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Military And Security Developments
Feb 06.
- Iran-US: Possible breakdown in negotiations will significantly elevate armed conflict risks. Earlier on 6 February, representatives of the US administration and the Iranian regime met in Oman for negotiations. At the time of writing, the negotiations are ongoing; they will possibly delay any US decision to pursue military action against Iran. However, the talks remain highly fragile as Iran aims to limit talks to the nuclear issue, while the US wants to expand them to include Iran’s missile programme, support for regional militias and domestic record. A breakdown in negotiations remains a realistic possibility and will significantly elevate the risk of US military action in the coming days. We assess that a US strike against Iran will likely aim to exert pressure on government stability without triggering an immediate regime collapse. Iran is highly likely to respond to such strikes by targeting US military assets in the region, particularly its bases in Bahrain and Qatar. Tehran’s retaliation is likely to be measured against the intensity of Washington DC’s strike; Iran will likely answer a limited US strike with a limited retaliation aimed at managing and preventing armed escalation (see Sibylline Special Report – 19 January 2026).
Feb 05.
- UK: Acquittal of pro-Palestine activists will likely sustain activist risks against Israeli-linked business. On 4 February, six Palestine Action (PA) activists were acquitted of aggravated burglary following a raid against the Israeli defence firm Elbit System’s factory in August 2024. The assailants destroyed over GBP 1 m (USD 1.4 m) of military equipment at the facility in Filton (Bristol county); video footage shows one of the activists hitting a police officer with a sledgehammer. Three were acquitted of violent disorder. The jury at Woolwich Crown Court in the capital London failed to reach a verdict on additional charges, including criminal damage and grievous bodily harm. Reports of vocal pro-Palestine demonstrations and posters being put up outside the court building pushing the jurors for a verdict based on their ‘conscience’ have prompted calls for a retrial and an investigation into jury tampering. Nevertheless, perceptions that the verdict represents a major victory for pro-Palestine activism will possibly embolden further acts of costly activism, the risk of which moderately decreased following the UK government’s proscription of PA in July 2025. As such, we assess that physical security risks for defence, finance and insurance firms with perceived links to Israel will highly likely persist.
- Yemen: Resumption of aid flights to moderate immediate humanitarian concerns in north-west. On 3 February, the UN announced that humanitarian flights to Yemen’s Houthi-controlled capital Sanaa would resume for the remainder of February; the Iran-backed group had previously blocked UN access for a month. The UN had previously warned that Yemen’s humanitarian crisis would worsen in 2026 due to funding cuts, with 21 m people in Yemen requiring humanitarian assistance. The resumption of flights will likely facilitate the movement of NGO personnel and aid deliveries in and out of Houthi-controlled areas. The move will moderate immediate population health risks by alleviating disease and acute food insecurity; increasing access to and quality of healthcare; and improving short-term frameworks for controlling outbreaks of infection. However, concerns over personnel well-being and safety arising from arbitrary detention and renewed conflict escalation risks will possibly limit the movement of UN staff, especially in areas outside Sanaa. The prospect of US strikes targeting Iran in the coming weeks increases the likelihood of the Houthis reversing the move, sustaining longer-term energy, food and water security risks.
Feb 04.
IRAN
- Despite upcoming nuclear talks between the US and Iran, the risk of US airstrikes against Iran persists.
- Iran has intensified its intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) operations in the Persian Gulf and the Arabian Sea, increasing the risk of conflict escalation through miscalculation.
- The IRGC Navy (IRGC-N)’s unsuccessful attempt to intercept a US-flagged oil tanker in the Strait of Hormuz will likely compound price volatility across energy markets amid sustained regional tensions.
- An explosion in Hormozgan province (Iran) will likely increase Iranian anxieties over espionage, triggering increased scrutiny of foreign nationals.
- The risk of small-scale anti-government demonstrations will increase in the coming days; such gatherings will likely trigger further crackdowns.
ISRAEL
- Nothing significant to report
PALESTINIAN TERRITORIES
- GAZA STRIP: The discovery of a hidden weapons arsenal highlights ongoing attempts by militants to rearm and the long-term risks of conflict re-escalation.
- GAZA STRIP: Persistent bottlenecks at the newly reopened Gaza crossing will undercut aid provision.
- GAZA STRIP: Elevated militant activity will increase the risk of significant IDF airstrikes in the coming days.
- WEST Electoral law reforms will likely preserve the Fatah party’s majority in upcoming elections, while increasing the risk of protests and unrest.
IRAN
- Despite upcoming nuclear talks between the US and Iran, the risk of US airstrikes against Iran persists. On 31 January, US President Donald Trump announced that Iran was ‘seriously talking’ to the US regarding its nuclear programme amid a substantial US military build-up in the region (see Sibylline Middle East Crisis Update – 28 January 2026). Subsequently, Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian ordered Iranian negotiators to initiate nuclear talks with the US; regional media reports indicate that diplomatic contact is ongoing at the time of writing. On 6 February, US Special Envoy Steve Witkoff and Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Aragchi are scheduled to meet for high-level talks in Oman. The talks reflect efforts to defuse acute regional tensions and will possibly delay US airstrikes against Iranian military and government assets. However, there is a realistic possibility that the US or Iran will call off negotiations before 6 February; failure to engage in talks will substantially increase the risk of US airstrikes in the coming days (see below). If negotiations proceed, the US and Iran will likely maintain hardline positions vis-à-vis the latter’s enrichment programme, missile programme and support for regional proxies. Failure to secure concessions on these issues will significantly increase the likelihood of diplomatic deadlock, in turn increasing the risk of US airstrikes shortly thereafter. Strikes would likely aim to increase pressure on government stability without triggering immediate state collapse, targeting Iranian nuclear facilities, Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) installations and/or locations associated with Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei. Iran is highly likely to respond to US hostilities with missile and drone attacks targeting US military assets in the region, increasing the risk of exposure to explosions for proximate assets and personnel. Direct hostilities between the US and Iran will also highly likely disrupt regional commercial aviation activity. The extent of Iran’s retaliation will likely depend on the impact and scale of US airstrikes, with more impactful US strikes triggering a more intense Iranian response and compounding the risk of conflict escalation. The probability of Iran engaging in direct attacks targeting Israel will depend on the extent to which Israel participates directly in any US airstrikes. Even so, we assess there is a realistic possibility that even in the event of substantial Israeli engagement in a US airstrike campaign, Iran would seek to target US assets primarily, while also managing the risk of a sustained regional conflict involving Israel.
- Iran has intensified its intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) operations in the Persian Gulf and the Arabian Sea, increasing the risk of conflict escalation through miscalculation. On 3 February, an F-35C fighter jet from USS Abraham Lincoln (CVN-72) intercepted an Iranian Shahed-139 drone operating in its vicinity; the US Navy characterised the interception as ‘self-defence’ during the vessel’s operations in the Arabian Sea. In recent days, Iran has engaged in increasingly frequent ISR operations in the Persian Gulf and Arabian Sea; these mainly involve drone flights within the area surrounding the USS Abraham Lincoln. Such operations likely aim to demonstrate Iran’s capability to operate reconnaissance and combat drones in the vicinity of the aircraft carrier, as part of a broader campaign to deter the US from engaging in airstrikes (see above). Iran is highly likely to continue engaging in intensified ISR operations employing various Shahed drone models in the coming days. Efforts to approach US naval assets will likely trigger further interceptions, increasing the risk of conflict escalation through miscalculation. Further interceptions are also likely to undermine confidence in diplomatic engagement between the US and Iran, undercutting prospects for de-escalation and the establishment of a preliminary nuclear agreement in the coming weeks.
- The IRGC Navy (IRGC-N)’s unsuccessful attempt to intercept a US-flagged oil tanker in the Strait of Hormuz will likely compound price volatility across energy markets amid sustained regional tensions. Following the US’ interception of an Iranian drone on 3 February (see above), numerous small armed boats attempted to hail a US-flagged tanker, though the vessel passed through the waterway without incident. In the coming days, there is a realistic possibility that the IRGC-N will attempt additional vessel interceptions to bolster its negotiating position. Such efforts will increase the risk of supply chain disruption for oil and gas exports from the Gulf, while delays to exports due to attempted vessel diversions will increase the risk of bottlenecks and broader shipping delays. Further attempted interceptions (particularly successful interceptions) will almost certainly compound concerns regarding the navigability of the Strait of Hormuz amid escalating tensions, triggering further price volatility across international energy markets. Price surges are likely to increase operating costs in energy-intensive industries (particularly manufacturing, aviation and shipping) in the coming weeks.
- An explosion in Hormozgan province (Iran) will likely increase Iranian anxieties over espionage, triggering increased scrutiny of foreign nationals. On 31 January, state-linked Iranian media reported that a gas leak and subsequent explosion killed two individuals and injured 14 others in Bandar Abbas (Hormozgan). As Bandar Abbas serves as the primary port facility for the IRGC-N, the blast triggered significant speculation regarding possible US or Israeli attacks targeting IRGC-N facilities and personnel. Although the IRGC subsequently stated that no ‘attacks’ targeting its facilities in the city had taken place, we assess there is a realistic possibility that the explosion resulted from covert US- or Israeli-linked operations targeting IRGC personnel operating in an undeclared facility within the city. In the coming weeks, the US and Israel will likely continue engaging in covert operations within Iran, increasing the risk of sporadic explosions, fires and disruption impacting IRGC facilities throughout Iran. Amid escalating concerns regarding the penetration of Iran’s security forces by foreign intelligence services, the Iranian authorities will likely increase their surveillance of foreign nationals, dual citizens and ethno-religious minorities, increasing the risk of harassment and detention for locally engaged staff.
- The risk of small-scale anti-government demonstrations will increase in the coming days; such gatherings will likely trigger further crackdowns. On 11 February, Iran will mark the anniversary of the 1979 Iranian Revolution. The public holiday involves large public gatherings, pro-government demonstrations and parades in major cities; the Iranian authorities have stated that public events will continue as planned. The security and police forces will almost certainly adopt a significantly elevated posture in major cities amid concerns that anti-government activists will attempt to re-mobilise. This posture will likely deter large-scale protests, though small-scale gatherings will possibly emerge in major cities, particularly in the vicinity of central marketplaces and universities. The risk of protests will be particularly acute due to the beginning of Chehelom mourning observances for individuals killed during anti-government demonstrations in early January (see Sibylline Middle East Crisis Update – 14 January 2026). The security forces will highly likely employ heavy-handed tactics to disperse any anti-government gatherings that do emerge in public spaces, increasing safety risks for bystanders. Coverage of such measures will likely exacerbate tensions with the US, undermining negotiations and increasing the risk of US airstrikes targeting Iranian security force facilities in the coming weeks (see above).
PALESTINIAN TERRITORIES
- GAZA STRIP: The discovery of a hidden weapons arsenal highlights ongoing attempts by militants to rearm and the long-term risks of conflict re-escalation. On 3 February, the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) announced the discovery of several rockets and approximately 110 mortar rounds in Israeli-controlled territory beyond the Yellow Line in southern Gaza. The IDF claims the cache was found following the interrogation of suspects who approached the Yellow Line. The incident highlights the prevalence of hidden weapons caches and other militant infrastructure in Gaza, even within IDF-controlled territory after more than two years of operations. Furthermore, the incident underscores continued efforts by militants to acquire weapons and rebuild their arsenal. Additionally, earlier on 4 February, the IDF published apparent footage of Hamas operatives loading assault rifles into ambulances in the strip, though it is unclear when the footage was taken. As Hamas’ disarmament remains one of the key points of the Gaza peace plan, these efforts represent a direct challenge to the viability of the ceasefire. Rearmament efforts will sustain the risk of a resumption in the Israel-Gaza war in the coming months and years.
- GAZA STRIP: Persistent bottlenecks at the newly reopened Gaza crossing will undercut aid provision. On 2 February, following a one-day pilot on 31 January, the Rafah border crossing was reopened for entry and exit from Gaza. However, early reports indicate large bottlenecks during security checks to enter and exit, as well as a low rate of security clearance. According to the reports on 2 February, only 12 out of 50 Palestinians were allowed to enter Gaza, while 15 were able to exit the strip into Egypt. We assess that the number of people permitted through the crossing will gradually rise over the coming days, though it will likely remain low overall. This will sustain tensions between Israel and international parties involved in the Gaza peace process, though the closure of the crossing remains unlikely. Furthermore, we assess that bottlenecks and stringent security checks will undercut efforts to escalate aid distribution in Gaza.
- GAZA STRIP: Elevated militant activity will increase the risk of significant IDF airstrikes in the coming days. On 30 January, the IDF conducted a wave of overnight strikes across Gaza, killing at least 32 Palestinians. The strikes came after the IDF identified eight militants who emerged from an underground tunnel in east Rafah earlier that day, and after the IDF clashed with four armed militants within the Israeli-controlled Yellow Line area in central Gaza. On 3 February, militants seriously injured an IDF officer in an ambush on an IDF infantry force within Israeli-controlled territory in northern Gaza. The IDF responded with a series of strikes targeting militant commanders and infrastructure, killing at least 21 individuals, including civilians. Militant activity targeting IDF personnel has risen over the past month, with the latest strikes indicating an increased intensity of IDF retaliation. The intensification of IDF strikes will elevate security risks for personnel and bystanders across the strip over the coming weeks. However, we assess that the ceasefire will likely continue to hold (broadly) in the coming weeks.
- WEST BANK: Electoral law reforms will likely preserve the Fatah party’s majority in upcoming elections, while increasing the risk of protests and unrest. On 28 January, PA President Mahmoud Abbas approved an amendment to the 2007 Election Law that requires all electoral candidates to accept the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO)’s ‘National Program’. The programme includes the recognition of Israel, the renunciation of terrorism and the pursuit of a two-state solution. The amendment will likely disqualify Hamas, Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) and the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) from participating in the West Bank’s local elections (25 April) and the Palestinian National Council elections (1 November). The amendment highly likely forms part of Abbas’ efforts to consolidate Fatah’s authority within the PA, while also reversing Hamas’ and its allied factions’ political and military resurgence in the West Bank. As such, Hamas and aligned Palestinian factions will likely attempt to mobilise anti-PA protests to denounce the new amendment in the coming weeks. Demonstrations will likely target PA facilities and Fatah party offices, increasing the risk of unrest, altercations and clashes with PA security forces in major Palestinian population centres, including Ramallah (Ramallah and al Bireh governorate). Nevertheless, protest activity is highly unlikely to destabilise the PA critically, with Fatah likely to maintain a majority in both the municipal and national council elections. As such, we assess that governance conditions within the West Bank are highly unlikely to improve, sustaining long-standing corruption and supervision quality risks for locally engaged entities.
REGIONAL AND GLOBAL DEVELOPMENTS
EU-Iran: The EU designated the IRGC as a terrorist organisation and imposed new sanctions against Iranian officials and entities, elevating compliance risks for associated businesses worldwide. On 29 January, the EU listed the IRGC as a terrorist organisation in response to its recent crackdown on anti-government protesters nationwide. Also, on the same day, the EU imposed new sanctions targeting several IRGC officials and six entities, citing their roles in the violent suppression of protests, arbitrary detentions and executions. The sanctioned entities include Iran’s Audio-Visual Media Regulatory Authority (SATRA) and several IRGC-tied cyber and technology organisations linked to the internet blackout. The EU also issued separate sanctions against Iranian companies facilitating the transfer of drones and missile technology to Russia, in addition to Iranian shipping and logistics firms accused of supporting weapons deliveries. The latest proscription and sanctions are highly likely to trigger the freezing of IRGC-linked financial assets held in EU jurisdictions, significantly increasing financial and legal risks for associated subcontractors, banks and logistics providers. Financial institutions in the EU and the Gulf region will also likely face heightened regulatory and compliance demands to counteract inadvertent dealings with IRGC-affiliated entities, alongside increased anti-money-laundering (AML) obligations. Additionally, the recent decisions will almost certainly elevate diplomatic tensions between Iran and the EU, in turn likely reducing the efficacy of EU-mediated channels on Iran’s nuclear programme – even if a new deal is reached in the coming months (which we assess remains a low-likelihood outcome).
- Tunisia: New prison sentences are unlikely to increase anti-government protests significantly. On 3 February, a Tunisian appeal court upheld and increased the prison sentences of 21 prominent politicians and security officials, on charges of conspiring against the state. Notably, the court handed a new 20-year sentence to the leader of the opposition Ennahda Movement, Rached Ghannouchi, up from the previous 14-year term. The court also upheld 35-year sentences against former intelligence chief Kamel Guizani and former foreign minister Rafik Abdessalem, both of whom remain abroad. The new sentences are likely to sustain rising domestic criticism of President Kais Saied, whose popularity continues to decline amid a major crackdown on opposition and a deteriorating economy. However, we assess that the new sentences are unlikely to prompt an escalation in ongoing anti-government protests. These protests are likely to continue until the start of the month of Ramadan (17 February to 18 March) and will likely take place primarily in the capital Tunis during weekends. Altercations with the security forces during these protests remains a realistic possibility, elevating bystander security and travel disruption risks in their vicinity. Labour strikes during February remain unlikely.
- Iran-US: Drone downing and attempted tanker seizure underscore military, diplomatic tensions. On 3 February, the US military shot down an Iranian Shahed 129 drone that approached the USS Abraham Lincoln (CVN-72) aircraft carrier strike group in the Arabian Sea. On the same day, Iranian gunboats unsuccessfully attempted to intercept a US-flagged oil tanker in the Strait of Hormuz. These incidents underscore heightened military tensions between Iran and the US ahead of scheduled nuclear negotiations in Oman on 6 February. As a result of the large-scale US military build-up in the region, further US defensive actions against Iranian military assets are possible in the coming days, raising the risk of conflict escalation through miscalculation. Further Iranian attempts to seize US-linked commercial vessels are also possible in the coming weeks, driven by heightened military tensions and attempts to gain diplomatic leverage. While the nuclear negotiations are likely to proceed on 6 February, persistent differences over the structure and scope of talks will sustain a heightened risk of a US attack on Iranian military, political and dual-use infrastructure in the coming weeks
Feb 03.
- Iran-UK: Sanctions over violent protest crackdowns will elevate compliance, regulatory risks. On 2 February, the UK sanctioned ten Iranian individuals and one organisation for their role in the recent violent state crackdown on anti-government protesters in Iran. Those designated include the interior minister, Eskandar Momeni, several senior police officials and prominent members of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC). The Police Command of the Islamic Republic of Iran (FARAJA) was also sanctioned. These measures will increase legal, financial and operational risks for UK businesses with exposure to Iran and Iran-linked supply chains. The sanctions are also likely to heighten compliance and regulatory risks across several sectors, particularly energy, logistics and maritime services. While Tehran has not yet commented on the move, Iran will likely respond with sanctions targeting UK interests. This will increase exposure for Iranian businesses reliant on UK-involved supply chains, especially in the pharmaceutical and logistics sectors. Following the EU’s designation of the IRGC as a terrorist organisation on 27 January, pressure will increase on the UK to follow suit. Any such move by the UK would also heighten regulatory and compliance exposure for financial institutions and banks.
- Syria: Ceasefire will likely hold, despite risk of splinter groups retaliating against government forces. On 2 February, Syrian government forces entered the city of Al-Hasakah (Al-Hasakah governorate), one of the last strongholds held by the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF). The deployment is the first step towards implementing a ceasefire and integration deal between the two sides. It is also likely that government forces will enter the cities of Kobani (Aleppo governorate) and Qamishli (Al-Hasakah) later today. We assess that there is a realistic possibility that the integration of Kurdish factions into the Syrian army will begin in the coming months. As such, the current ceasefire will likely hold. However, Damascus will likely insist on excluding the majority of the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) and the People’s Defence Units (YPG) from this integration deal, pressuring the SDF to relocate them to Iraq. There is a realistic possibility that radical elements from these groups will attempt to mount retaliatory attacks against the government forces in Al-Hasakah and Aleppo governorates. Such attacks will likely target government and military buildings as well as checkpoints along provincial highways, sustaining elevated security risks in north-eastern Syria.
Feb 02.
- Iran-US: Progress towards negotiations will reduce risk of US attack against Iran in coming days. Earlier on 2 February, state-affiliated media announced that Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian ordered the initiation of nuclear negotiations with the US. On 31 January, US President Donald Trump stated that Iran was already ‘seriously talking’ to the US amid the latter’s large-scale military build-up in the Arabian Sea. Progress towards nuclear negotiations will reduce the risk of a US attack against Iran in the coming days, moderating regional tensions. However, persistent differences over the structure of the talks and the scope of any possible agreement will sustain heightened conflict escalation risks in the coming weeks. The emergence of certain indicators would signal stalled progress in the diplomatic process, and in turn elevate the likelihood of a US attack against Iran. These include the US issuing imminent deadlines for engagement publicly, Iran prolonging framework discussions rather than engaging on substantive details and Iran maintaining hardline positions on enrichment (as well as its missile programme and its support for regional proxies). In the event of an attack, we assess that the US would likely target Iran’s political and military leadership and possibly its dual-use infrastructure.
- Syria: Arrest of Hizballah-linked cell underscores persistent threat posed by Iranian-backed groups. On 1 February, Syria’s interior ministry claimed to have dismantled a cell responsible for a series of recent rocket attacks targeting the capital Damascus’ Mazzeh district and its military airport. The security forces seized numerous weapons, including drones, rockets and their launch platforms; they then tracked the arms’ source to Lebanese Hizballah (LH). The dismantling will reduce the likelihood of further rocket attacks on the capital. However, it also underscores the persistent threat of a resurgence by Iranian-backed groups. This threat is most acute in areas such as Tartus and Latakia governorates, as well as along the border regions with Lebanon, such as Homs governorate, where the government’s presence is limited and where pro-Assad and LH-linked cells are still active. In these regions, we assess that similar rocket and drone attacks against government forces will remain likely through 2026, sustaining elevated physical security risks near checkpoints and public and/or military facilities. (Source: Sibylline)
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