorations at military cemeteries and sacred sites throughout the deployment, including a service of remembrance for the crew of the previous HMS Prince of Wales over the wreck site in the South China Sea – the first time today’s ship has visited.

Petty Officer James Smith, one of HMS Richmond’s warfare specialist, has enjoyed the deployment on every level.

“Professionally, Highmast has been fantastic and full of opportunity to test our skills in real life scenarios,” he said.

“Personally, the chance to play golf all over the world has been a real highlight! I’m now very excited to get home and have a family holiday, and a proper Cornish pasty.”

The homecomings of the ships have been brought forward due to bad weather forecast for the original planned date of Monday December 1.

Timings (subject to change depending on the weather)

PORTSMOUTH, SUNDAY NOVEMBER 30

HMS Dauntless

0800 at Outer Spit Buoy (OSB), 0820 Round Tower, 0845 Alongside

HMS Prince of Wales

1230 at OSB, 1250 Round Tower, 1315 Alongside

HNoMS Roald Amundsen

1500 at OSB, 1520 Round Tower, 1545 Alongside

PLYMOUTH, SUNDAY NOVEMBER 30

HMS Richmond

1330 at the Breakwater, 1345 past the Hoe 11-gun salute, 1400 Devil’s Point, 1430 Alongside

Some achievements by the Carrier Strike Group since it deployed in April

Its aircraft have flown more than 2,500 sorties
Ships have visited 12 countries and interacted with 30 nations
The force has operated with nine different carrier groups
UK F-35B Lightning jets have flown to four other aircraft carriers
The Queen Elizabeth-class Carrier/Lightning Force has achieved Full Operating Capability
28 VVIPs have been hosted
4,230 registered visitors and guests have been welcomed on board
82 UK companies have used the ships to showcase their products at industry/export events with the prospect of generating more than £17bn for the UK economy

The Carrier Strike Group has achieved a number of ‘firsts’ during its eight months away from the UK:

Largest ever fifth-generation sovereign air wing embarked on any aircraft carrier (24)
First F-35B to land on the Japanese ship Kaga.
First aircraft carrier to dock in Tokyo and Singapore cruise liner terminals
First UK-India dual carrier exercise
First UK carrier group to visit Australia since 1997.
First UK carrier group to take part in Exercise Bersama Lima, the Five Powers Defence Arrangement main annual workout, since 1997.
First Prime Minister to stay overnight on a Royal Navy warship in a generation.
HNoMS Roald Admunsen sailed further east than any Norwegian warship before her and became the first to visit: India, Japan, and Singapore. Throughout, a UK Wildcat helicopter and crew were embarked, another first. (Source: https://www.gov.uk/)

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NEWS IN BRIEF – REST OF THE WORLD

November 28, 2025 by

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27 Nov 25. Dominican Republic-US: Military co-operation, material support will reduce regional tensions. On 26 November, President Luis Abinader announced he will allow the US to temporarily use the San Isidro Air Base and the capital Santo Domingo’s Las Américas International Airport (SDQ) as part of Washington DC’s regional counter-narcotics operations. The US will be permitted to refuel aircraft and transport equipment and technical personnel at these facilities. During the same press conference, US Secretary of War Pete Hegseth announced plans to temporarily deploy additional military aviation assets to San Isidro and Las Américas, including C-130 cargo aircraft and KC-135 Stratotanker refuelling craft. The measure demonstrates growing Dominican support for the US’ regional operations. In recent months, the US has sought to expand its logistical network across the Caribbean region to support ‘Operation Southern Spear’, including by reactivating military facilities in Puerto Rico and conducting flights from El Salvador. In the short-to-medium term, bolstering the US’ regional military capabilities and expanding logistics networks will highly likely sustain strikes against alleged drug trafficking boats and surveillance flights along Venezuela’s coastline. Aviation and maritime disruption risks will possibly increase during such operations, particularly if the US imposes security notices restricting air or sea traffic. Regional tensions between the US and the Dominican Republic will decrease in the short term. (Source: Sibylline)

27 Nov 25. Nigeria: Declaration of security emergency is unlikely to moderate long-term attack, KFR risks. On 26 November, President Bola Tinubu declared a nationwide security emergency following a wave of violent attacks and mass kidnapping-for-ransom (KPR) incidents. Tinubu ordered the military and the police to recruit additional personnel; he has also deployed the forest guard to target armed groups (known locally as bandits) in rural areas of central and northern Nigeria. These additional deployments will likely facilitate successful operations to capture and kill armed groups (locally known as bandits) and Islamist militants, likely including airstrikes on rural positions by the Nigerian Air Force (NAF). This will also likely include an expansion of assistance from Nigeria’s security partners (including the US) under multilateral military co-operation agreements. However, the entrenched nature of Nigeria’s conflicts and the ineffectiveness of the security apparatus (as Nigeria’s military is already deployed in 30 of 36 states) will likely undercut such efforts. We assess that while the operations will likely record limited tactical successes, they are unlikely to improve the security environment substantially. This will sustain long-term attack and KFR risks for NGO staff based in central and northern Nigeria, particularly in Borno, Katsina, Sokoto and Zamfara states. (Source: Sibylline)

27 Nov 25. Guinea-Bissau: Military coup will significantly disrupt operational continuity. On 25 November, members of the Presidential Guard detained President Umaro Sissoco Embaló and announced the formation of a military government. The coup comes shortly after the 23 November presidential election, which Embaló claimed to have won despite widespread allegations of fraud. The Presidential Guard also detained several high-profile government and opposition figures, including former prime minister Domingos Simões Pereira and leading opposition presidential candidate Fernando Dias. The newly formed junta subsequently implemented a nationwide curfew and announced the indefinite closure of Guinea-Bissau’s land borders and airspace. Although local media reports indicate that conditions within the capital Bissau are stable, the security forces have adopted an augmented posture throughout the city, establishing numerous checkpoints and roadblocks. These measures will almost certainly remain in place in the coming days, critically disrupting operational and supply chain continuity, particularly through the Port of Bissau. In the coming days, the junta will likely face increasing international pressure to announce a plan to transition back to civilian rule. Failure to do so will increase the likelihood of regional organisations, including the African Union (AU) and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), implementing sanctions and trade restrictions. Additionally, given public support for opposition figures, protest risks in Bissau will rise if they remain in custody. (Source: Sibylline)

26 Nov 25. Afghanistan-Pakistan: Alleged Pakistani airstrikes will increase risk of renewed hostilities. Overnight on 24 to 25 November, Pakistan conducted airstrikes in Khost province (Afghanistan), killing at least nine children and a woman according to Afghan Taliban spokesperson Zabihullah Mujahid. Other airstrikes allegedly took place in Kunar and Paktika provinces (Afghanistan). Mujahid stated on X that Afghanistan would ‘respond appropriately at the right time’. So far, Pakistan has neither claimed responsibility for, nor denied, the airstrikes. The airstrikes follow Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) attacks in Pakistan targeting the Federal Constabulary (FC) headquarters in Peshawar (Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province) and another attack targeting a judicial court in the capital Islamabad. The airstrikes also come amid a fragile ceasefire and elevated tensions between Islamabad and Kabul. Pakistan has long accused the Afghan Taliban of sheltering the TTP. We assess that the airstrikes will significantly increase the risk of renewed hostilities, with violent border clashes likely in the coming days and weeks. Additionally, the TTP is likely to escalate its activities inside Pakistan, with a realistic possibility of attacks targeting major urban centres like Peshawar and Islamabad. (Source: Sibylline)

25 Nov 25. Taiwan: Proposed rise in defence spending would strengthen military capabilities, relations with US. On 25 November, Taiwanese President Lai Ching-te announced plans to introduce a TWD 1.25 trillion (USD 39.29 bn) supplementary defence budget to improve the island’s asymmetric military capabilities. This aligns with the president’s objective to increase defence spending to 3.3% of GDP by 2026 and 5% by 2030, amid the rising military threat from China. However, there is a realistic possibility that Lai will be unable to pass the supplementary budget through the Legislative Yuan (i.e. Taiwan’s unicameral legislature), as his Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) is in the minority. The opposition Kuomintang (KMT) party will likely seek to cut the proposed spending. However, if the budget is passed in whole or in part, the Taiwanese government will highly likely increase military procurement from the US, thereby increasing its credibility with President Donald Trump’s administration, which emphasises allies spending more on defence. Furthermore, a rise in defence spending will make a Taiwan-US trade agreement more likely, which the island seeks to lower tariffs on Taiwanese exports. (Source: Sibylline)

24 Nov 25. Sudan: Ceasefire proposal is highly unlikely to resolve conflict; violence risks remain elevated. On 24 November, the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF) unilaterally declared a three-month humanitarian ceasefire in Sudan. The Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) have not responded to the declaration at the time of writing. The RSF likely proposed the truce to further two primary objectives: firstly, to consolidate recent territorial gains and reassess its capabilities before launching further offensives on SAF-controlled territory; secondly to disrupt the SAF’s momentum in contesting the RSF’s control of key strategic locations in the Kordofan region. As such, the SAF is unlikely to accept the ceasefire declaration unconditionally, undermining the prospects for implementation. Rather, the SAF and allied militias are highly likely to continue conducting offensive operations in Kordofan, with a particular focus on relieving the RSF’s sieges on Babanusa (West Kordofan state), Dalang and Kadugli (both South Kordofan state). Even if the SAF agrees to the truce in principle, it is highly unlikely that the SAF’s and RSF’s complex networks of allied communal militias will adhere to the truce. As such, violence, looting and sexual violence will likely remain widespread in western Sudan, sustaining threats to locally engaged staff. (Source: Sibylline)

24 Nov 25. China criticises Japan’s plan to deploy missiles on island near Taiwan.

Summary
Japan says plan to deploy missiles near Taiwan ‘steadily moving forward’
China calls the plan an attempt to ‘provoke military confrontation’
Taipei says Japan has the right to protect Japanese territory
China’s military has put out fiery videos

China called Japan’s plan to deploy missiles on an island near Taiwan a deliberate attempt to “create regional tension and provoke military confrontation” on Monday, as a diplomatic dispute simmers between the two nations.

The remarks come amid their worst diplomatic crisis in years, after Japanese Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi said this month a hypothetical Chinese attack on democratically governed Taiwan could trigger a military response from Tokyo.

“Right-wing forces in Japan are… leading Japan and the region towards disaster,” Chinese foreign ministry spokesperson Mao Ning told a regular press briefing. Beijing “is determined and capable of safeguarding its national territorial sovereignty,” she added.

VITRIOLIC STATE MEDIA COMMENTARIES

Japan’s Defence Minister Shinjiro Koizumi said on Sunday that plans were “steadily moving forward” to deploy a medium-range surface-to-air missile unit at a military base on Yonaguni, an island about 110 km (68 miles) off Taiwan’s east coast.

“The move is extremely dangerous and should raise serious concerns among nearby countries and the international community,” especially in the context of Takaichi’s earlier remarks, Mao said on Monday.

China had responded to her comments with vitriol in state media commentaries, bans on Japanese seafood, a halt in Japanese movie releases, and a warning to citizens not to visit Japan.

Beijing views Taiwan as its own territory, and has not ruled out the use of force to take control of it, though the island’s government rejects Beijing’s claim and says only Taiwan’s people can decide their future.

In Taipei on Monday, Taiwan Deputy Foreign Minister Francois Wu told lawmakers that Japan, as a sovereign nation, had the right to take steps needed to protect the security of its territory, pointing out how close Yonaguni was to Taiwan.

“Japan’s strengthening of its relevant military facilities is basically helpful to maintaining security in the Taiwan Strait,” he added.

“So, of course, this is helpful to our national interests as Japan has no territorial designs or hostility towards Taiwan.”

On Sunday, Koizumi said the missile deployment aimed to protect Yonaguni, adding, “We believe that having this unit in place will actually lower the chances of an armed attack against our country”.

‘IF WAR BREAKS OUT TODAY’

In mid-November China’s defence ministry warned Japan of a “crushing” military defeat if it used force to intervene over democratically-governed Taiwan. A number of command centres of the Chinese People’s Liberation Army followed suit, putting out a series of fiery music videos on social media in the past week. The PLA Rocket Force, which oversees China’s conventional and nuclear arsenal, on Sunday showed footage of the country’s intercontinental ballistic missiles capable of carrying nuclear warheads and soldiers readying their rifles in a music video titled “If war breaks out today, this is my response!” In a video posted by the PLA Navy’s South Sea Fleet on Wednesday, a group of soldiers holding rifles and wearing camouflage face paint called out: “If fighting breaks out tonight, comrades, are you ready?”

“Artillery has been calibrated, ammunition is in place, and (we) have locked on the coordinates,” one of the soldiers said.

The PLA Navy’s North Sea Fleet, in another music video posted last Monday, showed warships and aircraft firing missiles and hitting targets in fiery blasts.

“Come, enemy, let’s have a showdown; I’ve already chambered my bullets; no matter how cunning you are, or how ferocious, I will bury you all the same,” the song went. (Source: Reuters)

24 Nov 25. Pakistan: Attack on security complex in Peshawar underscores elevated militancy risks. Earlier on 24 November, three suicide bombers attacked the headquarters of the paramilitary Federal Constabulary (FC) in Peshawar, the provincial capital of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province. One of the attackers detonated his explosives at the gate of the headquarters, killing three FC officers and injuring at least six civilians. The attack occurred as FC personnel were participating in morning parade drills. The headquarters, located in a densely populated area of Peshawar, has since been cordoned off. While no group has claimed responsibility for the attack, it comes amid an overall uptick in militant activity in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa by Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP). Pakistan has long accused the Afghan Taliban regime of sheltering the TTP, with tensions between the two countries particularly elevated. The incident also follows a suicide attack in the capital Islamabad two weeks earlier. We assess that there is a realistic possibility of further attacks targeting the security forces in major cities of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, including Peshawar, driving heightened security measures. (Source: Sibylline)

21 Nov 25. Readout of Secretary of War Pete Hegseth’s Meeting With Federal Republic of Nigeria National Security Advisor Mr. Mallam Nuhu Ribadu. Assistant to the Secretary of War for Public Affairs and Senior Advisor Sean Parnell provided the following readout: On Nov. 20, Secretary of War Pete Hegseth welcomed a delegation of security leaders from the Federal Republic of Nigeria led by their National Security Advisor, Mr. Mallam Nuhu Ribadu, to the Pentagon. Both leaders discussed ways to make tangible progress on stopping violence against Christians in Nigeria and combatting West African jihadist terrorist groups. Secretary Hegseth emphasized the need for Nigeria to demonstrate commitment and take both urgent and enduring action to stop violence against Christians and conveyed the Department’s desire to work by, with, and through Nigeria to deter and degrade terrorists that threaten the United States. (Source: U.S. DoD)

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NEWS IN BRIEF – MIDDLE EAST – CONFLICT

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Military And Security Developments

Nov 28.

Israel-Syria: Heavy clashes are unlikely to undermine bilateral security talks. On 27 November, there were heavy clashes during an Israel Defense Forces (IDF) raid to apprehend terror suspects from the Islamist Jamaa Islamiya group in Beit Jinn (Rif Dimashq governorate, Syria). The clashes were likely with members of local clans; they injured five IDF service personnel and killed at least 13 clan members. While weekly IDF raids in Syria are common, the recent clashes are unprecedented in scope since the ousting of former president Bashar al-Assad in December 2024. Nevertheless, we assess that the Syrian government is unlikely to retaliate against the IDF forces stationed in Daraa and Quneitra governorates or to call off the ongoing US-backed talks to reach a security deal with Israel in the coming months. However, there is a possibility that rogue Islamist factions will launch retaliatory attacks against Israeli troops in these governorates, sustaining security instability and armed conflict risks in southern Syria.
Israel-Palestinian Territories: Terror suspects’ killing will raise global scrutiny, domestic unrest risks. On 27 November, media outlets published videos of Israeli border police officers shooting and killing two terror suspects in Jenin (Jenin governorate) after they had already surrendered. The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) and the Israeli police subsequently launched an investigation into the incident. Earlier on 28 November, this was followed by the opening of a criminal case by Israel’s department for internal police investigations. Amid an ongoing rise in incidents of Israeli settler violence against Palestinians in the West Bank, we assess that the incident is likely to further increase international scrutiny of Israel’s activities in the Palestinian Territories. This will increase the risk of further sanctions on individuals and groups associated with the far right in Israel, as well as possible restrictions on Israeli products originating in the West Bank in the coming months. The prosecution of the involved officers remains a realistic possibility and will highly likely result in far-right protests and domestic unrest in Israel, particularly near courts during the officers’ court hearings.

Nov 27.

Lebanon-Cyprus: Maritime agreement will increase investor confidence, undercut by regional tensions. On 26 November, Lebanon and Cyprus signed a maritime demarcation agreement. In 2007, the two countries reached a preliminary agreement mapping out their offshore maritime zones, but it was not ratified due to delays by the Lebanese government. The agreement will allow Lebanon to expand its offshore gas and oil exploration and will likely increase the prospects of co-operation with Cyprus and the EU on energy and infrastructure. Beirut’s eventual ratification of the agreement comes amid growing confidence in the stability and competence of the Lebanese government. Together with prospective economic gains from offshore exploration and energy co-operation with Cyprus, we assess that the agreement will likely increase investment over the coming months. However, investor confidence will be undercut by sustained geopolitical and internal instability related to Israel and Lebanese Hizballah (LH). This will likely limit investment decisions, particularly ahead of Lebanon’s general elections scheduled for May 2026.
Iraq: Attack on gas field will elevate energy security risks in Kurdistan region throughout December. On 26 November, a rocket attack hit a storage tank at Khor Mor gas field, one of the largest in Iraq’s Kurdistan region, causing a fire and major operational disruption at the site. The incident halted gas supplies to power stations across Al-Sulaymaniyah, Duhok and Erbil governorates, causing widespread blackouts. Notably, the attack comes 48 hours after Kurdish forces intercepted a drone targeting the field. While no group has claimed responsibility for the attacks, we assess that the perpetrators are likely rogue Iraqi Shia groups targeting Kurdish military installations and US troops stationed near Kurdish oil infrastructure. The attack marks an escalation in the sporadic drone and missile attack campaign which has targeted Kurdish oil fields in Duhok, Erbil and Saladin governorates, as well as local airports since 2024. As such, similar attacks are highly likely in the coming weeks, increasing energy security risks in Kurdistan region. Furthermore, security and bystander risks around airports and military bases will also increase in the region throughout December.

Nov 26.

KEY DEVELOPMENTS

IRAN

Despite a high-level meeting between Iran and France, a breakthrough in nuclear negotiations remains unlikely in the short term.
The US continues to sanction dozens of Iranian-linked entities in the energy, shipping and aviation industries, sustaining substantial economic pressure on Iran.

ISRAEL

Limited arrests during violent clashes between ultra-Orthodox rioters and the military police in Ramat Gan (Tel Aviv district) highlight the growing risk of domestic unrest.

PALESTINIAN TERRITORIES

GAZA STRIP: The official cessation of Gaza Humanitarian Foundation (GHF) operations will likely drive Israeli anxieties around militant aid seizures, while also jeopardising the ceasefire agreement.
GAZA STRIP: The frequency of armed clashes within the Israeli-controlled ‘yellow line’ area in Rafah (southern Gaza) will escalate in line with ongoing Israel Defense Forces (IDF) operations targeting militant tunnels.
GAZA STRIP: The reducing threshold for Israeli retaliatory airstrikes will likely drive the frequency of further such strikes across the strip.
WEST BANK: The IDF’s new counter-terrorism operation underscores sustained concerns regarding militant activity in the northern West Bank.
WEST BANK: Singapore has sanctioned several Israeli settlers amid rising violence in the West Bank, underscoring persistent compliance and reputational concerns for Israeli-linked firms operating therein.

IRAN

Despite a high-level meeting between Iran and France, a breakthrough in nuclear negotiations remains unlikely in the short term. On 25 November, Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi and French Foreign Minister Jean-Noël Barrot discussed Iran’s nuclear programme. The talks came amid continued international concern regarding stalled negotiations between Iran and the US, as well as Iran’s continued restrictions on international monitoring efforts. We assess it is highly unlikely that the meeting will trigger a breakthrough in efforts to mediate an agreement between Iran and the US. In the coming weeks, Iran will almost certainly continue to stress (publicly) its willingness to negotiate with the US, while preconditioning any such talks on the US acknowledging its ‘rights’ to enrich uranium domestically (and on the US providing guarantees that Israel will not conduct airstrikes on Iranian nuclear facilities during said negotiations). The US is highly unlikely to accept such pre-conditions, sustaining diplomatic deadlock regarding Tehran’s nuclear programme. Without broader diplomatic engagement or international oversight, concerns regarding Iran’s likely efforts to redevelop its nuclear and missile production capabilities will sustain the risk of further Israeli airstrikes in the coming months, while also maintaining elevated regional tensions.
The US continues to sanction dozens of Iranian-linked entities in the energy, shipping and aviation industries, sustaining substantial economic pressure on Iran. On 20 November, the US sanctioned over 41 individuals, entities and vessels associated with Iran’s oil exports and ‘shadow fleet’. The sanctions primarily target ship operators and logistics firms associated with the Sepehr Energy Jahan Nama Pars Company, a sanctioned Iranian firm that facilitates oil exports on behalf of Iran’s security forces. Sanctioned entities include several UAE-based firms, Panama-flagged vessels and the Germany-based BPT Berlin Petroleum Trading GmbH, underscoring broadening sanction-exposure risks in the energy and shipping industries amid sustained US scrutiny of Iranian economic activity. The US also sanctioned 13 individuals, entities and aircraft associated with Mahan Air, an Iranian airline linked to arms transfers to Iran’s regional proxies, underscoring moderately increasing compliance concerns for entities engaged in the region’s aviation sector. Continued US sanctioning of Iranian economic interests and associates is highly likely to sustain rising economic pressure on Iran and limit its engagement with international markets. On 25 November, the shipping-intelligence firm Kpler also reported that the volume of Iranian oil held on tankers at sea (essentially in storage) has reached a two-year peak, amid softening Chinese demand. In the coming weeks, muted demand for Iranian crude exports will likely maintain downward pressure on prices, with Iran offering further discounts to Chinese buyers. This will increase fiscal pressure and further undercut Iran’s foreign currency reserves in the medium-to-long term.

ISRAEL

Limited arrests during violent clashes between ultra-Orthodox rioters and the military police in Ramat Gan (Tel Aviv district) highlight the growing risk of domestic unrest. On the night of 25 November, hundreds of ultra-Orthodox protesters arrived at the residence of an ultra-Orthodox defector in Ramat Gan shortly after the military police attempted to arrest him. Attempts by the military police to arrest the defector were unsuccessful and triggered a riot, in which protesters flipped over a military police car. Subsequently, the military police contingent was reinforced by additional Israeli police personnel, who arrested two rioters. The incidents highlight the growing belligerence of the ultra-Orthodox community during their protests against mandatory military conscription. Furthermore, the low number of arrests highlights the Israeli enforcement agencies’ limited resources and political will to deal with such rioters. This will continue to embolden the ultra-Orthodox community, and likely increase the rate at which protests carried out by the community devolve into incidents of violence and rioting in the coming months. They will possibly even spread outside ultra-Orthodox population centres. Any such developments are liable to elevate domestic unrest, physical security and travel disruption risks across Israel in the coming months.

PALESTINIAN TERRITORIES

GAZA: The official cessation of Gaza Humanitarian Foundation (GHF) operations will likely drive Israeli anxieties around militant aid seizures, while also jeopardising the ceasefire agreement. On 24 November, the US and Israeli-backed GHF announced that the latter is winding down its operations in Gaza after almost six months of activity. Despite the official announcement, GHF food distribution centres throughout Gaza have not, in effect, functioned since the ceasefire began in early October, limiting the move’s impact on the current humanitarian conditions in Gaza. GHF’s executive director, Jon Acree, indicated that the new US-led Civil-Military Coordination Center (CMCC) would only later be ready to adopt and expand the GHP model and did not provide a timeframe. As such, aid distribution will likely be led and directed by UN agencies for the foreseeable future. Both Israel and the US have claimed that aid distribution by UN agencies is particularly prone to militant violence and therefore vulnerable to seizure, and that this is possibly gifting militants the necessary resources to re-establish and maintain their influence over Gaza. Israeli allegations that aid is being used in this way will possibly present sticking points in the implementation of the current ceasefire and future peace plan, increasing the risk of breakdowns in the agreement over the coming months.
GAZA: The frequency of armed clashes within the Israeli-controlled ‘yellow line’ area in Rafah (southern Gaza) will escalate in line with ongoing IDF operations targeting militant tunnels. In the past week, IDF operations against militant tunnel infrastructure in eastern Rafah have increased. The situation has in turn driven a rise in the frequency of attacks against Israeli forces by militants trapped within these tunnels and who are attempting to escape. Over the past week, the IDF has killed over 20 operatives and apprehended at least eight others during operations and associated clashes in eastern Rafah. The clashes come despite the suggestion of possible discussions between Israel and Hamas about the release of those militants trapped within the Israeli-controlled yellow line area. As such, we assess that clashes in eastern Rafah will likely continue over the coming week, sustaining heightened exposure to cross-fire and explosives in the area.
GAZA: The reducing threshold for Israeli retaliatory airstrikes will likely drive the frequency of further such strikes across the strip. In the past week, attacks against Israeli servicepeople have prompted several IDF airstrikes against targets across the strip. In the first incident (19 November), militants opened fire on Israeli military personnel operating in Khan Yunis (southern Gaza), though the IDF sustained no injuries. Later that day, the Israeli air force conducted strikes across Gaza, including in western al-Mawasi (southern Gaza). In a second notable case on 22 November, an armed militant crossed into the Israeli-controlled yellow line area via a route used for the transport of humanitarian aid in southern Gaza and opened fire on Israeli servicemen. Following this, the IDF conducted intense airstrikes across Gaza, including in Deir al-Balah (central Gaza). The incidents mark a shift from previous retaliatory airstrikes, which were primarily triggered as a result of harm to IDF troops; in neither of these incidents were IDF service personnel harmed. As such, we assess that the threshold for retaliatory IDF airstrikes is reducing, increasing the risk of airstrikes growing in frequency and compounding aid and logistical staff’s exposure to direct explosions and collateral damage across Gaza. Such strikes are liable to compound the risk of a ceasefire breaking down over the long term.
WEST BANK: The IDF’s new counter-terrorism operation underscores sustained concerns regarding militant activity in the northern West Bank. On 25 November, the IDF and Shin Bet launched a major counter-terrorism operation in the northern West Bank. The IDF deployed the equivalent of three brigades to Tubas governorate and engaged in operations in the al-Aqaba, Tammun and Tubas areas (all Tubas), as well as the nearby Nur Shams refugee camp (Tulkarm governorate). The IDF has implemented a localised curfew, erected numerous roadblocks and deployed a range of military equipment – including bulldozers, helicopters and heavy machinery – to its areas of operations. While the Israeli authorities have stated that the operation will last several days, clashes with Palestinian militant factions will increase the likelihood of longer-term and broader activity in Tubas. The operation will almost certainly disrupt business continuity in the northern West Bank, with firms and public sector entities likely to implement indefinite closures in the coming days. Continued IDF operations will also highly likely disrupt travel along Highway 90, as well as Roads 57, 578 and 5977, undermining supply chain continuity and travel mobility. Locally engaged staff will almost certainly continue to face elevated risks of exposure to crossfire and ordnance detonation, while media outlet staff attempting to cover the operation will face elevated risks of harassment from the security forces. At the time of writing, the operation has resulted in numerous weapons seizures, underscoring the sustained risk of militant activity (and capacity building) in the northern West Bank. In the coming weeks, the Israeli security forces will almost certainly maintain an elevated posture in the West Bank’s northern governorates – including Jenin, Nablus, Tubas and Tulkarm governorates – amid efforts to disrupt militant activity. Such operations will almost certainly sustain elevated ethno-religious tensions and drive the risk of radicalisation and militant recruitment in the short-to-medium term. This dynamic will maintain the risk of sole-perpetrator and low-capacity militant attacks targeting Israeli security positions and civilians in both the West Bank and Israel in the coming months, particularly during periods of religious significance, such as the upcoming Hanukkah period (14 to 22 December).
WEST BANK: Singapore has sanctioned several Israeli settlers amid rising violence in the West Bank, underscoring persistent compliance and reputational concerns for Israeli-linked firms. On 21 November, Singapore’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs announced it would impose financial sanctions on four Israeli nationals and bar them from entering the country due to their association with settler violence targeting Palestinian civilians in the West Bank. The announcement comes amid a broader uptick in settler violence targeting Palestinian civilians during the ongoing olive harvest season (see Sibylline Middle East Crisis Update – 12 November 2025). In the coming weeks, elevated settler violence targeting Palestinians is highly likely to continue, triggering increasing international scrutiny of settler activity in the West Bank. We assess this will likely result in further bilateral sanctions targeting high-profile settlers and associated entities, compounding compliance concerns and reputational risks for firms with operations in Israel and Israeli settlements in the West Bank. Such risks will be particularly acute in the finance, agriculture and construction sectors, with affected entities facing increased risks of targeted activism, boycotts and financial divestment in the medium-to-long term.

RED SEA

Nothing significant to report
ISRAEL-LEBANON: Israel’s assassination of Lebanese Hizballah (LH)’s chief of staff is unlikely to trigger imminent retaliation; however, the ceasefire will remain vulnerable to a breakdown throughout Q1 2026. On 23 November, Israel assassinated LH Chief of Staff Haytham Ali Tabatabai in a pinpoint airstrike on an apartment building in Beirut’s Haret Hreik neighbourhood. The strike killed four people and injured 28 others. Tabatabai is the most senior LH commander to be killed by Israel since the November 2024 ceasefire between Israel and the Iranian-backed group. Following the strike, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu stated that his country would not allow LH to rebuild its power and urged the Lebanese government to fulfil its commitment to disarm the group. Despite the assassination and persistent Israeli threats against LH assets in southern Lebanon, we assess that LH is unlikely to retaliate in the coming weeks, as the group is keen to focus on rebuilding its weakened military capabilities, domestic network and leadership. LH will likely remain reluctant to pursue any military action that results in domestic accusations that the group is dragging Lebanon into a war before nationwide general elections in 2026. As such, Israel is highly likely to capitalise on LH’s reduced willingness to exercise military options by carrying out further airstrikes against the group’s members and assets in Nabatieh and South governorates (both Lebanon), possibly including pinpoint strikes in major cities such as Jezzine, Sidon and Tyre (all South). Similarly, further limited strikes against specific targets in Beirut remain likely in the coming weeks as part of a bid to pressure the Lebanese government to pursue the group’s full disarmament (see Sibylline Situation Update Brief – 17 November 2025). However, despite LH’s current reluctance, more substantive Israeli airstrike campaigns targeting LH in Beirut, central areas north of the Litani River and/or Baalbek-Hermel and Beqaa governorates would possibly push LH to ‘breaking point’, triggering a collapse in the ceasefire and a new round of armed conflict.
ISRAEL-GLOBAL: A new lawsuit targeting Binance will further increase the existing compliance risks facing financial institutions dealing with the crypto firm throughout H1 2026. On 24 November, 306 US victims of the 7 October 2023 Hamas attack sued the cryptocurrency firm Binance and its founder Changpeng Zhao, accusing them of facilitating funds for the militant group and its affiliates through laundered money. In particular, the lawsuit accused Binance of enabling Hamas, LH, Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) and Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) to move more than USD 1 bn through its platform, including more than USD 50 m after the 7 October attack. Notably, Zhao already pleaded guilty to charges of money laundering in April 2024, and was sentenced to four months in prison. Binance also agreed back then to plead guilty and to pay USD 4.3 bn in fines. While the recent lawsuit is highly likely to take several months in courts, it will further increase compliance and reputational risks for global financial companies, hedge funds, crypto firms, banks and governments dealing with Binance throughout H1 2026 (at least), even without a new conviction from the court. Furthermore, the lawsuit is likely to prompt other Hamas victims in Israel and the US to sue additional smaller crypto firms and decentralised crypto exchanges allegedly used by other Iranian-backed groups.
Israel-Palestinian Territories: Counter-terrorism operation will drive security risks to proximate staff. On 25 November, Israel launched a large-scale counter-terrorism operation in the north-eastern West Bank, deploying the equivalent of three Israel Defense Forces (IDF) brigades to Tubas governorate. Additional military reinforcements, including bulldozers and heavy equipment, were also sent to the Nur Shams refugee camp in Tulkarm governorate. The operation highlights persistent concerns about militant activity in the West Bank and increases staff exposure to crossfire or misidentification. While the authorities state the operation will last several days, possible clashes between the IDF and Palestinian civilians and militant groups would trigger a greater security response, raising the likelihood of sustained or expanded operations. A curfew is in place, and schools and many workplaces in the governorate have suspended operations. This has will likely disrupt local supply chains and revenues for businesses in the West Bank, with possible knock-on impacts for Israeli firms sourcing from the West Bank. Heightened security measures are also likely to increase the use of checkpoints and stop-and-search practices, increasing the risk of arbitrary detentions for staff and broader travel delays.
Syria: Sectarian tensions will elevate risks of ethno-religious clashes, sporadic business disruption. On 25 November, the Syrian security forces deployed live fire to disperse protesters and counter-protesters in Latakia (Latakia governorate), injuring several individuals according to unconfirmed reports. Hundreds of Alawite individuals gathered in Latakia, demanding a decentralised political system in Syria and the release of Alawite detainees; shortly after, pro-government counter-protesters (likely from the Sunni community) gathered and harassed the Alawites. These protests come days after armed clashes between Sunni Bedouin tribes and Alawites in nearby Homs (Homs governorate). While demonstrations have subsided currently, we assess that elevated sectarian tensions in Latakia governorate and Syria’s coastal areas will likely persist throughout December. As such, further Alawite anti-government protests in Hama, Homs, Latakia and Tartus governorates in the coming weeks are likely, possibly triggering new rounds of ethno-religious clashes with Sunnis and Bedouin clans. Any new bouts of ethnic violence are likely to be primarily concentrated against community figures and business assets and will likely prompt further curfews and sporadic business disruption throughout December.

Nov 24.

Israel-Lebanon: LH assassination underscores slow disarmament progress; limited response is likely. On 23 November, Israel assassinated Lebanese Hizballah (LH) Chief of Staff Haytham Ali Tabatabai in an airstrike on an apartment building in the capital Beirut’s Haret Hreik neighbourhood. The strike killed four and injured 28 others. Israel stated that LH is rearming and regrouping, highlighting limited progress in the ongoing disarmament process and increasing the likelihood that Israel will escalate tactical pressure against LH in the coming weeks (see Sibylline Situation Update Brief – 17 November 2025). Given LH’s limited capacity for sustained escalation, it will likely respond in a controlled manner, possibly with a limited rocket attack into northern Israel, elevating bystander security risks for personnel near the Israel-Lebanon border and causing operational delays due to evacuations. LH is highly unlikely to conduct a high-risk attack on densely populated centres in Israel such as Haifa (Haifa district). The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) will likely use such attacks to justify further targeted strikes against LH leaders in Beirut, as well as cross-border operations in Lebanon’s southern governorates, raising conflict re-escalation risks.
Syria: Ethnic clashes will increase security risks in several cities in coming days. On 23 November, Bedouin gunmen set fire to several Alawite homes in Homs after unknown gunmen killed a couple from the Bani Khaled tribe in nearby Zaidal (both Homs governorate). Local media also reported limited clashes and gunfire in Homs’ predominantly Alawite districts, prompting the deployment of the government forces and the imposition of a temporary curfew. Nevertheless, we assess that the resumption of violence is highly likely by either side in the coming days. Any such attacks are likely to target community figures, businesses and residential areas inside Homs and its peripheries. Alawite attacks against the Syrian government’s General Security Services (GSS) in the city will remain possible, increasing exposure to crossfire and explosives near security checkpoints. There is also a possibility that these clashes will trigger Alawite retaliatory attacks against the government forces in Syria’s coastal region, increasing security risks in Latakia (Latakia governorate) and Tartus (Tartus governorate) in the coming days. (Source: Sibylline)

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NEWS IN BRIEF – UKRAINE CONFLICT

November 28, 2025 by

Sponsored by Bertin Exensor

www.exensor.com

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Military And Security Developments

Nov 28.

A recent large-scale corruption scheme within Ukraine’s energy sector will further erode the already-deteriorating levels of public trust in both the government and President Volodymyr Zelensky.

* While the European Commission (EC) is likely to remain committed to supporting Ukraine, it will likely face growing pressure from Ukraine-sceptic countries to resist sending further financial aid to Kyiv.

* In the longer term, persistently high levels of corruption will further weaken Kyiv’s already-limited prospects of securing EU membership.

Context

The Ukrainian government is facing its largest and most politically consequential corruption scandal since the start of the full-scale Russo-Ukrainian war. The National Anti-Corruption Bureau of Ukraine (NABU) revealed earlier this month that it is in the midst of a 15-month investigation into a large-scale embezzlement scheme at Energoatom, the state-owned nuclear power operator. Investigators uncovered an alleged USD 100 million scheme involving kickbacks of up to 15% on contracts – including contracts intended to strengthen the defences protecting Ukraine’s energy infrastructure against Russian strikes.

The scandal implicates numerous senior government and business figures deemed to be close to President Zelensky. One key suspect, Timur Mindich, is a former close business associate of Zelensky; Mindich has since fled the country. The case has already led to the suspension of key cabinet members, including Minister of Justice Herman Halushchenko and Minister of Energy Svitlana Hrynchuk. The head of the Presidential Office, Andriy Yermak, is the most senior official to submit their resignation in connection with the scandal (so far). More broadly, and in addition to tarnishing Ukraine’s credibility among its allies, the scandal is likely to reignite long-standing domestic grievances over endemic corruption, further undermining public confidence in the current leadership at a crucial time (namely the US-led peace negotiations).

Forecast

The corruption scandal will highly likely erode the public’s confidence in the cabinet and the presidency even further, increasing the likelihood of protests in major urban centres

Corruption has historically been a major trigger for social backlash and large-scale protests in Ukraine. This was evidenced by mass demonstrations in July (the largest since the start of the full-scale war) following the government’s perceived attempts to curtail the independence of anti-corruption bodies (see Sibylline Special Report – 31 July 2025). After those protests, President Zelensky’s approval ratings dropped by eight points (see Figure 1). We assess that another decline is highly likely in light of the latest scandal.

While Yermak’s resignation earlier on 28 November is a clear attempt to draw a line between the presidential administration and the scandal, suspicions regarding Yermak are likely to prompt speculation about Zelensky’s role in (or awareness of) the scheme. The emergence of further details that implicate senior public officials, particularly those in the government, the presidential administration (including Zelensky himself) or the parliament, would highly likely trigger renewed protests – particularly during key peace negotiations. Any such demonstrations are most likely to occur in major Ukrainian cities, including the capital Kyiv. For now, however, we assess that the overall risk of protests remains moderate.

Russia-Ukraine: Moscow’s unwillingness to alter ceasefire demands will delay conflict resolution. On 27 November, Russian President Vladimir Putin reiterated his demand that Ukraine withdraw its forces from their current positions as a condition for a ceasefire (notably not a full peace). Putin also stated that the initial 28-point plan drafted by the US last week could serve as a basis for future negotiations to end the war (see Sibylline Special Report – 21 November 2025). These comments support our assessment that the Kremlin is, at present, unwilling to compromise on its core demands regarding the outcome of the conflict. This effectively amounts to a rejection of the amended peace text recently drafted by the US and Ukraine, which reportedly reduces the concessions required from Ukraine. At the same time, US Special Envoy Steve Witkoff is expected to meet President Putin next week to continue peace negotiations. Nevertheless, Moscow’s intransigence in altering its long-standing demands, together with Ukraine’s reluctance to agree to territorial concessions (particularly the withdrawal from Donetsk oblast), is highly likely to stall the peace talks. We continue to assess that a definitive resolution of the conflict remains unlikely in the short-to-medium term

Nov 27.

Executive summary

In our last Strategic Risk Forecast, we put forward various scenarios concerning the trajectory of the Russo-Ukrainian war in the next 12 months. Our baseline scenario is that the war will likely continue in some form without a definitive resolution; there is also a realistic possibility of a fragile ceasefire that will fail to stop the fighting entirely.
The leak of a US-proposed peace plan on 20 November has precipitated the most intense period of diplomacy to date, though we continue to assess that the war is unlikely to end in the short term. The initial 28-point plan has been reworked during subsequent US-Ukraine bilateral talks in Geneva (Switzerland). While Kyiv has nominally agreed to the plan’s ‘essence’, major issues have yet to be resolved – indicating that this is likely to be the beginning of the negotiating process, rather than the end. Meanwhile, Moscow is unlikely to accept any major compromises on its key war objectives. As such, back-and-forth shuttle diplomacy is likely to continue in the coming weeks, despite US President Donald Trump’s determination to end the war as soon as possible.
Ukraine’s heating season officially began on 28 October. Russia’s strike campaign continues to exacerbate severe energy security risks in Ukraine, and will sustain significant operational disruption for businesses throughout the winter. Ukraine’s overall interception rates are decreasing month-on-month; this has resulted in greater damage to the country’s energy-production and -distribution network, increasing the risks of protracted blackouts nationwide.

Key triggers, warnings and indicators (TWIs) to watch for in December include US efforts to coerce either or both sides into reaching a peace deal, possibly via the imposition of fresh sanctions on Russia and/or intelligence and weapons suspensions for Ukraine. In addition, the ongoing Energoatom corruption scandal will continue to jeopardise domestic and governmental stability.

US: Ukraine-affiliated organisations face increased security risks from Russian threat actors. On 25 November, the US-based cyber security company Arctic Wolf reported that a Russia-linked threat group (‘RomCom’) infiltrated the systems of an unnamed engineering company in the US in September. Reportedly, the company had provided services to a US city that maintains a municipal relationship with Ukraine, highlighting the expansion of RomCom’s operations against entities supporting the Ukrainian war effort. It is likely that the group hijacked a legitimate website to trick victims into installing a fake software update. This installation deployed a renowned malware loader (‘SocGholish’) onto compromised systems. RomCom then downloaded another malicious payload (‘Mythic Agent’) to establish persistence; this was soon detected and quarantined by security mechanisms. We assess that the company’s detection of the attack likely prevented RomCom from deploying ransomware, mitigating disruption on the compromised system. This incident underscores the sustained security risk to global organisations providing both diplomatic and military aid to Ukraine amid the ongoing war.

Nov 25.

KEY DEVELOPMENTS

OFFENSIVES: Against the backdrop of the recent US peace plan, Russian forces are intensifying offensive operations along several parts of the front line, including some notable gains in Zaporizhzhia oblast
STRIKES: The trajectory of the ongoing peace talks is likely to influence the intensity of Russia’s long-range strike campaign, consistent with previous periods of intense diplomatic activity
TERRITORY: The US’ 28-point peace plan would require Ukraine to make significant territorial concessions, but also possibly enable Kyiv to bypass constitutional technicalities concerning territorial changes
FORECAST: Reports emerged earlier on 25 November that Ukraine had ‘agreed’ to a US-brokered peace plan, though it remains unclear what precisely they have agreed to; the war will highly likely continue in the short-to-medium term
OFFENSIVES: Against the backdrop of the recent US peace plan and a resumption of diplomatic activity, Russian forces are intensifying offensive operations along several parts of the front line. In Pokrovsk (Donetsk oblast), Russian troops continue to advance as part of wider efforts to encircle the Pokrovsk-Myrnohrad pocket. On 21 November, Ukraine’s 7th Rapid Reaction Corps reported that Russia has redeployed elements of the relatively elite 76th Airborne (VDV) Division in the Pokrovsk direction, likely as part of efforts to accelerate advances after a slowdown in recent weeks.
OFFENSIVES: Russia has meanwhile made its most significant gains in Zaporizhzhia oblast to the south, where its forces have reportedly captured fifteen settlements since September. Most of these advances have taken place around the city of Huliapole, which lies roughly 54 miles (87km) east of Zaporizhzhia City. Russian forces have been deployed north of Huliapole, which a Ukrainian military spokesperson described as a key transport hub, with logistical routes running north towards Pokrovske (Dnipropetrovsk oblast) and east towards Pokrovsk (Donetsk oblast). As of 25 November, Russian forces have taken a village located just two miles (3km) east of the city, indicating the growing pressure on Ukraine’s defences on this part of the front. While Russian forces are not achieving major breakthroughs, the cumulative rate of advances across several sections of the front underscores the steady deterioration of Ukraine’s position.
OFFENSIVES: At the same time, Russia is amplifying unverified claims of its territorial gains, likely as part of the ongoing information campaign aimed at portraying the Kremlin’s military victory over Ukraine as inevitable. On 20 November, the Russian Ministry of Defence (MoD) claimed that its forces had captured Kupiansk (Kharkiv oblast). Ukraine’s General Staff has rejected the claim; geolocated evidence indicates that Ukrainian forces retain control of most of the city. We assess that these claims, coinciding with initial reports of the US 28-point peace plan, are likely intended to reinforce the perception that Russia retains the upper hand and that Ukraine’s defeat is inevitable. However, it remains our assessment that Russian forces still have a significant amount of territory to consolidate in and around Kupiansk. Ukrainian forces have conducted numerous counter-attacks in recent weeks, indicating a relatively dynamic situation around Kupiansk, rather than the conclusion of a successful Russian operation.
OFFENSIVES: With battlefield realities having a significant influence on negotiations, the continuation of US military support for Ukraine will strongly shape the Ukrainian government’s bargaining position. Following the disclosure of the US peace plan’s initial draft, Reuters reported that according to unnamed sources familiar with the matter, Washington DC is willing to apply greater pressure on Kyiv than during previous rounds of discussions in order to secure a peace framework by 27 November. This would reportedly include reducing intelligence sharing and limiting weapons supplies if Kyiv refuses to comply. The reports stating that Ukraine recently agreed to an amended peace plan likely reduce the likelihood of such measures; however, should negotiations protract, such action would remain a possibility. The temporary suspension of US intelligence sharing likely had a significant impact on the battlefield (and the collapse of the Kursk front) in March.
STRIKES: The trajectory of the ongoing peace talks is likely to influence the intensity of Russia’s long-range strike campaign, consistent with previous periods of intense diplomatic activity. Overnight on 24 to 25 November, Russia launched a large strike involving 464 drones and 22 missiles, heavily targeting Kyiv and disrupting electricity and heating infrastructure. The timing of the attack coincided with discussions between US and Ukrainian officials on revisions to the US peace plan, indicating that Moscow is likely to continue using long-range strikes to sustain pressure on Kyiv during the negotiations. If the talks were to move in a direction favourable to Russia’s demands, the Kremlin could realistically scale back the tempo of its strikes. In August, for example, around the time of the Alaska summit, Russia temporarily reduced the intensity of its attacks in an apparent attempt to appease President Trump, who had been critical of large-scale Russian barrages in the preceding months. However, amid the likely back-and-forth of negotiations in the coming days and weeks, periodic high-intensity Russian strikes are likely to continue to inflict major stress on Ukraine’s energy system.

POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS

TERRITORY: The US’ 28-point peace plan, first reported on 20 November, would require Ukraine to make significant territorial concessions beyond land Russia currently occupies, but also possibly enable Kyiv to bypass constitutional technicalities concerning territorial changes. The framework notes that Russian-annexed Crimea, as well as Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts, would be ‘de facto recognised’ as Russian, including by the US, but not de jure (see Sibylline Special Report – 21 November 2025). Ukraine’s constitution stipulates that altering Ukraine’s territorial composition is possible only via a nationwide referendum. Such wording could realistically offer Ukraine constitutional room for manoeuvre on politically painful issues surrounding territory, though even de facto recognition would be unpopular within Ukrainian society. It appears from the latest talks in Geneva (Switzerland) that a decision on territorial concessions has been delayed for now, but this will remain among the key sticking points for both sides. For further analysis on peace proposals, see FORECAST below.
ELECTIONS: The original US plan envisions Ukraine holding elections within 100 days, while Europe’s proposal states that Ukraine will hold elections ‘as soon as possible’ after signing the peace agreement. Ukraine is prohibited from holding elections under martial law, which has been in place since the beginning of Russia’s full-scale invasion. Martial law conditions will almost certainly remain in force for the foreseeable future as the war continues; this will limit the possibility of holding elections in the coming months, unless a firm peace agreement is signed and implemented successfully. Russia will almost certainly seek to influence any such elections in Ukraine following a cessation of hostilities or as part of a peace agreement to increase the likelihood of a result that suits Moscow’s interests. At the same time, organisational challenges stemming from the fact that thousands of Ukrainian refugees are abroad and many Ukrainians are under Russian occupation will also present obstacles for ensuring any vote is free, fair or safe.

FORECAST

PEACE: Reports emerged earlier on 25 November that Ukraine had ‘agreed’ to a US-brokered peace plan, though it remains unclear what precisely they have agreed to; the war will highly likely continue in the short-to-medium term. According to an unspecified Ukrainian official, Kyiv supports the ‘essence’ of the peace deal following talks between Ukrainian and US representatives in Geneva (Switzerland) on 23 November and subsequent negotiations. (See Sibylline Special Report – 21 November 2025 for further context.)

We assess that Kyiv’s move reflects its determination to illustrate clearly and quickly (ahead of the proposed 27 November ‘deadline’) that it is willing to end the war, rather than indicating that a final agreement has been reached. It is likely an attempt to outflank Russia and place the onus on Moscow to make the necessary concessions to move the negotiating process forward. Reports claim that the original 28-point plan, which was broadly more favourable to Russia’s terms, was shortened to 19 points and substantially amended following the Geneva talks. According to Ukraine’s first deputy foreign minister, Serhiy Kyslytsia, numerous key issues including Ukraine’s NATO membership and territorial concessions have been ‘placed in brackets’ for President Trump and Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky to decide upon later – a key indication that this is far from a final document.

Ukraine’s attempts to illustrate its willingness to agree to US proposals will reduce the likelihood of punitive US pressure ahead of a previously proposed 27 November deadline for Ukraine to sign the plan. Although President Trump disclosed on 22 November that the plan was not a ‘final offer’, earlier reports claimed that the US had threatened to suspend intelligence sharing and weapons supplies to coerce Ukraine into agreeing. As such, the ‘agreement’ will reduce the likelihood of the US taking such action in the coming days.

Despite Ukraine’s tentative ‘agreement’, Moscow is highly likely to oppose any alterations which offer more favourable terms to Kyiv, underscoring our assessment that this is the beginning, rather than the end, of the negotiating process. On 23 November, President Vladimir Putin said that the original 28-point peace plan could form the basis of a final settlement, with numerous other Russian officials clearly stating that there are elements with which Russia disagrees and would seek to amend, even before the Geneva talks. Russian officials have since criticised a subsequent European counter-proposal which opposes many of Russia’s war objectives. Kremlin foreign policy aide Yuri Ushakov referred to Europe’s plan as being ‘completely unconstructive’ and stated that it would not work for Moscow.

Russian officials have not changed their uncompromising messaging over the past week, and while this could be a negotiating tactic, we continue to assess that a shift in Kremlin strategic messaging to its population is a key indicator that a peace deal is being seriously considered. In recent days, the Russian establishment has been very clear in maintaining its uncompromising approach, indicating that the revisions made following the Geneva summit are likely to prove non-starters for Russia (at least in the short term). The Kremlin and the wider Russian government continue to maintain that Russia’s objectives will be met, including via military force if necessary. At present, the Kremlin is not preparing its population to accept anything other than its maximalist objectives. While this is possibly a negotiating tactic that does not preclude back-channel talks, this raises the risk of an ultranationalist backlash in Russia in the event that a compromise deal is reached suddenly and without a strategic communications campaign to prepare the population. We will continue to monitor domestic Russian communications, but at present we have seen no shift indicating a readiness to accept concessions.

We assess that back-and-forth negotiations will highly likely continue in the coming days and weeks, as both sides argue over two seemingly distinct proposals that have emerged – the original 28-point plan and the revised 19-point Geneva plan. Ukraine is working to organise President Zelensky’s visit to the US ‘at the earliest possible date’ in November to finalise a peace plan with Trump, according to Secretary of the National Security and Defence Council Rustem Umerov. Meanwhile, pressure will likely shift onto Moscow following the proposed 27 November ‘deadline’ if it refuses to accept the new proposals – which, we assess, remains highly likely. The Kremlin is likely to continue insisting that the terms ‘agreed’ at the Trump-Putin Alaska summit in August should form the basis for a peace agreement. Given that those ‘terms’ were not disclosed, it remains unclear what the US response would be to Russia’s unwillingness to compromise in the short term. In the meantime, however, the war will highly likely continue to grind on, with Russia seeking to improve its negotiating position still further.

Russia-Ukraine: A final peace deal is unlikely in near term despite US diplomatic efforts. On 26 November, Russian presidential aide Yuri Ushakov announced that US President Donald Trump’s special envoy Steve Witkoff and other US officials will travel to the Russian capital Moscow next week for peace talks. Trump stated that he has directed Witkoff to meet with Russian President Vladimir Putin, while US Secretary of the Army Dan Driscoll is expected to hold consultations with the Ukrainian side. The flurry of diplomatic activity comes amid a renewed US push to end the Russo-Ukrainian war; the details of a US-proposed peace plan were first reported last week. The plan’s framework – which largely favours Russia’s terms for ending the war – has been substantially revised following negotiations between Ukraine and the US. Although Trump has claimed that there are only a ‘few remaining points of disagreement’, we assess that these are highly likely issues of major contention between the warring parties (i.e. territorial disputes). Consequently, the lack of agreement on such matters will reduce the likelihood of a finalised peace agreement in the near term.
Ukraine: Clamp-down on anti-corruption bodies will remain catalyst for severe backlash, unrest. On 24 November, Ukrainian law enforcement agencies rejected reports that they were preparing charges against Oleksandr Klymenko, the head of the Specialised Anti-Corruption Prosecutor’s Office (SAPO). Earlier the same day, Ukrainska Pravda, citing law enforcement sources, had reported that Andriy Yermak, the head of the President’s Office, had instructed security forces to draw up charges against Klymenko and officials within the National Anti-Corruption Bureau (NABU). The move was allegedly intended as retaliation for the two bodies’ ongoing investigation into a large-scale corruption scheme in the energy sector, which has implicated key government figures. Although the allegations were denied, they are likely to fuel already-heightened concerns about efforts by the authorities to undermine the country’s anti-corruption drive. In August, a government-backed bill aimed at curtailing the independence of NABU and SAPO sparked the largest anti-government protests since the start of Russia’s full-scale invasion (see Sibylline Special Report – 31 July 2025). We assess that the perception that the authorities are seeking to suppress anti-corruption efforts will trigger significant backlash, increasing the risk of renewed protests.

Nov 24.

Russia-Eurasia Region: How will Moscow seek to bolster its influence?

Please note there will be no regular WRR reporting from 24 December 2025 until 1 January 2026 (inclusive). This is to account for the upcoming holiday period. Our regular reporting will recommence on 2 January 2026. Any major developments during the reporting pause will be covered in an Alert by our out-of-hours team.

Executive summary

Where Russia’s influence is diminishing, we assess that its grey-zone and influence operations are increasingly likely to impact business activity in 2026 – including in Armenia and Moldova.
Growing geopolitical competition in Central Asia and the South Caucasus is undermining Russia’s influence but will not lead to a sharp uptick in Russian destabilisation campaigns.
Russia will retain strong influence over Belarus and likely nurture its ties with the increasingly authoritarian Georgian government.
We assess that the Baltic states remain much more resilient and able to counter Russia’s destabilisation attempts and influence operations than various other post-Soviet countries.

Context

Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 has significantly impacted Moscow’s ability to project and protect its waning influence across the Former Soviet Union (FSU). The full-scale war has upended long-held assumptions about Russia’s post-Cold War role in the region and marked an opportunity (and for some a perceived necessity) to reset their foreign policies vis-à-vis Moscow. While Belarus and Georgia have identified an opportunity to align more closely with Russia so as to consolidate their authoritarian governments, other states across Central Asia have sought to maintain pragmatic relations, despite growing scepticism about the Kremlin’s ability to provide the region with security and economic benefits.

However, regional actors other than the heavily oppositional Baltic states and Ukraine are pursuing greater alignment with the West. This will be of significant concern for Moscow. Such states include those over which Russia had hitherto maintained extensive influence, such as Armenia and Moldova. This trend marks a clear threat to Russia’s perceived role as a ‘Great Power’, as well as its sphere of influence across Eurasia (which we assess Moscow is determined to defend). In this report, we examine what Russia is likely to do in its bid to maintain its influence in 2026; we also explore the various flashpoints and internal dynamics that Moscow will possibly leverage to support this goal.

Russia-Ukraine: Competing peace plans will delay conflict resolution. On 23 November, US Secretary of State Marco Rubio and the head of the Ukrainian Presidential Administration Andriy Yermak met in Geneva (Switzerland) to discuss amendments to the 28-point US peace plan revealed last week. Both sides praised the progress made during the consultations but did not disclose any changes to the draft plan. Although the initial plan included compromises for both parties, it broadly favoured Russia in territorial terms, while imposing significant security and military constraints on Ukraine. The Rubio-Yermak meeting is likely to be followed by a series of negotiations and revisions aimed at producing a workable agreement (see Sibylline Special Report – 21 November 2025). Meanwhile, the EU has released its own 28-point peace plan which, unlike Washington DC’s version, rejects major territorial concessions to Moscow, starts negotiations from the current line of contact and does not block Kyiv from joining NATO. Ultimately, while these developments have relaunched the peace process, we assess that Russia and Ukraine are likely unwilling to compromise on key issues, which will delay the conclusion of any agreement. Meanwhile, disagreements between the US and EU over peace terms will also complicate the conflict’s resolution. (Source: Sibylline)

26 Nov 25. $100 AI Upgrade Gives Ukrainian FPV Drones Last-Meter Accuracy in Heavy Jamming. Ukrainian first-person view (FPV) drones are reportedly hitting targets more accurately with a new AI-guided system that developers said can keep working even under heavy electronic warfare (EW). The device, called TFL-1, provides autonomous terminal guidance for the final 400 to 500 meters (1,312 to 1,640 feet) of a drone’s flight. It is built to endure heavy jamming by ignoring the radio horizon, helping pilots maintain control in cruise mode while pushing through “curtain” EW interference. TFL‑1 runs in three modes: Green for manual tracking, Red for AI targeting, and Blue for a neural-network enhanced mode tuned for armored targets. It also boosts pilot efficiency, adds cryptographic protection, and includes a target-refinement function to sharpen final-stage accuracy. New operators can reportedly learn it in about 10 seconds, and it works alongside Ukrainian mission-support tools like MilBeta and CrashDetect. Developed by Ukrainian firm The Fourth Law, TFL-1 has been certified for military use by the country’s defense ministry and is now in service with roughly 20 brigades. Early tests showed a 100-percent hit rate across 10 trial launches, prompting army units to request 30 more modules right away. The 412th Autonomous Brigade Nemesis later purchased 100 units and reported about a 50-percent success rate in the first 20 combat uses. Each TFL-1 costs under $100, keeping the upgrade well below 10 percent of a typical FPV drone and enabling large-scale adoption across frontline units. (Source: UAS VISION/NextGenDefense)

21 Nov 25. Cuashub.com said today that Ukraine quietly fields Merops Interceptor, shoots down more than 1,000 Shaheds. Ukraine has been secretly operating the Merops counter-drone system, an interceptor-based counter-drone complex that has reportedly downed more than 1,000 Shahed attack drones used by Russian forces. The system’s combat use had not been publicly acknowledged until Business Insider disclosed its deployment, citing positive evaluations from Ukrainian operators. Following Ukraine’s field experience, several NATO countries, including Poland, the United States and Romania, have begun training on Merops at a testing facility in Nowa Dęba, Poland. Photos from the drills show soldiers carrying the interceptor drones and conducting live test launches. Merops was developed under Project Eagle, a U.S.-backed initiative supported by Swift Beat, a company linked to former Google CEO Eric Schmidt. The system centers on Surveyor drones that perform mid-air interceptions, destroying enemy drones during flight.

How the Merops system works

A standard Merops unit consists of a command station, launch platforms and a fleet of Surveyor interceptor drones. The drones can operate autonomously or under remote control and use onboard sensors to track incoming targets. While detailed specifications remain classified, it is reported that Surveyor drones reach speeds above 280 km/h, fast enough to engage jet-powered systems such as Russia’s Geran-3, capable of speeds beyond 300 km/h. The interceptors are also marketed as resistant to Russian electronic warfare, though this has not been independently confirmed. Each drone costs roughly $15,000, less than a Shahed but more expensive than many Ukrainian-made interceptors. Training for Merops operators reportedly lasts about two weeks, and a full crew consists of four personnel inclusing a commander, a pilot and two technicians. The launch platforms can be mounted on standard pickup trucks, supporting rapid repositioning for both frontline and rear-area defense. Ukraine’s use of Merops adds another system to a fast-expanding ecosystem of indigenous and foreign interceptor drones. Earlier this month, Ukraine’s General Chereshnya AIR system was credited by its developer with intercepting 548 Russian UAVs in October. https://cuashub.com/en/content/ukraine-quietly-fields-merops-interceptor-shoots-down-more-than-1000-shaheds/ (Source: https://cuashub.com/

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21 Nov 25. Delays, setbacks loom over Trump’s Golden Dome missile shield.

Summary
Companies
Government shutdown and lack of spending plan cause delays
Industry fears contracts won’t be issued by December 31
Contractors balk at high development costs for interceptors

President Donald Trump’s Golden Dome missile defense initiative is facing significant delays, hampered by the 43-day government shutdown and lack of a clear plan to spend the first $25bn appropriated for the program this summer, eight sources familiar with the situation told Reuters. The shutdown delayed hiring and pulled crucial personnel away from their normal duties of approving and signing contracts, according to three industry sources and a U.S. official, who along with other sources spoke with Reuters on condition of anonymity fearing reprisals for talking to the press about a program where many aspects are classified as secret. More critically, the nearly $25 bn earmarked for Golden Dome as part of the budget reconciliation package approved this summer has not been turned into a spending plan that details exactly how the money will be allocated, two sources from the administration along with a source on Capitol Hill and two of the industry executives told Reuters. The setbacks threaten Trump’s promise that the $175bn program, unveiled on the seventh day of his new administration, will be in place to protect the continental United States by 2028.

“I don’t think they have made a lot of progress, but I don’t think it’s going horribly,” one of the U.S. officials told Reuters on condition of anonymity.

Reuters spoke to over a dozen sources from within the administration, the Pentagon, Capitol Hill and in the defense industry to piece together a picture of the headwinds facing Golden Dome, Trump’s signature national defense priority. A spending plan outlined in the bill funding Golden Dome was due to Congress in late August. That plan is now expected to be delivered by Deputy Secretary of Defense Steve Feinberg in December, two sources on Capitol Hill told Reuters. Delays in defense contracting are routine, but because of Trump’s short timeline they have taken on added significance for Golden Dome. Those delays have led some in the defense industry to express fear that key Golden Dome contracts will not be issued by the Pentagon’s internal deadline of December 31. Such a delay could potentially drive up costs, according to four defense industry executives who are planning to bid on aspects of the program.

“The Golden Dome is a visionary project led by a visionary President,” a White House spokesperson said. “It shouldn’t surprise anyone that it takes hard work to create such a system, and everyone is working well together to put pen to paper and deliver this next-generational technology.”

A Pentagon spokesperson said it is closely guarding the progress it is making on Golden Dome. “Recognizing adversaries’ intent to exploit Golden Dome’s breakthroughs, we are rigorously protecting America’s strategic advantages inherent in this program.” Feinberg and Golden Dome program manager General Michael Guetlein declined to comment.

GOLDEN DOME STRUGGLES TO MEET AGGRESSIVE TIMELINE

Guetlein met a mid-November deadline to present an implementation plan for the system and that plan is under review, the Pentagon told Reuters. From that blueprint, the Pentagon plans to begin awarding contracts for companies to test and build satellites, interceptors, ground stations and networking infrastructure. But sources inside the administration told Reuters the architecture for the plan proposed in September remains in flux, and won’t be finalized for several more weeks. A Pentagon spokesperson told Reuters “the baseline architecture has been established” but did not give further details. Without the final architecture, implementation plan or an approved spending plan Guetlein has been unable to put programs up for contract, effectively freezing the initiative’s ability to move from planning to rapid execution, one U.S. official and three industry executives said. The delays have fueled industry concerns that Golden Dome will need a much larger budget and longer timeline. Todd Harrison, a senior fellow at the American Enterprise Institute, a conservative think tank, estimated in September the cost of a “robust, all-threat” missile defense system at $3.6trn over 20 years. Guetlein is scrambling to staff up the Pentagon’s Golden Dome office and still has not met the internal headcount goal of 30 staffers. The program has also lost a key technical director from the U.S. Space Command working on the project’s architecture, said one administration official and three industry executives familiar with the program.

A new staff member to fill the position has been identified, two of the people said.

Guetlein has managed to mobilize a workforce of contractors, establish internal systems and hire a small team within the Pentagon in addition to borrowing missile defense experts from various facilities like the rocket development center at Redstone Arsenal outside Huntsville, Alabama, an administration official and three industry executives said.

Tom Karako, a weapons security expert at the Washington-based think tank Center for Strategic and International Studies, said the point of having a four-star general like Guetlein in charge is that “he can break glass and get things done.”

“As long as there is indecision about every little thing at still higher levels, none of this is ever going to get started,” he said.

CONTRACTORS BALK AT DEVELOPMENT COSTS

But Golden Dome’s challenges don’t end with the bureaucratic delays. Potential contractors have balked at the upfront costs they will have to shoulder to develop the Space-Based Interceptors, a network of satellites that would carry missiles to intercept a threat from launch to just before impact, multiple defense industry sources said. One of the executives at a top defense contractor told Reuters they are unlikely to compete to build the interceptors because of the costs of the years-long competition and the possibility that the next administration will abandon the program. The development costs for the interceptors are expected to be borne by the companies competing for the award, according to documents seen by Reuters. Typically this type of risky research funding is partly shouldered by the federal government. Contractors are being asked to develop four different versions of the interceptors, according to the documents: two versions that can intercept missiles at different altitudes of the boost phase, one version during mid-flight, and another to counter faster-moving hypersonic missiles. The government envisions groups of as many as five companies competing for different interceptor types. Within each competition group there are “prize pools.” The largest pool for $340m would be split among companies that complete an “on orbit” test with first place receiving $125m and fifth place, $40m, according to a Pentagon presentation to industry viewed by Reuters. Ultimately companies could win lucrative production contracts worth $1.8bn to $3.4bn annually, the Pentagon said in its presentation. But industry executives estimate it might cost $200 m to $2 bn to build and test a space-based interceptor. Major defense contractors including Lockheed Martin (LMT.N) Northrop Grumman (NOC.N) RTX (RTX.N)and Boeing (BA.N) are expected to compete for various components of Golden Dome once blanket contracts can actually be awarded. Some things are going right. The Department of Defense is making progress centralizing early-warning systems maintained by disparate government spy agencies intended to defend against ballistic, hypersonic, and advanced cruise missiles, according to two industry sources and two U.S. officials. Those systems involve hacking into enemy systems, gathering information from satellites and intelligence on the ground and feeding that simultaneously to Golden Dome, greatly aiding preparations to shoot missiles down. (Source: Reuters)

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