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Military And Security Developments
Nov 28.
- Israel-Syria: Heavy clashes are unlikely to undermine bilateral security talks. On 27 November, there were heavy clashes during an Israel Defense Forces (IDF) raid to apprehend terror suspects from the Islamist Jamaa Islamiya group in Beit Jinn (Rif Dimashq governorate, Syria). The clashes were likely with members of local clans; they injured five IDF service personnel and killed at least 13 clan members. While weekly IDF raids in Syria are common, the recent clashes are unprecedented in scope since the ousting of former president Bashar al-Assad in December 2024. Nevertheless, we assess that the Syrian government is unlikely to retaliate against the IDF forces stationed in Daraa and Quneitra governorates or to call off the ongoing US-backed talks to reach a security deal with Israel in the coming months. However, there is a possibility that rogue Islamist factions will launch retaliatory attacks against Israeli troops in these governorates, sustaining security instability and armed conflict risks in southern Syria.
- Israel-Palestinian Territories: Terror suspects’ killing will raise global scrutiny, domestic unrest risks. On 27 November, media outlets published videos of Israeli border police officers shooting and killing two terror suspects in Jenin (Jenin governorate) after they had already surrendered. The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) and the Israeli police subsequently launched an investigation into the incident. Earlier on 28 November, this was followed by the opening of a criminal case by Israel’s department for internal police investigations. Amid an ongoing rise in incidents of Israeli settler violence against Palestinians in the West Bank, we assess that the incident is likely to further increase international scrutiny of Israel’s activities in the Palestinian Territories. This will increase the risk of further sanctions on individuals and groups associated with the far right in Israel, as well as possible restrictions on Israeli products originating in the West Bank in the coming months. The prosecution of the involved officers remains a realistic possibility and will highly likely result in far-right protests and domestic unrest in Israel, particularly near courts during the officers’ court hearings.
Nov 27.
- Lebanon-Cyprus: Maritime agreement will increase investor confidence, undercut by regional tensions. On 26 November, Lebanon and Cyprus signed a maritime demarcation agreement. In 2007, the two countries reached a preliminary agreement mapping out their offshore maritime zones, but it was not ratified due to delays by the Lebanese government. The agreement will allow Lebanon to expand its offshore gas and oil exploration and will likely increase the prospects of co-operation with Cyprus and the EU on energy and infrastructure. Beirut’s eventual ratification of the agreement comes amid growing confidence in the stability and competence of the Lebanese government. Together with prospective economic gains from offshore exploration and energy co-operation with Cyprus, we assess that the agreement will likely increase investment over the coming months. However, investor confidence will be undercut by sustained geopolitical and internal instability related to Israel and Lebanese Hizballah (LH). This will likely limit investment decisions, particularly ahead of Lebanon’s general elections scheduled for May 2026.
- Iraq: Attack on gas field will elevate energy security risks in Kurdistan region throughout December. On 26 November, a rocket attack hit a storage tank at Khor Mor gas field, one of the largest in Iraq’s Kurdistan region, causing a fire and major operational disruption at the site. The incident halted gas supplies to power stations across Al-Sulaymaniyah, Duhok and Erbil governorates, causing widespread blackouts. Notably, the attack comes 48 hours after Kurdish forces intercepted a drone targeting the field. While no group has claimed responsibility for the attacks, we assess that the perpetrators are likely rogue Iraqi Shia groups targeting Kurdish military installations and US troops stationed near Kurdish oil infrastructure. The attack marks an escalation in the sporadic drone and missile attack campaign which has targeted Kurdish oil fields in Duhok, Erbil and Saladin governorates, as well as local airports since 2024. As such, similar attacks are highly likely in the coming weeks, increasing energy security risks in Kurdistan region. Furthermore, security and bystander risks around airports and military bases will also increase in the region throughout December.
Nov 26.
KEY DEVELOPMENTS
IRAN
- Despite a high-level meeting between Iran and France, a breakthrough in nuclear negotiations remains unlikely in the short term.
- The US continues to sanction dozens of Iranian-linked entities in the energy, shipping and aviation industries, sustaining substantial economic pressure on Iran.
ISRAEL
- Limited arrests during violent clashes between ultra-Orthodox rioters and the military police in Ramat Gan (Tel Aviv district) highlight the growing risk of domestic unrest.
PALESTINIAN TERRITORIES
- GAZA STRIP: The official cessation of Gaza Humanitarian Foundation (GHF) operations will likely drive Israeli anxieties around militant aid seizures, while also jeopardising the ceasefire agreement.
- GAZA STRIP: The frequency of armed clashes within the Israeli-controlled ‘yellow line’ area in Rafah (southern Gaza) will escalate in line with ongoing Israel Defense Forces (IDF) operations targeting militant tunnels.
- GAZA STRIP: The reducing threshold for Israeli retaliatory airstrikes will likely drive the frequency of further such strikes across the strip.
- WEST BANK: The IDF’s new counter-terrorism operation underscores sustained concerns regarding militant activity in the northern West Bank.
- WEST BANK: Singapore has sanctioned several Israeli settlers amid rising violence in the West Bank, underscoring persistent compliance and reputational concerns for Israeli-linked firms operating therein.
IRAN
- Despite a high-level meeting between Iran and France, a breakthrough in nuclear negotiations remains unlikely in the short term. On 25 November, Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi and French Foreign Minister Jean-Noël Barrot discussed Iran’s nuclear programme. The talks came amid continued international concern regarding stalled negotiations between Iran and the US, as well as Iran’s continued restrictions on international monitoring efforts. We assess it is highly unlikely that the meeting will trigger a breakthrough in efforts to mediate an agreement between Iran and the US. In the coming weeks, Iran will almost certainly continue to stress (publicly) its willingness to negotiate with the US, while preconditioning any such talks on the US acknowledging its ‘rights’ to enrich uranium domestically (and on the US providing guarantees that Israel will not conduct airstrikes on Iranian nuclear facilities during said negotiations). The US is highly unlikely to accept such pre-conditions, sustaining diplomatic deadlock regarding Tehran’s nuclear programme. Without broader diplomatic engagement or international oversight, concerns regarding Iran’s likely efforts to redevelop its nuclear and missile production capabilities will sustain the risk of further Israeli airstrikes in the coming months, while also maintaining elevated regional tensions.
- The US continues to sanction dozens of Iranian-linked entities in the energy, shipping and aviation industries, sustaining substantial economic pressure on Iran. On 20 November, the US sanctioned over 41 individuals, entities and vessels associated with Iran’s oil exports and ‘shadow fleet’. The sanctions primarily target ship operators and logistics firms associated with the Sepehr Energy Jahan Nama Pars Company, a sanctioned Iranian firm that facilitates oil exports on behalf of Iran’s security forces. Sanctioned entities include several UAE-based firms, Panama-flagged vessels and the Germany-based BPT Berlin Petroleum Trading GmbH, underscoring broadening sanction-exposure risks in the energy and shipping industries amid sustained US scrutiny of Iranian economic activity. The US also sanctioned 13 individuals, entities and aircraft associated with Mahan Air, an Iranian airline linked to arms transfers to Iran’s regional proxies, underscoring moderately increasing compliance concerns for entities engaged in the region’s aviation sector. Continued US sanctioning of Iranian economic interests and associates is highly likely to sustain rising economic pressure on Iran and limit its engagement with international markets. On 25 November, the shipping-intelligence firm Kpler also reported that the volume of Iranian oil held on tankers at sea (essentially in storage) has reached a two-year peak, amid softening Chinese demand. In the coming weeks, muted demand for Iranian crude exports will likely maintain downward pressure on prices, with Iran offering further discounts to Chinese buyers. This will increase fiscal pressure and further undercut Iran’s foreign currency reserves in the medium-to-long term.
ISRAEL
- Limited arrests during violent clashes between ultra-Orthodox rioters and the military police in Ramat Gan (Tel Aviv district) highlight the growing risk of domestic unrest. On the night of 25 November, hundreds of ultra-Orthodox protesters arrived at the residence of an ultra-Orthodox defector in Ramat Gan shortly after the military police attempted to arrest him. Attempts by the military police to arrest the defector were unsuccessful and triggered a riot, in which protesters flipped over a military police car. Subsequently, the military police contingent was reinforced by additional Israeli police personnel, who arrested two rioters. The incidents highlight the growing belligerence of the ultra-Orthodox community during their protests against mandatory military conscription. Furthermore, the low number of arrests highlights the Israeli enforcement agencies’ limited resources and political will to deal with such rioters. This will continue to embolden the ultra-Orthodox community, and likely increase the rate at which protests carried out by the community devolve into incidents of violence and rioting in the coming months. They will possibly even spread outside ultra-Orthodox population centres. Any such developments are liable to elevate domestic unrest, physical security and travel disruption risks across Israel in the coming months.
PALESTINIAN TERRITORIES
- GAZA: The official cessation of Gaza Humanitarian Foundation (GHF) operations will likely drive Israeli anxieties around militant aid seizures, while also jeopardising the ceasefire agreement. On 24 November, the US and Israeli-backed GHF announced that the latter is winding down its operations in Gaza after almost six months of activity. Despite the official announcement, GHF food distribution centres throughout Gaza have not, in effect, functioned since the ceasefire began in early October, limiting the move’s impact on the current humanitarian conditions in Gaza. GHF’s executive director, Jon Acree, indicated that the new US-led Civil-Military Coordination Center (CMCC) would only later be ready to adopt and expand the GHP model and did not provide a timeframe. As such, aid distribution will likely be led and directed by UN agencies for the foreseeable future. Both Israel and the US have claimed that aid distribution by UN agencies is particularly prone to militant violence and therefore vulnerable to seizure, and that this is possibly gifting militants the necessary resources to re-establish and maintain their influence over Gaza. Israeli allegations that aid is being used in this way will possibly present sticking points in the implementation of the current ceasefire and future peace plan, increasing the risk of breakdowns in the agreement over the coming months.
- GAZA: The frequency of armed clashes within the Israeli-controlled ‘yellow line’ area in Rafah (southern Gaza) will escalate in line with ongoing IDF operations targeting militant tunnels. In the past week, IDF operations against militant tunnel infrastructure in eastern Rafah have increased. The situation has in turn driven a rise in the frequency of attacks against Israeli forces by militants trapped within these tunnels and who are attempting to escape. Over the past week, the IDF has killed over 20 operatives and apprehended at least eight others during operations and associated clashes in eastern Rafah. The clashes come despite the suggestion of possible discussions between Israel and Hamas about the release of those militants trapped within the Israeli-controlled yellow line area. As such, we assess that clashes in eastern Rafah will likely continue over the coming week, sustaining heightened exposure to cross-fire and explosives in the area.
- GAZA: The reducing threshold for Israeli retaliatory airstrikes will likely drive the frequency of further such strikes across the strip. In the past week, attacks against Israeli servicepeople have prompted several IDF airstrikes against targets across the strip. In the first incident (19 November), militants opened fire on Israeli military personnel operating in Khan Yunis (southern Gaza), though the IDF sustained no injuries. Later that day, the Israeli air force conducted strikes across Gaza, including in western al-Mawasi (southern Gaza). In a second notable case on 22 November, an armed militant crossed into the Israeli-controlled yellow line area via a route used for the transport of humanitarian aid in southern Gaza and opened fire on Israeli servicemen. Following this, the IDF conducted intense airstrikes across Gaza, including in Deir al-Balah (central Gaza). The incidents mark a shift from previous retaliatory airstrikes, which were primarily triggered as a result of harm to IDF troops; in neither of these incidents were IDF service personnel harmed. As such, we assess that the threshold for retaliatory IDF airstrikes is reducing, increasing the risk of airstrikes growing in frequency and compounding aid and logistical staff’s exposure to direct explosions and collateral damage across Gaza. Such strikes are liable to compound the risk of a ceasefire breaking down over the long term.
- WEST BANK: The IDF’s new counter-terrorism operation underscores sustained concerns regarding militant activity in the northern West Bank. On 25 November, the IDF and Shin Bet launched a major counter-terrorism operation in the northern West Bank. The IDF deployed the equivalent of three brigades to Tubas governorate and engaged in operations in the al-Aqaba, Tammun and Tubas areas (all Tubas), as well as the nearby Nur Shams refugee camp (Tulkarm governorate). The IDF has implemented a localised curfew, erected numerous roadblocks and deployed a range of military equipment – including bulldozers, helicopters and heavy machinery – to its areas of operations. While the Israeli authorities have stated that the operation will last several days, clashes with Palestinian militant factions will increase the likelihood of longer-term and broader activity in Tubas. The operation will almost certainly disrupt business continuity in the northern West Bank, with firms and public sector entities likely to implement indefinite closures in the coming days. Continued IDF operations will also highly likely disrupt travel along Highway 90, as well as Roads 57, 578 and 5977, undermining supply chain continuity and travel mobility. Locally engaged staff will almost certainly continue to face elevated risks of exposure to crossfire and ordnance detonation, while media outlet staff attempting to cover the operation will face elevated risks of harassment from the security forces. At the time of writing, the operation has resulted in numerous weapons seizures, underscoring the sustained risk of militant activity (and capacity building) in the northern West Bank. In the coming weeks, the Israeli security forces will almost certainly maintain an elevated posture in the West Bank’s northern governorates – including Jenin, Nablus, Tubas and Tulkarm governorates – amid efforts to disrupt militant activity. Such operations will almost certainly sustain elevated ethno-religious tensions and drive the risk of radicalisation and militant recruitment in the short-to-medium term. This dynamic will maintain the risk of sole-perpetrator and low-capacity militant attacks targeting Israeli security positions and civilians in both the West Bank and Israel in the coming months, particularly during periods of religious significance, such as the upcoming Hanukkah period (14 to 22 December).
- WEST BANK: Singapore has sanctioned several Israeli settlers amid rising violence in the West Bank, underscoring persistent compliance and reputational concerns for Israeli-linked firms. On 21 November, Singapore’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs announced it would impose financial sanctions on four Israeli nationals and bar them from entering the country due to their association with settler violence targeting Palestinian civilians in the West Bank. The announcement comes amid a broader uptick in settler violence targeting Palestinian civilians during the ongoing olive harvest season (see Sibylline Middle East Crisis Update – 12 November 2025). In the coming weeks, elevated settler violence targeting Palestinians is highly likely to continue, triggering increasing international scrutiny of settler activity in the West Bank. We assess this will likely result in further bilateral sanctions targeting high-profile settlers and associated entities, compounding compliance concerns and reputational risks for firms with operations in Israel and Israeli settlements in the West Bank. Such risks will be particularly acute in the finance, agriculture and construction sectors, with affected entities facing increased risks of targeted activism, boycotts and financial divestment in the medium-to-long term.
RED SEA
- Nothing significant to report
- ISRAEL-LEBANON: Israel’s assassination of Lebanese Hizballah (LH)’s chief of staff is unlikely to trigger imminent retaliation; however, the ceasefire will remain vulnerable to a breakdown throughout Q1 2026. On 23 November, Israel assassinated LH Chief of Staff Haytham Ali Tabatabai in a pinpoint airstrike on an apartment building in Beirut’s Haret Hreik neighbourhood. The strike killed four people and injured 28 others. Tabatabai is the most senior LH commander to be killed by Israel since the November 2024 ceasefire between Israel and the Iranian-backed group. Following the strike, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu stated that his country would not allow LH to rebuild its power and urged the Lebanese government to fulfil its commitment to disarm the group. Despite the assassination and persistent Israeli threats against LH assets in southern Lebanon, we assess that LH is unlikely to retaliate in the coming weeks, as the group is keen to focus on rebuilding its weakened military capabilities, domestic network and leadership. LH will likely remain reluctant to pursue any military action that results in domestic accusations that the group is dragging Lebanon into a war before nationwide general elections in 2026. As such, Israel is highly likely to capitalise on LH’s reduced willingness to exercise military options by carrying out further airstrikes against the group’s members and assets in Nabatieh and South governorates (both Lebanon), possibly including pinpoint strikes in major cities such as Jezzine, Sidon and Tyre (all South). Similarly, further limited strikes against specific targets in Beirut remain likely in the coming weeks as part of a bid to pressure the Lebanese government to pursue the group’s full disarmament (see Sibylline Situation Update Brief – 17 November 2025). However, despite LH’s current reluctance, more substantive Israeli airstrike campaigns targeting LH in Beirut, central areas north of the Litani River and/or Baalbek-Hermel and Beqaa governorates would possibly push LH to ‘breaking point’, triggering a collapse in the ceasefire and a new round of armed conflict.
- ISRAEL-GLOBAL: A new lawsuit targeting Binance will further increase the existing compliance risks facing financial institutions dealing with the crypto firm throughout H1 2026. On 24 November, 306 US victims of the 7 October 2023 Hamas attack sued the cryptocurrency firm Binance and its founder Changpeng Zhao, accusing them of facilitating funds for the militant group and its affiliates through laundered money. In particular, the lawsuit accused Binance of enabling Hamas, LH, Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) and Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) to move more than USD 1 bn through its platform, including more than USD 50 m after the 7 October attack. Notably, Zhao already pleaded guilty to charges of money laundering in April 2024, and was sentenced to four months in prison. Binance also agreed back then to plead guilty and to pay USD 4.3 bn in fines. While the recent lawsuit is highly likely to take several months in courts, it will further increase compliance and reputational risks for global financial companies, hedge funds, crypto firms, banks and governments dealing with Binance throughout H1 2026 (at least), even without a new conviction from the court. Furthermore, the lawsuit is likely to prompt other Hamas victims in Israel and the US to sue additional smaller crypto firms and decentralised crypto exchanges allegedly used by other Iranian-backed groups.
- Israel-Palestinian Territories: Counter-terrorism operation will drive security risks to proximate staff. On 25 November, Israel launched a large-scale counter-terrorism operation in the north-eastern West Bank, deploying the equivalent of three Israel Defense Forces (IDF) brigades to Tubas governorate. Additional military reinforcements, including bulldozers and heavy equipment, were also sent to the Nur Shams refugee camp in Tulkarm governorate. The operation highlights persistent concerns about militant activity in the West Bank and increases staff exposure to crossfire or misidentification. While the authorities state the operation will last several days, possible clashes between the IDF and Palestinian civilians and militant groups would trigger a greater security response, raising the likelihood of sustained or expanded operations. A curfew is in place, and schools and many workplaces in the governorate have suspended operations. This has will likely disrupt local supply chains and revenues for businesses in the West Bank, with possible knock-on impacts for Israeli firms sourcing from the West Bank. Heightened security measures are also likely to increase the use of checkpoints and stop-and-search practices, increasing the risk of arbitrary detentions for staff and broader travel delays.
- Syria: Sectarian tensions will elevate risks of ethno-religious clashes, sporadic business disruption. On 25 November, the Syrian security forces deployed live fire to disperse protesters and counter-protesters in Latakia (Latakia governorate), injuring several individuals according to unconfirmed reports. Hundreds of Alawite individuals gathered in Latakia, demanding a decentralised political system in Syria and the release of Alawite detainees; shortly after, pro-government counter-protesters (likely from the Sunni community) gathered and harassed the Alawites. These protests come days after armed clashes between Sunni Bedouin tribes and Alawites in nearby Homs (Homs governorate). While demonstrations have subsided currently, we assess that elevated sectarian tensions in Latakia governorate and Syria’s coastal areas will likely persist throughout December. As such, further Alawite anti-government protests in Hama, Homs, Latakia and Tartus governorates in the coming weeks are likely, possibly triggering new rounds of ethno-religious clashes with Sunnis and Bedouin clans. Any new bouts of ethnic violence are likely to be primarily concentrated against community figures and business assets and will likely prompt further curfews and sporadic business disruption throughout December.
Nov 24.
- Israel-Lebanon: LH assassination underscores slow disarmament progress; limited response is likely. On 23 November, Israel assassinated Lebanese Hizballah (LH) Chief of Staff Haytham Ali Tabatabai in an airstrike on an apartment building in the capital Beirut’s Haret Hreik neighbourhood. The strike killed four and injured 28 others. Israel stated that LH is rearming and regrouping, highlighting limited progress in the ongoing disarmament process and increasing the likelihood that Israel will escalate tactical pressure against LH in the coming weeks (see Sibylline Situation Update Brief – 17 November 2025). Given LH’s limited capacity for sustained escalation, it will likely respond in a controlled manner, possibly with a limited rocket attack into northern Israel, elevating bystander security risks for personnel near the Israel-Lebanon border and causing operational delays due to evacuations. LH is highly unlikely to conduct a high-risk attack on densely populated centres in Israel such as Haifa (Haifa district). The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) will likely use such attacks to justify further targeted strikes against LH leaders in Beirut, as well as cross-border operations in Lebanon’s southern governorates, raising conflict re-escalation risks.
- Syria: Ethnic clashes will increase security risks in several cities in coming days. On 23 November, Bedouin gunmen set fire to several Alawite homes in Homs after unknown gunmen killed a couple from the Bani Khaled tribe in nearby Zaidal (both Homs governorate). Local media also reported limited clashes and gunfire in Homs’ predominantly Alawite districts, prompting the deployment of the government forces and the imposition of a temporary curfew. Nevertheless, we assess that the resumption of violence is highly likely by either side in the coming days. Any such attacks are likely to target community figures, businesses and residential areas inside Homs and its peripheries. Alawite attacks against the Syrian government’s General Security Services (GSS) in the city will remain possible, increasing exposure to crossfire and explosives near security checkpoints. There is also a possibility that these clashes will trigger Alawite retaliatory attacks against the government forces in Syria’s coastal region, increasing security risks in Latakia (Latakia governorate) and Tartus (Tartus governorate) in the coming days. (Source: Sibylline)
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