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Military And Security Developments
Nov 28.
A recent large-scale corruption scheme within Ukraine’s energy sector will further erode the already-deteriorating levels of public trust in both the government and President Volodymyr Zelensky.
* While the European Commission (EC) is likely to remain committed to supporting Ukraine, it will likely face growing pressure from Ukraine-sceptic countries to resist sending further financial aid to Kyiv.
* In the longer term, persistently high levels of corruption will further weaken Kyiv’s already-limited prospects of securing EU membership.
Context
The Ukrainian government is facing its largest and most politically consequential corruption scandal since the start of the full-scale Russo-Ukrainian war. The National Anti-Corruption Bureau of Ukraine (NABU) revealed earlier this month that it is in the midst of a 15-month investigation into a large-scale embezzlement scheme at Energoatom, the state-owned nuclear power operator. Investigators uncovered an alleged USD 100 million scheme involving kickbacks of up to 15% on contracts – including contracts intended to strengthen the defences protecting Ukraine’s energy infrastructure against Russian strikes.
The scandal implicates numerous senior government and business figures deemed to be close to President Zelensky. One key suspect, Timur Mindich, is a former close business associate of Zelensky; Mindich has since fled the country. The case has already led to the suspension of key cabinet members, including Minister of Justice Herman Halushchenko and Minister of Energy Svitlana Hrynchuk. The head of the Presidential Office, Andriy Yermak, is the most senior official to submit their resignation in connection with the scandal (so far). More broadly, and in addition to tarnishing Ukraine’s credibility among its allies, the scandal is likely to reignite long-standing domestic grievances over endemic corruption, further undermining public confidence in the current leadership at a crucial time (namely the US-led peace negotiations).
Forecast
The corruption scandal will highly likely erode the public’s confidence in the cabinet and the presidency even further, increasing the likelihood of protests in major urban centres
Corruption has historically been a major trigger for social backlash and large-scale protests in Ukraine. This was evidenced by mass demonstrations in July (the largest since the start of the full-scale war) following the government’s perceived attempts to curtail the independence of anti-corruption bodies (see Sibylline Special Report – 31 July 2025). After those protests, President Zelensky’s approval ratings dropped by eight points (see Figure 1). We assess that another decline is highly likely in light of the latest scandal.
While Yermak’s resignation earlier on 28 November is a clear attempt to draw a line between the presidential administration and the scandal, suspicions regarding Yermak are likely to prompt speculation about Zelensky’s role in (or awareness of) the scheme. The emergence of further details that implicate senior public officials, particularly those in the government, the presidential administration (including Zelensky himself) or the parliament, would highly likely trigger renewed protests – particularly during key peace negotiations. Any such demonstrations are most likely to occur in major Ukrainian cities, including the capital Kyiv. For now, however, we assess that the overall risk of protests remains moderate.
- Russia-Ukraine: Moscow’s unwillingness to alter ceasefire demands will delay conflict resolution. On 27 November, Russian President Vladimir Putin reiterated his demand that Ukraine withdraw its forces from their current positions as a condition for a ceasefire (notably not a full peace). Putin also stated that the initial 28-point plan drafted by the US last week could serve as a basis for future negotiations to end the war (see Sibylline Special Report – 21 November 2025). These comments support our assessment that the Kremlin is, at present, unwilling to compromise on its core demands regarding the outcome of the conflict. This effectively amounts to a rejection of the amended peace text recently drafted by the US and Ukraine, which reportedly reduces the concessions required from Ukraine. At the same time, US Special Envoy Steve Witkoff is expected to meet President Putin next week to continue peace negotiations. Nevertheless, Moscow’s intransigence in altering its long-standing demands, together with Ukraine’s reluctance to agree to territorial concessions (particularly the withdrawal from Donetsk oblast), is highly likely to stall the peace talks. We continue to assess that a definitive resolution of the conflict remains unlikely in the short-to-medium term
Nov 27.
Executive summary
- In our last Strategic Risk Forecast, we put forward various scenarios concerning the trajectory of the Russo-Ukrainian war in the next 12 months. Our baseline scenario is that the war will likely continue in some form without a definitive resolution; there is also a realistic possibility of a fragile ceasefire that will fail to stop the fighting entirely.
- The leak of a US-proposed peace plan on 20 November has precipitated the most intense period of diplomacy to date, though we continue to assess that the war is unlikely to end in the short term. The initial 28-point plan has been reworked during subsequent US-Ukraine bilateral talks in Geneva (Switzerland). While Kyiv has nominally agreed to the plan’s ‘essence’, major issues have yet to be resolved – indicating that this is likely to be the beginning of the negotiating process, rather than the end. Meanwhile, Moscow is unlikely to accept any major compromises on its key war objectives. As such, back-and-forth shuttle diplomacy is likely to continue in the coming weeks, despite US President Donald Trump’s determination to end the war as soon as possible.
- Ukraine’s heating season officially began on 28 October. Russia’s strike campaign continues to exacerbate severe energy security risks in Ukraine, and will sustain significant operational disruption for businesses throughout the winter. Ukraine’s overall interception rates are decreasing month-on-month; this has resulted in greater damage to the country’s energy-production and -distribution network, increasing the risks of protracted blackouts nationwide.
Key triggers, warnings and indicators (TWIs) to watch for in December include US efforts to coerce either or both sides into reaching a peace deal, possibly via the imposition of fresh sanctions on Russia and/or intelligence and weapons suspensions for Ukraine. In addition, the ongoing Energoatom corruption scandal will continue to jeopardise domestic and governmental stability.
- US: Ukraine-affiliated organisations face increased security risks from Russian threat actors. On 25 November, the US-based cyber security company Arctic Wolf reported that a Russia-linked threat group (‘RomCom’) infiltrated the systems of an unnamed engineering company in the US in September. Reportedly, the company had provided services to a US city that maintains a municipal relationship with Ukraine, highlighting the expansion of RomCom’s operations against entities supporting the Ukrainian war effort. It is likely that the group hijacked a legitimate website to trick victims into installing a fake software update. This installation deployed a renowned malware loader (‘SocGholish’) onto compromised systems. RomCom then downloaded another malicious payload (‘Mythic Agent’) to establish persistence; this was soon detected and quarantined by security mechanisms. We assess that the company’s detection of the attack likely prevented RomCom from deploying ransomware, mitigating disruption on the compromised system. This incident underscores the sustained security risk to global organisations providing both diplomatic and military aid to Ukraine amid the ongoing war.
Nov 25.
KEY DEVELOPMENTS
- OFFENSIVES: Against the backdrop of the recent US peace plan, Russian forces are intensifying offensive operations along several parts of the front line, including some notable gains in Zaporizhzhia oblast
- STRIKES: The trajectory of the ongoing peace talks is likely to influence the intensity of Russia’s long-range strike campaign, consistent with previous periods of intense diplomatic activity
- TERRITORY: The US’ 28-point peace plan would require Ukraine to make significant territorial concessions, but also possibly enable Kyiv to bypass constitutional technicalities concerning territorial changes
- FORECAST: Reports emerged earlier on 25 November that Ukraine had ‘agreed’ to a US-brokered peace plan, though it remains unclear what precisely they have agreed to; the war will highly likely continue in the short-to-medium term
- OFFENSIVES: Against the backdrop of the recent US peace plan and a resumption of diplomatic activity, Russian forces are intensifying offensive operations along several parts of the front line. In Pokrovsk (Donetsk oblast), Russian troops continue to advance as part of wider efforts to encircle the Pokrovsk-Myrnohrad pocket. On 21 November, Ukraine’s 7th Rapid Reaction Corps reported that Russia has redeployed elements of the relatively elite 76th Airborne (VDV) Division in the Pokrovsk direction, likely as part of efforts to accelerate advances after a slowdown in recent weeks.
- OFFENSIVES: Russia has meanwhile made its most significant gains in Zaporizhzhia oblast to the south, where its forces have reportedly captured fifteen settlements since September. Most of these advances have taken place around the city of Huliapole, which lies roughly 54 miles (87km) east of Zaporizhzhia City. Russian forces have been deployed north of Huliapole, which a Ukrainian military spokesperson described as a key transport hub, with logistical routes running north towards Pokrovske (Dnipropetrovsk oblast) and east towards Pokrovsk (Donetsk oblast). As of 25 November, Russian forces have taken a village located just two miles (3km) east of the city, indicating the growing pressure on Ukraine’s defences on this part of the front. While Russian forces are not achieving major breakthroughs, the cumulative rate of advances across several sections of the front underscores the steady deterioration of Ukraine’s position.
- OFFENSIVES: At the same time, Russia is amplifying unverified claims of its territorial gains, likely as part of the ongoing information campaign aimed at portraying the Kremlin’s military victory over Ukraine as inevitable. On 20 November, the Russian Ministry of Defence (MoD) claimed that its forces had captured Kupiansk (Kharkiv oblast). Ukraine’s General Staff has rejected the claim; geolocated evidence indicates that Ukrainian forces retain control of most of the city. We assess that these claims, coinciding with initial reports of the US 28-point peace plan, are likely intended to reinforce the perception that Russia retains the upper hand and that Ukraine’s defeat is inevitable. However, it remains our assessment that Russian forces still have a significant amount of territory to consolidate in and around Kupiansk. Ukrainian forces have conducted numerous counter-attacks in recent weeks, indicating a relatively dynamic situation around Kupiansk, rather than the conclusion of a successful Russian operation.
- OFFENSIVES: With battlefield realities having a significant influence on negotiations, the continuation of US military support for Ukraine will strongly shape the Ukrainian government’s bargaining position. Following the disclosure of the US peace plan’s initial draft, Reuters reported that according to unnamed sources familiar with the matter, Washington DC is willing to apply greater pressure on Kyiv than during previous rounds of discussions in order to secure a peace framework by 27 November. This would reportedly include reducing intelligence sharing and limiting weapons supplies if Kyiv refuses to comply. The reports stating that Ukraine recently agreed to an amended peace plan likely reduce the likelihood of such measures; however, should negotiations protract, such action would remain a possibility. The temporary suspension of US intelligence sharing likely had a significant impact on the battlefield (and the collapse of the Kursk front) in March.
- STRIKES: The trajectory of the ongoing peace talks is likely to influence the intensity of Russia’s long-range strike campaign, consistent with previous periods of intense diplomatic activity. Overnight on 24 to 25 November, Russia launched a large strike involving 464 drones and 22 missiles, heavily targeting Kyiv and disrupting electricity and heating infrastructure. The timing of the attack coincided with discussions between US and Ukrainian officials on revisions to the US peace plan, indicating that Moscow is likely to continue using long-range strikes to sustain pressure on Kyiv during the negotiations. If the talks were to move in a direction favourable to Russia’s demands, the Kremlin could realistically scale back the tempo of its strikes. In August, for example, around the time of the Alaska summit, Russia temporarily reduced the intensity of its attacks in an apparent attempt to appease President Trump, who had been critical of large-scale Russian barrages in the preceding months. However, amid the likely back-and-forth of negotiations in the coming days and weeks, periodic high-intensity Russian strikes are likely to continue to inflict major stress on Ukraine’s energy system.
POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS
- TERRITORY: The US’ 28-point peace plan, first reported on 20 November, would require Ukraine to make significant territorial concessions beyond land Russia currently occupies, but also possibly enable Kyiv to bypass constitutional technicalities concerning territorial changes. The framework notes that Russian-annexed Crimea, as well as Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts, would be ‘de facto recognised’ as Russian, including by the US, but not de jure (see Sibylline Special Report – 21 November 2025). Ukraine’s constitution stipulates that altering Ukraine’s territorial composition is possible only via a nationwide referendum. Such wording could realistically offer Ukraine constitutional room for manoeuvre on politically painful issues surrounding territory, though even de facto recognition would be unpopular within Ukrainian society. It appears from the latest talks in Geneva (Switzerland) that a decision on territorial concessions has been delayed for now, but this will remain among the key sticking points for both sides. For further analysis on peace proposals, see FORECAST below.
- ELECTIONS: The original US plan envisions Ukraine holding elections within 100 days, while Europe’s proposal states that Ukraine will hold elections ‘as soon as possible’ after signing the peace agreement. Ukraine is prohibited from holding elections under martial law, which has been in place since the beginning of Russia’s full-scale invasion. Martial law conditions will almost certainly remain in force for the foreseeable future as the war continues; this will limit the possibility of holding elections in the coming months, unless a firm peace agreement is signed and implemented successfully. Russia will almost certainly seek to influence any such elections in Ukraine following a cessation of hostilities or as part of a peace agreement to increase the likelihood of a result that suits Moscow’s interests. At the same time, organisational challenges stemming from the fact that thousands of Ukrainian refugees are abroad and many Ukrainians are under Russian occupation will also present obstacles for ensuring any vote is free, fair or safe.
FORECAST
PEACE: Reports emerged earlier on 25 November that Ukraine had ‘agreed’ to a US-brokered peace plan, though it remains unclear what precisely they have agreed to; the war will highly likely continue in the short-to-medium term. According to an unspecified Ukrainian official, Kyiv supports the ‘essence’ of the peace deal following talks between Ukrainian and US representatives in Geneva (Switzerland) on 23 November and subsequent negotiations. (See Sibylline Special Report – 21 November 2025 for further context.)
We assess that Kyiv’s move reflects its determination to illustrate clearly and quickly (ahead of the proposed 27 November ‘deadline’) that it is willing to end the war, rather than indicating that a final agreement has been reached. It is likely an attempt to outflank Russia and place the onus on Moscow to make the necessary concessions to move the negotiating process forward. Reports claim that the original 28-point plan, which was broadly more favourable to Russia’s terms, was shortened to 19 points and substantially amended following the Geneva talks. According to Ukraine’s first deputy foreign minister, Serhiy Kyslytsia, numerous key issues including Ukraine’s NATO membership and territorial concessions have been ‘placed in brackets’ for President Trump and Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky to decide upon later – a key indication that this is far from a final document.
Ukraine’s attempts to illustrate its willingness to agree to US proposals will reduce the likelihood of punitive US pressure ahead of a previously proposed 27 November deadline for Ukraine to sign the plan. Although President Trump disclosed on 22 November that the plan was not a ‘final offer’, earlier reports claimed that the US had threatened to suspend intelligence sharing and weapons supplies to coerce Ukraine into agreeing. As such, the ‘agreement’ will reduce the likelihood of the US taking such action in the coming days.
Despite Ukraine’s tentative ‘agreement’, Moscow is highly likely to oppose any alterations which offer more favourable terms to Kyiv, underscoring our assessment that this is the beginning, rather than the end, of the negotiating process. On 23 November, President Vladimir Putin said that the original 28-point peace plan could form the basis of a final settlement, with numerous other Russian officials clearly stating that there are elements with which Russia disagrees and would seek to amend, even before the Geneva talks. Russian officials have since criticised a subsequent European counter-proposal which opposes many of Russia’s war objectives. Kremlin foreign policy aide Yuri Ushakov referred to Europe’s plan as being ‘completely unconstructive’ and stated that it would not work for Moscow.
Russian officials have not changed their uncompromising messaging over the past week, and while this could be a negotiating tactic, we continue to assess that a shift in Kremlin strategic messaging to its population is a key indicator that a peace deal is being seriously considered. In recent days, the Russian establishment has been very clear in maintaining its uncompromising approach, indicating that the revisions made following the Geneva summit are likely to prove non-starters for Russia (at least in the short term). The Kremlin and the wider Russian government continue to maintain that Russia’s objectives will be met, including via military force if necessary. At present, the Kremlin is not preparing its population to accept anything other than its maximalist objectives. While this is possibly a negotiating tactic that does not preclude back-channel talks, this raises the risk of an ultranationalist backlash in Russia in the event that a compromise deal is reached suddenly and without a strategic communications campaign to prepare the population. We will continue to monitor domestic Russian communications, but at present we have seen no shift indicating a readiness to accept concessions.
We assess that back-and-forth negotiations will highly likely continue in the coming days and weeks, as both sides argue over two seemingly distinct proposals that have emerged – the original 28-point plan and the revised 19-point Geneva plan. Ukraine is working to organise President Zelensky’s visit to the US ‘at the earliest possible date’ in November to finalise a peace plan with Trump, according to Secretary of the National Security and Defence Council Rustem Umerov. Meanwhile, pressure will likely shift onto Moscow following the proposed 27 November ‘deadline’ if it refuses to accept the new proposals – which, we assess, remains highly likely. The Kremlin is likely to continue insisting that the terms ‘agreed’ at the Trump-Putin Alaska summit in August should form the basis for a peace agreement. Given that those ‘terms’ were not disclosed, it remains unclear what the US response would be to Russia’s unwillingness to compromise in the short term. In the meantime, however, the war will highly likely continue to grind on, with Russia seeking to improve its negotiating position still further.
- Russia-Ukraine: A final peace deal is unlikely in near term despite US diplomatic efforts. On 26 November, Russian presidential aide Yuri Ushakov announced that US President Donald Trump’s special envoy Steve Witkoff and other US officials will travel to the Russian capital Moscow next week for peace talks. Trump stated that he has directed Witkoff to meet with Russian President Vladimir Putin, while US Secretary of the Army Dan Driscoll is expected to hold consultations with the Ukrainian side. The flurry of diplomatic activity comes amid a renewed US push to end the Russo-Ukrainian war; the details of a US-proposed peace plan were first reported last week. The plan’s framework – which largely favours Russia’s terms for ending the war – has been substantially revised following negotiations between Ukraine and the US. Although Trump has claimed that there are only a ‘few remaining points of disagreement’, we assess that these are highly likely issues of major contention between the warring parties (i.e. territorial disputes). Consequently, the lack of agreement on such matters will reduce the likelihood of a finalised peace agreement in the near term.
- Ukraine: Clamp-down on anti-corruption bodies will remain catalyst for severe backlash, unrest. On 24 November, Ukrainian law enforcement agencies rejected reports that they were preparing charges against Oleksandr Klymenko, the head of the Specialised Anti-Corruption Prosecutor’s Office (SAPO). Earlier the same day, Ukrainska Pravda, citing law enforcement sources, had reported that Andriy Yermak, the head of the President’s Office, had instructed security forces to draw up charges against Klymenko and officials within the National Anti-Corruption Bureau (NABU). The move was allegedly intended as retaliation for the two bodies’ ongoing investigation into a large-scale corruption scheme in the energy sector, which has implicated key government figures. Although the allegations were denied, they are likely to fuel already-heightened concerns about efforts by the authorities to undermine the country’s anti-corruption drive. In August, a government-backed bill aimed at curtailing the independence of NABU and SAPO sparked the largest anti-government protests since the start of Russia’s full-scale invasion (see Sibylline Special Report – 31 July 2025). We assess that the perception that the authorities are seeking to suppress anti-corruption efforts will trigger significant backlash, increasing the risk of renewed protests.
Nov 24.
Russia-Eurasia Region: How will Moscow seek to bolster its influence?
Please note there will be no regular WRR reporting from 24 December 2025 until 1 January 2026 (inclusive). This is to account for the upcoming holiday period. Our regular reporting will recommence on 2 January 2026. Any major developments during the reporting pause will be covered in an Alert by our out-of-hours team.
Executive summary
- Where Russia’s influence is diminishing, we assess that its grey-zone and influence operations are increasingly likely to impact business activity in 2026 – including in Armenia and Moldova.
- Growing geopolitical competition in Central Asia and the South Caucasus is undermining Russia’s influence but will not lead to a sharp uptick in Russian destabilisation campaigns.
- Russia will retain strong influence over Belarus and likely nurture its ties with the increasingly authoritarian Georgian government.
- We assess that the Baltic states remain much more resilient and able to counter Russia’s destabilisation attempts and influence operations than various other post-Soviet countries.
Context
Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 has significantly impacted Moscow’s ability to project and protect its waning influence across the Former Soviet Union (FSU). The full-scale war has upended long-held assumptions about Russia’s post-Cold War role in the region and marked an opportunity (and for some a perceived necessity) to reset their foreign policies vis-à-vis Moscow. While Belarus and Georgia have identified an opportunity to align more closely with Russia so as to consolidate their authoritarian governments, other states across Central Asia have sought to maintain pragmatic relations, despite growing scepticism about the Kremlin’s ability to provide the region with security and economic benefits.
However, regional actors other than the heavily oppositional Baltic states and Ukraine are pursuing greater alignment with the West. This will be of significant concern for Moscow. Such states include those over which Russia had hitherto maintained extensive influence, such as Armenia and Moldova. This trend marks a clear threat to Russia’s perceived role as a ‘Great Power’, as well as its sphere of influence across Eurasia (which we assess Moscow is determined to defend). In this report, we examine what Russia is likely to do in its bid to maintain its influence in 2026; we also explore the various flashpoints and internal dynamics that Moscow will possibly leverage to support this goal.
Russia-Ukraine: Competing peace plans will delay conflict resolution. On 23 November, US Secretary of State Marco Rubio and the head of the Ukrainian Presidential Administration Andriy Yermak met in Geneva (Switzerland) to discuss amendments to the 28-point US peace plan revealed last week. Both sides praised the progress made during the consultations but did not disclose any changes to the draft plan. Although the initial plan included compromises for both parties, it broadly favoured Russia in territorial terms, while imposing significant security and military constraints on Ukraine. The Rubio-Yermak meeting is likely to be followed by a series of negotiations and revisions aimed at producing a workable agreement (see Sibylline Special Report – 21 November 2025). Meanwhile, the EU has released its own 28-point peace plan which, unlike Washington DC’s version, rejects major territorial concessions to Moscow, starts negotiations from the current line of contact and does not block Kyiv from joining NATO. Ultimately, while these developments have relaunched the peace process, we assess that Russia and Ukraine are likely unwilling to compromise on key issues, which will delay the conclusion of any agreement. Meanwhile, disagreements between the US and EU over peace terms will also complicate the conflict’s resolution. (Source: Sibylline)
26 Nov 25. $100 AI Upgrade Gives Ukrainian FPV Drones Last-Meter Accuracy in Heavy Jamming. Ukrainian first-person view (FPV) drones are reportedly hitting targets more accurately with a new AI-guided system that developers said can keep working even under heavy electronic warfare (EW). The device, called TFL-1, provides autonomous terminal guidance for the final 400 to 500 meters (1,312 to 1,640 feet) of a drone’s flight. It is built to endure heavy jamming by ignoring the radio horizon, helping pilots maintain control in cruise mode while pushing through “curtain” EW interference. TFL‑1 runs in three modes: Green for manual tracking, Red for AI targeting, and Blue for a neural-network enhanced mode tuned for armored targets. It also boosts pilot efficiency, adds cryptographic protection, and includes a target-refinement function to sharpen final-stage accuracy. New operators can reportedly learn it in about 10 seconds, and it works alongside Ukrainian mission-support tools like MilBeta and CrashDetect. Developed by Ukrainian firm The Fourth Law, TFL-1 has been certified for military use by the country’s defense ministry and is now in service with roughly 20 brigades. Early tests showed a 100-percent hit rate across 10 trial launches, prompting army units to request 30 more modules right away. The 412th Autonomous Brigade Nemesis later purchased 100 units and reported about a 50-percent success rate in the first 20 combat uses. Each TFL-1 costs under $100, keeping the upgrade well below 10 percent of a typical FPV drone and enabling large-scale adoption across frontline units. (Source: UAS VISION/NextGenDefense)
21 Nov 25. Cuashub.com said today that Ukraine quietly fields Merops Interceptor, shoots down more than 1,000 Shaheds. Ukraine has been secretly operating the Merops counter-drone system, an interceptor-based counter-drone complex that has reportedly downed more than 1,000 Shahed attack drones used by Russian forces. The system’s combat use had not been publicly acknowledged until Business Insider disclosed its deployment, citing positive evaluations from Ukrainian operators. Following Ukraine’s field experience, several NATO countries, including Poland, the United States and Romania, have begun training on Merops at a testing facility in Nowa Dęba, Poland. Photos from the drills show soldiers carrying the interceptor drones and conducting live test launches. Merops was developed under Project Eagle, a U.S.-backed initiative supported by Swift Beat, a company linked to former Google CEO Eric Schmidt. The system centers on Surveyor drones that perform mid-air interceptions, destroying enemy drones during flight.
How the Merops system works
A standard Merops unit consists of a command station, launch platforms and a fleet of Surveyor interceptor drones. The drones can operate autonomously or under remote control and use onboard sensors to track incoming targets. While detailed specifications remain classified, it is reported that Surveyor drones reach speeds above 280 km/h, fast enough to engage jet-powered systems such as Russia’s Geran-3, capable of speeds beyond 300 km/h. The interceptors are also marketed as resistant to Russian electronic warfare, though this has not been independently confirmed. Each drone costs roughly $15,000, less than a Shahed but more expensive than many Ukrainian-made interceptors. Training for Merops operators reportedly lasts about two weeks, and a full crew consists of four personnel inclusing a commander, a pilot and two technicians. The launch platforms can be mounted on standard pickup trucks, supporting rapid repositioning for both frontline and rear-area defense. Ukraine’s use of Merops adds another system to a fast-expanding ecosystem of indigenous and foreign interceptor drones. Earlier this month, Ukraine’s General Chereshnya AIR system was credited by its developer with intercepting 548 Russian UAVs in October. https://cuashub.com/en/content/ukraine-quietly-fields-merops-interceptor-shoots-down-more-than-1000-shaheds/ (Source: https://cuashub.com/
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