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Military And Security Developments
Feb 13.
- Iran-US: Aircraft carrier redeployment underscores heightened likelihood of US strikes on Iran. On 12 February, US media reported that the USS Gerald R Ford (CVN-78) aircraft carrier strike group (CSG) will join the USS Abraham Lincoln (CVN-72) CSG in the Arabian Sea, within the US Central Command (CENTCOM)’s area of responsibility. Given that the USS Gerald R Ford’s most recent known position is in the Caribbean Sea, the CSG will likely enter CENTCOM between 22 and 26 February. On 12 February, US President Donald Trump reiterated threats against Iran, stating that if talks fail, it will be ‘very traumatic’ for the country. The additional CSG deployment, together with the continued reiteration of hardline positions from both countries, increases the likelihood of the US targeting Iranian military facilities, defence systems, early warning capabilities, naval assets and nuclear facilities in the coming weeks. . Meanwhile, the EU Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) has extended an earlier warning for EU airlines to remain clear of Iran’s airspace until 31 March. This decision reflects heightened military tensions and concerns over escalation; it will continue to disrupt regional air travel and supply chains, elevating operational and financial risks for downstream businesses.
- Iraq: Further clashes in Baqubah are likely in coming days, elevating safety risks. On 12 February, four mortar shells struck the outlying area of Al-Badaa in Baqubah (Diyala governorate). At the time of writing, no group has claimed responsibility and the authorities have opened an investigation. Notably, this is the first mortar attack in Baqubah in four years and likely reflects the start of a new round of fighting between tribal groups. Recent clashes between tribal groups in Baqubah have involved small arms engagements, including the use of rocket-propelled grenade (RPG) launchers. The exact cause of the fighting is unknown, but as many parts of Diyala are still contested between the Kurdish-led Erbil government and the central Baghdad government, resultant security vacuums in rural areas enable the development of armed groups, often in conflict over an array of competing claims. In the coming days, we assess that the Iraqi security forces will conduct widespread stop-and-search campaigns in Baqubah. This will increase the likelihood of clashes with local tribes and criminal groups, especially during the evening hours. These incidents will elevate bystander exposure to crossfire in the city, particularly near security facilities and checkpoints along highways.
Feb 12.
• Iran-US: Possible further US carrier deployment will increase risk of attack on Iran in coming weeks. On 11 February, international media reported that US President Donald Trump has instructed a second aircraft carrier strike group (CSG) to prepare for deployment to the Middle East. The USS Abraham Lincoln (CVN-72) CSG is already stationed in the Arabian Sea. On the same day, Trump stated that US talks with Iran would continue, despite the US military build-up and his 10 February threat that, if talks fail, the US will do ‘something very tough’. Meanwhile, on 11 February, Tehran reaffirmed that its missile capabilities are not subject to the ongoing negotiations. While the prospect of further discussions moderates the risk of an immediate escalation, no schedule for further talks has been publicly confirmed and both sides continue to assert their red lines. This reduces the likelihood of a meaningful diplomatic resolution to the crisis in the coming weeks. These factors, together with the possibility of a second CSG deployment, increase the likelihood of US military involvement in Iran in the coming weeks; any such action would likely target military facilities, defence systems, early warning capabilities and possibly naval assets and nuclear facilities.
• Syria-US: Withdrawal from strategic base will increase security risks along border with Jordan. On 11 February, Syrian officials stated that US forces had withdrawn from Al-Tanf Base (Rif Dimashq governorate) to Jordan. The officials added that Syrian forces had already taken control of the base in co-ordination with the US. The base was a critical military and logistical node for the US-led coalition to fight the Islamic State (IS) group during the Syrian civil war. The withdrawal underlines wider security co-ordination between Washington DC and Damascus, with the latter gradually increasing its control over rural border areas. However, there is a realistic possibility that the withdrawal will prompt IS to extend its attacks into central Syria and the Syrian desert (the Badiya). Such attacks are particularly likely to target military patrols and checkpoints along provincial highways, driving proximate risks to staff during overland movement. Similarly, drug trafficking cells along the border with Jordan are likely to capitalise on the move to expand their cross-border operations. This will increase the likelihood of further Jordanian airstrikes inside Syrian territory, including
Feb 11.
CONTEXT
• Iran continues to insist on limiting the scope of negotiations and reiterating its ‘red lines’. This is prompting increasingly bellicose rhetoric from the US, which has suggested it will move even more military assets to the region. We asses that stagnation in talks and rising tensions underline an increasing risk of US strikes against Iran in the coming weeks.
SCENARIO 1
• The US seeks to resolve a deadlock in negotiations through limited and highly targeted strikes. These are aimed at restoring deterrence and securing leverage, rather than initiating a prolonged war; Iran’s retaliation follows a similar calculus to mitigate regional spillover risks.
SCENARIO 2
• The US assesses that there is limited prospect of a deal with Iran and pursues regime change through military action; however, in the absence of clear progress toward its goals, the US returns to negotiations.
SCENARIO 3
• The US conducts an extensive bombing campaign to force regime change while co-ordinating with local protesters and armed groups to form an alternative government.
KEY TRIGGERS, WARNINGS AND INDICATORS (TWIs) OF US STRIKES AGAINST IRAN
CONTEXT
Earlier on 11 February, a political adviser to Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei stated that Iran’s missile capabilities are not subject to the ongoing negotiations with Washington DC. The comments come ahead of a meeting between US President Donald Trump and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu later on 11 February. Netanyahu will reportedly press Trump on widening the talks to include limits on Tehran’s missile arsenal and security threats beyond its nuclear programme. Meanwhile, on 10 February, Trump stated that if no deal is reached with Iran, the US will do ‘something very tough’. Trump further stated he was considering deploying a second aircraft carrier to join the USS Abraham Lincoln (CVN-72) aircraft carrier strike group, which is currently based in the US Central Command (CENTCOM) area of responsibility. The most recent round of talks took place in Muscat (Oman) on 6 February; while further talks have been mooted, no follow-up schedule has since been confirmed publicly. As the process appears to have stalled amid both sides reasserting their red lines, we assess that the likelihood of a short-term diplomatic settlement has decreased, while the likelihood of US military involvement in Iran in the coming days and weeks has increased. In this Middle East Crisis Update Special Edition, we consider the likelihood of three scenarios in which the US decides to proceed with strike action.
SCENARIO 1
The US seeks to resolve a deadlock in negotiations through limited and highly targeted strikes. These are aimed at restoring deterrence and securing leverage, rather than initiating a prolonged war; Iran’s retaliation follows a similar calculus to mitigate regional spillover risks.
The US strikes target military facilities, particularly air and coastal defence systems, early warning capabilities and possibly naval assets such as military ports and ships. The US is also likely to target Iranian nuclear facilities, though this is unlikely to trigger regional nuclear fallout. Israel supports the strikes through intelligence sharing but avoids engaging in direct military action. The US keeps the duration of the strike campaign limited, signalling publicly and through intermediaries that the operation is complete unless Iran escalates.
Iran is likely to calibrate its response carefully. Tehran will seek to preserve deterrence credibility, while avoiding actions that would trigger a broader US response. Iran will likely target US military assets in Bahrain and Qatar; there is also a realistic possibility that it will target assets in Iraq, Jordan and Syria. However, Iran is unlikely to target assets within the UAE and Saudi Arabia, unless these are directly utilised in the US operation. We assess that Iranian retaliation will likely prioritise military infrastructure over civilian or energy assets, thereby limiting casualties and mitigating US retaliation.
In the maritime sphere, Iran will likely also attempt to demonstrate capability by conducting limited drone or missile strikes against US naval assets, designed at most to damage vessels partially. There is a realistic possibility of harassment of commercial shipping, particularly US-affiliated or Israel-linked vessels in the Arabian Sea, Red Sea and the Arabian Gulf. Any such incidents will likely include attempts to divert vessels into Iran’s waters through coercive manoeuvres or boarding operations in the Strait of Hormuz. Such operations will increase the risk of miscalculation and misfire, raising the possibility of conflict escalation beyond Tehran’s initial objectives and into conditions more akin to those outlined in Scenarios 2 and 3 below.
Limited US strikes and Iranian retaliation will mitigate regional spillover risks, with Iranian proxies unlikely to target US assets under these conditions. However, in the days during and immediately following the exchanges between the US and Iran, regional transit will be heavily disrupted. Airspace closures, air route diversions and airline flight cancellations will be almost certain across the region. An increase in flight delays and ticket costs will also likely impact international flights, particularly those between Asia and Europe. Furthermore, such disruption will impact air cargo and supply chains relying on air shipments, increasing operational disruption and financial risks. Maritime operations that pass through Middle Eastern waterways are also likely to experience severe disruption if the Iran-backed Yemen-based Houthis resume attacks on Israel-linked shipping, particularly adjacent to the Strait of Hormuz and possibly also the Bab al-Mandab Strait. Such disruption will likely include limited availability of crews and vessels, limited shipments, increased insurance premiums and longer voyage times when bypassing the Middle East region. These will delay supply chains, elevating financial and operational risks for businesses. Furthermore, lingering disruption to air and maritime operations will remain a realistic possibility in the following month.
We assess that the US’ strikes will trigger some level of concession from Iran, such as broadening the scope of negotiations. US officials will likely claim the operation a success, mitigating the likelihood of further such action in the immediate term. However, if Tehran does not elicit any concession or statement of its willingness to negotiate, the risk of escalation to Scenarios 2 and 3 will increase.
SCENARIO 2
The US assesses that there is limited prospect of a deal with Iran and pursues regime change through military action; however, in the absence of clear progress toward its goals, the US returns to negotiations.
US launches widespread strikes, initially targeting government and military facilities. These include IRGC, Basij, Ministry of Intelligence and police facilities; government communications infrastructure; and Artesh, Air Force and naval assets. Nuclear facilities, ports and high-ranking security force personnel are also targeted. These cause substantial damage but are ultimately unsuccessful in neutralising Iran’s political leadership and associated governing structures or in undermining the stability of the regime. Airstrikes trigger broad airspace closures and disrupt airline operations, driving major delays to regional and transcontinental travel. Damage to traditional and cyber infrastructure causes widespread communications outages, significantly hampering evacuation plans, emergency response co-ordination and routine business operations. US strikes drive proximate security threats to business personnel, especially in urban areas, from direct targeting and misidentification; exposure to falling debris from Iranian air defence interceptions; drone activity; and sporadic small arms and artillery fire.
The strikes are perceived by Tehran as an existential threat. Iran retaliates within the first 24 hours with missile and drone attacks against regional US military installations, possibly including those in Bahrain, Kuwait and the UAE. Iran also issues explicit threats to restrict the navigability of the Strait of Hormuz, particularly for US and Western vessels, triggering immediate volatility in global energy markets. While Iran is unlikely to attempt a sustained, unilateral closure of the Strait, even limited harassment or interdiction activity significantly increases insurance premiums and disrupts shipping. However, Iran remains unlikely to directly strike US facilities in Saudi Arabia, seeking to avoid drawing Riyadh into the conflict.
Iran’s retaliation sustains and escalates US coercive pressure, including expanded sanctions, offensive cyber operations, seizures of Iran-linked vessels globally (though particularly in the Arabian Sea) and repeated airstrike campaigns. Commercial shipping companies increasingly avoid the Strait of Hormuz where possible, or transit only under naval escort. The likelihood of clashes between Iran’s maritime forces (the conventional navy and IRGC naval forces) and US assets increases, further compounding maritime transit disruption. As part of Iran’s response, Tehran activates regional proxy networks. Most significantly, the Houthis in Yemen resume and intensify their attacks on Western commercial vessels and US naval assets in the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden. These operations drive sustained increases in shipping rates, insurance costs and physical security risks for maritime personnel, triggering downstream operational and supply chain delays. ‘Axis of Resistance’ groups mobilise in Iraq, Lebanon and the Palestinian Territories. These groups conduct rocket, missile and drone attacks against US forces and possibly Israeli targets, while also threatening Western commercial assets.
Inside Iran, deteriorating security conditions and perceptions of regime vulnerability raise the possibility of fragmentation within the government and military. This possibly drives defections among the armed forces and limited clashes, particularly in outlying regions. Such incidents are exploited by Iran’s secessionist and ethno-nationalist movements, notably in Sistan and Baluchestan province, which simultaneously escalate attacks against security force positions and infrastructure. The perception of regime weakness triggers a resumption in anti-government activism; sporadic protests, strikes and violence disrupt local commercial markets, banking systems, ports and energy facilities. However, instability does not reach unmanageable levels for the regime and fails to trigger a coup or major rebellion (see Scenarios 2B and 2C of Sibylline Special Report – 19 January 2026). The Iranian state retains sufficient control of the armed forces to sustain its coercive capacity, while popular opposition to foreign intervention triggers an at least temporary, rally-around-the-flag effect which reduces support for, and willingness to engage in, anti-government movements.
The US sustains air and maritime operations for several weeks. However, the absence of clear progress towards regime change, combined with sustained proxy attacks, rising energy prices and widening regional instability, generates domestic political opposition in the US. Iran subsequently approaches the US through intermediaries and offers substantial concessions on a nuclear deal, though stops short of abandoning enrichment altogether. The US re-assesses and concludes that continued military pressure is unlikely to achieve decisive outcomes, will likely sustain disruption to global oil markets and complicate the domestic political environment ahead of the 2026 midterm elections. Washington DC suspends major kinetic operations and returns to negotiations, even if primarily as a means of pausing the conflict rather than resolving it.
While the US-Iran military confrontation cools in the medium term, the prospects for a durable non-kinetic outcome remain limited. The potential for domestically driven regime change persists and US red lines on nuclear enrichment remain unchanged. The conflict is effectively paused rather than resolved, sustaining a latent, heightened risk of renewed escalation over the following six to 12 months.
SCENARIO 3
The US conducts an extensive bombing campaign to force regime change while co-ordinating with local protesters and armed groups to form an alternative government.
As in Scenario 2, a lack of faith in negotiations to secure objectives prompts the US to conduct a large-scale bombing campaign utilising its bolstered regional military presence in pursuit of regime change. US strikes aim to undermine the Iranian government through extensive waves of strikes that initially decimate the country’s chain of command – specifically by targeting Supreme Leader Khamenei, as well as IRGC leaders and high-ranking army officers – causing a maximum shock effect. Simultaneously, the first strikes also neutralise Iran’s surface-to-air batteries, military communications infrastructure and early detection systems nationwide, including those within major cities and the capital Tehran. This significantly undermines the security forces’ capacity. Throughout the first days of the war, the US targets weapons storage units, ballistic missile launch pads and nationwide nuclear facilities (including those previously targeted in June 2025).
If initial strikes are unable to secure regime change, the US expands its target set to undermine state capacities. In the first week, the US likely targets law enforcement, including police and Basij facilities, IRGC provincial headquarters nationwide and the Iranian Cyber Police (FATA) headquarters in an attempt to undercut state capacity and therefore contain unrest and enforce internet blackouts. The US also attempts to degrade security at major prisons that are known to contain thousands of recently detained anti-government protesters, including Ervin prison in Tehran, triggering widespread chaos in major cities. This prompts thousands of protesters to re-mobilise. They then capitalise on the diversion of security resources towards external operations to take control of government buildings, security force weapons depots and state-owned enterprise headquarters. Additionally, Iran’s numerous secessionist movements (including Azeris, Baloches, Khuzestani Arabs and Kurds) capitalise on deteriorating security conditions to escalate their attacks on security force positions and personnel in peripheral provinces, weakening Tehran’s grip on outlying regions. In the second week of the conflict, the US conducts limited special forces operations (via ‘boots on the ground’) to seize specific high-capacity weapons and nuclear materials, as well as to conduct assassinations.
Despite the extensive strikes, Iran remains able to retaliate, launching multiple salvos of ballistic missiles targeting US assets and bases in the Gulf region, primarily al-Udeid Air Base (Qatar) and the US Naval Forces Central Command (NAVCENT, Bahrain). Iran is also able to mobilise its proxies in Iraq to launch aerial attacks against US assets in the capital Baghdad, as well as Kurdistan Region (KRI), Syria and Jordan. While the conflict intensifies and US strikes continue to degrade Iran’s military capabilities severely, Tehran resumes its ballistic and drone attacks against Israel; this prompts the latter to join the war and widens the scale of the regional conflict. It also spurs the Houthis in Yemen to resume drone strikes against Israeli cities and to target Israeli- and US-affiliated vessels (as their de facto ceasefire with Israel and the US effectively collapses).
Consequently, joint US/Israeli strikes target Iran’s coastal oil facilities, which are essentially the government’s economic artery. Major strikes target key oil facilities in Abadan (Khuzestan province), Bandar Abbas (Hormozgan province) and Kharg Island (Bushehr province), triggering widespread disruption of energy operations in Iran and Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries. Additionally, Israel specifically targets power grids inside major Iranian cities, as well as airports and dual-use infrastructure, to paralyse the government and military even further
Prolonged mutual strikes and growing domestic unrest prompt Iran to attempt to close the strategic Strait of Hormuz and escalate pressure on the international community to stop the war. Tehran possibly employs an array of tactics to achieve this, including naval mines across the narrow 21-mile (33.8km)-wide channel; it possibly also physically obstructs the chokepoint with warships and deliberately sinks vessels to block the waterway. The Strait’s closure severely disrupts crude oil exports from Iraq, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and the UAE. Within hours, global crude prices surge, triggering an immediate shock across international energy markets. Energy security risks rise sharply for major Asian importers, particularly China, India and Japan, further exacerbating global energy market disruption. In turn, elevated oil prices drive up insurance and shipping costs, further straining global supply chains. Any prolonged closure of the Strait of Hormuz substantially disrupts all GCC economies, triggering mass capital flight from the region.
Gradually, declining confidence in the regime’s stability triggers mass defections among several security force units and senior commanders. While there is a realistic possibility that this will trigger a coup (see Scenario 2B of Sibylline Special Report – 19 January 2026), this dynamic possibly also evolves into a civil conflict between anti-government elements and pro-government security forces, triggering regional chaos (see Scenario 2C in the abovementioned report, which is also our Most Dangerous scenario). In this case, the US likely attempts to co-ordinate closely with local protest leaders and anti-government forces in the hope of securing a pro-West secular government that is able to garner international political, logistical and military support. Such a process almost certainly takes months to formulate due to ongoing civil conflict and widespread unrest. Signs that autonomous governance is emerging away from Tehran’s control begin to materialise in the country’s peripheral provinces.
Meanwhile, the worsening security and economic situation in Iran drives large-scale displacement, with hundreds of thousands of refugees seeking safety in neighbouring countries, particularly Armenia, Azerbaijan, Iraq, Turkey, and Pakistan. Additionally, a significant influx of Iranian refugees into Iraq triggers ethno-religious tensions and increases the risk of intercommunal violence, especially in major urban centres such as Baghdad. In Pakistan, the arrival of Baloch refugees in Baluchistan province drives expanded recruitment by Baloch separatist groups, exacerbating security threats to personnel and critical assets operating in western Pakistan. Similarly, the movement of Iranian Kurds into Turkey and Iraq increases concerns over militant separatist activity, resulting in temporary border closures and heightened security measures; there are potential knock-on effects for cross-border trade and supply chain continuity.
KEY TRIGGERS, WARNINGS AND INDICATORS (TWIs) OF US STRIKES AGAINST IRAN
• A second US aircraft carrier arrives in the region
• The US confirms that the second round of talks has concluded without concessions from Iran
• Iran continues to refuse to broaden negotiations; it also continues to reiterate (publicly) red lines and resistance to US pressure
• US government spokespeople increase the frequency of statements underscoring the national security threat posed by Iran’s nuclear and weapons programmes
• Israeli officials also begin to escalate rhetoric underlining the threat posed by Iran, possibly citing concerns that its nuclear programme is more intact than previously assessed
• Widespread evacuation alerts are issued by Western governments and businesses
• A substantial mobilisation is observed at US bases in GCC countries, particularly Bahrain and Qatar
• US troop deployments are reshuffled in Iraq, Jordan and Syria• Syria: Energy investment in north-eastern region will be challenged by persistent attack risks. On 10 February, international media reported that several Saudi and US energy companies are set to form a consortium to explore oil and gas in five blocs in north-eastern Syria. The consortium includes Saudi Arabia’s ACWA Power and TAQA, as well as the US’ Argent LNG, Baker Hughes and Hunt Energy. The exploration blocs are likely to be located in the former Kurdish-controlled areas in north-eastern Euphrates region, including Al-Hasakah and Raqqa governorates. These areas recently came under the control of Damascus following a series of military operations earlier this year. However, a possible insurgency by radical Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) elements will remain a key security risk in eastern Euphrates region. Together with risks of an Islamic State (IS) resurgence and threats of cross-border infiltration and aerial attacks by Iran-backed groups from Iraq, the security environment in the region will remain unstable over 2026.
• Syria: Energy investment in north-eastern region will be challenged by persistent attack risks. On 10 February, international media reported that several Saudi and US energy companies are set to form a consortium to explore oil and gas in five blocs in north-eastern Syria. The consortium includes Saudi Arabia’s ACWA Power and TAQA, as well as the US’ Argent LNG, Baker Hughes and Hunt Energy. The exploration blocs are likely to be located in the former Kurdish-controlled areas in north-eastern Euphrates region, including Al-Hasakah and Raqqa governorates. These areas recently came under the control of Damascus following a series of military operations earlier this year. However, a possible insurgency by radical Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) elements will remain a key security risk in eastern Euphrates region. Together with risks of an Islamic State (IS) resurgence and threats of cross-border infiltration and aerial attacks by Iran-backed groups from Iraq, the security environment in the region will remain unstable over 2026.
• Turkey: Ministerial appointment underscores judiciary’s politicisation; opposition repression is likely. Earlier on 11 February, Turkey’s President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan appointed former Istanbul Chief Public Prosecutor Akın Gürlek as Minister of Justice. As chief prosecutor, Gürlek oversaw several high-profile investigations involving the opposition Republican People’s Party (CHP). These cases include the arrest and imprisonment of Istanbul (Istanbul province) Mayor and CHP presidential candidate Ekrem İmamoğlu in March 2025 for corruption, as well as criminal and civil proceedings against CHP leader Özgür Özel. We assess that these were almost certainly politicised cases amid a state crackdown on the opposition ahead of possible early elections and/or constitutional reform efforts, which are likely intended to consolidate Erdoğan’s power (see Sibylline Special Report – 2 June 2025). Gürlek’s appointment underscores the increasing politicisation of the judiciary in Turkey. As minister, he has significant indirect influence over criminal investigations, pre-trial detention practices and cases that could result in political bans. Additionally, Gürlek will play a role in drafting legislative proposals related to criminal law, political party regulations and aspects of the electoral framework. Although subject to parliamentary approval, Erdoğan’s governing alliance maintains a parliamentary quorum, increasing the likelihood of further measures aimed at repressing opposition activity in the coming months.
Feb 10.
• Iran-US: Maritime advisory underscores risk of Iran seizing US-flagged vessels in coming weeks. On 9 February, the US Maritime Administration (MARAD) issued an advisory notice warning that US-flagged vessels should remain as far as safely possible from Iran’s territorial waters while navigating the Strait of Hormuz. This comes after Iranian gunboats unsuccessfully attempted to intercept a US-flagged oil tanker in the strait on 3 February, amid heightened bilateral diplomatic and military tensions. We assess that Iran will possibly attempt further seizures of US-linked commercial vessels in the Strait of Hormuz and the Gulf of Oman in the coming weeks, as an attempt to gain diplomatic leverage in ongoing nuclear negotiations. Moreover, with Iran refusing to concede on the issue of domestic nuclear enrichment, there remains a realistic possibility that talks will collapse in the coming days or weeks, increasing the risk of military escalation and retaliatory action by Tehran against US-linked shipping. MARAD has advised crews not to deny boarding forcibly. This underscores significant security risks to on-board personnel during such events, including possible exposure to crossfire, aggressive manoeuvring to avoid small-vessel approaches and the risk of injury or damage from nearby helicopter activity.
• Israel: Further anti-government protests, strikes by ethnic-Arab communities are likely in February. Earlier on 10 February, several protests by Israel’s ethnic-Arab community erupted in Beersheba (Southern district), Haifa (Haifa district), Jerusalem (Jerusalem district) and Tel Aviv (Tel Aviv district). The police have detained five protesters who poured dye into public fountains in Haifa and Tel Aviv. The authorities also arrested two protesters who blocked the road entrance to Jerusalem at the Chords Bridge. These actions are part of the National Day of Disruption announced by ethnic-Arab activists in Israel, denouncing police neglect of their communities’ safety amid rising violence. The demonstrations come two weeks after thousands of ethnic-Arab protesters marched in Sakhnin (Northern) and Rahat (Southern). Further protests and strike action across Israel are likely in the coming days and weeks. These will sustain elevated risks of business and travel disruption, including the blockade of critical thoroughfares such as Tel Aviv’s Highway 20 (also known as Ayalon Highway). Bystander risks will remain elevated near protest locations, particularly outside Sakhnin’s Misgav police station, where there is an elevated risk of clashes between radical protesters and the security forces. However, hospitals and education facilities are unlikely to be impacted significantly.
Feb 07.
• Iran-US: Breakthrough in talks is unlikely in coming days, sustaining risk of US strikes. On 8 February, Iranian foreign minister Abbas Araghchi reiterated that Tehran will never accept the full suspension of its uranium enrichment. Araghchi added that any discussions on the topic should accept enrichment for peaceful purposes, implying that Iranian negotiators will likely attempt to focus talks on the level and purity of enrichment. Furthermore, Araghchi added that the topic of Iran’s missile programme will be excluded from any talks with the US. The statements underscore the lack of movement in Iran’s negotiating position on two key flashpoints; Araghchi did not mention Tehran’s support for proxies across the region. This will render diplomatic breakthroughs unlikely in the coming days. In addition, there is a realistic possibility that Iran’s arrests of members in the Reformists Front political alliance on 8 February will further complicate the next round of US-Iran talks. As such, the collapse of negotiations in the next two weeks remains a realistic possibility. This will significantly elevate the risk of US strikes against Iran in the coming weeks amid its ongoing military build-up in the region.
• Israel-Palestinian Territories: New West Bank regulation to elevate ethno-religious, diplomatic tensions. On 8 February, Israel’s security cabinet eased restrictions on land purchases by Israeli citizens in the West Bank and granted the authorities expanded enforcement powers over religious and archaeological sites in the territory. This move undermines the ‘Hebron Protocol’ (a part of the 1995 ‘Oslo II’ accord) by transferring licensing and construction authority in the Cave of the Patriarchs and settlement areas of Hebron (Hebron governorate) from the Palestinian Authority (PA) to Israel. This will enable Israeli settlers to expand existing projects and undertake new construction in Hebron, heightening significant ethno-religious tensions in the city and exacerbating attack risks and associated security threats to nearby business personnel and assets. Additionally, such regulatory changes will allow Israeli citizens to purchase land directly from Palestinian residents without a transaction permit, reducing domestic compliance risks for prospective buyers and facilitating accelerated settlement expansion across the West Bank. We assess that this will likely elevate diplomatic tensions between Israel and allied countries. However, amid heightened tensions between the West and Iran, this is unlikely to result in significant and immediate repercussions for Israel-linked businesses. (Source: Sibylline)
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