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Military And Security Developments
Feb 11.
• Ukraine: Possible election, referendum will complicate negotiation process with Russia, US. Earlier on 11 February, the Financial Times (FT) reported that Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky is expected to announce plans on 24 February (the fourth anniversary of Russia’s full-scale invasion) to hold a presidential election and a referendum. However, an unspecified insider in Zelensky’s office has denied such plans. The conflicting reports come amid indications that US President Donald Trump’s administration is pushing for an end to the war by spring or early summer. The Trump administration is reportedly pressing Ukraine to hold both votes by 15 May or risk losing proposed US security guarantees (see Sibylline Special Report – 5 February 2026). According to the FT, the Ukrainian parliament could use March and April to work through the legal changes required to enable voting under wartime conditions. We assess that this timeline is ambitious, though a vote in some form could realistically take place this year. However, even if Ukraine were to hold elections in mid-May, polling has consistently showed that a majority of Ukrainians are against ceding territory to Russia. As such, if Ukrainians (realistically) reject the terms of a peace deal in a referendum, Russia would likely reject any renegotiations and justify continuing its war thereafter. This in turn would increase the risk of US pressure on Kyiv to agree to terms anyway, which would possibly destabilise the incoming government.
Feb 10.
KEY DEVELOPMENTS
• DONETSK: Over recent weeks, Russian forces have been slowly advancing in Pokrovsk (Donetsk oblast), controlling nearly the entire town, according to geolocated satellite imagery
• STRIKES: Over the past week, Russia continued its systematic targeting of Ukraine’s energy infrastructure, causing rolling blackouts nationwide and an effective halving of the output of Ukraine’s remaining nuclear power plants
• TERRITORY: Additional Russian demands for recognition of its territorial claims will highly likely further complicate the already fraught issue during peace negotiations, likely adding to further delays
• FORECAST: Despite the emergence of deadlines for when the US wants the war to end, we assess that a lasting peace deal is unlikely in the coming months given the limited change to the strategic drivers influencing decision makers and the lack of tangible results from talks so far
• OFFENSIVES: On 5 February, a prominent Ukrainian military observer stated that the Russian command has initiated preparations for a summer offensive, which he expects to begin in late April. The Ukrainian source outlined the main directions for Russia’s potential offensive – the Sloviansk-Kramatorsk axis, which encompasses the key cities of the fortress belt in Donetsk oblast; and the Orikhiv-Zaporizhzhia axis (Zaporizhzhia oblast). The offensive could prioritise one of these fronts or both simultaneously, depending on conditions.
• OFFENSIVES: Ahead of any summer offensive, the Russian command is likely to build up reserves, gather weapons and supplies, covertly move troops into starting positions and reinforce air defence and electronic warfare measures. According to the above-mentioned Ukrainian military observer, the Russian command’s main challenge is that frontline units remain bogged down in tactical operations, preventing them from advancing at the pace required to meet command deadlines. We assess that this has remained a recurrent issue for Russian forces. Furthermore, Moscow reportedly does not wish to use its strategic reserves – which it has been accumulating since the autumn of 2025 – to support an offensive. As such, the Russian command is confronted with the choice of either potentially delaying a scheduled summer offensive from less advantageous positions (which the command has been reticent to do in the past), or risking an early deployment of strategic reserves in a bid to maintain the offensive’s momentum.
• OFFENSIVES: We assess that another determining factor for future Russian offensives will be Ukraine’s operational situation and the Kremlin’s perception of it, which may not be accurate. Ukraine faces growing difficulties stemming from personnel and equipment shortages. These continue to undermine the country’s defensive operations and therefore are likely to facilitate Russian offensive opportunities. However, the precise timing and intensity of a renewed offensive remains unclear, particularly given the nature of Russia’s campaigns. Moscow’s campaigns maintain a high tempo of attacks for prolonged periods of time, making it difficult to ascertain precisely when and where a specific ‘offensive’ has begun.
• DONETSK: Over recent weeks, Russian forces have been slowly advancing in Pokrovsk (Donetsk oblast), controlling nearly the entire town, according to geolocated satellite imagery. The Ukrainian analytical group DeepState has confirmed the extremely difficult situation faced by remaining Ukrainian forces in northern Pokrovsk and its surrounding areas. According to DeepState, Russian forces are conducting extensive remote mining with drones, complicating the resupply of Ukrainian troops that remain in isolated defensive positions. The group also highlighted Ukraine’s failed attempts to redeploy personnel with armoured vehicles, which were reportedly destroyed systematically by Russia’s battlefield air interdiction efforts. We previously assessed that this was a likely outcome if Ukrainian forces attempted such a move. In Myrnohrad (directly east of Pokrovsk; Donetsk oblast), Russian forces are massing personnel to complete the settlement’s capture, where Ukrainian troops are reportedly operating in the north. Meanwhile, Russian forces are also building pressure on Rodynske (located to the north of Pokrovsk; Donetsk oblast), underscoring the intense pressure across the entire sector.
• STRIKES: Over the past week, Russia continued its systematic targeting of Ukraine’s energy infrastructure, causing rolling blackouts nationwide. Overnight on 6-7 February, Russia launched a significant combined strike including 408 drones and 39 missiles. This is Moscow’s second strike of over 400 aerial threats since the end of the moratorium on attacks against energy infrastructure. The strike targeted multiple power-generating facilities, including 750 kilovolt (kV) and 330 kV substations that form the backbone of Ukraine’s energy grid, thermal power plants and electric substations linked to nuclear power plants. State-owned energy company Ukrenergo reported that following the strike, all nuclear power plants were forced to reduce generation, effectively halving Ukraine’s nuclear power output. Following the 7 February attack, Ukraine has asked neighbouring Poland for emergency energy assistance to stabilise the grid.
• STRIKES: Ukraine carried out strikes inside Russia using domestically produced missiles, underscoring its ongoing efforts to reduce reliance on Western-made projectiles. On 5 February, Ukraine’s General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces had targeted Russia’s Kapustin Yar airfield (Astrakhan oblast) in January, employing the domestically developed FP-5 Flamingo cruise missile. The Kapustin Yar airfield, located around 370 miles (595km) from Ukraine-held territory, is used for pre-launch preparations of medium and intercontinental-range ballistic missiles (MRBMs and ICBMs, respectively). The airfield has previously been identified as the launch site for Russia’s Oreshnik intermediate-range ballistic missile (IRBM). According to the Ukrainian General Staff, the site sustained varying degrees of damage. While these claims remain difficult to verify, if the strike took place, it would underscore the growing utility of Ukraine’s indigenous MRBM capabilities.
POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS
• NUCLEAR: On 5 February, US President Donald Trump called for an improved, modernised nuclear treaty rather than extending the now-expired New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START) with Russia. Trump has previously advocated for a deal that also includes China (though Chinese involvement remains unlikely in the medium term), which will reduce the likelihood of a new treaty replacing New START in the coming months. Axios reported on 5 February, citing unspecified insiders, that both sides were closing in on an agreement to observe the terms of the expired pact for at least another six months. The outlet claimed that negotiations on a potential new deal would take place during this period. While we cannot confirm this, if true, the lack of a formalised extension will elevate the risk of covert nuclear proliferation. However, the lapse of New START will almost certainly not increase the already remote threat of nuclear war in the medium term.
• TERRITORY: Additional Russian demands for recognition of its territorial claims will highly likely further complicate the already fraught issue during peace negotiations. On 5 February, an unspecified ‘Western’ insider told Russian news agency Tass that Russia seeks international recognition of the Donbas as Russian territory as part of a peace treaty. According to this unnamed source, the Russian side views recognition of the region (which comprises Ukraine’s Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts) by all countries as part of a ‘larger agreement’.
• TERRITORY: Russia has repeatedly insisted that Ukraine withdraw from the Donbas and has linked the prospect of any peace deal to Russian control over the region in recent months. However, Moscow has until now made significantly fewer demands that its annexed territory be officially recognised by the international community. However, in April 2025, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov did say that international recognition of Russia’s ‘ownership’ of Crimea, as well as the Russian-annexed Donetsk, Kherson, Luhansk and Zaporizhzhia oblasts, is ‘imperative’.
• TERRITORY: However, international recognition of the Donbas as de jure part of Russia would almost certainly make any territorial deal harder for Ukraine to accept politically. Recent polling from the Kyiv International Institute of Sociology (KIIS) shows that over half of Ukrainians (52%) oppose ceding the Donbas region in exchange for Western-provided security guarantees, while 40% consider such an arrangement acceptable. Numerous decision-makers across the West have discussed the possibility of accepting de facto but not de jure Russian control over the annexed territories, akin to the de facto acceptance (but never legal recognition) of the Soviet occupation of the Baltic states. If Moscow doubles down on this demand, this will realistically further delay any potential peace deal, which we continue to assess is unlikely to end the war entirely in the short-to-medium term in any case. Lavrov stated earlier on 10 February that there is still a ‘long way to go’ on negotiations and warned against US ‘enthusiasm’ following recent negotiations in Abu Dhabi (UAE). While Lavrov is not a central Russian negotiator and his influence has likely diminished in recent years, his statements likely reflect Russian expectations that negotiations will prove protracted.
• EXPORTS: On 8 February, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky announced plans to establish ten weapons export centres across Europe, including in the Baltic and Nordic countries. He also stated that production of Ukrainian drones will begin in Germany by mid-February, with fully operational production lines similar to those already in place in the UK. These developments highlight Kyiv’s continued efforts to expand arms production and leverage Ukraine’s battlefield experience. We assess that this approach is likely to strengthen Ukraine’s defence industrial base by increasing its resilience through diversifying its clients beyond the Ukrainian Ministry of Defence, and improve its long-term sustainability if and when the war ends (or pauses).
FORECAST
NEGOTIATIONS: Despite the emergence of various deadlines for when the US wants the war to end, our assessment remains that a lasting peace deal is unlikely in the coming months given the limited change in the strategic drivers influencing major decision-makers and the lack of tangible results from talks so far. The second round of trilateral talks between Russia, Ukraine and the US took place in Abu Dhabi (UAE) on 4 and 5 February. Those consultations resulted in the two sides agreeing to exchange 314 prisoners of war (POWs), the first such swap since October 2025. This notably countered President Zelensky’s earlier assertion that Russia had suspended POW negotiations. Zelensky has nevertheless confirmed that there was an agreement to hold another round of negotiations soon, potentially in the US, though no date has been formally announced as of the time of writing.
Reuters reported on 6 February that Ukrainian and US negotiators had discussed the prospect of reaching a peace deal in March, which we assess is an overly ambitious goal – though a temporary ceasefire remains more plausible. According to unspecified insiders, an agreement for ending the war would be put to a referendum in Ukraine and national elections would take place simultaneously. Ukrainian and US officials reportedly discussed the possibility of holding these votes in May. However, Ukraine would almost certainly face a myriad of organisational and security challenges in organising elections. Ukraine’s Central Electoral Commission assessed in late January that the authorities would need six months to prepare for elections (which are not possible under current martial law conditions). Rushed elections with minimal or no Western security protections would almost certainly allow Russia to attempt to destabilise the vote. Even if Ukraine were to hold elections, Ukrainians could realistically reject the terms of a peace deal, especially if the concessions are deemed to be overly preferable to Russia (especially concerning territory, given that polls have consistently shown a majority of Ukrainians against ceding the Donbas).
Meanwhile, Zelensky stated on 7 February that the US wants Russia and Ukraine to end the war before the start of summer or ‘by June’. According to him, the Trump administration will likely pressure the warring parties to meet this timeframe. However, numerous previous timelines imposed by Trump have come and gone with little impact on the negotiations. At present, the positions of Russia and Ukraine on key issues, namely territory, remain far removed, with negotiations yet to bring the two sides closer to an agreement (at least publicly). It remains possible that further progress has been made behind closed doors, but we continue to see little shift in the strategic drivers influencing key decision-makers in Moscow (in particular) that would make them believe a peace deal is currently in their interests. By contrast, growing pressure on the battlefield will likely increase the readiness of Kyiv to agree to a peace treaty in 2026, though the precise terms will determine whether this is politically acceptable, or whether a referendum will delay any decision. In this case, we assess that US pressure will most likely be directed towards Ukraine based on Washington DC’s assessment that it can more easily influence the strategic drivers impacting Ukraine’s willingness for peace, whereas it cannot (or does not wish to) influence the strategic drivers impacting Russia.
Both the sources cited in the Reuters article and Zelensky acknowledged the significance of the US November midterm elections to negotiating timelines, signalling how Washington DC’s priorities will likely shift over the coming months. Unspecified insiders told Reuters that the US negotiating team has informed Ukrainian officials that Trump is likely to focus on domestic affairs as the midterms approach. As a result, they stated that senior US officials will have less time to focus on reaching a peace accord. Consequently, the Kremlin could potentially perceive that it is in its interest to secure a deal by November (particularly if the Trump administration aligns more with Russia’s terms to end the war in the coming months). However, we assess that Moscow is more likely to maintain its belief that it can outlast the West and Ukraine. The Kremlin will likely perceive that the emergence of various domestic and international priorities will steadily reduce international attention to Ukraine, vindicating Moscow’s long-term attritional strategy.
Lastly, France’s decision to send its top diplomat to Moscow for negotiations reflects a break from Europe’s previous stance on engaging with Russia, though Europe is likely to remain broadly sidelined in ongoing US-mediated peace talks. Various reports have stated that Emmanuel Bonne, French President Emmanuel Macron’s diplomatic advisor, held talks on 3 February with Russian officials, including Russian presidential aide Yuri Ushakov. During the first phase of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, France was notably in a minority in Europe, given its calls for continued dialogue with Russia. While it later ended that policy, Macron is likely returning to France’s earlier position in a bid to increase European involvement in the peace process – which has been sidelined to a significant extent. According to Bloomberg, the purpose of Bonne’s visit was to convey to Russia that Europe must be involved in any decisions concerning European security and that European countries will not ‘rubber-stamp’ a deal to end the war. Despite France’s willingness to engage in talks with Russia and advocate for greater European involvement in the peace process, we assess that Moscow will highly likely continue to view Europe as an impediment to peace over the coming months and prefer a trilateral approach, as seen in the Abu Dhabi (UAE) talks.
Feb 07.
• Ukraine: IMF will likely agree to essential loan despite revisions to required tax bill. On 6 February, Bloomberg reported that Ukraine is seeking to amend a tax bill required by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) to secure a USD 8 bn loan. The IMF had required Kyiv to abolish several tax exemptions as part of broader efforts to counter tax evasion and avoidance and broaden the country’s tax base. The finance minister initially proposed introducing value-added tax (VAT) for self-employed entrepreneurs with annual revenues above UAH 1 m (over USD 23,000); Ukrainian businesses typically rely on such structures to minimise tax liabilities. However, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky and Prime Minister Yuliia Svyrydenko opposed such tax rises, likely due to concerns over public backlash. In response, the finance ministry plans to water down the legislation by increasing the VAT revenue threshold either to UAH 2 m (over USD 47,000) or UAH 4 m (around USD 93,400). The IMF refused to comment on the development. Nevertheless, we assess that the Fund will likely remain flexible and agree to disburse the loan, which is essential for Ukraine to cover its current financial gaps.
• Russia-EU: New sanctions alone will unlikely force Moscow to end war in coming months. On 6 February, the EU unveiled its twentieth sanctions package against Russia. According to European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen, the new tranche of punitive measures targets Russian energy, financial services and trade. The main element of the proposed measures is the introduction of a full ban on the provision of maritime services, namely insurance, shipping or port access, to vessels transporting Russian crude. Separately, the sanctions target an additional 20 Russian regional banks, and the bloc will also take measures against cryptocurrencies, including companies that trade them and platforms which enable trading. Von der Leyen has called on EU member states to endorse the new sanctions package ahead of the fourth anniversary of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine. However, the new proposed sanctions alone are highly unlikely to push the Kremlin to reconsider the cost-benefit of continuing the conflict in the near-to-medium term. We continue to assess that Russia is highly likely willing to endure further economic hardship in pursuit of its maximalist war objectives. (Source: Sibylline)
11 Feb 26. A Czech initiative sourcing ammunition for Ukraine aims to secure shells worth five bn euros ($5.95 bn) globally but has only managed to raise 1.4 bn euros so far, a senior NATO military official said on Wednesday.
The programme, involving foreign donors including Germany, Denmark and the Netherlands alongside Czech defence officials and arms companies, seeks to acquire large-calibre ammunition for Ukraine to reduce its disadvantage on the battlefield against Russia.
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In December, NATO’s Ukraine mission, NSATU, projected the initiative would deliver 1.8 m artillery rounds in 2025, constituting 43% of all ammunition supplied to Kyiv, and roughly 70% of the legacy Soviet calibre ammunition.
The official, who spoke on condition of anonymity, noted 16 bn euros worth of ammunition were available on the global market currently.
NATO is targeting a five-bn-euro expenditure focused predominantly on acquiring hundreds of thousands of artillery shells under the Czech scheme, the official said, adding that 1.4 bn euros had been committed by donors so far.
Last year, donors gave around $4.8 bn to pay for ammunition supplies under the programme, former Foreign Minister Jan Lipavsky said in December. The Czech contribution has been up to 3 bn crowns ($145.15 m).($1 = 0.8398 euros)(Source: Reuters)
12 Feb 26. UK announces urgent new air defence package for Ukraine worth over half a billion pounds.
New half a bn pound package of air defence for Ukraine, including £150 m for NATO PURL, and additional 1,000 UK-manufactured missiles.
The UK has announced it will urgently provide new air defence missiles and systems worth over £500 m to protect Ukraine from Putin’s brutal attacks on energy sites and homes, as the Defence Secretary co-chairs the 33rd meeting of the Ukraine Defence Contact Group today (12th February 2026) at the NATO headquarters in Brussels.
The Defence Secretary will confirm that the UK will for the first time provide £150 m to the NATO Prioritised Ukraine Requirements List (PURL) initiative, which ensures the rapid delivery of air defence interceptors to defend Ukraine’s skies.
The PURL initiative sees NATO coordinating the purchase of world-class defence equipment from the United States for the defence of Ukraine.
At the same time, the UK is set to deliver an additional 1,000 Lightweight Multirole Missiles (LMMs), manufactured in Belfast, that will be critical to defending Ukrainian infrastructure and cities from Russia’s escalating drone and missile attacks.
This £390 m deal builds on the deepening collaboration between UK and Ukrainian industry to transfer production and support of Rapid Ranger launchers and command and control vehicles to Ukraine.
The coming months will also see the UK deliver an additional 1,200 air defence missiles and 200,000 rounds of artillery ammunition for Ukraine’s defenders through the Air Defence Consortium (ADC).
Defence Secretary John Healey MP said:
As we approach the fifth year of Putin’s full scale invasion, the UK and our allies are more committed than ever to supporting Ukraine.
I’m proud of the UK’s continued leadership and pleased to confirm a new half a bn pound package of air defence, including £150 m for PURL, to help Ukrainians defend against Putin’s relentless drone and missile attacks.
The UDCG meeting of 50 nations will be co-chaired by the UK and the German Defence Minister Boris Pistorius, and attended by Ukrainian Defence Minister Mykhailo Fedorov, NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte and Australian Deputy Prime Minister Richard Marles.
Ukraine’s supporters will discuss the country’s key military needs for 2026, share battlefield insights, plan equipment deliveries, and identify the gaps that need to be addressed.
The UK stepped up to co-lead the Ukraine Defence Contact Group with Germany, as well as the Coalition of the Willing with France, last year. Both the Prime Minister and Defence Secretary have been clear that the UK’s national security – the foundation of the Government’s Plan for Change – starts in Ukraine. (Source: https://www.gov.uk/)
10 Feb 26. Ukraine’s Zelenskiy: changes under way in air defence, other areas. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskiy assembled his top military officers on Tuesday to discuss shortcomings in air defence and other aspects of protecting civilians from attack nearly four years into Russia’s war in Ukraine.
Zelenskiy, speaking in his nightly video address, also assessed how local authorities in Ukraine’s cities were tackling the aftermath of massive Russian attacks, particularly in ensuring high-rise apartments had power and heating. He again singled out for criticism officials in the capital Kyiv.
Zelenskiy said he held long discussions with the military’s Commander-in-Chief, Oleksandr Syrskyi, the chief of the general staff, Andrii Hnatov, and Defence Minister Mykhailo Fedorov.
“Many changes are happening right now in the work of air defence. In some regions, the way teams operate, interceptors, mobile fire units, the entire small air defence component is being practically rebuilt completely,” Zelenskiy said.
“But this is only one element of defence that requires changes. Changes will happen.”
UKRAINE SEEKS MORE WEAPONRY
The president has frequently pointed to improved air defences as critical to protecting cities from air attacks and has asked Kyiv’s Western allies to provide more weaponry to knock out incoming missiles and drones.
Last week, with heating still not restored to hundreds of dwellings after air raids targeting energy infrastructure, he said defence lines in some areas were proving inefficient.
Energy Minister Denys Shmyhal, writing on Telegram after the daily meeting of officials on energy issues, said crews were working around the clock to restore heating in Kyiv, where night-time temperatures were set to hit -19 Celsius (-2 Fahrenheit).
After meeting with the top brass, Zelenskiy said Kharkiv and Poltava regions in central and northeastern Ukraine were also having difficulties with electricity, as well as parts of Odesa region on the Black Sea.
He renewed criticism of decision-makers in Kyiv, where he has been at odds with Mayor Vitali Klitschko, as well as in his hometown of Kryvyi Rih and Okhtyrka near the Russian border.
“Every community leader and responsible service must pay real attention to what is happening with buildings, with networks,” he said. “We are monitoring at all levels and people will be held personally responsible.” (Source: Reuters)
09 Feb 26. Ukraine has launched Mission Control, a first-of-its-kind digital command-and-control system designed to unify planning, execution and reporting for all drone operations across the country, as Kyiv seeks more innovative ways to move the frozen front line on the battlefield after almost four years of Russia’s full-scale invasion.
The new system sits inside DELTA, Ukraine’s battlefield management ecosystem — an operational platform that already connects sensors and shooters across air, land, maritime, cyber, and space domains.
Ukrainian drone crews enter operational data into the system, including drone type, launch location, flight route, and mission task, which generates reports on real battlefield activity, according to officials. The process is meant to eliminate paper reports, facilitating an immediate analysis of battlefield conditions and strike effectiveness.
Mission Control represents Kyiv’s latest push to turn improvised war-fighting into a standardized, data-driven operation, echoing the sensor-to-shooter integration Western militaries have sought for decades.
The rollout comes as Ukraine positions its wartime data trove as leverage in peace negotiations — and as a touchpoint for deeper integration with allies.
“We will create a system that allows them to develop their software solutions utilizing our data,” Defense Minister Mykhailo Fedorov told reporters days before launching Mission Control, per Reuters. “Currently, data from the front lines holds immense value.”
Although Fedorov announced the system’s kickoff just last month, officials have been working on the concept for years as a means to level the playing field against Russia’s military numerical overmatch, Ukraine, Deputy Defense Minister Lt. Col. Yuriy Myronenko told Military Times last week.
“We are a very different country from our enemy,” Myronenko said. “They have a lot of resources, people, money, and a lot of Soviet units, storage, ammunition, and a lot of things.”
Myronenko served as a combat commander fighting with drones in Ukraine’s southern front in 2023, then led the DELTA development group, then oversaw national cyber defense and drone procurement before moving to his current post. (Source: Defense News)
08 Feb 26. Ukraine imposes sanctions on foreign suppliers of components for Russian missiles. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskiy said on Sunday that he was imposing sanctions on some foreign manufacturers of components for Russian drones and missiles used against Ukraine.
“Producing this weaponry would be impossible without critical foreign components, which the Russians continue to obtain by circumventing sanctions,” Zelenskiy said on X.
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“We are introducing new sanctions precisely against such companies – component suppliers, as well as missile and drone manufacturers. I have signed the relevant decisions.”
According to two decrees published by the Ukrainian presidency, targets of the sanctions include several Chinese companies as well as companies from the former Soviet Union, the United Arab Emirates and Panama.
Despite negotiations to end the four-year war, Russia has sharply increased the scale and number of missile and drone strikes on Ukraine in recent months, focusing its attacks on the energy and logistics sectors.
Zelenskiy said on X that in the past week, Russia had launched more than 2,000 attack drones, 1,200 guided aerial bombs, and 116 missiles of various types at Ukraine’s cities and villages. (Source: Reuters)
07 Feb 26. Africa’s largest private defence company moves to supply Ukraine with new armoured vehicle.
South Africa-based defence and aerospace manufacturer Paramount Group is seeking to establish a presence in Ukraine’s rapidly expanding armoured vehicle market, signalling Africa’s growing role in global defence supply chains even as Pretoria maintains complex diplomatic ties with Russia.
Africa’s largest private defence company moves to supply Ukraine with new armoured vehicle
• Paramount Group is a South African defence and aerospace manufacturer extending its operations to Ukraine’s armoured vehicle market.
• This expansion reflects Africa’s growing influence in global defence industries and involves leveraging European partnerships, such as Paramount Greece.
• The company introduced the OWL vehicle, adapted for Ukraine with enhanced protection features to address modern combat challenges.
• Paramount’s expansion aligns with its historical collaboration with Ukraine in areas like armoured vehicle production and aviation modernization.
Paramount Group, the Sandton-based defence manufacturer founded by South African entrepreneur Ivor Ichikowitz, is entering Ukraine’s fast-growing military procurement market as the war reshapes defence supply chains.
The company, which supplies armoured vehicles, aircraft, naval systems and defence technologies to customers in more than 25 countries across several continents, is expanding internationally as South Africa navigates ties with Moscow while adhering to a policy of non-alignment, amid heightened Western scrutiny.
European subsidiary leads push
The expansion is being spearheaded by Paramount Greece, the company’s European subsidiary operating through Paramount Industries Greece S.A., positioning the firm within European and NATO-linked defence markets.
According to Ukrainian defence outlet Oboronka, the unit earlier this year showcased a locally adapted Mbombe 4 vehicle to Ukrainian defence stakeholders, marking one of Paramount’s most direct engagements with a conflict-zone customer in Europe.
The vehicle is part of the Mbombe family of mine-protected combat platforms designed for high-threat environments. The name “Mbombe” honours a Zulu warrior and signals a focus on protection and durability.
Defence Blog reported that the Ukrainian-configured variant has been designated the OWL, incorporating battlefield lessons from local forces with enhancements focused on resistance to artillery fragments, landmines and small-arms fire, persistent threats that continue to shape procurement priorities.
Integration is being handled by Military Armored Company HUB (MAC HUB), Paramount’s local partner.
The platform draws on the Kalyani M4, produced in India under licence from Bharat Forge, highlighting the increasingly cross-border nature of modern defence manufacturing.
The company introduced the OWL vehicle, adapted for Ukraine with enhanced protection features to address modern combat challenges.
Engineered for blast protection
According to Oleksandr Dubyna, director of MAC HUB, the OWL is the second, and largest, model in the company’s lineup, developed over an 18-month engineering cycle in collaboration with Paramount Greece.
“The main feature of this vehicle is that it has the highest level of mine protection in Ukraine and was designed from the outset on a fully welded monocoque chassis,” chief designer Viktor said.
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Pretoria’s geopolitical tightrope
The expansion comes as South Africa navigates a sensitive geopolitical position over the Russia-Ukraine war, with Pretoria seeking to preserve diplomatic ties with both Kyiv and Moscow.
While maintaining longstanding relations with Russia, the government says it follows a policy of non-alignment and supports diplomatic efforts to end the conflict.
Paramount’s move into Ukraine, however, signals how some South African companies are pursuing overseas opportunities independently of the country’s delicate diplomatic balancing.
Despite filing for Chapter 11 bankruptcy protection in the United States in 2024 after a prolonged business dispute, listing assets of $500 m to $1 bn against liabilities of $100 m to $500 m, the privately owned defence and aerospace manufacturer continues to seek international contracts. (Source: Google/https://africa.businessinsider.com/)
06 Feb 26. Ukraine Hits Russian Oreshnik Launch Site With Flamingo Missiles. Illustration of Ukraine’s FP-5 “Flamingo” cruise missile, developed by defense firm Fire Point. (Radzas2008 / Shutterstock)
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Ukrainian forces struck Russia’s Kapustin Yar test site, used for medium- and intercontinental-range ballistic missile preparations, using Ukrainian-made long-range weapons.
“During January 2026, the Armed Forces of Ukraine carried out a series of successful strikes on a complex of hangar-type buildings where pre-launch preparations for intercontinental and medium-range ballistic missiles take place at the Kapustin Yar test site in Russia’s Astrakhan region,” the General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine said in a social media post.
According to the Ukrainian General Staff, some buildings at the site sustained varying degrees of damage, with one hangar being severely damaged. Part of the personnel was evacuated from the area following the strikes.
The attacks employed Ukrainian-made long-range weapons, including the FP-5 Flamingo, a subsonic cruise missile capable of carrying heavy warheads on strikes of up to 3,000 kilometers (1,864 miles).
The Special Operations Forces (SSO) confirmed that, alongside other units of the Ukrainian Defense Forces, they carried out a comprehensive operation targeting Kapustin Yar. “Long-range drones from the SSO Deep Strike units inflicted fire damage on the infrastructure of the Russian military facility,” the statement said.
(Source: https://www.sofx.com/)
06 Feb 26. Ukraine Turns Civilian Planes into Drone Hunters. French broadcaster TF1 aired rare footage of Ukrainian forces using a civilian PZL M28 Skytruck aircraft, a Polish-modified version of the Antonov An-28, to intercept Russian Shahed-type attack drones during nighttime combat missions. The twin-turboprop utility plane employs a door-mounted M134 Minigun capable of firing up to 6,000 rounds per minute against incoming aerial drone targets.
According to TF1, the aircraft is operated by a civilian crew who have volunteered to help the military defend Ukrainian airspace.
“It’s 2 a.m. There are targets in the air to the southeast. We, as pilots, are trying to fight these drones with our planes, shooting them down with a machine gun,” one pilot told the outlet.
“We try to catch as many as possible and shoot them down in a safe place – fields, forests – but never over houses,” the pilot added.
TF1 reported that the pilots’ plane was marked with kill counts, reflecting nearly 150 drones the crew has downed. (Source: https://www.sofx.com/)
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