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Military And Security Developments
Dec 12.
- Russia-Ukraine: Moscow is highly unlikely to compromise over Donbas in short-to-medium term. On 11 December, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky disclosed that the US is offering to create a ‘free economic zone’ in the Ukrainian-controlled areas of the Donbas. Under the proposal, Ukraine would withdraw from Donetsk oblast (one of the two regions which make up the Donbas). Russian forces would also not be able to enter this zone. However, Zelensky stated that it remains uncertain who would govern this territory. Reports on the matter have claimed that an international force would supervise the area, and that it would potentially include the US. Zelensky stated that Ukraine would need security guarantees to prevent Russian troops from seizing control of the zone after any potential Ukrainian withdrawal. The suggestion to create a ‘free economic zone’ is highly likely aimed at striking a compromise on territorial concessions, which remains one of the key sticking points in peace efforts. We assess that gaining full control of the Donbas (either through negotiations or military force) remains among Russia’s minimum and longest-standing war objectives. As such, Moscow is highly unlikely to agree to the proposal in the short-to-medium term.
Dec 10.
- Ukraine: Energy security risks remain elevated amid unlikely truce over Russian strikes. On 9 December, Ukrainian Prime Minister Yulia Svyrydenko announced further restrictions on Ukrainians’ electricity consumption, as well as the need for additional energy imports. This follows intensified Russian strikes against the country’s energy infrastructure. Ukraine faces one of the harshest heating seasons since the start of the conflict, with Russian forces significantly increasing the scale and frequency of strikes on energy facilities. The impact of the campaign has been evidenced by nationwide rolling blackouts. Beyond causing extensive damage, Russia’s strikes are also complicating repair efforts on critical infrastructure. Amid Ukraine’s deteriorating energy security, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky signalled his willingness to reach a truce with Russia to encourage Moscow to refrain from targeting energy infrastructure. However, we assess that Russia is unlikely to accept such an arrangement in the short term, as energy attacks form a key component of its strategy to erode Ukraine’s resilience and weaken its political will to continue the war.
Dec 09.
KEY DEVELOPMENTS
- KHARKIV: Russian forces are continuing to commit resources to facilitate advances in Kharkiv oblast, indicating Moscow’s clear desire to make further territorial gains in areas that it has not officially annexed or claimed
- POKROVSK: Although the Ukrainian forces continue to hold positions in the Pokrovsk-Myrnohrad area (Donetsk oblast), incremental Russian gains are steadily increasing the risk of a full encirclement
- US: The new National Security Strategy (NSS) further reinforces our assessment that President Donald Trump’s administration seeks a rapprochement with Russia, rather than a greater embroilment in the Russo-Ukrainian war
- FORECAST: The European Commission has unveiled its proposals for a financial aid scheme for Ukraine for the next two years, but agreement over such a package remains highly uncertain, sustaining financial uncertainty
- OFFENSIVES: The Russian authorities have claimed to have taken various towns across the frontline in recent weeks, likely in an effort to secure further concessions in the US-led peace process. However, we assess that a number of these claims are premature, with fighting ongoing in a number of these settlements. Claims of Russia’s seizure of Kupiansk (Kharkiv oblast) have been circulating online in particular, supported by likely AI-generated images on social media. However, we assess that much of the city remains in Ukrainian hands or at least heavily contested, with little evidence to support the Kremlin’s claims. Likewise, recent claims regarding the seizure of most of Siversk (Donetsk oblast) are also likely to be premature, with no confirmation at present that the Russian forces have pushed the Ukrainians out of the settlement entirely, though heavy fighting continues. Russian President Vladimir Putin made similar claims on 1 December that Russian troops had taken Pokrovsk, which we assess is not entirely accurate (see below for further analysis).
- KHARKIV: Russian forces are continuing to commit resources to facilitate their advances at various points in Kharkiv oblast, indicating Moscow’s clear desire to make further territorial gains in areas that it has not officially annexed or claimed. This stands in contrast to ongoing offensive operations in the Donbas, as well as Kherson and Zaporizhzhia oblasts, which are regularly discussed in ongoing peace talks.
- KHARKIV: Russian forces have struck the Pechenihy Reservoir Dam on the Siverskyi-Donets River. The dam is located 29 miles (46km) east of Kharkiv city; this has increased the risk of downstream flooding in areas to the south-east of the city. Ukraine’s 16th Army Corps reported on 7 December that Russian forces have been heavily striking the dam in recent days, using a combination of missiles, Shahed-type drones, guided glide bombs and other shorter-range drones. This clearly indicates that disrupting Ukrainian logistics along that stretch of the Siverskyi-Donets River is currently an operational priority for Russian forces. Numerous local authorities in Ukraine also reported on 7 December that Russian forces launched missile strikes against a bridge spanning the Siverskyi-Donets River near Staryi Saltiv, approximately 15 miles (25km) to the north of the dam.
- KHARKIV: While it remains unclear how much damage has been caused to the dam, a breach remains a realistic possibility in the coming days. However, various Ukrainian authorities have underscored in recent days that contingency plans are in place if such a breach occurs. As such, evacuation procedures and alternative ground lines of communication (GLOCs) for Ukrainian forces will likely be established in the coming days. In the meantime, such strikes are liable to form part of Russian preparations for an intensification of offensive operations across Kharkiv, including against the larger cities of Kupiansk and Vovchansk.
- POKROVSK: Although the Ukrainian forces continue to hold positions in the Pokrovsk-Myrnohrad area (Donetsk oblast), incremental Russian gains are steadily increasing the risk of a full encirclement. In recent days, Russian forces have advanced within Pokrovsk as well as to its north and north-east. These advances underscore ongoing Russian efforts to fully encircle Pokrovsk and Myrnohrad (located to the east). Earlier on 9 December, Russian Chief of the General Staff Valery Gerasimov stated that Russia’s main objective is to clear Ukrainian positions in Myrnohrad, which he claims has been encircled. We assess that Russia likely does not retain full control over Pokrovsk, where fighting likely continues in the northern outskirts, and has not completed its encirclement of the Pokrovsk-Myrnohrad area. Various Ukrainian sources maintain that Ukrainian forces in Myrnohrad continue to be resupplied by thin GLOCs, but these are increasingly vulnerable and are forces in the city are likely to be overwhelmingly reliant on drone drops, limiting the number of troops that can be supplied.
- POKROVSK: Nevertheless, Russian advances are clearly putting pressure on Ukrainian forces to withdraw. Local military sources reported to Ukrainian media that Ukrainian troops had pulled back from several unspecified positions near Pokrovsk and Myrnohrad several weeks ago. On 2 November, a senior NATO official, quoted by Ukrainian media, stated that Myrnohrad was nearly encircled, with troops in the settlement relying on drone deliveries for supplies as a result of Russia’s intensive use of drones to interdict logistics in the area.
- STRIKES: Russia’s strike on 5-6 December included 704 drones and missiles, underscoring Moscow’s ability to launch intense, large-scale barrages on a semi-regular basis. The attack heavily targeted railway and energy infrastructure and coincided with talks between US and Ukrainian officials on 6 December. Meanwhile, Ukraine has continued its own strike campaign, regularly targeting Russian oil infrastructure. In November, Ukraine targeted Russian oil refineries 14 times, setting a record, according to a recent Bloomberg report.
POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS
- US: The new National Security Strategy (NSS) further reinforces our assessment that President Donald Trump’s administration seeks a rapprochement with Russia, rather than a greater embroilment in the Russo-Ukrainian war. On 4 December, the White House released its new NSS, which largely criticises the EU and European countries’ policies. Notably, the document states that ‘the Trump administration finds itself at odds with European officials who hold unrealistic expectations for the war’ in Ukraine. It also notes that while a ‘large European majority wants peace’, this is not translated into the region’s policy; this statement likely reflects the US’ lack of confidence in Europe’s input towards ending the war. The NSS also notes that many European governments regard Russia as an existential threat, but it does not list Russia as such (in contrast to the NSS published in 2022 under former president Joe Biden, which described Russia as a threat).
- US: We continue to assess that Europe will almost certainly remain opposed to a serious re-engagement with Russia over the coming months while the war in Ukraine continues, in contrast to the Trump administration’s approach. Meanwhile, the US’ interest in a rapprochement with Russia will likely cause friction in the already strained transatlantic relations, undermining the West’s cohesion vis-à-vis Russia. The NSS outlines that managing European relations with Russia will require significant US diplomatic engagement to ‘re-establish strategic stability across the Eurasian landmass’ and to mitigate the risk of conflict between Russia and Europe. Moscow will almost certainly seek to exploit the apparent weaknesses in transatlantic relations over the coming months, in order to increase the likelihood of Washington DC offering peace terms that favour the Kremlin’s interests. Such attempts by Russia will likely include renewed statements that Europe (either certain European states or the EU) is undermining the peace process.
- PEACE: Recent comments from Trump signal that the US will likely increase pressure on Ukraine in the coming weeks to reach a ‘peace’ deal, rather than on Russia. In an interview with Politico on 8 December, Trump argued that Russia has a stronger position in peace negotiations. Trump later said that Moscow has the ‘upper hand’ in the war because of its size, adding his assessment that typically, ‘at some point, size will win’. Such comments will likely incentivise Russia to continue with its current attritional strategy to achieve its war goals in the coming weeks, rather than to negotiate. Furthermore, Trump also stated that Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky will ‘have to get on the ball and start … accepting things’. We assess that Trump’s remarks moderately increase the likelihood that the US will attempt to enforce unfavourable ‘peace’ terms on Ukraine in the coming weeks and in early 2026. However, as Trump has made such comments before, it remains likely that back-and-forth negotiations will continue.
- PEACE: Despite intensified efforts to broker an end to the Russo-Ukrainian war, several questions remain unresolved concerning territorial concessions and security guarantees for Ukraine. On 8 December, Axios reported that Russia is maintaining its position that Ukrainian forces must withdraw from the parts of the Donbas that are under Ukraine’s control (i.e. Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts). Axios cited unspecified insiders familiar with recent Ukraine-US negotiations and disclosed that US representatives are trying to develop new proposals to ‘bridge’ the issue. However, we assess that Russia is highly unlikely to soften its position on these territories in the short-to-medium term.
- PEACE: Meanwhile, on 8 December, Zelensky reiterated Ukraine’s reluctance to cede territory to Russia. Zelensky stated that Ukraine has no ‘legal’ or ‘moral’ right to make territorial concessions, which would highly likely be unpopular in Ukrainian society. Ukraine’s constitution describes its territory as ‘indivisible and inviolable’ and stipulates that territorial issues must be resolved via referendum. We continue to assess that Kyiv and Moscow’s positions on territory are highly unlikely to converge in the foreseeable future, preventing a short-term breakthrough towards peace.
FORECAST
AID: On 3 December, the European Commission (EC) unveiled proposals for a financial aid scheme for Ukraine for the next two years. The first proposed option involves issuing a reparations loan guaranteed by frozen Russian sovereign assets worth EUR 165bn. Ukraine would only be required to repay the loan if Russia ends the war and pays war reparations (which we assess remains unlikely at present). EUR 115bn from the loan would be allocated to Ukraine’s defence needs, while EUR 50bn would cover the country’s wider budgetary needs. This proposal forms part of a wider EUR 210 bn package, with the remaining EUR 45bn intended to repay a G7 loan to Ukraine issued in 2024.
Since Belgium hosts the largest share of frozen Russian assets, it continues to request guarantees from other EU partners to share a potential liability if Russia launches a legal dispute. According to internal EU documents consulted by Politico, under the above-mentioned funding proposal, EU countries would need to contribute substantial amounts to cover the EUR 210 bn aid package. These financial guarantees would be divided proportionally among member states, with Germany expected to provide up to EUR 52 bn. German Chancellor Friedrich Merz has reassured Belgium that his government would cover 25% of the backstop, representing the largest share of any single country. However, if Russia‑friendly EU countries refuse to support the initiative, the burden on the remaining EU states would increase, unless non-EU countries choose to participate in the backing (such as the UK and Norway). Ultimately, it remains uncertain whether the reassurances provided by EU members will be sufficient to secure Belgium’s support.
Meanwhile, Bloomberg reported on 5 December that the US has been lobbying several European countries to oppose the EU’s proposed reparations loans using frozen Russian assets. According to European diplomats familiar with the matter who spoke on condition of anonymity, the US argues that the frozen assets should be used to help secure a peace deal between Russia and Ukraine, rather than to prolong the conflict. Another reason likely entails Washington DC’s willingness to allocate such funds in a way that supports US-aligned reconstruction efforts in Ukraine, as outlined in the initial 28-point peace draft revealed at the end of November. US lobbying will possibly reduce the number of EU states that support the reparations loans, increasing the burden on those that agree to financial guarantees. We continue to assess that the inclusion of frozen assets in US-proposed peace plans have further reduced the likelihood of the EU agreeing to use them; in such an event, Moscow would almost certainly claim that the EU is systematically sabotaging the US-led peace process.
The alternative option devised by the EC is a EUR 90 bn (USD105bn) loan financed by EU borrowing on capital markets, which would cover roughly two-thirds of Ukraine’s financial needs in 2026-27. Such a loan would require unanimous approval from all EU member states, with countries that have historically been reluctant to provide more support to Kyiv (such as Hungary) likely to veto the measure.
The EU Council summit scheduled for 18-19 December will be crucial for Ukraine’s ability to finance its war effort, as Ukraine’s recently adopted 2026 budget includes significant financial gaps. Ukraine’s finance ministry has reported that the country will require over USD 45bn in external funding in 2026, while the EU estimates that Ukraine will need approximately EUR 135bn (USD 157bn) in foreign aid for 2026-27. Without new funding commitments, Ukraine will possibly run out of cash in the first half of 2026, according to various estimates. Even if EU member states agree on a financial aid package, it is highly likely to take several months before funds are actually allocated (and Ukraine is able to purchase weaponry). Ultimately, the latest Ukrainian budget confirms that Kyiv will remain heavily reliant on external funding for the foreseeable future; this will continue to undermine its negotiating position without strong European financial backing.
Dec 08.
- Ukraine: Immediate radiation leaks are highly unlikely at Chernobyl nuclear plant. On 5 December, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) reported that the protective shield covering the Chernobyl nuclear reactor (Kyiv oblast) has lost its primary safety functions (including its confinement capability) following a drone strike on the structure in February. The plant’s protective shield is designed to keep radioactive contaminants physically contained, so that they cannot escape into the environment. However, the IAEA noted that there is no permanent damage to the reactor’s load-bearing structures or monitoring systems and that temporary repairs have been carried out. The agency also stated that comprehensive restoration must take place in 2026. There have been no reports of radiation leaks since Russia’s drone strike in February. We assess that these initial repairs have highly likely limited the risk of any immediate radiation leakage. Therefore, the likelihood of an acute radiological incident remains very low. However, the loss of full confinement means that the shield’s complete restoration will be required to minimise long-term risks.
- Russia-Ukraine-US: US is unlikely to withdraw from peace process entirely in coming weeks. On 7 December, US President Donald Trump’s son Donald Trump Jr stated that his father may abandon attempts to end the Russo-Ukrainian war. Since resuming the presidency in January, Trump’s engagement in ending the Russo-Ukrainian war has varied in intensity. Trump has used different levers to push the two warring countries to negotiate, including military aid supplies to Ukraine and sanctions against Russia. Nevertheless, Trump Jr’s comments come amid a renewed push for peace from the Trump administration, with ongoing negotiations occurring between various stakeholders. Officials in Trump’s administration have made similar threats in recent months, including Vice President JD Vance. We assess that Trump Jr’s comments highly likely reflect Washington DC’s frustration at the lack of a breakthrough towards ending the war, rather than indicate Trump’s intentions to withdraw from the peace process in the coming days or weeks. However, a scaling back of diplomatic efforts is possible. (Source: Sibylline)
10 Dec 25. Poland could give Ukraine MiG jets in swap for drone tech. Poland is in talks to transfer MiG-29 jets to Ukraine in exchange for access to Ukrainian drone technology, Defence Minister Wladyslaw Kosiniak-Kamysz said on public radio on Wednesday. “In some time, MiG-29 aircraft will no longer serve in the Polish Air Force due to their depleted service life,” the defence minister said.
“We are negotiating with the Ukrainian side about transferring the MiG-29s, but we are also discussing transferring technologies to Poland, such as drones. This solidarity must be two-way.”
The General Staff of the Polish Army said the potential transfer was linked to the lack of prospects for further modernisation of the ageing, Soviet-designed MiG-29 fighters.
“It will be an element of the allied policy of supporting Ukraine and maintaining the security of NATO’s eastern flank,” it said in a statement published on Tuesday evening, noting that the final decision had not yet been made.
Tasks currently performed by the withdrawn MiGs would be taken over by F-16 and FA-50 aircraft. The army added that, in connection with the transfer, talks were underway with Ukraine regarding the provision of selected drone and missile technologies to Poland. (Source: Reuters)
08 Dec 25. Drone strike resulted in damage to Chernobyl radiation shield. A team from the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) investigating the effects of military activity on energy infrastructure has found that the protective shield covering the Chernobyl nuclear reactor has been “severely damaged” in a drone strike that occurred in February 2025. The drone strike also caused a major fire in the outer cladding of the massive steel structure built to prevent any radioactive release from the reactor destroyed in the 1986 accident, IAEA said. As a result of the drone event, the shield lost its primary safety functions, including the confinement capability. The IAEA team found that there was no permanent damage to its load-bearing structures or monitoring systems.
“Limited temporary repairs have been carried out on the roof, but timely and comprehensive restoration remains essential to prevent further degradation and ensure long-term nuclear safety,” IAEA Director General Rafael Mariano Grossi said.
Another IAEA team is travelling across Ukraine this month to assess the status of electrical substations critical for nuclear safety and security, following recent military attacks targeting energy infrastructure. For more information: https://www.iaea.org/ (Source: www.unmannedairspace.info)
08 Dec 25. “Ukraine’s Contra Drone develops C-UAS ground robotic system NEO.” Ukraine’s Pravda news source reports that Ukrainian company Contra-Drone has developed a wheeled ground robot equipped with an expanded electronic warfare system, capable of protecting positions and military groups from drones during missions. Pravda reports that Oboronka, a defence industry project created by Mezha.Media, has learned the ground robotic system called NEO is equipped with a 10‑channel electronic warfare system capable of countering FPV and Mavic drones. “It has two types of antennas: a dome antenna (operating in all directions) and a directional antenna (operating only in the direction pointed by the operator but with greater power). The directional antenna, located at the front of the robot, is needed to counter drones such as the Mavic and Autel. The operator can adjust its angle to target an enemy drone performing reconnaissance or carrying a payload.”
“The (g)round robotic system can carry a 300‑kg load over 30 km and reaches speeds of up to 15 km/h,” continued the report. “The robot is equipped with tubeless tyres capable of withstanding an anti‑personnel mine blast. The Contra-drone NEO can rotate 360 degrees on the spot, turning in the required direction. The robot can be controlled via Starlink, which serves as the primary communication method. If the drone moves into bushes or forested areas and loses connection, the operator switches to radio control. The radio‑control range is 5 km.” (Source: www.unmannedairspace.info)
04 Dec 25. “Ukraine’s General Cherry launches uprated version of its C-UAS AIR interceptor.” Ukraine’s Defender Media reports Ukraine’s General Cherry has released an updated version of its first interceptor drone, Air — the General Cherry Air Pro. The UAV has already been codified and approved for use by Ukraine’s Security and Defence Forces, said the media outlet.
“As of 3 December, the model is available on the Brave1 Market and DOT-Chain Defence platforms.
“The Air Pro interceptor can reach speeds of over 200 km/h. It is designed to neutralise enemy reconnaissance and strike UAVs. Among Air Pro’s potential targets are hostile drones such as Mavic/Autel, Privet-82, Molniya, ZALA, Supercam, Orlan, Lancet, Geran, and their variants.
“Key specifications include:
- Speed: 200+ km/h
- Flight time: up to 35 minutes
- Daytime target identification: up to 1,500 m
- Payload: up to 0.8 kg
- Maximum altitude: 6.8 km
For more information
(Source: www.unmannedairspace.info)
09 Dec 25. Ukraine Begins Production of Turbojet Engines for Drones. A Ukrainian-Australian company has launched the production of turbojet engines for drones, missiles, and guided bombs in Ukraine. The Australian partners developed the engines, and the Ukrainian firm invested its own funds in their production. The joint venture showcased its products at the Brave1 Components exhibition in Kyiv. The manufacturer has introduced two turbojet engines. They are already undergoing flight tests. The first, smaller one, was designed for interceptor drones. It can carry 10-15 kilograms and consumes about 350 milliliters of fuel per minute. The second, larger one, was created for installation on reusable interceptor drones, kamikazes, small cruise missiles, and for use as boosters to increase the range of guided aerial bombs. The joint venture plans to expand the line to two more engines. One will be an intermediate model between the existing models, and the other will be the largest in the line – it will allow for increased payload weight or increased flight range. The plant in Ukraine can already mass-produce both engine models. To do this, the company has purchased equipment and mastered modern production technology. The Ukrainian company produces engine housings and combustion chambers from stainless steel. When designing this chamber, it consisted of 38 different components that had to be manufactured separately. But thanks to the new technology, the company is able to immediately receive a finished product, which has significantly accelerated and reduced the cost of production. The production of all aluminum parts for engines was also localized in Ukraine. The company is currently working on localizing turbine production. Currently, this product is supplied by several foreign companies, which partially limits the production of engines. Two more imported components in the engine are the control board and a small starter motor that runs for the first 10 seconds to create air flow and start the main unit. Currently, the developers are looking for manufacturers who would undertake the production of these components in Ukraine. (Source: UAS VISION/Obronka)
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