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Military And Security Developments
Dec 05.
- Ireland: Alleged drone activity during Ukrainian presidential visit points to security vulnerabilities. On 4 December, the Irish outlet The Journal reported that at least four unidentified ‘military style’ drones breached a no-fly zone near the capital’s Dublin Airport (DUB) during Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky’s arrival on 1 December. At approximately 2300hrs (local time), an Irish Naval Service vessel reportedly spotted the drones operating near the flight path of Zelensky’s aircraft. According to Irish media, the drones missed the aircraft’s approach and then circled the vessel, which had been secretly deployed in the Irish Sea for the duration of Zelensky’s state visit. Zelensky’s plane landed without incident. Given both the suspected target and the reported drone specifications, it is realistic that Russian or Russian-backed actors flew the drones. The incident is likely to revive concerns over Ireland’s security vulnerabilities arising from its neutrality and underinvestment in defence. These concerns are likely to mount in the coming months, as Ireland is due to host a summit of the European Political Community (EPC) in the autumn of 2026 and assume the rotating EU presidency in July 2026. We assess that increased UK naval deployments near Irish waters are likely during key meetings associated with Ireland’s above-mentioned diplomatic responsibilities.
Dec 04.
- Ukraine: EU financial aid will remain critical to cover 2026 budget gap. On 3 December, Ukraine’s parliament (also known as Rada) approved the country’s 2026 budget, which President Volodymyr Zelensky is almost certain to sign. The new budget allocates 27.2% of GDP to defence spending. The bill was reportedly revised three times to increase defence funding, ultimately raising it by 17% compared to the initial draft. The budget projects UAH 4.8 trillion (USD 115 bn) in expenditures and UAH 2.9trn (USD 70bn) in revenues, resulting in an annual deficit equivalent to 18.5% of GDP. Minister of Finance Serhiy Marchenko stressed that Ukraine requires USD 45bn in external financing. The budget’s parliamentary approval will help Kyiv secure a USD 8.1 bn loan from the IMF. However, given that this support will remain insufficient to cover the substantial budget shortfall, we assess that continued external assistance from the EU will be critical to stabilise Ukraine’s 2026 financial outlook.
Dec 03.
- Russia-Ukraine-US: Kremlin intransigence will remain key obstacle to conflict resolution. Overnight on 2-3 December, Russian President Vladimir Putin met US Special Envoy Steve Witkoff and US President Donald Trump’s son-in-law Jared Kushner to discuss proposals aimed at ending the war in Ukraine. According to Kremlin foreign policy adviser Yuri Ushakov, the talks failed to produce a compromise; Putin reportedly reacted negatively to several US suggestions. We assess that the US’ proposals likely required the Kremlin to reduce its long-standing territorial demands in Ukraine. The meeting forms part of a two-week period of intensified diplomatic activity surrounding Trump’s peace initiative. While the initial draft strongly aligned with Moscow’s interests, Washington DC subsequently produced an amended version in consultation with negotiators from Kyiv, toning down provisions that had favoured Putin. Overall, the Kremlin’s response to the latest talks underscores its continued unwillingness to make substantive concessions. In the absence of a settlement that accommodates its core demands, Russia is highly likely to remain committed to the war in Ukraine, as it believes that it can achieve its objectives by military means.
Dec 02.
KEY DEVELOPMENTS
- OFFENSIVES: In November, Russian territorial gains accelerated, underscoring the steady deterioration of Ukraine’s operational situation
- POKROVSK: Russia has claimed the capture of Pokrovsk (Donetsk oblast), though Ukraine has dismissed such claims, with the northern parts of city likely remaining a contested area
- CORRUPTION: The resignation of the head of the Ukrainian presidential administration, Andriy Yermak, is the most high-profile official departure to date amid a large-scale corruption scandal
- FORECAST: Despite continued diplomatic efforts from the US to end the Russo-Ukrainian war, a major breakthrough remains elusive in the short term, with Russia continuing to show its inflexibility on working towards peace
- OFFENSIVES: According to Agence France-Presse (AFP)’s analysis of data from the US-based Institute for the Study of War (ISW), Russian forces captured approximately 270 square miles (701 sq km) in November. This marks the second-largest monthly advance in the Russo-Ukrainian war outside of its initial stages, which were characterised by a very dynamic frontline. AFP’s estimate includes areas under partial or contested Russian control, as well as confirmed Russian gains. In contrast, the Ukrainian OSINT group DeepState reported 195 square miles (505 sq km) of confirmed Russian gains. Nonetheless, these assessments highlight a significant acceleration in the Kremlin’s territorial advances, with DeepState noting that Russia captured about 90% more territory in November than in October.
- OFFENSIVES: According to DeepState, roughly 40% of Russian advances occurred near Huliaipole in Zaporizhzhia oblast. By contrast, in the Pokrovsk direction (Donetsk oblast), Russia’s territorial gains accounted for only 11% of November’s overall advances. This likely points to the relative success of Ukraine’s active defensive operations in the Pokrovsk-Myrnohrad area, where Russia is committing significant resources and personnel in attempts to encircle both Pokrovsk and Myrnohrad.
- OFFENSIVES: The need to defend multiple sectors of the frontline, including Pokrovsk-Myrnohrad and Dobropillia further to the north in Donetsk oblast, has likely diverted Ukrainian attention and resources away from Huliaipole, contributing to Russian advances there. The Ukrainian authorities have acknowledged operational challenges in the Huliapole sector, including uncoordinated withdrawals that have enabled Russian penetration of certain flanks. While these advances have not led to a breakthrough, they underscore the gradual erosion of Ukraine’s operational position, leading to growing difficulties in defending several fronts simultaneously.
- POKROVSK: On 1 December, Russian President Vladimir Putin claimed the capture of Pokrovsk (Donetsk oblast) ahead of peace talks with US special envoy Steve Witkoff. The Ukrainian General Staff reported earlier on 2 December that fighting is still ongoing in parts of the city, dismissing the Russian claim. While Russia’s control over the western and southern parts of Pokrovsk has been confirmed, the northern areas of the city likely remain a contested zone. According to Ukrainian military officials, Ukrainian troops are still operating in the northern part of the city along the railway line and are eliminating Russian positions. The Ukrainian 7th Rapid Reaction Corps of the Air Assault Forces reported on 1 December that Russian forces are threatening logistics but that Ukrainian forces are organising other routes to Pokrovsk and Myrnohrad to resupply defensive forces.
- POKROVSK: Although the situation in Pokrovsk remains unclear, the Kremlin’s claims of its capture are highly likely part of an information campaign to influence the US amid bilateral peace talks. For further analysis of the likely outcome of the bilateral meeting on 2 December, see FORECAST. Additionally, the increasingly critical situation in Pokrovsk will add to pressure on Ukrainian decision-makers to order a withdrawal from the area to conserve capability
- STRIKES: Over the past week, Russia has continued to conduct large-scale airstrikes, as evidenced by the attack overnight on 28-29 November. The strike involved 596 drones and 36 missiles, resulting in direct hits to 22 locations, while falling debris was recorded in 17 locations. The attack heavily targeted energy infrastructure in Chernihiv, Kharkiv, Kyiv, Poltava and Sumy oblasts. The Ukrainian authorities reported that around 500,000 residents in the capital Kyiv and 100,000 in Kyiv oblast experienced power outages. Meanwhile, Ukrainian officials have reported that Russian forces are using operator-controlled Shahed drones piloted in real time near the front lines, which even allow them to engage Ukrainian aircraft.
- STRIKES: Over the past week, Ukrainian naval drones struck two of Russia’s shadow fleet oil tankers in the Black Sea. On 28-29 November, naval drones hit two oil tankers (the Kairos and the Virat) while they were reportedly heading to Russia’s port of Novorossiysk (Krasnodar krai) to load oil. These strikes form part of Kyiv’s ongoing campaign against Russian oil infrastructure and are likely aimed at disrupting Moscow’s ability to export oil and thereby undermining its war-funding revenues. Such attacks are likely to increase the risk of Russian retaliation against vessels sailing to Ukrainian ports, which would ultimately drive higher war-risk insurance premiums.
POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS
- CORRUPTION: The resignation of the head of the Ukrainian presidential administration Andriy Yermak on 28 November marks the country’s most high-profile departure to date in connection with a large-scale corruption scandal. It is currently uncertain who will replace Yermak. However, unnamed Ukrainian government sources have mentioned several possible contenders. These include Minister of Digital Transformation Mykhailo Fedorov, Defence Minister Denys Shmyhal, the head of Ukraine’s Main Directorate of Intelligence (GUR) Kyrylo Budanov, the deputy head of the presidential administration Pavlo Palisa and First Deputy Foreign Minister Serhiy Kyslytsia. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky has claimed that there will be a reset of the presidential administration; Yermak’s replacement is unlikely to wield similar levels of power (at least in the short term). For further analysis on the unfolding corruption scandal, see Sibylline Situation Update Brief – 28 November 2025.
- POLITICS: A recent op-ed by former Ukrainian commander-in-chief Valeriy Zaluzhnyi possibly underscores how potential political rivals are seeking to capitalise on the recent corruption scandal to contest Zelensky’s leadership. In the article, published on 29 November, Zaluzhnyi stated that peace provides opportunities for ‘political change’ and ‘deep reforms’, as well as for recovery and economic growth. Zaluzhnyi also mentioned the possibility of ‘strengthening the foundations of justice through the fight against corruption’, thereby acknowledging the current political climate in Ukraine. Elsewhere, Zaluzhnyi has criticised Kyiv’s insufficient allocation of money to the military in 2021, arguing that this resulted in the Ukrainian forces being under-equipped with weapons and manpower when Russia launched its full-scale invasion in 2022.
- POLITICS: Although Zaluzhnyi’s op-ed largely focuses on the need for Ukraine to obtain post-war security guarantees, it comes amid the unfolding corruption scandal, which is one of the most politically turbulent events of Zelensky’s presidency. Zaluzhnyi, who now serves as Ukraine’s ambassador to the UK, previously denied running a political campaign in October, though he is regarded as a leading presidential candidate in a possible future election. Nevertheless, the article could realistically indicate Zaluzhnyi’s longer-term political ambitions.
FORECAST
NEGOTIATIONS: US-led diplomatic efforts aimed at ending the Russo-Ukrainian war have continued at pace over the past few days, though a major peace breakthrough remains elusive in the near term. On 30 November, a Ukrainian delegation held talks with US officials on a peace plan backed by US President Donald Trump. Although both countries provided a positive assessment of the negotiations, neither side has disclosed specific details on the discussions’ outcome. According to an unspecified insider with knowledge of the recent bilateral talks in Florida (US), Ukraine and the US discussed ‘the most problematic aspects of the peace proposals in detail’, likely referring to territorial concessions and ensuring Ukraine’s post-war security.
On 26 November, Politico reported that Secretary of State Marco Rubio had told European partners that the US wants to reach a peace deal before it agrees to any security guarantees for Ukraine. Politico cited an unnamed European diplomat and another person familiar with the negotiations; it also reported that Rubio had identified several other issues that would be addressed after a deal, which the European side interpreted as Ukrainian territorial integrity and frozen Russian assets. While it remains unknown whether the US’ position has shifted since, given the above-mentioned US-Ukraine talks on 30 November, we assess that Ukraine almost certainly continues to seek clearly defined and robust security guarantees before signing a potential peace deal.
For Ukraine, post-war security arrangements must provide an effective deterrent against future renewed Russian aggression, particularly if Ukraine is to be barred from joining NATO under any peace agreement. Security guarantees, NATO membership and territorial integrity will highly likely remain the most politically fraught issues for Ukraine. Kyiv’s position on these matters is likely to remain at odds with Moscow’s for the foreseeable future. We assess that the absence of a consensus on these issues will reduce the likelihood of a peace deal in the short-to-medium term, with negotiations likely to continue over the coming weeks and months.
The US’ special envoy Steve Witkoff is meeting with Russian President Vladimir Putin later on 2 December, though Putin’s recent remarks reflect Moscow’s maximalist war objectives and lack of willingness to compromise. On 27 November, Putin reiterated his previous demand that as a precondition for a ceasefire, Ukrainian forces must withdraw from their current positions in territories that Russia has claimed as its own but does not fully occupy. Putin stated that if Ukraine does not withdraw, Russia will press its offensive. Such statements underscore that Russia is prepared to double down on its attritional strategy (despite significant losses) to gain more territory in eastern Ukraine.
At the same time, Putin claimed that it would be ‘pointless’ to sign any peace documents with the Ukrainian leadership, whose legitimacy the Kremlin has questioned repeatedly throughout the war. Putin claimed that while Russia wants to reach an agreement with Ukraine, it is currently ‘legally impossible’; he called for other willing and able powers to negotiate on the Ukrainian government’s behalf. Putin implied that Moscow needs any decisions on ending the war to be recognised by ‘major international players’. We assess that this highly likely represents an attempt to undermine input from Ukraine and its European allies, while advocating for Russia and other ‘great powers’ (likely meaning the US) to decide how the war ends.
Ultimately, Putin’s recent comments indicate that Russia is not prepared to relax its terms on which to end the war, with Russia-US talks unlikely to yield a breakthrough. We assess that Russia will highly likely reiterate its long-standing terms and possibly attempt to repackage its demands to give the impression that the Kremlin is offering concessions to the US without doing so in reality. Similarly, Russia will likely exaggerate its recent territorial gains (see OFFENSIVES above) to portray its victory as inevitable during the meeting with Witkoff, in a bid to influence US decision-making on peace.
- Ukraine: Delays over EU loan will heighten socio‑economic uncertainty amid budget vote deadlock. On 1 December, a Ukrainian news outlet reported that the parliament (the Rada), dominated by the ruling Servant of the People party, will not adopt the 2026 budget on 2 December due to competing agendas within the party. Some lawmakers reportedly support the draft, others want amendments, while another faction is calling for an overhaul of the government and law enforcement institutions – possibly in relation to the ongoing large-scale corruption scandal. A timely adoption of the budget remains crucial for Ukraine to secure a loan from the International Monetary Fund (IMF). At the same time, disagreements among EU member states continue to complicate the bloc’s plan to grant a large support loan to Kyiv. Belgium remains opposed to using frozen Russian assets for a loan to Ukraine, due to concerns over Russian retaliation. If this persists it will significantly undermine efforts to finalise an EU-backed support package for Ukraine, adding uncertainty to Kyiv’s 2026 financial outlook and its efforts to finance its war effort.
Dec 01.
Key points
- Weapons caches and disrupted terrorism plots indicate that Hamas is increasingly willing to carry out attacks across Europe; the disruption of these plans reflects the region’s effective counter-terrorism operations.
- Israeli and/or Jewish institutions and individuals will likely remain Hamas’ primary targets.
- Hamas operations in Europe increase the risk of an organised crime-Islamist extremism nexus, elevating the threats posed by criminals and terrorists.
- The channelling of funds via charities increases the risk of terrorist financing exposure for the charity, NGO and financial sectors.
- The higher complexity of Hamas’ plots involving the procurement of firearms will likely facilitate their disruption by European intelligence and security outfits.
Context
On 6 November, Austria’s domestic intelligence agency (DSN) announced that it had seized a Hamas weapons cache in the capital Vienna in September; the DSN suspects it was intended for potential terrorist attacks in Europe. Germany’s Federal Prosecutor’s Office (‘Bundesanwaltschaft’) stated that the weapons were transported from Germany to Austria during the summer of 2025. The weapons cache was discovered amid a spate of arrests of alleged Hamas members in Germany and the UK in October and November, who are accused of plotting attacks in Germany. Although these developments indicate Europe’s effective counter-terrorism operations, they also indicate Hamas’ increasing willingness to carry out attacks in the region, for which there is no known precedent.
The weapons cache in Austria is one of several hidden reserves allegedly established by Hamas in Europe; the three other known caches were established prior to the outbreak of the Israel-Hamas conflict in October 2023 for contingency purposes. Germany’s Bundesanwaltschaft and Israel’s national intelligence agency (‘Mossad’) have both stated that these caches were established for the purpose of carrying out attacks against Jewish and/or Israeli individuals in Europe. This aligns with a series of arrests for terror attack plots over the past two years. Reportedly, these plots have been directed by the Hamas leadership, which likely seeks new ways to carry out attacks on Israeli and/or Jewish targets given the setbacks it has faced in Gaza (Palestinian Territories). We assess that this trend could be exacerbated if the US-led peace plan involving the deployment of an international stabilisation force (ISF) is successful.
- Ukraine: Resignation of presidential office head will erode trust in Ukrainian leadership. On 28 November, Andriy Yermak, President Volodymyr Zelensky’s chief of staff, resigned after anti-corruption investigators conducted searches at his residence earlier that day. Although the watchdogs have not brought any charges against Yermak, the searches took place amid an ongoing investigation into a large-scale corruption scheme in the energy sector involving senior government officials and a former business associate of Zelensky. The scandal has already led to the resignation of two senior cabinet ministers. Yermak has played a crucial role in Zelensky’s presidency, particularly in leading Ukraine’s diplomatic negotiations with Western partners since the start of the Russo-Ukrainian war. His resignation is likely an attempt to shield Zelensky from the scandal. However, it is likely to raise concerns about the president’s role or awareness of the corruption scheme. Furthermore, it will likely weaken Ukraine’s diplomatic negotiating team amid the ongoing US-led peace talks. (Source: Sibylline)
01 Dec 25. Ukraine’s Upsized FPV Drone Built for Heavier, Harder-Hitting Warheads. Ukraine’s drone makers are boosting frontline firepower with a new first-person view (FPV) drone designed for heavier payloads. Developed by Ptashka Drones, the 18-inch (46-centimeter) platform is reportedly the first of its size to enter full mass production in Ukraine. Test footage shows the drone carrying various munitions, proving it can handle real combat weight with ease. The upsized airframe lets operators pack larger warheads, giving units the ability to strike fortified positions and high-value targets that smaller FPV drones often struggle to reach. At present, most Ukrainian units still rely on 15-inch (38-centimetre) FPV drones, typically fitted with standard charges, grenade launchers, or improvised small-arms payloads. The bigger frame also supports a larger battery and fibre-optic coil, boosting flight time, stability, and operational range. Within its 5-kilometre (3-mile) operational window, pilots can circle targets, probe defences, and remain airborne longer before committing to a strike. Ptashka Drones positions the heavy-lift FPV as a force multiplier, complementing Ukraine’s existing fleet rather than replacing smaller drones. (Source: UAS VISION/NextGenDefense)
01 Dec 25. European defence startups have long faced challenges in accessing realistic operational environments where new technologies can be tested and validated with end users. 17Tech.fi is now opening a structured, and legally compliant pathway to Ukraine’s battlefield testing ecosystem, enabling innovators to gather direct insights from active front-line units and iterate mission-critical solutions faster than traditional procurement processes allow. Through structured collaboration with Ukrainian defence innovation bodies, including Defence Builder, 17Tech.fi provides a framework for controlled field testing, pilot deployments, and systematic front-line feedback. The approach significantly shortens development time, improves product relevance, and supports the alignment of European capabilities with urgent Ukrainian operational needs. 17Tech’s team brings extensive experience from defence industry knowledge and startup innovations and accelerations globally. The team has designed and operated accelerators in Europe and Asia, financed hundreds of early-stage companies, and supported defence forces in multiple countries in building new innovation models and technology evaluation frameworks.
Sami Luukkonen, Founding Partner at 17Tech and former Global Head of Defence, Aerospace & High Tech at the world’s largest consulting firm, emphasises the importance of structured access: “For years, European innovators have lacked a safe, legal, and operationally relevant environment to validate defence technologies. Ukraine offers a uniquely demanding testbed, and our role is to create a professional, transparent, and responsible pathway for companies to work with official defence counterparts. This is not about speed alone – it is about ensuring that the right technologies reach the right users with real data behind them.”
Perspective of an experienced accelerator manager
Antti Kosunen, an experienced accelerator manager and co-founder of 17Tech, emphasises the importance of operating at the intersection of defence innovation, startup financing, and rapid deployment cycles: “Over the past decade, I’ve seen hundreds of startups succeed or fail depending on how quickly they gain access to real users and real operational environments. Nowhere is this more critical than in defence technology. Ukraine provides an unmatched opportunity for structured, responsible, and data-driven testing that simply cannot be replicated in simulators or domestic training grounds. Our role is to ensure that companies enter this environment with the right preparation, the right partners, and a clear framework that benefits both innovators and front-line users.
This accelerator is, in my view, the most effective way for defence startups to find real product–market fit. In defence, true demand is defined by the battlefield—not by presentations, prototypes, or theoretical use cases. When companies receive direct feedback from units operating under real combat conditions, they quickly learn what works, what fails, and what must be improved. That level of validation shortens development cycles by months or even years and prevents teams from investing in the wrong features. Nothing brings a product to market readiness faster than exposure to actual operational needs.”
Application Pathway for Startups
Defence startups in Europe and allied countries can now apply for inclusion in the 17Tech Defence Tech Accelerator till December 15th, 2025. Selected companies will gain access to structured testing programs, front-line feedback loops, and opportunities to deploy prototypes in controlled operational scenarios in Ukraine as well as business support and access to several defence forces.
Startups interested in participating can apply at:
https://www.f6s.com/17tech-defense-tech-accelerator-2526
17Tech Oy, Helsinki, Finland 17tech.fi
Sami Luukkonen, +358 400 464 669
Antti Kosunen, +358 400 850 200
17TECH OY is a defence technology accelerator and a venture capital firm.
17Tech runs structured programs to help early- to mid-stage startups grow rapidly by providing investment, mentorship, workspace, and connections to investors, future users and a peer network in the defense industry. 17Tech provides up-to date knowledge for the situation and technolgies used on real battlefields in Ukraine.
28 Nov 25. Captured Russian Shahed-3 Reveals US Parts. Ukrainian Armed Forces have successfully captured a whole Russian-Iranian Shahed-3 suicide drone, including its camera, during recent operations. The drone was equipped with a modem for a Mesh network, used for transmitting control signals in real time. This network enables signals to be passed through a chain of drones, allowing the operator to control them over long distances without direct communication. This capture provides valuable insights into the drone’s technology and capabilities, according to Militarnyi. Earlier in September, the Ukrainian Military Intelligence Directorate (HUR) released an in-depth analysis of the design and components of the Shahed-3 drone. It features a Chinese-made Telefly JT80 turbojet engine and two fuel tanks, enabling flight speeds of 300-370 km/h and a range of up to 1000 km. The drone’s design closely resembles the previous Shahed-2 model, with electronic components such as the SADRA inertial navigation system, pressure measurement block (ADC), and power distribution unit (PDU) repeating from earlier versions. It also uses the “Comet-M12” satellite navigation system with a 12-element adaptive antenna array to resist countermeasures from Ukrainian electronic warfare systems, Militarnyi wrote. Additionally, the captured Shahed-3 includes a camera and video transmission system identical to those used in the Shahed-2 of the “Ъ” series. The drone contains 45 foreign-made components, half of which are sourced from the US, with others from China, Switzerland, Germany, the UK, and Japan. Previously, it was reported that Ukrainian long-range drones struck the VNIIR-Progress defense plant in the Russian city of Cheboksary, a key producer of Kometa satellite navigation antennas for Shahed-type drones and missiles. (Source: UAS VISION/UNITED24)
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