News in Brief

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19 Feb 26. Congo (DRC)-US: Limited investment appetite will undercut prospects of reduced armed conflict risk. On 18 February, Reuters reported details of a shortlist of strategic assets which the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) is offering to the US under a minerals framework, agreed alongside a US-brokered peace deal between the DRC and Rwanda. The list includes the Rubaya coltan mine (North Kivu province), which accounts for 15% of the world’s coltan output. This would potentially provide the US with a substantial source of tantalum, a material crucial for electronics. The Rubaya mine is currently within territory controlled by the Rwanda-backed M23 rebel group. The Congolese government likely hopes that the offer will encourage the US to pressure Rwanda more fully to cut off support for the M23, thereby reducing conflict risks and driving a boom in local investment. However, the shortlist also includes several sites outside the conflict zone, including in mineral-rich Haut-Katanga province. We assess that US firms are likely to prioritise investment in facilities outside of high-risk regions, undercutting prospects for sufficient investment in North Kivu to drive the necessary economic revitalisation to discourage future conflict. (Source: Sibylline)

 

18 Feb 26. Peru: President’s removal will sustain elevated government stability, domestic unrest risks. On 17 February, Peru’s Congress voted to censure and remove President José Jerí from office. Congressional representatives approved all seven censure motions, which were brought amid an ongoing corruption scandal involving Jerí and sanctioned Chinese businessmen. Congressional leader Fernando Rospigliosi has rejected the position of president, despite being next in the line of succession. Instead, Congress will vote to elect a new president later on 18 February at 1800hrs (local time); four political parties have presented candidates for selection. Jerí is the third consecutive president that Congress has removed from office. His removal comes ahead of the 12 April general elections where a new president will be elected, mitigating a substantial increase in government stability risks. However, we assess that Peru’s politically volatile landscape will likely spark protests in the coming weeks, particularly if additional corruption allegations are lodged against political candidates. Therefore, domestic unrest risks will remain elevated in urban centres ahead of the elections, particularly in the capital Lima. (Source: Sibylline)

 

17 Feb 26. Pakistan: Security risks remain high in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province after attack on security forces. On 16 February, militants rammed an explosives-laden vehicle into a checkpoint in Bajaur (Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province), killing 11 security personnel and one civilian. No group has claimed responsibility, though the military has alleged that Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) carried out the attack. Reportedly, the security forces have killed 12 militants in a retaliatory operation. The incident highlights the increasingly fragile security environment in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. According to the Center for Research and Security Studies, there were 2,331 fatalities due to violence in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa in 2025, an increase from 1,620 in 2024. Despite continued counter-terrorism operations in the province, we assess that this trend is likely to worsen over the coming year. The Taliban regime in Afghanistan remains unable (or unwilling) to prevent militants based in its border regions from mounting attacks in Pakistan. We also assess that any further mass-casualty attacks will possibly prompt the Pakistani authorities to conduct cross-border airstrikes on militant bases in Afghanistan. (Source: Sibylline)

 

17 Feb 26. Nigeria: Unsuccessful militant attack is unlikely to represent major counter-insurgency progress. On 16 February, the Nigerian Army announced that the Joint Task Force (North-East) had successfully repelled two co-ordinated militant attacks in Borno state on 14 February. Dozens of unidentified militants attacked security force positions in Mandaragirau and Pulka (both Borno), though failed to overrun the camps. The militants were likely affiliated with Islamic State – West Africa Province (ISWAP), with the Nigerian security forces claiming to have killed ISWAP commander ‘Abou Aisha’ in Pulka. From March to November 2025, ISWAP militants overran more than 20 security force positions in north-eastern Nigeria as part of the so-called ‘burn the camps’ offensive. As such, the attacks’ failure possibly marks a moderate improvement in the security forces’ capacity to defend heavily fortified positions within civilian population centres. This is likely to be bolstered by growing US engagement over the coming months. However, an increasing resiliency of security force positions will possibly prompt ISWAP to prioritise its control of rural areas. This would drive an uptick in attacks on overland transit routes, displaced persons camps and outlying checkpoints, increasing the risks of staff exposure to ambush, kidnap-for-ransom and high-capacity militant attacks in north-eastern Nigeria. (Source: Sibylline)

 

13 Feb 26. Thailand: New coalition improves government stability, reduces policy risk. Earlier on 13 February, Prime Minister Anutin Charnvirakul announced that the Pheu Thai Party (PT) will join his Bhumjaithai (BJT) party to form a coalition government. Five MPs from smaller parties have also joined the coalition. This brings the coalition to at least 272 seats in the 500-seat House of Representatives (i.e. the lower house), with 74 from the PT and 193 from the BJT. Reportedly, the BJT is also considering inviting the conservative Kla Tham Party to join the coalition with its 58 lawmakers. We assess that this coalition is likely to strengthen government stability in the short-to-medium term, with the BJT continuing to pursue its pro-business economic policy agenda. There is a realistic possibility that a political split will emerge between the pro-military BJT and populist PT due to mutual mistrust. However, if Kla Tham joins the government, policy risk will remain low, given the size of the coalition. (Source: Sibylline)

 

13 Feb 26. China-Japan: Seizure of Chinese vessel will drive tensions, supply chain disruption risks. On 12 February, the Japanese authorities seized a Chinese fishing vessel that attempted to evade an onboard inspection to the south-west of Japan’s Mishima Island (Yamaguchi prefecture) and arrested its captain. Reportedly, Japan’s Fisheries Agency suspected that the boat was conducting illicit fishing within Japan’s exclusive economic zone (EEZ). The incident comes amid elevated bilateral tensions after Japanese Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi stated in November 2025 that Japan may respond militarily if China invaded Taiwan (see Sibylline Situation Update Brief – 26 November 2025). China has since retaliated by cancelling flights and restricting exports of dual-use items to Japan. We assess that this vessel seizure incident is likely to trigger further retaliatory action. There is a realistic possibility that Beijing will tighten its export licensing of rare earths to Tokyo, which would affect Japan’s automobile and electronics industries. Relations are likely to remain fraught over the coming years, particularly given Takaichi’s hawkish position on regional security issues. (Source: Sibylline)

 

13 Feb 26. Republic of Congo: Incumbent’s re-election is almost certain; disputes will sustain unrest risks. On 12 February, the deadline for submitting candidates for the 15 March presidential election expired, with the incumbent, President Denis Sassou-Nguesso, currently facing six opposition candidates. While the candidates still need to be confirmed by the Constitutional Court before campaigning begins on 28 February, this is unlikely to be a particularly contentious process. None of the candidates are likely to pose any significant challenge to Nguesso who, barring his death, will almost certainly secure re-election (see Sibylline Situation Update Brief – 4 February 2026). The two largest opposition parties have not submitted candidates, while the two current candidates who previously ran against Nguesso in 2021 secured less than 1% of the vote each. Frédéric Bintsamou, the leader of the Ninjas ethnic militia group, who previously intended to stand has also refused to take part, claiming that conditions for a free and transparent election have not been met. This will reduce the risk of a remobilisation of the Ninjas following the polls (as happened after the 2016 election) and lessening the likelihood of a substantial spike in violence in the Pool department. However, widespread lack of faith in the election process will sustain protest risks around the polling period. (Source: Sibylline)

 

12 Feb 26. India unveils draft DAP 2026 prioritising indigenous procurement. DAP prioritises ‘Buy (Indian-IDDM)’ procurement to boost domestic defence production and cut imports. The proposed DAP-2026 draft aims to align India’s defence acquisition with the evolving geo-strategic landscape. Credit: Hamara/Shutterstock.com. The Indian Department of Defence has released a draft of the Defence Acquisition Procedure (DAP)-2026, which is set to replace the current Defence Acquisition Procedure-2020, pending approval. The proposed changes intend to bring India’s defence acquisition in line with “evolving geo-strategic” conditions, the increasing role of the private defence sector, and the technological demands of current military operations. Under the draft DAP-2026, the Ministry of Defence (MoD) places emphasis on domestic manufacturing by prioritising the Buy Indian-IDDM (Indigenously Designed, Developed and Manufactured) category, which covers equipment that is indigenously designed, developed and manufactured. This measure seeks to reduce dependence on imports and support self-reliance in the defence sector. The document outlines several adjustments, including strategies for categorising procurements based on technological availability and manufacturing readiness. It also introduces exclusive procedures for swift acquisition of equipment with short technological cycles, and provisions for spiral design and procurement of major platforms.Furthermore, the draft sets out an evaluation process for indigenous content and design, the use of local military materials, and incentives intended to encourage innovation. (Source: airforce-technology.com)

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Military And Security Developments

Feb 18.

• Russia-Ukraine: Reported divisions among Ukrainian negotiators will likely further stall peace efforts. The third round of US-brokered trilateral negotiations to end the Russo-Ukrainian war continues today on 18 February, with unconfirmed reports detailing apparent divisions within Ukraine’s delegation on reaching a peace agreement. According to The Economist, the delegation consists of two differently aligned groups, with one wing centred around the head of the Ukrainian president’s office, Kyrylo Budanov, supporting a swift US-led deal to end the war. Reportedly, this faction fears that this opportunity may soon disappear. By contrast, the other side, which the outlet claimed is influenced by Budanov’s predecessor, Andriy Yermak, opposes this approach. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky is reportedly balancing both positions; it remains unclear if he will decide on one approach over another. We assess that this reported split within the Ukrainian delegation will reinforce the already low likelihood of a breakthrough in peace negotiations in the short term. Ukraine will likely remain publicly hesitant to accept a quick deal, especially if it is deemed to favour Moscow and without Kyiv first receiving robust security guarantees. However, the US will possibly leverage divisions among Ukrainian negotiators to pressure or incentivise Ukraine to reach a peace deal (or at least a ceasefire agreement) in the coming months.

Feb 17.

KEY DEVELOPMENTS

• OFFENSIVES: Over the past week, Ukrainian forces have launched a series of seemingly successful, localised counter-attacks in Zaporizhzhia oblast
• STRIKES: High intensity strikes continue, but the resumption of scheduled outages (made possible by sufficient reserve capacity across the grid to spread out at various times) remains low in the short term given the scale of damage caused to Ukraine’s grid
• NEGOTIATIONS: The third round of trilateral talks between Russia, Ukraine and the US will take place today (17 February) and on 18 February in Geneva (Switzerland), though an imminent breakthrough remains unlikely
• FORECAST: Current discussions linking a peace deal to a Ukrainian election are at an impasse, with Russia demanding Ukraine withdraws from the Donbas before a ceasefire can be agreed, while Ukraine demands that ceding territory can only happen through a referendum (and possible election) two months after a ceasefire
• OFFENSIVES: Over the past week, Ukrainian forces have launched a series of seemingly successful, localised counter-attacks in Zaporizhzhia oblast. A Ukrainian military observer stressed that these operations do not constitute a broader counter-offensive, an assessment we agree with. Rather, these are limited counter-attacks aimed at stabilising areas where Russian forces have made gains in recent months, including in the direction of Huliapole (Zaporizhzhia oblast). The source noted that persistent constraints in reserves, artillery and air superiority continue to prevent Ukrainian operational escalation. We assess Ukrainian counter-attacks will likely remain limited in scope.
• OFFENSIVES: Disruption to Russian military communications has reportedly facilitated the effectiveness of recent Ukrainian attacks, following SpaceX’s decision to halt Starlink services for Russian forces and additional interference affecting messaging application Telegram within Russia. In addition to disrupting military communications, the interruption of Starlink has likely undermined Russian short- and medium-range drone strikes. In turn, this decreased the efficacy of Russia’s battlefield air interdiction campaign, which Ukrainian forces have likely exploited to make localised gains. However, it remains unclear how long these opportunities and vulnerabilities will remain and whether Ukrainian forces retain the resources to keep counter-attacking in the coming weeks.
• RECRUITMENT: We assess that Russia remains capable of sustaining the high attrition rates associated with its assault tactics at least through 2026. A Ukrainian commander, quoted by a media outlet on 12 February, indicated that Russian troop losses in January exceeded the number of newly mobilised and contracted soldiers for the second consecutive month. However, both the source and Ukraine’s military intelligence (GUR) have cautioned that this imbalance does not signal a recruitment crisis for Russia, as the Kremlin continues to implement various recruitment measures to offset battlefield losses. Notably, during the Munich Security Conference (Germany), UK defence secretary John Healey highlighted Russia’s growing reliance on foreign-recruited fighters as part of these efforts. Meanwhile, we previously reported that certain Russian regions had reintroduced lucrative sign-on bonuses for contract soldiers, having reduced them to the federal minimum in 2025 (see Sibylline Ukraine Update – 20 January 2026). Ultimately, despite mounting strains and heavy casualties, Russia highly likely remains capable of sustaining its war effort, while Ukraine faces a much more serious personnel problem.
• MUNITIONS: While drones currently play an increasingly prominent role in battlefield strikes, artillery continues to account for between 25% and 33% of battlefield casualties, according to an OSINT analytical group. Estonia’s intelligence services have highlighted that Russia expanded its artillery shell production in 2025 to 7 m shells, up from 4.5 m in 2024. Russia has been able to modernise key manufacturing facilities, including with Western high-precision industrial machinery, despite international sanctions. Reports from 2025 indicated that China had assisted Belarus in manufacturing 240,000 artillery shells and 240,000 rockets annually, destined for Russia. Ultimately, Russia’s expanding defence industrial output – enabled in part by assistance from partners such as Belarus, China and North Korea – will allow it to sustain the war in 2026. This will also facilitate the reconstruction of stockpiles if and when the war ends (or pauses), supporting Russia’s wider military reconstitution efforts in the coming years.
• STRIKES: Russia is continuing its semi-regular high-intensity combined strike campaigns, including one launched early on 17 February. The attack involved 396 drones and 29 missiles; four ballistic missiles and 18 drones made confirmed hits across Ukraine. Such attacks continue to target Ukrainian critical and energy infrastructure heavily. At the time of writing, there are no scheduled power outages in the capital Kyiv (and numerous other cities), meaning that outages can occur with no warning. We assess that the likelihood of a resumption of scheduled outages, made possible by sufficient reserve capacity across the grid to spread out at various times, remains low in the short term given the scale of damage caused to Ukraine’s grid and the frequency of Russian strikes.
• STRIKES: Ukraine resumed strikes using its Flamingo FP-5 missiles this month, targeting a military depot in Russia’s Volgograd oblast overnight on 11-12 February, according to the General Staff of the Ukrainian Armed Forces. Ukrainian military sources described the facility as one of Russia’s largest storage hubs for missiles, ammunition and explosive materials. The authorities in Volgograd oblast have confirmed that a fire broke out at a military facility, but have not provided any further details. We assess that the use of the domestically produced Flamingo cruise missile will likely allow Kyiv to conserve expensive, high-precision, Western-provided missiles. Ukraine likely possesses a very limited number of such missiles and is saving these for high-importance missions in the future. Meanwhile, Ukraine recently targeted oil infrastructure across Russia with long-range drones. After a lull in January, Ukraine has stepped up drone attacks against oil refineries in February, striking prominent plants. This is likely to continue in the coming weeks, particularly if peace talks stall.

POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS

• AID: Ukraine’s partners pledged nearly USD 38 bn in new military aid at the last Ramstein summit on 12 February, with most of the support to be used to strengthen Ukraine’s air defence systems and drone capabilities. According to Ukrainian Defence Minister Mykhailo Fedorov, 17 countries, including Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Germany and the UK, promised additional financial and military assistance to Ukraine. According to a report released by the Kiel Institute on 11 February, European-provided military support to Ukraine increased by 67% last year compared to the 2022 to 2024 average. However, total military aid allocations to Ukraine in 2025 were 13% below the annual average over this period, largely due to the halt in direct US support, which fell by 99% last year. While the report underscores European efforts to step up military support for Ukraine, Europe is unlikely to be able to fill the capability void left by the US over the coming months. Further announcements of military support are likely ahead of and on the 24 February anniversary of the full-scale invasion.
• NEGOTIATIONS: The third round of trilateral talks between Russia, Ukraine and the US will take place today (17 February) and on 18 February in Geneva (Switzerland), though an imminent breakthrough remains unlikely. According to the Kremlin’s press secretary Dmitry Peskov, these negotiations will cover a broader range of issues than the previous discussions held in Abu Dhabi (UAE). Peskov also implied that territory will be the main focus of the talks – a thorny issue on which the two sides remain far removed and highly unlikely to reach a compromise on in the near term. Russia continues to demand that Ukraine withdraw from the remainder of the Donbas region (which comprises Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts), before any ceasefire can be agreed. Ceding the remainder of the Donbas is highly likely to remain a non-starter for Ukraine in the medium term, given that Kyiv has stated that any cession of land can only be approved via a referendum. However, in the coming months US pressure will likely increase on Ukraine, rather than Russia, to soften its terms for ending the war. This will possibly include threats or the actual suspension of intelligence sharing with Ukraine and/or withholding weapons sales permits to Ukraine.

FORECAST

ELECTIONS: Reports that the US is encouraging Kyiv to hold elections in the coming months will likely increase pressure on Ukraine’s leadership, though a vote remains unlikely in the short term. On 11 February, the Financial Times (FT) reported that Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky is expected to announce plans on 24 February (the fourth anniversary of Russia’s full-scale invasion) to hold a presidential election and a referendum. However, an unspecified insider in Zelensky’s office later denied such plans, arguing that the security level is currently insufficient for Ukraine to hold elections.

Zelensky subsequently stated on 14 February that a two-month ceasefire would be necessary in order to hold elections and guarantee the safety of voters. However, the prospect of a ceasefire holding for this long without violations is highly unlikely in the coming weeks. We assess that Ukraine would face a myriad of logistical and security challenges if it chose to hold elections (even if votes were to be held under a ceasefire) given that ms of Ukrainians are internally displaced or residing abroad. Questions also remain about how soldiers on the frontlines would be able to participate, as well as Ukrainians living under Russian occupation. Ukraine would also likely seek to obtain security guarantees from the West (including the US) to ensure that the vote can proceed as fairly and freely as possible given the very credible threats of Russian interference. However, it remains uncertain what support Western states could provide that would ensure Ukraine’s security and adequately deter Russia.

Ukraine’s constitution prohibits elections as long as martial law is in effect; martial law has been in force since the beginning of Russia’s full-scale invasion, and lawmakers have consistently voted to extend it. Most recently, Ukraine’s parliament voted on 14 January to extend martial law for another 90 days (i.e. until 4 May), with a further extension likely despite apparent increasing pressure from the US to end the war by the spring or early summer. The FT reported that the US is pressing Ukraine to hold both votes by 15 May or risk losing proposed US security guarantees. Although Zelensky has denied that the US is making such threats or linking the holding of elections to security guarantees, such guarantees are a means through which the Trump administration can incentivise or coerce Kyiv to make concessions. For further analysis on Western-provided security guarantees, see Sibylline Special Report – 5 February 2026.

Even if elections were to take place later this year, there is no guarantee that the Ukrainian population would approve a peace deal via a referendum, especially if the terms are deemed to be overly preferable to Russia. According to polling commissioned from the Kyiv Security Forum published on 12 February, 33.2% of Ukrainians consider the total expulsion of Russian troops from Ukraine’s 1991 borders – including Crimea and the Donetsk and Luhansk People’s Republics (DNR and LNR) – as a minimum requirement for a peace agreement, even though this is a remote possibility. Meanwhile, 23.5% of respondents stated they were prepared to accept concessions based on the frontline at the time of a peace agreement. As such, if Ukraine’s population rejects the terms of a peace deal in a referendum (which is a realistic possibility), we assess that Russia would likely reject any renegotiations and justify continuing its war thereafter.

Moscow has long argued that the current Ukrainian government lacks legitimacy because elections have not been held during wartime. In an interview published on 15 February, Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Mikhail Galuzin stated that Russia is prepared to refrain from conducting long-range strikes against Ukraine on election day. However, this would almost certainly not eradicate all security threats stemming from the war. Separately, Galuzin reiterated a previous Russian proposal for the UN to bring Ukraine under ‘temporary external governance’. Galuzin stated this would allow for ‘democratic elections’ to be held and for a ‘viable’ government to come to power with which Russia could sign a ‘full-fledged peace treaty’ and ‘legitimate’ documents outlining future interstate co-operation. By making such comments, Galuzin is highly likely attempting to create a justification for why Russia cannot sign a peace agreement with the current Ukrainian authorities. Our assessment remains that Russia seeks the establishment of a Moscow-friendly government in Ukraine as part of its war objectives.

Current discussions are therefore at an impasse, with Russia demanding Ukraine’s withdrawal from the Donbas before a ceasefire can be agreed, while Ukraine demands that ceding territory can only happen through a referendum (and possible election) two months after a ceasefire. Given we continue to assess that it is not in Russia’s interests to agree to a stable ceasefire without significant Ukrainian concessions, the impasse is likely to preclude a timely resolution to the war – and will increase the likelihood of the US pressuring Ukraine to ease its own demands.

• Ukraine: Charges against former energy minister will maintain governance scrutiny, corruption risks. Earlier on 16 February, Ukraine’s National Anti-Corruption Bureau (NABU) announced that a former energy minister has been charged with money laundering and participating in organised crime in connection with a large-scale corruption scandal. NABU did not name the minister explicitly. However, the agency provided the duration of the former official’s mandate, which correlates with Herman Halushchenko’s time in office (2021 to 2025). According to NABU, a fund was registered in Anguilla (British Overseas Territory) in February 2021 with the aim of attracting USD 100 m worth of ‘investments’, with Halushchenko’s family members among the ‘investors’. The scandal in which Halushchenko was implicated emerged in November 2025 (see Sibylline Situation Update Brief – 28 November 2025). We assess that the development will likely sustain domestic and international scrutiny over Ukraine’s governance standards and persistent corruption concerns, particularly as sensitive talks aimed at ending the war continue. While corruption has traditionally prompted social backlash and large-scale protests, the risk of major domestic unrest will not increase markedly in the near term.
• Ukraine: Military recruitment will continue to face resistance, isolated clashes with security forces. On 16 February, the Ukrainian military authorities reported that on the previous day, a group of civilians assaulted military recruitment personnel in Odesa (Odesa oblast). The military personnel were escorting an individual who had reportedly violated military registration and recruitment. The personnel were then confronted with an unspecified number of civilians, who reportedly displayed aggressive behaviour and used physical force and tear gas against them. A similar incident took place in late October 2025 in Odesa, when military mobilisation activities met with strong resistance from civilians and quickly escalated into violence. Such incidents have also occurred elsewhere in Ukraine and underscore continued resistance to Ukraine’s mobilisation efforts. We assess that any attempt to expand military mobilisation will meet with growing public discontent, given that the Russo-Ukrainian war is likely to continue at its current intensity in the short-to-medium term and considering Kyiv’s chronic shortage of military personnel. Such efforts will continue heightening the risk of isolated violent confrontations involving recruitment officials, though risks to bystanders will remain low. (Source: Sibylline)

 

13 Feb 26. Sweden strengthens Ukraine’s defence with a contribution of USD 100 million to US package. Sweden is contributing USD 100 million to the US support package Prioritised Ukraine Requirements List (PURL). Together with the Netherlands, Norway and the United Kingdom, Sweden will fund a joint support package totalling USD 500 million aimed at strengthening Ukraine’s defence capabilities.

“Sweden stands firm in its solidarity with Ukraine. Through our contribution to PURL, which will give Ukraine access to prioritised US defence materiel, we are once again demonstrating that we are prepared to take concrete steps to strengthen Ukraine’s defence capabilities. Air defence and ammunition are crucial to allow Ukraine to defend itself against Russia’s continued attacks. Together with our Allies and partners, we are sending a clear signal that demonstrates our shared commitment to peace and security in Europe,” says Minister for Defence Pål Jonson.

This is the third time Sweden has contributed to PURL. On previous occasions, Sweden has:

• provided USD 275mi for a support package together with Denmark and Norway and
• provided USD 60m for a support package together with other Nordic and Baltic countries.

Taking into account this new contribution, Sweden has provided a total of USD 435 million in financial support to PURL. Through the PURL initiative, the United States makes high-priority US defence materiel available to Ukraine. Materiel is delivered as a support package funded by Allies and partner countries. The package includes advanced air defence systems and ammunition, both of which are crucial to Ukraine’s ability to defend itself against ongoing attacks. NATO coordinates the implementation of the initiative and ensures that the contents of the packages meet Ukraine’s most highly prioritised needs. Through coordination and joint initiatives, the Allies can provide effective and targeted support. (Source: Clarion)

 

16 Feb 26. Lithuania allocates $265m in military aid for Ukraine in 2026. The assistance will prioritise air defence, Ukrainian drones, and long-range artillery ammunition. Lithuania will allocate $265m in military aid to Ukraine in 2026, Defence Minister Robertas Kaunas has said. The support will focus on air defence, drones, and long-range artillery ammunition. Minister Kaunas outlined the aid package during the 33rd Nato Defence Contact Group session, which was held alongside the Nato Defence Ministerial meeting in Brussels. Discussions at the event included Ukraine’s most urgent requirements, updates from frontline developments, and ongoing peace negotiations.

“We hear the urgent needs of Ukraine. Lithuania’s military assistance has already surpassed USD 1 bn and we have another $265m earmarked for this year to be used in three priority areas: air defence, Ukrainian drones and long-range artillery ammunition,” Minister Kaunas said.

During the session, Kaunas also outlined Lithuania’s continued commitment to enhancing Ukraine’s defence capabilities to the Ukraine Defence Contact Group. (Source: army-technology.com)

 

17 Feb 26. Ukrainian Drone Operators Defeated NATO Combat Group During Joint Exercises. During the Hedgehog 2025 military exercises in May, Ukrainian drone operators decisively outmatched a large NATO combat group, exposing serious vulnerabilities in traditional mechanized warfare, according to a recent report by The Wall Street Journal. Hedgehog 2025 involved more than 16,000 troops from 12 NATO countries training in Estonia alongside Ukrainian drone specialists, some temporarily rotated from active front-line service. The exercise simulated a “contested and congested” modern battlefield dominated by drones, electronic warfare, and rapid information flows. Lieutenant Colonel Arbo Probal of the Estonian Defence Forces said the aim was to overwhelm units with stress and cognitive overload as quickly as possible. In one scenario, a NATO combat group of several thousand soldiers—including British and Estonian units—attempted a mechanized assault. They failed to account for the level of battlefield transparency created by pervasive drone surveillance. Moving without adequate camouflage, their positions, tents, and armored vehicles were quickly identified and “destroyed” in the simulation. Ukrainian forces relied on Delta, an advanced battlefield management system that integrates real-time intelligence, artificial intelligence–driven analysis, target identification, and strike coordination. According to sources, a Ukrainian unit of roughly ten soldiers conditionally destroyed 17 armoured vehicles and carried out about 30 strikes within half a day. Another opposing force led by Estonian unmanned-systems coordinator Aivar Hanniotti deployed more than 30 drones over an area of less than four square miles. Concealment proved nearly impossible. “There was no possibility to hide,” Hanniotti said, noting that mechanized units were located and neutralized rapidly. Overall results for NATO forces were described as “terrible.” Simulated enemy units were able to neutralize the equivalent of two battalions in a single day, effectively stripping them of combat capability before they could reach drone operators. Estonian officials said the exercise shocked participating officers and underscored how Ukraine’s combat experience is reshaping European security thinking. The drills highlighted structural NATO challenges, including slow strike coordination and restricted data sharing, in contrast to Ukraine’s faster, more networked approach to warfare. (Source: UAS VISION/MILITARNYI; UNITED24MEDIA)

 

17 Feb 26. Wingcopter and TAF Industries Establish Joint Venture to Scale Production of Reconnaissance Drones in Germany for Ukraine. German drone pioneer Wingcopter and Ukraine’s largest unmanned aerial vehicle producer TAF Industries have signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) to establish a joint venture aimed at strengthening defence production and long-term industrial cooperation. The MoU was signed during the 62nd Munich Security Conference in the presence of government representatives from Germany and Ukraine. The planned joint venture will reinforce the resilience of Ukraine’s critical defence manufacturing, ensure continuity of supply under wartime conditions, and diversify industrial risk by expanding production into a secure environment in Germany. It also creates a durable framework for German–Ukrainian collaboration in defence technologies that have already been proven in combat. The partnership will operate under the “Build with Ukraine” framework. Under the agreement, TAF Industries will provide licensed designs and operational expertise for its reconnaissance UAV systems, widely deployed in real operational environments. Wingcopter will contribute industrial infrastructure, manufacturing capacity, and engineering expertise to rapidly scale production in Germany. Wingcopter’s expansion into the defence sector through its newly established Wingcopter Security & Defence (WSD) unit forms a strong backbone for the project. WSD complements the company’s commercial delivery and surveying operations by adding intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) and cargo capabilities, leveraging its proven dual-use drone platform and intellectual property. Looking ahead, the partners plan to co-develop and localise future UAV platforms for European and NATO markets, further strengthening Europe’s defence industrial base and enhancing regional security and resilience. Both companies described the partnership as a strategic step to combine battlefield-proven innovation with German industrial strength, scale life-saving systems, create jobs, and build a sustainable industrial bridge between Ukraine and Germany. (Source: UAS VISION)

 

13 Feb 26. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy today received the first Ukrainian drone manufactured in Germany by Quantum Frontline Industries (QFI). German Minister of Defence, Boris Pistorius acted as patron to the handover of the first Linza 3.0 multi-purpose drone for the Ukrainian Armed Forces.

Matthias Lehna, Managing Director of Quantum Frontline Industries, and Mykyta Rozhkov, Chief BD Officer of Frontline Robotics welcomed the President and the Minister of Defence ahead of the official opening of the Munich Security Conference, to highlight the start of production in the new facility of the recently established Joint Venture.

During his address to QFI employees and media representatives, President Zelenskyy said: “I want to thank the people of Germany for the support of your nation since the start of the war. Your solidarity means a great deal to us. I also want to congratulate both companies and say how proud I am of the important work they are doing.”

The German Minister of Defence, Boris Pistorius highlighted Germany’s support and partnership with Ukraine and said: “I would like to express my gratitude for this project, which, as someone put it, was implemented at lightspeed. We learn from successes achieved on the battlefield and benefit from spillover effects in innovations that are exploited.”

Matthias Lehna, Managing Director of QFI said: “Quantum Frontline Industries has started production in just two months after the announcement. QFI is the first of its kind but will not be the last. We are proud to be a flagship company for Ukrainian German industrial cooperation and proud to support the Armed Forces of Ukraine with the best technology of both countries”

Mykyta Rozhkov, Chief BD Officer of Frontline Robotics said: “This first QFI produced Linza 3.0 represents months of dedication from Ukrainian engineers and our international partners. It was created from frontline experience and is already helping Ukrainian forces operate more  effectively. We are proud of the rapid progress of our joint venture and the way it strengthens long-term cooperation between our countries”.

The QFI facility will enable the large-scale production of 10,000 drones for the Ukrainian Armed Forces in Germany within a year and has now started early-stage production, following its announcement in December 2025.  Quantum Frontline Industries will automate its production capacity to meet the demand from Ukraine and has plans to scale further to provide Ukrainian technology to Europe. Linza 3.0, the first Ukrainian drone produced in Germany, was recently presented by Frontline Robotics. It’s the latest generation of its multi-purpose drone already deployed with more than 60 units of the Ukrainian Defense Forces. The drone is equipped with an AI-enabled visual-inertial navigation module, features a 12-inch frame and can carry up to 4 kg of payload over a distance of up to 15 km, remaining airborne for up to 60 minutes.  The visit was facilitated and supported by the Ukrainian Council of Defence Industry, representing Ukrainian private defence manufacturers.

 

13 Feb 26. Saab and Joint Stock Company “Ukrainian Defense Industry” sign memorandum of understanding. Saab and the Joint Stock Company “Ukrainian Defense Industry” (JSC UDI) have signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) regarding their intention to collaborate in the areas of aviation and airborne surveillance, in which they have complementary expertise. The aim is to strengthen Ukraine’s defence capabilities. The MoU was signed today at the Munich Security Conference 2026 in Germany.  JSC UDI has a strong track record as a strategic manufacturer of weapons and military hardware. By consolidating state enterprises and companies, it has become an integral part of Ukraine’s security and defence sector. Saab will contribute its solid defence industry experience and leading expertise in aviation and airborne surveillance technology.

“We look forward to collaborating with JSC UDI, exploring cooperation opportunities relating to Ukraine. Saab is strongly committed to supporting Ukraine’s defence capability and its defence sector,” says Anders Carp, Deputy CEO of Saab.

 

13 Feb 26. Cuashub.com said today that Ukraine pursues domestic “Iron Dome” to counter relentless Shaheds. Ukraine is intensifying efforts to build a domestically produced air defense network, turning to emerging technologies such as laser weapons, interceptor drones and low-cost countermeasures as it confronts sustained aerial attacks from Russia. Among the systems under development is a prototype laser weapon known as the Sunray, which Ukrainian soldiers and engineers recently demonstrated in a field test. Mounted on a pickup truck and resembling a telescope fitted with cameras, the system tracked a hovering drone before destroying it within seconds.

Ukraine pursues domestic “Iron Dome” to counter relentless Shaheds

(Source: https://cuashub.com/

 

12 Feb 26. “Ukraine develops Sunray counter drone laser system.” Ukraine has developed a prototype laser air defence system designed to counter Russian drones at significantly lower cost than comparable Western systems, according to a report in Ukraine’s Pravda news outlet, quoting a story in The Atlantic published on Tuesday, February 10.

“The system, known as Sunray, was demonstrated to The Atlantic during a field test in Ukraine,” said the Ukrainian news source. “The portable laser weapon reportedly fits into the trunk of a car and can be mounted on a pickup truck. During a test described in the report, the laser burned through a small drone midair within seconds, causing it to fall.

“The developers said the system had been created over roughly two years at a cost of several million dollars. The expected price of a single unit is estimated at a few hundred thousand dollars. By comparison, the Helios laser system developed by Lockheed Martin for the US Navy was produced under a US$150m contract.”

No technical details of the system, or the company behind it, have been reported.

For more information: https://www.pravda.com.ua/eng/news/2026/02/11/8020416/

https://www.theatlantic.com/national-security/2026/02/ukraine-drones-lasers-iron-dome/685944/ (Source: www.unmannedairspace.info)

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Founded in 1987, Exensor Technology is a world leading supplier of Networked Unattended Ground Sensor (UGS) Systems providing tailored sensor solutions to customers all over the world. From our Headquarters in Lund Sweden, our centre of expertise in Network Communications at Communications Research Lab in Kalmar Sweden and our Production site outside of Basingstoke UK, we design, develop and produce latest state of the art rugged UGS solutions at the highest quality to meet the most stringent demands of our customers. Our systems are in operation and used in a wide number of Military as well as Homeland Security applications worldwide. The modular nature of the system ensures any external sensor can be integrated, providing the user with a fully meshed “silent” network capable of self-healing. Exensor Technology will continue to lead the field in UGS technology, provide our customers with excellent customer service and a bespoke package able to meet every need.

A CNIM Group Company

——————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————

Sponsored by Bertin Exensor

 

www.exensor.com

 

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13 Feb 26. Department of War Partners With Department of Energy in Historic Nuclear Energy Initiative. The Department of War (DoW) and the Department of Energy (DoE) are partnering to mark a historic milestone in advancing America’s nuclear energy landscape and strengthening national security. This groundbreaking collaboration with Valar Atomics is directly aligned with President Trump’s Executive Order to reshape and modernize America’s nuclear energy landscape. On Sunday, February 15, 2026, a next-generation nuclear reactor will be transported via C-17 from March Air Reserve Base in California to Hill Air Force Base in Utah. The reactor will then be transported to Utah San Rafael Energy Lab (USREL) in Orangeville, Utah, for testing and evaluation. The successful delivery and installation of this reactor will unlock significant possibilities for the future of energy resilience and strategic independence for our nation’s defense, showcasing an agile, innovative, and commercial-first approach to solving critical infrastructure challenges. By harnessing the power of advanced nuclear technology, we are not only enhancing our national security but championing a future of American energy dominance.  (Source: U.S. DoD)

 

13 Feb 26. DOW Aims to Accelerate Advanced Materials Processing. The Department of War (DOW) announced today the September 17, 2025 investment on a five-year contract totaling nearly $9.2 m to the national advanced materials Manufacturing Innovation Institute, LIFT, to address manufacturing challenges associated with ceramic matrix composites (CMC). This announcement was delayed due to the government shutdown. This effort, funded through the Office of the Assistant Secretary of War for Industrial Base Policy (OASW(IBP))’s Industrial Base Analysis and Sustainment (IBAS) Program, supports White House and Secretary of War priorities in advanced composites manufacturing research and development and defense industrial base workforce development.

“This project aims to disrupt manufacturing affordability through advanced materials and processing technologies,” said Assistant Secretary of War for Industrial Base Policy Michael Cadenazzi. “I believe its location in Detroit, Michigan at LIFT’s new Ceramics Manufacturing Center will help revitalize economic growth and industrial capacity in a state with a rich history in building America’s industrial might.”

While composites have been used for decades, they’re relatively new to the centuries old metallics manufacturing industry. Recent advancements in carbon-fiber technologies have impacted CMCs, which are known for their ability to withstand higher temperatures as compared to their polymer composite counterparts. This capability is currently being employed in technologies used in the production of commercial products and defense-critical systems such as stealth aircraft, jet engines, and hypersonic weapons. LIFT is 1 of 18 Manufacturing USA Innovation Institutes designed to foster innovation, enhance domestic supply chains, and forge a skilled workforce to reestablish U.S. leadership in advanced manufacturing across the globe. Since the IBAS Program’s inception in 2014, the Innovation Capability and Modernization (ICAM) Office has invested over $2.6 bn across 206 projects to restore domestic manufacturing capacity and capability. ICAM is part of OASW(IBP)’s Manufacturing Capability Expansion and Investment Prioritization (MCEIP) Directorate within the Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of War for Industrial Base Resilience. For more information on MCEIP, please visit:

About the Office of the Assistant Secretary of War for Industrial Base Policy (OASW(IBP))

The OASW(IBP) works with domestic and international partners to forge and sustain a robust, secure, and resilient industrial base enabling the warfighter, now and in the future. OASW(IBP)’s Innovation Capability and Modernization Office, which executes the IBAS Program, provides DOW with key capabilities to achieve the strategic aims of the Department and Presidential Executive Orders. These call for a strong, resilient, responsive, and healthy national industrial base that can respond at-will to national security requirements. (Source: U.S. DoD)

 

13 Feb 26. US: Homeland Security shutdown will increase partisan divisions, government stability risks. On 12 February, Senate Democrats blocked a spending bill that would have funded the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) beyond the 13 February shutdown deadline without any new reforms to immigration enforcement. Negotiations remain gridlocked amid entrenched partisan divisions over restrictions on federal immigration agents. As both chambers of Congress have now been dismissed for a week-long recess, DHS will almost certainly enter a shutdown on 14 February. In this scenario, the Republican leadership will likely push for another stopgap funding bill to keep the department running while negotiations continue. In a shutdown, all DHS essential missions and functions will continue, mitigating any broader national security risks. It is also unlikely that immigration enforcement operations will slow down. However, operations will possibly be moderately reduced at other DHS agencies, including the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) and the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA). Still, we assess that a shutdown will likely be resolved in the short term, reducing longer-term travel and operational disruption risks. (Source: Sibylline)

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Founded in 1987, Exensor Technology is a world leading supplier of Networked Unattended Ground Sensor (UGS) Systems providing tailored sensor solutions to customers all over the world. From our Headquarters in Lund Sweden, our centre of expertise in Network Communications at Communications Research Lab in Kalmar Sweden and our Production site outside of Basingstoke UK, we design, develop and produce latest state of the art rugged UGS solutions at the highest quality to meet the most stringent demands of our customers. Our systems are in operation and used in a wide number of Military as well as Homeland Security applications worldwide. The modular nature of the system ensures any external sensor can be integrated, providing the user with a fully meshed “silent” network capable of self-healing. Exensor Technology will continue to lead the field in UGS technology, provide our customers with excellent customer service and a bespoke package able to meet every need.

A CNIM Group Company

————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————-

Sponsored by Bertin Exensor

 

www.exensor.com

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19 Feb 26. UK needs to accelerate defence spending PM says. The UK Prime Minister, Sir Keir Starmer, told reporters on Monday that the country needs to “step up” and “go faster” on defence spending. Starmer’s comments follow a BBC report stating that the government is considering proposals to accelerate a planned rise in the defence budget to 3% of GDP. It comes amid suggestions that the country’s allies are ‘frustrated’ by delays in finalising budgets for joint programmes.
In other news, Canada’s government has unveiled its first-ever Defence Industrial Strategy, with a focus on bolstering domestic production to reduce reliance on imported equipment. To achieve this, domestic – often smaller – defence companies will be prioritised, with international partnerships being explored where this is not possible. Failing that, Canada will procure from partner countries on the condition that there is reinvestment into the country’s economy.
Several new funding initiatives are also being launched, including a new Defence Advisory Forum to ensure better engagement with industry, and a CAD4 billion ‘Defence Platform’ intended to support companies in accessing capital funds. (Source: Clarion)

 

16 Feb 26. Finland secures ReArm Europe funding for defence sector. Some of the funding will be directed towards dual-use technologies, potentially in the form of drones or digital systems.

• Finland has revealed that it has secured ReArm Europe funding that will boost defence sector capabilities
• The focus appears to be on dual-use technologies and bolstering supply chain security
• Meanwhile, Helsinki also announced that Finland will host a new Nato C2 capability to aid in High North security

Finland has secured unspecified funding as part of the European Union’s (EU) ReArm Europe programme intended to rejuvenate defence spending across the bloc, with Helsinki stating the finances would boost military capability. Announced on 12 February, the Finland Government announced €280m ($332m) in funding from the European Regional Development Fund and other agencies under the EU’s regional and structural policy programme. Within the ‘Innovation and Skills in Finland’ segment, the EU’s ReArm Europe Plan will open up two “completely new policy lines” to support investments in the country’s defence industry and production of dual-use items. A 12 February Finnish Government release said the move would “bolster Finland’s defence capability” and aid supply chain security.

“With the help of the EU’s new policy lines on regional development funding, we will be able to strengthen security of supply, improve military mobility, and enhance the production capacity within Finland’s defence industry and dual-use items,” said Minister of Economic Affairs Sakari Puisto.

“As a result, we can more easily attract investments to the regions and create new jobs,” Puisto added.

In 2025 the European Commission unveiled the ReArm Europe Plan, which encompasses a budget of €800bn ($867.74bn) aimed at bolstering defence spending across the continent.  One of the early, but key, initial aspects of the ReArm Europe initiative involves expediting the availability of funds for defence purposes, releasing bns of euros for military procurement needs. However, the funds are not necessarily distributed by the EU, rather it enables such national spending to be activated without it counting against wider fiscal deficit targets imposed on member states. Of the €800bn in ReArm funding, around €150bn is provided by targeted EU loans with the rest comprised of expected increases national defence spending.

Finland to host Nato C2 centre

Meanwhile, on 12 February Finland announced that it had received approval from Nato to host a deployable command and control (C2) module in the High North in a bid to strengthen Arctic security. The Deployable CIS Module (DCM) will provide C2 services in support of Nato forces and commands in Finland, potentially extending across the Alliance if necessary.

“A Deployable CIS Module will strengthen Nato’s deterrence and defence throughout the High North,” said Finland’s Minister of Defence Antti Häkkänen.

In 2023 Finland opted to join Nato as a result of regional security threats caused by Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, adding some 1,300km of border frontier to the opposed blocs. According to intelligence firm GlobalData, Finland’s defence expenditure was forecast to reach $7.1bn by the end of 2025, representing an 8.4% increase over 2024 levels. (Source: army-technology.com)

 

16 Feb 26. Canada and Denmark agree on expanded defence partnership at MSC. The agreement boosts defence ties in innovation, industrial collaboration, joint activities in training, exercises, and others. Canada and the Kingdom of Denmark have formalised a Defence Cooperation Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) at the Munich Security Conference (MSC) on 13 February 2026. The agreement was signed by Canada’s Minister of National Defence David J. McGuinty alongside Denmark’s Minister of Defence Troels Lund Poulsen, Faroese Minister of Defence Sirið Stenberg, and Greenland’s Minister of Defence Vivian Motzfeldt. The memorandum sets out enhanced collaboration in areas such as defence innovation, industrial and materiel partnerships, shared logistics, and joint activities involving personnel, training, exercises, and education. It demonstrates a joint dedication to transatlantic security and bolsters coordination among Nato allies amid a challenging global security landscape.

David J. McGuinty said: “Canada is an Arctic nation—and we will defend the North. Today, this defence cooperation agreement with Denmark, Greenland and the Faroe Islands strengthens our collective deterrence and our ability to operate seamlessly with our North Atlantic Treaty Organization Allies and partners in the High North. Today, we send a clear message: the Arctic is secure, and we will keep it that way.”

This development follows progress in Canada–Denmark defence relations, notably Denmark’s inclusion in Canada’s Maritime Security Partnership, which was announced during the Nato Summit last June. Both countries seek to deepen operational collaboration in the North Atlantic and Arctic regions through these initiatives. The two nations share a 3,000-kilometre maritime border between Canada and Greenland. Canada and Denmark also share historical ties as founding members of Nato. The organisation remains central to Canada’s security policy, with continued Canadian support for its principle of collective defence. Recently, Canada outlined an additional contribution of $50m to the Danish Model for purchasing capabilities from Ukraine’s domestic industry. This brings Canada’s total funding through this channel to $190m. (Source: army-technology.com)

 

14 Feb 26. UK Carrier Strike Group to deploy to North Atlantic to keep UK safe. UK will bolster regional security by deploying a Carrier Strike Group to the North Atlantic and High North.

• UK to deploy Carrier Strike Group to the North Atlantic and High North in 2026 in a major boost for regional security.
• Powerful show of force with Royal Navy warships, F-35 jets and helicopters to deter Russian aggression and protect vital undersea infrastructure.
• Deployment will include major exercises alongside US, Canadian, and Northern European allies.

Britain will send its Carrier Strike Group back to sea in 2026 in a major show of force across the Euro-Atlantic and High North, reinforcing NATO’s deterrence at a time of rising Russian threats in the region. Known as ‘Operation Firecrest’ and led by HMS Prince of Wales – the largest warship in the Royal Navy – the UK will deploy the strike group across the North Atlantic and Arctic. It will include world-class Royal Navy warships and RAF fifth-generation F-35 fighter jets to bolster defence and security.  It comes as Russia’s military activity in the North Atlantic continues to increase. Over the past two years, there has been a 30% increase in Russian navy vessels threatening UK waters.  The deployment will see the UK and US working side-by-side on Euro-Atlantic security around the North American East Coast, boosting the historic alliance between the two nations. The Carrier Strike Group will sail across the Atlantic to visit a US port, with US jets also expected to operate from the flight deck of HMS Prince of Wales.   The deployment will include activity under NATO’s Arctic Sentry mission, launched this week, strengthening the Alliance’s security in a region where melting sea ice is opening new routes and increasing threat from hostile state activity.  With growing concern over Russian operations in the Greenland-Iceland-UK gap and the increased risk to critical undersea cables and pipelines, the deployment will send a clear message that the UK will always defend its waters, protect critical infrastructure, and stand shoulder-to-shoulder with its Allies.

Defence Secretary John Healey MP said: “I’m proud that we’re stepping up UK leadership on High North and Atlantic security. This deployment will help make Britain warfighting ready, boost our contribution to NATO, and strengthen our operations with key allies, keeping the UK secure at home and strong abroad.”

Operation Firecrest will involve thousands of personnel from all three services of the Armed Forces, demonstrating Britain’s ability to project force wherever it is needed and operate seamlessly within NATO. The Carrier Strike Group will exercise alongside NATO’s Standing Naval Maritime Group 1, itself being led by the UK, with HMS Dragon acting as the command ship of the NATO maritime group throughout 2026. Parts of the deployment will fall under NATO command, including close cooperation with operational headquarters Joint Force Command Norfolk, which is set to be under the command of a British officer for the first time.  The deployment will be carried out alongside key allies including the United States, Canada, and Joint Expeditionary Force nations, building on the UK’s growing defence cooperation in the High North and reaffirming the strength of the historic UK–US defence relationship.  This reinforces the UK’s commitment to High North security and builds on the Defence Secretary’s commitment to double the number of UK troops deployed to Norway, from 1,000 to 2,000.   It also reaffirms the Government’s commitment to stepping up on defence. The UK has committed to the largest sustained increase in defence spending since the end of the Cold War – hitting 2.6% of GDP from 2027 – to ensure that Britain and our allies are safe. The deployment follows the success of the UK’s 2025 Carrier Strike Group mission to the Indo-Pacific, which saw over 1,000 F-35 sorties and activity with over 30 nations, and resulted in the UK’s Carrier Strike Group being certified fully ‘mission ready’ and committed to NATO. (Source: https://www.gov.uk/)

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Founded in 1987, Exensor Technology is a world leading supplier of Networked Unattended Ground Sensor (UGS) Systems providing tailored sensor solutions to customers all over the world. From our Headquarters in Lund Sweden, our centre of expertise in Network Communications at Communications Research Lab in Kalmar Sweden and our Production site outside of Basingstoke UK, we design, develop and produce latest state of the art rugged UGS solutions at the highest quality to meet the most stringent demands of our customers. Our systems are in operation and used in a wide number of Military as well as Homeland Security applications worldwide. The modular nature of the system ensures any external sensor can be integrated, providing the user with a fully meshed “silent” network capable of self-healing. Exensor Technology will continue to lead the field in UGS technology, provide our customers with excellent customer service and a bespoke package able to meet every need.

A CNIM Group Company

—————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————-

Sponsored by Bertin Exensor

 

www.exensor.com

 

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12 Feb 26. India: Purchase of fighter jets will increase military capability, posture, modernisation efforts. On 11 February, India’s Defence Acquisition Council (DAC) approved an initial proposal to buy 114 Rafale fighter jets from France’s Dassault Aviation for INR 3.25trn (USD 35bn). This procurement will take India’s total Rafale fleet to 176. The purchase comes after the retirement of the MiG-21 fighter jet in September 2025, with other variants scheduled to retire in the coming years. While India has recently pushed to increase domestic manufacturing, it has historically relied on defence equipment imports. The purchase follows heightened tensions with Pakistan and China in recent years, as well as a military confrontation with Pakistan in May 2025 during which more than six of India’s jets were reportedly shot down. We assess that the acquisition of Rafale jets will enhance India’s military capability and strategic posture as it continues efforts to modernise its forces. However, questions regarding the jets’ operational reliability and performance will likely persist, particularly in light of reports of underperformance during the recent conflict with Pakistan. (Source: Sibylline)

 

12 Feb 26. Thailand-Cambodia: Landmine explosion unlikely to trigger military conflict despite tensions. At around 1640hrs (local time) on 11 February, a landmine wounded three Thai soldiers in Phlan Yao (Kantharalak district, Si Sa Ket province) near the border with Cambodia. The unit was on a security mission in Thai territory. Preliminary reports from the Thai army suggest that the landmine was left over from previous fighting. Prime Minister Anutin Charnvirakul asked units to exercise greater caution when carrying out their duties. Thailand and Cambodia engaged in military exchanges in July and December 2025, partly triggered by alleged Cambodian landmine placements (see Sibylline Situation Update Brief – 19 December 2025). We assess that this incident is unlikely to renew the conflict, as Thailand has not attributed the explosion to newly laid mines. However, tensions remain as the two countries continue to trade accusations of human rights violations and territorial infringements. Their land border is highly unlikely to be reopened in the short term, sustaining logistics and trade disruption. (Source: Sibylline)

 

12 Feb 26. Ethiopia: Possible federal deployment to Tigray is likely to drive conflict escalation in Amhara region. On 11 February, pro-Amharan ethno-nationalist media sources claimed that the Fano (an Amharan ethno-nationalist militia group) had entered Debre-Tabor, the zonal capital of South Gondar (Amhara region). They further claimed that Ethiopian federal forces responded with airstrikes within the city. While it has not been possible to corroborate the specific claims, the Fano have been making territorial advances in the South Gondar zone. This has largely been triggered by a local withdrawal of Ethiopian federal forces, possibly prior to their deployment to the Tigray region amid escalating tensions with the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF, see Sibylline Special Report – 4 December 2025). If Ethiopian forces deploy to Tigray, this will likely trigger a TPLF insurgency, absorbing considerable military resources. This will enable ethno-nationalist militias, particularly in Amhara, to make further territorial gains. This will increase the risk of attacks on the region’s major cities and key overland routes, driving staff exposure to crossfire, explosives and kidnap over the coming months. (Source: Sibylline)

 

11 Feb 26. Taiwan: Paralysis in defence budget review is likely to persist, undermining military modernisation. Earlier on 11 February, the opposition Taiwan People’s Party (TPP) agreed to schedule the government’s special defence budget for a committee review in the Legislative Yuan (LY; Taiwan’s unicameral legislature). The governing Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) originally proposed a TWD 1.3 trillion (USD 40 bn) budget; however, the TPP is also putting its TWD 400 bn (USD 12.7 bn) version forward for review. Both renditions cover expenses for the arms sales announced by the US in December 2025. The first payment instalment to the US is due by 31 March. The opposition Kuomintang (KMT) and TPP have stalled the defence budget proposal since the government first put it forward in November 2025. We assess that the LY is highly unlikely to approve the DPP’s proposed spending in full, given the TPP’s vow to check the government and the KMT’s preference to engage with China. As such, the budget is unlikely to be passed before April. Such delays are likely to undermine Taiwan’s asymmetric military capabilities and drive tensions with the US. (Source: Sibylline)

 

07 Feb 26. Ethiopia: Demands for Eritrean withdrawal reflect increasing risk of Tigray conflict resumption. On 7 February, Ethiopia formally demanded the withdrawal of Eritrean forces from Ethiopian territory and accused Eritrea of providing material support to armed groups within Ethiopia. Eritrean forces currently occupy portions of territory along the border within Tigray region, through which they have been providing the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF) with arms and supporting smuggling efforts (see Sibylline Special Report – 4 December 2025). While the statement has raised concerns of broader conflict between Ethiopia and Eritrea, it more likely indicates the increasing risk of resumed conflict within Tigray. Ethiopia’s attempts to isolate the TPLF leadership have been undermined by a reconciliation between the TPLF and Eritrea, enabling the movement of materiel along the border. Now, particularly with elections looming in June, tensions are mounting over TPLF demands to regain Western Tigray from Amharan control, resulting in clashes between TPLF-aligned militias and Amharan/federal forces in late January. As such, the demand will possibly become the justification for greater restrictions on Tigray or the deployment of federal forces to the region to secure the border. Either will risk the resumption in conflict between federal and TPLF-forces, driving exposure to cross-fire and airstrikes within Tigray, including in Mekelle. (Source: Sibylline)

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Founded in 1987, Exensor Technology is a world leading supplier of Networked Unattended Ground Sensor (UGS) Systems providing tailored sensor solutions to customers all over the world. From our Headquarters in Lund Sweden, our centre of expertise in Network Communications at Communications Research Lab in Kalmar Sweden and our Production site outside of Basingstoke UK, we design, develop and produce latest state of the art rugged UGS solutions at the highest quality to meet the most stringent demands of our customers. Our systems are in operation and used in a wide number of Military as well as Homeland Security applications worldwide. The modular nature of the system ensures any external sensor can be integrated, providing the user with a fully meshed “silent” network capable of self-healing. Exensor Technology will continue to lead the field in UGS technology, provide our customers with excellent customer service and a bespoke package able to meet every need.

A CNIM Group Company

——————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————

Sponsored by Bertin Exensor

www.exensor.com

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Military And Security Developments

Feb 13.

• Iran-US: Aircraft carrier redeployment underscores heightened likelihood of US strikes on Iran. On 12 February, US media reported that the USS Gerald R Ford (CVN-78) aircraft carrier strike group (CSG) will join the USS Abraham Lincoln (CVN-72) CSG in the Arabian Sea, within the US Central Command (CENTCOM)’s area of responsibility. Given that the USS Gerald R Ford’s most recent known position is in the Caribbean Sea, the CSG will likely enter CENTCOM between 22 and 26 February. On 12 February, US President Donald Trump reiterated threats against Iran, stating that if talks fail, it will be ‘very traumatic’ for the country. The additional CSG deployment, together with the continued reiteration of hardline positions from both countries, increases the likelihood of the US targeting Iranian military facilities, defence systems, early warning capabilities, naval assets and nuclear facilities in the coming weeks. . Meanwhile, the EU Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) has extended an earlier warning for EU airlines to remain clear of Iran’s airspace until 31 March. This decision reflects heightened military tensions and concerns over escalation; it will continue to disrupt regional air travel and supply chains, elevating operational and financial risks for downstream businesses.
• Iraq: Further clashes in Baqubah are likely in coming days, elevating safety risks. On 12 February, four mortar shells struck the outlying area of Al-Badaa in Baqubah (Diyala governorate). At the time of writing, no group has claimed responsibility and the authorities have opened an investigation. Notably, this is the first mortar attack in Baqubah in four years and likely reflects the start of a new round of fighting between tribal groups. Recent clashes between tribal groups in Baqubah have involved small arms engagements, including the use of rocket-propelled grenade (RPG) launchers. The exact cause of the fighting is unknown, but as many parts of Diyala are still contested between the Kurdish-led Erbil government and the central Baghdad government, resultant security vacuums in rural areas enable the development of armed groups, often in conflict over an array of competing claims. In the coming days, we assess that the Iraqi security forces will conduct widespread stop-and-search campaigns in Baqubah. This will increase the likelihood of clashes with local tribes and criminal groups, especially during the evening hours. These incidents will elevate bystander exposure to crossfire in the city, particularly near security facilities and checkpoints along highways.

Feb 12.

• Iran-US: Possible further US carrier deployment will increase risk of attack on Iran in coming weeks. On 11 February, international media reported that US President Donald Trump has instructed a second aircraft carrier strike group (CSG) to prepare for deployment to the Middle East. The USS Abraham Lincoln (CVN-72) CSG is already stationed in the Arabian Sea. On the same day, Trump stated that US talks with Iran would continue, despite the US military build-up and his 10 February threat that, if talks fail, the US will do ‘something very tough’. Meanwhile, on 11 February, Tehran reaffirmed that its missile capabilities are not subject to the ongoing negotiations. While the prospect of further discussions moderates the risk of an immediate escalation, no schedule for further talks has been publicly confirmed and both sides continue to assert their red lines. This reduces the likelihood of a meaningful diplomatic resolution to the crisis in the coming weeks. These factors, together with the possibility of a second CSG deployment, increase the likelihood of US military involvement in Iran in the coming weeks; any such action would likely target military facilities, defence systems, early warning capabilities and possibly naval assets and nuclear facilities.
• Syria-US: Withdrawal from strategic base will increase security risks along border with Jordan. On 11 February, Syrian officials stated that US forces had withdrawn from Al-Tanf Base (Rif Dimashq governorate) to Jordan. The officials added that Syrian forces had already taken control of the base in co-ordination with the US. The base was a critical military and logistical node for the US-led coalition to fight the Islamic State (IS) group during the Syrian civil war. The withdrawal underlines wider security co-ordination between Washington DC and Damascus, with the latter gradually increasing its control over rural border areas. However, there is a realistic possibility that the withdrawal will prompt IS to extend its attacks into central Syria and the Syrian desert (the Badiya). Such attacks are particularly likely to target military patrols and checkpoints along provincial highways, driving proximate risks to staff during overland movement. Similarly, drug trafficking cells along the border with Jordan are likely to capitalise on the move to expand their cross-border operations. This will increase the likelihood of further Jordanian airstrikes inside Syrian territory, including
Feb 11.
CONTEXT
• Iran continues to insist on limiting the scope of negotiations and reiterating its ‘red lines’. This is prompting increasingly bellicose rhetoric from the US, which has suggested it will move even more military assets to the region. We asses that stagnation in talks and rising tensions underline an increasing risk of US strikes against Iran in the coming weeks.
SCENARIO 1
• The US seeks to resolve a deadlock in negotiations through limited and highly targeted strikes. These are aimed at restoring deterrence and securing leverage, rather than initiating a prolonged war; Iran’s retaliation follows a similar calculus to mitigate regional spillover risks.
SCENARIO 2
• The US assesses that there is limited prospect of a deal with Iran and pursues regime change through military action; however, in the absence of clear progress toward its goals, the US returns to negotiations.
SCENARIO 3
• The US conducts an extensive bombing campaign to force regime change while co-ordinating with local protesters and armed groups to form an alternative government.
KEY TRIGGERS, WARNINGS AND INDICATORS (TWIs) OF US STRIKES AGAINST IRAN
CONTEXT
Earlier on 11 February, a political adviser to Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei stated that Iran’s missile capabilities are not subject to the ongoing negotiations with Washington DC. The comments come ahead of a meeting between US President Donald Trump and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu later on 11 February. Netanyahu will reportedly press Trump on widening the talks to include limits on Tehran’s missile arsenal and security threats beyond its nuclear programme. Meanwhile, on 10 February, Trump stated that if no deal is reached with Iran, the US will do ‘something very tough’. Trump further stated he was considering deploying a second aircraft carrier to join the USS Abraham Lincoln (CVN-72) aircraft carrier strike group, which is currently based in the US Central Command (CENTCOM) area of responsibility. The most recent round of talks took place in Muscat (Oman) on 6 February; while further talks have been mooted, no follow-up schedule has since been confirmed publicly. As the process appears to have stalled amid both sides reasserting their red lines, we assess that the likelihood of a short-term diplomatic settlement has decreased, while the likelihood of US military involvement in Iran in the coming days and weeks has increased. In this Middle East Crisis Update Special Edition, we consider the likelihood of three scenarios in which the US decides to proceed with strike action.
SCENARIO 1
The US seeks to resolve a deadlock in negotiations through limited and highly targeted strikes. These are aimed at restoring deterrence and securing leverage, rather than initiating a prolonged war; Iran’s retaliation follows a similar calculus to mitigate regional spillover risks.
The US strikes target military facilities, particularly air and coastal defence systems, early warning capabilities and possibly naval assets such as military ports and ships. The US is also likely to target Iranian nuclear facilities, though this is unlikely to trigger regional nuclear fallout. Israel supports the strikes through intelligence sharing but avoids engaging in direct military action. The US keeps the duration of the strike campaign limited, signalling publicly and through intermediaries that the operation is complete unless Iran escalates.
Iran is likely to calibrate its response carefully. Tehran will seek to preserve deterrence credibility, while avoiding actions that would trigger a broader US response. Iran will likely target US military assets in Bahrain and Qatar; there is also a realistic possibility that it will target assets in Iraq, Jordan and Syria. However, Iran is unlikely to target assets within the UAE and Saudi Arabia, unless these are directly utilised in the US operation. We assess that Iranian retaliation will likely prioritise military infrastructure over civilian or energy assets, thereby limiting casualties and mitigating US retaliation.
In the maritime sphere, Iran will likely also attempt to demonstrate capability by conducting limited drone or missile strikes against US naval assets, designed at most to damage vessels partially. There is a realistic possibility of harassment of commercial shipping, particularly US-affiliated or Israel-linked vessels in the Arabian Sea, Red Sea and the Arabian Gulf. Any such incidents will likely include attempts to divert vessels into Iran’s waters through coercive manoeuvres or boarding operations in the Strait of Hormuz. Such operations will increase the risk of miscalculation and misfire, raising the possibility of conflict escalation beyond Tehran’s initial objectives and into conditions more akin to those outlined in Scenarios 2 and 3 below.
Limited US strikes and Iranian retaliation will mitigate regional spillover risks, with Iranian proxies unlikely to target US assets under these conditions. However, in the days during and immediately following the exchanges between the US and Iran, regional transit will be heavily disrupted. Airspace closures, air route diversions and airline flight cancellations will be almost certain across the region. An increase in flight delays and ticket costs will also likely impact international flights, particularly those between Asia and Europe. Furthermore, such disruption will impact air cargo and supply chains relying on air shipments, increasing operational disruption and financial risks. Maritime operations that pass through Middle Eastern waterways are also likely to experience severe disruption if the Iran-backed Yemen-based Houthis resume attacks on Israel-linked shipping, particularly adjacent to the Strait of Hormuz and possibly also the Bab al-Mandab Strait. Such disruption will likely include limited availability of crews and vessels, limited shipments, increased insurance premiums and longer voyage times when bypassing the Middle East region. These will delay supply chains, elevating financial and operational risks for businesses. Furthermore, lingering disruption to air and maritime operations will remain a realistic possibility in the following month.
We assess that the US’ strikes will trigger some level of concession from Iran, such as broadening the scope of negotiations. US officials will likely claim the operation a success, mitigating the likelihood of further such action in the immediate term. However, if Tehran does not elicit any concession or statement of its willingness to negotiate, the risk of escalation to Scenarios 2 and 3 will increase.
SCENARIO 2
The US assesses that there is limited prospect of a deal with Iran and pursues regime change through military action; however, in the absence of clear progress toward its goals, the US returns to negotiations.
US launches widespread strikes, initially targeting government and military facilities. These include IRGC, Basij, Ministry of Intelligence and police facilities; government communications infrastructure; and Artesh, Air Force and naval assets. Nuclear facilities, ports and high-ranking security force personnel are also targeted. These cause substantial damage but are ultimately unsuccessful in neutralising Iran’s political leadership and associated governing structures or in undermining the stability of the regime. Airstrikes trigger broad airspace closures and disrupt airline operations, driving major delays to regional and transcontinental travel. Damage to traditional and cyber infrastructure causes widespread communications outages, significantly hampering evacuation plans, emergency response co-ordination and routine business operations. US strikes drive proximate security threats to business personnel, especially in urban areas, from direct targeting and misidentification; exposure to falling debris from Iranian air defence interceptions; drone activity; and sporadic small arms and artillery fire.
The strikes are perceived by Tehran as an existential threat. Iran retaliates within the first 24 hours with missile and drone attacks against regional US military installations, possibly including those in Bahrain, Kuwait and the UAE. Iran also issues explicit threats to restrict the navigability of the Strait of Hormuz, particularly for US and Western vessels, triggering immediate volatility in global energy markets. While Iran is unlikely to attempt a sustained, unilateral closure of the Strait, even limited harassment or interdiction activity significantly increases insurance premiums and disrupts shipping. However, Iran remains unlikely to directly strike US facilities in Saudi Arabia, seeking to avoid drawing Riyadh into the conflict.
Iran’s retaliation sustains and escalates US coercive pressure, including expanded sanctions, offensive cyber operations, seizures of Iran-linked vessels globally (though particularly in the Arabian Sea) and repeated airstrike campaigns. Commercial shipping companies increasingly avoid the Strait of Hormuz where possible, or transit only under naval escort. The likelihood of clashes between Iran’s maritime forces (the conventional navy and IRGC naval forces) and US assets increases, further compounding maritime transit disruption. As part of Iran’s response, Tehran activates regional proxy networks. Most significantly, the Houthis in Yemen resume and intensify their attacks on Western commercial vessels and US naval assets in the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden. These operations drive sustained increases in shipping rates, insurance costs and physical security risks for maritime personnel, triggering downstream operational and supply chain delays. ‘Axis of Resistance’ groups mobilise in Iraq, Lebanon and the Palestinian Territories. These groups conduct rocket, missile and drone attacks against US forces and possibly Israeli targets, while also threatening Western commercial assets.
Inside Iran, deteriorating security conditions and perceptions of regime vulnerability raise the possibility of fragmentation within the government and military. This possibly drives defections among the armed forces and limited clashes, particularly in outlying regions. Such incidents are exploited by Iran’s secessionist and ethno-nationalist movements, notably in Sistan and Baluchestan province, which simultaneously escalate attacks against security force positions and infrastructure. The perception of regime weakness triggers a resumption in anti-government activism; sporadic protests, strikes and violence disrupt local commercial markets, banking systems, ports and energy facilities. However, instability does not reach unmanageable levels for the regime and fails to trigger a coup or major rebellion (see Scenarios 2B and 2C of Sibylline Special Report – 19 January 2026). The Iranian state retains sufficient control of the armed forces to sustain its coercive capacity, while popular opposition to foreign intervention triggers an at least temporary, rally-around-the-flag effect which reduces support for, and willingness to engage in, anti-government movements.
The US sustains air and maritime operations for several weeks. However, the absence of clear progress towards regime change, combined with sustained proxy attacks, rising energy prices and widening regional instability, generates domestic political opposition in the US. Iran subsequently approaches the US through intermediaries and offers substantial concessions on a nuclear deal, though stops short of abandoning enrichment altogether. The US re-assesses and concludes that continued military pressure is unlikely to achieve decisive outcomes, will likely sustain disruption to global oil markets and complicate the domestic political environment ahead of the 2026 midterm elections. Washington DC suspends major kinetic operations and returns to negotiations, even if primarily as a means of pausing the conflict rather than resolving it.
While the US-Iran military confrontation cools in the medium term, the prospects for a durable non-kinetic outcome remain limited. The potential for domestically driven regime change persists and US red lines on nuclear enrichment remain unchanged. The conflict is effectively paused rather than resolved, sustaining a latent, heightened risk of renewed escalation over the following six to 12 months.
SCENARIO 3
The US conducts an extensive bombing campaign to force regime change while co-ordinating with local protesters and armed groups to form an alternative government.
As in Scenario 2, a lack of faith in negotiations to secure objectives prompts the US to conduct a large-scale bombing campaign utilising its bolstered regional military presence in pursuit of regime change. US strikes aim to undermine the Iranian government through extensive waves of strikes that initially decimate the country’s chain of command – specifically by targeting Supreme Leader Khamenei, as well as IRGC leaders and high-ranking army officers – causing a maximum shock effect. Simultaneously, the first strikes also neutralise Iran’s surface-to-air batteries, military communications infrastructure and early detection systems nationwide, including those within major cities and the capital Tehran. This significantly undermines the security forces’ capacity. Throughout the first days of the war, the US targets weapons storage units, ballistic missile launch pads and nationwide nuclear facilities (including those previously targeted in June 2025).
If initial strikes are unable to secure regime change, the US expands its target set to undermine state capacities. In the first week, the US likely targets law enforcement, including police and Basij facilities, IRGC provincial headquarters nationwide and the Iranian Cyber Police (FATA) headquarters in an attempt to undercut state capacity and therefore contain unrest and enforce internet blackouts. The US also attempts to degrade security at major prisons that are known to contain thousands of recently detained anti-government protesters, including Ervin prison in Tehran, triggering widespread chaos in major cities. This prompts thousands of protesters to re-mobilise. They then capitalise on the diversion of security resources towards external operations to take control of government buildings, security force weapons depots and state-owned enterprise headquarters. Additionally, Iran’s numerous secessionist movements (including Azeris, Baloches, Khuzestani Arabs and Kurds) capitalise on deteriorating security conditions to escalate their attacks on security force positions and personnel in peripheral provinces, weakening Tehran’s grip on outlying regions. In the second week of the conflict, the US conducts limited special forces operations (via ‘boots on the ground’) to seize specific high-capacity weapons and nuclear materials, as well as to conduct assassinations.
Despite the extensive strikes, Iran remains able to retaliate, launching multiple salvos of ballistic missiles targeting US assets and bases in the Gulf region, primarily al-Udeid Air Base (Qatar) and the US Naval Forces Central Command (NAVCENT, Bahrain). Iran is also able to mobilise its proxies in Iraq to launch aerial attacks against US assets in the capital Baghdad, as well as Kurdistan Region (KRI), Syria and Jordan. While the conflict intensifies and US strikes continue to degrade Iran’s military capabilities severely, Tehran resumes its ballistic and drone attacks against Israel; this prompts the latter to join the war and widens the scale of the regional conflict. It also spurs the Houthis in Yemen to resume drone strikes against Israeli cities and to target Israeli- and US-affiliated vessels (as their de facto ceasefire with Israel and the US effectively collapses).
Consequently, joint US/Israeli strikes target Iran’s coastal oil facilities, which are essentially the government’s economic artery. Major strikes target key oil facilities in Abadan (Khuzestan province), Bandar Abbas (Hormozgan province) and Kharg Island (Bushehr province), triggering widespread disruption of energy operations in Iran and Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries. Additionally, Israel specifically targets power grids inside major Iranian cities, as well as airports and dual-use infrastructure, to paralyse the government and military even further
Prolonged mutual strikes and growing domestic unrest prompt Iran to attempt to close the strategic Strait of Hormuz and escalate pressure on the international community to stop the war. Tehran possibly employs an array of tactics to achieve this, including naval mines across the narrow 21-mile (33.8km)-wide channel; it possibly also physically obstructs the chokepoint with warships and deliberately sinks vessels to block the waterway. The Strait’s closure severely disrupts crude oil exports from Iraq, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and the UAE. Within hours, global crude prices surge, triggering an immediate shock across international energy markets. Energy security risks rise sharply for major Asian importers, particularly China, India and Japan, further exacerbating global energy market disruption. In turn, elevated oil prices drive up insurance and shipping costs, further straining global supply chains. Any prolonged closure of the Strait of Hormuz substantially disrupts all GCC economies, triggering mass capital flight from the region.
Gradually, declining confidence in the regime’s stability triggers mass defections among several security force units and senior commanders. While there is a realistic possibility that this will trigger a coup (see Scenario 2B of Sibylline Special Report – 19 January 2026), this dynamic possibly also evolves into a civil conflict between anti-government elements and pro-government security forces, triggering regional chaos (see Scenario 2C in the abovementioned report, which is also our Most Dangerous scenario). In this case, the US likely attempts to co-ordinate closely with local protest leaders and anti-government forces in the hope of securing a pro-West secular government that is able to garner international political, logistical and military support. Such a process almost certainly takes months to formulate due to ongoing civil conflict and widespread unrest. Signs that autonomous governance is emerging away from Tehran’s control begin to materialise in the country’s peripheral provinces.
Meanwhile, the worsening security and economic situation in Iran drives large-scale displacement, with hundreds of thousands of refugees seeking safety in neighbouring countries, particularly Armenia, Azerbaijan, Iraq, Turkey, and Pakistan. Additionally, a significant influx of Iranian refugees into Iraq triggers ethno-religious tensions and increases the risk of intercommunal violence, especially in major urban centres such as Baghdad. In Pakistan, the arrival of Baloch refugees in Baluchistan province drives expanded recruitment by Baloch separatist groups, exacerbating security threats to personnel and critical assets operating in western Pakistan. Similarly, the movement of Iranian Kurds into Turkey and Iraq increases concerns over militant separatist activity, resulting in temporary border closures and heightened security measures; there are potential knock-on effects for cross-border trade and supply chain continuity.
KEY TRIGGERS, WARNINGS AND INDICATORS (TWIs) OF US STRIKES AGAINST IRAN
• A second US aircraft carrier arrives in the region
• The US confirms that the second round of talks has concluded without concessions from Iran
• Iran continues to refuse to broaden negotiations; it also continues to reiterate (publicly) red lines and resistance to US pressure
• US government spokespeople increase the frequency of statements underscoring the national security threat posed by Iran’s nuclear and weapons programmes
• Israeli officials also begin to escalate rhetoric underlining the threat posed by Iran, possibly citing concerns that its nuclear programme is more intact than previously assessed
• Widespread evacuation alerts are issued by Western governments and businesses
• A substantial mobilisation is observed at US bases in GCC countries, particularly Bahrain and Qatar
• US troop deployments are reshuffled in Iraq, Jordan and Syria• Syria: Energy investment in north-eastern region will be challenged by persistent attack risks. On 10 February, international media reported that several Saudi and US energy companies are set to form a consortium to explore oil and gas in five blocs in north-eastern Syria. The consortium includes Saudi Arabia’s ACWA Power and TAQA, as well as the US’ Argent LNG, Baker Hughes and Hunt Energy. The exploration blocs are likely to be located in the former Kurdish-controlled areas in north-eastern Euphrates region, including Al-Hasakah and Raqqa governorates. These areas recently came under the control of Damascus following a series of military operations earlier this year. However, a possible insurgency by radical Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) elements will remain a key security risk in eastern Euphrates region. Together with risks of an Islamic State (IS) resurgence and threats of cross-border infiltration and aerial attacks by Iran-backed groups from Iraq, the security environment in the region will remain unstable over 2026.
• Syria: Energy investment in north-eastern region will be challenged by persistent attack risks. On 10 February, international media reported that several Saudi and US energy companies are set to form a consortium to explore oil and gas in five blocs in north-eastern Syria. The consortium includes Saudi Arabia’s ACWA Power and TAQA, as well as the US’ Argent LNG, Baker Hughes and Hunt Energy. The exploration blocs are likely to be located in the former Kurdish-controlled areas in north-eastern Euphrates region, including Al-Hasakah and Raqqa governorates. These areas recently came under the control of Damascus following a series of military operations earlier this year. However, a possible insurgency by radical Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) elements will remain a key security risk in eastern Euphrates region. Together with risks of an Islamic State (IS) resurgence and threats of cross-border infiltration and aerial attacks by Iran-backed groups from Iraq, the security environment in the region will remain unstable over 2026.
• Turkey: Ministerial appointment underscores judiciary’s politicisation; opposition repression is likely. Earlier on 11 February, Turkey’s President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan appointed former Istanbul Chief Public Prosecutor Akın Gürlek as Minister of Justice. As chief prosecutor, Gürlek oversaw several high-profile investigations involving the opposition Republican People’s Party (CHP). These cases include the arrest and imprisonment of Istanbul (Istanbul province) Mayor and CHP presidential candidate Ekrem İmamoğlu in March 2025 for corruption, as well as criminal and civil proceedings against CHP leader Özgür Özel. We assess that these were almost certainly politicised cases amid a state crackdown on the opposition ahead of possible early elections and/or constitutional reform efforts, which are likely intended to consolidate Erdoğan’s power (see Sibylline Special Report – 2 June 2025). Gürlek’s appointment underscores the increasing politicisation of the judiciary in Turkey. As minister, he has significant indirect influence over criminal investigations, pre-trial detention practices and cases that could result in political bans. Additionally, Gürlek will play a role in drafting legislative proposals related to criminal law, political party regulations and aspects of the electoral framework. Although subject to parliamentary approval, Erdoğan’s governing alliance maintains a parliamentary quorum, increasing the likelihood of further measures aimed at repressing opposition activity in the coming months.
Feb 10.
• Iran-US: Maritime advisory underscores risk of Iran seizing US-flagged vessels in coming weeks. On 9 February, the US Maritime Administration (MARAD) issued an advisory notice warning that US-flagged vessels should remain as far as safely possible from Iran’s territorial waters while navigating the Strait of Hormuz. This comes after Iranian gunboats unsuccessfully attempted to intercept a US-flagged oil tanker in the strait on 3 February, amid heightened bilateral diplomatic and military tensions. We assess that Iran will possibly attempt further seizures of US-linked commercial vessels in the Strait of Hormuz and the Gulf of Oman in the coming weeks, as an attempt to gain diplomatic leverage in ongoing nuclear negotiations. Moreover, with Iran refusing to concede on the issue of domestic nuclear enrichment, there remains a realistic possibility that talks will collapse in the coming days or weeks, increasing the risk of military escalation and retaliatory action by Tehran against US-linked shipping. MARAD has advised crews not to deny boarding forcibly. This underscores significant security risks to on-board personnel during such events, including possible exposure to crossfire, aggressive manoeuvring to avoid small-vessel approaches and the risk of injury or damage from nearby helicopter activity.
• Israel: Further anti-government protests, strikes by ethnic-Arab communities are likely in February. Earlier on 10 February, several protests by Israel’s ethnic-Arab community erupted in Beersheba (Southern district), Haifa (Haifa district), Jerusalem (Jerusalem district) and Tel Aviv (Tel Aviv district). The police have detained five protesters who poured dye into public fountains in Haifa and Tel Aviv. The authorities also arrested two protesters who blocked the road entrance to Jerusalem at the Chords Bridge. These actions are part of the National Day of Disruption announced by ethnic-Arab activists in Israel, denouncing police neglect of their communities’ safety amid rising violence. The demonstrations come two weeks after thousands of ethnic-Arab protesters marched in Sakhnin (Northern) and Rahat (Southern). Further protests and strike action across Israel are likely in the coming days and weeks. These will sustain elevated risks of business and travel disruption, including the blockade of critical thoroughfares such as Tel Aviv’s Highway 20 (also known as Ayalon Highway). Bystander risks will remain elevated near protest locations, particularly outside Sakhnin’s Misgav police station, where there is an elevated risk of clashes between radical protesters and the security forces. However, hospitals and education facilities are unlikely to be impacted significantly.
Feb 07.
• Iran-US: Breakthrough in talks is unlikely in coming days, sustaining risk of US strikes. On 8 February, Iranian foreign minister Abbas Araghchi reiterated that Tehran will never accept the full suspension of its uranium enrichment. Araghchi added that any discussions on the topic should accept enrichment for peaceful purposes, implying that Iranian negotiators will likely attempt to focus talks on the level and purity of enrichment. Furthermore, Araghchi added that the topic of Iran’s missile programme will be excluded from any talks with the US. The statements underscore the lack of movement in Iran’s negotiating position on two key flashpoints; Araghchi did not mention Tehran’s support for proxies across the region. This will render diplomatic breakthroughs unlikely in the coming days. In addition, there is a realistic possibility that Iran’s arrests of members in the Reformists Front political alliance on 8 February will further complicate the next round of US-Iran talks. As such, the collapse of negotiations in the next two weeks remains a realistic possibility. This will significantly elevate the risk of US strikes against Iran in the coming weeks amid its ongoing military build-up in the region.
• Israel-Palestinian Territories: New West Bank regulation to elevate ethno-religious, diplomatic tensions. On 8 February, Israel’s security cabinet eased restrictions on land purchases by Israeli citizens in the West Bank and granted the authorities expanded enforcement powers over religious and archaeological sites in the territory. This move undermines the ‘Hebron Protocol’ (a part of the 1995 ‘Oslo II’ accord) by transferring licensing and construction authority in the Cave of the Patriarchs and settlement areas of Hebron (Hebron governorate) from the Palestinian Authority (PA) to Israel. This will enable Israeli settlers to expand existing projects and undertake new construction in Hebron, heightening significant ethno-religious tensions in the city and exacerbating attack risks and associated security threats to nearby business personnel and assets. Additionally, such regulatory changes will allow Israeli citizens to purchase land directly from Palestinian residents without a transaction permit, reducing domestic compliance risks for prospective buyers and facilitating accelerated settlement expansion across the West Bank. We assess that this will likely elevate diplomatic tensions between Israel and allied countries. However, amid heightened tensions between the West and Iran, this is unlikely to result in significant and immediate repercussions for Israel-linked businesses. (Source: Sibylline)
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Military And Security Developments
Feb 11.
• Ukraine: Possible election, referendum will complicate negotiation process with Russia, US. Earlier on 11 February, the Financial Times (FT) reported that Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky is expected to announce plans on 24 February (the fourth anniversary of Russia’s full-scale invasion) to hold a presidential election and a referendum. However, an unspecified insider in Zelensky’s office has denied such plans. The conflicting reports come amid indications that US President Donald Trump’s administration is pushing for an end to the war by spring or early summer. The Trump administration is reportedly pressing Ukraine to hold both votes by 15 May or risk losing proposed US security guarantees (see Sibylline Special Report – 5 February 2026). According to the FT, the Ukrainian parliament could use March and April to work through the legal changes required to enable voting under wartime conditions. We assess that this timeline is ambitious, though a vote in some form could realistically take place this year. However, even if Ukraine were to hold elections in mid-May, polling has consistently showed that a majority of Ukrainians are against ceding territory to Russia. As such, if Ukrainians (realistically) reject the terms of a peace deal in a referendum, Russia would likely reject any renegotiations and justify continuing its war thereafter. This in turn would increase the risk of US pressure on Kyiv to agree to terms anyway, which would possibly destabilise the incoming government.
Feb 10.
KEY DEVELOPMENTS
• DONETSK: Over recent weeks, Russian forces have been slowly advancing in Pokrovsk (Donetsk oblast), controlling nearly the entire town, according to geolocated satellite imagery
• STRIKES: Over the past week, Russia continued its systematic targeting of Ukraine’s energy infrastructure, causing rolling blackouts nationwide and an effective halving of the output of Ukraine’s remaining nuclear power plants
• TERRITORY: Additional Russian demands for recognition of its territorial claims will highly likely further complicate the already fraught issue during peace negotiations, likely adding to further delays
• FORECAST: Despite the emergence of deadlines for when the US wants the war to end, we assess that a lasting peace deal is unlikely in the coming months given the limited change to the strategic drivers influencing decision makers and the lack of tangible results from talks so far
• OFFENSIVES: On 5 February, a prominent Ukrainian military observer stated that the Russian command has initiated preparations for a summer offensive, which he expects to begin in late April. The Ukrainian source outlined the main directions for Russia’s potential offensive – the Sloviansk-Kramatorsk axis, which encompasses the key cities of the fortress belt in Donetsk oblast; and the Orikhiv-Zaporizhzhia axis (Zaporizhzhia oblast). The offensive could prioritise one of these fronts or both simultaneously, depending on conditions.
• OFFENSIVES: Ahead of any summer offensive, the Russian command is likely to build up reserves, gather weapons and supplies, covertly move troops into starting positions and reinforce air defence and electronic warfare measures. According to the above-mentioned Ukrainian military observer, the Russian command’s main challenge is that frontline units remain bogged down in tactical operations, preventing them from advancing at the pace required to meet command deadlines. We assess that this has remained a recurrent issue for Russian forces. Furthermore, Moscow reportedly does not wish to use its strategic reserves – which it has been accumulating since the autumn of 2025 – to support an offensive. As such, the Russian command is confronted with the choice of either potentially delaying a scheduled summer offensive from less advantageous positions (which the command has been reticent to do in the past), or risking an early deployment of strategic reserves in a bid to maintain the offensive’s momentum.
• OFFENSIVES: We assess that another determining factor for future Russian offensives will be Ukraine’s operational situation and the Kremlin’s perception of it, which may not be accurate. Ukraine faces growing difficulties stemming from personnel and equipment shortages. These continue to undermine the country’s defensive operations and therefore are likely to facilitate Russian offensive opportunities. However, the precise timing and intensity of a renewed offensive remains unclear, particularly given the nature of Russia’s campaigns. Moscow’s campaigns maintain a high tempo of attacks for prolonged periods of time, making it difficult to ascertain precisely when and where a specific ‘offensive’ has begun.
• DONETSK: Over recent weeks, Russian forces have been slowly advancing in Pokrovsk (Donetsk oblast), controlling nearly the entire town, according to geolocated satellite imagery. The Ukrainian analytical group DeepState has confirmed the extremely difficult situation faced by remaining Ukrainian forces in northern Pokrovsk and its surrounding areas. According to DeepState, Russian forces are conducting extensive remote mining with drones, complicating the resupply of Ukrainian troops that remain in isolated defensive positions. The group also highlighted Ukraine’s failed attempts to redeploy personnel with armoured vehicles, which were reportedly destroyed systematically by Russia’s battlefield air interdiction efforts. We previously assessed that this was a likely outcome if Ukrainian forces attempted such a move. In Myrnohrad (directly east of Pokrovsk; Donetsk oblast), Russian forces are massing personnel to complete the settlement’s capture, where Ukrainian troops are reportedly operating in the north. Meanwhile, Russian forces are also building pressure on Rodynske (located to the north of Pokrovsk; Donetsk oblast), underscoring the intense pressure across the entire sector.
• STRIKES: Over the past week, Russia continued its systematic targeting of Ukraine’s energy infrastructure, causing rolling blackouts nationwide. Overnight on 6-7 February, Russia launched a significant combined strike including 408 drones and 39 missiles. This is Moscow’s second strike of over 400 aerial threats since the end of the moratorium on attacks against energy infrastructure. The strike targeted multiple power-generating facilities, including 750 kilovolt (kV) and 330 kV substations that form the backbone of Ukraine’s energy grid, thermal power plants and electric substations linked to nuclear power plants. State-owned energy company Ukrenergo reported that following the strike, all nuclear power plants were forced to reduce generation, effectively halving Ukraine’s nuclear power output. Following the 7 February attack, Ukraine has asked neighbouring Poland for emergency energy assistance to stabilise the grid.
• STRIKES: Ukraine carried out strikes inside Russia using domestically produced missiles, underscoring its ongoing efforts to reduce reliance on Western-made projectiles. On 5 February, Ukraine’s General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces had targeted Russia’s Kapustin Yar airfield (Astrakhan oblast) in January, employing the domestically developed FP-5 Flamingo cruise missile. The Kapustin Yar airfield, located around 370 miles (595km) from Ukraine-held territory, is used for pre-launch preparations of medium and intercontinental-range ballistic missiles (MRBMs and ICBMs, respectively). The airfield has previously been identified as the launch site for Russia’s Oreshnik intermediate-range ballistic missile (IRBM). According to the Ukrainian General Staff, the site sustained varying degrees of damage. While these claims remain difficult to verify, if the strike took place, it would underscore the growing utility of Ukraine’s indigenous MRBM capabilities.
POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS
• NUCLEAR: On 5 February, US President Donald Trump called for an improved, modernised nuclear treaty rather than extending the now-expired New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START) with Russia. Trump has previously advocated for a deal that also includes China (though Chinese involvement remains unlikely in the medium term), which will reduce the likelihood of a new treaty replacing New START in the coming months. Axios reported on 5 February, citing unspecified insiders, that both sides were closing in on an agreement to observe the terms of the expired pact for at least another six months. The outlet claimed that negotiations on a potential new deal would take place during this period. While we cannot confirm this, if true, the lack of a formalised extension will elevate the risk of covert nuclear proliferation. However, the lapse of New START will almost certainly not increase the already remote threat of nuclear war in the medium term.
• TERRITORY: Additional Russian demands for recognition of its territorial claims will highly likely further complicate the already fraught issue during peace negotiations. On 5 February, an unspecified ‘Western’ insider told Russian news agency Tass that Russia seeks international recognition of the Donbas as Russian territory as part of a peace treaty. According to this unnamed source, the Russian side views recognition of the region (which comprises Ukraine’s Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts) by all countries as part of a ‘larger agreement’.
• TERRITORY: Russia has repeatedly insisted that Ukraine withdraw from the Donbas and has linked the prospect of any peace deal to Russian control over the region in recent months. However, Moscow has until now made significantly fewer demands that its annexed territory be officially recognised by the international community. However, in April 2025, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov did say that international recognition of Russia’s ‘ownership’ of Crimea, as well as the Russian-annexed Donetsk, Kherson, Luhansk and Zaporizhzhia oblasts, is ‘imperative’.
• TERRITORY: However, international recognition of the Donbas as de jure part of Russia would almost certainly make any territorial deal harder for Ukraine to accept politically. Recent polling from the Kyiv International Institute of Sociology (KIIS) shows that over half of Ukrainians (52%) oppose ceding the Donbas region in exchange for Western-provided security guarantees, while 40% consider such an arrangement acceptable. Numerous decision-makers across the West have discussed the possibility of accepting de facto but not de jure Russian control over the annexed territories, akin to the de facto acceptance (but never legal recognition) of the Soviet occupation of the Baltic states. If Moscow doubles down on this demand, this will realistically further delay any potential peace deal, which we continue to assess is unlikely to end the war entirely in the short-to-medium term in any case. Lavrov stated earlier on 10 February that there is still a ‘long way to go’ on negotiations and warned against US ‘enthusiasm’ following recent negotiations in Abu Dhabi (UAE). While Lavrov is not a central Russian negotiator and his influence has likely diminished in recent years, his statements likely reflect Russian expectations that negotiations will prove protracted.
• EXPORTS: On 8 February, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky announced plans to establish ten weapons export centres across Europe, including in the Baltic and Nordic countries. He also stated that production of Ukrainian drones will begin in Germany by mid-February, with fully operational production lines similar to those already in place in the UK. These developments highlight Kyiv’s continued efforts to expand arms production and leverage Ukraine’s battlefield experience. We assess that this approach is likely to strengthen Ukraine’s defence industrial base by increasing its resilience through diversifying its clients beyond the Ukrainian Ministry of Defence, and improve its long-term sustainability if and when the war ends (or pauses).
FORECAST
NEGOTIATIONS: Despite the emergence of various deadlines for when the US wants the war to end, our assessment remains that a lasting peace deal is unlikely in the coming months given the limited change in the strategic drivers influencing major decision-makers and the lack of tangible results from talks so far. The second round of trilateral talks between Russia, Ukraine and the US took place in Abu Dhabi (UAE) on 4 and 5 February. Those consultations resulted in the two sides agreeing to exchange 314 prisoners of war (POWs), the first such swap since October 2025. This notably countered President Zelensky’s earlier assertion that Russia had suspended POW negotiations. Zelensky has nevertheless confirmed that there was an agreement to hold another round of negotiations soon, potentially in the US, though no date has been formally announced as of the time of writing.
Reuters reported on 6 February that Ukrainian and US negotiators had discussed the prospect of reaching a peace deal in March, which we assess is an overly ambitious goal – though a temporary ceasefire remains more plausible. According to unspecified insiders, an agreement for ending the war would be put to a referendum in Ukraine and national elections would take place simultaneously. Ukrainian and US officials reportedly discussed the possibility of holding these votes in May. However, Ukraine would almost certainly face a myriad of organisational and security challenges in organising elections. Ukraine’s Central Electoral Commission assessed in late January that the authorities would need six months to prepare for elections (which are not possible under current martial law conditions). Rushed elections with minimal or no Western security protections would almost certainly allow Russia to attempt to destabilise the vote. Even if Ukraine were to hold elections, Ukrainians could realistically reject the terms of a peace deal, especially if the concessions are deemed to be overly preferable to Russia (especially concerning territory, given that polls have consistently shown a majority of Ukrainians against ceding the Donbas).
Meanwhile, Zelensky stated on 7 February that the US wants Russia and Ukraine to end the war before the start of summer or ‘by June’. According to him, the Trump administration will likely pressure the warring parties to meet this timeframe. However, numerous previous timelines imposed by Trump have come and gone with little impact on the negotiations. At present, the positions of Russia and Ukraine on key issues, namely territory, remain far removed, with negotiations yet to bring the two sides closer to an agreement (at least publicly). It remains possible that further progress has been made behind closed doors, but we continue to see little shift in the strategic drivers influencing key decision-makers in Moscow (in particular) that would make them believe a peace deal is currently in their interests. By contrast, growing pressure on the battlefield will likely increase the readiness of Kyiv to agree to a peace treaty in 2026, though the precise terms will determine whether this is politically acceptable, or whether a referendum will delay any decision. In this case, we assess that US pressure will most likely be directed towards Ukraine based on Washington DC’s assessment that it can more easily influence the strategic drivers impacting Ukraine’s willingness for peace, whereas it cannot (or does not wish to) influence the strategic drivers impacting Russia.
Both the sources cited in the Reuters article and Zelensky acknowledged the significance of the US November midterm elections to negotiating timelines, signalling how Washington DC’s priorities will likely shift over the coming months. Unspecified insiders told Reuters that the US negotiating team has informed Ukrainian officials that Trump is likely to focus on domestic affairs as the midterms approach. As a result, they stated that senior US officials will have less time to focus on reaching a peace accord. Consequently, the Kremlin could potentially perceive that it is in its interest to secure a deal by November (particularly if the Trump administration aligns more with Russia’s terms to end the war in the coming months). However, we assess that Moscow is more likely to maintain its belief that it can outlast the West and Ukraine. The Kremlin will likely perceive that the emergence of various domestic and international priorities will steadily reduce international attention to Ukraine, vindicating Moscow’s long-term attritional strategy.
Lastly, France’s decision to send its top diplomat to Moscow for negotiations reflects a break from Europe’s previous stance on engaging with Russia, though Europe is likely to remain broadly sidelined in ongoing US-mediated peace talks. Various reports have stated that Emmanuel Bonne, French President Emmanuel Macron’s diplomatic advisor, held talks on 3 February with Russian officials, including Russian presidential aide Yuri Ushakov. During the first phase of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, France was notably in a minority in Europe, given its calls for continued dialogue with Russia. While it later ended that policy, Macron is likely returning to France’s earlier position in a bid to increase European involvement in the peace process – which has been sidelined to a significant extent. According to Bloomberg, the purpose of Bonne’s visit was to convey to Russia that Europe must be involved in any decisions concerning European security and that European countries will not ‘rubber-stamp’ a deal to end the war. Despite France’s willingness to engage in talks with Russia and advocate for greater European involvement in the peace process, we assess that Moscow will highly likely continue to view Europe as an impediment to peace over the coming months and prefer a trilateral approach, as seen in the Abu Dhabi (UAE) talks.
Feb 07.
• Ukraine: IMF will likely agree to essential loan despite revisions to required tax bill. On 6 February, Bloomberg reported that Ukraine is seeking to amend a tax bill required by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) to secure a USD 8 bn loan. The IMF had required Kyiv to abolish several tax exemptions as part of broader efforts to counter tax evasion and avoidance and broaden the country’s tax base. The finance minister initially proposed introducing value-added tax (VAT) for self-employed entrepreneurs with annual revenues above UAH 1 m (over USD 23,000); Ukrainian businesses typically rely on such structures to minimise tax liabilities. However, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky and Prime Minister Yuliia Svyrydenko opposed such tax rises, likely due to concerns over public backlash. In response, the finance ministry plans to water down the legislation by increasing the VAT revenue threshold either to UAH 2 m (over USD 47,000) or UAH 4 m (around USD 93,400). The IMF refused to comment on the development. Nevertheless, we assess that the Fund will likely remain flexible and agree to disburse the loan, which is essential for Ukraine to cover its current financial gaps.
• Russia-EU: New sanctions alone will unlikely force Moscow to end war in coming months. On 6 February, the EU unveiled its twentieth sanctions package against Russia. According to European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen, the new tranche of punitive measures targets Russian energy, financial services and trade. The main element of the proposed measures is the introduction of a full ban on the provision of maritime services, namely insurance, shipping or port access, to vessels transporting Russian crude. Separately, the sanctions target an additional 20 Russian regional banks, and the bloc will also take measures against cryptocurrencies, including companies that trade them and platforms which enable trading. Von der Leyen has called on EU member states to endorse the new sanctions package ahead of the fourth anniversary of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine. However, the new proposed sanctions alone are highly unlikely to push the Kremlin to reconsider the cost-benefit of continuing the conflict in the near-to-medium term. We continue to assess that Russia is highly likely willing to endure further economic hardship in pursuit of its maximalist war objectives. (Source: Sibylline)

 

11 Feb 26. A Czech initiative sourcing ammunition for Ukraine aims to secure shells worth five bn euros ($5.95 bn) globally but has only managed to raise 1.4 bn euros so far, a senior NATO military official said on Wednesday.
The programme, involving foreign donors including Germany, Denmark and the Netherlands alongside Czech defence officials and arms companies, seeks to acquire large-calibre ammunition for Ukraine to reduce its disadvantage on the battlefield against Russia.
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In December, NATO’s Ukraine mission, NSATU, projected the initiative would deliver 1.8 m artillery rounds in 2025, constituting 43% of all ammunition supplied to Kyiv, and roughly 70% of the legacy Soviet calibre ammunition.
The official, who spoke on condition of anonymity, noted 16 bn euros worth of ammunition were available on the global market currently.
NATO is targeting a five-bn-euro expenditure focused predominantly on acquiring hundreds of thousands of artillery shells under the Czech scheme, the official said, adding that 1.4 bn euros had been committed by donors so far.
Last year, donors gave around $4.8 bn to pay for ammunition supplies under the programme, former Foreign Minister Jan Lipavsky said in December. The Czech contribution has been up to 3 bn crowns ($145.15 m).($1 = 0.8398 euros)(Source: Reuters)

 

12 Feb 26. UK announces urgent new air defence package for Ukraine worth over half a billion pounds.
New half a bn pound package of air defence for Ukraine, including £150 m for NATO PURL, and additional 1,000 UK-manufactured missiles.
The UK has announced it will urgently provide new air defence missiles and systems worth over £500 m to protect Ukraine from Putin’s brutal attacks on energy sites and homes, as the Defence Secretary co-chairs the 33rd meeting of the Ukraine Defence Contact Group today (12th February 2026) at the NATO headquarters in Brussels.
The Defence Secretary will confirm that the UK will for the first time provide £150 m to the NATO Prioritised Ukraine Requirements List (PURL) initiative, which ensures the rapid delivery of air defence interceptors to defend Ukraine’s skies.
The PURL initiative sees NATO coordinating the purchase of world-class defence equipment from the United States for the defence of Ukraine.
At the same time, the UK is set to deliver an additional 1,000 Lightweight Multirole Missiles (LMMs), manufactured in Belfast, that will be critical to defending Ukrainian infrastructure and cities from Russia’s escalating drone and missile attacks.
This £390 m deal builds on the deepening collaboration between UK and Ukrainian industry to transfer production and support of Rapid Ranger launchers and command and control vehicles to Ukraine.
The coming months will also see the UK deliver an additional 1,200 air defence missiles and 200,000 rounds of artillery ammunition for Ukraine’s defenders through the Air Defence Consortium (ADC).
Defence Secretary John Healey MP said:
As we approach the fifth year of Putin’s full scale invasion, the UK and our allies are more committed than ever to supporting Ukraine.
I’m proud of the UK’s continued leadership and pleased to confirm a new half a bn pound package of air defence, including £150 m for PURL, to help Ukrainians defend against Putin’s relentless drone and missile attacks.
The UDCG meeting of 50 nations will be co-chaired by the UK and the German Defence Minister Boris Pistorius, and attended by Ukrainian Defence Minister Mykhailo Fedorov, NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte and Australian Deputy Prime Minister Richard Marles.
Ukraine’s supporters will discuss the country’s key military needs for 2026, share battlefield insights, plan equipment deliveries, and identify the gaps that need to be addressed.
The UK stepped up to co-lead the Ukraine Defence Contact Group with Germany, as well as the Coalition of the Willing with France, last year. Both the Prime Minister and Defence Secretary have been clear that the UK’s national security – the foundation of the Government’s Plan for Change – starts in Ukraine. (Source: https://www.gov.uk/)

 

10 Feb 26. Ukraine’s Zelenskiy: changes under way in air defence, other areas. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskiy assembled his top military officers on Tuesday to discuss shortcomings in air defence and other aspects of protecting civilians from attack nearly four years into Russia’s war in Ukraine.
Zelenskiy, speaking in his nightly video address, also assessed how local authorities in Ukraine’s cities were tackling the aftermath of massive Russian attacks, particularly in ensuring high-rise apartments had power and heating. He again singled out for criticism officials in the capital Kyiv.
Zelenskiy said he held long discussions with the military’s Commander-in-Chief, Oleksandr Syrskyi, the chief of the general staff, Andrii Hnatov, and Defence Minister Mykhailo Fedorov.
“Many changes are happening right now in the work of air defence. In some regions, the way teams operate, interceptors, mobile fire units, the entire small air defence component is being practically rebuilt completely,” Zelenskiy said.
“But this is only one element of defence that requires changes. Changes will happen.”
UKRAINE SEEKS MORE WEAPONRY
The president has frequently pointed to improved air defences as critical to protecting cities from air attacks and has asked Kyiv’s Western allies to provide more weaponry to knock out incoming missiles and drones.
Last week, with heating still not restored to hundreds of dwellings after air raids targeting energy infrastructure, he said defence lines in some areas were proving inefficient.
Energy Minister Denys Shmyhal, writing on Telegram after the daily meeting of officials on energy issues, said crews were working around the clock to restore heating in Kyiv, where night-time temperatures were set to hit -19 Celsius (-2 Fahrenheit).
After meeting with the top brass, Zelenskiy said Kharkiv and Poltava regions in central and northeastern Ukraine were also having difficulties with electricity, as well as parts of Odesa region on the Black Sea.
He renewed criticism of decision-makers in Kyiv, where he has been at odds with Mayor Vitali Klitschko, as well as in his hometown of Kryvyi Rih and Okhtyrka near the Russian border.
“Every community leader and responsible service must pay real attention to what is happening with buildings, with networks,” he said. “We are monitoring at all levels and people will be held personally responsible.” (Source: Reuters)

 

09 Feb 26. Ukraine has launched Mission Control, a first-of-its-kind digital command-and-control system designed to unify planning, execution and reporting for all drone operations across the country, as Kyiv seeks more innovative ways to move the frozen front line on the battlefield after almost four years of Russia’s full-scale invasion.
The new system sits inside DELTA, Ukraine’s battlefield management ecosystem — an operational platform that already connects sensors and shooters across air, land, maritime, cyber, and space domains.
Ukrainian drone crews enter operational data into the system, including drone type, launch location, flight route, and mission task, which generates reports on real battlefield activity, according to officials. The process is meant to eliminate paper reports, facilitating an immediate analysis of battlefield conditions and strike effectiveness.
Mission Control represents Kyiv’s latest push to turn improvised war-fighting into a standardized, data-driven operation, echoing the sensor-to-shooter integration Western militaries have sought for decades.
The rollout comes as Ukraine positions its wartime data trove as leverage in peace negotiations — and as a touchpoint for deeper integration with allies.
“We will create a system that allows them to develop their software solutions utilizing our data,” Defense Minister Mykhailo Fedorov told reporters days before launching Mission Control, per Reuters. “Currently, data from the front lines holds immense value.”
Although Fedorov announced the system’s kickoff just last month, officials have been working on the concept for years as a means to level the playing field against Russia’s military numerical overmatch, Ukraine, Deputy Defense Minister Lt. Col. Yuriy Myronenko told Military Times last week.
“We are a very different country from our enemy,” Myronenko said. “They have a lot of resources, people, money, and a lot of Soviet units, storage, ammunition, and a lot of things.”
Myronenko served as a combat commander fighting with drones in Ukraine’s southern front in 2023, then led the DELTA development group, then oversaw national cyber defense and drone procurement before moving to his current post. (Source: Defense News)

 

08 Feb 26. Ukraine imposes sanctions on foreign suppliers of components for Russian missiles. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskiy said on Sunday that he was imposing sanctions on some foreign manufacturers of components for Russian drones and missiles used against Ukraine.
“Producing this weaponry would be impossible without critical foreign components, which the Russians continue to obtain by circumventing sanctions,” Zelenskiy said on X.
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“We are introducing new sanctions precisely against such companies – component suppliers, as well as missile and drone manufacturers. I have signed the relevant decisions.”
According to two decrees published by the Ukrainian presidency, targets of the sanctions include several Chinese companies as well as companies from the former Soviet Union, the United Arab Emirates and Panama.
Despite negotiations to end the four-year war, Russia has sharply increased the scale and number of missile and drone strikes on Ukraine in recent months, focusing its attacks on the energy and logistics sectors.
Zelenskiy said on X that in the past week, Russia had launched more than 2,000 attack drones, 1,200 guided aerial bombs, and 116 missiles of various types at Ukraine’s cities and villages. (Source: Reuters)

 

07 Feb 26. Africa’s largest private defence company moves to supply Ukraine with new armoured vehicle.
South Africa-based defence and aerospace manufacturer Paramount Group is seeking to establish a presence in Ukraine’s rapidly expanding armoured vehicle market, signalling Africa’s growing role in global defence supply chains even as Pretoria maintains complex diplomatic ties with Russia.
Africa’s largest private defence company moves to supply Ukraine with new armoured vehicle
• Paramount Group is a South African defence and aerospace manufacturer extending its operations to Ukraine’s armoured vehicle market.
• This expansion reflects Africa’s growing influence in global defence industries and involves leveraging European partnerships, such as Paramount Greece.
• The company introduced the OWL vehicle, adapted for Ukraine with enhanced protection features to address modern combat challenges.
• Paramount’s expansion aligns with its historical collaboration with Ukraine in areas like armoured vehicle production and aviation modernization.
Paramount Group, the Sandton-based defence manufacturer founded by South African entrepreneur Ivor Ichikowitz, is entering Ukraine’s fast-growing military procurement market as the war reshapes defence supply chains.
The company, which supplies armoured vehicles, aircraft, naval systems and defence technologies to customers in more than 25 countries across several continents, is expanding internationally as South Africa navigates ties with Moscow while adhering to a policy of non-alignment, amid heightened Western scrutiny.
European subsidiary leads push
The expansion is being spearheaded by Paramount Greece, the company’s European subsidiary operating through Paramount Industries Greece S.A., positioning the firm within European and NATO-linked defence markets.
According to Ukrainian defence outlet Oboronka, the unit earlier this year showcased a locally adapted Mbombe 4 vehicle to Ukrainian defence stakeholders, marking one of Paramount’s most direct engagements with a conflict-zone customer in Europe.
The vehicle is part of the Mbombe family of mine-protected combat platforms designed for high-threat environments. The name “Mbombe” honours a Zulu warrior and signals a focus on protection and durability.
Defence Blog reported that the Ukrainian-configured variant has been designated the OWL, incorporating battlefield lessons from local forces with enhancements focused on resistance to artillery fragments, landmines and small-arms fire, persistent threats that continue to shape procurement priorities.
Integration is being handled by Military Armored Company HUB (MAC HUB), Paramount’s local partner.
The platform draws on the Kalyani M4, produced in India under licence from Bharat Forge, highlighting the increasingly cross-border nature of modern defence manufacturing.
The company introduced the OWL vehicle, adapted for Ukraine with enhanced protection features to address modern combat challenges.
Engineered for blast protection
According to Oleksandr Dubyna, director of MAC HUB, the OWL is the second, and largest, model in the company’s lineup, developed over an 18-month engineering cycle in collaboration with Paramount Greece.
“The main feature of this vehicle is that it has the highest level of mine protection in Ukraine and was designed from the outset on a fully welded monocoque chassis,” chief designer Viktor said.
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Pretoria’s geopolitical tightrope
The expansion comes as South Africa navigates a sensitive geopolitical position over the Russia-Ukraine war, with Pretoria seeking to preserve diplomatic ties with both Kyiv and Moscow.
While maintaining longstanding relations with Russia, the government says it follows a policy of non-alignment and supports diplomatic efforts to end the conflict.
Paramount’s move into Ukraine, however, signals how some South African companies are pursuing overseas opportunities independently of the country’s delicate diplomatic balancing.
Despite filing for Chapter 11 bankruptcy protection in the United States in 2024 after a prolonged business dispute, listing assets of $500 m to $1 bn against liabilities of $100 m to $500 m, the privately owned defence and aerospace manufacturer continues to seek international contracts. (Source: Google/https://africa.businessinsider.com/)

 

06 Feb 26. Ukraine Hits Russian Oreshnik Launch Site With Flamingo Missiles. Illustration of Ukraine’s FP-5 “Flamingo” cruise missile, developed by defense firm Fire Point. (Radzas2008 / Shutterstock)
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Ukrainian forces struck Russia’s Kapustin Yar test site, used for medium- and intercontinental-range ballistic missile preparations, using Ukrainian-made long-range weapons.
“During January 2026, the Armed Forces of Ukraine carried out a series of successful strikes on a complex of hangar-type buildings where pre-launch preparations for intercontinental and medium-range ballistic missiles take place at the Kapustin Yar test site in Russia’s Astrakhan region,” the General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine said in a social media post.
According to the Ukrainian General Staff, some buildings at the site sustained varying degrees of damage, with one hangar being severely damaged. Part of the personnel was evacuated from the area following the strikes.
The attacks employed Ukrainian-made long-range weapons, including the FP-5 Flamingo, a subsonic cruise missile capable of carrying heavy warheads on strikes of up to 3,000 kilometers (1,864 miles).
The Special Operations Forces (SSO) confirmed that, alongside other units of the Ukrainian Defense Forces, they carried out a comprehensive operation targeting Kapustin Yar. “Long-range drones from the SSO Deep Strike units inflicted fire damage on the infrastructure of the Russian military facility,” the statement said.
(Source: https://www.sofx.com/)

 

06 Feb 26. Ukraine Turns Civilian Planes into Drone Hunters. French broadcaster TF1 aired rare footage of Ukrainian forces using a civilian PZL M28 Skytruck aircraft, a Polish-modified version of the Antonov An-28, to intercept Russian Shahed-type attack drones during nighttime combat missions. The twin-turboprop utility plane employs a door-mounted M134 Minigun capable of firing up to 6,000 rounds per minute against incoming aerial drone targets.
According to TF1, the aircraft is operated by a civilian crew who have volunteered to help the military defend Ukrainian airspace.
“It’s 2 a.m. There are targets in the air to the southeast. We, as pilots, are trying to fight these drones with our planes, shooting them down with a machine gun,” one pilot told the outlet.
“We try to catch as many as possible and shoot them down in a safe place – fields, forests – but never over houses,” the pilot added.
TF1 reported that the pilots’ plane was marked with kill counts, reflecting nearly 150 drones the crew has downed. (Source: https://www.sofx.com/)
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12 Feb 26. War Department, USDA Team Up on National Security. Secretary of War Pete Hegseth yesterday signed a memorandum of understanding with Agriculture Secretary Brooke Rollins, cementing the relationship between the two agencies under the National Farm Security Action Plan, and explaining how they will collaborate when agriculture and national defense intersect.
“We’re going to promote agricultural and economic prosperity, defend the foundations of agriculture and food … and strengthen domestic and agricultural productivity,” Hegseth said. “Together, we are elevating the protection of U.S. agriculture into America’s national security framework by ensuring systems remain protected against potential terror attacks, major disasters and other emergencies, with the full support of the Department of War and the national security enterprise.”
In July 2025, the Agriculture Department announced the National Farm Security Action Plan, a governmentwide, multiprong effort focused on ensuring America’s ability to secure its own food supply, in part by eliminating interference from adversarial nations. Part of that plan involves using presidential authorities to reclaim farmland in the U.S. currently owned by foreign adversaries — such as China — including land owned by adversarial nations that encroaches on U.S. military installations.
“When our farmland is threatened, the welfare of the entire nation is put on the line,” Rollins said. “It is undeniable that America’s enemies are playing the long game, infiltrating our research institutions, stealing our technology, launching cyberattacks on our food system and buying up our farmland. China alone owns 265,000 acres of American agricultural land … these actions expose strategic vulnerabilities in America’s food and agriculture supply chain.”
The National Farm Security Action Plan is designed to protect America’s farmland, and DOW is part of that effort. The MOU solidifies the department’s commitment to the plan.
“The National Farm Security Action Plan is a necessary step toward safeguarding our homeland against malign foreign influence,” Hegseth said. “America is the best of ideas, but America is actually also a place; it is a land … that we must defend at every single echelon, from space to the farm field.”
One novel and immediate result of the MOU is that the USDA will have access to the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency’s capabilities.
“[DARPA] can do things, they can design things, they can bring things to life that no other agency across the federal government is remotely capable of,” Hegseth said. “Working with [USDA], we will ensure agriculture projects directly enhance our military’s strength and readiness.”
While Hegseth and Rollins signed a cabinet-level MOU, another memorandum was signed yesterday between DARPA and USDA’s chief scientist. According to a DARPA spokesperson, the memorandum between DARPA and USDA creates a direct path for collaboration on efforts with overlap in national, economic and agricultural security.
One example is the DARPA Guardian program, which is developing methods to mitigate the risks posed by non-native pests, including the New World Screwworm, a serious threat to the ranching community, the U.S. food supply and national security. The agreement signed yesterday further demonstrates a whole-of-government approach to tackling this critical problem. (Source: U.S. DoD)

 

11 Feb 26. Hegseth Calls for Military Unity Across Western Hemisphere at Inaugural Defense Chiefs Gathering. Secretary of War Pete Hegseth today called on defense chiefs and other senior military leaders from 34 Western Hemisphere countries to unite in deterrence against bad actors who may already be operating in, or working to encroach upon, the region.
Convened by Air Force Gen. Dan Caine, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and held in downtown Washington, the daylong, first-of-its-kind Western Hemisphere Chiefs of Defense Conference focused on regional security cooperation against narco-terrorism and other criminal enterprises throughout the hemisphere, while also analyzing common security priorities between allies and partner nations.
While delivering prepared remarks at the meeting’s outset, Hegseth said the U.S. — like all countries represented at the conference — desires a hemisphere of peace, which is why all those countries must work together to achieve and preserve it.
“We, like you, want — and will — achieve a permanent peace in this hemisphere. So, let’s work together our militaries: exercising, training, operations, , access, basing, overflight, you name it — let’s work together,” Hegseth told the gathered leaders.
“To achieve these goals, we have to stand together; there’s no other way to do it,” he added.
Hegseth said the War Department, under the leadership of President Donald J. Trump and his administration, is prioritizing protecting the homeland and key territories throughout the hemisphere for the first time in decades.
“The United States is asserting, reestablishing and enforcing the Trump corollary of the Monroe Doctrine,” Hegseth explained.
Issued in 1823 by President James Monroe, the Monroe Doctrine declared that the Western Hemisphere was off-limits to any new attempts at colonization by European nations, and that any interference by those powers would be viewed as a hostile act against the United States.
Reciprocally, the U.S. pledged not to interfere with any of Europe’s internal affairs and not meddle in any of Europe’s colonial affairs.
“It’s common sense: restoring American power and American strength in our hemisphere through shared priorities and common interests and threads with partners against our adversaries,” Hegseth said.
He went on to reiterate a core tenet of the Trump administration’s philosophy on homeland security: that, for far too long, the U.S. had focused on securing and defending other nations around the world while neglecting security within the U.S. and throughout the Western Hemisphere.
“The consequences of this have been dire for our nation and for your nations; fentanyl, cocaine other deadly drugs poured across our border, poisoning and killing ms of Americans. The number of deaths for Americans to those weapons and those threats is far higher than American casualties in any kinetic war,” Hegseth said, adding that illegal mass migration and human smuggling had risen exponentially in the years leading up to the U.S. closing its southern border last year.
Along with the residual benefits of closing the border — which Hegseth said include the biggest drop in illegal border crossings in the past 50 years, as well as a significant reduction in the U.S. murder rate — he also pointed out to the successes that the U.S. military and law enforcement are having through the anti-narco-terror mission to the south, specifically with Operation Southern Spear.
Launched last year by U.S. Southern Command, Southern Spear is a joint U.S. military campaign aimed at disrupting drug trafficking in the Caribbean and Eastern Pacific, particularly by conducting lethal airstrikes against suspected traffickers.
“Operation Southern Spear has restored deterrence against the narco-terrorist cartels that profit from poisoning Americans and killing our people and your people,” Hegseth told the group, adding that the number of narco-terror boats in the region has diminished significantly since the U.S. strikes began in September 2025.
“Narco-traffickers know that the true cost of flooding our country with deadly drugs is death for themselves — a real deterrent,” he said.
Hegseth also pointed to the success of Operation Absolute Resolve, in which U.S. forces last month captured Venezuelan leader Nicolás Maduro and his wife.
“Operation Absolute Resolve demonstrated, once again, the bravery and skill and capability of America’s best: our warfighters,” he said.
As his remarks drew to a close, Hegseth underscored that Trump and his administration believe that sovereignty and territorial integrity depend upon military power, and not just traditional law enforcement.
“Yes, policing is important enforcing is important, but military power is important,” Hegseth said, adding that the countries represented during the day’s conference must work together to combat and dismantle narco-terrorism and drug trafficking cartels in the Western Hemisphere.
“We need to build those bonds of partnership to defeat the challenges to our security and our sovereignty,” he added. “So, as you might say, we can make the Americas great again.” (Source: U.S. DoD)

 

10 Feb 26. DOW Restructures Foreign Military Sales, Prioritizes Speed, Efficiency. In a video posted on social media today, Secretary of War Pete Hegseth announced that the War Department moved two agencies critical to getting American-made combat gear into the hands of allied and partner nations under the War Department’s Office of Acquisition and Sustainment.
“On Nov. 7, we laid out the Department of War’s vision for strengthening the defense sales enterprise,” Hegseth said. “Today, we’re turning that vision into decisive action.”
Both the Defense Security Cooperation Agency and the Defense Technology Security Administration are part of how the United States helps partners and allies get access to American-made weapons and equipment. They will now fall under the Office of the Undersecretary of War for Acquisition and Sustainment, led by Michael P. Duffey, according to the memorandum.
The Defense Security Cooperation Agency, for instance, is largely responsible for facilitating the sale of U.S. weapons to partners and allies. However, the agency is also responsible for developing and planning the long-term partnerships and training opportunities that accompany those sales. The Defense Technology Security Administration is responsible for identifying and mitigating any risks associated with transferring technology to partners and allies.
By moving both agencies under the department’s Office of Acquisition and Sustainment, Hegseth aims to make weapons sales to allies and partners faster and more efficient, as well as help revitalize America’s defense industrial base.
“This executive order is our mandate: leverage America’s record-breaking defense sales to revitalize our industrial base and support our partners,” Hegseth said. “On nearly every overseas trip that I take, the demand is clear, every single time; our allies want to buy the world’s most lethal weapons: American weapons.”
The realignment, Duffey said, has created a single coherent defense sales enterprise within the department, one that moves at the speed of war, but with the purpose of deterring aggression.
“Coupled with this new executive order, we’re now positioned to leverage the total aggregated global demand for U.S. weapons to grow our nation’s industrial might, while maintaining the American warfighters’ technological edge,” he added.
Duffey noted that the changes will unlock foreign investment, power production lines, fuel investments in new American manufacturing plants and create thousands of new jobs in the U.S.
“When we promise to provide American military capabilities, we must deliver,” Hegseth said. “Thanks to President Trump’s leadership, these efforts are game changers for the way we do business with our allies and partners around the globe: more and better weapons delivered faster for our warfighters and our allies.” (Source: U.S. DoD)

 

10 Feb 26. Department of War Finalizes Realignment of the Defense Security Cooperation Agency and the Defense Technology Security Administration. The Department of War (DoW) today announced the realignment of the Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) and the Defense Technology Security Administration (DTSA) to the Under Secretary of War for Acquisition and Sustainment (USW(A&S)). This significant transformation, directed by the Secretary of War, unifies critical acquisition, sustainment, industrial base policy, security cooperation, defense sales, and arms transfer functions under a single organization to improve efficiency, enhance the U.S. industrial base, and enable greater burden-sharing with our allies and partners.
“The President has laid out a clear vision for aggressive promotion of U.S. defense sales through his groundbreaking America First Arms Transfer Strategy,” said USW(A&S) Michael Duffey. “This realignment will increase and accelerate the delivery of lethal weapons and advanced capabilities to our allies and partners, empowering them to shoulder a greater share of their self-defense. By unifying our arms transfer enterprise with our acquisition system, we will move with the purpose and speed required to strengthen our alliances and ensure the United States remains the partner of choice in global arms sales.”
The realignment establishes a clear and unambiguous line of authority, creating a single enterprise to oversee the execution of defense sales from initial acquisition to final production and delivery. The structural reform is also a key component of the Department’s broader effort to improve the speed and accountability of the arms transfer enterprise.
By aligning DSCA and DTSA with the Department’s acquisition, industrial base, and technology security functions under USW(A&S), the DoW will integrate technology security considerations earlier in the acquisition life cycle, enhance forecasting of global demand to better meet the defense needs of the United States and our partners, and facilitate the delivery of warfighting capability at the speed of relevance while protecting the U.S. technological edge.
The realignment directly supports the National Defense Strategy and the President’s commitment to revitalizing the defense industrial base, including through Executive Action to improve arms transfers. The move will unlock strategic opportunities to leverage allied and partner investments, contributing to the creation of American jobs and ensuring the readiness and security of our Warfighters, allies, and partners. (Source: U.S. DoD)
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Founded in 1987, Exensor Technology is a world leading supplier of Networked Unattended Ground Sensor (UGS) Systems providing tailored sensor solutions to customers all over the world. From our Headquarters in Lund Sweden, our centre of expertise in Network Communications at Communications Research Lab in Kalmar Sweden and our Production site outside of Basingstoke UK, we design, develop and produce latest state of the art rugged UGS solutions at the highest quality to meet the most stringent demands of our customers. Our systems are in operation and used in a wide number of Military as well as Homeland Security applications worldwide. The modular nature of the system ensures any external sensor can be integrated, providing the user with a fully meshed “silent” network capable of self-healing. Exensor Technology will continue to lead the field in UGS technology, provide our customers with excellent customer service and a bespoke package able to meet every need.

A CNIM Group Company
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Sponsored by Bertin Exensor

 

www.exensor.com

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12 Feb 26. UK to make NMH decision before Leonardo’s offer expires in March, says minister. The UK government intends to make its long-awaited decision on the New Medium Helicopter (NMH) programme in the coming days, a senior minister said on 11 February. Debating the issue in the House of Commons, the Minister of State at the Ministry of Defence (MoD), Luke Pollard, said that the decision to acquire the AW149 from the last sole bidder Leonardo, or not, will be made before the Yeovil-based manufacturer’s current offer expires. This is due to happen in March.

“[The member of parliament for Yeovil, Adam Dance] is right that the best and final offer price has an expiry date, but we have committed as a government that we will not time out – that is, it will not simply fail at that point. We will make a decision ahead of that, as part of the work we are doing on the Defence Investment Plan [DIP],” Pollard said.

Janes first reported in January 2021 the MoD’s intention to launch the NMH competition. Formally commenced later that year, the GBP1 bn (USD1.4 bn) requirement to replace 23 Puma HC2s with “up to 44” new helicopters was initially downselected to the Airbus Helicopters H175M, Leonardo AW149, and Lockheed Martin S-70M Black Hawk (a previous element of the wider GBP1.2 bn requirement that included the replacement of three other helicopter types was earlier separated out). Both Airbus Helicopters and Lockheed Martin withdrew from the process in August 2024, with each saying they were unable to fulfil the requirement within the allotted budget, leaving Leonardo as the sole competing supplier. (Source: Janes)

 

11 Feb 26. UK steps up defence of Arctic and High North from rising Russian threats. During a visit to meet Royal Marine Commandos at Camp Viking in the Arctic Circle in northern Norway, the Defence Secretary will today confirm that the number of British troops deployed to Norway will double over three years from 1,000 to 2,000 personnel.

• British troops deployed to Norway to double over three years from 1,000 to 2,000 personnel.
• Defence Secretary confirms UK Armed Forces will play vital part in NATO Arctic Sentry mission, with military planning underway.
• Major Joint Expeditionary Force exercise, ‘Lion Protector’, will see air, land, and naval forces deploy across High North in 2026.

Arctic and High North security will be strengthened against rising Russian threats as Britain steps up its presence in the region. During a visit to meet Royal Marine Commandos at Camp Viking in the Arctic Circle in northern Norway, the Defence Secretary will today (Wednesday 11 February) confirm that the number of British troops deployed to Norway will double over three years from 1,000 to 2,000 personnel. It comes as the UK-led Joint Expeditionary Force (JEF) confirms major military activity in the High North this year.   Taking place in September 2026, Exercise Lion Protector will see air, land, and naval forces from JEF nations train to protect critical national infrastructure from attacks and sabotage and enhance their joint command and control capabilities. Hundreds of personnel will deploy across Iceland, the Danish Straits and Norway, as JEF steps up to enhance deterrence and defence in the Arctic, High North, and North Atlantic. The Defence Secretary is also expected to confirm that UK Armed Forces will play their part in NATO’s Arctic Sentry mission, with detailed military planning at NATO underway. Healey will join Defence Ministers at NATO HQ on Thursday in Brussels to discuss the proposals. The government has committed to the largest sustained increase in defence spending since the end of the Cold War – hitting 2.6% of GDP from 2027 – to ensure that Britain and our allies are safe.

Defence Secretary John Healey MP said:”Demands on defence are rising, and Russia poses the greatest threat to Arctic and High North security that we have seen since the Cold War. We see Putin rapidly re-establishing military presence in the region, including reopening old Cold War bases.   The UK is stepping up to protect the Arctic and High North – doubling the number of troops we have in Norway and scaling up joint exercises with NATO allies.”

Cold Response and Lion Protector will this year see thousands of troops deploy across the Arctic and North Atlantic – with the UK leading the way. We train together, we deter together, and if necessary, we will fight together. 1,500 Royal Marine Commandos are deploying to Norway for NATO’s Exercise Cold Response taking place in March. The major military exercise across Norway, Finland and Sweden will enhance allied ability to defend strategically important locations across fjords and mountains.

This follows the historic Lunna House Agreement with Norway, signed in December, which will see the UK and Norway jointly operate a fleet of submarine-hunting Type 26 warships, expand joint Arctic training, and pre-position British military equipment in Norway to be better prepared for future crises.

The Strategic Defence Review also said that the UK should work to “improving NATO’s deterrence posture in Northern Europe and the High North.”

Russia’s growing activity across the Arctic, High North, and North Atlantic has changed the security picture for the region. The UK, with its 50 plus year history of operating in the Arctic, and through deep partnerships with allies including Norway, Sweden and Finland – will be at the centre of NATO’s northern response from day one. (Source: https://www.gov.uk/)

 

10 Feb 26. Europe braces as US returns to Munich Security Conference. The upcoming Munich Security Conference will take place during the worst transatlantic crisis for centuries as the US dons its imperial garb.

• The emergence of a New World Order resultant from a radical shift in US policy has left Europe geopolitically adrift
• China will seek to capitalise on the growing gap between the US and Europe, with its diplomatic Red carpet well-trod in recent weeks
• The risk perception of the US has worsened dramatically in the last 12 months, according to the Munich Security Index

Arriving as the harbinger of a New American Imperialism, the return of a US delegation led by Secretary of State Marco Rubio to the Munich Security Conference (MSC) later this week will form the theatrical centre of a debate beginning to shape the geopolitical future of Europe. China will make a pitch for Europe to shift away from Washington and continue a diplomatic blitz by Beijing attempting to separate London, Paris, and Berlin, from the US’ orbit. Beijing has already welcomed the leaders of the UK, France, and Finland, among others, in recent months. German Chancellor Friedrich Merz will visit China at the end of February. This growing shift is perhaps an unintended consequence for US policy towards Europe, which was clearly laid out in the recent National Security Strategy. What will be even less palatable for the US, is a clear desire for many European countries to reduce their reliance on US military equipment. The European Union, along with the UK, are key markets for US defence suppliers, providing capabilities across the land, sea, air, and space domains. This will be a concern for US President Donald Trump, who wants to ensure Europe retains its need for American arms, a position no doubt mirrored by the US defence sector. What tone the US delegation will take is unknown, but its arrival in Europe will be met with much more scepticism than 12 months ago, when Vice President JD Vance shocked the world with an excoriating speech that cast the US’ commitment to Nato in doubt. (Source: army-technology.com)

 

06 Feb 26. New UK defence procurement plan due for April Fool’s release.

A new “segmented approach” will take effect from April Fool’s Day, capturing the persistent lack of transparency in government.

• The segmented approach to defence procurement will take effect from 1st April
• The government has continuously delayed its long overdue Defence Investment Plan (DIP) demonstrating a lack of transparency to industry of its investment intentions
• The date of the release captures the absurdity of the government’s long-time inertia at a crucial time, amid a high threat security environment

The UK’s defence readiness and industry minister Luke Pollard shared plans to implement the new “segmented approach” for defence procurement on April Fool’s Day this year. It is no secret that the government has been dragging its heels when it comes to providing a cost breakdown for all the things the Armed Forces need for the next ten years – whether that be a New Medium Helicopter or Army tactical communications, among other looming capability gaps. So implementing a new approach to defence acquisition on a holiday known for pranks and trickery truly captures the lack of transparency at the heart of a department struggling to make sense of its priorities. Parliamentarians have already publicly called on the government to offer “timely, accurate information to support effective scrutiny of defence acquisition, expenditure, and military capability”, a responsibility that has become “increasingly difficult” for MPs. This is particularly significant at a time when the UK is subject to hybrid warfare tactics on a daily basis by a number of state actors. One cannot help but invoke a little gallows humour.

What is the segmented approach?

The segmented approach will overhaul existing acquisition processes with a three-tier system which has faster timelines relative to the capability being purchased. Sometimes referred to as the “3-2-1” model, the new approach divides contracting timelines into three segments:

1. Major platforms (ships, tanks, aircraft) to be contracting within two years
2. Upgrades (communications, sensors, weapons systems) contracted within one year
3. Rapid commercial innovation (software, AI, off-shelf drones) has a three month target

DIP delay

The government agreed to implement the segmented approach along with all 62 recommendations in the Strategic Defence Review last June. However, the Ministry of Defence (MoD) has delayed the DIP time and again, first due in the summer, again toward the end of 2025, and now supposedly sometime in March 2026. But the government maintains that the type of procurement reform it conceives constitutes “the biggest shakeup to the MoD in over 50 years”. This deep level of reform seeks to speed up development cycles and cut down on what the government considers “waste”. But ministers have also repeated that the defence industry will drive the British economy and open defence up to emerging sectors like artificial intelligence, cyber, advanced connectivity technologies and semiconductors to empower the Armed Forces.   Speaking to The Guardian, Pollard insisted there is more to reform than replacing obsolete platforms and equipment. And all this is made more difficult to finance while having to tackle 47 out of 89 major programmes that were “overbudget and delayed” under the previous government. Nevertheless, it does not change the fact that the UK cannot afford to wait months on end for new kit; especially when the number of available Royal Navy frigates can be counted on one hand while Russian naval platforms scour the North Atlantic. An ominous foretelling of the fiscal trouble to come was laid out to bare in a Defence Committee session last month, when Chief of the Defence Staff, Air Chief Marshal Richard Knighton, revealed that there will be inevitable “tradeoffs” when it comes to allocating funds to priority programmes. But strangely, the MoD, clearly strapped for cash, is still brazen enough to reject any future procurement of its own Nightfall tactical ballistic missiles, a deep strike capability currently being built for and will be sent to Ukraine from 2027. In another subtle twist of irony, Pollard said the Nightfall rejection came down to the missile being too “high risk” despite claims that the new segmented approach will encourage a genuine risk appetite to drive progress. (Source: army-technology.com)

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Founded in 1987, Exensor Technology is a world leading supplier of Networked Unattended Ground Sensor (UGS) Systems providing tailored sensor solutions to customers all over the world. From our Headquarters in Lund Sweden, our centre of expertise in Network Communications at Communications Research Lab in Kalmar Sweden and our Production site outside of Basingstoke UK, we design, develop and produce latest state of the art rugged UGS solutions at the highest quality to meet the most stringent demands of our customers. Our systems are in operation and used in a wide number of Military as well as Homeland Security applications worldwide. The modular nature of the system ensures any external sensor can be integrated, providing the user with a fully meshed “silent” network capable of self-healing. Exensor Technology will continue to lead the field in UGS technology, provide our customers with excellent customer service and a bespoke package able to meet every need.

A CNIM Group Company

——————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————

Sponsored by Bertin Exensor

 

www.exensor.com

 

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05 Feb 26. Venezuela-US: Joint law enforcement operation underscores decreasing regional tension risks. According to reports on 4 February, US and Venezuelan law enforcement conducted a joint operation to arrest Alex Saab and the head of Venezuela’s Globovision TV network, Raúl Gorrín. Saab is a Colombian-born former Venezuelan official and close ally of Venezuela’s former president Nicolás Maduro. US President Donald Trump’s administration expects that Venezuela will extradite Saab to the US in the coming days. The recent joint operation points to increasing collaboration between the Trump administration and acting Venezuelan President Delcy Rodríguez’s regime. In recent weeks, the Venezuelan regime has made a concerted effort to present itself as a collaborative partner with the US; the regime has released over 350 political prisoners, according to human rights groups. Furthermore, the National Assembly passed a reform to the country’s hydrocarbons law, eliminating the obligation for companies to form a majority partnership with state energy company Petróleos de Venezuela (PDVSA). We continue to assess that the Rodríguez regime will co-operate with the US on key issues, such as the energy sector, in order to retain power and dissuade the US from conducting further military action (Source: Sibylline)

 

05 Feb 26. Colombia: Suspension of peace negotiations will increase physical security risks in short term. On 4 February, the Gulf Clan (AGC) organised crime group temporarily suspended all ongoing peace negotiations with the Colombian government. The decision was taken after a 3 February meeting between Colombian President Gustavo Petro and US President Donald Trump; Petro’s administration reportedly disclosed information about the AGC’s leadership and allegedly threatened to attack the leaders of multiple criminal groups. Since the US’ capture of Venezuela’s former president Nicolás Maduro, Trump has threatened to conduct military action in Colombia in exchange for security concessions (see Sibylline Situation Update Brief – 3 February 2026). We assess that Petro’s disclosure almost certainly points to efforts to increase security collaboration with the US, marginally reducing regional tensions in the coming weeks. In the short-to-medium term, AGC representatives will likely uphold the suspension of peace negotiations and carry out limited armed attacks against military personnel to deter further collaboration. Attack, kidnapping and violent crime risks will heighten, particularly for military convoys and security forces personnel in AGC strongholds (such as Colombia’s northern coast). (Source: Sibylline)

 

04 Feb 26. India’s MoD claims highest ever funding boost in Union Budget 2026-27.  The defence budget has increased to almost three times its 2013–14 level of Rs2.53tn. The Indian Government has allocated Rs7.85tn ($86.7bn) to the Ministry of Defence (MoD) in the Union Budget for the 2026–27 financial year, marking a 15.19% rise compared to the previous year’s estimates. This funding, announced on 1 February 2026, represents 14.67% of the total national budget, the largest share among all ministries. The defence budget has nearly tripled since 2013–14, when it stood at Rs2.53tn. Within the defence allocation, capital expenditure accounts for 27.95%, while revenue spending on sustenance and operational readiness receives 20.17%. Pay and allowances represent 26.40%, pensions make up 21.84%, and civil organisations are allocated 3.64%. The government has earmarked over Rs2.19tn for capital expenditure for the armed forces in 2026–27, an increase of 21.84% over the previous year’s budget estimate. Of this amount, Rs1.85tn is specifically designated for capital acquisitions, reflecting a rise of approximately 24%. The Ministry of Defence plans to utilise these funds to procure next-generation fighter aircraft, advanced weaponry, ships, submarines, uncrewed aerial vehicles and drones, aiming to modernise all three services and strengthen future capabilities. The Border Roads Organisation will see an increased capital allocation of Rs73.94bn for strategic infrastructure projects such as tunnels, bridges, and airfields. Defence services have also received an allocation of Rs9.75bn for an optical fibre cable network. The focus on indigenous manufacturing continues under the ‘Aatmanirbhar Bharat’ or ‘self-reliant India’ initiative, with Rs1.39tn allotted for procurement from domestic defence industries in FY 2026–27. Approximately three-quarters of the capital acquisition budget is reserved for Indian companies, including private sector entities. The government will exempt basic customs duty on raw materials imported for parts used in aircraft maintenance, repair or overhaul in the defence sector to further support domestic production. For research and development, the Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO) will receive an increased budget of Rs291bn in FY 2026–27, up from Rs268bn in the previous year, with Rs172bn set aside for capital expenditure. Since December 2025, several initiatives have sought to promote research and development (R&D) in defence manufacturing. About one-quarter of the DRDO R&D budget has been made available to industry, start-ups, and academia following earlier policy announcements. Between FY 2022–23 and FY 2024–25, cumulative spending on defence R&D reached Rs682bn with a further Rs268bn allocated for FY 2025–26 in addition to this figure. DRDO sanctioned 148 new research projects during this period.Business intelligence and analytics company GlobalData projected India’s defence expenditure to reach $543.1bn between 2026 and 2030. (Source: army-technology.com)

 

05 Feb 26.  “Air manoeuvre – the movement of ground forces by air to gain advantage – is confronted today by the increasing sophistication and density of threats… It is therefore imperative to develop air manoeuvre forces so that they can operate against current and emerging threats.” This is according to Air Manoeuvre Forces in European Large-Scale Combat Operations, a new RUSI research report by Jack Watling, Robert Tollast and Nick Reynolds which assesses the current and future viability of air manoeuvre in European large-scale combat operations against the backdrop of increasingly dense threat environments characterised by pervasive sensing, long-range precision weapons and contested electromagnetic spectrum conditions. Drawing on case studies – notably Russia’s failed attempt to seize Ukraine’s Hostomel airfield in 2022 which prompted scepticism regarding the survivability of helicopters and air assault forces – the report argues that such conclusions conflate poor planning and execution with judgements on the inherent utility of air manoeuvre. The paper says many of the threats that challenge air manoeuvre equally constrain ground manoeuvre, reinforcing the value of forces that can bypass terrain and rapidly reshape the geometry of the battlefield. The report says that modern threats, including networked air defences, ubiquitous UAV surveillance and precision indirect fire, place air manoeuvre forces at particular risk during assembly, insertion and sustainment. However, it also says that technological developments – including assured connectivity, air-launched weapons and unmanned resupply – provide opportunities to adapt air manoeuvre concepts to remain viable. The study says that air manoeuvre forces retain disproportionate operational value if they are restructured, re-equipped and employed as integral components of corps-level operations, capable of operating in a dispersed posture and synchronised with joint fires and air operations. The study says that a failure to adapt risks forfeiting a capability that has repeatedly proven decisive in shaping operational outcomes.

Key Findings

• Air manoeuvre faces unprecedented threat density but remains operationally relevant. “Pervasive sensing, long-range fires and a large number of pop-up threats, against which it is hard to plan, threaten the viability of air manoeuvre operations in conventional war in the European theatre.”
• The very threats confronting air manoeuvre also increase its relative value.

“As many of these threat systems also pose a serious challenge for ground manoeuvre, the ability to move troops unimpeded by terrain arguably makes air manoeuvre more important – not less.”

• Dispersed planning and assured connectivity are central to survivability.

“Assured connectivity and blue force (GPS) tracking should allow air manoeuvre forces to plan and initiate operations from a dispersed posture, thereby mitigating the risk from long-range fires.”

• Precision strike enables denial without occupation. “The same capabilities of ubiquitous precision strike can enable an air manoeuvre force to deny or interdict a target without having to physically occupy it.”

Key Recommendations

• Make air manoeuvre forces an organic corps-level asset. “Air manoeuvre forces are made an organic asset of a corps, so that they can leverage the joint force in planning and execution.”
• Integrate launched effects into air manoeuvre formations. “Air manoeuvre forces are given organic ‘middle strike’ or launched effect elements that train to employ UAVs in conjunction with aviation.”
• Invest in precision strike resilient to electronic warfare. “Air manoeuvre forces are equipped with precision strike capabilities that are not susceptible to degradation by electronic warfare.”
• Strengthen communications resilience in contested environments. “Air manoeuvre forces must have a way of reliably passing targets to the main body in a contested electromagnetic spectrum. This demands investment in satellite communications and relays as well as a software layer to minimise the volume of data that need to be passed.”

Conclusion

The report concludes that air manoeuvre will remain a high-risk capability but one that continues to offer commanders unique operational advantages when employed at appropriate scale and with sufficient integration into joint force planning. Historical experience demonstrates that air manoeuvre has repeatedly succeeded against sophisticated threats when supported by rigorous planning, suppression of enemy air defences and coherent command and control.

In Europe’s emerging threat environment, the question is not whether air manoeuvre is obsolete, but whether NATO forces are prepared to adapt doctrine, force structure and capabilities to ensure its continued viability. The authors argue that failing to do so would unnecessarily constrain operational choice and cede initiative to adversaries capable of exploiting the same technological trends.

Notes to Editors

Air Manoeuvre Forces in European Large-Scale Combat Operations is based on engagement between the authors and air manoeuvre forces across NATO and partner militaries, and consultations with military helicopter manufacturers, as well as a literature review of doctrine and assessment of air manoeuvre operations. Jack Watling is a Senior Research Fellow for Land Warfare at RUSI, Robert Tollast is a Research Analyst in the Land Warfare team and Nick Reynolds is a Research Fellow for Land Warfare. For more information and media inquiries please email

 

02 Feb 26. Kyrgyzstan-EU: Close ties with Russia will sustain sanctions risks over long term. On 3 February, the Kyrgyz government announced that the EU’s special envoy for sanctions, David O’Sullivan, will visit Kyrgyzstan on 26 February amid concerns that the country is assisting Russia in evading punitive measures. Bloomberg reported on 30 January that the bloc is considering applying its anti-sanctions circumvention tool for the first time against the Central Asian state. Unspecified figures familiar with the matter claim that this mechanism would restrict the export of machine tools and certain radio equipment to Kyrgyzstan. Although a senior Kyrgyz official, Daniyar Amangeldiev, stated that Kyrgyzstan has introduced restrictions on the export of dual-use goods, Russia has used the country and other third jurisdictions to evade sanctions. While O’Sullivan’s expected visit is aimed at avoiding new punitive measures, Kyrgyzstan’s close economic ties with Russia mean that the risk of Western sanctions will remain high over the longer term. Despite the EU’s efforts to tighten enforcement, we assess that Russia will almost certainly continue to find new workarounds to bypass sanctions for the duration of the war in Ukraine, including across Central Asia. (Source: Sibylline)

 

02 Feb 26.  Ethiopia: Drone strike will compound elevated tensions in Tigray, driving risks of conflict resumption. On 31 January, the Ethiopian military (ENDF) killed one person in two drone strikes targeting alleged Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF) supply trucks in Enticho (Tigray region). This follows renewed clashes between the TPLF and the ENDF and allied Amharan militias in Tselemti in western Tigray region (currently administered and disputed by Amharan regional forces). While the TPLF reportedly withdrew from Tselemti (moderating risks of further clashes therein), tensions between the federal government and the TPLF will almost certainly continue to rise in the coming months, particularly ahead of June’s federal elections. This will sustain the risk of further attempts by the Tigray forces to resecure western Tigray and retaliatory airstrikes by the ENDF, increasing collateral and crossfire risks across the region. This is likely to drive the re-mobilisation of armed elements within Tigray (both pro- and anti-TPLF), compounding security risks and ultimately driving the risk of conflict resumption in Tigray (see Sibylline Special Report – 4 December 2025). However, we assess that the splintering of support for the TPLF will undercut its capacity to contest a conflict as effectively as it did during the 2020-2022 Tigray War. (Source: Sibylline)

 

02 Feb 26. Myanmar-Russia: New defence pact will strengthen military junta; armed conflict risks remain high. On 3 February, Myanmar and Russia signed a new defence co-operation pact that is set to remain in effect until 2030. Russian Security Council Secretary Sergei Shoigu pledged Moscow’s ‘comprehensive assistance, including in the international arena’ and proposed energy co-operation with Myanmar. Russia is one of the main international supporters of Myanmar’s military junta, which has used Russian-made jets to conduct airstrikes against rebel-controlled areas. There is a realistic possibility that Russia will increase its military and diplomatic support to the junta over the coming months. Russia has also recognised Myanmar’s recent month-long general election as legitimate. According to electoral data released on 3 February, the junta-aligned Union Solidarity and Development Party secured a landslide victory in both houses of parliament. While the junta claims the result legitimises its control, most countries consider the polls neither free nor fair. We assess that armed conflict risks will remain elevated this year as the civil war persists, with the junta reportedly escalating its bombing in Tanintharyi region over the past week. (Source: Sibylline)

 

02 Feb 26. Poland-Belarus: Balloon incursions likely point to grey-zone defence probing, smuggling operations. On 2 February, the Polish authorities reported that balloon-like objects had entered Polish airspace via Belarus for the third successive evening in a row. The Operational Command of the Polish Armed Forces stated that the balloons were launched to carry out reconnaissance and probe air defence systems. Temporary restrictions were imposed on civil aviation in the affected area of Podlaskie voivodeship, though these have since been lifted. There is also a realistic possibility that the balloons were launched by criminals to test new methods for smuggling contraband such as cigarettes into Poland, though ultimately this would likely be carried out with the de facto approval of the Belarusian authorities. In January, the Polish authorities detected small drone activity along the border with Belarus. We assess that such drone activity (that does not entail a clear violation of Polish airspace) is likely for the purposes of identifying weak points in the Polish border fence. Continued probing and small-scale incursions are likely along the Polish-Belarusian border in the coming months, though the impact on aviation will remain low. A single, large-scale violation of Polish airspace by Russian drones will remain a realistic risk in 2026. (Source: Sibylline)

 

03 Feb 26. Guinea-Bissau: Opposition offer is likely insincere; repression will likely continue in coming months. On 2 February, opposition leaders Domingos Simões Pereira and Fernando Dias both rejected offers by the transitional president, Horta Inta-A Na Man, to join the government. Inta-A had previously announced plans to form an ‘inclusive’ transitional government and facilitated Pereira’s release from prison (though he remains under house arrest). We assess that the move likely reflects an attempt by the junta to appease the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), rather than a genuine effort to broaden democratic participation (see Sibylline Situation Update Brief – 15 December 2025). The junta will likely characterise the offer as symbolic of its commitment to reform, moderating short-term tensions. Nevertheless, the junta is likely to intensify its repression of the opposition in the coming months in anticipation of the 6 December legislative and presidential elections. This will exacerbate tensions with ECOWAS while increasing unrest and strike action risks in major cities. However, we assess that the threat of repression, coupled with Pereira’s limited mobilisation capacity given his house arrest, will moderate protest attendance and associated operational disruption. (Source: Sibylline)

 

05 Feb 26. Nigeria: Attack makes further US strikes likely, though this is unlikely to improve security conditions. On 3 February, gunmen (known locally as bandits) who are currently aligned with Boko Haram killed at least 170 people in an attack on Woro village (Kwara state). Bandits are active across northern and central Nigeria, where they are tied broadly to the movement of nomadic pastoral communities and the resulting conflict over resources with sedentary communities. The escalating militarisation of these groups has driven frequent mass-casualty attacks, which will almost certainly continue throughout 2026 (see Sibylline Situation Update Brief – 23 January 2026). The latest attack comes as the US announced that it has dispatched a team of military officers to Nigeria to co-ordinate with local officials. The US also continues to conduct aerial reconnaissance missions over northern states after it launched airstrikes against claimed jihadist camps in Sokoto state in December 2025. Though the US’ official mandate covers only Islamic State-affiliated groups across northern states, further mass-casualty attacks will increase the likelihood of further strikes. However, we assess that a US airstrike campaign is fundamentally unlikely to undermine the influence of such groups, sustaining associated security risks throughout 2026. (Source: Sibylline)

 

02 Feb 26. Congo (DRC): Alleged drone attack in Kisangani underscores possible rebel group tactical shift. On 2 January, the Tshopo provincial government announced that it was not necessary to evacuate the area surrounding Kisangani Bangoka International Airport (FKI) following allegations of an attempted drone attack on the airport. Overnight on 31 January to 1 February, the Rwanda-backed M23 rebel group reportedly launched eight explosive-laden drones towards the airport, which the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC)’s security forces (FARDC) claim to have intercepted. Kisangani Bangoka serves as the primary forward base for the FARDC’s aerial assets engaged in counter-M23 operations in eastern DRC. If confirmed, the attack would represent M23’s westernmost strike in its ongoing insurgency and a potential shift towards targeting the FARDC’s aerial assets with longer-range drones. In addition to ongoing ground operations in North Kivu and South Kivu provinces, M23 will possibly increase the frequency of drone attacks targeting Kisangani Bangoka airport in the coming weeks to maximise pressure on the FARDC and increase prospects for further territorial gains. Increasingly frequent drone attacks will also likely undermine efforts to broker a durable ceasefire between the DRC, M23 and Rwanda, sustaining risks of armed conflict and regional tensions. (Source: Sibylline)

 

04 Feb 26. Sudan: Army’s South Kordofan advance will not improve security, humanitarian risks significantly. On 3 January, the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) announced that it had recaptured Kadugli (South Kordofan state) from the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF). The city’s capture comes amid an advancing SAF offensive in Kordofan region during the region’s dry season (December – February). On 26 January, the SAF took control of Dilling (South Kordofan) and began moving southwards via the Dilling–Kadugli highway to Kadugli. In the coming weeks, the SAF will likely attempt to secure transport routes connecting Dilling to El Obeid (North Kordofan state), which are currently controlled by the RSF and allied militias. Although these efforts will likely facilitate a partial resumption of aid operations therein, RSF efforts to reinforce its encirclement of El Obeid will drive the risk of the frontlines shifting and rapidly undercutting NGO mobility and operations. The RSF is also highly likely to continue conducting drone attacks on SAF-controlled cities, towns and supply lines in the coming weeks, sustaining risks of staff exposure to explosions. Such conditions will likely undermine the continuity of aid distribution operations, sustaining critical pressure on food security conditions. (Source: Sibylline)

 

02 Feb 26. Russia claims $15bn in 2025 arms exports, with focus on Africa. Russia earned over $15bn from arms exports in 2025, supplying military equipment to more than 30 countries despite Western sanctions aimed at isolating Moscow over its invasion of Ukraine, President Vladimir Putin announced last week, though questions remain about the number’s validity. Speaking at a Jan. 30 meeting of the Commission on Military-Technical Cooperation in Moscow, Putin said export contracts had been “reliably fulfilled” despite mounting pressure from Western nations attempting to block Russia’s defense partnerships. The revenue, he said, would help modernize defense enterprises, expand production capacity and fund research programs. The $15bn figure represents a significant income stream for Russia’s defense industrial base as the country continues its war in Ukraine, now approaching its fourth year. The revenue may help offset some effects of Western economic sanctions, though the long-term sustainability of these export levels remains uncertain given Moscow’s increased own consumption of military goods and ongoing diplomatic isolation.​ If accurate, the new numbers would represent a remarkable rebound to near pre-war levels for Russia’s military exports. According to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, which closely tracks the global major arms trade using transparent methodology, Russian large weapons exports fell 47% between 2022 and 2024, while the broader trend reveals a 64% decline comparing the 2015-19 period to 2020-24, though the descent began before the invasion of Ukraine. Russia dropped to third place globally for arms exports, behind the U.S. and France, by 2024 due to its declining influence in the global military marketplace, SIPRI data shows. There may be credibility problems with the official Russian numbers. The government in Moscow claimed $13.75 bn in exports for 2024, while Western analysts estimated them to be bns of dollars lower. Russian arms exports collapsed between 2021 and 2023 and may have dropped from $14.6 bn to approximately $3 bn, according to an analysis from the Jamestown Foundation, a Washington-based think tank founded in 1984 to support Soviet defectors. While exact estimates differ, the trend holds true across methodologies and Western reports. Russia stopped publicly disclosing detailed data on arms export contracts following the start of the full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, including ceasing to provide information to relevant United Nations organizations. This has also made it harder for independent observers to accurately estimate the full picture of Russia’s arms trade, evidenced by divergent estimates by different Western organizations. SIPRI data shows Russia’s leading arms companies, Rostec and United Shipbuilding Corporation, increased their revenues by 23% in 2025, but this growth came from domestic military demand, which the researchers note “more than offset the revenues lost due to falling arms exports.” Putin’s announcement came alongside new remarks from Rosoboronexport’s CEO, Alexander Mikheyev, who told the Russian state news agency TASS that military-technical cooperation with African countries has reached levels last seen during the Soviet era and “surpassed it in some respects.” Rosoboronexport is also expanding its activities in Africa, Mikheyev said, following the presidential commission meeting.​ Rosoboronexport, Russia’s state arms export monopoly, oversees more than 85 percent of the country’s military exports. The company has concluded over 30,000 contracts with 122 countries since its establishment, with total exports exceeding $230bn. In total, the company’s order book now exceeds $60bn, Mikheyev said on Jan. 30. The Kremlin has prioritized arms sales to Africa, Asia and the Middle East, which aren’t directly subject to the Western restrictions imposed following Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine. Putin said more than 340 joint defense projects with 14 countries were either underway or in development, and announced additional state support measures for military exports covering 2026 through 2028.​ If the reported numbers are accurate, Russia’s ability to maintain arms exports at these levels would raise questions about Western sanctions effectiveness. While the restrictions have targeted Russia’s banking, technology, and trade sectors, many countries in Africa and Asia continue to do business with Russia and purchase Russian military equipment due to lower costs and longstanding defense relationships. The continued sales also reflect Moscow’s use of its weapons exports to strengthen its geopolitical position in far-flung parts of the globe. However, Russia’s defense industry is already operating at wartime production levels to supply its own military. Defense spending had reached 7.3% of GDP as of December 2025, according to official numbers. Additionally, combat losses of Russian-made equipment in Ukraine, Venezuela and Iran may have raised questions among some potential buyers about the effectiveness of Moscow’s weapons systems in modern warfare. (Source: Defense News)

 

02 Feb 26. Pakistan: Co-ordinated Balochistan attacks underscore militant threat, possibly deterring investment. On 31 January, militants launched co-ordinated gun and bomb attacks targeting military and government installations, as well as police stations, across Gwadar, Mastung, Noshki and the provincial capital Quetta (all Balochistan province). The militants killed at least 33 people, including civilians and security officials. The Balochistan Liberation Army (BLA) militant group has claimed responsibility. In response, the military launched counter-terrorism operations, reportedly killing 145 militants over the last two days. The provincial government has invoked powers under Section 144 of the Constitution, banning public gatherings and demonstrations until the end of the month. The attacks come amid persistent militant activity in the province and a fragile overall security situation. We assess that these co-ordinated attacks underscore the sophisticated capabilities of the BLA and the growing militant threat in the province. The attacks are likely to undermine investor confidence and possibly deter foreign investment in Balochistan’s mineral sector. (Source: Sibylline)

 

31 Jan 26. Canada: Statement from the Defence, Security and Resilience Bank (DSRB) Development Group. The DSRB Development Group welcomes the statement by Canada’s Minister of Finance confirming Canada’s leading role with regards the establishment of the Defence, Security and Resilience Bank. Canada’s leadership reflects a shared understanding among allies that strengthening defence and security now requires not only increased spending, but financing structures capable of supporting industrial scale-up, supply-chain resilience, and long-term capacity. The Defence, Security and Resilience Bank is being established to address this challenge by improving access to affordable, predictable financing across defence and security ecosystems, while working alongside existing national and multilateral institutions. The DSRB Development Group is working closely with Canada and other like-minded nations to support the establishment of the Bank, including its design, governance, and operational framework, to ensure it meets the needs of participating nations and their industries. (Source: PR Newswire)

 

30 Jan 26. Japan-South Korea: Security, economic co-operation likely to expand over coming years. Earlier on 30 January, the Japanese and South Korean defence ministers agreed to boost their security co-operation during a meeting in Yokosuka (Kanagawa prefecture, Japan). The two sides will resume bilateral naval search and rescue exercises for the first time in nine years, work together to develop unmanned weapon systems and hold annual defence ministerial talks. This comes after South Korean President Lee Jae-myung met with Japanese Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi in Japan earlier this month. In recent years, Japan and South Korea have significantly improved relations amid a growing military threat from North Korea and rising Chinese assertiveness in the region. Economic and security ties will highly likely continue to improve, particularly if Takaichi’s Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) wins the upcoming general election on 8 February. We assess that North Korea will likely conduct missile launch tests in response to any joint drills by the two countries, driving regional tensions. However, there remains a latent risk that tensions will be reignited between Seoul and Tokyo over historical wartime disputes, such as the issue of ‘comfort women’. (Source: Sibylline)

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Military And Security Developments

Feb 06.

• Iran-US: Possible breakdown in negotiations will significantly elevate armed conflict risks. Earlier on 6 February, representatives of the US administration and the Iranian regime met in Oman for negotiations. At the time of writing, the negotiations are ongoing; they will possibly delay any US decision to pursue military action against Iran. However, the talks remain highly fragile as Iran aims to limit talks to the nuclear issue, while the US wants to expand them to include Iran’s missile programme, support for regional militias and domestic record. A breakdown in negotiations remains a realistic possibility and will significantly elevate the risk of US military action in the coming days. We assess that a US strike against Iran will likely aim to exert pressure on government stability without triggering an immediate regime collapse. Iran is highly likely to respond to such strikes by targeting US military assets in the region, particularly its bases in Bahrain and Qatar. Tehran’s retaliation is likely to be measured against the intensity of Washington DC’s strike; Iran will likely answer a limited US strike with a limited retaliation aimed at managing and preventing armed escalation (see Sibylline Special Report – 19 January 2026).

Feb 05.

• UK: Acquittal of pro-Palestine activists will likely sustain activist risks against Israeli-linked business. On 4 February, six Palestine Action (PA) activists were acquitted of aggravated burglary following a raid against the Israeli defence firm Elbit System’s factory in August 2024. The assailants destroyed over GBP 1 m (USD 1.4 m) of military equipment at the facility in Filton (Bristol county); video footage shows one of the activists hitting a police officer with a sledgehammer. Three were acquitted of violent disorder. The jury at Woolwich Crown Court in the capital London failed to reach a verdict on additional charges, including criminal damage and grievous bodily harm. Reports of vocal pro-Palestine demonstrations and posters being put up outside the court building pushing the jurors for a verdict based on their ‘conscience’ have prompted calls for a retrial and an investigation into jury tampering. Nevertheless, perceptions that the verdict represents a major victory for pro-Palestine activism will possibly embolden further acts of costly activism, the risk of which moderately decreased following the UK government’s proscription of PA in July 2025. As such, we assess that physical security risks for defence, finance and insurance firms with perceived links to Israel will highly likely persist.
• Yemen: Resumption of aid flights to moderate immediate humanitarian concerns in north-west. On 3 February, the UN announced that humanitarian flights to Yemen’s Houthi-controlled capital Sanaa would resume for the remainder of February; the Iran-backed group had previously blocked UN access for a month. The UN had previously warned that Yemen’s humanitarian crisis would worsen in 2026 due to funding cuts, with 21 m people in Yemen requiring humanitarian assistance. The resumption of flights will likely facilitate the movement of NGO personnel and aid deliveries in and out of Houthi-controlled areas. The move will moderate immediate population health risks by alleviating disease and acute food insecurity; increasing access to and quality of healthcare; and improving short-term frameworks for controlling outbreaks of infection. However, concerns over personnel well-being and safety arising from arbitrary detention and renewed conflict escalation risks will possibly limit the movement of UN staff, especially in areas outside Sanaa. The prospect of US strikes targeting Iran in the coming weeks increases the likelihood of the Houthis reversing the move, sustaining longer-term energy, food and water security risks.

Feb 04.

IRAN

• Despite upcoming nuclear talks between the US and Iran, the risk of US airstrikes against Iran persists.
• Iran has intensified its intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) operations in the Persian Gulf and the Arabian Sea, increasing the risk of conflict escalation through miscalculation.
• The IRGC Navy (IRGC-N)’s unsuccessful attempt to intercept a US-flagged oil tanker in the Strait of Hormuz will likely compound price volatility across energy markets amid sustained regional tensions.
• An explosion in Hormozgan province (Iran) will likely increase Iranian anxieties over espionage, triggering increased scrutiny of foreign nationals.
• The risk of small-scale anti-government demonstrations will increase in the coming days; such gatherings will likely trigger further crackdowns.

ISRAEL

• Nothing significant to report

PALESTINIAN TERRITORIES

• GAZA STRIP: The discovery of a hidden weapons arsenal highlights ongoing attempts by militants to rearm and the long-term risks of conflict re-escalation.
• GAZA STRIP: Persistent bottlenecks at the newly reopened Gaza crossing will undercut aid provision.
• GAZA STRIP: Elevated militant activity will increase the risk of significant IDF airstrikes in the coming days.
• WEST Electoral law reforms will likely preserve the Fatah party’s majority in upcoming elections, while increasing the risk of protests and unrest.

IRAN

• Despite upcoming nuclear talks between the US and Iran, the risk of US airstrikes against Iran persists. On 31 January, US President Donald Trump announced that Iran was ‘seriously talking’ to the US regarding its nuclear programme amid a substantial US military build-up in the region (see Sibylline Middle East Crisis Update – 28 January 2026). Subsequently, Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian ordered Iranian negotiators to initiate nuclear talks with the US; regional media reports indicate that diplomatic contact is ongoing at the time of writing. On 6 February, US Special Envoy Steve Witkoff and Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Aragchi are scheduled to meet for high-level talks in Oman. The talks reflect efforts to defuse acute regional tensions and will possibly delay US airstrikes against Iranian military and government assets. However, there is a realistic possibility that the US or Iran will call off negotiations before 6 February; failure to engage in talks will substantially increase the risk of US airstrikes in the coming days (see below). If negotiations proceed, the US and Iran will likely maintain hardline positions vis-à-vis the latter’s enrichment programme, missile programme and support for regional proxies. Failure to secure concessions on these issues will significantly increase the likelihood of diplomatic deadlock, in turn increasing the risk of US airstrikes shortly thereafter. Strikes would likely aim to increase pressure on government stability without triggering immediate state collapse, targeting Iranian nuclear facilities, Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) installations and/or locations associated with Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei. Iran is highly likely to respond to US hostilities with missile and drone attacks targeting US military assets in the region, increasing the risk of exposure to explosions for proximate assets and personnel. Direct hostilities between the US and Iran will also highly likely disrupt regional commercial aviation activity. The extent of Iran’s retaliation will likely depend on the impact and scale of US airstrikes, with more impactful US strikes triggering a more intense Iranian response and compounding the risk of conflict escalation. The probability of Iran engaging in direct attacks targeting Israel will depend on the extent to which Israel participates directly in any US airstrikes. Even so, we assess there is a realistic possibility that even in the event of substantial Israeli engagement in a US airstrike campaign, Iran would seek to target US assets primarily, while also managing the risk of a sustained regional conflict involving Israel.
• Iran has intensified its intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) operations in the Persian Gulf and the Arabian Sea, increasing the risk of conflict escalation through miscalculation. On 3 February, an F-35C fighter jet from USS Abraham Lincoln (CVN-72) intercepted an Iranian Shahed-139 drone operating in its vicinity; the US Navy characterised the interception as ‘self-defence’ during the vessel’s operations in the Arabian Sea. In recent days, Iran has engaged in increasingly frequent ISR operations in the Persian Gulf and Arabian Sea; these mainly involve drone flights within the area surrounding the USS Abraham Lincoln. Such operations likely aim to demonstrate Iran’s capability to operate reconnaissance and combat drones in the vicinity of the aircraft carrier, as part of a broader campaign to deter the US from engaging in airstrikes (see above). Iran is highly likely to continue engaging in intensified ISR operations employing various Shahed drone models in the coming days. Efforts to approach US naval assets will likely trigger further interceptions, increasing the risk of conflict escalation through miscalculation. Further interceptions are also likely to undermine confidence in diplomatic engagement between the US and Iran, undercutting prospects for de-escalation and the establishment of a preliminary nuclear agreement in the coming weeks.
• The IRGC Navy (IRGC-N)’s unsuccessful attempt to intercept a US-flagged oil tanker in the Strait of Hormuz will likely compound price volatility across energy markets amid sustained regional tensions. Following the US’ interception of an Iranian drone on 3 February (see above), numerous small armed boats attempted to hail a US-flagged tanker, though the vessel passed through the waterway without incident. In the coming days, there is a realistic possibility that the IRGC-N will attempt additional vessel interceptions to bolster its negotiating position. Such efforts will increase the risk of supply chain disruption for oil and gas exports from the Gulf, while delays to exports due to attempted vessel diversions will increase the risk of bottlenecks and broader shipping delays. Further attempted interceptions (particularly successful interceptions) will almost certainly compound concerns regarding the navigability of the Strait of Hormuz amid escalating tensions, triggering further price volatility across international energy markets. Price surges are likely to increase operating costs in energy-intensive industries (particularly manufacturing, aviation and shipping) in the coming weeks.
• An explosion in Hormozgan province (Iran) will likely increase Iranian anxieties over espionage, triggering increased scrutiny of foreign nationals. On 31 January, state-linked Iranian media reported that a gas leak and subsequent explosion killed two individuals and injured 14 others in Bandar Abbas (Hormozgan). As Bandar Abbas serves as the primary port facility for the IRGC-N, the blast triggered significant speculation regarding possible US or Israeli attacks targeting IRGC-N facilities and personnel. Although the IRGC subsequently stated that no ‘attacks’ targeting its facilities in the city had taken place, we assess there is a realistic possibility that the explosion resulted from covert US- or Israeli-linked operations targeting IRGC personnel operating in an undeclared facility within the city. In the coming weeks, the US and Israel will likely continue engaging in covert operations within Iran, increasing the risk of sporadic explosions, fires and disruption impacting IRGC facilities throughout Iran. Amid escalating concerns regarding the penetration of Iran’s security forces by foreign intelligence services, the Iranian authorities will likely increase their surveillance of foreign nationals, dual citizens and ethno-religious minorities, increasing the risk of harassment and detention for locally engaged staff.
• The risk of small-scale anti-government demonstrations will increase in the coming days; such gatherings will likely trigger further crackdowns. On 11 February, Iran will mark the anniversary of the 1979 Iranian Revolution. The public holiday involves large public gatherings, pro-government demonstrations and parades in major cities; the Iranian authorities have stated that public events will continue as planned. The security and police forces will almost certainly adopt a significantly elevated posture in major cities amid concerns that anti-government activists will attempt to re-mobilise. This posture will likely deter large-scale protests, though small-scale gatherings will possibly emerge in major cities, particularly in the vicinity of central marketplaces and universities. The risk of protests will be particularly acute due to the beginning of Chehelom mourning observances for individuals killed during anti-government demonstrations in early January (see Sibylline Middle East Crisis Update – 14 January 2026). The security forces will highly likely employ heavy-handed tactics to disperse any anti-government gatherings that do emerge in public spaces, increasing safety risks for bystanders. Coverage of such measures will likely exacerbate tensions with the US, undermining negotiations and increasing the risk of US airstrikes targeting Iranian security force facilities in the coming weeks (see above).

PALESTINIAN TERRITORIES 

• GAZA STRIP: The discovery of a hidden weapons arsenal highlights ongoing attempts by militants to rearm and the long-term risks of conflict re-escalation. On 3 February, the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) announced the discovery of several rockets and approximately 110 mortar rounds in Israeli-controlled territory beyond the Yellow Line in southern Gaza. The IDF claims the cache was found following the interrogation of suspects who approached the Yellow Line. The incident highlights the prevalence of hidden weapons caches and other militant infrastructure in Gaza, even within IDF-controlled territory after more than two years of operations. Furthermore, the incident underscores continued efforts by militants to acquire weapons and rebuild their arsenal. Additionally, earlier on 4 February, the IDF published apparent footage of Hamas operatives loading assault rifles into ambulances in the strip, though it is unclear when the footage was taken. As Hamas’ disarmament remains one of the key points of the Gaza peace plan, these efforts represent a direct challenge to the viability of the ceasefire. Rearmament efforts will sustain the risk of a resumption in the Israel-Gaza war in the coming months and years.
• GAZA STRIP: Persistent bottlenecks at the newly reopened Gaza crossing will undercut aid provision. On 2 February, following a one-day pilot on 31 January, the Rafah border crossing was reopened for entry and exit from Gaza. However, early reports indicate large bottlenecks during security checks to enter and exit, as well as a low rate of security clearance. According to the reports on 2 February, only 12 out of 50 Palestinians were allowed to enter Gaza, while 15 were able to exit the strip into Egypt. We assess that the number of people permitted through the crossing will gradually rise over the coming days, though it will likely remain low overall. This will sustain tensions between Israel and international parties involved in the Gaza peace process, though the closure of the crossing remains unlikely. Furthermore, we assess that bottlenecks and stringent security checks will undercut efforts to escalate aid distribution in Gaza.
• GAZA STRIP: Elevated militant activity will increase the risk of significant IDF airstrikes in the coming days. On 30 January, the IDF conducted a wave of overnight strikes across Gaza, killing at least 32 Palestinians. The strikes came after the IDF identified eight militants who emerged from an underground tunnel in east Rafah earlier that day, and after the IDF clashed with four armed militants within the Israeli-controlled Yellow Line area in central Gaza. On 3 February, militants seriously injured an IDF officer in an ambush on an IDF infantry force within Israeli-controlled territory in northern Gaza. The IDF responded with a series of strikes targeting militant commanders and infrastructure, killing at least 21 individuals, including civilians. Militant activity targeting IDF personnel has risen over the past month, with the latest strikes indicating an increased intensity of IDF retaliation. The intensification of IDF strikes will elevate security risks for personnel and bystanders across the strip over the coming weeks. However, we assess that the ceasefire will likely continue to hold (broadly) in the coming weeks.
• WEST BANK: Electoral law reforms will likely preserve the Fatah party’s majority in upcoming elections, while increasing the risk of protests and unrest. On 28 January, PA President Mahmoud Abbas approved an amendment to the 2007 Election Law that requires all electoral candidates to accept the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO)’s ‘National Program’. The programme includes the recognition of Israel, the renunciation of terrorism and the pursuit of a two-state solution. The amendment will likely disqualify Hamas, Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) and the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) from participating in the West Bank’s local elections (25 April) and the Palestinian National Council elections (1 November). The amendment highly likely forms part of Abbas’ efforts to consolidate Fatah’s authority within the PA, while also reversing Hamas’ and its allied factions’ political and military resurgence in the West Bank. As such, Hamas and aligned Palestinian factions will likely attempt to mobilise anti-PA protests to denounce the new amendment in the coming weeks. Demonstrations will likely target PA facilities and Fatah party offices, increasing the risk of unrest, altercations and clashes with PA security forces in major Palestinian population centres, including Ramallah (Ramallah and al Bireh governorate). Nevertheless, protest activity is highly unlikely to destabilise the PA critically, with Fatah likely to maintain a majority in both the municipal and national council elections. As such, we assess that governance conditions within the West Bank are highly unlikely to improve, sustaining long-standing corruption and supervision quality risks for locally engaged entities.

REGIONAL AND GLOBAL DEVELOPMENTS

EU-Iran: The EU designated the IRGC as a terrorist organisation and imposed new sanctions against Iranian officials and entities, elevating compliance risks for associated businesses worldwide. On 29 January, the EU listed the IRGC as a terrorist organisation in response to its recent crackdown on anti-government protesters nationwide. Also, on the same day, the EU imposed new sanctions targeting several IRGC officials and six entities, citing their roles in the violent suppression of protests, arbitrary detentions and executions. The sanctioned entities include Iran’s Audio-Visual Media Regulatory Authority (SATRA) and several IRGC-tied cyber and technology organisations linked to the internet blackout. The EU also issued separate sanctions against Iranian companies facilitating the transfer of drones and missile technology to Russia, in addition to Iranian shipping and logistics firms accused of supporting weapons deliveries. The latest proscription and sanctions are highly likely to trigger the freezing of IRGC-linked financial assets held in EU jurisdictions, significantly increasing financial and legal risks for associated subcontractors, banks and logistics providers. Financial institutions in the EU and the Gulf region will also likely face heightened regulatory and compliance demands to counteract inadvertent dealings with IRGC-affiliated entities, alongside increased anti-money-laundering (AML) obligations. Additionally, the recent decisions will almost certainly elevate diplomatic tensions between Iran and the EU, in turn likely reducing the efficacy of EU-mediated channels on Iran’s nuclear programme – even if a new deal is reached in the coming months (which we assess remains a low-likelihood outcome).

• Tunisia: New prison sentences are unlikely to increase anti-government protests significantly. On 3 February, a Tunisian appeal court upheld and increased the prison sentences of 21 prominent politicians and security officials, on charges of conspiring against the state. Notably, the court handed a new 20-year sentence to the leader of the opposition Ennahda Movement, Rached Ghannouchi, up from the previous 14-year term. The court also upheld 35-year sentences against former intelligence chief Kamel Guizani and former foreign minister Rafik Abdessalem, both of whom remain abroad. The new sentences are likely to sustain rising domestic criticism of President Kais Saied, whose popularity continues to decline amid a major crackdown on opposition and a deteriorating economy. However, we assess that the new sentences are unlikely to prompt an escalation in ongoing anti-government protests. These protests are likely to continue until the start of the month of Ramadan (17 February to 18 March) and will likely take place primarily in the capital Tunis during weekends. Altercations with the security forces during these protests remains a realistic possibility, elevating bystander security and travel disruption risks in their vicinity. Labour strikes during February remain unlikely.
• Iran-US: Drone downing and attempted tanker seizure underscore military, diplomatic tensions. On 3 February, the US military shot down an Iranian Shahed 129 drone that approached the USS Abraham Lincoln (CVN-72) aircraft carrier strike group in the Arabian Sea. On the same day, Iranian gunboats unsuccessfully attempted to intercept a US-flagged oil tanker in the Strait of Hormuz. These incidents underscore heightened military tensions between Iran and the US ahead of scheduled nuclear negotiations in Oman on 6 February. As a result of the large-scale US military build-up in the region, further US defensive actions against Iranian military assets are possible in the coming days, raising the risk of conflict escalation through miscalculation. Further Iranian attempts to seize US-linked commercial vessels are also possible in the coming weeks, driven by heightened military tensions and attempts to gain diplomatic leverage. While the nuclear negotiations are likely to proceed on 6 February, persistent differences over the structure and scope of talks will sustain a heightened risk of a US attack on Iranian military, political and dual-use infrastructure in the coming weeks

Feb 03.

• Iran-UK: Sanctions over violent protest crackdowns will elevate compliance, regulatory risks. On 2 February, the UK sanctioned ten Iranian individuals and one organisation for their role in the recent violent state crackdown on anti-government protesters in Iran. Those designated include the interior minister, Eskandar Momeni, several senior police officials and prominent members of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC). The Police Command of the Islamic Republic of Iran (FARAJA) was also sanctioned. These measures will increase legal, financial and operational risks for UK businesses with exposure to Iran and Iran-linked supply chains. The sanctions are also likely to heighten compliance and regulatory risks across several sectors, particularly energy, logistics and maritime services. While Tehran has not yet commented on the move, Iran will likely respond with sanctions targeting UK interests. This will increase exposure for Iranian businesses reliant on UK-involved supply chains, especially in the pharmaceutical and logistics sectors. Following the EU’s designation of the IRGC as a terrorist organisation on 27 January, pressure will increase on the UK to follow suit. Any such move by the UK would also heighten regulatory and compliance exposure for financial institutions and banks.
• Syria: Ceasefire will likely hold, despite risk of splinter groups retaliating against government forces. On 2 February, Syrian government forces entered the city of Al-Hasakah (Al-Hasakah governorate), one of the last strongholds held by the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF). The deployment is the first step towards implementing a ceasefire and integration deal between the two sides. It is also likely that government forces will enter the cities of Kobani (Aleppo governorate) and Qamishli (Al-Hasakah) later today. We assess that there is a realistic possibility that the integration of Kurdish factions into the Syrian army will begin in the coming months. As such, the current ceasefire will likely hold. However, Damascus will likely insist on excluding the majority of the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) and the People’s Defence Units (YPG) from this integration deal, pressuring the SDF to relocate them to Iraq. There is a realistic possibility that radical elements from these groups will attempt to mount retaliatory attacks against the government forces in Al-Hasakah and Aleppo governorates. Such attacks will likely target government and military buildings as well as checkpoints along provincial highways, sustaining elevated security risks in north-eastern Syria.

Feb 02.

• Iran-US: Progress towards negotiations will reduce risk of US attack against Iran in coming days. Earlier on 2 February, state-affiliated media announced that Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian ordered the initiation of nuclear negotiations with the US. On 31 January, US President Donald Trump stated that Iran was already ‘seriously talking’ to the US amid the latter’s large-scale military build-up in the Arabian Sea. Progress towards nuclear negotiations will reduce the risk of a US attack against Iran in the coming days, moderating regional tensions. However, persistent differences over the structure of the talks and the scope of any possible agreement will sustain heightened conflict escalation risks in the coming weeks. The emergence of certain indicators would signal stalled progress in the diplomatic process, and in turn elevate the likelihood of a US attack against Iran. These include the US issuing imminent deadlines for engagement publicly, Iran prolonging framework discussions rather than engaging on substantive details and Iran maintaining hardline positions on enrichment (as well as its missile programme and its support for regional proxies). In the event of an attack, we assess that the US would likely target Iran’s political and military leadership and possibly its dual-use infrastructure.
• Syria: Arrest of Hizballah-linked cell underscores persistent threat posed by Iranian-backed groups. On 1 February, Syria’s interior ministry claimed to have dismantled a cell responsible for a series of recent rocket attacks targeting the capital Damascus’ Mazzeh district and its military airport. The security forces seized numerous weapons, including drones, rockets and their launch platforms; they then tracked the arms’ source to Lebanese Hizballah (LH). The dismantling will reduce the likelihood of further rocket attacks on the capital. However, it also underscores the persistent threat of a resurgence by Iranian-backed groups. This threat is most acute in areas such as Tartus and Latakia governorates, as well as along the border regions with Lebanon, such as Homs governorate, where the government’s presence is limited and where pro-Assad and LH-linked cells are still active. In these regions, we assess that similar rocket and drone attacks against government forces will remain likely through 2026, sustaining elevated physical security risks near checkpoints and public and/or military facilities. (Source: Sibylline)

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Military And Security Developments

Feb 05.

• Doubts about Western commitment to Ukraine’s long-term security will encourage Russia to test the credibility of a peace deal; our worst-case scenario sees Russia resuming hostilities in the future.
• Bolstering Ukraine’s peacetime armed forces will likely prove the most credible direct deterrent against another invasion, though disputes in Europe will undermine the viability of long-term support.
• NATO-style protections provided by the US will likely remain Ukraine’s preferred security guarantee in the absence of membership in the alliance, which remains a non-starter for Russia.
• The deployment of Western troops inside Ukraine as part of a peace deal is highly unlikely due to Russian opposition, as well as chronic personnel and equipment constraints across Europe.
• A UN-mandated peacekeeping mission is highly unlikely; it would likely encounter difficulties given Russian veto powers and the realities of policing an expansive frontline.
• A reported proposal to offer Ukraine an accelerated path to limited EU membership is unlikely to offer strong security guarantees on its own, though it could reinforce other guarantees over the long term.
• A Ukrainian nuclear deterrent remains highly unlikely; it would increase rather than decrease the likelihood of a renewed Russian invasion before any such programme could be completed.

Context

Credible security guarantees for Ukraine will play a key role in any peace deal and in deterring a renewed Russian attack. An intensified push by US President Donald Trump in late 2025 spurred talks among various stakeholders about the kind of guarantees Ukraine could receive following a potential peace deal (or at least a ceasefire agreement). These include sending troops to Ukraine as part of a reassurance force, with France and the UK taking a leading role in any such deployment. Meanwhile, reports from late January claimed that the US had signalled that guarantees which ‘mirror’ NATO’s collective defence principle (Article 5) will possibly hinge on territorial concessions, specifically Ukraine agreeing to cede the Donbas to Russia.

Any Western-provided security guarantees will be defined by the precise terms of a peace deal (or the absence of one). In the short term, the West will possibly leverage the promise of credible security guarantees to incentivise Kyiv to accept politically tough concessions (namely regarding territory). Yet given that Russia’s hardline position has changed little in recent years, the Kremlin will retain the ultimate decision as to whether an agreement is in its interests (at least temporarily) or whether it would limit (to unacceptable levels) Russia’s imperial aspirations in Ukraine – meaning the war would likely continue or freeze without resolution.

The West’s ability to offer ironclad, effective guarantees is increasingly undermined by growing transatlantic divergences and doubts about the US’ willingness to commit to Ukraine’s security over the long term. Russia will highly likely seek to exploit these divisions, both in the short term and in the coming years as competing geopolitical priorities provide Moscow with new opportunities. For a guarantee to be credible and to enforce peace effectively (by deterring war), it requires an unambiguous commitment by Ukraine’s partners over the long term. Ultimately, the perceived or real absence of such a commitment remains the key driver influencing Moscow’s strategic calculus on whether the costs of resuming its war at a later date are acceptable. In this respect, we assess that a policy of ‘strategic ambiguity’ – which was favoured prior to the full-scale invasion in 2022 – will highly likely fail to deter future Russian action. If a security guarantee is perceived as weak or ill-defined (and thus lacking in credibility), the likelihood of a resumption of fighting will increase; as such, any peace or ceasefire agreement signed in 2026 may not end the de facto 12-year-long Russo-Ukrainian war

Feb 04.

• Ukraine: Metallurgy sector financial issues threaten to undermine long-term reconstruction. On 3 February, Ukrainian steelmaker Metinvest failed to reach an agreement with a group of its creditors to restructure more than USD 1.25 bn of debt. Metinvest is attempting to postpone the repayment dates of its three main bonds by around two to three years, due to the financial impact of the Russo-Ukrainian war. The company owned the Azovstal and Illich plants in Mariupol (Donetsk oblast), both of which fell under Russian occupation, resulting in the loss of 65% of its business. Metinvest’s situation reflects the broader state of Ukraine’s steel sector, which has been heavily impacted by the hostilities in eastern Ukraine, where many steel-producing facilities are located. Meanwhile, plants that are in non-occupied regions remain heavily affected by Russian long-range strikes against energy infrastructure, causing significant operational disruption. Facing growing financial difficulties, Ukraine’s metallurgical sector will face rising bankruptcy risks, which would ultimately curtail government tax revenues. In the long term, this threatens to undermine the country’s reconstruction prospects and economic recovery, given the central role steelmakers are expected to play.

Ukraine: Metallurgy sector financial issues threaten to undermine long-term reconstruction. On 3 February, Ukrainian steelmaker Metinvest failed to reach an agreement with a group of its creditors to restructure more than USD 1.25 bn of debt. Metinvest is attempting to postpone the repayment dates of its three main bonds by around two to three years, due to the financial impact of the Russo-Ukrainian war. The company owned the Azovstal and Illich plants in Mariupol (Donetsk oblast), both of which fell under Russian occupation, resulting in the loss of 65% of its business. Metinvest’s situation reflects the broader state of Ukraine’s steel sector, which has been heavily impacted by the hostilities in eastern Ukraine, where many steel-producing facilities are located. Meanwhile, plants that are in non-occupied regions remain heavily affected by Russian long-range strikes against energy infrastructure, causing significant operational disruption. Facing growing financial difficulties, Ukraine’s metallurgical sector will face rising bankruptcy risks, which would ultimately curtail government tax revenues. In the long term, this threatens to undermine the country’s reconstruction prospects and economic recovery, given the central role steelmakers are expected to play.

• Europe: Vulnerability exploitation underscores increased security risks from Russian threat actors. On 2 February, cyber security company Zscaler reported that a Russian state-sponsored threat group (‘APT28’) has targeted Microsoft Office users in Romania, Slovakia and Ukraine in a cyber operation (‘Neusploit’) since at least 29 January. The group uses phishing emails in both English and local languages to distribute a malicious RTF file, exploiting a software vulnerability (CVE-2026-21509) affecting Microsoft Office products. This ultimately executes two malware droppers (‘MiniDoor’ and ‘PixyNetLoader’) onto compromised systems. The vulnerability was first disclosed on 26 January, highlighting its rapid exploitation. Upon execution, MiniDoor exfiltrates victims’ emails to threat actor-controlled infrastructure, before deploying PixyNetLoader to install additional malicious payloads, maintain persistence and steal other sensitive information. PixyNetLoader reportedly only executes if it is not located in an analysis environment to enhance obfuscation and detection evasion. We assess that this operation signals the continued expansion of Russia’s cyber strategy, underscoring increased security risks to countries particularly in Eastern Europe.

Feb 03.

KEY DEVELOPMENTS 

• STRIKES: Russian forces likely adjusted their tactics during a temporary moratorium on striking energy facilities (which has now ended) over the past week; there was increased targeting of railway facilities, particularly in Dnipropetrovsk and Zaporizhzhia oblasts
• GUARANTEES: The FT has reported that Ukraine has agreed to a ‘multi-tiered’ ceasefire enforcement plan involving Europe and the US, though details remain limited and Russia is highly likely to test the credibility of any such commitment, if approved
• POWs: Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stated on 30 January that Russia has suspended exchanges of prisoners of war (POWs); if accurate, this would likely represent a negative indicator that a peace deal is imminent
• FORECAST: On 29 January, US President Donald Trump claimed that his Russian counterpart had agreed to refrain from long-range strikes against Kyiv and other urban centres for a week, though strikes on 3 February indicated that the truce is over
• VOVCHANSK: In recent days, Russian forces have likely intensified their efforts to capture Vovchansk (Kharkiv oblast) which is located just three miles (5km) from the Russian border. Geolocated footage released on 1 February indicates that Russian forces recently advanced in the south of the town. Additionally, a spokesperson for Ukraine’s Joint Forces, Viktor Tregubov, stated on 2 February that the situation was ‘frankly difficult’, explaining that Russian forces were attempting to bypass the town, as well as to infiltrate the remaining Ukrainian-held positions. The battle for Vovchansk has been heavily protracted, with Russian forces getting bogged down soon after their cross-border operation began in May 2024. It remains unclear whether Russian forces have sufficient capabilities in the area to make major advances in the coming weeks, though their rate of advance has increased over the last month or so in contrast to almost no movement over the previous year.
• INTELLIGENCE: According to the Financial Times (FT), an unnamed Western official has stated that Ukraine’s reliance on US intelligence could be significantly reduced within months. These comments follow French President Emmanuel Macron’s recent claim that France now provides Ukraine with two-thirds of its intelligence needs. While we cannot confirm the veracity of these claims, the report points, at least in part, to an increase in European weapon systems provided to Ukraine. US-manufactured equipment typically requires US intelligence to be able to function and therefore a decrease in those systems likely entails a decrease in corresponding intelligence requirements. However, given that Europe plans to support Ukraine through the purchase of US weapon systems, the extent to which reliance on US intelligence can be reduced remains unclear. The long-term impact on Ukraine’s war effort in the absence of US (primarily CIA) intelligence support also remains unclear; this intelligence support was bolstered in 2014 and has been critical to Ukraine’s war effort.
• STRIKES: The CEO of SpaceX, Elon Musk, stated on 31 January that the company had successfully halted the Russian military’s ‘unauthorised use’ of the company’s Starlink satellite system to carry out strikes on Ukraine. The announcement was made after the Ukrainian authorities reported in January that Starlink dishes had been discovered among the wreckage of hundreds of Russian long-range drones. The Starlink connection increased the range of the drones and augmented their defence against electronic warfare (EW) measures. We previously reported on the extensive use of Starlink by the Russian military. On 1 February, Ukrainian Defence Minister Mykhailo Fedorov reported that work was in progress to ensure that only authorised Starlink terminals operate in Ukrainian territory in a bid to ensure that only Ukrainian forces are able to access the technology. However, the precise nature of these measures remains unclear; there are potential knock-on disruption risks, not only for military communications, but also for the extensive civilian use of Starlink.
• STRIKES: Russian forces likely adjusted their tactics during a temporary moratorium on striking energy facilities (which has now ended) over the past week; this likely involves the increased targeting of railway facilities, particularly in Dnipropetrovsk and Zaporizhzhia oblasts. A strike on a rail facility in Synelnykove (Dnipropetrovsk) caused damage to freight cars, electric (train) cars, railway tracks and power grids. The state railway operator Ukrainian Railways (‘Ukrzaliznytsia’) was forced to restrict train services and make greater use of bus replacements between Dnipropetrovsk and Zaporizhzhia. This followed numerous other strikes on fuel trucks and buses in Dnipropetrovsk. On 31 January, Russian forces carried out a so-called ‘double tap’ strike (which is a war crime) on a bus belonging to the Ukrainian energy company DTEK that was transporting coal miners in Dnipropetrovsk, killing 12 civilians. For more analysis of Russian strike patterns, see FORECAST below.
• STRIKES: On 30 January, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky blamed European leaders for leaving Ukrainian air defences exposed to Russian ballistic missile strikes due to a delay in critical deliveries. Pac-3 interceptor missiles used in Patriot air defence systems – the only type capable of intercepting Russia’s ballistic missiles – allegedly arrived a day late due to a missed payment under the Prioritised Ukraine Requirements List (PURL). Zelensky’s comments indicate that he was referring to a combined strike on 20 January that included 34 ballistic and cruise missiles. His comments also point to the extent of Ukraine’s dependence on foreign military aid to ensure that the country’s air defences remain operational; a single day’s delay is liable to result in serious defensive gaps. Given the intensity of missile strikes, including the largest such strike of the year on 3 February (see FORECAST below), Ukraine’s air defences will almost certainly remain insufficient to prevent major disruption to the country’s energy grid in the short-to-medium term.

POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS

• GUARANTEES: Earlier on 3 February, the FT reported that Ukraine has agreed to a ‘multi-tiered’ ceasefire enforcement plan involving Europe and the US. According to unspecified insiders, a Russian violation would trigger a response within 24 hours, starting with a ‘diplomatic warning’ and necessary military action by the Ukrainian army. If hostilities continued after that, forces from the so-called ‘Coalition of the Willing’ would intervene. However, of the countries within this coalition, only France and the UK have formally pledged to send troops to Ukraine in the event of a peace deal (in any case, we assess that their deployment would be highly unlikely as part of any peace deal). The FT’s report does not specify the other roles that those countries which have not agreed to send troops to Ukraine would be expected to play; details concerning logistics are similarly vague. The last tier envisions that, in the case of an expanded attack 72 hours after the initial breach, a co-ordinated military response by a ‘Western-backed force’ involving the US military would ensue.
• GUARANTEES: While we cannot confirm the report, our assessment remains that (genuinely) credible and robust security guarantees would prove crucial components for deterring renewed Russian aggression. However, a ‘diplomatic warning’ is unlikely to deter Russia, which has broken numerous ceasefires since the Russo-Ukrainian war de facto began in 2014. If implemented, Russia would highly likely seek to test the capability and will of the West (particularly the US) to act. If Moscow perceives that Kyiv’s Western partners are preoccupied with domestic or other international crises or do not want a long-term embroilment in Ukraine, the credibility of the guarantees is likely to be insufficient to deter subsequent Russian military action. The likelihood of renewed aggression will be elevated if a ceasefire agreement does not grant Russia the territories that it desires in Ukraine’s Donbas region. Additional analysis on Ukrainian security guarantees will be issued in a forthcoming Special Report.
• NEGOTIATIONS: Another round of peace talks between Russia, Ukraine and the US is due to take place on 4 and 5 February in Abu Dhabi (UAE), though the prospect of an imminent, major breakthrough remains low. Trilateral negotiations were widely expected to resume on 1 February, though it is unclear why they were delayed. Separately, the Russian envoy, Kirill Dmitriev, met US officials on 31 January in Miami (US) for bilateral negotiations, which US Special Envoy Steve Witkoff described as ‘productive and constructive’. The upcoming talks come amid a renewed push by the US since late 2025 to broker an end to the Russo-Ukrainian war. Despite an ‘agreement’ to halt Russian long-range strikes against Ukrainian energy infrastructure temporarily (see FORECAST), the talks have thus far yielded few tangible steps towards peace (and are unlikely to in the near term).
• NEGOTIATIONS: Russia maintains that a meeting between Russian President Vladimir Putin and President Zelensky can only be held in Moscow (Russia), which Kyiv will almost certainly continue to oppose for clear security (and symbolic) reasons. On 2 February, the Kremlin press secretary, Dmitry Peskov, dismissed the prospect of the two leaders meeting in a neutral jurisdiction. Presidential aide Yuri Ushakov claimed on 28 January that Moscow would guarantee Zelensky’s safety should he visit for face-to-face talks with Putin. However, the Ukrainian president will almost certainly not travel to Moscow for a myriad of reasons, namely low levels of mutual trust and security concerns. In a similar vein, the prospect of Putin travelling to Kyiv (Ukraine) for talks with Zelensky is remote. Ultimately, Russia’s insistence that presidential talks should be held in Moscow is highly likely a means to avoid a Putin-Zelensky summit, amid continued US pressure for such a meeting.
• POWs: President Zelensky stated on 30 January that Russia has suspended exchanges of prisoners of war (POWs); if accurate, this would likely represent a negative indicator that a peace deal is imminent. According to Zelensky, the Russian side stopped the prisoner swaps due to a lack of interest and because Moscow does not see the benefit of such an arrangement. Zelensky stated that the last exchange of POWs was conducted on 2 October 2025. The two sides have exchanged POWs on several occasions throughout the full-scale invasion of Ukraine, including many such swaps in 2025.
• POWs: We previously assessed that these exchanges allow for trust building and lower-level co-operation between the warring parties that would likely assist in negotiations aimed at ending the war at a later date. The current heads of the Russian and Ukrainian negotiating delegations, Admiral Igor Kostykov and Lieutenant General Kyrylo Budanov (the head and former head of both countries’ military intelligence, respectively), have both been heavily involved in POW negotiations in recent years. If such negotiations have been suspended, it remains unclear whether this is because the focus has switched to other areas (as some officials indicated during the recent trilateral negotiations in the UAE), or whether negotiations are being stalled. POW exchanges have long been an important litmus test for continued direct (albeit lower level) negotiations between the two sides. As such, Russia’s potential disengagement from POW exchanges further reinforces our assessment that significant advancements towards peace are unlikely in the near term.

FORECAST

TRUCE: On 29 January, US President Donald Trump claimed that his Russian counterpart had agreed to refrain from long-range strikes against Kyiv and other Ukrainian urban centres for a week amid extremely low temperatures. President Zelensky later disclosed that negotiators had discussed the matter during the first round of trilateral negotiations, which took place on 23 and 24 January, and indicated that the supposed moratorium would apply to energy infrastructure.

However, subsequent statements from the Kremlin indicated possible misinterpretation or misunderstanding of the scope of the supposed ‘truce’, which has now very much ended. According to Peskov, Trump had asked Putin to halt strikes targeting only Kyiv and to create ‘favourable conditions for negotiations’ until 1 February. Meanwhile, President Zelensky stated earlier on 3 February that the truce was to begin on 30 January and to last for one week (meaning a likely end date of 6 February). At the time of Trump’s announcement, it was unclear whether this energy truce had already entered into force or when it was due to do so, as well as which other Ukrainian cities it would apply to.

Ambiguities and vaguely defined terms increase the likelihood of ceasefires being violated (either deliberately or inadvertently) or failing to hold; previous US-brokered temporary agreements have also resulted in much confusion. By ‘agreeing’ to a temporary cessation of strikes against Ukraine’s energy infrastructure, Russia highly likely wanted to present itself as willing to negotiate and act in good faith, even if it possibly intentionally misinterpreted the length of a supposed truce. Despite showing limited willingness to take genuine steps towards peace, Moscow highly likely wants to avoid alienating the Trump administration, given it has previously shown some alignment on Russia’s terms on which to end the war.

Russia’s large-scale overnight strikes on 2-3 February definitively ended the ‘truce’ and reinforced our previous assessment that a short pause would enable Russia to stockpile for more intensive strikes in the aftermath of the moratorium. Russia’s large-scale combined strike focused primarily on targeting energy infrastructure when overnight temperatures in Kyiv reached below -20 C (-4 F). In total, 521 projectiles were fired, including 71 ballistic and cruise missiles, primarily in the direction of Dnipropetrovsk, Kharkiv, Kyiv, Odesa and Vinnytsia oblasts (all Ukraine). According to the Ukrainian energy company DTEK, the company’s thermal power stations were ‘significantly damaged’ in the attack, which marked the ninth large-scale attack on DTEK power plants since October 2025. DTEK described the attack as the most significant against the country’s energy infrastructure of 2026 so far. According to preliminary data provided by Ukraine’s air force, 38 missiles and 412 drones were intercepted – indicating a significant percentage of the missiles penetrated Ukraine’s defences and likely struck their targets.

We assess that energy security risks will remain heightened in the coming weeks amid continued low temperatures. In turn, humanitarian risks will remain elevated across different urban centres, including the capital Kyiv, where an exodus of citizens has occurred due to the energy emergency. As such, the likelihood of further scheduled and emergency blackouts will remain elevated, which will undermine business operations (particularly for entities involved in energy-intensive work) across Ukraine.

Prior to the 3 February strikes, Zelensky had signalled a level of Russian compliance with the truce; it also remains unlikely that the potential Russian ‘misunderstanding’ will prompt a hardline US diplomatic response. The timelines and details of what was agreed remain unclear. Nevertheless, the Ukrainian president stated on 2 February that Russia had not carried out any missile or drone strikes against Ukrainian energy infrastructure in the past 24 hours. Similarly, he did not report any strikes against energy targets overnight on 29-30 January. This partial adherence to the US-brokered agreement possibly provides Moscow with diplomatic cover amid trilateral negotiations, which are due to restart on 4 and 5 February in Abu Dhabi. However, it remains unlikely that the Trump administration will punish Moscow severely, despite Zelensky’s open accusation that the Kremlin ‘took advantage’ of the US proposal. If further such temporary or more substantial truces are to hold in the future, the conditions of any such agreements must be detailed and clearly spelled out; a ground ceasefire agreed under similarly unclear conditions will only increase the already elevated likelihood of violations and collapse.

• Russia-Ukraine: Tiered ceasefire violation plan alone is unlikely to deter future Russian hostilities. Earlier on 3 February, the Financial Times reported that Ukraine has agreed to a ‘multi-tiered’ ceasefire enforcement plan involving Europe and the US. According to unspecified insiders, a Russian violation would trigger a response within 24 hours, starting with a ‘diplomatic warning’ and necessary military action by the Ukrainian army. If hostilities continued after that, forces from the so-called ‘Coalition of the Willing’ would intervene. In the case of an expanded attack 72 hours after the initial breach, a co-ordinated military response by a ‘Western-backed force’ involving the US military would ensue. While we cannot confirm the report, our assessment remains that credible, robust security guarantees would prove crucial components for deterring renewed Russian aggression. However, a ‘diplomatic warning’ is unlikely to deter Russia, which has broken numerous ceasefires since the Russo-Ukrainian war de facto began in 2014. If implemented, Russia would highly likely seek to test the capability and will of the West (particularly the US) to act. If Moscow perceives that Kyiv’s Western partners are preoccupied or do not want a long-term embroilment in Ukraine, the credibility of the guarantees is likely to be insufficient to deter subsequent Russian military action (particularly if a ceasefire agreement does not grant Russia the territories that it desires in Ukraine’s Donbas region).

Feb 02.

• Russia-Ukraine: Prospect of significant breakthrough in next US-brokered peace talks remains low. On 1 February, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky said another round of peace talks between his country, Russia and the US is due to take place on 4 and 5 February in Abu Dhabi (UAE). Trilateral negotiations were widely expected to resume on 1 February, though Zelensky did not specify why they had been postponed. Neither Russia nor the US have confirmed the new date of the talks at the time of writing, however. The slated talks come amid a renewed push from the US since late 2025 to broker an end to the Russo-Ukrainian war, with territory remaining one of the key sticking points in negotiations. Despite an uptick in diplomatic activity and negotiations in recent weeks, we continue to assess that the likelihood of a major breakthrough towards peace remains low in the near term. (For further analysis of our expected scenarios and outcomes of the war in Ukraine. (Source: Sibylline)

 

04 Feb 26. Ukraine’s Gripen jets likely to come with long-reach Meteor missiles. Ukraine and Sweden are discussing the prospect of arming Kyiv with Europe’s top air-to-air missile, the Meteor, which a Saab official said would be a “natural content” of a weapon package for Gripen users. Ukrainian Defense Minister Mykhailo Fedorov announced last week that the country was discussing the potential transfer of JAS 39 Gripen jets and Meteor missiles to the war-torn country. These beyond-visual range, air-to-air missiles can currently only be integrated on the Gripen, Eurofighter, and the Rafale fighter jets, although the United Kingdom is leading ground-based integration testing on the F-35.

“The Meteor missile would be a natural content in a weapon package for any Gripen user, discussions are taking place with several export nations, including Ukraine,” Jussi Halmetoja, operations advisor in the air domain at Saab told Defense News at the Singapore Airshow here.

Halmetoja added that the Meteor missiles would enhance Ukraine’s operations by providing pilots with extended engagement ranges, denying Russian aircraft freedom of movement and control of the air.

Late last year, Ukraine and Sweden signed a letter of intent to export up to 150 Gripen fighter jets to Kyiv, although no final deal has been concluded.

The Meteor is 419-pound (190 kilo) munition manufactured by MBDA that first entered into service with the Swedish Air Force on the Gripen in 2016. It was developed in a joint project of six European countries, including Sweden, and led by MBDA.  It uses a rocket booster as well as a throttleable ramjet motor that can continue to power the missile until impact, allowing for late-stage maneuverability. That capability increases its kill-zone compared to more common rocket-powered air-to-air missiles that coast after their initial boost. Saab lists Meteor’s range as more than 100 kilometers and its speed at over Mach 4, though the range is regularly reported as being around 200 kilometers. Meteor was “arguably the most capable AAM currently in service on Western combat aircraft,” the London-based International Institute for Security Studies wrote in a report in September 2022. Last year, Sweden procured its third batch of Meteor missiles destined for the Gripen aircraft. The acquisition was done through international cooperation, whereby the British arm of MBDA is the one providing the systems. (Source: Defense News)

 

02 Feb 26. Ukraine’s “counter-UAS interception rate fell from 84% in November to 81% in December.” Ukraine’s rate of Russian drones fell to 81% in December 2025, down from 84% in November 2025, according to a new publication Ukraine Air War Monitor published by Foundation Office Ukraine/Konrad Adenauer Foundation.

“In December, 987 drones could not be intercepted (previous month: 844). Interception rates for ballistic missiles and cruise missiles changed little: approximately 25% of ballistic missiles were intercepted, and an average of 85% of cruise missiles,” said the publication.  In December, Russia deployed 5,131 drones against Ukrainian cities and civilian targets (6% fewer than in the previous month), as well as 120 cruise missiles and 57 ballistic missiles, according to the publication. For the first time, the use of an Iskander-1000 missile was reported. Medium-range ballistic missiles (IRBMs) of the Oreshnik type are expected to be stationed in Belarus.

The Ukraine Air War Monitor reports:

“In 2025, the Russian army carried out approximately 56,700 air attacks, primarily using long-range drones (96% of all attacks), against civilian targets in Ukraine — more than four times as many as in 2024 (13,300). In 15 nights in 2025, attacks involving more than 500 drones were recorded. Drone defense remained the greatest challenge for the Ukrainian Air Force. The interception rate for long-range drones fell from 98% in February to as low as 80% in October.

Ukraine was able to restrict Russian drone production through targeted strikes on factories and supplier companies. From August 2025 onward, the number of Russian long-range drones deployed declined steadily. China remains the most important supporter of Russia’s drone production.”

For more information: https://www.kas.de/en/web/ukraine/blickpunkt-ukraine/detail/-/content/ukraine-air-war-monitor-vol-xi (Source: www.unmannedairspace.info)

 

02 Feb 26. SpaceX Disables Starlink Terminals on Russian Strike Drones. According to Ukrainian authorities, Russian forces recently began using attack drones fitted with Starlink terminals to strike military targets inside Ukraine. The issue was raised urgently with SpaceX after drones using satellite connectivity were detected operating over Ukrainian cities. Ukraine’s Minister of Defence, Mykhailo Fedorov, said his team contacted SpaceX immediately and proposed technical steps to halt the unauthorized use. On January 29, he wrote that within hours of the reports, the ministry had shared concrete solutions. He later confirmed that SpaceX responded quickly and started implementing restrictions to disable Starlink terminals when used on Russian unmanned systems. Fedorov thanked SpaceX President Gwynne Shotwell and Elon Musk for the swift response. Open-source monitoring groups from Ukraine and Russia reported that the countermeasures include speed-based restrictions. Starlink terminals are disabled when movement exceeds roughly 75–90 kilometers per hour, preventing use on fast-moving platforms such as strike drones while preserving service for ground users and slower systems. The steps were aimed at drones such as the BM-35 and “Molniya,” reportedly modified to carry Starlink terminals for long-range navigation and command-and-control. Musk said the measures appeared effective and invited feedback if more was needed. Fedorov replied that the first actions were already producing results and that coordination would continue.

Serhii Beskrestnov (“Flash”), an adviser to Fedorov, said many Ukrainian users were already observing the countermeasures. He noted that current steps are temporary and will be replaced by a broader, long-term solution.

Beskrestnov also emphasized the need to gather nationwide information on military Starlink users, acknowledging past reluctance among soldiers using volunteer-provided terminals. Starlink has been central to Ukraine’s communications since early 2022, supporting military and civilian connectivity during attacks on infrastructure. (Source: UAS VISION/Defence Blog; Ukrinform)

 

30 Jan 26. Russia’s Starlink-equipped Geran drones increase Ukraine’s counter-UAS challenges. According to multiple media reports, Ukraine’s Defence Minister Mykhailo Fedorov has been intalks with Elon Musk’s SpaceX over concerns that Russian drones have started to use internet services from Starlink satellites during attacks on Ukrainian cities. New versions of Russian Shahed/Gern drones have been identified by Ukranian forces equipped with Starlink terminals which feature command-and-control and video/telemetry links which are extremely difficult to detect and jam. According to Mykhailo Fedorov in a social media post: “Within hours of Russian drones with Starlink connectivity appearing over Ukrainian cities, the Ministry of Defence team promptly contacted SpaceX and proposed ways to resolve the problem…I’m grateful to SpaceX President Gwynne Shotwell and personally to Elon Musk for their swift response.” The last few months have seen a rapid evolution of the Geran range of drones, with Geran-4 drones now capable of reaching 350–500 km/h and Geran-5s equipped with a 90 kg warhead and a 1,000 km range, both of which can be air launched, extending range even further. The addition of Starklink to the Geran family, and other long-range Russian drones, will make the counter-UAS challenges for Ukraine even more difficult.

According to the Odessa Journal:

“(Starlink) terminals have been recorded on long-range Shahed kamikaze drones with ranges of up to 2,000 km; on tactical FPV drones of the Molniya series, including the Molniya-2 and Molniya-2R variants, actively used since December 2025 by the Rubikon unit; and on the long-range BM-35 drone, recorded with Starlink in January 2026 during strikes on Dnipro and Odessa.”

For more information: https://www.euronews.com/2026/01/29/ukraine-contacts-spacex-over-russian-drones-allegedly-using-starlink-officials-say

https://odessa-journal.com/russia-uses-starlink-to-boost-uav-reconnaissance-and-strikes-bypassing-sanctions-via-third-countries (Source: www.unmannedairspace.info)

 

26 Jan 26. Ukraine MoD appoints defence technology adviser and discusses US air defence support. The Minister of Defence of Ukraine, Mykhailo Fedorov, has appointed Serhii “Flash” Beskrestnov as adviser on defence technology.   Fedorov noted that “Flash” is among the leading practical experts in drones, electronic warfare and the analysis of enemy decision-making. “He was the first to report on the use by Russians of FPV drones equipped with machine vision, as well as the use of jet-powered Shahed drones. His current primary focus is on systemic solutions to counter Russian strike and reconnaissance drones.” In addition to advising Fedorov on defense technology, “Flash” will also analyse captured enemy equipment and evaluate new military developments.   The appointment follows Fedorov’s meeting last week with Julie S. Davis, the U.S. Chargé d’Affaires in Ukraine. Fedorov thanked the US for its assistance and spoke about ongoing work with partners to extend the long-term supply of critical U.S.-made defence technology.

“To protect the sky, it is crucial to have, as soon as possible, a clear forecast of air defence missile deliveries for this year and to build reliable supplies for the years to come,” Fedorov stated.

Both parties also discussed the organisation of joint analytics on the use of key US systems, including Patriot, HIMARS and others, drawing on battlefield data to enable both countries to jointly advance these systems and improve their effectiveness.

“We also gave particular attention to implementing the large-scale Drone Deal,” Fedorov said. “We are working to enable US partners to directly test Ukrainian drones without unnecessary bureaucracy.” (Source: www.unmannedairspace.info)

 

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Founded in 1987, Exensor Technology is a world leading supplier of Networked Unattended Ground Sensor (UGS) Systems providing tailored sensor solutions to customers all over the world. From our Headquarters in Lund Sweden, our centre of expertise in Network Communications at Communications Research Lab in Kalmar Sweden and our Production site outside of Basingstoke UK, we design, develop and produce latest state of the art rugged UGS solutions at the highest quality to meet the most stringent demands of our customers. Our systems are in operation and used in a wide number of Military as well as Homeland Security applications worldwide. The modular nature of the system ensures any external sensor can be integrated, providing the user with a fully meshed “silent” network capable of self-healing. Exensor Technology will continue to lead the field in UGS technology, provide our customers with excellent customer service and a bespoke package able to meet every need.

A CNIM Group Company

———————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————–

Sponsored by Bertin Exensor

 

www.exensor.com

 

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05 Feb 26. Russia-US: Threat of nuclear escalation remains very low despite lapse of arms control treaty. Earlier on 5 February, the last remaining nuclear treaty between Russia and the US expired. The New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START) capped the number of strategic nuclear warheads that the two countries could deploy. Russian President Vladimir Putin announced in September 2025 that Russia would abide by the limits established in the pact for another year if the US did the same. Earlier on 5 February, the Kremlin stated that it had received no response from the US on extending the treaty. Instead, US President Donald Trump has expressed support for a broader deal involving China, the world’s third-largest nuclear partner. Russia suspended its participation in New START on 21 February 2023, after announcing a ‘temporary’ suspension of US inspections at Russian facilities in August 2022. We assess that the lapse of the treaty will increase the risk of nuclear proliferation and reduce already-limited trust between Russia and the US. However, its expiration will not elevate the currently remote threat of a nuclear escalation in the medium-to-long term. (Source: Sibylline)

 

04 Feb 26. India and US maintain momentum in defense ties. Amid deepening security ties between India and the U.S., New Delhi has significantly increased procurement of military equipment from Washington even as supplies from Russia, for long India’s biggest source of weapons, decline significantly. Analysts however say that in the coming years, one of the world’s biggest arms importers is turning to countries that will give it access to critical weapons technology. Nearly negligible a decade and a half ago, defense trade with the U.S. has jumped to $20 bn, making it New Delhi’s third-largest arms supplier after Russia and France. In November, an Indian state-owned firm signed a $1 bn deal to buy 113 F404 engines from General Electric Aerospace to power a domestically manufactured light combat aircraft called the Tejas Mk-1A. The fighters are crucial for India’s efforts to shore up the strength of its air force in the face of neighboring China’s growing military power. India is also in the final stages of negotiating a deal to co-produce General Electric’s F414 jet engine in the country to power a more advanced fighter jet called the Tejas Mk2 as well as initial batches of a fifth-generation fighter jet it is developing. Those deals represent a major milestone in the India-U.S. defense relationship according to Dinakar Peri, an analyst in the Security Studies program at Carnegie Foundation.

“That is significant because for a long time, India has not bought much offensive military equipment from the U.S. except, say, Apache helicopters and howitzers. It has mostly bought support platforms,” he pointed out. “But now over the next 15 to 20 years, an estimated 350 to 400 fighter jets that will be made in India will have American engines at the heart of the planes. That is almost 40 to 50 percent of the sanctioned fighter strength of the Indian Air Force.”

While India is building fighter jets for its air force, New Delhi lacks the know-how to make engines to power the aircraft. In November, Washington also approved arms sales of Javelin anti-tank missiles and Excalibur precision artillery projectiles to New Delhi worth $92.8 m. India will also lease two additional MQ-9B Sea Guardian predator drones for the Indian Navy, to expand maritime surveillance across the Indian Ocean. The defense deals came amid tensions that persisted for months over 50% tariffs that Washington had imposed on Indian goods – the highest in the world – until a trade deal reached this week slashed the duties. Analysts say security ties have remained insulated from the friction over trade.

“In the turbulent first year of Trump 2.0, if there has been continuity in the relationship, that has been in defense. Both countries are persevering with the security partnership such as military exercises and signing new contracts for weapons,” according to Brigadier Arun Sahgal, who directs the Forum for Strategic Initiatives here.

“In fact defense is the only silver lining in the relationship and will provide the necessary accelerator to maintain balance in the relationship,” he said.

The defense partnership is driven by Washington and New Delhi’s need to balance China’s rising power in Asia. While approving the supply of anti-tank missiles and artillery projectiles, the Pentagon’s Defense Security Cooperation Agency said that the sales would strengthen its strategic relationship with India, which it called “an important force for political stability, peace, and economic progress” in the Indo-Pacific and South Asia. In recent years, India’s procurement of military equipment from the U.S. has included Apache helicopters, Super Hercules transport planes and maritime patrol aircraft. But as India pushes to modernize its armed forces, it is accelerating efforts to increase defense production at home and upgrade its military capabilities to counter regional rival China. The so-called “Make in India” and “Self-reliance” drive has gathered urgency amid recent hostilities with Pakistan and China — Indian and Chinese troops were engaged in a four-year-long military standoff following a border skirmish in 2020. A four-day conflict between India and Pakistan last May was their worst in decades. India’s most ambitious indigenous defense project is developing a fifth-generation fighter aircraft. While initial batches will be powered with the American F414 engines, New Delhi has turned to France to gain access to crucial technology. A deal is in the final stages of approval to co-develop and co-produce engines for the aircraft with full technology transfer.

“We are about to start engine manufacturing work in India with the French company Safran,” Indian Defense Minister Rajnath Singh said in August.

New Delhi is also leaning toward a French fighter jet to equip its air force. The Defence Procurement Board, which evaluates defense equipment acquisitions, recently approved a proposal to buy 114 Rafale jets from France’s Dassault Aviation. While more approvals will be needed, analysts say the deal is in the final stages. India has previously bought 36 Rafales.

“France provides the alternative as India seeks strategic autonomy. New Delhi does not want too much dependency on the U.S., especially amid the current geopolitical uncertainties,” pointed out analyst Peri.

During a meeting last February between Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi and President Donald Trump, the American president said that the U.S. is paving the way to ultimately provide India with the F-35 stealth fighters.

But analysts in New Delhi rule out the possibility of India opting for the F-35, pointing out that stringent controls attached to U.S. military equipment are a deterrent in buying advanced equipment from Washington.

“With fighter jets the problem is the conditions attached to their sale. Modern military hardware for example requires a constant software upgrade. All this gives the U.S. leverage in control over the equipment, which India would not want,” according to Manoj Joshi, distinguished fellow at New Delhi’s Observer Research Foundation.

He says India’s caution has redoubled amid the global turbulence witnessed in the past year. “We were getting friendlier towards American imports but there will be a rethink. Yesterday the U.S. was New Delhi’s close friend, today it is no longer a friend to the same extent, what tomorrow holds we don’t know,” said Joshi.

Although India has diversified its purchases away from Russia, it is still a top weapons supplier – partly because Indian military systems continue to require Moscow’s support, and partly because it is willing to supply advanced systems and share technology with New Delhi, with which it shares a close partnership. As New Delhi spends bns of dollars to strengthen its defense in the coming years, India will turn to countries that are willing to share technology and produce military equipment in the country. Part of the production of Rafale fighter jets, for example, is expected to take place in India, once the deal gets the green signal. Analysts say it remains to be seen if similar deals can be struck with the United States.

“India will continue to maintain the pace of its defense relationship with Washington, but to sustain it beyond a certain point, it has to move beyond being purely transactional and move into the realm of joint production and joint development of weapons,” according to Sahgal. (Source: Defense News)

 

04 Feb 26. HASC chair seeking $450bn for defense in reconciliation. House Armed Services Committee Chairman Mike Rogers told Breaking Defense the next NDAA will focus on expanding the defense industrial base. The fiscal 2027 budget season has barely started, but the head of the House Armed Services Committee is setting two major goals for the year: securing $450bn for defense in an upcoming reconciliation bill, and using the next defense policy bill to expand the defense industrial base. In an exclusive interview with Breaking Defense, HASC Chairman Mike Rogers said that he is working with his Senate counterpart, Sen. Roger Wicker, to lock that funding in.

“We’ve informed our leadership of that,” he said Wednesday. “We’re not talking about something frivolous here. We’re talking about national defense.”

That $450bn would be three times the $150bn secured for defense in last year’s reconciliation effort — which itself represented the first time defense money was secured through the reconciliation procedure. However, Rogers argued that the funding would be necessary to achieve the target, laid down by President Donald Trump, of a $1.5trn defense budget for FY27. Rogers explained his math thusly: If the White House requests a budget equivalent to last year’s, at about $1.03trn, and rolls over the $20 bn left over from last year’s reconciliation bill, that leaves a gap of about $450bn to hit $1.5trn. And while appropriators have final say on defense spending during the normal budget process, authorizers, such as Rogers, have control in reconciliation.  However, getting $450bn in defense spending into a reconciliation bill and passed into law could be an uphill battle.  While Republicans are able to pass a reconciliation bill without help from Democrat votes, they will face tight margins and a narrow timeframe for doing so, as Democrats are projected to take back the House in the upcoming midterm elections. And securing Republican support for additional defense funding in reconciliation is not a given: A recent blueprint for the second reconciliation bill put out by the House Republican Study Committee did not list defense among other priority areas such as home ownership and health care.  However, Rogers stressed that a $1.5trn defense budget is necessary to be able to pay for major modernization projects including the Golden Dome missile shield, sixth-generation F-47 fighter jet, and Sentinel intercontinental ballistic missile program.

“We have all these big ticket items that we have to do, and you can’t do that on a trillion-dollar budget. You just can’t,” he said. “So that’s the sobering side of the story that I think we’re going to be able to offer to our colleagues when it comes to getting the votes to do this.”

What To Expect In The FY27 NDAA

Meanwhile, HASC has already begun early work on the FY27 National Defense Authorization Act, which will prioritize the expansion of the defense industrial base, Rogers said.

“We tilled the soil last year by trying to improve acquisition processes to make it more commercial, so that it’s easier for industry to work with the government,” he said. “That was on purpose, because we do have to expand the defense industrial base. It’s gotten very small, and it’s atrophied, and it needs a lot of attention.”

Following the end of the Cold War, the defense industry narrowed to just six prime contractors, after the infamous Last Supper meeting in 1993 where Pentagon leaders told defense executives to consolidate or risk going out of business. Over the past decade, the industrial base has grown, as venture capital-backed defense tech startups like Anduril and Palantir entered the scene. But Rogers said he would like to see a larger number of commercial companies start making products for the Defense Department.

“That’s our question to these folks, and we’ve already started bringing them in and asking them, ‘What can we do to incentivize you to get into the defense production?’” he said. “Taking the traditionals and non-traditionals, what can we do to incentivize you to grow? [For] the primes, what can we do to incentivize you to expand?

HASC still is in its early stages of understanding the problem and doesn’t have “preconceived ideas” about exactly what legislative steps may need to be taken to widen the aperture for new entrants to the defense sector, Rogers said.

“I don’t know what all the obstacles are going to be,” he said. “I’m expecting some of them may be outside our jurisdiction. For example, tax policy. There may be something about our tax structure that disincentivizes expansion. If so, let us know so we can work with our counterparts on the Ways and Means Committee to address that.” (Source: Breaking Defense.com)

——————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————-

Founded in 1987, Exensor Technology is a world leading supplier of Networked Unattended Ground Sensor (UGS) Systems providing tailored sensor solutions to customers all over the world. From our Headquarters in Lund Sweden, our centre of expertise in Network Communications at Communications Research Lab in Kalmar Sweden and our Production site outside of Basingstoke UK, we design, develop and produce latest state of the art rugged UGS solutions at the highest quality to meet the most stringent demands of our customers. Our systems are in operation and used in a wide number of Military as well as Homeland Security applications worldwide. The modular nature of the system ensures any external sensor can be integrated, providing the user with a fully meshed “silent” network capable of self-healing. Exensor Technology will continue to lead the field in UGS technology, provide our customers with excellent customer service and a bespoke package able to meet every need.

A CNIM Group Company

—————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————

Sponsored by Bertin Exensor

 

www.exensor.com

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04 Feb 26. Germany: Sabotage of naval vessel reflects sustained Russian hybrid threats. On 3 February, the Hamburg Public Prosecutor’s Office arrested two men suspected of sabotaging at least one German naval vessel in the Port of Hamburg (Hamburg city state) in 2025. The authorities detained a 37-year-old Romanian national in Hamburg and a 54-year-old Greek national in Greece; both were port workers. Three properties were also searched in Hamburg, Greece and Romania. The detainees reportedly targeted a corvette – the smallest class of warship – by pouring 20kg of gravel into the engine, puncturing water lines, removing fuel caps and disabling safety switches. The damage was discovered before the vessel was put into service. Investigations into both men’s involvement in other suspected sabotage actions are ongoing; this includes the discovery of metal shavings in the ship drive of the Emden (a K130 Braunschweig-class corvette) reported in February 2025. Although the motivation remains unconfirmed, we assess that Russia has the intent and capability to have orchestrated the incident. Given Germany’s role as the largest donor to Ukraine among European states, we assess that there will be a sustained risk of sporadic Russian sabotage operations targeting German military and critical infrastructure installations throughout 2026. (Source: Reuters)

 

03 Feb 26. Germany eyes lasers, spy satellites in military space spending splurge.

• Summary
• Germany plans SATCOM Stage 4 with over 100 satellites for secure communications
• Focus on non-kinetic options like jamming and lasers to disrupt hostile satellites
• Germany prioritising domestic and European suppliers for military space programme

Germany is weighing investments ranging from spy satellites and space planes to offensive lasers under a 35bn euro ($41bn) military space spending plan aimed at countering growing threats from Russia and China in orbit, the country’s space commander said. Germany will build an encrypted military constellation of more than 100 satellites, known as SATCOM Stage 4, over the next few years, the head of German Space Command Michael Traut told Reuters on the sidelines of a space event ahead of the Singapore Airshow. He said the network would mirror the model used by the U.S. Space Development Agency, a Pentagon unit that deploys low-Earth-orbit satellites for communications and missile tracking. Rheinmetall (RHMG.DE) is in talks with German satellite maker OHB (OHBG.DE) about a joint bid for an unnamed German military satellite project, Reuters reported last week. The potential deal comes as Europe’s top three space firms – Airbus (AIR.PA) , Thales (TCFP.PA) and Leonardo (LDOF.MI) – are seeking to build a European satellite communications alternative to Elon Musk’s Starlink. Traut said Germany’s investment in military space architecture reflected a sharply more contested space environment since Russia’s full‑scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022. Berlin and its European allies, he said, needed to bolster their deterrence posture by investing not only in secure communications but also in capabilities that could hinder or disable hostile space systems.

“(We need to) improve our deterrence posture in space, since space has become an operational or even warfighting domain, and we are perfectly aware that our systems, our space capabilities, need to be protected and defended,” Traut said.

INSPECTOR SATELLITES AND LASERS

Germany will channel funding into intelligence‑gathering satellites, sensors and systems designed to disrupt adversary spacecraft, including lasers and equipment capable of targeting ground-based infrastructure, Traut said. He added that Germany would prioritise small and large domestic and European suppliers for the programme. Traut emphasised Germany would not field destructive weapons in orbit that could generate debris, but said a range of non-kinetic options existed to disrupt hostile satellites, including jamming, lasers and actions against ground control stations. He also pointed to so-called inspector satellites — small spacecraft capable of maneuvering close to other satellites — which he said Russia and China had already deployed.

“There is a broad range of possible effects in the electromagnetic spectrum, in the optical, in the laser spectrum, and even some active physical things like inspector satellites,” he said.

“You could even go after ground segments of a space system in order to deny that system to your adversary or to tell him, ‘If you do something to us in space, we might do something to you in other domains as well.’” ($1 = 0.8477 euros) (Source: Reuters)

 

03 Feb 26. Germany-Russia: Russian operations to procure military-grade technology will likely persist. On 2 February, Germany’s Federal Prosecutor’s Office ordered raids targeting a network of companies suspected of supplying Russia’s arms industry with EU-sanctioned goods. The authorities searched properties across Lübeck and Ostholstein (both Schleswig-Holstein state), Frankfurt (Hesse state), Nuremberg (Bavaria state) and Mecklenburg-Vorpommern state. A German-Ukrainian national, two German nationals and two German-Russian nationals were arrested and EUR 30m (approximately USD 35m) in assets was seized. The investigations centred on a Lübeck-based trading company founded in March 2022 by a German‑Russian businessman, ‘Nikita S’ (one of the detainees), which is accused of leading the illegal procurement network. The network allegedly facilitated 16,000 shipments of embargoed items worth approximately EUR 30 m (USD 35 m) to at least 24 sanctioned Russian arms companies. The development affirms an assessment made by Germany’s domestic intelligence service (BfV) that Russia has increased its efforts to procure military-grade technology from German companies. These efforts will almost certainly persist over the coming year, underscoring the importance of due diligence for firms operating in the dual-use good industries. (Source: Sibylline)

 

02 Feb 26. Baltic States agree to move capabilities unrestricted across borders.

They hope the Military Mobility Area will present an overture for a wider “military Schengen zone” across Europe

• Defence ministers for Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania met in Tallinn to pursue the creation of a Military Mobility Area on Nato’s Eastern Flank
• This model will allow the flow of military assets across borders, unrestircted by bureaucratic niceities
• But there is a loftier goal in mind: to expand the Area to the rest of Europe, which will prove challenging as military mobility remains deficient despite EU and Nato ambitions

Baltic defence leaders gathered in Tallinn at the end of January to discuss the security of Nato’s Eastern Flank, with a major part of the proceedings reaching agreement on the creation of a Military Mobility Area (MMA) spanning the three countries. The MMA will see the military capabilities of one nation flow unrestricted among the territories of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania. The concept will allow for consolidation of resources to areas with the greatest need for security.

“If necessary, Lithuania’s military assets will be able to move freely towards Riga, Estonia’s artillery will support Vilnius, Latvian capabilities will back up Tallinn, and vice versa,” clarified Robertas Kaunas, Lithuania’s Minister of National Defence.

Despite Russian resources and manpower being sustainably expended in its war in Ukraine, the Baltic States also pose a major vulnerability to Russian strategic ambitions in a prospective conflict with Nato, which defence experts anticipate in the coming years. If Russia engages the Baltic States, it would perceive them as a single adversary, and their strategy would reflect this as they seek to cut them off from Nato allies via the Suwalki Gap and at sea. For this reason, Baltic military capabilities ought to muster a unified and agile response, and the creation of an MMA removes the bureaucratic niceties that impede a collective force posture.

“Every hour is critical in a crisis, we cannot let the walls of bureaucracy undercut our defence,” Kaunas discerned.

The trio also alluded to the possibility of extending this military corridor to the rest of Europe to form what has been called a “military Schengen” zone.

This model is already being pursued to integrate the Continental and Nordic corridors but to little effect. While the endeavour is achievable among the three Baltic States, since it is an existential issue, it will prove far more difficult across continental Europe. A large problem comes down to differences in technical infrastructure specifications. For example, there is only one road that connects Poland and Lithuania and their railway gauges are different, which has led to lengthy transport delays. About a year ago, the European Court of Auditors famously remarked that “tanks from one EU country cannot move through another if they are heavier than road traffic regulations allow.” There is more besides; the EU has identified 500 priority “hotspot [infrastructure] projects” that need attention. Still, it is hoped that recent EU protocols will help to remedy the problem, which stems from years of complacency. The €150bn Security Action for Europe (SAFE) loan instrument will help member states finance the implementation of these costly infrastructure standards. Notably, there is more to military mobility than land transportation, as the European Investment Bank listed strategic lift capabilities alongside reinforcing bridges and upgrading railways. Likewise, a leading airpower specialist at the Royal United Services Institute in London, Justin Bronk, reminded Airforce Technology in October last year that “Europe is covered in tarmac” to enable mobility, a logistical legacy of the Second World War. (Source: army-technology.com)

 

30 Jan 26. European crisis fund worth over $500bn could be used for defence, says ESM chief.

• European Stability Mechanism was set up to stem euro debt crisis
• ESM’s chief says it could lend for defence spending
• Gramegna: Use ‘full potential’ of ESM
• European countries pushed to boost defence outlays in response to Russian invasion of Ukraine

A European crisis fund with more than 430bn euros ($514bn) of firepower could lend money to countries ​for defence, the head of the European Stability Mechanism told Reuters, as the bloc scrambles to reinforce its military. Pierre Gramegna, managing director of the European Stability ‌Mechanism, said the ESM could give credit lines for defence and would not demand stringent economic reform in return, in part to dispel any stigma that might arise from asking the emergency euro zone fund for money.

“In these times of geopolitical turmoil, which have triggered higher expenditure, defence costs for all countries, we must use the full potential of the ESM,” said Gramegna.

He pointed to the use of credit lines for defence for countries in good financial health but whose budgets are stretched, in particular smaller euro zone states.

“We have instruments,” he said. “It is in the best interests of Europe … to use the full potential.”

“It is obvious that ‌the relationship between Europe and the United States is becoming more and more bumpy.”

REPURPOSING DEBT CRISIS FUND

Any such financial support would be symbolically important, ​repurposing a fund set up at the height of the euro zone debt crisis to stave off the collapse of national economies, banks and shore up the currency. U.S. President Donald Trump’s open hostility towards Europe is forcing its political leaders to scour for alternative means of defending the region against Russian aggression. Gramegna’s remarks suggest a willingness to use the vast European reserve to reinforce euro zone countries, ‍in particular smaller Baltic nations bordering Russia, although loans first need to be signed off by the euro zone nations backing the ESM. Only countries in the euro zone could get the loans, excluding those who do not use the currency, such as Poland. The ESM makes no explicit mention of defence in its mission and any such shift would require the blessing of member states, including from militarily neutral countries like Austria, Cyprus, Malta or ⁠Ireland. Europe’s attempts to boost its defences, four years after Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, have taken on greater urgency since Trump threatened trade tariffs on countries that rejected his claim on Greenland, a Danish ‍territory. Gramegna hinted at a potential role for the ESM, which was set up during the debt crisis to lend to countries such as Greece but has since become largely redundant.

“It is one of our instruments,” he ‌said, referring to ‌using so-called precautionary credit lines for defence. “It’s available. We need to rediscover the potential of that instrument.”

“You need to guarantee that this facility … has to be used for defence expenditure,” he said, adding that it would not come with draconian terms. “The whole goal here is to avoid that this type of tool is combined with restructuring of the economy.”

‘DEFENCE SUPPORT LINE’

His comments breathe fresh life into a “defence support line” earlier suggested by former Italian prime minister Enrico Letta to lend up to 2% of a country’s economic output at low interest rates for defence.

The proposal faces hurdles, however.

“When the ⁠euro area countries designed the ESM, they never ⁠intended it to be available for everyday use,” ​said Rebecca Christie of Brussels-based think tank Bruegel.

“Adding defence would be powerful. But Germany would need to make a complete about-face on how the fund can be used,” she said, referring to Europe’s largest economy.

Gramegna’s proposal mirrors an ESM crisis support scheme worth up to 240 bn euros set up during the COVID pandemic to help countries spend on healthcare. That ultimately remained unused. The Baltic states of Lithuania, Estonia and Latvia could ‍stand to benefit. They have almost quadrupled spending on defence since Russia invaded Ukraine to roughly 5% of their economic output, borrowing heavily to cover the bill. Those countries, which border Russia and its close ally Belarus, have suffered an increasing number of sabotage attacks that law enforcement agencies blame on Russia. They borrowed bns of euros from the EU’s oversubscribed SAFE loans scheme for defence projects, where the EU jointly borrows money on the market to lend it on ​at cost to EU governments for defence. ESM support would work similarly. If set up like the pandemic support, the ‍loans would have considerable weight across the EU. Estonia had a gross domestic product of roughly 40 bn euros in 2024 – 2% of that would be less than 1 bn euros. Gramegna said countries could make “collective requests”, which would avoid any stigma ​attached to asking for assistance from the ESM. “The impetus has to come from the member countries,” he said. (Source: Reuters)

 

01 Feb 26. UK wants closer EU defence ties with potential bid to join new SAFE fund. British Prime Minister Keir Starmer said his government will consider applying to join a second possible multi-bn-euro European Union fund for defence projects as his ministers prepare for talks with EU counterparts this week. The European Commission is considering launching a second edition of its SAFE loans scheme as Europe seeks to bolster its defences due to growing fears of Russia and doubts about U.S. security commitments to Europe under President Donald Trump. A British plan to join the original 150bn-euro ($177bn) SAFE fund broke down in November after Starmer’s government refused to pay a financial contribution to join, representing a setback for a post-Brexit reset of relations. Asked if Britain would seek to join a new version of SAFE, Starmer said Europe needed to do more to rearm.

“That should require us to look at schemes like SAFE and others to see whether there is a way in which we can work more closely together,” he told reporters on his way to China last week. The comments were scheduled for release on Sunday.

“Whether it’s SAFE or other initiatives, it makes good sense for Europe in the widest sense of the word – which is the EU plus other European countries – to work more closely together.”

European Union Trade Commissioner Maros Sefcovic and other EU officials are due in London for talks this week. Starmer has tried to work more closely with the EU and remove some post-Brexit trade barriers in contrast to the rancorous relations between previous Conservative governments and the EU as they negotiated Britain’s departure from the bloc, which was completed in 2020. He has also taken a leading role in co-ordinating European support for Ukraine. Under the SAFE scheme, the EU jointly borrowed money on financial markets to lend to countries in the bloc for defence projects. Asked about recent criticism from Nigel Farage, whose Reform UK party is leading in the polls, who said the governing Labour government was moving too close to the EU, Starmer said the Brexit campaigner had repeatedly misled the public. “I wouldn’t listen too much to what Nigel Farage has to say about this,” Starmer said. ($1 = 0.8440 euros) (Source: Reuters)

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Founded in 1987, Exensor Technology is a world leading supplier of Networked Unattended Ground Sensor (UGS) Systems providing tailored sensor solutions to customers all over the world. From our Headquarters in Lund Sweden, our centre of expertise in Network Communications at Communications Research Lab in Kalmar Sweden and our Production site outside of Basingstoke UK, we design, develop and produce latest state of the art rugged UGS solutions at the highest quality to meet the most stringent demands of our customers. Our systems are in operation and used in a wide number of Military as well as Homeland Security applications worldwide. The modular nature of the system ensures any external sensor can be integrated, providing the user with a fully meshed “silent” network capable of self-healing. Exensor Technology will continue to lead the field in UGS technology, provide our customers with excellent customer service and a bespoke package able to meet every need.

A CNIM Group Company

——————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————–

Sponsored by Bertin Exensor

 

www.exensor.com

 

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29 Jan 26. Niger: Likely militant attack on airport underscores increasing attack risks in capital. On 28 January, unknown gunmen, equipped with unidentified explosives, launched an attack in the vicinity of the capital Niamey’s Diori Hamani International Airport (NIM). The attack was repulsed but casualty figures have not yet been released. The airport serves as a base for the Niger Air Force and as the headquarters for the United Force of the Alliance of Sahel States (FU‑AES). Footage of the incident shows that the facility’s air defences were activated, indicating the possible use of drones. Although no group has claimed responsibility for the attack, it was likely perpetrated by the al-Qaeda-aligned Jama’at Nasr al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM). Since 2023, JNIM has progressively expanded its area of operations in western Niger and has substantially developed its drone capabilities in Mali and Burkina Faso. In the coming weeks, JNIM will likely attempt to leverage these capabilities to conduct further attacks in and around Niamey, particularly during the Ramadan period (17 February – 18 March). Locally engaged staff will face increased risks of exposure to crossfire and explosions, while further drone incursions into Nigerien airspace will increase risks of periodic disruption to commercial aviation. (Source: Sibylline)

 

26 Jan 26. US: De-escalation of rhetoric surrounding Greenland will sustain elevated regional tensions. On 21 January, President Donald Trump announced he was suspending planned 10% tariffs on Denmark and seven other European allies, previously scheduled to go into effect on 1 February. The tariffs, originally announced on 17 January, were in response to these allies sending a military contingent to Greenland amid Trump’s threats to acquire the semiautonomous region of Denmark. Trump also ruled out the use of force to acquire Greenland and suggested that a framework for a future deal between the US and NATO was underway. At the time of writing, it is unclear what the framework for a future deal contains and whether Greenland has approved of it. We assess that the US will likely seek NATO agreements regarding critical mineral extraction and military matters (largely to mitigate Chinese and Russian influence in the western hemisphere); if agreements on these issues cannot be reached, talks will likely break down. In the near term, shifting discourse from the US around Greenland will sustain elevated regional tensions. (Source: Sibylline)

 

28 Jan 26. Philippines: Armed encounter highlights continued latent militant threat in Mindanao. On 28 January, a spokesperson for the Philippine Army’s 90th Infantry Battalion announced that one soldier was killed and one was injured on 27 January in an armed encounter with the Dawlah Islamiyah (DI)-Hassan Group in Datu Hoffer (Maguindanao del Sur province, Bangsamoro region). The exchange of fire occurred in the mountainous areas of Datu Hoffer after villagers reported the militants’ presence, prompting the security forces to launch an operation. In all, four militants were reportedly injured, with the authorities stating that operations will continue against the faction. DI – which is aligned with the Islamic State (IS) – has had its capability significantly reduced in recent years due to persistent pressure from the security forces. The latest incident highlights that security risks stemming from militant groups will persist in the Bangsamoro region of Mindanao despite the overall improved security environment. We assess that the upcoming regional parliamentary elections (which were again postponed on 28 January) are a potential trigger for an increase in activity from militant groups. (Source: Sibylline)

 

29 Jan 26. Pakistan: Likely imminent counter-terrorism operation will increase displacement, humanitarian risks. On 28 January, around 70,000 of the total 150,000 residents of Tirah (Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province) had reportedly fled the region. This follows reports of an imminent counter-terrorism operation by the military against Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) positions. The exodus began after mosque announcements in December 2025 urged residents to leave the town by 23 January to avoid a potential conflict. Pakistan’s defence minister, Khawaja Muhammad Asif, has denied claims from the provincial authorities that there is no military operation planned in the province. However, military officials maintain that targeted counter-terrorism operations will continue in the province, alleging that the TTP takes refuge in Tirah and uses residents as human shields. We assess that residents will likely continue to vacate Tirah in the coming weeks due to a likely counter-terrorism operation, increasing internal displacement and humanitarian risks. Additionally, there is a realistic possibility of revenge attacks by the TTP, which will further elevate security risks. (Source: Sibylline)

 

27 Jan 26. Denel ‘not fit to support the national defence force.’ “A company that cannot reliably pay staff cannot credibly support the SA National Defence Force (SANDF) nor can it claim to safeguard strategic defence capabilities” is a scathing summation of Denel nearly missing January salary payments for two of its divisions. Chris Hattingh, a Democratic Alliance (DA) representative on both the Joint Standing Committee on Defence (JSCD) and the Portfolio Committee on Defence and Military Veterans (PCDMV), has it the salary payment issue to staff at Denel Dynamics and ammunition manufacturer Pretoria Metal Pressings (PMP) was not surprising.

“This,” he said, “is the predictable outcome of years of failed governance, collapsed accountability and the unresolved legacy of state capture”.

“Denel was hollowed out during the state capture years: leadership was compromised, finances were abused, skills were lost and credibility with clients collapsed. That damage was severe.

“But what is now happening goes beyond history. Years later and after repeated bailout packages and turnaround promises, Denel still cannot meet its most basic obligation to its workers. Since 2019, Denel has received bns of rand in direct bailouts and guarantees. Much of this funding was meant to stabilise operations and enable recovery.

“Yet employees are again being told salaries may not be paid, raising serious questions about where the money went, whether turnaround plans were ever properly implemented and who is being held accountable for failure,” a statement has Hattingh saying.

Arguably Denel’s most visible failure is Project Hoefyster, a new infantry fighting vehicle (IFV) to replace the long-serving Ratel.

It’s now 19 years since a development contract was entered into with Denel, to be executed by Lyttelton, Centurion-based Denel Land Systems (DLS), for five engineering variant development models including logistics, ammunition and simulators of the new IFV, named “Badger”, the English translation of Ratel. Last November the PCDMV heard the first phase of the contract was set down for completion in May 2012 with Denel unable to meet the deadline. In turn this affected phase two of the project – industrialisation and production – with delivery scheduled for 2019 and then shifted to 2023. The deadlines, the PCDMV heard, “have slipped” with delays attributed to, among others, financial challenges experienced by Denel from 2016, technical complexities, under-estimation of the software qualification process/effort, extensive re-testing and development cycles, high staff turnover and cost escalation.

Denel’s “move” from the no longer existent Department of Public Enterprises (DPE) last April to Minister Angie Motshekga’s Ministry of Defence and Military Veterans changed nothing, Hattingh maintains.

“Denel has not been ‘incorporated into the SANDF’. Moving shareholder oversight does not magically fix weak financial controls, poor execution or the absence of consequence management,” Hattingh is on record saying.

He goes further stating non-implementation or “diverted funding” of apparently approved recovery plans and “so-called ring fenced interventions” mean nothing to workers left in limbo.

“Denel’s slow collapse is how strategic capability is lost, not with a bang, but through repeated crises, unpaid salaries, and the steady loss of skilled people. The DA will demand full transparency on the use of bailout funds, clear evidence of implementation, and accountability for those responsible. We will insist on full disclosure of where the money went, who failed to implement approved recovery plans, and why workers are again paying the price for executive and political failure,” Hattingh concluded.

The Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU) also weighed in on the near non-payment of Denel Dynamics and PMP salaries. On Sunday it said Denel managing to pay salaries provides welcome relief to employees and their families.

However, COSATU remains concerned about the state of these divisions and the broader Denel group. “Workers at these two divisions were informed earlier in the week that they may not be paid.  Management needs to take workers into their confidence about the implementation of Denel’s turnaround plan, how the substantial financial support from government has been utilised, and what is being done to fulfil its backlog of orders to clients,” said Matthew Parks, COSATU Parliamentary Coordinator.

“Workers need assurance that this will not happen again next month and that management will ensure that Denel is truly on the path to recovery from the dark chapter of state capture and will return to its rightful place as the leading defence industry company in the continent and a global leader.

“It is critical that the Ministry and Department of Defence actively fulfil their oversight role for Denel and not simply rely upon good wishes and glossy presentations from management.  This needs to include a close partnership with Armscor and the Department of Trade, Industry and Competition, as well as major domestic customers such as the South African National Defence Force, Police Service, Correctional Services and other law enforcement arms of the state and the private security and arms industry.  This partnership is critical to reviving the defence and aviation masterplan,” the trade union said.

COSATU pledged to continue to offer its support to workers at Denel and said the company can and must be turned around as the state capture chapter is dismantled. “Its turnaround will be an important catalyst to the revival of South Africa’s lucrative defence industry and the sustaining and creation of thousands of badly needed jobs.”

COSATU General Secretary Solly Phetoe said the days of bailouts are over, and Denel has to fix the hard and fundamental challenges facing it. “The key to Denel’s return to the path of sustainability and profitability has to include the appointment of competent management and leadership, the removal of corrupt elements, the plugging of financial leakages, the recruitment of skilled staff and the honouring of workers’ rights.”

“Equally important to providing Denel a sustainable path to recovery and growth is to revive and ramp up our local procurement campaigns.  This must be anchored by the revival of the defence and aviation industrial masterplan,” Phetoe said.

State entities can procure arms, munitions; land, sea and air vehicles; clothing and protective gear, and other materials from Denel while the private security and defence sectors must be partners in this journey.  Private security companies alone with more than 500 000 security guards must procure their arms, munitions, vehicles, communications and protective gear from Denel.  Local procurement is the bedrock of any industry, Phetoe continued.

“Denel’s world quality products have helped it to secure an impressive order book from across the world.  Management needs to ensure that it honours these often-lucrative contracts in full.  Reports of Denel securing bids, receiving payments and then failing to deliver the products or having to be chased by clients and even dragged to court, must come to an end.  Such antics cause severe reputational harm to Denel and will eventually catch up with it.  Robbing Peter to pay Paul has never been a sound economic model.

“Denel over the years has been close to securing very lucrative orders across the world for Rooivalk, armoured personnel carriers or artillery systems; only to be pipped at the post by other suppliers after pressure was placed by the governments of far more powerful nations for contracts to be given to their companies.

“This is an unfortunate reality of real politic and the unequal geo-political balance of forces.  It necessitates strategic partners between Denel and South Africa and complementary arms manufacturers in similar likeminded countries.

“Particular attention must be given to the African continent where Denel’s products are tried, tested and best suited, especially armoured personnel carriers providing optimal protection to soldiers from landmines.

“Green shoots reported by Denel in 2025 gave workers hope that it was back on track.  We hope that the scare of this past week will not recur, but we must remain vigilant.  Accountability is essential.

“South Africa has a wonderful state-owned enterprise in Denel.  One that was built over decades with the blood and sweat of its workers.  It represents the best of South African intellectual and technical ingenuity.  Its products are highly sought across the world, from developed to developing countries.

“It needs dedicated focus and support, in particular to weed out corruption and mismanagement and through a ramped-up localisation plan from the sector.

“Denel’s management must appreciate that its turnaround can only be achieved with an honest relationship with its staff, by honouring its legal obligations to its employees, by investing in these workers and tapping into their experience and expertise.

“If these can be done, not only will be Denel be returned its glory days but it will once again play a leading role in unlocking South Africa’s industrial potential, economic growth and decent jobs,” Phetoe concluded.

(Source: https://www.defenceweb.co.za/)

 

27 Jan 26. South Sudan: Conflict escalation in Jonglei state will significantly increase threats to staff, civilians. On 25 January, the national military, the South Sudan People’s Defence Forces (SSPDF), issued evacuation orders for all civilians and NGO personnel in Akobo, Nyirol and Uror counties (all Jonglei state). The SSPDF issued the orders ahead of the planned launch of Operation Enduring Peace, which aims to retake territory within Jonglei currently controlled by the Sudan People’s Liberation Army-In Opposition (SPLA-IO). In early January, the SPLA-IO launched a renewed offensive in Jonglei and has taken control of several key positions along the Pibor Highway, which connects to the state capital Bor. In the coming days, the SSPDF’s initiation of combat operations will almost certainly trigger high-intensity clashes with SPLA-IO units and aligned militias in eastern Jonglei. Civilians will face significantly elevated risks of exposure to crossfire, explosions and indiscriminate airstrikes. Deteriorating security conditions will almost certainly trigger further displacement within South Sudan, increasing pressure on already-strained NGO services and exacerbating food insecurity. Overcrowding at displacement camps and limited access to sanitation facilities will also increase risks of communicable disease outbreaks, compounding public health concerns. (Source: Sibylline)

 

27 Jan 26. Kenya-Somalia: Cross-border attack highlights elevated security risks in border regions. On 26 January, al-Shabaab militants killed a local chief and a teacher in Hulugho (Garissa county, Kenya), approximately 10 miles (16km) from the Somali border. The incident follows an uptick in al-Shabaab activity along the Kenya-Somalia border in recent months, including an attack in November 2025 which killed two Kenyan border patrol officers. Despite intensified security deployments, the porous border facilitates the infiltration of al-Shabaab militants who frequently target local chiefs due to their communal influence and perceived co-operation with the security forces. In the coming days, the Kenyan security forces will likely escalate their security posture across Garissa. This will likely include the erection of security checkpoints on major highways, disrupting overland movement. Amid al-Shabaab’s escalating offensive in central and southern Somalia, we assess that further attacks in Garissa, Lamu, Mandera and Wajir counties are likely in the coming months. Attacks will likely consist of cross-border raids targeting Kenyan security force positions, driving risks of exposure to crossfire in proximity to police stations in towns and villages. This will also drive exposure to IEDs and kidnap risks during overland movement. (Source: Sibylline)

 

26 Jan 26. Bangladesh: Clashes between opposition parties underscore ongoing unrest risks. On 25 January, clashes between supporters of the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) and Jamaat-e-Islami (JI) in Chuadanga (Khulna division) injured at least 14 people. The incident occurred after JI activists allegedly offered money in exchange for votes during door-to-door campaigning, triggering protests from BNP supporters. This follows previous incidents of clashes between JI and BNP supporters in the capital Dhaka in recent days. The unrest comes after campaigning began on 22 January for the upcoming general election on 12 February (see Sibylline Situation Update Brief – 23 January 2026). We assess that further violent clashes between supporters of rival political parties are highly likely in the coming days, particularly outside JI and BNP offices, driving proximate unrest and road closure risks. These risks will increase if incendiary statements by the JI and BNP leadership continue against each other. However, security measures will be heightened in the coming days, which will likely limit the scale of these incidents. (Source: Sibylline)

 

26 Jan 26. Myanmar: Completed general election unlikely to significantly decrease security, sanctions risks. On 25 January, Myanmar held the third and final round of its general election in 63 townships. In the first two phases, the military-backed Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP) secured 193 of 209 seats in the lower house, and 52 of 78 seats in the upper house. As the military is also allocated a set quota of seats, it will certainly hold effective control over the legislature. The junta held the election, which was neither free nor fair, to legitimise its rule following the 2021 military coup (see Sibylline Situation Update Brief – 22 December 2025). The popular National League for Democracy (NLD) party was ineligible to run. Military government leader Senior General Min Aung Hlaing is highly likely to retain significant influence and will possibly become the president. We assess that the election will not decrease the risk of armed conflict, as the military has not reclaimed rebel-controlled territories. Western countries are broadly likely to retain sanctions against junta-affiliated personnel and firms. However, there is a realistic possibility that the US will avoid making overt criticism of the election results in an attempt to obtain access to local rare earth deposits. (Source: Sibylline)

 

23 Jan 26. UK Typhoons sent to protect Qatar amid fears of Iranian strike. Qatar’s chief diplomat cautioned against complacency in Davos, with fresh fears of another Iranian strike.

• The UK has responded to a call from Qatar to deploy Typhoons from the jointly operated 12 Squadron for “defensive purposes”
• Qatar’s top diplomat urged for a climbdown in regional tensions amid fears of a renewed military exchange between the US and Iran
• Iran has previously targeted Qatar’s Al Udeid Air Base, which hosts US and UK military personnel, amid fears the cornered regime could repeat their show of force

The UK Royal Air Force (RAF) deployed four FGR4 Typhoons to Qatar amid fears of a renewed missile exchange between the US and Iran. British jets were sent for “defensive purposes” noting regional tensions as part of the UK-Qatar Defence Assurance Agreement. Struggling to put down protests cropping up across Iran, a deadly government crackdown drew the ire of US President Donald Trump, emboldened by his raid into Venezuela, as he threatens to intervene. The fragile situation risks a repeat of another military exchange between the two countries, with fears that the Islamic Republic may once again target US bases in the region, such as the Al Udeid Air Base in Qatar. During the World Economic Forum in Davos, Qatar’s chief diplomat Mohammed bin Abdulrahman bin Jassim Al Thani cautioned against complacency in the Middle East, warning that positive developments such as the de-escalation in Gaza do not, alone, indicate stability in the region. A climbdown in tensions, particularly concerning Iran, is the best course of action, Al Thani intimated in a subtle speech. (Source: airforce-technology.com)

 

26 Jan 26. China: High-profile military purges will undermine combat readiness, reduce short-term conflict risks. On 24 January, China’s Ministry of National Defense announced that General Zhang Youxia, a vice chairman of the Central Military Commission (CMC), and CMC Chief of Staff Liu Zhenli were under investigation for ‘serious disciplinary and legal offences’. The People’s Liberation Army (PLA)’s official newspaper, the PLA Daily, claimed that the two individuals had ‘seriously abetted political and corruption problems’. They will almost certainly be dismissed. Since he came to power in 2012, President Xi Jinping has engaged in an anti-corruption campaign targeting the military, which has accelerated in recent years. This is arguably Xi’s most significant purge as Zhang is the highest-ranking general in the PLA. It represents a hollowing out of the PLA’s leadership, with only one member of the normally seven-person CMC (other than Xi) likely to remain in post. This raises significant questions about the PLA’s immediate combat readiness, given the level upheaval in a short period of time. We assess that these developments reduce the risk of a conflict in the South China Sea or Taiwan Strait in the short-to-medium term. However, it also highlights Xi’s attempts to assert absolute control over military strategy and command. (Source: Sibylline)

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Military And Security Developments

Jan 30.

• Region: Iran-linked threats across Europe will continue, despite IRGC proscription. On 29 January, EU member states agreed to designate Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) as a terrorist organisation. The IRGC will almost certainly be formally added to the EU’s terrorism blacklist in the coming days. The UK is reportedly working on legislation to proscribe hostile state agencies, including the IRGC, which is likely to be adopted later this year. The designation will provide law enforcement authorities with additional legal and operational tools to counter Iran-backed threats using anti-terrorist legislation. These will likely include expanded surveillance powers and intelligence co-operation. However, we assess that threats of Iran-directed attacks in Europe will persist, particularly in Northern, Southern and Western Europe. Israeli and/or Jewish-linked businesses, institutions and personnel, as will Iranian dissidents, will remain key targets. Iran will possibly use multiple layers of intermediaries for plausible deniability, complicating prosecutions. There is also a realistic possibility that Iran will seek to retaliate by pressuring EU interests abroad, increasing safety and operational risks for EU companies and diplomatic representations in the Middle East.
• Syria: Security instability risks will remain high in north-east despite new deal with Kurdish forces. Earlier on 30 January, the Syrian government and the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) agreed a comprehensive ceasefire deal and a phased integration of Kurdish military and administrative bodies into the Syrian state. Under the deal, the government forces will deploy to Al-Hasakah and Qamishli (all Al-Hasakah governorate), which are the last strongholds of the SDF. The deal includes the formation of a military division that will integrate three SDF brigades, as well as the creation of a local brigade that will contain Kurdish forces in the SDF-held city of Kobani (Aleppo governorate). While the deal will mitigate the risk of major armed conflict in the north-east, the security environment will remain highly unstable throughout February and March. Retaliatory attacks against the government forces by radical Kurdish elements, particularly the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK), will remain likely. These will increase bystander security risks near checkpoints and government buildings. Nevertheless, we assess that the ceasefire will likely hold.
• Yemen: UN humanitarian withdrawal will increase food, water, energy security risks. On 29 January, regional media reported that the UN World Food Programme (WFP) will terminate the contracts for all of its staff in areas of Yemen controlled by the Iran-backed Houthis. The decision was reportedly made in response to several incidents in which UN personnel were detained by the group and were often accused of spying for Israel and the US. The move will likely exacerbate already-critical humanitarian conditions in Yemen, particularly in the north-west, and increase the risk of hunger-related illnesses, including malnutrition. The UN’s decision to withdraw will possibly trigger similar measures among other NGOs responsible for maintaining critical food, water and energy supplies. This will elevate operational risks for entities that rely on NGO support. More broadly, humanitarian conditions will likely remain acute nationwide throughout 2026, despite recent regional initiatives from countries including Saudi Arabia, amid the prospect of renewed conflict between Saudi-backed forces and the Houthis.

Jan 29.

• Palestinian Territories: Anti-government protests are likely following election law amendment. On 28 January, Palestinian Authority (PA) President Mahmoud Abbas approved an amendment to the election law that requires all candidates to accept the Palestine Liberation Organization’s (PLO) ‘National Program’. The programme includes the recognition of Israel, the renunciation of terrorism and the pursuit of a two-state solution. The amendment is highly likely aimed at preventing Hamas and its allied factions from participating in the West Bank’s municipal elections on 25 April. The move is consistent with the PA’s attempts to prevent Hamas’ political and military resurgence in the West Bank following the war in Gaza. As such, Hamas’s affiliates and several aligned Palestinian groups in the West Bank will likely organise anti-government protests in the coming weeks to denounce the new amendment. These are particularly likely to occur outside PA and Fatah offices and will increase the risk of clashes with the PA security forces in their vicinity. However, protest action is highly unlikely to destabilise the PA government or undermine the upcoming elections, with Fatah likely to retain its majority.
• Iran-EU: EU’s likely proscription of IRGC to drive legal and regulatory risks for associated businesses. Earlier on 29 January, the EU’s foreign policy chief, Kaja Kallas, indicated that the bloc is preparing to list Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) as a terrorist organisation following its recent violent crackdown on anti-government protesters. While the designation is likely to pass following France’s decision to support the move on 28 January, the vote still requires the unanimous approval of all 27 EU member states. The proscription of the IRGC would trigger the freezing of IRGC-linked financial assets held in EU jurisdictions, significantly increasing financial and legal risks for associated subcontractors, banks and logistics providers. Financial institutions will also likely face heightened regulatory and compliance exposure from inadvertent dealings with IRGC-affiliated entities, alongside increased anti-money-laundering (AML) obligations. The move will almost certainly elevate diplomatic tensions between Iran and the EU, likely reducing the efficacy of EU-mediated channels on Iran’s nuclear programme. This would reduce the likelihood of a nuclear deal in the short term and maintain the heightened risk of a US strike on Iran in the coming weeks.

Jan 28.

IRAN

• Anti-government protests have broadly subsided in Iran, though the re-introduction of internet connectivity will increase the risk of further demonstrations in the coming weeks.
• The US continues to bolster its military posture in the Middle East, increasing pressure on Iran and the risk of kinetic escalation.
• Iran began conducting military drills on 27 January; there are now concerns regarding the navigability of its regional airspace, increasing the risk of substantial disruption to commercial aviation.
• Despite rising regional tensions, the US and Iran will possibly engage in high-level negotiations in the coming days; these would in turn possibly delay strike action.

ISRAEL

• The return of the remains of the last hostage held in Gaza will reduce domestic unrest risks.

PALESTINIAN TERRITORIES

• GAZA STRIP: The Rafah border crossing is likely to reopen to those exiting to and entering from Gaza in the coming days.
• WEST BANK: The IDF’s operations in Jerusalem governorate underscore the likely expansion of its security footprint preceding the Ramadan period (17 February to 18 March).

IRAN

• Anti-government protests have broadly subsided in Iran, though the re-introduction of internet connectivity will increase the risk of further demonstrations in the coming weeks. On 21 January, the Supreme National Security Council (SNSC) released a statement indicating that approximately 3,000 individuals and security force personnel died during anti-government protests in early January. The SNSC attributed over 2,500 of those deaths to ‘terrorist incidents’. These figures are significantly lower than UN estimates, which indicate that the security forces killed at least 5,000 anti-government protesters and detained over 20,000 others. This violent crackdown has prompted a broad dissipation of anti-government protests in the past two weeks, which was facilitated by the enforcement of an internet blackout and the initiation of legal proceedings targeting merchants associated with the demonstrations. However, these measures have also substantially disrupted economic activity within Iran, increasing pressure on the authorities to re-introduce internet services, particularly to traders. On 28 January, the NetBlocks global internet monitor reported that connectivity has reached 80% of regularly observed levels, indicating the partial reintroduction of internet and telecommunications services. However, internet access remains heavily censored and monitored. The authorities are almost certainly continuing to restrict access to social media platforms and limiting efforts to spread information regarding the fallout from anti-government protests. Even so, there is a realistic possibility that resumed internet access will bolster anti-government activists’ capacity to mobilise further demonstrations in the coming weeks. Protest organisers will possibly centre demonstrations around funeral observances for those who died in the crackdown, many of which will occur in early-to-mid-February. Any protests are likely to trigger harsh repression and crackdowns by the security forces, compounding tensions with the US and likely triggering further internet blackouts thereafter.
• The US continues to bolster its military posture in the Middle East, increasing pressure on Iran and the risk of kinetic escalation. On 26 January, the US Navy’s Carrier Strike Group 3 (which includes the USS Abraham Lincoln) entered the United States Central Command (CENTCOM)’s area of responsibility, which includes the Middle East. US President Donald Trump subsequently characterised the deployment as an ‘armada next to Iran’. On 27 January, CENTCOM also announced that the Ninth Air Force (Air Forces Central, AFCENT) will conduct a multi-day readiness exercise in CENTCOM’s area of responsibility. This exercise underscores the US’ effort to project airpower into the broader region, while also evaluating AFCENT’s capabilities under realistic operational conditions. Taken together, these deployments and exercises indicate that the US is bolstering its offensive and defensive posture in the region, likely as part of efforts to maximise pressure on Iran to make substantial concessions in bilateral negotiations (see below). While the precise date of the exercise has not been revealed, aerial readiness exercises and intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) operations in the coming days will possibly result in periodic disruption to commercial aviation activities. These operations will bolster the US’ preparedness to undertake strike action targeting Iran, raising the likelihood of such action, particularly in the event of a breakdown in diplomatic contact between Tehran and Washington DC (see below).
• Iran began conducting military drills on 27 January; there are now concerns regarding the navigability of its regional airspace, increasing the risk of substantial disruption to commercial aviation. On 25 January, Iran updated its NOTAM and suspended all Visual Flight Rules (VFR) until 25 April. These measures will heavily restrict low-altitude civilian air activity. They likely reflect Tehran’s increasing concerns regarding the US’ ISR operations taking place within and around Iranian airspace. On 27 January, Iran also announced it would conduct live fire military drills in the vicinity of the Strait of Hormuz between 27 and 29 January; as part of the drills, Iran has also deployed the IRIS Shahid Bagheri drone carrier within its territorial waters. Amid broader concerns regarding regional escalation, KLM announced on 24 January that it would avoid Iran’s, Iraq’s and Israel’s airspaces, and suspended flights to Ben Gurion International Airport (TLV, Israel), Dubai International Airport (DXB, UAE), King Fahd International Airport (DMM) and King Khalid International Airport (RUH, both Saudi Arabia). During this period, British Airways also cancelled two overnight flights to DXB and suspended flights to Bahrain International Airport (BAH). Although British Airways and KLM have subsequently resumed flights to BAH, DMM, DXB and RUH, commercial airlines will likely adopt similar periodic suspensions as regional tensions continue to rise, given escalating security concerns and increasing insurance costs. In the coming weeks, concerns regarding the navigability and security of Iran’s airspace will likely trigger flight suspensions, cancellations and route adjustments, increasing the risk of travel disruption and delays, including along transcontinental flightpaths between Europe and Asia. Decreasing flight availability will also restrict access to commercially accessible evacuation routes in the event of regional conflict escalation.
• Despite rising regional tensions, the US and Iran will possibly engage in high-level negotiations in the coming days; these would in turn possibly delay strike action. On 26 January, President Trump reiterated claims that Iran ‘want[s] to talk’ and indicated that the US was ready to engage in nuclear negotiations. Also on 26 January, Iran’s ambassador to Switzerland stated that ‘informal’ communication is taking place between Washington DC and Tehran. Although this indicates that backchannels remain open, Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi subsequently denied that Tehran requested negotiations or has been in contact with US Special Envoy Steve Witkoff in recent days. On 28 January, Trump stated that ‘time is running out’ for Iran to ‘make a deal’, with reference to nuclear negotiations. In the coming days, the US will likely continue leveraging its military posture in the Middle East to threaten Iran (credibly) with military intervention if it does not productively engage in negotiations. We assess that there is a realistic possibility that Iran will publicly commit to negotiations in the coming days; such a commitment would likely delay US strike action and temporarily stabilise regional tensions. However, the US will likely attempt to secure major concessions from Iran regarding its domestic enrichment activity, its missile programme and its support for regional proxies. Hardline US negotiating positions will substantially increase the risk of deadlock, as seen during talks in 2025. Persistent deadlock or perceived Iranian obfuscation would significantly increase the risk of US strike action thereafter (see Sibylline Special Report – 19 January 2026). Depending on the scale, target selection and impact of US airstrikes, Iran will likely respond with strikes on US military assets in the region, increasing the risk of escalating hostilities in the coming weeks.

ISRAEL

• The return of the remains of the last hostage held in Gaza will reduce domestic unrest risks. On 26 January, the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) confirmed that it had received the remains of Master Sgt. Ran Gvili, the last hostage held in Gaza. The return of the final hostage is almost certain to bring an end to the weekly protests in Tel Aviv (Tel Aviv district) calling for the release of all hostages held in Gaza. This will reduce protest and domestic unrest risks across Israel and associated travel disruption, particularly in Tel Aviv, over the coming weeks.

PALESTINIAN TERRITORIES 

• GAZA STRIP: The Rafah border crossing is likely to reopen to those exiting to and entering from Gaza in the coming days. On 28 January, Israeli news reported that the IDF had completed preparations for the reopening of the Rafah border crossing, which will likely be conducted in the coming days. For the first time in almost two years, the crossing will also be open for the movement of people into Gaza. According to the reports, those who exit Gaza will undergo security checks by a delegation of the EU and local Gazans who work for the Palestinian Authority (PA). Israel will monitor those who exit from a distance, using facial recognition to verify if they are authorised. Additionally, Israel will be able to prevent unauthorised individuals from exiting through the carousel at the crossing. By contrast, those who enter Gaza will have to pass Israeli security checks. These checks will include the use of facial recognition, magnetometers and screening machines. The new mechanism is another part of Phase 2 of the Gaza Peace Plan and will likely help to facilitate the passage of aid into Gaza. Even so, thorough security checks will likely cause bottlenecks, preventing a significant increase in humanitarian provisions. Furthermore, there is a realistic possibility that militant elements will attempt to exit or enter Gaza through the crossing; such attempts would elevate security risks for personnel working at, or transiting through, the crossing. Miscommunication and poor co-ordination between Israel and the EU delegation are also likely, particularly during the first three weeks after the crossing reopens. This will possibly elevate tensions between Israel and EU countries whose nationals are staffing the delegation, but are unlikely to trigger a significant diplomatic breakdown between Israel and the EU.
• WEST BANK: The IDF’s operations in Jerusalem governorate underscore the likely expansion of its security footprint preceding the Ramadan period (17 February to 18 March). On 25 January, the IDF’s Central Command (which is responsible for operations in the West Bank) launched a military exercise to improve its readiness for ‘extreme scenarios’ and offensive operations. Subsequently, on 27 January, the IDF launched an operation in Hizma (Jerusalem) in response to ‘terrorist activity’; the operation is ongoing at the time of writing. Local media reports indicate that the IDF issued notices ordering businesses to close during the operation, while IDF bulldozers have blocked major thoroughfares with rubble to restrict the entry and exit of vehicles into and from the town. In the coming days, the operation will possibly delay movement along Highway 437, disrupting transit through the broader Jerusalem area. In the coming weeks, the IDF will likely continue augmenting its posture in the West Bank ahead of the Ramadan period (17 February to 18 March), amid concerns of an uptick in militant activity. This will likely result in increasingly frequent operations, movement restrictions and curfews targeting population centres associated with militant activity, compounding the risk of localised travel and operational disruption. This dynamic will likely exacerbate ethno-religious tensions within the West Bank, subsequently increasing the risk of radicalisation and militant recruitment. A corresponding increase in sole-perpetrator and low-capacity militant attacks remains possible, increasing the risk of bystanders being exposed to shooting, stabbing and car-ramming attacks. Exposure risks will be particularly acute in the vicinity of checkpoints, border crossing facilities and public transport hubs, including in the Jerusalem area.

RED SEA

• The Iran-backed Houthis have warned against a US and/or Israeli strike on Iran, elevating the risk of a resumption in drone and missile strikes on Israel and Israeli-associated shipping in the Red Sea (see expansion in the REGIONAL AND GLOBAL DEVELOPMENTS section below).

REGIONAL AND GLOBAL DEVELOPMENTS

Iraq-US-Yemen: Iranian proxies’ warning of intervention in the event of a US and/or Israeli strike on Iran, elevates the likelihood of attacks against US military assets across the region. On 26 January, several Iranian proxies in Iraq (including Badr, Harakat Hezbollah al-Nujaba and Kata’ib Hezbollah) warned that they would intervene and support Iran in the event of a US/Israeli strike, even if hostilities didn’t extend to Iraq. On the same day, the Iranian-backed Houthis in Yemen published a video of an undated attack on a vessel, implying a similar warning. These simultaneous statements are likely part of a co-ordinated Iranian pressure campaign amid a US military build-up in the region, including the arrival of the USS Abraham Lincoln (CVN-72) aircraft carrier strike group to the US Central Command (CENTCOM) area of responsibility (see above). We assess that there is a realistic possibility that Iranian proxies in Iraq will follow through on this threat by targeting US assets in the region. However, in this scenario, these groups are unlikely to target US assets in Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries as this would risk triggering major US retaliation in Iraq and prompt critical GCC companies to exit the Iraqi market. Instead, Iranian proxies are more likely to engage in limited attacks against US military and government assets in Iraq’s Kurdistan region and possibly in Jordan and Syria. Even so, it is unlikely that the Syrian or Jordanian governments will directly retaliate against these groups, as long as the attacks remain limited and not directed against their forces. We also assess that in the event of a limited US/Israeli strike against Iran, the Houthis are likely to target Israeli vessels and interests in the Red Sea, including the port of Eilat (Southern district), rather than breach the de facto ceasefire with the US or target the GCC. However, risks of more substantive Iranian proxy involvement in the conflict will significantly increase if the US/Israel-Iran hostilities are protracted and escalate in scope and intensity beyond June 2025’s 12-day war.

• Iran-US: CENTCOM military exercise underscores elevated short-term risk of US strikes on Iran. On 27 January, the US announced that Air Forces Central (AFCENT) will conduct a multi-day readiness exercise in the United States Central Command (CENTCOM) area of responsibility, which includes the Middle East. The announcement came a day after the US repositioned its USS Abraham Lincoln (CVN-72) aircraft carrier strike group in the Arabian Sea. Meanwhile, earlier on 28 January, Tehran said it had not requested negotiations with Washington DC and rejected US officials’ suggestions that it is ready to make a deal under military pressure. The US exercise, together with Iran’s diplomatic disengagement, underlines the increasing risk of US strike action against Iran in the coming days and weeks. In the event of a strike, the US will likely target locations associated with Iran’s political and military leadership and possibly dual-use infrastructure. Iran will likely respond by targeting US regional assets, elevating conflict escalation risks and regional tensions (see Sibylline Special Report – 19 January 2026). In the immediate term, the exercise will likely exacerbate supply chain disruption due to airspace closures and the rerouting of maritime traffic around operational areas.
• Iraq-US: Controversial nomination for prime minister is likely to increase sanctions risks in 2026. On 27 January, US President Donald Trump warned that the US would end support to Iraq if former prime minister Nouri al-Maliki is reinstated to the post. The warning came days after the Coordination Framework (CF) alliance (Iraq’s largest parliamentary bloc) selected al-Maliki as its nominee. However, the nomination does not guarantee al-Maliki’s premiership, and the US’ stance will possibly lead to further deliberations within the CF. Furthermore, the warning will likely complicate ongoing discussions to select a Kurdish president and a Sunni parliamentary speaker in the coming weeks. These developments will augment political uncertainty and government instability in Iraq. Furthermore, we assess that a government headed by al-Maliki will significantly increase the risk of US sanctions against Iraq (see Sibylline Situation Update Brief – 10 December 2025). These will likely target the finance, logistics and oil sectors. Such sanctions will add significant economic pressure to Iraq’s fragile economy and will likely lead to mass capital flight.
• Jan 27.
• Middle East, North Africa and Turkey region: Iranian proxy threats highlight elevated likelihood of attacks against US assets. On 26 January, several Iranian proxies in Iraq (including Badr, Harakat Hezbollah al-Nujaba and Kata’ib Hezbollah) warned that they would intervene and support Iran in the event of a US/Israel strike. On the same day, the Iranian-backed Houthis in Yemen issued a similar warning. These simultaneous statements are likely part of an Iranian pressure campaign amid a US military build-up in the region. There is a realistic possibility that Iranian proxies in Iraq will follow through on this threat by targeting US assets in the region in the event of a US/Israeli strike on Iran. However, they are unlikely to target Gulf countries. Instead, they are more likely to engage in limited attacks against US assets in Iraq (and possibly in Jordan and Syria). Additionally, we assess that the Houthis are likely to target Israeli interests in the Red Sea rather than breach the ceasefire with the US. If the Houthis do target US assets, this would significantly increase the risk of protracted conflict and regional escalation.
• Iran-UAE-US: UAE’s position on territory use will mitigate risk of retaliatory strikes on US assets. On 26 January, the UAE’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs stated that the country would not allow its airspace, territory or territorial waters to be used for hostile military action against Iran. The statement came as the US repositioned its USS Abraham Lincoln (CVN-72) aircraft carrier strike group in the Arabian Sea off the coast of Oman. We assess that limited US strike action against Iran remains likely in the coming weeks (see Sibylline Special Report – 19 January 2026), and that the UAE’s announcement is unlikely to affect the US posture. That said, in the event of a US military operation in Iran, the UAE’s public position will mitigate the risk of Iranian reprisal strikes on US military assets in the UAE, including Al Dhafra Air Base (Abu Dhabi emirate). Similarly, it will reduce the likelihood of attacks on critical infrastructure by the Iran-backed Houthis in Yemen, thereby moderating security risks for nearby personnel. However, in the event of a kinetic engagement between the US and Iran, the UAE will face elevated business and economic risks, including airspace closures and shipping delays which will disrupt regional supply chains.
• Region: Iranian proxy threats highlight elevated likelihood of attacks against US assets. On 26 January, several Iranian proxies in Iraq (including Badr, Harakat Hezbollah al-Nujaba and Kata’ib Hezbollah) warned that they would intervene and support Iran in the event of a US/Israel strike. On the same day, the Iranian-backed Houthis in Yemen issued a similar warning. These simultaneous statements are likely part of an Iranian pressure campaign amid a US military build-up in the region. There is a realistic possibility that Iranian proxies in Iraq will follow through on this threat by targeting US assets in the region in the event of a US/Israeli strike on Iran. However, they are unlikely to target Gulf countries. Instead, they are more likely to engage in limited attacks against US assets in Iraq (and possibly in Jordan and Syria). Additionally, we assess that the Houthis are likely to target Israeli interests in the Red Sea rather than breach the ceasefire with the US. If the Houthis do target US assets, this would significantly increase the risk of protracted conflict and regional escalation.

Jan 26.

• Germany: Arrest highlights sustained risk of Hamas-linked terrorism in Europe. On 23 January, the police arrested a Lebanese national suspected of being a member of the Hamas terrorist organisation. The individual, ‘Mohammed S’, was detained at the capital’s Berlin Brandenburg Airport (BER) upon arrival from Beirut (Lebanon) at approximately 2300hrs (local time). According to the Federal Prosecutor’s Office, he is a member of a group of so-called ‘foreign operatives’ who procure firearms and ammunition for Hamas-linked attacks targeting Israeli and Jewish institutions across Europe. He is suspected of obtaining approximately 300 live rounds of ammunition in August 2025 and colluding with one of three alleged Hamas members who were arrested in October 2025. While the Islamist terrorism threat in Europe predominantly stems from sole perpetrators, often radicalised online, this latest arrest underscores the sustained risk of international terrorism perpetrated by Hamas cells in Germany. However, robust European counter-terrorism capabilities (in co-operation with the Mossad and US intelligence agencies) will likely continue to mitigate the threat of Hamas attacks.
• Iran-region: Flight suspensions, reroutes will increase flight delays, travel, insurance costs. On 24 January, the airline KLM announced that it will avoid flying through the airspaces of Iran, Iraq and Israel until further notice. The airline also suspended flights to Saudi Arabia’s Dammam (Eastern province) and the capital Riyadh, as well as the UAE’s Dubai (Dubai emirate) until further notice. The announcement comes amid a spate of airlines rerouting and cancelling their flights within and through the region over the past two weeks. Tensions between Iran and the US remain elevated, with the US deploying an aircraft carrier strike group to the region, among other military assets, while Iran has suspended all Visual Flight Rules (heavily restricting low-altitude civilian air activity) until 25 April 2026. We assess that risks of conflict escalation between the US and Iran will remain elevated over the coming two to three weeks, with a US strike likely (see Sibylline Middle East Crisis Update – 21 January 2026). This will sustain flight disruption across the region, including flight cancellations and delayed schedules, as well as increased flight times and costs due to lower flight availability and rerouting. This disruption will likely also impact international and logistic flights (as well as raising insurance costs), particularly on the Asia-Europe route.
• Turkey: Further localised protests are likely following femicide incident in Istanbul’s Şişli district. On 25 January, large crowds protested outside Osmanbey Metro Station in Istanbul’s Şişli district (Istanbul province) after the decapitated body of an Uzbek woman was discovered in a nearby waste disposal unit late on 24 January. Hundreds also gathered in the capital Ankara. The civil society organisation ‘We Will Stop Femicide Platform’ reports a significant rise in femicide in recent years, with perpetrators often facing limited accountability. Turkey withdrew from the Istanbul Convention in 2021, removing its obligation to meet international standards on preventing violence against women. Further protests are likely in the coming days, particularly in Şişli, including the Osmanbey and Pangaltı neighbourhoods, and near Kuyulubağ Sokak (Kuyulubağ Street), where the body was found. Protests are also possible in central areas of Istanbul, including Taksim Square and İstiklal Avenue, as well as in Ankara. While most women’s rights protests in Turkey are peaceful, a heavy-handed police presence in central urban areas will increase the risk of clashes between demonstrators and the authorities, thereby elevating security and arbitrary detention risks for nearby personnel.
• Israel: Further anti-government protests, strikes by ethnic-Arab communities are likely in February

On 22 January, thousands of ethnic-Arab protesters marched in Sakhnin (Northern district), denouncing what they perceive as police neglect of Arab communities’ safety. This comes amid an uptick in gang violence by organised crime groups (OCGs), who also impose protection rackets on shops. The march is part of ongoing protest and strike action by local businesses in Shakhnin, as well as in other ethnic-Arab communities including Rahat (Southern district). The strike is highly likely to continue in the coming days, until at least 25 January, sustaining risks of business disruption. However, hospitals or education facilities are unlikely to be impacted. There is also a possibility of further (albeit smaller) protests in Sakhnin next week by groups representing younger ethnic-Arab demographics, increasing the risk of clashes with the security forces outside the Misgav police station. Additionally, given that prominent local Arab-led parties also share these safety concerns, further protests and strikes across northern Arab communities (such as in Nazareth; Northern district) are likely in February, sustaining risks of business and mobility disruption.

• Tunisia: Sentencing of prominent journalists highlights democratic backsliding, unrest risks. On 22 January, a Tunisian court convicted prominent journalists Borhen Bsaies and Mourad Zeghidi of money laundering and tax evasion, sentencing them to three and a half years in prison. The authorities previously jailed Bsaies and Zeghidi in May 2024 on charges of ‘spreading false news’, a move widely perceived as politically motivated. Since President Kais Saied consolidated his power in 2021, Tunisia has experienced significant democratic backsliding, including widespread crackdowns on public dissent. Reactive protests are possible over the weekend (23-25 January) in major urban centres, including the capital Tunis, Sfax (Sfax governorate) and Sousse (Sousse governorate). The security forces will likely adopt a heightened security posture during demonstrations, increasing the risk of sporadic clashes with protesters and elevating domestic unrest risks. The arrest and conviction of other journalists is possible in the coming months, heightening regulatory and compliance risks for businesses and individuals operating within Tunisia’s media sector. These arrests will also increase reputational risks for businesses associated with the Tunisian government, possibly leading to boycotts and reduced consumer engagement.
• Israel-Lebanon: Strikes on border crossings are likely to intensify throughout first quarter of 2026

On 21 January, the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) stated that they have conducted airstrikes targeting four crossing points along the Syria-Lebanon border allegedly used by Lebanese Hizballah (LH) to smuggle weapons. While the IDF did not disclose any further details, the map the army shared indicates that these are unofficial crossing points located near Hermel (Lebanon). This border area has been a critical node for LH’s logistical network throughout the last decade. The IDF have previously struck border crossings between the two countries over the past two years, including official border checkpoints such as at Al-Masnaa (Lebanon). We assess that the recent strikes likely indicate that Israel is seeking to escalate pressure on LH amid its persistent refusal to disarm. Consequently, strikes are likely to increase in frequency and scope in areas north of the Litani River throughout the next two months. This will significantly increase collateral risks to staff during overland movement through all crossings between Syria and Lebanon in the first quarter of 2026, as well as to business personnel situated in Baalbek-Hermel and Beqaa governorates (both Lebanon). (Source: Sibylline)

 

27 Jan 26. Israel is preparing for talks with the Trump administration on a new 10-year security deal, seeking to extend U.S. military support even as Israeli leaders signal they are planning for a future with reduced American cash grants, the Financial Times reported on Tuesday. Gil Pinchas, speaking to the FT before stepping down as chief financial adviser to Israel’s military and defence ministry, said Israel would seek to prioritise joint military and defence projects over cash handouts in talks that he expected to take place in the coming weeks. (Source: Reuters)

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Military And Security Developments

Jan 30.

• Russia-Ukraine: US-requested halt on long-range strikes will be vulnerable to violation, collapse. On 29 January, US President Donald Trump claimed that his Russian counterpart, Vladimir Putin, had agreed to refrain from long-range strikes against the Ukrainian capital Kyiv and other urban centres for a week amid extremely low temperatures. In recent weeks, Russia has intensified attacks against Ukraine’s energy infrastructure, which has resulted in the harshest heating conditions since the start of the full-scale invasion in 2022 (see Sibylline Ukraine Monthly Forecast – 23 January 2026). Comments from Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky indicate that the pause would apply to energy infrastructure, though we are unable to confirm this. Details concerning the supposed moratorium, including when it could enter force and which other cities it would apply to, are vague. Russian officials have not yet confirmed Moscow’s agreement. Even if Putin has agreed, any such moratorium will highly likely be vulnerable to violations or fail to hold. While a temporary cessation of Russian attacks would partly alleviate humanitarian risks, it would also enable Russia to stockpile drones and missiles to resume its bombardment of energy infrastructure in the near future.
  Jan 29.
  • Russia-US: Peace progress will increase likelihood of successful purchase of oil major’s assets. Earlier on 29 January, Russia’s second-largest oil company, Lukoil, announced the planned sale of its foreign assets to the US private equity firm Carlyle Group. Lukoil has specified that the transaction does not apply to assets in Kazakhstan. The Russian oil major has not disclosed the value of the deal, which requires approval from the US’ Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC). Meanwhile, Carlyle has said that the sale is conditional upon due diligence and regulatory approvals. In October 2025, the US sanctioned Lukoil and another Russian oil company, Rosneft, due to Russia’s lack of commitment towards ending the war in Ukraine. Washington DC has thus far rejected two bids to purchase Lukoil’s international assets, including one from the Swiss-based commodity trader Gunvor and another from a group led by US bank Xtellus Partners. We assess that the likelihood of Carlyle’s bid being accepted will increase should Russia continue to engage in US-facilitated peace talks. In the meantime, significant operational disruption at Lukoil’s foreign facilities and elevated energy insecurity in countries hosting such assets are unlikely.
  Jan 27.
  KEY DEVELOPMENTS 
  • OFFENSIVES: Russian forces have likely captured around 58.7 square miles (152 sq km) of Ukrainian territory in January – nearly three times less than in December 2025
  • SHELLS: According to the Wall Street Journal (WSJ), Germany’s largest defence manufacturer, Rheinmetall, will ‘soon’ be able to produce around 1.5 m 155mm artillery shells per annum, which is reportedly more than the entire US defence industry
  • STRIKES: Attempts to impose an ‘EU preference clause’ that would restrict Ukraine’s use of an EU loan would significantly undermine Kyiv’s ability to acquire crucial equipment from non-EU states, such as UK Storm Shadow missiles
  • FORECAST: Unconfirmed reports indicate that the US has signalled that its security guarantees are contingent on Ukraine agreeing to a peace deal, which likely requires Kyiv having to cede the Donbas region; this would be a highly controversial move
  • OFFENSIVES: As of late January 2026, the Ukrainian OSINT mapping project DeepState indicated that Russian forces had captured about 58.7 square miles (152 sq km) of Ukrainian territory in January – nearly three times less than in December 2025. Russia recorded most of its advances towards Siversk and Kostiantynivka (both located in Donetsk oblast). Various military analysts have cited difficult weather conditions, including freezing temperatures and shorter daylight hours, as a likely factor behind the slowdown in infantry operations. The lull in Russian territorial progress likely underscores Moscow’s difficulties in sustaining a high operational tempo and achieving steady gains. This also possibly an indication of a temporary operational pause ahead of further offensive operations in the coming months. Despite this, we assess that ultimately, growing Ukrainian challenges in the coming months will remain the main enabling factor for future Russian gains.
  • SHELLS: According to the Wall Street Journal (WSJ), Germany’s largest defence manufacturer Rheinmetall will ‘soon’ be able to produce 1.5 m 155mm artillery shells per annum, which is reportedly more than the quantity produced by the entire US defence industry. This detail was revealed in a wider article assessing the challenges faced by Europe in rapidly ramping up military production amid efforts to offset the drop-off in US military aid to Ukraine and growing transatlantic tensions. The increased production of 155m artillery shells by Rheinmetall (for which a specific timeline was not given) will realistically benefit Ukraine, which is increasingly reliant on NATO-provided 155mm systems. Rheinmetall is already a major supplier of artillery shells to Kyiv. Despite this, construction has still not begun on its shell production plant in Ukraine, agreed in 2024. The official reason for this is ‘unresolved regulatory issues’, though it is also possible that the growing intensity of Russian strikes has had a deterrent effect. It is unclear whether this factory, originally due to begin production in 2026, was factored into the WSJ calculation.
  • STRIKES: The CEO of Ukrainian energy company DTEK, Maxim Timchenko, stated on 23 January that Ukraine is close to a ‘humanitarian catastrophe’ due to Russian strikes on the country’s energy system. Over the past two weeks, Ukraine has experienced temperatures between -15 and -20 C (5 and -4 F), as intensive Russian strikes on energy targets have continued. On 23-24 January, for instance, Russian forces launched a combined strike comprising 396 projectiles, primarily towards Kyiv oblast, which reportedly left 1.2 m properties nationwide without power. On 25 January, Kyiv’s Mayor Vitali Klitschko stated that approximately 15% of the capital’s housing was still without power as a result of the strike.
  • STRIKES: Trilateral talks between the US, Russia and Ukraine held in the UAE on 23-24 January failed to result in a moratorium on strikes against energy infrastructure (and coincided with the largest Russian strike on Ukraine over the past week). The US and Ukrainian sides reportedly proposed that Russia halt attacks on Ukrainian energy infrastructure in exchange for Kyiv refraining from strikes on Russian oil refineries and oil tankers, according to the Financial Times (FT). While it is possible that Russia will agree to a limited moratorium on strikes in future talks (as it has done previously), we assess that Moscow will likely continue its strike campaign through the remaining winter months in order to maximise pressure on Kyiv. Any moratorium would likely be limited, as well as highly susceptible to violations and ultimately a breakdown.
  • STRIKES: Any attempt to impose an ‘EU preference clause’ that would restrict Ukraine’s use of the EU’s EUR 90 bn (USD 108 bn) loan would significantly undermine Ukraine’s ability to acquire crucial equipment from non-EU countries. On 26 January, The Telegraph reported that France opposes calls to facilitate Ukraine’s purchases of UK-produced Storm Shadow missiles with the EU loan. Paris has consistently advocated a European preference clause that would require Kyiv to prioritise the purchase of defence equipment from EU defence industries in a bid to boost the bloc’s domestic defence industry. However, such a clause would restrict Kyiv’s ability to leverage the EU loan to fulfil its military needs. Under an EU preference clause, Ukrainians would be required to submit purchase plans, which would be reviewed against a set of criteria. However, 11 European countries, including Germany, oppose such conditions and are calling for a relaxation of the rules to facilitate Kyiv’s defence purchases from third-country suppliers, including the UK. Without new sources of Storm Shadow missiles, Ukraine’s ability to strike at Russia’s rear will likely be limited
  • STRIKES: On 27 January, German Defence Minister Boris Pistorius urged Western allies to step up support for Ukraine’s air defences. Pistorius noted that Germany has limited capacity to deliver further equipment, including additional US-made Patriot air defence interceptors. Pistorius explained that Germany is awaiting replacements for the equipment that has already been delivered and also acknowledged that the number of other air defence systems supplied to Ukraine (like the IRIS-T) is insufficient. Ultimately, Western partners’ difficulties in transferring crucial air defence equipment will leave Ukraine persistently vulnerable to Russia’s strike campaign. Meanwhile, if the EU imposes restrictions on Ukraine’s use of the EUR 90 bn loan, this would possibly undermine Kyiv’s ability to access US Patriot air defence systems and interceptors, which have proven effective against Russian ballistic missiles.
  POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS
  • NEGOTIATIONS: Russia, Ukraine and the US held trilateral talks on 23-24 January in Abu Dhabi (UAE) which, despite assessments from various parties that they were ‘constructive’, are unlikely to have resulted in a tangible breakthrough towards ending the war. We had previously assessed that the likelihood of a significant advancement towards peace arising from the talks was unlikely, largely due to the lack of consensus on key areas. Aside from the trilateral consultations, Russian and Ukrainian negotiators also held bilateral talks, according to reports which cited unspecified Ukrainian officials. For further analysis on the role of security guarantees in the talks, see FORECAST below.
  • NEGOTIATIONS: Before the talks in the UAE, the Kremlin sought to downplay the prospect of imminent progress towards peace during a meeting on 22 January with a US delegation in the Russian capital Moscow. Presidential aide Yuri Ushakov stated that ‘there is no hope of achieving a long-term settlement’ without resolving territorial issues – as agreed during a summit between Russian President Vladimir Putin and US President Trump in Alaska in August 2025. Details of that summit remain limited, but Russian officials continue to claim that the two sides reached an understanding on the terms necessary to end the war – it remains possible that a misunderstanding over what was agreed in principle will lead to a disconnect between US and Russian expectations.
  • NEGOTIATIONS: Talks are expected to resume in the coming days in Abu Dhabi, with reports indicating that the next round will take place on 1 February. According to a report by Axios published on 24 January, one unspecified US official has claimed that the likelihood of a meeting between Putin and Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky is growing. The official also suggested that if the next trilateral meeting yields positive results, the negotiating teams of the warring parties could meet in their respective capitals. However, we assess that this is overly optimistic in the near term given that mutual trust will remain extremely low despite limited, possible progress in talks. In a similar vein, while Zelensky has previously expressed willingness to meet his Russian counterpart, the Kremlin will likely maintain its position that such a meeting can only take place as a final step in reaching a peace deal.
  • MARITIME: Further seizures of Russian shadow fleet vessels will increase the risk of maritime grey-zone activity in the coming weeks, with the assets of European countries that have intercepted tankers or supported operations likely to be particularly vulnerable. On 22 January, the French Navy intercepted the ‘Grinch’ oil tanker between the southern coast of Spain and the northern coast of Morocco. The tanker was sailing from Murmansk (Murmansk oblast, Russia) under the Comoros flag. French President Emmanuel Macron said that the vessel is subject to international sanctions and suspected of flying a false flag. Although certain European countries are showing an increasing willingness to adopt an assertive posture against shadow fleet vessels, we assess that the risk of a direct military confrontation with Russia will remain low. Rather, Russian retaliation is more likely to include targeting maritime and undersea infrastructure. For further analysis, see Sibylline Situation Update Brief – 27 January 2026.
  FORECAST
  GUARANTEES: The Financial Times (FT) reported earlier on 27 January that the US has signalled that its security guarantees are contingent on Ukraine agreeing to a peace deal, which likely requires Kyiv to cede the Donbas region. While unconfirmed, the proposed US protections include a pledge that guarantees will ‘mirror’ NATO’s Article 5 and a co-ordinated military response in the event of renewed Russian aggression. This is according to unspecified insiders. The US has also indicated it would provide Ukraine with more military aid to strengthen its peacetime army if Kyiv withdraws from Ukrainian-controlled areas of the Donbas. However, the White House’s deputy press secretary, Anna Kelly, has refuted the reported conditions linked to security guarantees, arguing that the US’ role in the peace process is to bring both sides together to make a deal.
  Gaining full control of the Donbas, which comprises Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts, remains one of Russia’s core, long-standing war objectives. Russian officials have repeatedly demanded that Kyiv withdraw its forces from areas of the region under Ukrainian control. Although Russia is estimated to occupy approximately 88% of the Donbas, Ukraine would (in this scenario) forfeit several strategic cities in Donetsk comprising the so-called fortress belt, namely Druzhkivka, Kostiantynivka, Kramatorsk and Sloviansk. We assess that Russian control of these heavily fortified areas would be highly advantageous for Moscow if it sought to launch a renewed invasion of Ukraine in the future, particularly if the Kremlin doubts Western (specifically US) resolve to commit to agreed security guarantees.
  An unnamed senior Ukrainian official quoted by the FT claimed that the US is using guarantees to push Ukraine towards concessions that Washington DC believes could bring Russia to the negotiating table. However, Russia’s territorial claims in Ukraine expand beyond the Donbas (the future status of Kherson and Zaporizhzhia oblasts – annexed by Russia in 2022 – is not specified in the FT’s report). Following the Alaska summit in August 2025, reports claimed that Putin had proposed freezing the frontlines in those two regions in exchange for a Ukrainian withdrawal from the Donbas (see Sibylline Ukraine Update – 18 August 2025).
  Despite President Zelensky stating on 25 January that a document outlining US security guarantees for Ukraine was ‘100% ready’, it remains unclear if any such concession of territory has been agreed. In any case, the agreement’s signing is liable to be delayed by lengthy referenda processes. According to Zelensky, Kyiv is awaiting confirmation of the date and location for the security document signing. Zelensky stated that the document would then be sent to the Ukrainian parliament and the US Congress for ratification without specifying a possible timeframe. He also underscored that any territorial concessions would have to be put to a referendum, which would possibly postpone any definitive decision in the short-to-medium term.
  We continue to assess that Ukraine remains more malleable to diplomatic pressure than Russia given its strained military position and reliance on Western support, including assurances vis-à-vis its post-war security. Over the coming weeks, Kyiv will almost certainly remain reluctant to make significant territorial concessions without first receiving concrete, robust security guarantees that it believes will prevent a future Russian attack. We have repeatedly assessed that the credibility and durability of security guarantees for Ukraine provided by the West, including the US, will highly likely be fundamental in deterring renewed Russian aggression. However, should US pressure on Ukraine increase significantly (especially if the Trump administration withholds intelligence sharing), Ukraine will find it harder to resist making unfavourable territorial concessions as its operational situation deteriorates further.
  Jan 26.
  • Russia-Ukraine: War will highly likely continue in near-to-medium term despite possible future talks. On 24 January, the second day of trilateral negotiations between Russia, Ukraine and the US concluded without a significant breakthrough towards ending the Russo-Ukrainian war. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky has disclosed that further discussions could take place as early as this week. The talks were expected to focus on territory, one of the key issues over which the two warring parties continue to disagree. Moscow maintains that it seeks full control of Donbas region (which comprises Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts). Meanwhile, for the foreseeable future Kyiv will be reluctant to cede swathes of territory in Donetsk oblast that Russian forces do not occupy fully. Ultimately, we continue to assess that the positions of Kyiv and Moscow on the key issues needed to end the war are highly unlikely to converge in the near-to-medium term. The absence of an agreement will possibly encourage the US to apply pressure (most likely on Ukraine) in an attempt to facilitate an end to the war in the coming weeks.
  • Russia: New citizenship, residency reporting rules will elevate surveillance risks for Russians abroad. On 23 January, a Russian opposition media outlet reported that the foreign ministry has prepared a draft law which would mandate Russian citizens to notify the authorities within 60 days of receiving foreign citizenship or residency abroad. Russians would be required to disclose to Russia’s internal ministry or a consulate abroad that they have obtained a new citizenship or residence permit. Failure to notify the relevant authorities could result in fines or community service. Currently, Russians can voluntarily notify the consulate or embassy of their dual citizenship or residence permit. Hundreds of thousands of Russians are estimated to have left their home country since the start of the full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. If passed in its current guise, the new rules would enter into force on 1 January 2028. While amendments are possible, the legislation will likely be adopted in their existing form, expanding Russia’s control over its expatriate population, particularly anti-Kremlin dissidents. Although details concerning enforcement remain uncertain, compliance with the new requirements will increase surveillance risks for Russians living abroad.
  • France: Tanker interception will prompt Russian maritime grey-zone activity, risks to civilian shipping. On 22 January, the French Navy intercepted the ‘Grinch’ oil tanker, a vessel that has been linked to Russia’s shadow fleet. The fleet consists of a group of ageing tankers with opaque ownership structures operating under flags of convenience to bypass Western sanctions on Russian oil exports. The operation took place in the Mediterranean Sea with intelligence support from the UK. The operation indicates a more assertive European posture towards the shadow fleet since the beginning of the year. It comes after the UK Armed Forces supported a US operation to seize the Russian-flagged tanker ‘Marinera’ on 7 January. The UK has also indicated its readiness to conduct a similar operation unilaterally or with European partners. We assess that further seizures of Russian shadow fleet vessels in European waters are likely in the coming weeks and months. This will almost certainly increase regional tensions with Russia, which will likely increase its maritime grey-zone activity in European waters. We also assess that safety and operational risks to civilian shipping will increase as Russia will possibly attempt to retaliate by harassing French and UK-owned, registered or insured vessels in the Baltic Sea, Black Sea and eastern Mediterranean Sea.
  • Russia-Ukraine: Peace breakthrough remains unlikely despite trilateral talks with US. On 23-24 January, trilateral talks are expected to take place in Abu Dhabi (UAE) between Russia, Ukraine and the US aimed at ending the Russo-Ukrainian war. Unspecified insiders familiar with the negotiations claim that territory will be the primary issue to be discussed; we continue to assess that this remains a key sticking point in efforts to reach a peace agreement. It comes after US envoys Steve Witkoff and Jared Kushner met with Russian President Vladimir Putin late on 22 January in Moscow (Russia). Russia and Ukraine have engaged in limited direct bilateral talks and held separate negotiations with the US in 2025, though these have failed to yield tangible results towards ending the war. While trilateral talks would be a notable step in the US’ push to broker a cessation of hostilities, Russia and Ukraine remain far removed in their positions on ending the war. We assess that this will highly likely prevent a breakthrough in the near-to-medium term. That said, the two sides could realistically agree to a limited moratorium on strikes against energy infrastructure.
  • Russia: Russia will highly likely be able to sustain war in 2026 despite growing public finances strain. On 21 January, Deputy Finance Minister Vladimir Kolychev warned that the federal budget will likely face a growing deficit at the start of 2026 due to lower hydrocarbon revenues and a surge in front-loaded payments. Growing Western sanctions enforcement has tightened pressure on Russian oil exports, which in December 2025 reached their lowest level since August 2025. On 21 January, the EU implemented a ban on imports of refined products made from Russian crude, which has partly reduced oil imports from key buyers such as India. Oil, along with gas exports, has historically accounted for a significant share of Russia’s federal revenues. However, the recent spike in gold prices, for example, has provided Russia with a significant windfall, with Bloomberg estimating that Central Bank of Russia gold holdings have increased by more than USD 216bn since the beginning of the full-scale invasion of Ukraine. As such, despite a decrease in crucial hydrocarbon revenues and mounting financial vulnerabilities, we assess that Russia retains alternative assets that could theoretically be liquidated if needed to enable it to economically sustain the war against Ukraine at least through 2026
  (Source: Sibylline)

 

29 Jan 26. Ukraine Gets 500 km Range Loitering Munitions from France. French company EOS Technologie has delivered its first Rodeur 330 strike drones to Ukraine, AFP reports. A limited number of units have already arrived. The loitering munitions can fly up to 500 kilometers, remain airborne for five hours, and strike targets in fully autonomous mode. The delivery highlights the rapid growth of France’s military drone sector, accelerated by lessons from the war in Ukraine.
EOS Technologie CEO Jean-Marc Zuliani told AFP that Ukrainian forces have gained unparalleled operational experience. According to him, Ukraine currently needs advanced technology more than sheer quantities of equipment, while offering Western manufacturers a real-world testing ground for new systems.
Zuliani described the Rodeur as a potential “shield” for Europe and a “sword” for Ukraine, capable of deep strikes against airbases, defense infrastructure, refineries, and fuel depots inside Russian territory.
The Rodeur 330 combines reconnaissance and strike functions in a single platform. It carries a 4-kilogram payload and uses metric-precision guidance to autonomously hit targets. Two operators can assemble the drone in three minutes and launch it via catapult.
With a 3.3-meter wingspan and a maximum takeoff weight of 25 kilograms, the drone cruises at 120 km/h, can reach altitudes of 5,000 meters, and loiter for up to five hours. Operators require one week of training, with an additional week for maintenance.
EOS Technologie has also partnered with an unnamed major automotive manufacturer, which Zuliani says could produce anywhere from 10,000 to one m drones by 2030. Meanwhile, Ukraine requires roughly 20,000 drones per month, according to Hadrien Canter of French startup Alta Ares, which develops software to improve drone interception rates.
(Source: UAS VISION/EUROMAIDAN)
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Founded in 1987, Exensor Technology is a world leading supplier of Networked Unattended Ground Sensor (UGS) Systems providing tailored sensor solutions to customers all over the world. From our Headquarters in Lund Sweden, our centre of expertise in Network Communications at Communications Research Lab in Kalmar Sweden and our Production site outside of Basingstoke UK, we design, develop and produce latest state of the art rugged UGS solutions at the highest quality to meet the most stringent demands of our customers. Our systems are in operation and used in a wide number of Military as well as Homeland Security applications worldwide. The modular nature of the system ensures any external sensor can be integrated, providing the user with a fully meshed “silent” network capable of self-healing. Exensor Technology will continue to lead the field in UGS technology, provide our customers with excellent customer service and a bespoke package able to meet every need.

A CNIM Group Company
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Sponsored by Bertin Exensor

www.exensor.com

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27 Jan 26. Efforts to de-escalate tensions in Minnesota will decrease risks of violent clashes, attacks. On 26 January, the Trump administration removed Gregory Bovino as ‘commander at large’ for US Border Patrol following the fatal shooting of a US citizen in Minneapolis (Minnesota) on 24 January. The shooting prompted significant public backlash, exacerbated by contradicting accounts given by US Border Patrol and eyewitnesses, and has led to increased domestic unrest risks across urban centres nationwide. Border czar Tom Homan is expected to replace Bovino to oversee operations in Minnesota. Furthermore, on 26 January, President Donald Trump held phone conversations with Minnesota Governor Tim Walz and Minneapolis Mayor Jacob Frey, after which all parties took a conciliatory tone. These combined efforts to de-escalate tensions will likely lower the risks of violent clashes, attacks, property damage and looting in Minneapolis in the near term. Nevertheless, any uptick in shooting incidents during immigration enforcement operations or troop surges to Democratic-led cities will increase domestic unrest risks. The risks will be particularly elevated in cities such as Chicago (Illinois), New York City (New York), San Francisco (California) and the capital Washington DC. (Source: Sibylline)

29 Jan 26. War Department Boards Merge to Form New Science, Technology and Innovation Board (STIB).
Secretary of War Pete Hegseth today has approved a major overhaul of the War Department’s legacy advisory boards, directing the merger of the Defense Innovation Board (DIB) and the Defense Science Board (DSB) into the new Science and Technology Innovation Board (STIB), pending formal establishment by the Federal Register. This move continues the transition of the Department away from the alphabet soup era of indecisive overlapping groups that delay results to the American warfighter. The STIB is built on speed and clarity for rapid resolution to complex national security problems.
As the Department reestablishes a warrior ethos, the Under Secretary of War for Research and Engineering continues to assist in eliminating the bureaucratic blockers that undermine the decision-making velocity expected of a fighting force. The unification of two powerful advisory bodies into one will create one voice for innovation that replaces competing recommendations with fast, coherent guidance. The STIB brings together the DSB’s deep scientific and technical rigor with the DIB’s private sector agility and disruptive mindset. This merger results in one board with the authority, expertise and urgency to deliver real answers, not more processes.
“Our warfighters can’t afford to wait. We are unifying our best scientific minds and our most innovative private-sector leaders into a single board built to provide clear answers, not more bureaucracy. The creation of the STIB ensures that ideas on the bleeding edge move quickly from concept to the field, directly making a difference to the joint force,” said Emil Michael, Under Secretary of War for Research and Engineering.
To ensure the board drives outcomes, the STIB will maintain two permanent subcommittees:
• Subcommittee on Strategic Options – Charged with identifying concepts, capabilities, strategies, and courses of action across the S&T enterprise that rebalance cost and benefit, strengthen deterrence, and ensure U.S. operational dominance.
• Subcommittee on National Security Innovation – Tasked with examining and advising on innovation pathways, emerging and disruptive technologies, commercial best practices in strategy and management, organizational design, human capital, decision making, and scaling — while leveraging America’s broader innovation ecosystem for national security.
This merger transforms two respected boards into a unified force multiplier for the War Department. It reduces bureaucratic drag, eliminates redundant operations and ends the churn of siloed advisory groups that often hinders progress. The STIB will attract top talent from science, technology and commercial innovation hubs, giving them a single, powerful venue to shape both disruptive advancement and foundational scientific priorities.
The War Department is moving with renewed order and purpose. The STIB now stands as the forum where America’s leading scientists and industry experts provide grounded, mission focused counsel to solve our warfighter’s toughest problems.
View the new board appointments here: www.stib.cto.mil (Source: U.S. DoD)

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Founded in 1987, Exensor Technology is a world leading supplier of Networked Unattended Ground Sensor (UGS) Systems providing tailored sensor solutions to customers all over the world. From our Headquarters in Lund Sweden, our centre of expertise in Network Communications at Communications Research Lab in Kalmar Sweden and our Production site outside of Basingstoke UK, we design, develop and produce latest state of the art rugged UGS solutions at the highest quality to meet the most stringent demands of our customers. Our systems are in operation and used in a wide number of Military as well as Homeland Security applications worldwide. The modular nature of the system ensures any external sensor can be integrated, providing the user with a fully meshed “silent” network capable of self-healing. Exensor Technology will continue to lead the field in UGS technology, provide our customers with excellent customer service and a bespoke package able to meet every need. A CNIM Group Company
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Sponsored by Bertin Exensor

www.exensor.com
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29 Jan 26. Germany proposes ‘two-speed’ EU to hasten defense buildup. Germany is spearheading an initiative to create a “two-speed” European Union, proposing that a core group of six major economies bypass the bloc’s traditional consensus-based decision-making to accelerate defense cooperation and industrial competitiveness amid mounting geopolitical pressures.
German Finance Minister Lars Klingbeil and his French counterpart, Roland Lescure, jointly convened finance ministers from Poland, Spain, Italy and the Netherlands on Jan. 28 for a video conference to establish what is being called the E6 format of the six leading European economies.
“Now is the time for a Europe of two speeds,” Klingbeil said at a Berlin event ahead of the meeting.
In a letter of invitation to his colleagues, obtained by Defense News, Klingbeil presented a four-point agenda that makes defense spending a priority alongside a Savings and Investment Union, strengthening the Euro and securing critical raw materials.
“Europe has to become stronger and more resilient,” Klingbeil said in the letter. “Work towards this goal needs to be sped up in all dimensions. Continuing as before is not an option.”
Klingbeil’s two-page document calls for enhanced collaboration on defense spending and urges making defense a key focus in the next EU multiannual budget. The letter also calls for “turning defense into an engine for growth” for the continent’s economy.
The German finance minister described the Jan. 28 call as a kick-off meeting, saying that he hoped to have a follow-up meeting on the sidelines of the next EUROGroup meeting, a gathering of finance ministers of the Euro-zone.
The two-speed concept for deeper European integration, while not entirely new to EU discussions, is gaining fresh momentum as the bloc confronts what many here describe as an urgent need to reduce dependence on the United States for defense.
However, the approach risks fracturing European cohesion by alienating EU members who are on board with deeper integration but are not part of the group of six. German officials have indicated that the format would remain flexible and possibly open to additional participants.
The initiative also reflects a strategic recalibration in Berlin’s European partnerships.
Chancellor Friedrich Merz signed a comprehensive German-Italian “Protocol on a Plan of Action for strategic cooperation” with Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni on Jan. 27, which commits both nations to “urgently and jointly achieve European defence readiness by closing capability gaps and strengthening the European pillar in NATO.” They will collaborate on integrated air and missile defense, unmanned systems, naval vessels, electronic warfare, and potentially a common land combat platform.
Simultaneously, Berlin is deepening ties eastward: Merz announced in November that Germany and Poland are drafting a new defense policy agreement to be concluded in 2026, with the Bundeswehr already increasing joint exercises with Polish forces and expanding cooperation on drone detection and neutralization.
The initiative comes as Germany itself undergoes a historic military buildup. Berlin’s 2026 budget allocates €82.69 billion ($98.92 billion) for the Bundeswehr, with an additional €25.5 billion ($30.5 billion) from a special defense fund, as Merz pursues his stated goal of making Germany “the strongest conventional army in Europe.”
At the World Economic Forum in Davos on Jan. 22, Merz reaffirmed plans for Germany to increase defense spending to 5% of GDP, calling it “a huge increase” necessary to assert European sovereignty.
All this comes against the backdrop of strained relations in the EU’s traditional Franco-German growth engine, precipitated by an impasse in the Future Combat Air System project meant to design Europe’s next-generation fighter jet, and the challenges posed to collective EU action by unanimity rules among the Bloc’s 27 member countries. (Source: Defense News)

 

30 Jan 26. The Belgian Ministry of Defence has officially confirmed the launch of the Land Systems Logistic Support (LS²), an industrial partnership bringing together John Cockerill Defense, FN Herstal and Thales. This ambitious and unprecedented initiative aims to ensure the long-term maintenance of all vehicles and embedded systems of the Belgian Land Force and to guarantee their long-term operational availability. Thibault Lambrecht is appointed CEO of LS² and will take up his duties early February.
This project, with a duration of 20 years, is based on a strong and unprecedented industrial cooperation between three major defence industry companies: John Cockerill Defense, FN Herstal and Thales Belgium.
By pooling their expertise in the service of Belgian sovereignty, the three partners have formed a joint venture dedicated to the maintenance, modernisation and logistical support of all land force vehicles and their information systems, communication and armament.

29 Jan 26. Powering Europe: EIB Group invests a record €100bn to support shared prosperity, security and European values
• Financing for energy security rose to a record in 2025, with €11.6bn invested in European grids, and mobilising around a third of the total energy transition investment
• Biggest ever financing programme for startups, scale-ups and tech infrastructure consolidates EIB Group’s position as cornerstone of EU’s venture capital ecosystem
• Scope of security and defence investments expanded, financing quadruples to reach nearly 5% of EIB Group’s annual EU business, in milestone year of historic decisions
• Financing for housing innovation, renovation and new construction rose by 50%, while more than half of EIB Group’s EU financing went to projects in cohesion regions
The European Investment Bank (EIB) Group is deploying its full firepower to support European competitiveness, security and strategic autonomy, with a record €100 bn in annual financing. The results from the EIB Group’s activity in 2025 show historic highs in new investment for the green and digital transitions, for European security and defence, for shared priorities including housing, and for reinforcing win-win partnerships and alliances in Ukraine, accession countries and across the globe.
“Europe is a superpower, and we must punch our weight and believe in our capabilities,” said EIB Group President Nadia Calviño. “The EIB Group is making a difference. Investing in shared prosperity, security, strategic autonomy and European values, so Europe delivers on its promises to citizens and partners.”
Transition to the future
Almost 60% of EIB Group’s total financing in 2025 went to green projects, from large energy grids and interconnectors to the deployment of storage and renewables, clean technologies for the decarbonisation of heavy industry, as well as adaptation investment, such as water infrastructure, reinforcing the resilience of economies and societies to climate change and its impact.
A record €11.6bn was devoted to grids and storage projects, supporting the security of the power supply. It is estimated that the financing signed last year will help construct or upgrade 56,000 km of power lines, from the landmark Bay of Biscay interconnector between the Iberian Peninsula and France, through an underwater cable connecting two regions in central Italy, to local grids and municipal power infrastructure in Germany.
EIB Group financing backed one fifth of all newly installed solar capacity, one in three new onshore wind projects, as well as the vast majority of all offshore wind projects in 2025. Tailored financing products supported the EU’s wind and grids manufacturing industries, while record high investment volumes in energy efficiency are expected to lower bills for small and medium-sized companies and households. EIB Group financing supported around one third of the total energy transition investment in the EU last year.
In addition to clean technologies, the EIB Group is supporting homegrown innovation in health and biotech, artificial intelligence and other disruptive technologies, digital infrastructures and critical raw materials. With the rollout of TechEU last year, the biggest ever financing programme for innovation, the EIB Group plans to mobilise at least €250 bn in investment by 2027, ensuring that ideas, technologies and innovative companies born in the EU, can stay, grow and thrive here in the EU. The financing deployed last year alone is estimated to mobilize more than €100 bn in investment, from AI-powered 6G networks, to semiconductors manufacturing.
As cornerstone financier of innovation, the European Investment Fund (EIF) – EIB’s risk-finance subsidiary – delivered close to €16 bn in guarantees and equity finance for small businesses and startups across the EU. The EIF is estimated to have contributed almost a quarter of all venture capital raised by European funds last year. In the months ahead, it will expand its European Tech Champions Initiative, building on the huge success of the first phase, which has already anchored the creation of 12 venture capital mega funds in Europe, and the scale-up of 35 startups – including nine unicorns.
Security and defence
Responding to the new geopolitical landscape, the EIB Group significantly expanded the scope of its activities in the area of security and defence and into projects dedicated to military use. Security and defence investments quadrupled to more than €4 bn, close to 5% of the EIB Group’s EU financing.
Thanks to this step change, the EIB Group plays a leading role in safeguarding peace and security for EU citizens, with flagship projects ranging from military camps and maintenance facilities to research and development in advanced radar systems and avionics, and from sensors essential for the protection of Europe’s seabed and underwater assets to cybersecurity infrastructure and space capabilities.
Moreover, the EIB Group has been a pathfinder for EU’s financial industry, catalysing support for companies supporting Europe’s deterrence capabilities. Through intermediated lending agreements signed with commercial banks in Germany, France, Spain, Greece, and Austria, the EIB Group is facilitating access to financing for small and medium-sized companies in the supply chain of Europe’s large defence contractors, while the EIF has been nurturing, as anchor investor, the development of a venture capital ecosystem investing in defence firms with a pan-European approach.
Underpinning Europe’s economic model and values
The EIB Group is focusing on investments that underpin the European economic model and values. Investments for cohesion rose to a record high, with more than 50% of the Group’s EU investment going to projects in Europe’s less developed regions.
The EIB Group’s Affordable and Sustainable Housing Plan (available in EN, FR and DE) launched in 2025 alongside the European Commission, raised EIB Group financing for innovation, renovation and new buildings to more than €5bn, up nearly 50% on an annual basis, with a further increase planned for 2026. From student residences in Greece, to social housing in Belgium, from hospitals and health facilities in Spain, to primary schools in France, financing for social infrastructure whose impact is felt daily by EU citizens is a key priority for the EIB Group.
Financing for agriculture and the bioeconomy also rose to a record high of nearly €8 bn, strengthening a vital sector for Europe’s economy and food security, supporting rural communities, and creating viable futures for young and new farmers, who face financing barriers
Building bridges and win-win partnerships around the world
The EIB Group also deployed more than €9 bn for its EIB Global operations, building win-win global partnerships anchoring Europe as a trusted partner in a changing world, improving living conditions in many areas. For example, in 2025, the EIB Group financing for water projects rose to a record €5bn globally.
Financing for Ukraine rose to a new record and now exceeds €4 bn since the start of Russia’s invasion, with a new project signed or inaugurated every other week, from schools, hospitals and community facilities to district heating and power supply.
An EIB Global strategic orientation was adopted in 2025, fully aligning our operations with EU policy priorities. The EIB is the world’s largest public financier in water and a global leader investing in health, clean energy, and transport. Investments in private sector support and entrepreneurship brings opportunities for young people and women in emerging economies.
Doing more, doing better
In parallel to increasing the volume of its activities, the EIB Group has streamlined its internal processes, with the goal of accelerating investment decisions and cutting time to market. One-stop-shops have been introduced for clients, with investment checkers and reliance on established regulatory frameworks, designed to help Europe’s entrepreneurs get the right financing, at the right time, and the right scale to make a difference.
The full activity report, including a list of flagship project examples can be found here
A key figures summary for 2025 can be found here: [EN] [FR] [DE] [IT] [ES]
The presentation of the EIB Group’s annual operational[1] results, including project examples will be available here after the press conference
[1] All figures are unaudited and provisional, refer to signatures and are for the EIB Group unless otherwise specified.

 

29 Jan 26. “Credible nuclear deterrence in Europe continues to depend on US conventional and nuclear backstops…Recent isolationist tendencies in US defence and foreign policy have also re-ignited doubts over US commitments to extended nuclear deterrence.”
This is according to Nuclear Deterrence in Shifting Euro-Atlantic Security Architecture, a new RUSI research report by Darya Dolzikova, which shows how Europe needs to adapt its conventional and nuclear posture to ensure that nuclear deterrence remains effective in the face of changing threats and geopolitical pressures reshaping the wider Euro-Atlantic security environment.
The report argues that while nuclear weapons remain central to NATO’s deterrence posture, the credibility and effectiveness of nuclear deterrence in Europe are under increasing strain due to shifting US security priorities, the persistent threat of Russian conventional and potentially nuclear aggression, and the growing impact of China on global nuclear dynamics.
The study says European nuclear deterrence continues to rely heavily on US conventional and nuclear backstops, even though Washington has signalled a long-term reorientation of its security priorities. This report underscores the limitations of existing British and French nuclear postures to address the full range of threats facing Europe. It says that perceptions that the UK’s deterrent is dependent on the United States undermines its wider assurance value to its allies. France, while stressing the ‘European dimension’ of its deterrent, remains outside NATO’s Nuclear Planning Group, and has not specified the nature of the ‘European dimension’, creating ambiguity for non-nuclear Allies.
Key Findings
• US conventional and nuclear support underpins European deterrence but is no longer guaranteed. The report notes that “European inferiority [vis-a-vis Russia] in conventional capabilities on land is currently offset, inter alia, by superior NATO airpower” but warns that NATO remains reliant on the US for that air superiority as well as missile and air defence. It adds: “Recent isolationist tendencies in US defence and foreign policy have also re-ignited doubts over US commitments to extended nuclear deterrence.”
• British and French nuclear forces face credibility limits. “Without the backstop provided by US nuclear forces, the UK and France currently lack the flexibility of response – in capabilities and doctrine – to credibly deter or respond to the expanding range of threats facing Europe, including potential threats of Russian ground incursions into NATO territory and, in extremis, limited Russian nuclear use in Europe.”
• China’s nuclear expansion complicates US nuclear commitments to European security. China’s expanding nuclear arsenal – expected by the US to reach 1,500 warheads by 2035 – risks US deterrence resources being stretched across two theatres. The report says: “Expanding Chinese capabilities (the US expects China to field 1,500 nuclear warheads by 2035) are increasingly drawing US attention and resources away from Europe.”
Key Recommendations
• Maintain US engagement in European security. The report says: “The immediate priority must be finding ways to maintain US engagement in European security and Washington’s continued provision of key conventional enablers and extended nuclear deterrence to Europe, while considering ways to strengthen European capabilities.”
• Reassess UK and French nuclear posture and capabilities. The study identifies the UK–France Nuclear Steering Group, established under the 2025 Northwood Declaration, as a potential mechanism for deeper coordination, transparency and dialogue. It also suggests the UK should consider developing its own sub-strategic nuclear weapons.
• Strengthen European conventional capabilities and improve integration of conventional and nuclear planning. The paper says that non-nuclear Allies in particular should invest in advanced conventional capabilities, which will allow for the distribution of deterrence responsibilities across NATO. It says adds: “For these advanced conventional capabilities to have the intended benefits for European defence, and for nuclear deterrence in Europe in particular, NATO Allies must have a better demonstrated ability and strategy of integrating conventional and nuclear deterrence and related operational planning within NATO.”
• Match investments into strengthened conventional and nuclear posture with risk management measures. The report notes that the ability for a greater number of decision-making centres in NATO to pose threats to Russian strategic assets creates additional escalation and miscalculation risks, which will need to be managed. “Within NATO, working towards a uniformity of risk perception and identifying ways to reassure Allies is critical both to effective deterrence and to risk management.”
Conclusion
The report concludes that nuclear weapons will remain indispensable to Euro-Atlantic security but warns that deterrence in Europe is entering a far more complex and uncertain phase. Russia’s readiness to use nuclear coercion, combined with doubts over US conventional engagement and the limitations of European nuclear forces, creates acute risks of miscalculation in a future crisis. While sustaining US commitment remains essential, European NATO Allies must also shoulder greater responsibility by strengthening conventional capabilities, improving options for leveraging and managing escalation dynamics, and more closely integrating nuclear and non-nuclear capabilities to preserve credible deterrence in an increasingly complex security environment.
Notes to Editors
Darya Dolzikova is a Senior Research Fellow at the Royal United Services Institute (RUSI) focused on nuclear proliferation and deterrence issues. This report forms part of RUSI’s Future Euro-Atlantic Security Architecture project. The report draws on a meeting of experts held in Brussels in October 2025, alongside a review of primary policy documents and secondary literature from across NATO member states and Russia.
For more information and media enquiries please contact

28 Jan 26. Report by the Comptroller and Auditor General
Smarter approach to tackling fraud and economic crime could save MoD millions – NAO report
• While the MoD recovered more than it spent on counter-fraud work in 2024-25, over the last four years it recouped on average just 48p for every £1 spent (government expects that public bodies should save £3 for every £1 spent).
• Procurement fraud, asset theft, personnel management issues and information exploitation constitute the MoD’s main areas of fraud risk.
• NAO recommends several measures to help MoD better manage fraud and economic crime, including setting a department-wide objective to bring down the overall level of estimated financial loss.
• Download the embargoed report (PDF)
• Download the embargoed press notice (PDF)
• Download the embargoed statement from the Chair of the Public Accounts Committee (PDF)
The Ministry of Defence (MoD) recouped less than half the money it spent over the last four years on tackling criminal economic activity including procurement fraud, theft of assets such as laptops, weaponry and armour, and pay and expenses fraud, according to a new National Audit Office (NAO) report.1
This is because of ongoing challenges that include a limited shared understanding of departmental objectives, a fragmented structure leading to inefficiencies in investigations, and a historic lack of trust between counter-fraud and police teams – although its return on counter-fraud spending is improving.
Like all parts of government, the MoD is vulnerable to economic crime including fraud, bribery and corruption. It has in place a counter-fraud team and several defence police authorities who can tackle such threats.2
But recent whistleblowing disclosures to the NAO indicate that individual allegations can take a long time to resolve or do not reach a satisfactory resolution and that overall, the MoD could manage fraud and economic crime far more effectively.
The MoD reports that its potential exposure to fraud can reach up to £1.5 bn a year, mostly from procurement. But, as it acknowledges, this is only a broad estimate that does not take into account the effectiveness of its controls.
Although the MoD receives hundreds of allegations of suspected fraud or economic crime each year, relatively few result in detection, disruption and recovery. Government expects that public bodies should save £3 for every £1 spent on counter-fraud work, yet between 2021-22 and 2024-25, the MoD reported a return of just 48p for every £1 spent. In 2024-25, however, it saved £1.34 for every £1 spent.3
The MoD also has limited assurance that cases assigned outside of its counter-fraud and police teams are handled appropriately and it does not always know and centrally record how its police services investigate fraud against the department.
The NAO has identified several key challenges preventing the MoD from strengthening its response to fraud and economic crime.4 These include not having a department-wide objective to minimise fraud losses and protect defence capability; a fragmented structure that makes it hard for the MoD’s counter-fraud and police teams to acquire the specialist resources to investigate cases effectively; and a historic lack of trust between counter-fraud and police teams, with unclear lines of reporting, duplication and missed investigative opportunities. A series of internal and external reviews of MoD policing have drawn similar conclusions.5
The MoD has recently strengthened its approach to managing fraud and economic crime by increasing and improving its use of fraud risk assessments, embedding police staff within counter-fraud teams, and working on a joint investigative model for criminal economic activity.
To build on this, the MoD should:
• set a department-wide objective to bring down the overall level of estimated financial loss due to fraud and economic crime
• empower a senior official to act as the MoD’s representative in cases where the department is the victim of economic crime
• establish an accountable multi-disciplinary body that brings together the various counter-fraud and police teams that investigate economic crime
• improve the triaging of cases
• improve its counter-fraud performance by gathering intelligence from across the department, developing its understanding of fraud risk and publishing a detailed estimate of its total fraud losses
• gather complete information on fraud incidents either through a single case management system or through aligning its case management systems
• identify where analytics would be most helpful in tackling fraud and economic crime, and resource these in a way that maximises returns on investment
Gareth Davies, head of the NAO, said:
“The MoD could make significant savings if it better managed its losses from fraud and other forms of economic crime.
“Using this resource more effectively will require the MoD to reform the way it goes about tackling fraud and other economic crime, but would enable it to achieve real savings that could be used to enhance the country’s defence capability.”

 

27 Jan 26. EU should only buy European components for defence, France space minister says.
• Summary
• EU relies on U.S. tech for defence, space access
• Baptiste calls for EU-wide effort on satellite autonomy
• European firms merge to compete with SpaceX, Starlink
If the European Union wants to be serious about defence, the first step is to stop buying non-European components with a “Buy European Act”, France’s minister for space said on Tuesday.
The EU relies heavily on U.S.-made missiles and fighter jets along with many high-tech defence products.
In space, the EU used Elon Musk’s SpaceX to launch critical satellites such as its Galileo system, which runs Europe’s location services independent of the U.S. GPS system.
“The world has drastically changed and our main ally has become highly unpredictable,” the French minister Philippe Baptiste said, adding to growing calls round the world for greater self-reliance in response to U.S. President Donald Trump’s erratic foreign policy.
“We need to have autonomous access to space. It’s a radical change from the way we behave. We need to design European (satellite) constellations which means there is no American kill switch,” Baptiste added to reporters on the sidelines of a European space conference in Brussels.
“To be serious, the first step is we need a kind of ‘Buy European Act´. Let’s stop buying on-the-shelf components that are not European.”
He pointed to the war in Ukraine where entrepreneur Elon Musk decided to disconnect his satellite internet service Starlink, disrupting a counter-offensive by Kyiv.
“We need ITAR-free constellations,” Baptiste added, referring to strict U.S. International Trafficking in Arms Regulations (ITAR) that govern the export of components.
“I agree with Germany. We think it’s very urgent and we cannot wait 10 years.”
EU-WIDE EFFORT NEEDED
With the bloc lagging behind on Low Earth Orbit satellites, Baptiste cautioned efforts should be at EU level and there was no point in individual nations like France, Germany and Italy building their own systems. LEO satellites are critical for real-time defence uses as high-orbit have longer signal delays.
“Today we have countries who have weaponised satellites. It’s not science fiction, it exists. Our industry needs to cooperate better,” he said.
China, Russia and the U.S. have demonstrated anti-satellite weapons and launched manoeuvrable spacecraft, raising worries that an attack during conflict could disrupt GPS navigation or sever channels of communication.
The EU’s new launcher Ariane 6 only completed its first mission last year after years of delays.
France is pushing for international regulation for LEO satellites as collision risks rise and the capacity of transmission frequency bands becomes limited.
“We need to have discussions among the big players – it’s us, the United States and China,” he said.
“It’s overcrowded up there. There is no choice … when there will be a collision with a Chinese satellite whether it’s America First or not – you have a collision.”
The threat of U.S. primacy has triggered consolidation among European companies active in space.
Europe’s biggest satellite firms – Airbus, Thales and Leonardo – announced a $7bn merger last year in order to compete with SpaceX and Starlink. The merger has prompted two major German companies Rheinmetall and satellite maker OHB to discuss a joint bid on a satellite project for Germany’s armed forces. (Source: Reuters)

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Founded in 1987, Exensor Technology is a world leading supplier of Networked Unattended Ground Sensor (UGS) Systems providing tailored sensor solutions to customers all over the world. From our Headquarters in Lund Sweden, our centre of expertise in Network Communications at Communications Research Lab in Kalmar Sweden and our Production site outside of Basingstoke UK, we design, develop and produce latest state of the art rugged UGS solutions at the highest quality to meet the most stringent demands of our customers. Our systems are in operation and used in a wide number of Military as well as Homeland Security applications worldwide. The modular nature of the system ensures any external sensor can be integrated, providing the user with a fully meshed “silent” network capable of self-healing. Exensor Technology will continue to lead the field in UGS technology, provide our customers with excellent customer service and a bespoke package able to meet every need.

A CNIM Group Company
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Sponsored by Bertin Exensor

 

www.exensor.com

 

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20 Jan 26. Cuba: ‘State of war’ declaration will increase government scrutiny, arbitrary detention risks. Reports on 18 January indicate that the Cuban National Defense Council has approved ‘plans and measures for the transition to a state of war’, increasing repression risks. The announcement did not specify any further details. This follows a US military operation to capture former Venezuelan president Nicolás Maduro, a close Cuban ally, on 3 January. During the operation, 32 Cuban military personnel (many of whom served as Maduro’s security detail) were killed. According to the Cuban constitution, a state of war may be imposed ‘in the case of military aggression’. Furthermore, the constitution establishes a framework of measures the government may implement during a state of war, including suspending constitutional rights (such as freedom of movement or assembly) and expanding the security forces’ powers. In the short-to-medium term, the Cuban regime is likely to increase scrutiny over individuals perceived to have celebrated Maduro’s capture or who have expressed significant support for the US. If anti-government protests manifest during the ‘state of war’ against the regime’s declaration and measures, arbitrary detention and human rights risks will increase significantly, particularly for media personnel. We assess that the risk of armed conflict will remain elevated, though unilateral US military action in Cuba remains highly unlikely in the short term. (Source: Sibylline)

 

20 Jan 26. Afghanistan: Blast in capital Kabul underscores ISKP threat, security risks facing Chinese nationals. On 19 January, a bomb blast occurred at a Chinese-run restaurant in the high-security Shahr-e-Naw neighbourhood of the capital Kabul. According to spokesperson for the Afghan Interior Ministry Abdul Mateen Qani, at least seven people were killed, including a Chinese national. Over a dozen people were also injured in the attack. Islamic State – Khorasan Province (ISKP) has claimed responsibility for the incident. The organisation stated that the attacker deliberately targeted Chinese nationals in retaliation for Beijing’s alleged oppression of its ethnic-Uighur population (i.e. a Muslim minority in China) and criticising Kabul’s dealings with Beijing. The attack comes amid China’s growing presence in Afghanistan and its increased investment in the Afghan oil and minerals sector in recent years. We assess that the attack highlights the threat facing the Taliban government from ISKP, despite the authorities’ claims to have eliminated the group. Additionally, the attack is likely to heighten Chinese security concerns regarding its assets and citizens, increasing pressure on the Taliban to enhance security measures. (Source: Sibylline)

 

20 Jan 26. Philippines: President will almost certainly survive impeachment motion; policy risks will be elevated. On 19 January, Filipino lawyer Andre de Jesus filed an impeachment motion against President Ferdinand Marcos Jr. for allegedly violating the constitution and betraying public trust. The complaint, backed by a senior opposition lawmaker, claims that Marcos is a drug addict who enabled the arrest of former president Rodrigo Duterte in March 2025 under an International Criminal Court (ICC) warrant. There is a remote chance that the House of Representatives will pass the motion, given that Marcos’ allies are in the majority. However, it underscores growing political difficulties for Marcos as he feuds with Vice President Sara Duterte (Rodrigo’s daughter) and faces public dissatisfaction over corruption linked to flood control projects. We assess that policy risks will be elevated ahead of the 2028 presidential election, which Marcos is unable to contest due to term limits. There is a realistic possibility that one of Marcos’ allies will file an impeachment complaint against Sara Duterte over the coming months to undermine her campaign to be the next president. (Source: Sibylline)

 

20 Jan 26. South Sudan: Opposition Juba offensive likely to escalate conflict along key route in Jonglei state. On 19 January, Wisley Welebe Samson, the deputy chief of staff for operations for the Sudanese People’s Liberation Army-In Opposition (SPLA-IO), reiterated calls for aligned forces to converge on the capital Juba. This comes after the SPLA-IO captured Pajut town in Duk county (Jonglei state) on 16 January, securing a key node on the Pibor Highway along which they will likely push towards the state capital Bor. Fighting along this axis is likely to escalate significantly over the coming days, with witnesses in Bor reporting a substantial build-up of South Sudan People’s Defence Forces (SSPDF) tank and ground units. Similarly, there is a risk of a further escalation in fighting in Eastern Equatoria state as SPLA-IO-aligned forces there push westwards towards Juba. Fighting along these axes will likely substantially disrupt the flow of aid from Juba towards programmes in northern and eastern regions, while driving substantial disruption, placing increasing pressure on available resources. This will increase NGO staff’s exposure to violent crime and the risk of theft of aid materials and resources over the coming months. (Source: Sibylline)

 

20 Jan 26. Congo (DRC): Rwanda: M23 withdrawal will lower security risks; conflict will persist in rural areas. On 18 January, the Congolese military (FARDC) re-entered Uvira (South Kivu province, DRC) following the withdrawal of the Rwanda-backed M23 rebels. The M23 had previously pledged to withdraw shortly after seizing the city in December 2025 but failed to do so. Government officials stated that the Gatumba border crossing with Burundi will reopen in the coming weeks, moderating risks of shortages and further displacement. The M23’s withdrawal comes as Congolese President Félix Tshisekedi started negotiations with Angola for the latter to mediate a national dialogue and a possible peace process, amid stalling progress in a separate Qatar-backed process. The M23 continues to benefit from such delays, as they allow the group to entrench its control of lucrative mineral deposits in eastern DRC. As such, the withdrawal possibly reflects efforts to undermine a potential Angolan peace process and instead reinvigorate the more favourable Qatar peace process. Nevertheless, while the M23’s withdrawal will moderate immediate and critical security risks within Uvira, we assess that the M23 will likely continue offensive operations in rural areas of South Kivu, sustaining conflict risks. (Source: Sibylline)

 

20 Jan 26. Moldova: Exit from Russia-led bloc will sustain societal polarisation, destabilisation risks. On 19 January, Moldova’s foreign minister Mihai Popșoi disclosed that the country is taking steps to withdraw from the Russia-led Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). According to him, Moldova has initiated the process of denouncing three agreements which form the basis of its membership in the organisation. Popșoi explained that denouncing these agreements will allow Moldova to state, from a legal standpoint, that it is no longer a member of the CIS. He added that the government expects to finalise the relevant documents by mid-February before they are submitted to parliament. In recent years, Moldova has distanced itself from the CIS, an intergovernmental organisation established after the collapse of the Soviet Union. While Moldova’s steps to finalise its exit from the CIS are almost certainly aimed at reducing Russian influence, any such move will sustain pro-Russia destabilisation attempts and societal polarisation over alignment with the West versus Moscow. However, large-scale protests are unlikely in the short-to-medium term. (Source: Sibylline)

 

19 Jan 26. Guatemala: Authorities declare 30-day state of siege, underscoring elevated physical security risks. On 18 January, President Bernardo Arévalo declared a nationwide 30-day state of siege. The measure allows the security forces to carry out warrantless detentions and searches of homes if they suspect criminal activity. Arévalo made this decision after members of the Barrio 18 organised crime group (OCG) temporarily gained control over three different prisons and held approximately 46 people hostage. Subsequently, the security forces regained control over the prisons and arrested Barrio 18’s leader Aldo Ochoa (known as ‘El Lobo’). After El Lobo’s recapture was announced, seven police officers were killed in simultaneous armed attacks across nationwide urban centres. We assess that these simultaneous attacks are almost certainly retaliatory actions against the authorities following El Lobo’s recapture and the dismantling of criminal structures within prisons. Further attacks against security forces personnel remain likely in the coming days, elevating short-term physical security risks near police stations and military bases. Additionally, the state of siege will likely result in additional security checkpoints and stop-and-search operations, increasing overland supply chain and transit disruption risks, particularly within major urban centres. (Source: Sibylline)

 

19 Jan 26. Tajikistan-Afghanistan: Escalation risk will remain low despite uptick in border incidents. On 18 January, Tajikistan’s Committee for National Security (KDAM) announced that border troops killed four suspected terrorists who had crossed into the country illegally from neighbouring Afghanistan at approximately 0030hrs (local time). According to the agency, the group entered Shamsiddin Shohin district (Khatlon region) from a border village in Afghanistan’s Badakhshan province. As per the KDAM, after being located by the Tajik security forces, the individuals refused to surrender and opened fire, which resulted in an exchange of gunfire. The development follows a series of armed incidents along the Afghan-Tajikistani border since late 2025; five Chinese citizens were killed in two separate attacks in November 2025. An uptick in incidents in recent weeks underscores that the border will highly likely remain vulnerable to similar provocations over the long term given its porous and mountainous nature, which complicates patrolling efforts. Continued security threats emanating from Afghanistan will sustain bilateral tensions with Tajikistan over the coming months, though an escalation along the border is unlikely. (Source: Sibylline)

 

18 Jan 26. Canada – Prime Minister’s Office. The global landscape is rapidly changing, leaving economies, businesses, and workers in a state of uncertainty. In response, Canada is focused on what we can control: securing new trade and investment partnerships so we are not reliant on a single country, but more resilient to global shocks. We are positioning Canada as a strong, reliable partner to secure new capital, develop new export markets, and create new opportunities for Canadian workers and businesses. To advance that mission, the Prime Minister, Mark Carney, travelled to Doha, Qatar – the first-ever visit by a sitting Canadian Prime Minister to the state. The Prime Minister met with the Amir of Qatar, His Highness Sheikh Tamim bin Hamad Al Thani, to discuss increasing trade, commerce, investment, and security cooperation. Upon concluding the visit, the leaders announced a commitment from Qatar to make significant strategic investments in Canadian nation-building projects. These investments will get major projects built faster, supercharge our clean energy, health, AI, and defence industries, and create thousands of high-paying careers and sustained prosperity for Canadian workers. Building on this momentum, the Prime Minister and the Amir issued a joint statement committing to accelerated two-way investment and collaboration across AI, quantum computing, aerospace, defence technologies, advanced manufacturing, agriculture, and agri-food. After years of stalled negotiations, the leaders agreed to conclude negotiations on a new Canada-Qatar Foreign Investment Promotion and Protection Agreement (FIPA) by this summer. This will enable Canadian businesses to more easily expand their operations in, and attract investment from, Qatar – a country with an economy worth nearly $290 bn. Building on this progress, Canada and Qatar agreed to immediately deepen work together on:

• Bilateral trade and investment through the establishment of a Joint Canada-Qatar Commission on Economic, Commercial, and Technical Cooperation.
• Information technology, expanding investment opportunities in areas such as AI and information and computer technology.
• Defence and security, launching negotiations on a framework to facilitate the exchange of expertise on military, security, and defence matters.
• A new double-taxation agreement to make it easier for Canadians to work and invest in Qatar and vice versa, with negotiations starting soon.

To further build this partnership, Prime Minister Carney announced that Canada will:

• Expand air services between the two countries under the Canada-Qatar Air Transport Agreement.
• Establish an office for Canada’s Defence Attaché in Doha to increase the frequency and depth of bilateral engagements that increase exports from Canada’s defence sector.
• Exchange security-related best practices and lessons learned in preparation for the FIFA World Cup 26, as Canada, Mexico, and the United States prepare to co-host this global sporting event.

As Qatar marks the beginning of its 2026 Year of Culture, Prime Minister Carney emphasised the important and growing people-to-people and cultural ties between the two countries. He extended an invitation to His Highness the Amir as well as Qatar’s Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs, His Excellency Sheikh Mohammed bin Abdulrahman bin Jassim Al Thani, to visit Canada in the coming year. While in Doha, the Prime Minister met with the Minister of Public Health of Qatar to reinforce shared priorities in health and life science. He underscored the potential for Canadian companies to grow their footprint in Qatar’s healthcare ecosystem, including in biotechnology and groundbreaking AI-driven health technologies. He also met with Qatari business leaders and heads of the Qatari Investment Authority to explore more opportunities to collaborate, further positioning Canada as a premier destination for global capital and investment. Canada and Qatar are both economies with preeminent resources, with common goals to diversify trade and investment opportunities, with complementary strengths in technology, security, and international leadership. As Canada works to build major new energy projects, scale up our defence capabilities, and build on our leadership in AI and innovative technologies, strengthening our partnership with Qatar will accelerate these missions.

Quote

“Qatar is an effective, expansive, and increasing diplomatic force in the world today. They are a critical partner to Canada in many shared pursuits of peace and stability, from Ukraine to the Middle East. It is a relationship forged over many years by profound acts of friendship, including the Qataris’ effort to evacuate more than 200 Canadians from Afghanistan in 2021. Now we’re elevating our relationship – with an ambitious, new strategic partnership across trade, commerce, investment, AI, and defence – to deliver greater stability, security, and prosperity for our peoples.” — The Rt. Hon. Mark Carney, Prime Minister of Canada

Quick facts

• This was Prime Minister Carney’s first official visit to Qatar and the first-ever visit by a sitting Canadian Prime Minister.
• Nearly 10,000 Canadians live and work in Qatar, contributing across aerospace, artificial intelligence, defence, and agri-food sectors.
• Two-way trade exceeds $325 m, with Québec accounting for nearly half of Canadian exports – driven by aerospace and advanced manufacturing.
• Today, Qatar’s investment in Canada is growing by nearly 20% a year.
• Qatar is the third-largest economy in the Gulf region, offering significant business opportunities for Canadian companies.
• In November 2025, Canada removed the visa requirement for Qatari citizens and introduced electronic travel authorisation eligibility for air travel to facilitate business and leisure travel.
• In 2018, Canada and Qatar initiated negotiations toward a Foreign Investment Promotion and Protection Agreement (FIPA).

Related product

• Prime Minister Carney meets with Amir of Qatar His Highness Sheikh Tamim bin Hamad Al Thani

Associated link

• Canada-Qatar relations

This document is also available at https://pm.gc.ca

SOURCE Prime Minister’s Office. (Source: PR Newswire)

 

16 Jan 26. Pakistan-Saudi Arabia-Turkey: Potential defence agreement will expand security co-operation. On 14 January, Pakistan’s Defence Production Minister Raza Hayat Harraj confirmed that a ‘Pakistan-Saudi Arabia-Turkey trilateral agreement is something that is already in [the] pipeline.’ The agreement has reportedly been under discussion for over ten months, although the details have not been made public. Harraj clarified that the potential trilateral deal is separate from the mutual defence pact signed between Saudi Arabia and Pakistan last year, under which an attack on either country would be treated as an act of aggression against both. The announcement comes amid reports of Pakistan engaging in talks to sell JF-17 fighter jets to countries in the Middle East, including Saudi Arabia, and following the military conflict with India in May 2025. We assess that the trilateral defence pact will increase the likelihood of joint production agreements, expanded exercise schedules and enhanced access arrangements at ports and logistics facilities. This will significantly strengthen Pakistan’s defence ties and regional security co-operation. (Source: Sibylline)

 

16 Jan 26. India: Eased restrictions will increase defence industry growth, arms exports over long term. Earlier on 16 January, news reports citing government officials stated that India plans to ease restrictions significantly on foreign firms seeking to invest in Indian defence companies. Under the proposed rules, the cap on foreign direct investment (FDI) in defence firms holding existing licences under the ‘automatic route’ (i.e. where government approval is not required) would increase from 49% to 74%. The government is also considering removing a requirement whereby foreign investment beyond 74% is permitted only if it ‘results in access to modern technology’. Furthermore, the authorities are considering dropping the condition that fully export-oriented defence manufacturers must establish domestic maintenance and support facilities. Foreign investment in India’s defence sector has been limited thus far, totalling USD 26.5 bn out of cumulative foreign inflows worth USD 765 bn over the past 25 years. These proposed changes follow a military conflict with Pakistan in May 2025. We assess that once implemented, the changes will increase foreign investment in India’s defence industry and support higher defence exports in the long term, as India attempts to transition from an arms-importing country to an arms exporter. (Source: Sibylline)

 

16 Jan 26. Uganda: Incumbent will almost certainly win election, elevating domestic unrest, security risks. Earlier on 16 January, the Electoral Commission of Uganda (ECU) released provisional results showing that incumbent President Yoweri Museveni led the presidential election with 76% of the vote from 45% of polling stations. Opposition leader Robert Kyagulanyi Ssentamu (known as Bobi Wine) alleged that there has been widespread fraud, including ballot-box stuffing and voter intimidation (see Sibylline Alert – 13 January 2026). The final results are expected to be announced on 17 January and will highly likely act as a flashpoint for anti-government unrest in major cities and opposition strongholds, particularly the capital Kampala, Luweero and Mukono (both Central region). Protest attendance in Kampala will likely be bolstered by allegations that the security forces have surrounded Kyagulanyi’s house, placing him under de facto house arrest. If this persists or if the police formally detain or injure Kyagulanyi, the risk of protest escalation will increase. The security forces are highly likely to employ heavy-handed tactics to disperse protesters, including baton charges, tear gas and rubber bullets, driving risks to staff and assets near large gatherings. The authorities are also highly likely to prolong internet and/or telecommunication services disruption, impeding communication with local staff. (Source: Sibylline)

 

16 Jan 26. Ethiopia: Ammunition seizure highlights risk of Fano attacks, threats to staff. On 15 January, the Ethiopian Federal Police (EFP) seized 56,000 rounds of ammunition in Weldiya (Amhara region) while inspecting a vehicle travelling from Mekelle (Tigray region) to Shewa Robit (Amhara region). The EFP alleged that the ammunition was sent via Eritrea to the ethnic-Amharan ethno-nationalist Fano forces and that the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF) facilitated the transfer. In the coming weeks, belligerent rhetoric between Ethiopia and Eritrea will likely escalate. This will compound already-elevated bilateral tensions, though persistent domestic security challenges will likely prevent military escalation (see Sibylline Special Report – 4 December 2025). The Ethiopian authorities will likely intensify vehicle and cargo inspection protocols along thoroughfares in Amhara and Tigray in the coming weeks, increasing risks of delays to overland movement and staff exposure to petty corruption at checkpoints. However, these efforts are unlikely to curtail the Fano’s capabilities significantly, particularly in rural Amhara. Continued Fano attacks will sustain security risks for locally engaged staff, including those regularly transiting to major cities in Amhara such as Bahir Dar. Furthermore, tensions between Ethiopia’s federal government and the TPLF will almost certainly continue rising in the coming weeks, increasing the risk of clashes between disparate TPLF factions and staff exposure to crossfire. (Source: Sibylline)

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Founded in 1987, Exensor Technology is a world leading supplier of Networked Unattended Ground Sensor (UGS) Systems providing tailored sensor solutions to customers all over the world. From our Headquarters in Lund Sweden, our centre of expertise in Network Communications at Communications Research Lab in Kalmar Sweden and our Production site outside of Basingstoke UK, we design, develop and produce latest state of the art rugged UGS solutions at the highest quality to meet the most stringent demands of our customers. Our systems are in operation and used in a wide number of Military as well as Homeland Security applications worldwide. The modular nature of the system ensures any external sensor can be integrated, providing the user with a fully meshed “silent” network capable of self-healing. Exensor Technology will continue to lead the field in UGS technology, provide our customers with excellent customer service and a bespoke package able to meet every need.

A CNIM Group Company

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