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Military And Security Developments
Dec 18.
- European leaders say a €90bn (£79bn) loan for Ukraine preserves EU unity while sending a signal to Moscow. The deal, struck after a day of tense talks in Brussels, is intended to cover Kyiv’s military and economic needs for the next two years as it faces a looming cash crunch. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky had pushed for the direct use of Russian funds, but opposition led by Belgium blocked the move. The agreement comes amid intensified diplomacy, with US and Russian-led talks expected this weekend. (Source: BBC)
Dec 17.
Key points
• The continuation of Russia’s cyber-supplemented military strategy will likely perpetuate disruption and destruction risks from Russian state-sponsored cyber threat groups to key sectors in Ukraine amid the ongoing war.
• Iran’s cyber-enhanced military strategy will pose heightened security and cyber espionage risks to its adversaries amid long-term regional hostilities; any geopolitical escalation will increase disruption risks to compromised entities that it deems adversarial.
• The widespread adoption of cyber-enhanced military operations will likely consolidate China’s pre-positioning strategy throughout 2026, increasing security, cyber espionage, pre-positioning and disruption risks to critical national infrastructure (CNI) sectors across the Asia-Pacific, Europe and North America regions
Context
In November, the technology company Amazon stated that Iranian state-sponsored actors had used cyber operations to enhance kinetic action throughout 2024 and 2025, amid geopolitical escalations with the US and Israel. Also in November, the cyber security company ESET reported that the renowned Russian state-sponsored group ‘Sandworm’ had targeted key sectors in Ukraine in destructive cyber operations between April and September. Similar to incidents during the Russo-Ukrainian war’s initial stages, these attacks aimed to disrupt key operations in Ukraine permanently to aid Russian kinetic action. This highlights the long-term cyber supplementation of Russia’s military strategy, despite threat actors’ shift in target choices. Cyber operations can cause significant disruption to Western sectors as well as facilitate less risky, more effective intelligence collection to bolster and tailor kinetic action. As this practice becomes more widespread across geopolitical hotspots, we assess that global CNI sectors will face increased security, cyber espionage, pre-positioning and disruption risks throughout 2026.
Forecast
Russian cyber-enhanced military operations will sustain disruption and destruction risks to key sectors in Ukraine amid the ongoing war
Russian state-sponsored groups started conducting disruptive cyber attacks on Ukrainian organisations’ systems at least one month before the full-scale invasion of Ukraine on 24 February 2022. These cyber attacks aimed to disrupt operations within key sectors to limit Ukraine’s ability to respond promptly and unitedly to the upcoming invasion, laying the groundwork for what later became a fine-tuned cyber-enhanced military strategy. Specifically, two cyber attacks preceded and facilitated Russia’s military invasion of Ukraine by deploying two wiper malware variants (‘HermeticWiper’ and ‘AcidRain’) to obstruct effective communication in Ukraine. The attacks occurred just a few hours before the invasion on 23 and 24 February 2022, highlighting the highly co-ordinated nature of Moscow’s strategy.
Throughout the rest of 2022, Russian state-sponsored groups continued to conduct destructive cyber attacks against IT systems in Ukraine to support kinetic action, utilising both wiper malware and ransomware variants. These operations continued to target key sectors, particularly focusing on energy during the winter months to capitalise on the cold weather and intensify war fatigue. In October 2022, Sandworm disrupted operational technology (OT) within a Ukrainian electrical substation. The attack caused a temporary power outage that supplemented the impact of Russian missile strikes on Ukraine’s energy infrastructure, further showcasing cyber operations’ complementary nature in the war. This attack also underscores the continuous development of Russian cyber tactics, as it marked the first attempt to disrupt OT rather than IT systems during the war.
In December 2023, a cyber threat group likely affiliated with Russia conducted a large-scale cyber attack against Kyivstar, Ukraine’s largest telecommunications provider. Reportedly, the attack disrupted air raid sirens, cellular networks, internet services and some financial services for several days. This highlights the role cyber attacks play in disrupting critical military communications. In March 2024, Sandworm used cyber attacks to disrupt the information and communication systems of at least 20 Ukrainian energy, heating and water organisations. During this same period, Ukrainian drone strikes on Russian power substations and oil refineries led to an intensification of Russian retaliatory physical attacks on Ukrainian energy infrastructure. We assess that Sandworm’s attacks likely aimed to aid the Kremlin’s plans to degrade Ukraine’s energy capacity. Furthermore, the Ukrainian authorities were forced to plan additional power outages to preserve the country’s remaining energy infrastructure, causing further disruption and endangerment to civilian life.
As above-mentioned, Sandworm continued to target key sectors in Ukraine in destructive cyber attacks earlier this year between April and September. In April, the group deployed two data wipers to corrupt and/or delete files within the systems of an unnamed Ukrainian university. Between June and September, Sandworm also targeted entities within the government, energy, logistics and grain sectors with multiple wiper variants. The grain sector presents a new target; Sandworm likely aims to disrupt Ukraine’s primary economic export, highlighting the continuous evolution of Russia’s cyber-enhanced kinetic strategy. Sandworm has played a significant role in supporting Russia’s military and strategic objectives with cyber operations since the war began. We assess that Sandworm and other Russian state-sponsored groups will likely continue conducting destructive attacks against key Ukrainian sectors amid the ongoing war, given the longevity and evolution of their cyber attacks.
• Europe region-North America region: Russian cyber tactics will increase security risks to CNI sectors. On 15 December, the technology company Amazon reported that suspected Russian state-sponsored actors have targeted critical national infrastructure (CNI) sectors across the Europe and North America regions in cyber operations since at least 2021. Throughout 2025, these threat actors reportedly started exploiting misconfigured network edge devices (such as routers and virtual private network services; VPNs) to infiltrate targeted systems. This marks a departure from their previous tactics, which focused on the exploitation of software vulnerabilities. While compromised misconfigured devices can achieve the same operational outcomes, they also improve obfuscation and resource expenditure, highlighting the continuous development of threat actors’ capabilities. The tactics used during this cyber operation shared commonalities with two renowned Russian state-sponsored groups (‘Sandworm’ and ‘Curly COMrades’). Therefore, we assess that this operation may possibly form part of a broader Russian state-sponsored campaign involving multiple groups. Consequently, this tactical shift will pose increased security risks to CNI sectors across Europe and North America amid ongoing geopolitical hostilities.
• Russia: Foiled terror attack at prison colony likely underscores persistent IS-K threat. Earlier on 17 December, Russia’s Federal Security Service (FSB) announced that it had thwarted a terrorist attack at a penal colony in Rostov oblast. Allegedly, the attack was planned by prisoners from Central Asian countries that were part of an unspecified entity designated as a terrorist organisation. Previously, a similar incident occurred in Rostov oblast in June 2024, with the perpetrators reportedly linked to the Islamic State Khorasan Province (IS-K), a regional branch of the global Islamic State (IS) terrorist group. We assess that the latest incident involved IS-K affiliates, underscoring the persistent activity of IS-K cells in the region. IS-K remains one of the most active Islamist terrorist groups in Russia; it was responsible for the March 2024 terror attack in Moscow oblast. This foiled terror attack highlights that Russia continues to face sustained threats from Islamist terrorist networks, particularly IS-K. However, since the March 2024 attack, the Russian security forces have likely enhanced their proactive monitoring of these groups significantly, likely limiting their ability to carry out further attacks.
• Russia-US: Possible new sanctions are unlikely to push Moscow towards peace in near term. Earlier on 17 December, Bloomberg reported that the US is preparing new sanctions targeting Russia’s energy sector if the Kremlin rejects a peace deal to end the Russo-Ukrainian war. According to unspecified people familiar with the matter, the US is considering imposing punitive measures against vessels in Russia’s shadow fleet of oil tankers (which Moscow uses to evade Western sanctions), as well as against traders who facilitate related transactions. Bloomberg reported that the new sanctions could be announced as early as this week. However, US President Donald Trump will make the final decision as to whether to issue the measures. In recent weeks, the US has reinvigorated efforts to broker an end to the war in Ukraine. Although Washington DC sanctioned two Russian oil majors in October, we assess that the Trump administration is likely seeking an eventual economic rapprochement with Moscow, which will decrease the likelihood of sweeping punitive measures in the near term. Nevertheless, if the US decides to issue new sanctions, such economic penalties will unlikely encourage Russia to cease hostilities in the near-to-medium term.
Dec 16.
KEY DEVELOPMENTS
• KUPIANSK: Ukrainian forces have counter-attacked and successfully advanced within and around Kupiansk (Kharkiv oblast), reflecting vulnerabilities in Russian forces and Ukraine’s ability to conduct (limited) offensive operations
• ENERGY: The Washington Post has cited unspecified officials and analysts who assessed that Russian long-range strikes are ‘pushing Ukraine’s energy grid to the brink of collapse’, with widespread blackouts likely
• ELECTIONS: Despite Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky’s stated willingness to hold a wartime presidential election, the likelihood of it occurring in the coming months is currently low due to security issues if no ceasefire is in place
• FORECAST: Shuttle diplomacy continues, but despite back-and-forth negotiations, Russia remains highly unlikely to adjust its minimum conditions, with proposals for a demilitarised zone in Donetsk oblast highly unlikely to be acceptable to Moscow
• KUPIANSK: Over the past week, Ukrainian forces counter-attacked and successfully advanced within and around Kupiansk (Kharkiv oblast). In November, Russia claimed that its forces fully controlled Kupiansk, with Russian President Vladimir Putin reiterating these claims in early December. However, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky was recently filmed at Kupiansk’s western entrance, denying such claims. Geolocated footage from recent days confirms that there have been Ukrainian advances in and around Kupiansk, marking a notable counter-attack operation. Ukrainian military officials reported that Russian supply routes have been cut and that up to 200 Russian troops are now encircled in the remaining areas. According to these officials, the remaining Russian troops rely on drones for resupplies; their logistical situation remains complicated and they are effectively surrounded. Numerous Russian milblogger sources have also acknowledged the difficult position Russian forces are in, as they have been pushed back at multiple points towards the Oskil River.
• KUPIANSK: The recent developments in Kupiansk likely highlight Russia’s difficulty in conducting sustained offensives across multiple sectors and the possible prioritisation of other frontlines. Russian forces made rapid advances around Kupiansk in early August using infiltration tactics, while Ukrainian counter-attacks reportedly began as early as September. The latest fighting indicates that Russian forces have faced difficulties in consolidating their earlier gains in Kupiansk, likely due to various logistical challenges and personnel shortages in comparison to other priority fronts. Additionally, this pattern of rapid Russian advances followed by swift Ukrainian counter-attacks resembles the dynamics following Russia’s tactical breach in Dobropillia (north of Pokrovsk; both Donetsk oblast) in August, where Ukrainian forces similarly contested and reversed initial Russian gains.
• KUPIANSK: Ultimately, Ukraine’s counter-attack also underscores that Ukrainian forces are able to launch complex offensive operations, albeit at a relatively tactical level. Ukrainian officials will almost certainly use this recent counter-attack to oppose Russia’s narratives that its military victory is inevitable. Rather, the Ukrainian military authorities will highlight this operation to claim that when properly provisioned, they are capable of pushing Russian forces back.
• TRANSNISTRIA: Russia is unlikely to use Moldova’s breakaway Transnistria region as a base for offensive operations against south-western Ukraine in the short-to-medium term. According to Ukrainian military intelligence (GUR) sources cited by several Ukrainian media outlets in recent days, Russia is increasing its covert and military activity in Transnistria. Reportedly, Russia is establishing drone production and training centres, calling up reservists to military formations and bringing out weapons from storage. GUR sources claim that these measures aim to destabilise Moldova and create tensions along the border with Ukraine, increasing the risk of sabotage groups infiltrating Ukrainian territory.
• TRANSNISTRIA: We assess that, due to limited resources, Transnistria is highly unlikely to play a significant role in Russia’s wider war effort against Ukraine. Theoretically, the region could serve as a base for drone operations targeting south-western Ukrainian areas such as Odesa and Mykolaiv oblasts. However, Transnistria is unlikely to become a significant launch-point, as Russia can conduct strikes against these areas from other locations, including Russian-occupied Crimea. Nevertheless, the recent uptick in Russian activity may also be aimed at encouraging Ukraine to screen its border with Transnistria, thereby drawing resources away from high-priority frontlines in the east. Ultimately, while Transnistria will continue to pose a threat to both Ukraine and Moldova, its military potential and capability remains low and it will likely only pose limited threats to the region.
• STRIKES: Over the past week, Russia continued targeting Ukrainian energy infrastructure heavily (see ENERGY below). Ukraine’s south-western Odesa oblast was heavily affected, particularly during the large-scale attack between 12 and 13 December, involving 495 aerial objects. Odesa oblast experienced severe power outages; the provincial capital Odesa was left without electricity, water and heating following the attack. Ukraine’s private energy operator DTEK reported damage to 20 power substations across Odesa oblast.
• STRIKES: Over the past few weeks, Ukraine has stepped up naval drone strikes against Russia’s so-called ‘shadow fleet’ of oil tankers in the Black Sea, complementing its attacks on oil refineries. On 10 December, Ukrainian naval drones struck a Russian oil tanker en route to the port of Novorossiysk (Krasnodar krai; Russia). Several similar attacks have occurred since late November. These operations form part of Ukraine’s ongoing campaign against Russian oil infrastructure. They are likely aimed at disrupting Moscow’s ability to export oil, thereby undermining its war-funding revenues.
• STRIKES: On 13 December, the Ukrainian Navy reported that Russian drones struck the Turkish vessel Viva near a Ukrainian port, reflecting the high threat to maritime vessels operating in Russian and Ukrainian waters. The vessel was reportedly transporting sunflower oil heading to Egypt. The Ukrainian authorities reported that the attack caused a fire, though the vessel was able to continue its journey. The recent increase in attacks on vessels in the Black Sea has likely deteriorated the operating environment for commercial shipping. This will likely sustain the risk of higher insurance premiums, especially in the event of repeated attacks. Earlier on 16 December, the Turkish authorities confirmed that a Turkish F-16 shot down an ‘uncontrolled drone’ approaching its airspace in the Black Sea. It remains unclear whether the drone was Russian or Ukrainian. Regardless, the incident underscores the growing threat that the recent uptick in attacks poses to the wider Black Sea region.
• STRIKES: On 15 December, Ukraine published footage showing an attack on a Russian Kilo-class attack submarine in dock at the port of Novorossiysk, using a new type of underwater drone called ‘Sub Sea Baby’ overnight on 14-15 December. The Russian authorities have denied the claim. At present, it appears that the Ukrainian drone struck the quay near the submarine, though it remains unclear whether the attack also damaged the aft of the submarine. Nevertheless, if confirmed, this would be the first attack of its kind in naval history, further highlighting Kyiv’s growing maritime drone capabilities and the ever-growing threat they pose to Moscow’s Black Sea Fleet.
POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS
• ENERGY: On 15 December, The Washington Post cited unspecified officials and analysts who assessed that Russian long-range strikes are ‘pushing Ukraine’s energy grid to the brink of collapse’. According to these sources, Russia’s attacks threaten to disable transmission systems that transfer electricity from the west to the east of Ukraine. The unspecified contributors argued that this could effectively divide Ukraine into two. We previously assessed that Russia’s strike campaign this autumn and winter season is likely aimed at creating a power deficit in eastern Ukraine and undermining the flow of electricity from the west to the east of the country.
• ENERGY: The continued Russian long-range attacks against Ukraine’s already degraded energy infrastructure will increase the risk of blackouts (both at the local and national level) over the coming weeks. At the same time, the Ukrainian authorities are increasingly likely to take further measures to prioritise which consumers receive uninterrupted energy. The authorities will prioritise any facilities deemed to be of critical importance, likely leading to knock-on business disruption for non-critical businesses.
• ASSETS: Russia’s move to sue Euroclear, the Belgium-based institution holding the majority of frozen Russian assets, is almost certainly aimed at deterring any action to use them for Ukraine’s benefit. On 12 December, the Central Bank of Russia (CBR) filed a lawsuit in a court in the capital Moscow against Euroclear, as the European Commission (EC) considers ways to use the assets. Notably, also on 12 December, the EU agreed to freeze indefinitely EUR 210 bn (over USD 247 bn) worth of Russian central bank assets held in Europe – whereas previously, member states had to agree to their extension every six months. The developments come ahead of a European Council summit on 18 and 19 December, which will prove crucial in determining how the bloc will provide long-term financial support to Ukraine. We assess that the timing of Russia’s lawsuit almost certainly aims to further undermine the EU’s cohesion on the use of frozen Russian assets; it also signals that future legal action is likely. For further analysis, see Sibylline Situation Update Brief – 16 December 2025.
• ELECTIONS: Despite Zelensky’s willingness to hold a wartime presidential election, the likelihood of it occurring in the coming months is low. On 9 December, Zelensky stated that Ukraine would be ready to hold elections in the next 60 to 90 days if US and European partners ensure its security. Although Ukraine cannot hold an election under martial law, Zelensky disclosed on 14 December that he expects lawmakers to develop options to hold a presidential election in the near future. We previously assessed that holding an election during wartime would entail a myriad of organisational and security challenges, with Russia highly likely to attempt to destabilise the vote. In practice, it is unclear how the EU and US could ensure elections’ stability; a serious move towards a vote remains unlikely.
• ELECTIONS: Although the US is increasing pressure on Ukraine to hold an election, the Ukrainian population remains opposed to this move before the war ends. According to polling published on 15 December by the Kyiv International Institute of Sociology (KIIS), 57% of respondents believe that any elections should be held after a peace agreement is reached and hostilities cease. In contrast, 25% of respondents advocated for an election to take place if it was held after a ceasefire and with security guarantees from international partners. Meanwhile, 9% of respondents argued that a presidential election should be held now, even in the absence of a ceasefire. Additionally, the survey found that trust in Zelensky remains high, at 61%.
• ELECTIONS: However, separate polling data indicates that only 20.3% of Ukrainian citizens would vote for Zelensky in a future presidential election. The poll from Info Sapiens was conducted in the wake of details emerging about Ukraine’s large-scale corruption scandal in November, which could have influenced its results. Nevertheless, Zelensky remained the most popular candidate, with former commander-in-chief Valeriy Zaluzhnyi ranking second (19.1%). Realistically, the two sets of polling could indicate that while support for Zelensky as a wartime leader remains robust, Ukrainian society seeks a different postwar leader.
FORECAST
NEGOTIATIONS: Despite continued US-led efforts and proposals aimed at ending the Russo-Ukrainian war, we continue to assess that Russia remains unwilling to compromise on its terms to facilitate an end to hostilities. As such, a major breakthrough towards peace remains unlikely in the near term. However, shuttle diplomacy continues; on 15 December, reports emerged that the US proposed providing a security guarantee akin to ‘Article 5’ (i.e. NATO’s collective defence principle) to Ukraine, though details remain limited.
Russia will highly unlikely deviate from its position that, at a minimum, Ukrainian forces should withdraw from the entirety of Donbas region for a ceasefire to take place in the coming weeks. On 12 December, Kremlin foreign policy aide Yuri Ushakov reiterated Russia’s determination to take full control of Donbas region (which comprises Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts), either through negotiations or military means. His comments came in response to reports of a US proposal to create a ‘free economic zone’ in Donbas region (see Sibylline Daily Analytical Update – 12 December 2025). As part of this proposal, Ukrainian and Russian forces would not be able to enter this zone.
Ushakov’s comments almost certainly indicate that Russia would seek to militarise any potential demilitarised zone in Donbas, thus rejecting the US’ proposal which likely sought to compromise on territorial concessions. Ushakov acknowledged that while Russian or Ukrainian troops may not be present in this proposed zone, the deployment of the National Guard (also known as Rosgvardia) and the enforcement of Russian law would be necessary to ‘maintain order and organise life’. Rosgvardia was created in 2016 as an internal security force, though its units participated in the initial full-scale invasion of Ukraine. In 2023, Russia passed a law allowing Rosgvardia to acquire and use heavy weaponry; the body currently has combined arms military experience and capability. As such, Ukraine would almost certainly not trust the Rosgvardia’s presence in any potential demilitarised zone (which remains highly unlikely to materialise in the near term). Ultimately, the Kremlin’s Rosgvardia deployment demand is likely aimed at portraying Russia as not fully ruling out the idea of a demilitarised zone. Nevertheless, Russia would not agree to such a proposal in practice; we assess it would seek to undermine any such arrangement.
Despite Putin’s previous statement that Kyiv must hold a referendum on territorial concessions, Moscow is currently unwilling to facilitate a ceasefire for such a vote to take place. On 11 December, Zelensky said that Ukrainian society must have a say in territorial issues either through elections or a referendum, thereby indicating that such a vote is possible in the future. In response, Kremlin press secretary Dmitry Peskov voiced his opposition to a ceasefire to allow for a referendum, viewing any pause in hostilities as potentially allowing Ukraine to regroup rather than as a step towards ending the war. Although Russian officials have frequently questioned the legitimacy of the Ukrainian authorities and demanded that Ukraine hold elections (see Sibylline Ukraine Update – 4 September 2025), Peskov’s rejection reinforces Russia’s opposition to a ceasefire in Ukraine. We continue to assess that the Kremlin does not deem a ceasefire to be in its tactical or strategic interests, given the pressure it has sought to build in recent months.
We assess that diplomatic activity between various stakeholders is likely to continue over the coming week, particularly as the US is reportedly interested in reaching a ‘full understanding’ of its peace plan by Christmas (25 December). While this timeline is highly unlikely to lead to the war’s end, Ukraine is showing some (caveated) flexibility in accepting concessions on key issues, such as possibly abandoning its ambitions to join NATO (see Sibylline Daily Analytical Update – 15 December 2025). Nevertheless, if the US is determined to make progress before Christmas, President Donald Trump’s administration is more likely to increase pressure on Ukraine rather than on Russia, given that its levers to influence Ukraine (such as threats to suspend intelligence sharing and arms sales) are much greater than the economic levers that could lead Russia to agree a peace deal. Therefore, we assess that negotiations will likely protract well into 2026.
Key points
• Ukraine will remain highly reliant on external funding in 2026 to cover its domestic expenditure and sustain its war effort.
• Belgium’s approval will remain crucial for the EU to issue a loan to Ukraine backed by frozen Russian sovereign assets.
• Alternative financing plans are likely to place significant pressure on EU member states’ economies, sustaining uncertainty over the bloc’s ability to remain Ukraine’s primary financial backer in the medium-to-long term.
Context
EU leaders will decide how to provide long-term financial support for Ukraine during the European Council’s summit on 18 and 19 December. The main option the European Commission (EC) is considering is the issuance of a ‘reparations loan’ guaranteed by frozen Russian sovereign assets worth EUR 165 bn (around USD 194 bn). On 12 December, EU governments agreed to immobilise these assets indefinitely for the first time, meaning that they will no longer require renewals every six months (a move that dissenting member states such as Hungary had repeatedly threatened to block). However, there is no consensus on how these assets can be used.
A large portion of these assets is held by Euroclear, a central securities depository based in Belgium. Under the proposal, Euroclear would issue a loan to the EU, which would then lend the funds to Kyiv. Ukraine would be required to repay the loan only if Russia ends the war and pays war reparations (a scenario that remains unlikely at present). Of the total figure, EUR 115 bn (approximately USD 135 bn) would be allocated to Ukraine’s defence needs, while the remaining EUR 50 bn (about USD 59 bn) would cover broader budgetary requirements.
The EU has become Ukraine’s primary financial backer, particularly as the US’ support has declined sharply under President Donald Trump. Ukraine’s economic situation remains severe, with its 2026 budget revealing substantial funding gaps, while conditions on the frontline continue to deteriorate. As a result, Kyiv remains heavily reliant on external financing, not only to cover domestic expenditure but also to sustain its war effort. The forthcoming EU decision will serve as a key test of the bloc’s ability to support Ukraine’s war effort and the Ukrainian authorities’ negotiating position in 2026.
Forecast
Due to significant budget gaps, Ukraine will remain highly reliant on external funding to cover its civilian and military expenditures in 2026
On 3 December, Ukraine’s parliament (known as Rada) approved the country’s 2026 budget, which presents an annual deficit equivalent to 18.5% of gross domestic product (GDP). While the budget’s parliamentary approval will help Kyiv secure an EUR 6.9 bn (USD 8.1 bn) loan from the IMF, Minister of Finance Serhiy Marchenko has emphasised that Ukraine requires EUR 38.3 bn (USD 45 bn) in external financing. The EU estimates Ukraine’s overall financing needs for the 2026/27 fiscal year at EUR 135 bn (USD 158.6 bn) in combined military and financial support. Without external funding, Ukraine is expected to run out of cash during the first half of 2026, according to some estimates. Ukraine’s socio-economic situation remains critical, as the country continues to bear the growing costs of nearly four years of war which have caused significant damage to national infrastructure.
Meanwhile, on the military front, Ukraine’s operational situation has deteriorated steadily. Russia continues to demonstrate its ability to sustain a highly attritional war, while Ukraine faces mounting pressure on personnel and equipment. On 10 December, the Kiel Institute noted that new aid commitments are at their lowest level since the start of the Russo-Ukrainian war. Annual allocations averaged approximately EUR 41.6 bn (USD 48.9 bn) between 2022 and 2024; by comparison, only EUR 32.5 bn (around USD 38.2 bn) were delivered in 2025. This downward trend has been particularly acute in the second half of 2025 and broadly reflects European states’ failure to offset the decline in US support. We assess that if the EU fails to deliver financial aid to Ukraine, this will limit the country’s ability to purchase crucial equipment. Even if EU member states agree on a financial aid package, it will highly likely take several months before funds are allocated, thereby enabling Ukraine to procure weaponry. The rapid deterioration of Ukraine’s military situation will undermine its fragile bargaining position in peace talks significantly.
• Germany-Ukraine: Deepening defence co-operation will sustain Russian grey-zone threat. On 15 December, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy announced that preparations are being made to open Kyiv’s first defence industry office in Berlin (Germany). The ‘Ukraine Freedom House’ office is due to focus on expanding weapons exports and joint research initiatives aimed at strengthening Ukraine’s defence industrial base. Also on 15 December, it was announced that the Ukrainian drone manufacturer Frontline Robotics will jointly develop combat drones with the German defence firm Quantum Systems in Germany. These developments underscore the growing importance of Germany as backer of Ukraine amid the scaling back of US support. We assess that Russia will likely seek to retaliate by ramping up its grey-zone or hybrid campaign against Germany (which is already among Moscow’s principal targets) in 2026. Bundeswehr sites, defence firms, logistics hubs and railway freight will likely remain strategic targets of sabotage. Irregular drone flights in the vicinity of critical national infrastructure (CNI), including airports, are also likely.
Dec 15.
• Russia-Ukraine: Chance of peace in short term is remote despite Kyiv’s readiness to drop NATO goal. On 14 December, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stated that his country is prepared to abandon its long-standing ambition to join NATO in exchange for robust security guarantees. Zelensky called for an arrangement between Ukraine and the US akin to NATO’s Article 5 collective defence clause, as well as guarantees from European partners and other allies like Canada and Japan. His comments come amid a renewed US push to broker an end to the Russo-Ukrainian war in recent weeks. While this marks a notable shift in Ukraine’s public messaging, we have long assessed that Ukrainian membership in NATO is highly unlikely to materialise. Russia has repeatedly demanded that Ukraine renounce its ambitions to join NATO; Moscow used the perceived threat of Ukraine joining the alliance to justify its full-scale invasion in 2022. While significant, we assess that Ukraine’s potential abandonment of its NATO membership ambitions is highly unlikely to be sufficient to accelerate the end of the war in the short term, with further shuttle diplomacy likely to continue in the coming weeks. (Source: Sibylline)
18 Dec 25. EU leaders face crunch decision on using frozen Russian assets for Ukraine.
• Summary
• Ukraine will run out of money next year without more financing
• EU leaders aim to counter Trump’s ‘weak’ Europe claim with Ukraine support plan
• Belgium seeks indefinite guarantees against potential Russian legal claims
• EU debates financing options amid strained national budgets and Hungary’s veto
European Union leaders will decide whether to use frozen Russian assets to lend billions of euros of cash to Ukraine to keep its war effort afloat at a summit on Thursday seen as a critical test of the group’s strength.
The EU sees Russia’s war as a threat to its own security and wants to keep Ukraine financed and fighting.
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“We just can’t afford to fail. We have to show that we are strong,” EU foreign policy chief Kaja Kallas said, adding that leaders would stay as long as needed at the Brussels summit to find a solution.
‘MONEY TODAY OR BLOOD TOMORROW’
The European Commission has proposed using frozen Russian central bank assets that are mostly held in a Belgian clearing house to secure a huge loan to Kyiv. But Belgium is deeply concerned about legal and financial risks, and other states including Italy have also expressed worries.
EU leaders arriving at the summit said it was imperative they find a solution. They were also keen to show European countries’ strength and resolve after U.S. President Donald Trump last week called them “weak”.
“Now we have a simple choice – either money today or blood tomorrow. And I am not talking about Ukraine only, I am talking about Europe,” Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk said. “All European leaders have to finally rise to this occasion.”
European Commission chief Ursula von der Leyen said she would not leave the summit without agreement on how to finance Ukraine over the next two years.
Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskiy was due to participate in the summit in person. He had previously been expected to join by video call, underlining the urgency of the situation as seen from Kyiv.
BELGIUM WANTS MORE GUARANTEES ON RISK SHARING
Belgian Prime Minister Bart De Wever told his country’s parliament early on Thursday that he had not yet seen guarantees that answered his concerns on legal and liquidity risks and that financing plans were still changing “as we speak”.
Russia’s central bank has said the EU plans to use its assets are illegal and reserved the right to use all available means to protect its interests. It filed a lawsuit in Moscow this week seeking $230 bn in damages from clearing house Euroclear.
The stakes are high because without the EU’s financial help Ukraine will run out of money in the second quarter of next year and most likely lose the war to Russia, which the EU fears would bring closer the threat of Russian aggression against the bloc.
Kallas said she saw chances of a deal on the assets at 50/50. German Chancellor Friedrich Merz said: “My impression is that we can come to an agreement.”
Sweden’s Prime Minister Ulf Kristersson said this was the most important EU summit since the war in Ukraine started.
“I believe and hope that we can find technical solutions to the issues that Belgium still has outstanding, but I would like to emphasize that we are not there yet,” he said.
REPARATIONS LOAN IS ‘ONLY GAME IN TOWN’
One of the financing options could be for the EU to borrow the needed amount against the security of the EU budget and then lend the money on to Ukraine, but such a move would require unanimity among the 27 EU countries and Moscow-friendly Hungary has already said it would veto it.
Another option would be for each willing EU country itself to raise money on the market and pass it on to Kyiv, but that would mean a rise in the already high debt and deficit levels and a lack of longer-term financing certainty for Ukraine.
Diplomats said the use of the Russian assets was therefore in practice “the only game in town” and favoured by most countries because it ensured a large sum for Ukraine without increasing national debts or any immediate fiscal effort.
But to use it, EU leaders first need to convince Belgium, which holds 185 bn euros of the total 210 bn euros frozen in Europe, that they will not leave it alone with the bill if Russia successfully sues in international courts over the plan.
The discussions among leaders on Thursday would focus on narrowing down the scope of the guarantees Belgium is asking for to a form that would also be acceptable to other EU countries, diplomats said, stressing a financing solution for Ukraine would be found. (Source: Reuters)
18 Dec 25. Putin says Russia will take more land in Ukraine if Europe sinks peace moves.
• Summary
• Putin urges Kyiv and Europe to engage over US proposals
• He casts European politicians as ‘young pigs’
• Russia spending 5.1% of GDP on war in 2025, slide shows
• Defence minister sees 2026 task of advancing faster
President Vladimir Putin said on Wednesday Russia would take more land in Ukraine by force if Kyiv and European politicians whom he cast as “young pigs” did not engage over U.S. proposals for a peace settlement.
The United States has held talks with Russia, and separately with Kyiv and European leaders, on proposals for ending the war in Ukraine but no deal has been reached. Kyiv and its European allies are concerned by demands for Ukrainian territorial concessions and Ukraine wants stronger security guarantees.
At an annual Defence Ministry meeting, Putin said Russia, which sent tens of thousands of troops into Ukraine in 2022, was advancing on all fronts and would achieve its aims by force or through diplomacy.
“If the opposing side and their foreign patrons refuse to engage in substantive discussions, Russia will achieve the liberation of its historical lands by military means,” Putin said.
Russia says it controls about 19% of Ukraine, including the Crimea peninsula which it annexed in 2014, as well as most of the eastern Donbas region, much of the Kherson and Zaporizhzhia regions, and slivers of four other regions.
Russia says Crimea, Donbas, Kherson and Zaporizhzhia are now parts of Russia. Ukraine says it will never accept that, and almost all countries consider the regions to be part of Ukraine.
Defence Minister Andrei Belousov said a task for 2026 was to increase the pace of Russia’s offensive. A slide shown during a speech he delivered said Russia was spending 5.1% of gross domestic product on the war in 2025.
PUTIN SAYS EUROPEAN LEADERS WHIP UP HYSTERIA
European leaders say they stand with Kyiv and that Russia should not be rewarded for the war in Ukraine, which followed several years of fighting between Russian-backed separatists and Ukrainian troops in the Donbas region.
Putin said former U.S. President Joe Biden’s administration had sought to destroy Russia and that European politicians had also been pursuing the same objective, a charge denied by European leaders.
He accused European politicians – whom he described as “shoats, or “young pigs” – of whipping up hysteria about a potential war with Russia by warning that Moscow could one day attack a country in the NATO military alliance.
“I have repeatedly stated: this is a lie, nonsense, pure nonsense about some imaginary Russian threat to European countries. But this is being done quite deliberately,” Putin said.
Some European leaders have accused Russia of having no real intention of engaging in peace talks. Directing similar criticism at Europe, Belousov said European powers were trying to scuttle attempts to end the war and talking of a war between Russia and NATO within a few years.
“Such a policy creates real prerequisites for the continuation of military operations next year, 2026,” he said. (Source: Reuters)
17 Dec 25. UK sends automated turrets and missiles to shoot down Russian drones, as part of £600 m air defence package for Ukraine.
The UK has committed £600m in air-defence capabilities, including cutting edge turrets that can shoot down Russian drones to support Ukraine through the winter.
• Over 1,000 UK-built air-defence missiles delivered since June, as Russia targets power stations and energy networks.
• New British systems including RAVEN and GRAVEHAWK and counter-Shahed turrets set to bolster Ukraine’s defences this winter.
• Defence Secretary co-chairs meeting of the Ukraine Defence Contact Group (UDCG) as UK further steps up support for Ukraine’s security and sovereignty.
The UK has committed £600m in air-defence capabilities, including cutting edge turrets that can shoot down Russian drones to support Ukraine through the winter, as Putin’s air campaign plunges homes, hospitals, and power stations into darkness.
The support has already seen more than 1,000 missiles delivered to Ukraine since June, a direct result of the UK Government’s biggest single-year investment in air defence for Ukraine.
The announcement comes as the Defence Secretary John Healey MP and his German counterpart, Boris Pistorius co-chair the 32nd meeting of the UDCG today (16th December 2025). In a virtual meeting of 50 nations, which will be attended by NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte and US Secretary of War Pete Hegseth, Ukraine’s supporters will discuss the country’s key military needs for 2026, share battlefield insights, plan equipment deliveries and the gaps that need to be addressed.
The UK is backing Ukraine for the long term, with more than twenty remotely guided counter-drone turrets, acquired from Estonia, set for delivery in 2026. These new systems, designed specifically to defeat Shahed-style attack drones at scale and at lower cost, form a crucial part of Ukraine’s future defensive capabilities.
Building on that momentum, five RAVEN air-defence systems — announced this summer — will now be handed over to Ukraine, giving frontline units a rapid-reaction shield against low-flying threats. Whilst the first GRAVEHAWK air-defence systems, announced in January and now being delivered, will reinforce Ukraine’s ability to protect key infrastructure from Russia’s deep-strike barrages.
In addition, the UK with funding from international partners, has delivered over 1,000 air defence missiles and over 250,000 rounds of air-defence ammunition in 2025.
Together, this represents a major step-change in Britain’s support, ensuring Ukraine can keep the lights on and keep civilians safe through the harshest months of the war.
Defence Secretary, John Healey MP said: “Ukrainians continue to fight with huge courage – military and civilians alike. The UK’s £600 m air defence investment this year is critical help to Ukrainians as they defend their towns, cities and energy infrastructure from Russia’s barbaric attacks. Alongside this 50-strong group of partners, we are working to deliver the vital support for Ukraine’s defence to put them in the strongest possible position to secure peace. Central to this boost is the final tranche of 650 Lightweight Multirole Missiles (LMM), delivered ahead of schedule last autumn and now playing a critical role in stopping Russia’s one-way attack drones and cruise-missile strikes.”
The announcement also builds on the landmark Octopus announcement between the UK and Ukraine. This will see a new state-of-the-art interceptor drone built in the UK ready to be deployed at scale on the front line at Ukraine.
Interceptor drones are considerably cheaper than regular air defence missiles and have proved to be highly effective in countering the waves of one-way attack drones Russia continue to launch at Ukraine’s cities.
This reaffirms how the UK’s support for Ukraine, drives investment and growth back in the UK, creating thousands of highly skilled jobs across the country.
Both the Prime Minister and Defence Secretary have been clear that the UK’s national security – the foundation of the Government’s Plan for Change – starts in Ukraine.
The UK remains committed to securing a just and lasting peace in Ukraine, with £4.5 bn being spent on military support to Ukraine this year – the UK’s highest ever level. (Source: https://www.gov.uk/)
16 Dec 25. US, Europe vow to secure Ukraine, as Kyiv asks for $60bn in 2026. Ukrainian, European and U.S. negotiators have wrapped up two days of talks here with what officials describe as the most substantial movement yet toward a political framework to end Russia’s full scale invasion, even as core territorial questions remain unresolved.
Meanwhile, Ukraine on Tuesday predicted the total costs for its defense at $120bn for 2026, of which half would have to come from foreign support.
According to Zelenskyy and Ukrainian officials, the discussions in Berlin focused on a package of five documents that would underpin an eventual peace deal, several of which are dedicated to long term security guarantees for Ukraine. Kyiv says parts of the package are intended to be legally binding, with an “Article 5-like” mutual defense commitment, a reference to NATO nomenclature, requiring U.S. congressional approval and backed by additional European pledges.
German officials describe Washington’s offer on legal and material guarantees as “truly remarkable” and a “very important step forward.” The conference marks the first major EU hosted attempt to shape the emerging security architecture around a potential ceasefire.
Europe, the U.S. and Ukraine “achieved a common sense of purpose” on Monday in their quest to end the war in Ukraine, German Defense Minister Boris Pistorius said during his opening remarks for the Ukraine Defense Contact Group on Tuesday. There had previously been significant differences between Europe and the U.S. regarding a peace plan proposed by Washington, which was perceived across the Atlantic as a capitulation to most of Moscow’s war aims.
The center of gravity has shifted toward Europe in the past months, as the continent is now single-handedly financing Ukraine’s continued defense against Russia following Washington’s suspension of military assistance since March 2025. Total European allocated aid since the start of Russia’s invasion now more than doubles U.S. support for Ukraine, according to the Kiel Institute, a Germany-based research organization.
Besides progress on security guarantees, negotiators reported no tangible advance on the question of territorial concessions.
Russian demands for formal recognition of its hold over parts of eastern Ukraine remain incompatible with Kyiv’s public position, and Berlin officials describe the road ahead on these questions as “very long.”
Ukrainian government officials have repeatedly stressed that suggestions of ceding Ukrainian-held territory remain off the table and that any deal must avoid freezing the conflict on terms favorable to Moscow. European leaders have said only Ukrainians can decide on a path forward in territorial questions, despite U.S. pressure in recent weeks for Kyiv to give up about a fifth of its land to Russia.
Zelenskyy has signaled that once the five document package is finalized with U.S. and European partners, Kyiv expects a direct meeting with President Donald Trump to test whether Moscow will accept the emerging framework.
European and U.S. officials alike are portraying the Berlin talks as “very positive,” saying there is consensus on key issues even if the outcome stopped short of a formal ceasefire proposal.
A European-led multinational peacekeeping force to be deployed in Ukraine once the war ends is a key pillar of the proposed deal.
On Tuesday, British Defence Minister John Healey reaffirmed his country’s commitment to such a mission, saying that London continues “to direct funding to prepare our U.K. troops and armed forces so that we are ready to deploy when peace comes, with troops on the ground and jets in the air.”
Ten European leaders, along with EU Commission President Ursula von der Leyen, issued a joint statement after the talks proposing a “multinational force for Ukraine” led by Europe and backed by the United States. The European proposal additionally called for “sustained and significant support to Ukraine to build its armed forces, which should remain at a peacetime level of 800,000.”
In the meantime, Ukraine will be reliant on support from its Western partners. Speaking at the Ukraine Defense Contact Group meeting on Tuesday, Denys Shmyhal, the Ukrainian minister of defense, said his country expected the war costs to total $120 bn next year, of which Ukraine would be able to cover half on its own.
“The remaining $60 bn must come from our partners,” Shmyhal said, asking the countries present to each allocate at least 0.25% of their 2026 economic power to Ukraine’s defensive effort. Air defense remains a priority, according to the defense minister.
“Strong and coordinated decisions will accelerate our path toward a just and lasting peace,” Shmyhal said. “Now is the moment to bring it closer.”
(Source: Defense News)
17 Dec 25. Quantum Systems and Frontline JV to produce 10,000 Zoom and Linza UAVs in 2026. Joint venture (JV) Quantum Frontline Industries, a partnership between Germany’s Quantum Systems and Ukraine’s Frontline Robotics, will produce at least 10,000 Zoom and Linza unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) in 2026 for Ukraine in Germany, a Quantum Systems spokesperson told Janes on 16 December.
The 2026 order is based on “the demands of the Armed Forces of Ukraine (AFU)” and “100% of the UAVs will be exclusively for Ukraine”, the spokesperson said. The production of Frontline’s Zoom and Linza UAVs will begin at the start of 2026. The JV will be able to sell excess UAVs to NATO and allies in 2027, after the 10,000 UAV order is completed. Germany has expressed interest in procuring Ukrainian battle-tested technology but “nothing concrete yet”, the spokesperson added. The German government is funding all of the production and delivery. “The facility, tools, [and] equipment are in place,” the spokesperson added. The decision for the JV to produce the UAVs was made after a number of “automated industry specialists were brought in” and a recommendation was made based on the UAVs being “easily mass-produced in a conveyor-type line”, explained the spokesperson. “Initially, we’ll assemble [the UAVs] manually,” he said, adding the automation process will be introduced gradually.
Zoom is an intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) UAV with a 10-inch airframe, a tactical range of 15 km, and a flight time of over 35 minutes, according to Frontline. The UAV has a gyro-stabilised daytime camera with a resolution of 1280×720 and 10x optical zoom. The gyro-stabilised thermal imager has a resolution of 640×512 and a 30 Hz video refresh rate. The cruising flight speed is 12–15 m/s (43.2–54 km/h). (Source: Janes)
15 Dec 25. For the first time, Ukrainian drones will be manufactured on an industrial scale in Europe, within the new “Build with Ukraine” Initiative, by the new German-Ukrainian defence joint venture, “Quantum Frontline Industries”.
Quantum Systems and Frontline Robotics today announced the creation of “Quantum Frontline Industries” (QFI), a German-Ukrainian joint venture that will establish Europe’s first fully automated, industrial-scale foreign production line for drones for the Ukrainian Armed Forces.
Under the Build with Ukraine initiative, the new venture will mass-produce battlefield-proven multi-use drones developed by the Ukrainian company Frontline Robotics. 100% of systems produced in Germany will be delivered to the Defence Forces of Ukraine in volumes defined by the Ukrainian Ministry of Defence. The production line will combine Ukrainian battlefield-proven technology with German industrial automation, creating a new model of cross-border defence co-production: the German Model. It will also open employment opportunities in Germany for Ukrainians. Quantum Systems will provide industrial infrastructure and production operations, while Frontline Robotics contributes licensed designs, training, and full lifecycle support in line with NATO standards.
“Ukrainians have revolutionized the drone war, now we will revolutionize the industrial war together. For Quantum Systems, this is the logical next step of our proven track record in support of Ukraine. Together with Frontline Robotics, we will build on our proven experience and create Europe’s first foreign production capacity at this scale for Ukraine.” said Sven Kruck, Co-CEO of Quantum Systems
“We see this as an important mission – to build the first Ukrainian-German defence joint venture with our partners Quantum Systems. We are confident that our example will pave the way for future collaborations of this kind. This cooperation will supply the Defenсe Forces of Ukraine with thousands of drones to drive back the Russian aggressor.” said Yevhen Tretiak, CEO of Frontline Robotics.
Matthias Lehna, Managing Director of the new Joint Venture, stated: “QFI has three goals: Scale, Expand, and Create. Our new Joint Venture will bring together German engineering excellence with Ukrainian sense of urgency to mass produce urgently needed drones for Ukraine, expand its portfolio, and create new products for end users to push the boundaries of what is possible.”
Matthias Lehna will serve as the Managing Director of Quantum Frontline Industries. The 37-year-old served as an infantry officer in the German Armed Forces before joining the Cyber innovation Hub in Berlin and later Quantum Systems, as Director Governmental Relations and Business Development in 2023.
12 Dec 25. Ondas to Invest up to $11m in Drone Fight Group to Access Advanced Ukrainian Drone Technology. Ondas Holdings Inc., a provider of autonomous aerial and ground robot intelligence through its Ondas Autonomous Systems (OAS) business unit and private wireless solutions through Ondas Networks, has announced its intent to invest up to $11m in Drone Fight Group (DFG), a Ukrainian developer of advanced unmanned aerial systems.
This investment—to be executed through the Company’s strategic advisory and investment platform, Ondas Capital—represents Ondas’ first planned capital deployment in support of battle-tested Ukrainian defence technologies.
DFG is a fast-scaling innovator in high-performance unmanned systems that have been forged and refined through intense combat in Ukraine. DFG’s platforms include strike-optimized FPV systems, ISR drones, autonomous mission technologies, and cutting-edge drone simulators. These reflect battlefield models of adaptability, mission effectiveness, and accelerated production cycles.
Through Ondas Capital, Ondas intends to support DFG’s global expansion, enabling broader adoption of Ukrainian unmanned capabilities across the United States and allied nations. This strategic relationship is designed and intended to support efforts to strengthen the defense industrial base across allied nations by opening new channels for combat-proven technologies that can complement emerging defense modernization initiatives and training tools.
“Ukraine has become the proving ground for modern unmanned systems, driving unprecedented innovation under real operational pressures,” said Eric Brock, Chairman and CEO of Ondas. “Our planned investment in Drone Fight Group represents a deliberate step to bring this combat-proven innovation into the United States and allied industrial base. Through Ondas Capital, we are building a bridge that accelerates access to high-impact autonomous capabilities that meet urgent mission needs.”
Ondas Capital will host DFG at a first-of-its-kind U.S. event in Silicon Valley where tech leaders, defense industry decision makers, and investors will get a behind-the-scenes look at a Ukrainian unmanned aerial system that has been tested and proven on the frontlines of the war. This will be the first time DFG’s drones are shown in the U.S., offering a unique chance to hear directly from the Ukrainian team that built and uses them in real operations, including their frontline instructor “Sasquatch.”
Ondas expects its support of DFG to help broaden the availability of agile, scalable unmanned systems tailored for defense and homeland security missions. In addition to capital, Ondas Capital will provide strategic support to help position DFG’s technologies for multi-year procurement programs in the U.S. and international markets.
This investment aligns with Ondas’ multi-domain unmanned systems strategy, expanding the Company’s technology ecosystem across aerial, ground, and counter-UAS platforms, and is subject to finalization of terms, entry into a definitive agreement and compliance requirements. By sourcing, supporting, and integrating high-value autonomous systems, the Company aims to deliver enhanced operational effectiveness and mission readiness for customers worldwide.
About Drone Fight Group
Drone Fight Group (DFG) is a Ukrainian military-technology company driving full-cycle unmanned aerial system innovation, from concept development through frontline deployment. Built around an integrated “innovation circle,” DFG combines advanced R&D, rapid-production manufacturing, AI-enhanced simulation and training, and combat-proven operational experience to deliver high-performance unmanned systems optimized for modern warfare.
DFG’s portfolio includes strike-optimized FPV platforms, ISR drones, autonomous mission technologies, and ultra-realistic FPV training simulation environments built on real battlefield data. This closed-loop development model enables DFG to iterate at high velocity—rapidly refining design, functionality, and survivability based on real-time combat feedback and evolving threat landscapes.
Today, DFG stands at the forefront of Ukrainian unmanned systems innovation, recognized for its adaptability, manufacturing speed, and mission effectiveness across sustained high-intensity operations. The company’s technologies reflect the practical realities of the modern battlefield and are increasingly relevant to defense forces seeking scalable, cost-effective, and operationally validated unmanned capabilities. (Source: UAS VISION)
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