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12 Dec 25 Disrupting Russian Air Defence Production: Reclaiming the Sky, “The paper seeks to highlight how Russia’s adversaries may degrade the quality and reliability of Russian air defences…Considering the vulnerabilities identified in this report Russia’s international customers for air defences should reassess the resilience of these systems to attacks, including cyberattacks, technical compromise and supply chain disruption.”
This is according to Disrupting Russian Air Defence Production: Reclaiming the Sky, a new RUSI research report co-authored Dr Jack Watling which argues that Russia’s formidable integrated air and missile defence architecture is far more vulnerable to disruption than generally understood.
The report, which presents the most detailed assessment of the Russian Federation’s air defence industrial ecosystem to date, shows that Russia’s air defence network—central to protecting its forces, shielding its industrial base and counteracting Ukraine’s long-range strike campaign—depends heavily on foreign microelectronics, imported raw materials, Western measuring equipment and foreign-made design software.
The research also notes that Russia is expending more air defence interceptors than it is producing, a critical imbalance that could be strategically widened through targeted disruption. At the same time, production for systems such as the S-400 and Pantsir remains geographically concentrated, creating vulnerabilities to kinetic strike that could be exploited as Ukraine expands its long-range strike capabilities over 2026.
The report highlights several critically significant structural industrial production weaknesses. It says that Russia’s domestic semiconductor industry cannot yet manufacture advanced microprocessors; that Russian radar producers rely extensively on high-performance US-made printed circuit board laminates; that over US$42m of Western measuring equipment was imported into Russia in 2024 despite sanctions; and that beryllium oxide ceramics—vital for high-power radar—are sourced almost entirely from a single plant in Kazakhstan.
The research says that exploiting these weaknesses could meaningfully degrade Russia’s ability to expand air defence production, increase the cost and time required for system modernisation, and ultimately help restore Ukraine’s capacity to strike Russia’s war-sustaining infrastructure. The findings raise broader questions for countries considering purchasing Russian air defence systems and highlight the urgency of coordinated international action to restrict Russia’s access to vital technologies.
Key Findings
- Russia’s air defences, while formidable, face systemic industrial weaknesses. The report says: “Russia is currently expending more air defence interceptors than it is producing.”
- Critical components rely on foreign-made microelectronics and materials. “Russian air defences use a wide range of foreign-sourced microelectronics that Russia has struggled to produce domestically.”
- Russian radar production depends on imported high-performance PCB materials. “Printed Circuit Board laminates made by world-leading US company Rogers Corp are preferred by Russia’s radar engineers.”
- Key production sites are geographically concentrated and vulnerable to kinetic disruption. “Russia’s air defence enterprise is also vulnerable to physical attack, largely because of its concentration of functions around some key concerns.”
The report assesses that Russia’s air defence production could be disrupted by:
- Targeting Russia’s microelectronics supply chains through sanctions and enforcement. “Disruption to its operations would have a serious impact on the production of some of the most critical components of its air defence systems.”
- Sanctioning and interdicting shipments of beryllium oxide ceramics and other critical materials. “Russia has no operating plants for the production of beryllium oxide ceramics.”
- Preventing Russian access to Western-made calibration and measurement equipment. “Russian companies continued to import products made by Keysight and National Instruments mostly through China and Hong Kong.”
- Exploiting cyber vulnerabilities stemming from Russia’s reliance on foreign software tools. “Suitable replacements for designing radio-electronic components and equipment were still not developed.”
Conclusion
Russia currently produces some of the most capable integrated air and missile defence systems (IAMDS) in the world and produces them in high volumes. Its air defence network remains a central pillar of its military strategy and helps sustain its war effort against Ukraine, and poses a threat to NATO and conventional deterrence. This report demonstrates that the apparent resilience of Russia’s air defence production masks critical dependencies and that exploiting these vulnerabilities could significantly constrain Russia’s ability to modernise and expand its air defence inventory, improving the effectiveness of Ukraine’s long-range strike campaign and contributing to the long-term balance of deterrence in Europe.
12 Dec 25. Brazilian defence exports rise 74% over 2024. Brazil recorded a 74% increase in defence exports in 2025, the Secretariat of Defence Products (SEPROD) of the Brazilian Ministry of Defence (MoD) said on 1 December. Brazilian firms exported USD3.1bn in products and services, compared with USD1.78bn in 2024, according to the MoD. This increase was largely driven by the sale of four Embraer C-390 Millennium airlifters to Sweden, a KC-390 to Portugal, an A-29 Super Tucano attack and training aircraft to Sierra Nevada Corporation (SNC), and four A-29 Super Tucanos to Panama, Janes understands. Other export contracts covered tactical trucks, ammunition, training equipment, spares and equipment for aircraft, small arms, and command-and-control systems, among others. The Brazilian defence industry contributes 2.9 million direct and indirect jobs and represents 3.49% of Brazilian GDP. Approximately 80 companies export defence products to around 140 countries, SEPROD said. There are currently 307 accredited companies and 2,219 classified products, according to SEPROD. Germany, Bulgaria, the United Arab Emirates, the United States, and Portugal are the largest importers of the Brazilian defence products, the MoD said. Exports are expected to exceed USD3.1bn in 2026 as Embraer is in negotiations to sell C-390 Millennium aircraft to several countries. Sales of air-launched general purpose bombs and 155 mm artillery ammunition are also expected to increase. (Source: Janes)
10 Dec 25. Guatemala: Armed clashes, security forces reinforcements will elevate physical security risks. On 10 December, Guatemalan President Bernardo Arévalo announced plans to significantly reinforce the armed forces’ presence along the Guatemala-Mexico border, following armed clashes between organised crime groups (OCGs) in Guatemalan territory. Reports indicate that the clashes took place primarily in Huehuetenango department and involved members of Mexico’s Chiapas and Guatemala Cartel (CCYG) and Sinaloa Cartel (CDS), as well as the Guatemalan security forces. At the time of writing, at least eight people have been killed during the clashes. Furthermore, on 8 December, the authorities uncovered ‘narcomantas’ (i.e. banners written by drug-trafficking groups) in Huehuetenango, allegedly left by CDS and threatening rival OCGs. We assess that Arévalo will likely sustain the border’s militarisation beyond 11 December. In the short term, the heightened military presence will likely prompt delays for cross-border transit and trade, heightening supply chain disruption risks for the agriculture and freight transport sectors. Additionally, the presence of narcomantas points to sustained attack and violent crime risks in areas along the Guatemala-Mexico border, increasing physical safety risks. (Source: Sibylline)
11 Dec 25. Myanmar: Junta airstrikes in Rakhine state ahead of elections will drive security risks. At around 2100hrs (local time) on 10 December, a junta airstrike on a hospital in Mrauk-U town (Mrauk-U township, Rakhine state) killed at least 34 people and wounded many others. The junta claims that it does not target civilians. Rakhine state is currently largely controlled by the Arakan Army (AA), an ethnic armed organisation (EAO). In recent weeks, the junta has increased the frequency and intensity of its airstrikes in EAO-controlled areas ahead of general elections scheduled to begin on 28 December. The AA declared in August that it would not permit the polls to be held in Rakhine. Voting will not take place in ten out of the 14 AA-controlled townships, including Mrauk-U. However, the junta is reportedly planning an imminent offensive to secure AA-controlled Ann district, Gwa township, Taungup district, and Thandwe district (all Rakhine state) so that polls can take place there. We assess that security risks will remain significantly elevated in these areas and across much of Rakhine over the coming weeks. (Source: Sibylline)
11 Dec 25. Venezuela-US: US seizes sanctioned oil tanker off Venezuelan coast, escalating regional tensions. On 10 December, the US Coast Guard seized a sanctioned oil tanker off the coast of Venezuela; Brent Crude prices increased immediately after the incident. Reports indicate that the seized vessel is the ‘Skipper’ and was sailing under the flag of Guyana. Guyanese authorities have stated that the vessel was ‘falsely flying’ the flag and ‘is not registered in Guyana’. The Skipper is suspected of ‘spoofing’ its position (broadcasting false locations) and has been under US Treasury Department sanctions since 2022. The seizure comes amid escalating US military pressure in the Caribbean Sea, including strikes on suspected drug trafficking boats and a buildup of military bases and warship deployments in the region. Reports indicate that the military helicopters used to conduct the seizure were launched from the USS Gerald Ford aircraft carrier. We assess that maritime logistics risks for legitimate (non-sanctioned) oil shipments are unlikely to increase following the seizure. However, oil price volatility will be sustained in the likely event of further sanctioned tanker seizures, escalating regional tensions. We continue to assess that a US strike on a suspected drug trafficking position in Venezuela is a realistic possibility in the short-to-medium term. (Source: Sibylline)
10 Dec 25. Cambodia-Thailand: Disruption, safety risks along border areas remain elevated amid hostilities. As of 10 December, the renewed fighting between Cambodia and Thailand along their disputed border continues on its fourth consecutive day (see Sibylline Situation Update Brief – 9 December 2025). Thai officials have claimed that 50 Cambodian rockets struck civilian areas in Thai border territory, forcing the closure of around 190 local health facilities. Cambodia has claimed that Thailand used artillery fire and armed drones in Pursat province and fired mortars in Battambang province (both Cambodia). US President Donald Trump, who mediated previous ceasefire talks between the two countries, has pledged to ‘make a phone call’ later on 10 December to pressure both sides to halt fighting. Trump will likely threaten to raise tariffs on Cambodia and to suspend trade talks with Thailand if the two sides fail to agree to a ceasefire. We assess that there is a realistic possibility that this strategy will be effective to create a temporary ceasefire. However, a long-term solution to the dispute remains highly unlikely, sustaining risks of further bouts of fighting over the coming weeks and months. Safety risks will remain elevated along the border while hostilities continue. (Source: Sibylline)
10 Dec 25. Congo (DRC): M23’s likely capture of Uvira will increase displacement, protest risks. On 9 December, the Rwandan-backed M23 rebel group entered Uvira (South Kivu province). The urban centre has acted as South Kivu’s capital since the M23 captured Bukavu. Although the DRC government has not commented on the situation at the time of writing, we assess that the M23 will likely capture Uvira in the coming hours, if it has not done so already. This development comes after DRC President Félix Tshisekedi and Rwandan President Paul Kagame ratified a US-brokered ceasefire on 4 December. Following the accord, however, the M23 launched a renewed southwards offensive towards Uvira, triggering intense clashes with government-backed militias (known as Wazalendo) and displacing over 200,000 civilians. Uvira’s likely capture will almost certainly trigger further displacement in the coming days, with displacement across the Burundi-DRC border increasing the risk of road congestion and cross-border supply chain disruption. Although the M23 is unlikely to expand its offensive beyond South Kivu in the short-to-medium term, mis-information campaigns claiming that an offensive on Haut-Katanga province – located over 580 miles (933km) south of Uvira – is imminent will increase the risk of anti-government protests in the coming days. Protest risks will also rise in the capital Kinshasa, increasing pressure on government stability. (Source: Sibylline)
09 Dec 25. Haiti: Reinforcements are unlikely to improve security force’s short-term capabilities. On 8 December, approximately 230 Kenyan police officers deployed to Haiti to support the UN-backed Gang Suppression Force (GSF). This marks the first reinforcement since the Multinational Security Support (MSS) mission transitioned into the GSF in September. Reports indicate that the deployment currently consists of approximately 980 GSF personnel; the mission is authorised to deploy up to 5,500 personnel in total. The Kenyan deployment is highly unlikely to significantly improve the security capabilities in Haiti, sustaining elevated security and police forces risks. Furthermore, the additional support is highly unlikely to be capable of retaking significant areas of gang territory in the Artibonite, Centre and Ouest departments in the short-to-medium term. Instead, operations will likely aim to deter further territorial expansion by gangs, likely in the peripheral neighbourhoods of the capital Port-au-Prince (such as Kenscoff; Ouest department) and in Dessalines, L’Estère and Saint-Marc communes (all Artibonite department). Associated clashes will increase attack and violent crime risks in the medium term. (Source: Sibylline)
09 Dec 25. Cambodia-Thailand: Military hostilities continue to sustain heightened security risks along border. At the time of writing on 9 December, fighting between Thailand and Cambodia continues along their disputed border. Clashes broke out on 7 December at multiple locations and have since spread to other areas along the border. Cambodia accused Thailand of firing artillery into civilian areas in Pursat province, while Thailand announced that it launched an operation to expel Cambodian troops from Trat province. Fighting continues along other parts of the border, with artillery, small arms, rockets and drones reportedly being used. The Royal Thai Air Force confirmed that it carried out airstrikes earlier on 9 December, claiming to have struck a BM-21 rocket depot in Oddar Meanchey province (Cambodia). Cambodia claims that seven civilians have died in the latest clashes, while Thailand has reported the deaths of three soldiers. Malaysian Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim – who helped broker the ceasefire agreement earlier in the year – has called on both sides to exercise restraint. However, we assess that the fighting is likely to continue in the coming hours and days, sustaining security risks along the Cambodia-Thailand border and rendering talks unlikely. (Source: Sibylline)
09 Dec 25. Sudan: Paramilitary capture of oil field will disrupt exports as conflict intensifies in Kordofan region. On 8 December, the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF) claimed to have captured the Heglig oil field (South Kordofan state; along the Sudan-South Sudan border). Although independent sources have yet to confirm this development, video footage shows RSF militants operating in the oil field’s vicinity in recent days. Consequently, if Heglig has not been captured yet, such a development is likely. The Heglig oil field is a key processing and storage facility for Sudanese oil exports via the Greater Nile Oil Pipeline; it is the central processing facility for South Sudan’s oil exports, which account for 90% of its government revenue. Given the RSF’s historical connections to South Sudan’s ruling party, Sudan People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM), we assess that they are unlikely to ban oil exports via the pipeline unilaterally. Instead, the RSF will likely implement a fee structure requiring payments from the Sudanese government to continue processing oil deliveries. The Sudanese authorities are highly unlikely to make such payments, disrupting oil exports and compounding fiscal pressure on both South Sudan and Sudan. As such, the Sudanese Armed Forces will likely launch a counter-offensive on the Heglig facility in the coming months, compounding export disruption risks. (Source: Sibylline)
08 Dec 25. China-Japan: Continuing tensions will drive rare earth supply concerns for Japanese firms. On 7 December, Japanese Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi stated that Japan will respond ‘calmly and resolutely’ after claiming that Chinese jets had locked radars on Japanese aircraft on two separate occasions during 6 December. The incidents allegedly occurred south of Japan’s Okinawa Islands (Okinawa prefecture) during a Chinese training exercise involving the Liaoning aircraft carrier. Beijing stated that the allegations were ‘inconsistent with the facts’ and claimed that Japanese jets had ‘maliciously followed and harassed’ its carrier strike group. This is the latest development amid heightened bilateral tensions, which were sparked by Takaichi’s comments relating to Taiwan last month. We assess that the stabilisation of bilateral tensions is unlikely in the near term. Japanese media outlets have reported that some Japanese firms have been experiencing delays in approval processes of critical mineral (including rare earth) exports from China. This is in light with our previous assessment that China’s tightening of rare export controls for Japanese firms was a realistic possibility (see Sibylline Situation Update Brief – 26 November 2025). However, we assess that an outright ban on these exports has grown less likely, as it would significantly alarm international business partners. (Source: Sibylline)
08 Dec 25. Thailand-Cambodia: Risk of military escalation increases amid renewed border clashes. Earlier on 8 December, Thailand launched airstrikes against military targets in Cambodia. This comes after clashes broke out between the two countries on 7 December and escalated earlier on 8 December at multiple areas along the disputed border, including in Oddar Meanchey and Preah Vihear provinces (Cambodia) and Buriram, Si Sa Ket and Ubon Ratchathani provinces (Thailand). Both sides have claimed that the other violated the ceasefire first. Cambodia has accused Thailand of using tanks and artillery fire, while Thailand has claimed Cambodia used BM-21 rockets to target Thai territory. Four Cambodian civilians and at least one Thai soldier have been killed in the renewed clashes, while Thailand has evacuated more than 385,000 civilians across four border provinces. Thai Prime Minister Anutin Charnvirakul announced that Bangkok will launch ‘all necessary military operations’ in response to Phnom Penh’s alleged provocations. Consequently, there is a high risk of further clashes in the coming hours and days, likely involving artillery and small arms fire along the border. (Source: Sibylline)
08 Dec 25. Benin: Failed coup attempt will moderate immediate security risks, increase opposition crackdown. On 7 December, President Patrice Talon stated that the armed forces had thwarted an attempted coup (see Sibylline Alert – 7 December 2025). Earlier that day a faction of the armed forces, the self-proclaimed ‘Military Committee for Refoundation’ (CMR), claimed to have ousted Talon, having stormed his residence and the national television station. However, following clashes in Cotonou (Littoral department) and the capital Porto Novo, including air strikes by the Nigerian Air Force, forces loyal to Talon regained control, moderating immediate-term security risks. The security forces will almost certainly maintain an elevated posture in Cotonou and Porto Novo in the coming days. This will likely include erecting roadblocks proximate to strategic locations (such as the presidential palace and government buildings), disrupting staff mobility. The government is also highly likely to launch a crackdown on elements of the military perceived to be disloyal. While we assess that this will moderate government stability risks, there is a realistic possibility that the government weaponises the attempted coup to crack down on opposition figures ahead of the upcoming legislative and presidential elections. This will increase the likelihood of anti-government unrest in major cities in the coming weeks. (Source: Sibylline)
08 Dec 25. Trump security roadmap omits North Korea reference, raising diplomacy hopes.
- Summary
- Trump has spoken of his willingness to sit down with Kim Jong Un
- North Korean leader open to talks if recognised as a nuclear state
- South Korea increases military spending amid regional tensions
U.S. President Donald Trump’s new global security roadmap has dropped any reference to denuclearising North Korea as a goal, fuelling speculation that Washington may be angling to boost the chances of a diplomatic breakthrough with Pyongyang in 2026. The target of ending North Korea’s nuclear threat had been a constant in the National Security Strategy of every U.S. president since the emergence of Pyongyang’s programme in 2003, but was conspicuously absent in Friday’s document. The omission of any mention of North Korea and its accelerating programme to build nuclear weapons that can be delivered by ballistic missiles capable of striking the mainland U.S. is fanning expectations of a potential revival of talks between Trump and Kim Jong Un, last held in 2019. Trump has spoken of his willingness to sit down with the North Korean leader in a “proactive” way, indicating he “wants to get something done by taking some action,” said Hong Min of the Korea Institute for National Unification.
“Then I think there is a certain degree of conscious intent there, that the idea of denuclearisation … really doesn’t need to be brought up here,” said Hong, an expert on Pyongyang’s strategic thinking.
In Trump’s previous security blueprint issued during his first term in 2017, North Korea was mentioned 16 times as a threat to “our homeland” and a rogue state that could “use a nuclear weapon against the United States.” This year’s document lays out Trump’s vision of “flexible realism”, which focuses on containing conflict with China over Taiwan by boosting the military power of its allies in Asia, chiefly South Korea and Japan.
KIM JONG UN’S VIEW
Both South Korea and the United States on Monday denied there was any policy shift on North Korea, stressing denuclearisation remains the goal. Still, Kim has made clear that the issue of whether he could come back for talks hinges on their nature, and that he and Trump would have to meet as equal leaders of nuclear states.
“The concept of ‘denuclearisation’ has already lost its meaning. We have become a nuclear state,” Kim told parliament in September. “I say ‘denuclearisation’ is the last, last thing to expect from us.”
“If the United States, freeing itself from its absurd pursuit of others’ denuclearisation and recognizing the reality, wants genuine peaceful coexistence with us, there is no reason for us not to come face to face with it,” Kim said.
Analysts say peace talks with Trump would cement Kim’s standing at home as a world leader and prove to his impoverished people that he had delivered on a promise that his father and grandfather were unable to keep. The pair held summits in 2018 and 2019 before negotiations collapsed over Pyongyang’s nuclear weapons arsenal. North Korea is under heavy international sanctions over those weapons and its ballistic missiles programme.
STARS ALIGNING FOR TALKS?
Since the U.S. document release, South Korea has emphasised that it believes the stars may align for the restart of talks with North Korea next year and that signals from key players, ranging from the U.S. to China and Japan, are good.
“What we’ve done so far has produced results in terms of creating the right conditions to advance the peace process on the Korean peninsula,” Wi Sung-lac, South Korea’s national security adviser, said on Sunday.
Meanwhile, South Korea has been quietly bolstering its own defensive power, pledging to boost military spending to 3.5% of GDP by 2035 with a 7.5% increase for next year in keeping with demands from Trump. U.S. Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth praised South Korea on Saturday for being a “model” ally that “will receive our special favour” for agreeing to “assume the leading role in … conventional defence. We are optimistic that other Indo-Pacific allies will follow suit.” In talks with Trump in October, South Korean President Lee Jae Myung won approval to build nuclear-powered submarines with U.S. help in supplying fuel, given Seoul’s commitment to be free of nuclear weapons. (Source: Reuters)
08 Dec 25. Thailand launches airstrikes at Cambodia as border tensions reignite.
. Summary
- One Thai soldier killed, Thai army says
- Cambodia says its military has not retaliated, 3 civilians wounded
- Military facilities targeted in air strikes, says Thai Air Force
- Cambodia ex-PM urges restraint against Thai ‘aggressors’
- Over 385,000 civilians being evacuated in Thailand
Thailand said it launched airstrikes into Cambodia on Monday as fighting broke out in multiple areas along their disputed border, after both countries accused the other of breaching a ceasefire brokered by U.S. President Donald Trump. At least one Thai soldier had been killed and eight were wounded in the fresh clashes that intensified around 5:00 a.m. local time (2200 GMT), a Thai army spokesperson said, adding that air support was called in to hit Cambodian military targets. Thailand’s Air Force said that Cambodia mobilised heavy weaponry, repositioned combat units and prepared support elements that could escalate military operations.
“These developments prompted the use of air power to deter and reduce Cambodia’s military capabilities,” it said in a statement.
Cambodia’s defence ministry said in a statement that the Thai military had launched dawn attacks on its forces at two locations, following days of provocative actions, and added that Cambodian troops had not responded. Cambodia’s influential former longtime leader Hun Sen, father of current premier Hun Manet, said Thailand’s military was “aggressors” seeking to provoke a retaliatory response and urged Cambodian forces to exercise restraint.
“The red line for responding has already been set,” Hun Sen said on Facebook, without elaborating. “I urge commanders at all levels to educate all officers and soldiers accordingly.”
Three Cambodian civilians have been seriously injured in the fighting so far, according to a senior provincial official. Cambodia’s defence ministry said its forces had not retaliated. A simmering border dispute between the countries erupted into a five-day conflict in July, before a ceasefire deal brokered by Malaysian Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim and Trump, who also witnessed the signing of an expanded peace agreement between the two countries in Kuala Lumpur in October. Anwar, chair of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations bloc, urged both sides to exercise maximum restraint and maintain open channels of communication.
“The renewed fighting risks unravelling the careful work that has gone into stabilising relations between the two neighbours,” Anwar said in a post on X.
Southeast Asian countries have rarely engaged in military clashes among themselves in recent decades, with the use of cross-border air strikes even rarer.
Phichet Pholkoet, a resident of Thailand’s Ban Kruat district which adjoins Cambodia, said he has heard gunfire since early Monday morning.
“It startled me. The explosions were very clear. Boom boom!” he said via telephone. “I could hear everything clearly. Some are heavy artillery, some are small arms.”
In Thailand, more than 385,000 civilians across four border districts were being evacuated, with more than 35,000 already housed in temporary shelters, the Thai military said.
Across the border in Cambodia, opposition politician Meach Sovannara said civilians were also moving away from the fighting along the frontier.
“I heard the artillery shelling,” he told Reuters in an audio message from Samroang town, the capital of Oddar Meanchey Province, which abuts Thailand.
More than 1,100 families in Oddar Meanchey had been evacuated, authorities there said. At least 48 people were killed and an estimated 300,000 temporarily displaced during the July clashes, with the neighbours exchanging rockets and heavy artillery fire for five days.
LANDMINES AMONG CATALYSTS
Thailand and Cambodia have for more than a century contested sovereignty at undemarcated points along their 817-km (508-mile) land border, first mapped in 1907 by France when it ruled Cambodia as a colony. The long-standing dispute has occasionally exploded into skirmishes, such as a weeklong artillery exchange in 2011, despite attempts to peacefully resolve overlapping claims. Tensions began rising in May this year, following the killing of a Cambodian soldier during a brief exchange of gunfire, and steadily escalated into diplomatic spats and armed clashes. Although Anwar and Trump were able to halt the fighting within days and then cemented a ceasefire agreement at a regional summit in October. Thailand said it was halting the implementation of the truce with Cambodia last month, following a landmine blast that maimed one of its soldiers. Thailand has repeatedly accused Cambodia of planting fresh landmines along parts of their disputed border, which have seriously injured at least seven Thai soldiers since July. Phnom Penh denies the charge. Some of the mines found along the frontier were likely newly laid, Reuters reported in October, based on expert analysis of material shared by Thailand’s military. (Source: Reuters)
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