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18 Dec 25. Honduras: Armed forces’ security guarantees will sustain elevated government stability risks. On 17 December, President of the National Electoral Council (CNE) Ana Paola Hall called for additional security around the National Institute of Vocational Training (INFOP) in the capital Tegucigalpa, where a presidential recount of the set number of votes will occur. Hall called on the armed forces to guarantee the protection of people and electoral officials during the recount. The call comes amid small-scale protests in Tegucigalpa following the 30 November elections, largely conducted by supporters of the incumbent Liberty and Refoundation (LIBRE) party. President Xiomara Castro has called for additional protests, increasing domestic unrest risks near INFOP in the coming days and weeks. Meanwhile on 16 December, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Roosevelt Hernández declared that the armed forces will ‘guarantee the permanence of the government until 27 January 2026’. This statement likely aims to facilitate a transition after the recount, given that the CNE is obliged to declare a winner by 30 December. In the short term, government stability risks will remain heightened despite the armed forces’ assurances, while political polarisation will continue driving claims of electoral malpractice and concerns over military intervention. (Source: Sibylline)
18 Dec 25. Moldova: War risks, labour shortages will likely undermine socio-economic health improvement. On 17 December, the IMF issued a statement assessing that Moldova has a ‘unique opportunity’ for economic growth, but emphasising that the country needs decisive reforms. Mission Chief for Moldova at IMF Alina Iancu stated that the country’s EU accession prospects would help increase productivity, encourage long-term growth and improve living standards. At the same time, Iancu acknowledged that Moldova’s pro-West government must address structural shortcomings, as well as ensure strong macroeconomic management and policy-making to sustain reforms. Moldova remains one of Europe’s poorest countries; the spillover from Russia’s full-scale invasion of neighbouring Ukraine is compounding its already strained socio-economic health conditions. We assess that President Maia Sandu’s re-election in 2024 and the victory of her Party of Action and Solidarity (PAS) in parliamentary elections this September will highly likely ensure Moldova’s continued commitment to making the necessary reforms for EU membership. While this will likely increase investor confidence in the longer term, concerns about Russian destabilisation and labour shortages driven by large-scale emigration will remain obstacles to robust economic growth. (Source: Sibylline)
18 Dec 25. Taiwan-US: Proposed arms sales would strengthen Taiwan’s asymmetric defence capabilities On 17 December, the US announced eight arms sale packages worth around USD 11bn to Taiwan, including High Mobility Artillery Rocket Systems (HIMARS) and howitzers. If approved by Congress, the sales would surpass the combined value of all 19 military sales to Taiwan approved under former US president Joe Biden’s administration. China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) stated that it strongly opposes the plans, which ‘severely undermine Chinese sovereignty’. Last month, Taiwanese President Lai Ching-te announced a USD 40bn supplementary defence budget (for the period between 2026 and 2033). However, it is not guaranteed that the opposition-controlled Yuan (i.e. Taiwan’s unicameral legislature) will appropriate sufficient funds to purchase all the announced US arms sales, given opposition parties’ scepticism towards defence spending. In the short term, we assess that it is unlikely that Beijing will announce any major retaliatory action that would collapse the current US-China trade truce, as its current position is to stabilise ties with Washington DC ahead of US President Donald Trump’s scheduled state visit in April. However, we assess that China will continue to put pressure on Taiwan. y(Source: Sibylline)
18 Dec 25. “Four fundamental structural shifts – Russian aggression, the rise of China, an unpredictable US and European political instability – have coalesced to create the most acute security crisis in Europe since 1945… In the near future, credible conventional and nuclear deterrence must be the overarching priority to provide Europe with the time and space to rearm and build a resilient Euro-Atlantic security architecture.” This is according to The Future of the Euro-Atlantic Security Architecture, by Ed Arnold and Darya Dolzikova, which says that Europe is facing its most acute security crisis since 1945 and that the post-war Euro-Atlantic security architecture [EASA] – a complex system of institutions, treaties, norms and alliances – is no longer fit for purpose. It says strengthening NATO quickly is essential if Europeans are to “save NATO and continue to enjoy its protections”. It urges European allies to take greater ownership of NATO’s regional defence plans, prepare for scenarios in which the US is distracted or engaged elsewhere, and close key capability gaps. The report notes that the UK has a unique role to play in reforming current structures. The report identifies four structural shifts – the full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022 and sustained Russian aggression, advancements in China’s nuclear capabilities, growing US unpredictability, and deepening political instability and the growth of populism within Europe itself – for undermining key assumptions underpinning European security, including respect for sovereignty, arms control compliance and strategic stability. It says Russia’s repeated nuclear threats and the disintegration of arms control agreements have also raised escalation risks across Europe. The research says that while US nuclear commitments to Europe are expected to remain, conventional forces drawdown – particularly as the United States increasingly prioritises the Indo-Pacific – risks undermining the credibility of this extended nuclear deterrence. The report considers how UK and French nuclear capabilities can be better integrated with efforts to strengthen European conventional capabilities to bolster European defence and deterrence.
Key Findings
- Europe faces the most acute security crisis since 1945: “The Euro-Atlantic security architecture is under the greatest external and internal pressure since its inception…The 2022 full-scale invasion of Ukraine was a violent attempt to overthrow and replace [the EASA]… The stasis of liberalism and the rise of populism within Europe and the US are creating unprecedented and simultaneous internal political instability, fraying Western unity and multilateral collective action.”
- US leadership in Europe can no longer be assumed: “US leadership that upholds the EASA is no longer assured as the second President Donald J Trump administration dramatically realigns towards domestic priorities and the rise of China in the Indo-Pacific… While the US is not expected to decrease its nuclear commitments to Europe, that the US will undertake a conventional drawdown on the continent will have knock-on effects on the credibility of US extended nuclear deterrence on the continent. A withdrawal of – or unwillingness to engage in – conventional capabilities in defence of Europe will create destabilising gaps in Europe’s escalatory options.”
- Political instability is forcing European governments to focus on domestic challenges. “The rise of populism… is straining unity and making it harder to manage multilateral security institutions. An increase in ‘spoiler countries’, such as Hungary, which can exploit the requirement of unanimity in both the EU and NATO to their advantage, is preventing strong collective multilateral action. Moreover, domestic political concerns, principally over immigration, are driving a distrust of international organisations and agreements, such as the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), which constitutes a central part of the current values-based EASA. Reform – the party is currently leading the polls in the UK – and the Conservative Party are both campaigning to withdraw from the ECHR. If the UK voluntarily left the Council of Europe, it would be outside the organisation, alongside Russia and Belarus who were expelled, and this would impact the values-based nature of the agreement.”
Key Recommendations
- Strengthen NATO to function with reduced US leadership. The report says: “For Europeans to save NATO and continue to enjoy its protections, it must be strengthened quickly…European states must ensure that they can optimally operate within NATO even if the US is engaged elsewhere.”
- Prioritise credible deterrence to buy time for long-term reform. “In the near future, credible conventional and nuclear deterrence must be the overarching priority to provide Europe with the time and space to rearm and build a resilient EASA…The bolstering of European advanced conventional capabilities is the most immediate way of addressing concerns over the credibility and effectiveness of nuclear deterrence.”
- Consolidate minilateral security arrangements in Europe that complement NATO. “Bringing the E3 (UK, France and Germany) together with the Weimar Triangle (France, Germany and Poland) would develop the strongest European quad of powers, providing a strong leadership group and bridging NATO and the EU…Identifying opportunities for cooperation and coordination outside existing structures is particularly important for nuclear deterrence and assurance.”
Conclusion
The report concludes that without decisive European leadership, the continent risks strategic irrelevance at a moment when credible deterrence – nuclear and conventional – is essential. The report says the UK can play a critical leadership role in the new architecture given its nuclear capabilities, close relationship with the US, and central position within NATO. Europe must take greater responsibility for shaping its own defence and deterrence posture, yet without sustained political commitment and collective action, it risks falling behind strategically at a moment of profound global change.
The Future of the Euro-Atlantic Security Architecture is written by Ed Arnold, Senior Research Fellow for European Security, and Darya Dolzikova, Senior Research Fellow for Proliferation and Nuclear Policy at the Royal United Services Institute (RUSI). The research draws on expert-led meetings, semi-structured consultations with Euro-Atlantic policymakers and specialists, and extensive desk-based research of primary and secondary sources. The report forms part of RUSI’s Future Euro-Atlantic Security Architecture project, sponsored by the Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office’s Strategic Stability Programme.
16 Dec 25. Region-US: Escalating US military build-up in region underscores increasing tensions. On 15 December, US Southern Command (SOUTHCOM) stated that it conducted three strikes on suspected drug trafficking vessels in the eastern Pacific Ocean, killing eight people. Meanwhile, Trinidad and Tobago approved the transit of US military aircraft at its airports for logistics, resupply and personnel rotation purposes. In response, Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro announced the suspension of all energy agreements with Trinidad and Tobago. Furthermore, US President Donald Trump signed an executive order classifying fentanyl as a weapon of mass destruction, enhancing the US’ authority to combat drug trafficking. Meanwhile, US Secretary of State Marco Rubio and his Paraguayan counterpart (Rubén Ramírez Lezcano) signed a Status of Forces Agreement in order to combat organised crime groups (OCGs) that both countries have designated as terrorist organisations. On 13 December, the Dominican Republic authorised US military aircraft to land in the country. We assess that these developments point to an escalating build-up of US military assets in the Latin America and Caribbean region (as well as increasing regional tensions). We also continue to assess that a US strike targeting suspected drug traffickers on Venezuelan soil is a realistic possibility in the short-to-medium term. (Source: Sibylline)
16 Dec 25. Cambodia-Thailand: Thailand will heighten scrutiny on trade with Cambodia, blocking fuel, arms exports. Earlier on 16 December, the Thai National Security Council (NSC) approved tightened measures to prevent Thailand-flagged ships from moving fuel and strategic supplies to Cambodia. The authorities will warn Thai vessels who enter designated areas in the Gulf of Thailand that are considered to be ‘high-risk’. The Thai Maritime Enforcement Command Centre (Thai-MECC) and the Marine Department will work to inspect Thai vessels suspected of carrying shipments that could support Cambodia’s war effort. The Thai military has rejected characterisations of these naval inspections as a form of ‘blockade’, noting that it does not intend to ‘restrict all vessels of all nationalities’. The NSC’s decision follows the Thai suspension of fuel and military-related exports to Laos on 15 December via the Chong Mek border checkpoint (Ubon Ratchathani province), noting the suspected rerouting to Cambodia. We assess that Thai naval inspections are unlikely to affect unrelated third-country vessels, as this would drive international criticism and risk expanding the Cambodia-Thailand conflict. There is a realistic possibility that the Chong Mek route for fuel exports will resume in the short term, as Thailand and Laos are working on a framework to verify export purposes. (Source: Sibylline)
16 Dec 25. “This paper’s central conclusion is that, despite the concept’s strengths, it will need significant augmentation, beyond a network of relatively low mobility sensors, to be a significant deterrent to Russian maritime aggression.”
Introduction
This is according to The Atlantic Bastion, a new research report by the Royal United Services Institute which offers a comprehensive assessment of the UK’s emerging anti-submarine warfare (ASW) barrier and its prospective deterrent effect against Russian undersea forces.
Building on the UK’s 2025 Strategic Defence Review, the Atlantic Bastion is conceived as a layered network of uncrewed and autonomous systems, advanced sensors and more traditional assets, designed to ensure that Russian submarines cannot pass undetected through the Norwegian Sea and the Greenland–Iceland–UK gap. The report, by Sidharth Kaushal and Commander Edward Black, underscores that the Bastion is set to evolve over the coming years as new systems are procured and integrated.
However, the report says that deterrence by detection alone will not be enough. Drawing on Russian naval strategy, historic patterns of behaviour and interviews with senior Royal Navy personnel, the report concludes that Moscow is unlikely to be deterred simply by the risk of being tracked. Russian planners, it argues, may instead choose to surge submarines early in a crisis to draw NATO assets away from the High North, even if detection is expected.
The report asserts that the Atlantic Bastion should be understood not as a static sensor barrier but as a flexible, deeper and more geographically expansive construct. To be credible, it will need the ability to track contacts well beyond the Norwegian Sea; incorporate maritime strike capacity; integrate mine warfare; and operate effectively in both the Atlantic and Barents Sea.
The research highlights several critical trends, including Russia’s growing SSN (Nuclear-powered attack submarine) fleet and the projected delivery of six Yasen-class submarines to the Northern Fleet by the end of the decade, and the continued modernisation of its long-range strike systems. These developments reinforce the need for a more robust, manoeuvrable and multi-layered Bastion architecture that can raise the costs of Russian aggression and complicate its military planning. These findings present a compelling case for refining the Bastion’s design to ensure it fulfils its intended deterrence role.
Key Findings
- Russia’s most likely response is to surge nuclear-armed submarines into the Atlantic. The report says: “The most likely RFN [Russian Federation Navy] response to the Atlantic Bastion is to surge nuclear-armed submarines into the Atlantic.”
- Tracking beyond the Bastion is essential to prevent submarines from disappearing in the Atlantic. “This makes depth – the ability to track contacts beyond the Bastion – critical, considering that the Russians will seek to transit pre-conflict and lose tracking vessels in the Sargasso Sea.”
- Maritime strike capability must be integral to the Bastion. “To enhance its deterrent effect, the Atlantic Bastion should include or be able to host a significant quantity of maritime strike capacity, most realistically in the form of missiles.”
- European NATO navies will need to shoulder a significant share of strike responsibilities. “The UK and European NATO allies will need to provide a significant proportion of the maritime strike capacity within the Bastion to mitigate potential US re-tasking.”
Key Recommendations
- Expand the Bastion east and west to counter early Russian surges. “The geographical scope of the Bastion should extend both westward into the Atlantic … and eastward into the Barents Sea.”
- Integrate long-range strike assets directly into the Bastion architecture. “Punishment … conducted through conventional strike from the maritime domain, should be integral to the design of the Atlantic Bastion.”
- Incorporate mine warfare and autonomous minelaying systems. “A key capability … is the potential for using protective and defensive minefields in peacetime…and offensive mining [in wartime].”
- Develop long range and long duration submarine tracking using large, long-endurance uncrewed vessels. “Those USVs [Unmanned Surface Vessel] used in the Norwegian Sea must be large enough to support tracking to the west.”
Conclusion
The report concludes that the Atlantic Bastion is an essential element of the UK’s future maritime deterrent posture, but only if its design goes beyond a static defensive barrier. A narrowly defined Bastion, centred solely on low-mobility sensors in the Norwegian Sea, would risk becoming a “maritime Maginot Line” vulnerable to bypassing and early Russian surge tactics. Instead, the authors argue for a more dynamic, flexible and geographically expansive concept that integrates long range tracking capability, strike systems, mine warfare and enduring uncrewed platforms. Doing so would significantly complicate Russian strategic planning and strengthen the Bastion’s ability to deter both conflict and coercion.
Sidharth Kaushal is a Senior Research Fellow in Sea Power at RUSI, specialising in maritime doctrine, deterrence and the role of sea power in national strategy.
Edward Black is the First Sea Lord’s Visiting Fellow at RUSI and a serving Royal Navy mine clearance diving officer with extensive operational and diplomatic experience across several theatres.
The Atlantic Bastion, is based on qualitative analysis of primary and secondary literature, including Russian sources; assessments of past Russian behaviour; and interviews with UK naval staff and subject-matter experts. It integrates strategic theory with operational analysis to evaluate the Bastion’s deterrent potential and practical requirements.
This paper was researched and written based on information available up to August 2025. There have been significant developments since then, both in terms of the design of the Bastion, and the introduction of the Atlantic Strike and Atlantic Shield concepts. These were announced and outlined by General Sir Gwyn Jenkins, at the First Sea Lord’s Sea Power Conference on 8 December 2025. These initiatives speak to some of the issues analysed in the paper, and some of the concerns raised have therefore been overtaken by events. For more information and media inquiries please email
15 Dec 25. Cambodia-Thailand: Disruption, security risks remain high despite US president’s claims. Earlier on 15 December, Cambodia accused Thailand of expanding the conflict by carrying out airstrikes in Srei Snam (Siem Reap province, Cambodia) for the first time, approximately 44 miles (70km) into Cambodian territory. This development comes despite US President Donald Trump’s claim that he brokered a ceasefire on 12 December. Neither Cambodia nor Thailand have referenced a ceasefire in their follow-up statements, with Thai Prime Minister Anutin Charnvirakul explicitly rejecting this claim. At least 12 Cambodian civilians, 16 Thai soldiers and one Thai civilian were killed last week. We assess that the conflict is likely to continue in the short term; Anutin continues to state that Cambodia is the aggressor and considers continuous military action necessary. This stance aligns with the Thai military’s stated objective of degrading Cambodian military capabilities. The ongoing conflict will undermine trade and risk increased US tariffs. Earlier on 15 December, Thailand suspended fuel and military equipment exports to Laos via the Chong Mek checkpoint (Ubon Ratchathani province, Thailand), citing alleged rerouting to Cambodia. Delays along the border have been reported since this suspension came into effect. Additionally, the Royal Thai Navy has proposed restricting commercial maritime trade by Thai vessels to Cambodia. However, the navy clarified that the plan will not impact ships from other countries; the proposal will be considered on 16 December. (Source: Sibylline)
15 Dec 25. Congo (DRC): US criticism of Rwanda is unlikely to temper risk of armed conflict in eastern DRC. On 13 December, US Secretary of State Marco Rubio characterised Rwanda’s actions in eastern Congo (DRC) as ‘a clear violation’ of the US-backed peace agreement. The statement comes after the DRC and Rwanda ratified a US-backed peace and regional economic integration framework on 4 December. However, on 10 December, the Rwandan-backed M23 rebel group captured Uvira (South Kivu province) following a renewed offensive in South Kivu. The M23’s capture of the city underscores the persistent risk of armed conflict in eastern DRC, despite international mediation efforts. In the coming weeks, the M23 will highly likely continue to expand its territorial holdings to secure access to critical mineral deposits in the resource-rich eastern DRC; it will also attempt to maximise its leverage in further peace negotiations with the DRC. Rwanda is highly likely to continue supporting the M23 in these efforts, compounding bilateral tensions with the US. Yet despite escalating rhetoric, we assess that the US is unlikely to enact broad economic sanctions on Rwanda in the short term amid its broader efforts to consolidate access to critical mineral exports worldwide. (Source: Sibylline)
15 Dec 25. UK Defence Minister visits Baku to strengthen defence partnership.
Lord Vernon Coaker visited Baku for defence and security discussions. Security cooperation will be key pillar of the UK–Azerbaijan Strategic Partnership
- UK Defence Minister Lord Coaker visited Baku for defence and security discussions
- security co-operation will be key pillar of the UK–Azerbaijan Strategic Partnership, reflecting a shared understanding of the importance of regional stability and long-term peace
- nations committed to working together on shared strategic interests as threats increase
The UK and Azerbaijan are working together on a shared vision for peace, stability and prosperity in the South Caucasus. In support of this objective, Defence Minister Lord Vernon Coaker, visited Baku on 4 December 2025 – the first UK Ministry of Defence Minister to visit since 2022. The visit deepens defence collaboration following significant developments in the bilateral relationship, including the intention to progress the relationship to a Strategic Partnership, made in August 2025. Defence cooperation will stand as a central pillar of this partnership, reflecting a shared commitment to regional security and strategic stability.
Lord Vernon Coaker meeting with President Ilham Aliyev
The UK appointed its first resident Defence Attaché to Azerbaijan in March. In October, the UK lifted its arms embargo on Azerbaijan and Armenia, in line with dissolution of the OSCE Minsk Group mechanisms. The two nations signed their most ambitious bilateral defence cooperation programme to date in London in October 2025. During his visit, Lord Coaker has attended bilateral meetings with His Excellency President Ilham Aliyev, Minister of Defence of The Republic of Azerbaijan Colonel General Zakir Hasanov, and the Minister of Defence Industry of the Republic of Azerbaijan Vugar Mustafayev on exploring further opportunities for the development of UK-Azerbaijan defence and security partnership. Lord Coaker attended the Graduation Ceremony of the British Military Advisory and Training Team Instructor Training Course held at the Azerbaijan Army Training and Education Centre. Participants of the intensive four-week course were coached and mentored by British and Czech instructors in accordance with UK’s approach to Defence Train the Trainer Course. (Source: https://www.gov.uk/)
12 Dec 25. Long term South African defence strategy a work in progress – Motshekga. A Parliamentary question on the review of South Africa’s long term defence strategy drew a lengthy response from Defence and Military Veterans Minister Angie Motshekga who basically said it remains a work in progress, and that doubling defence spending to 1.5% of GDP will take many years. The Economic Freedom Fighters’ Carl Niehaus asked Motshekga whether, considering that the last review of the SA National Defence Force (SANDF) was conducted 10 years ago in 2015, she has any plans to initiate another review of the state of the SANDF that will take into consideration the present realities. She elaborated that the 2023/24 financial year Ministerial Priorities set the Defence Minister the target of ‘Conducting an Evaluation of the Defence Review 2015 and Action Plan’ for completion by 31 October 2024.
“Furthermore, on 24 January 2024 the Department was tasked by the Commander-in-Chief [President Cyril Ramaphosa] to develop a strategy and plan for an interim force at 1.5% of GDP, including to capitalise the SDA [Strategic Defence Account] at 10% of the budget; and ring-fence a further 5% of budget for R&D [Research and Development]”.
The resulting work was delivered to the Presidency at the end of October 2024 and presented at a Ministerial Work Session in March 2025. This included a PESTEL (political, economic, social, technological, environmental and legal) analysis of the national, regional, continental, and global levels; a SWOT (strengths, weaknesses, opportunities and threats) analysis; a draft Defence Capstone Policy Concept for South Africa; a draft Military Capstone Strategising Concept for the defence and protection of South Africa; a draft South African Military Strategy, Force Design and Force Structure for 2025-2055; and the long-term SANDF capability development plan (Journey to Greatness) document covering 2025-2055. Furthermore, engagements were held with the SA National Security Secretariat (SANSS), the support body for the National Security Council (SANSC), to develop a report on reviewing the 2015 Defence Review and the considerations for investing in a sustainable modern defence force. An initial engagement was held in March and another engagement took place in June, where “positive support was expressed in terms of the 1.5% of GDP Defence Funding Target as set by the President.” Motshekga explained that the Directors-General directed that the Department of Defence engage in a process to develop a Defence Value Proposition in line with the President’s direction and a long-term defence funding trajectory (30 years) on the understanding that the allocation of 1.5% of GDP to defence constitutes the minimum funding threshold. At present, Motshekga told Niehaus, defence is funded to the tune of just .68% of GDP. A third engagement with the SANSS took place on 31 October, “wherein the abovementioned Long-Term Force Evolution Strategy and Planning Concept for the SANDF was presented to the Directors-General. The SANSS endorsed the work and referred the work to the National Security Council for its support and endorsement to Cabinet. The matter was tabled at the National Security Council in Cape Town on 4 November 2025. The matter was held over for a Special NSC, the date of which is still to be determined,” Motshekga’s reply, dated 5 December 2025, concluded.
Speaking to DefenceWeb at the SA Army’s Exercise Vukuhlome 2025 Distinguished Visitors’ Day last month, Motshekga acknowledged the Department of Defence (DoD) is facing challenges – primarily financial ones – and these are being addressed by Cabinet, Parliament, and the DoD. “We are doing all we can in our power to sustain this pride of the nation,” she said of the SANDF.
South Africa’s defence budget will increase, but gradually, with a 50% increase planned over the next five years, Motshekga explained. She cautioned that doubling spending to 1.5% of GDP can’t be done overnight and she does not want to increase spending too quickly as this will create all sorts of problems. Doubling the defence budget is achievable in phases, she said, with spending increasing to more than 1% of GDP taking at least five years.
Earlier this year, Motshekga in reply to a parliamentary question posed by Maliyakhe Shelembe of the Democratic Alliance, stated that spending 2% of GDP on defence would take 30 years.
Motshekga replied that “the incremental growth of the defence funding will happen over six multi Medium Term Strategic Framework Periods.” Each of these is five years long. The Minister added that defence spending would grow from the 0.67% at present to 1.35% over a period of six years and hit 2.40% on year 30.
“That the SANDF needs more money is beyond dispute,” said defence analyst Ricardo Teixeira. “The real question is how to spend it without wasting it. Throwing money at the problem is tempting but could be dangerous. Without the capacity to plan appropriately and account for and maintain equipment, a sudden influx of funding could easily be squandered. The outcome would be another round of headlines about mismanaged contracts, irregular procurement and expensive barely used hardware.” (Source: https://www.defenceweb.co.za/)
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