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19 Feb 26. Congo (DRC)-US: Limited investment appetite will undercut prospects of reduced armed conflict risk. On 18 February, Reuters reported details of a shortlist of strategic assets which the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) is offering to the US under a minerals framework, agreed alongside a US-brokered peace deal between the DRC and Rwanda. The list includes the Rubaya coltan mine (North Kivu province), which accounts for 15% of the world’s coltan output. This would potentially provide the US with a substantial source of tantalum, a material crucial for electronics. The Rubaya mine is currently within territory controlled by the Rwanda-backed M23 rebel group. The Congolese government likely hopes that the offer will encourage the US to pressure Rwanda more fully to cut off support for the M23, thereby reducing conflict risks and driving a boom in local investment. However, the shortlist also includes several sites outside the conflict zone, including in mineral-rich Haut-Katanga province. We assess that US firms are likely to prioritise investment in facilities outside of high-risk regions, undercutting prospects for sufficient investment in North Kivu to drive the necessary economic revitalisation to discourage future conflict. (Source: Sibylline)
18 Feb 26. Peru: President’s removal will sustain elevated government stability, domestic unrest risks. On 17 February, Peru’s Congress voted to censure and remove President José Jerí from office. Congressional representatives approved all seven censure motions, which were brought amid an ongoing corruption scandal involving Jerí and sanctioned Chinese businessmen. Congressional leader Fernando Rospigliosi has rejected the position of president, despite being next in the line of succession. Instead, Congress will vote to elect a new president later on 18 February at 1800hrs (local time); four political parties have presented candidates for selection. Jerí is the third consecutive president that Congress has removed from office. His removal comes ahead of the 12 April general elections where a new president will be elected, mitigating a substantial increase in government stability risks. However, we assess that Peru’s politically volatile landscape will likely spark protests in the coming weeks, particularly if additional corruption allegations are lodged against political candidates. Therefore, domestic unrest risks will remain elevated in urban centres ahead of the elections, particularly in the capital Lima. (Source: Sibylline)
17 Feb 26. Pakistan: Security risks remain high in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province after attack on security forces. On 16 February, militants rammed an explosives-laden vehicle into a checkpoint in Bajaur (Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province), killing 11 security personnel and one civilian. No group has claimed responsibility, though the military has alleged that Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) carried out the attack. Reportedly, the security forces have killed 12 militants in a retaliatory operation. The incident highlights the increasingly fragile security environment in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. According to the Center for Research and Security Studies, there were 2,331 fatalities due to violence in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa in 2025, an increase from 1,620 in 2024. Despite continued counter-terrorism operations in the province, we assess that this trend is likely to worsen over the coming year. The Taliban regime in Afghanistan remains unable (or unwilling) to prevent militants based in its border regions from mounting attacks in Pakistan. We also assess that any further mass-casualty attacks will possibly prompt the Pakistani authorities to conduct cross-border airstrikes on militant bases in Afghanistan. (Source: Sibylline)
17 Feb 26. Nigeria: Unsuccessful militant attack is unlikely to represent major counter-insurgency progress. On 16 February, the Nigerian Army announced that the Joint Task Force (North-East) had successfully repelled two co-ordinated militant attacks in Borno state on 14 February. Dozens of unidentified militants attacked security force positions in Mandaragirau and Pulka (both Borno), though failed to overrun the camps. The militants were likely affiliated with Islamic State – West Africa Province (ISWAP), with the Nigerian security forces claiming to have killed ISWAP commander ‘Abou Aisha’ in Pulka. From March to November 2025, ISWAP militants overran more than 20 security force positions in north-eastern Nigeria as part of the so-called ‘burn the camps’ offensive. As such, the attacks’ failure possibly marks a moderate improvement in the security forces’ capacity to defend heavily fortified positions within civilian population centres. This is likely to be bolstered by growing US engagement over the coming months. However, an increasing resiliency of security force positions will possibly prompt ISWAP to prioritise its control of rural areas. This would drive an uptick in attacks on overland transit routes, displaced persons camps and outlying checkpoints, increasing the risks of staff exposure to ambush, kidnap-for-ransom and high-capacity militant attacks in north-eastern Nigeria. (Source: Sibylline)
13 Feb 26. Thailand: New coalition improves government stability, reduces policy risk. Earlier on 13 February, Prime Minister Anutin Charnvirakul announced that the Pheu Thai Party (PT) will join his Bhumjaithai (BJT) party to form a coalition government. Five MPs from smaller parties have also joined the coalition. This brings the coalition to at least 272 seats in the 500-seat House of Representatives (i.e. the lower house), with 74 from the PT and 193 from the BJT. Reportedly, the BJT is also considering inviting the conservative Kla Tham Party to join the coalition with its 58 lawmakers. We assess that this coalition is likely to strengthen government stability in the short-to-medium term, with the BJT continuing to pursue its pro-business economic policy agenda. There is a realistic possibility that a political split will emerge between the pro-military BJT and populist PT due to mutual mistrust. However, if Kla Tham joins the government, policy risk will remain low, given the size of the coalition. (Source: Sibylline)
13 Feb 26. China-Japan: Seizure of Chinese vessel will drive tensions, supply chain disruption risks. On 12 February, the Japanese authorities seized a Chinese fishing vessel that attempted to evade an onboard inspection to the south-west of Japan’s Mishima Island (Yamaguchi prefecture) and arrested its captain. Reportedly, Japan’s Fisheries Agency suspected that the boat was conducting illicit fishing within Japan’s exclusive economic zone (EEZ). The incident comes amid elevated bilateral tensions after Japanese Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi stated in November 2025 that Japan may respond militarily if China invaded Taiwan (see Sibylline Situation Update Brief – 26 November 2025). China has since retaliated by cancelling flights and restricting exports of dual-use items to Japan. We assess that this vessel seizure incident is likely to trigger further retaliatory action. There is a realistic possibility that Beijing will tighten its export licensing of rare earths to Tokyo, which would affect Japan’s automobile and electronics industries. Relations are likely to remain fraught over the coming years, particularly given Takaichi’s hawkish position on regional security issues. (Source: Sibylline)
13 Feb 26. Republic of Congo: Incumbent’s re-election is almost certain; disputes will sustain unrest risks. On 12 February, the deadline for submitting candidates for the 15 March presidential election expired, with the incumbent, President Denis Sassou-Nguesso, currently facing six opposition candidates. While the candidates still need to be confirmed by the Constitutional Court before campaigning begins on 28 February, this is unlikely to be a particularly contentious process. None of the candidates are likely to pose any significant challenge to Nguesso who, barring his death, will almost certainly secure re-election (see Sibylline Situation Update Brief – 4 February 2026). The two largest opposition parties have not submitted candidates, while the two current candidates who previously ran against Nguesso in 2021 secured less than 1% of the vote each. Frédéric Bintsamou, the leader of the Ninjas ethnic militia group, who previously intended to stand has also refused to take part, claiming that conditions for a free and transparent election have not been met. This will reduce the risk of a remobilisation of the Ninjas following the polls (as happened after the 2016 election) and lessening the likelihood of a substantial spike in violence in the Pool department. However, widespread lack of faith in the election process will sustain protest risks around the polling period. (Source: Sibylline)
12 Feb 26. India unveils draft DAP 2026 prioritising indigenous procurement. DAP prioritises ‘Buy (Indian-IDDM)’ procurement to boost domestic defence production and cut imports. The proposed DAP-2026 draft aims to align India’s defence acquisition with the evolving geo-strategic landscape. Credit: Hamara/Shutterstock.com. The Indian Department of Defence has released a draft of the Defence Acquisition Procedure (DAP)-2026, which is set to replace the current Defence Acquisition Procedure-2020, pending approval. The proposed changes intend to bring India’s defence acquisition in line with “evolving geo-strategic” conditions, the increasing role of the private defence sector, and the technological demands of current military operations. Under the draft DAP-2026, the Ministry of Defence (MoD) places emphasis on domestic manufacturing by prioritising the Buy Indian-IDDM (Indigenously Designed, Developed and Manufactured) category, which covers equipment that is indigenously designed, developed and manufactured. This measure seeks to reduce dependence on imports and support self-reliance in the defence sector. The document outlines several adjustments, including strategies for categorising procurements based on technological availability and manufacturing readiness. It also introduces exclusive procedures for swift acquisition of equipment with short technological cycles, and provisions for spiral design and procurement of major platforms.Furthermore, the draft sets out an evaluation process for indigenous content and design, the use of local military materials, and incentives intended to encourage innovation. (Source: airforce-technology.com)
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Founded in 1987, Exensor Technology is a world leading supplier of Networked Unattended Ground Sensor (UGS) Systems providing tailored sensor solutions to customers all over the world. From our Headquarters in Lund Sweden, our centre of expertise in Network Communications at Communications Research Lab in Kalmar Sweden and our Production site outside of Basingstoke UK, we design, develop and produce latest state of the art rugged UGS solutions at the highest quality to meet the most stringent demands of our customers. Our systems are in operation and used in a wide number of Military as well as Homeland Security applications worldwide. The modular nature of the system ensures any external sensor can be integrated, providing the user with a fully meshed “silent” network capable of self-healing. Exensor Technology will continue to lead the field in UGS technology, provide our customers with excellent customer service and a bespoke package able to meet every need.
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