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NEWS IN BRIEF – MIDDLE EAST – CONFLICT

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Military And Security Developments

Jan 30.

  • Region: Iran-linked threats across Europe will continue, despite IRGC proscription. On 29 January, EU member states agreed to designate Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) as a terrorist organisation. The IRGC will almost certainly be formally added to the EU’s terrorism blacklist in the coming days. The UK is reportedly working on legislation to proscribe hostile state agencies, including the IRGC, which is likely to be adopted later this year. The designation will provide law enforcement authorities with additional legal and operational tools to counter Iran-backed threats using anti-terrorist legislation. These will likely include expanded surveillance powers and intelligence co-operation. However, we assess that threats of Iran-directed attacks in Europe will persist, particularly in Northern, Southern and Western Europe. Israeli and/or Jewish-linked businesses, institutions and personnel, as will Iranian dissidents, will remain key targets. Iran will possibly use multiple layers of intermediaries for plausible deniability, complicating prosecutions. There is also a realistic possibility that Iran will seek to retaliate by pressuring EU interests abroad, increasing safety and operational risks for EU companies and diplomatic representations in the Middle East.
  • Syria: Security instability risks will remain high in north-east despite new deal with Kurdish forces. Earlier on 30 January, the Syrian government and the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) agreed a comprehensive ceasefire deal and a phased integration of Kurdish military and administrative bodies into the Syrian state. Under the deal, the government forces will deploy to Al-Hasakah and Qamishli (all Al-Hasakah governorate), which are the last strongholds of the SDF. The deal includes the formation of a military division that will integrate three SDF brigades, as well as the creation of a local brigade that will contain Kurdish forces in the SDF-held city of Kobani (Aleppo governorate). While the deal will mitigate the risk of major armed conflict in the north-east, the security environment will remain highly unstable throughout February and March. Retaliatory attacks against the government forces by radical Kurdish elements, particularly the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK), will remain likely. These will increase bystander security risks near checkpoints and government buildings. Nevertheless, we assess that the ceasefire will likely hold.
  • Yemen: UN humanitarian withdrawal will increase food, water, energy security risks. On 29 January, regional media reported that the UN World Food Programme (WFP) will terminate the contracts for all of its staff in areas of Yemen controlled by the Iran-backed Houthis. The decision was reportedly made in response to several incidents in which UN personnel were detained by the group and were often accused of spying for Israel and the US. The move will likely exacerbate already-critical humanitarian conditions in Yemen, particularly in the north-west, and increase the risk of hunger-related illnesses, including malnutrition. The UN’s decision to withdraw will possibly trigger similar measures among other NGOs responsible for maintaining critical food, water and energy supplies. This will elevate operational risks for entities that rely on NGO support. More broadly, humanitarian conditions will likely remain acute nationwide throughout 2026, despite recent regional initiatives from countries including Saudi Arabia, amid the prospect of renewed conflict between Saudi-backed forces and the Houthis.

Jan 29.

  • Palestinian Territories: Anti-government protests are likely following election law amendment. On 28 January, Palestinian Authority (PA) President Mahmoud Abbas approved an amendment to the election law that requires all candidates to accept the Palestine Liberation Organization’s (PLO) ‘National Program’. The programme includes the recognition of Israel, the renunciation of terrorism and the pursuit of a two-state solution. The amendment is highly likely aimed at preventing Hamas and its allied factions from participating in the West Bank’s municipal elections on 25 April. The move is consistent with the PA’s attempts to prevent Hamas’ political and military resurgence in the West Bank following the war in Gaza. As such, Hamas’s affiliates and several aligned Palestinian groups in the West Bank will likely organise anti-government protests in the coming weeks to denounce the new amendment. These are particularly likely to occur outside PA and Fatah offices and will increase the risk of clashes with the PA security forces in their vicinity. However, protest action is highly unlikely to destabilise the PA government or undermine the upcoming elections, with Fatah likely to retain its majority.
  • Iran-EU: EU’s likely proscription of IRGC to drive legal and regulatory risks for associated businesses. Earlier on 29 January, the EU’s foreign policy chief, Kaja Kallas, indicated that the bloc is preparing to list Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) as a terrorist organisation following its recent violent crackdown on anti-government protesters. While the designation is likely to pass following France’s decision to support the move on 28 January, the vote still requires the unanimous approval of all 27 EU member states. The proscription of the IRGC would trigger the freezing of IRGC-linked financial assets held in EU jurisdictions, significantly increasing financial and legal risks for associated subcontractors, banks and logistics providers. Financial institutions will also likely face heightened regulatory and compliance exposure from inadvertent dealings with IRGC-affiliated entities, alongside increased anti-money-laundering (AML) obligations. The move will almost certainly elevate diplomatic tensions between Iran and the EU, likely reducing the efficacy of EU-mediated channels on Iran’s nuclear programme. This would reduce the likelihood of a nuclear deal in the short term and maintain the heightened risk of a US strike on Iran in the coming weeks.

Jan 28.

IRAN

  • Anti-government protests have broadly subsided in Iran, though the re-introduction of internet connectivity will increase the risk of further demonstrations in the coming weeks.
  • The US continues to bolster its military posture in the Middle East, increasing pressure on Iran and the risk of kinetic escalation.
  • Iran began conducting military drills on 27 January; there are now concerns regarding the navigability of its regional airspace, increasing the risk of substantial disruption to commercial aviation.
  • Despite rising regional tensions, the US and Iran will possibly engage in high-level negotiations in the coming days; these would in turn possibly delay strike action.

ISRAEL

  • The return of the remains of the last hostage held in Gaza will reduce domestic unrest risks.

PALESTINIAN TERRITORIES

  • GAZA STRIP: The Rafah border crossing is likely to reopen to those exiting to and entering from Gaza in the coming days.
  • WEST BANK: The IDF’s operations in Jerusalem governorate underscore the likely expansion of its security footprint preceding the Ramadan period (17 February to 18 March).

IRAN

  • Anti-government protests have broadly subsided in Iran, though the re-introduction of internet connectivity will increase the risk of further demonstrations in the coming weeks. On 21 January, the Supreme National Security Council (SNSC) released a statement indicating that approximately 3,000 individuals and security force personnel died during anti-government protests in early January. The SNSC attributed over 2,500 of those deaths to ‘terrorist incidents’. These figures are significantly lower than UN estimates, which indicate that the security forces killed at least 5,000 anti-government protesters and detained over 20,000 others. This violent crackdown has prompted a broad dissipation of anti-government protests in the past two weeks, which was facilitated by the enforcement of an internet blackout and the initiation of legal proceedings targeting merchants associated with the demonstrations. However, these measures have also substantially disrupted economic activity within Iran, increasing pressure on the authorities to re-introduce internet services, particularly to traders. On 28 January, the NetBlocks global internet monitor reported that connectivity has reached 80% of regularly observed levels, indicating the partial reintroduction of internet and telecommunications services. However, internet access remains heavily censored and monitored. The authorities are almost certainly continuing to restrict access to social media platforms and limiting efforts to spread information regarding the fallout from anti-government protests. Even so, there is a realistic possibility that resumed internet access will bolster anti-government activists’ capacity to mobilise further demonstrations in the coming weeks. Protest organisers will possibly centre demonstrations around funeral observances for those who died in the crackdown, many of which will occur in early-to-mid-February. Any protests are likely to trigger harsh repression and crackdowns by the security forces, compounding tensions with the US and likely triggering further internet blackouts thereafter.
  • The US continues to bolster its military posture in the Middle East, increasing pressure on Iran and the risk of kinetic escalation. On 26 January, the US Navy’s Carrier Strike Group 3 (which includes the USS Abraham Lincoln) entered the United States Central Command (CENTCOM)’s area of responsibility, which includes the Middle East. US President Donald Trump subsequently characterised the deployment as an ‘armada next to Iran’. On 27 January, CENTCOM also announced that the Ninth Air Force (Air Forces Central, AFCENT) will conduct a multi-day readiness exercise in CENTCOM’s area of responsibility. This exercise underscores the US’ effort to project airpower into the broader region, while also evaluating AFCENT’s capabilities under realistic operational conditions. Taken together, these deployments and exercises indicate that the US is bolstering its offensive and defensive posture in the region, likely as part of efforts to maximise pressure on Iran to make substantial concessions in bilateral negotiations (see below). While the precise date of the exercise has not been revealed, aerial readiness exercises and intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) operations in the coming days will possibly result in periodic disruption to commercial aviation activities. These operations will bolster the US’ preparedness to undertake strike action targeting Iran, raising the likelihood of such action, particularly in the event of a breakdown in diplomatic contact between Tehran and Washington DC (see below).
  • Iran began conducting military drills on 27 January; there are now concerns regarding the navigability of its regional airspace, increasing the risk of substantial disruption to commercial aviation. On 25 January, Iran updated its NOTAM and suspended all Visual Flight Rules (VFR) until 25 April. These measures will heavily restrict low-altitude civilian air activity. They likely reflect Tehran’s increasing concerns regarding the US’ ISR operations taking place within and around Iranian airspace. On 27 January, Iran also announced it would conduct live fire military drills in the vicinity of the Strait of Hormuz between 27 and 29 January; as part of the drills, Iran has also deployed the IRIS Shahid Bagheri drone carrier within its territorial waters. Amid broader concerns regarding regional escalation, KLM announced on 24 January that it would avoid Iran’s, Iraq’s and Israel’s airspaces, and suspended flights to Ben Gurion International Airport (TLV, Israel), Dubai International Airport (DXB, UAE), King Fahd International Airport (DMM) and King Khalid International Airport (RUH, both Saudi Arabia). During this period, British Airways also cancelled two overnight flights to DXB and suspended flights to Bahrain International Airport (BAH). Although British Airways and KLM have subsequently resumed flights to BAH, DMM, DXB and RUH, commercial airlines will likely adopt similar periodic suspensions as regional tensions continue to rise, given escalating security concerns and increasing insurance costs. In the coming weeks, concerns regarding the navigability and security of Iran’s airspace will likely trigger flight suspensions, cancellations and route adjustments, increasing the risk of travel disruption and delays, including along transcontinental flightpaths between Europe and Asia. Decreasing flight availability will also restrict access to commercially accessible evacuation routes in the event of regional conflict escalation.
  • Despite rising regional tensions, the US and Iran will possibly engage in high-level negotiations in the coming days; these would in turn possibly delay strike action. On 26 January, President Trump reiterated claims that Iran ‘want[s] to talk’ and indicated that the US was ready to engage in nuclear negotiations. Also on 26 January, Iran’s ambassador to Switzerland stated that ‘informal’ communication is taking place between Washington DC and Tehran. Although this indicates that backchannels remain open, Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi subsequently denied that Tehran requested negotiations or has been in contact with US Special Envoy Steve Witkoff in recent days. On 28 January, Trump stated that ‘time is running out’ for Iran to ‘make a deal’, with reference to nuclear negotiations. In the coming days, the US will likely continue leveraging its military posture in the Middle East to threaten Iran (credibly) with military intervention if it does not productively engage in negotiations. We assess that there is a realistic possibility that Iran will publicly commit to negotiations in the coming days; such a commitment would likely delay US strike action and temporarily stabilise regional tensions. However, the US will likely attempt to secure major concessions from Iran regarding its domestic enrichment activity, its missile programme and its support for regional proxies. Hardline US negotiating positions will substantially increase the risk of deadlock, as seen during talks in 2025. Persistent deadlock or perceived Iranian obfuscation would significantly increase the risk of US strike action thereafter (see Sibylline Special Report – 19 January 2026). Depending on the scale, target selection and impact of US airstrikes, Iran will likely respond with strikes on US military assets in the region, increasing the risk of escalating hostilities in the coming weeks.

ISRAEL

  • The return of the remains of the last hostage held in Gaza will reduce domestic unrest risks. On 26 January, the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) confirmed that it had received the remains of Master Sgt. Ran Gvili, the last hostage held in Gaza. The return of the final hostage is almost certain to bring an end to the weekly protests in Tel Aviv (Tel Aviv district) calling for the release of all hostages held in Gaza. This will reduce protest and domestic unrest risks across Israel and associated travel disruption, particularly in Tel Aviv, over the coming weeks.

PALESTINIAN TERRITORIES 

  • GAZA STRIP: The Rafah border crossing is likely to reopen to those exiting to and entering from Gaza in the coming days. On 28 January, Israeli news reported that the IDF had completed preparations for the reopening of the Rafah border crossing, which will likely be conducted in the coming days. For the first time in almost two years, the crossing will also be open for the movement of people into Gaza. According to the reports, those who exit Gaza will undergo security checks by a delegation of the EU and local Gazans who work for the Palestinian Authority (PA). Israel will monitor those who exit from a distance, using facial recognition to verify if they are authorised. Additionally, Israel will be able to prevent unauthorised individuals from exiting through the carousel at the crossing. By contrast, those who enter Gaza will have to pass Israeli security checks. These checks will include the use of facial recognition, magnetometers and screening machines. The new mechanism is another part of Phase 2 of the Gaza Peace Plan and will likely help to facilitate the passage of aid into Gaza. Even so, thorough security checks will likely cause bottlenecks, preventing a significant increase in humanitarian provisions. Furthermore, there is a realistic possibility that militant elements will attempt to exit or enter Gaza through the crossing; such attempts would elevate security risks for personnel working at, or transiting through, the crossing. Miscommunication and poor co-ordination between Israel and the EU delegation are also likely, particularly during the first three weeks after the crossing reopens. This will possibly elevate tensions between Israel and EU countries whose nationals are staffing the delegation, but are unlikely to trigger a significant diplomatic breakdown between Israel and the EU.
  • WEST BANK: The IDF’s operations in Jerusalem governorate underscore the likely expansion of its security footprint preceding the Ramadan period (17 February to 18 March). On 25 January, the IDF’s Central Command (which is responsible for operations in the West Bank) launched a military exercise to improve its readiness for ‘extreme scenarios’ and offensive operations. Subsequently, on 27 January, the IDF launched an operation in Hizma (Jerusalem) in response to ‘terrorist activity’; the operation is ongoing at the time of writing. Local media reports indicate that the IDF issued notices ordering businesses to close during the operation, while IDF bulldozers have blocked major thoroughfares with rubble to restrict the entry and exit of vehicles into and from the town. In the coming days, the operation will possibly delay movement along Highway 437, disrupting transit through the broader Jerusalem area. In the coming weeks, the IDF will likely continue augmenting its posture in the West Bank ahead of the Ramadan period (17 February to 18 March), amid concerns of an uptick in militant activity. This will likely result in increasingly frequent operations, movement restrictions and curfews targeting population centres associated with militant activity, compounding the risk of localised travel and operational disruption. This dynamic will likely exacerbate ethno-religious tensions within the West Bank, subsequently increasing the risk of radicalisation and militant recruitment. A corresponding increase in sole-perpetrator and low-capacity militant attacks remains possible, increasing the risk of bystanders being exposed to shooting, stabbing and car-ramming attacks. Exposure risks will be particularly acute in the vicinity of checkpoints, border crossing facilities and public transport hubs, including in the Jerusalem area.

RED SEA

  • The Iran-backed Houthis have warned against a US and/or Israeli strike on Iran, elevating the risk of a resumption in drone and missile strikes on Israel and Israeli-associated shipping in the Red Sea (see expansion in the REGIONAL AND GLOBAL DEVELOPMENTS section below).

REGIONAL AND GLOBAL DEVELOPMENTS

Iraq-US-Yemen: Iranian proxies’ warning of intervention in the event of a US and/or Israeli strike on Iran, elevates the likelihood of attacks against US military assets across the region. On 26 January, several Iranian proxies in Iraq (including Badr, Harakat Hezbollah al-Nujaba and Kata’ib Hezbollah) warned that they would intervene and support Iran in the event of a US/Israeli strike, even if hostilities didn’t extend to Iraq. On the same day, the Iranian-backed Houthis in Yemen published a video of an undated attack on a vessel, implying a similar warning. These simultaneous statements are likely part of a co-ordinated Iranian pressure campaign amid a US military build-up in the region, including the arrival of the USS Abraham Lincoln (CVN-72) aircraft carrier strike group to the US Central Command (CENTCOM) area of responsibility (see above). We assess that there is a realistic possibility that Iranian proxies in Iraq will follow through on this threat by targeting US assets in the region. However, in this scenario, these groups are unlikely to target US assets in Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries as this would risk triggering major US retaliation in Iraq and prompt critical GCC companies to exit the Iraqi market. Instead, Iranian proxies are more likely to engage in limited attacks against US military and government assets in Iraq’s Kurdistan region and possibly in Jordan and Syria. Even so, it is unlikely that the Syrian or Jordanian governments will directly retaliate against these groups, as long as the attacks remain limited and not directed against their forces. We also assess that in the event of a limited US/Israeli strike against Iran, the Houthis are likely to target Israeli vessels and interests in the Red Sea, including the port of Eilat (Southern district), rather than breach the de facto ceasefire with the US or target the GCC. However, risks of more substantive Iranian proxy involvement in the conflict will significantly increase if the US/Israel-Iran hostilities are protracted and escalate in scope and intensity beyond June 2025’s 12-day war.

  • Iran-US: CENTCOM military exercise underscores elevated short-term risk of US strikes on Iran. On 27 January, the US announced that Air Forces Central (AFCENT) will conduct a multi-day readiness exercise in the United States Central Command (CENTCOM) area of responsibility, which includes the Middle East. The announcement came a day after the US repositioned its USS Abraham Lincoln (CVN-72) aircraft carrier strike group in the Arabian Sea. Meanwhile, earlier on 28 January, Tehran said it had not requested negotiations with Washington DC and rejected US officials’ suggestions that it is ready to make a deal under military pressure. The US exercise, together with Iran’s diplomatic disengagement, underlines the increasing risk of US strike action against Iran in the coming days and weeks. In the event of a strike, the US will likely target locations associated with Iran’s political and military leadership and possibly dual-use infrastructure. Iran will likely respond by targeting US regional assets, elevating conflict escalation risks and regional tensions (see Sibylline Special Report – 19 January 2026). In the immediate term, the exercise will likely exacerbate supply chain disruption due to airspace closures and the rerouting of maritime traffic around operational areas.
  • Iraq-US: Controversial nomination for prime minister is likely to increase sanctions risks in 2026. On 27 January, US President Donald Trump warned that the US would end support to Iraq if former prime minister Nouri al-Maliki is reinstated to the post. The warning came days after the Coordination Framework (CF) alliance (Iraq’s largest parliamentary bloc) selected al-Maliki as its nominee. However, the nomination does not guarantee al-Maliki’s premiership, and the US’ stance will possibly lead to further deliberations within the CF. Furthermore, the warning will likely complicate ongoing discussions to select a Kurdish president and a Sunni parliamentary speaker in the coming weeks. These developments will augment political uncertainty and government instability in Iraq. Furthermore, we assess that a government headed by al-Maliki will significantly increase the risk of US sanctions against Iraq (see Sibylline Situation Update Brief – 10 December 2025). These will likely target the finance, logistics and oil sectors. Such sanctions will add significant economic pressure to Iraq’s fragile economy and will likely lead to mass capital flight.
  • Jan 27.
  • Middle East, North Africa and Turkey region: Iranian proxy threats highlight elevated likelihood of attacks against US assets. On 26 January, several Iranian proxies in Iraq (including Badr, Harakat Hezbollah al-Nujaba and Kata’ib Hezbollah) warned that they would intervene and support Iran in the event of a US/Israel strike. On the same day, the Iranian-backed Houthis in Yemen issued a similar warning. These simultaneous statements are likely part of an Iranian pressure campaign amid a US military build-up in the region. There is a realistic possibility that Iranian proxies in Iraq will follow through on this threat by targeting US assets in the region in the event of a US/Israeli strike on Iran. However, they are unlikely to target Gulf countries. Instead, they are more likely to engage in limited attacks against US assets in Iraq (and possibly in Jordan and Syria). Additionally, we assess that the Houthis are likely to target Israeli interests in the Red Sea rather than breach the ceasefire with the US. If the Houthis do target US assets, this would significantly increase the risk of protracted conflict and regional escalation.
  • Iran-UAE-US: UAE’s position on territory use will mitigate risk of retaliatory strikes on US assets. On 26 January, the UAE’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs stated that the country would not allow its airspace, territory or territorial waters to be used for hostile military action against Iran. The statement came as the US repositioned its USS Abraham Lincoln (CVN-72) aircraft carrier strike group in the Arabian Sea off the coast of Oman. We assess that limited US strike action against Iran remains likely in the coming weeks (see Sibylline Special Report – 19 January 2026), and that the UAE’s announcement is unlikely to affect the US posture. That said, in the event of a US military operation in Iran, the UAE’s public position will mitigate the risk of Iranian reprisal strikes on US military assets in the UAE, including Al Dhafra Air Base (Abu Dhabi emirate). Similarly, it will reduce the likelihood of attacks on critical infrastructure by the Iran-backed Houthis in Yemen, thereby moderating security risks for nearby personnel. However, in the event of a kinetic engagement between the US and Iran, the UAE will face elevated business and economic risks, including airspace closures and shipping delays which will disrupt regional supply chains.
  • Region: Iranian proxy threats highlight elevated likelihood of attacks against US assets. On 26 January, several Iranian proxies in Iraq (including Badr, Harakat Hezbollah al-Nujaba and Kata’ib Hezbollah) warned that they would intervene and support Iran in the event of a US/Israel strike. On the same day, the Iranian-backed Houthis in Yemen issued a similar warning. These simultaneous statements are likely part of an Iranian pressure campaign amid a US military build-up in the region. There is a realistic possibility that Iranian proxies in Iraq will follow through on this threat by targeting US assets in the region in the event of a US/Israeli strike on Iran. However, they are unlikely to target Gulf countries. Instead, they are more likely to engage in limited attacks against US assets in Iraq (and possibly in Jordan and Syria). Additionally, we assess that the Houthis are likely to target Israeli interests in the Red Sea rather than breach the ceasefire with the US. If the Houthis do target US assets, this would significantly increase the risk of protracted conflict and regional escalation.

Jan 26.

  • Germany: Arrest highlights sustained risk of Hamas-linked terrorism in Europe. On 23 January, the police arrested a Lebanese national suspected of being a member of the Hamas terrorist organisation. The individual, ‘Mohammed S’, was detained at the capital’s Berlin Brandenburg Airport (BER) upon arrival from Beirut (Lebanon) at approximately 2300hrs (local time). According to the Federal Prosecutor’s Office, he is a member of a group of so-called ‘foreign operatives’ who procure firearms and ammunition for Hamas-linked attacks targeting Israeli and Jewish institutions across Europe. He is suspected of obtaining approximately 300 live rounds of ammunition in August 2025 and colluding with one of three alleged Hamas members who were arrested in October 2025. While the Islamist terrorism threat in Europe predominantly stems from sole perpetrators, often radicalised online, this latest arrest underscores the sustained risk of international terrorism perpetrated by Hamas cells in Germany. However, robust European counter-terrorism capabilities (in co-operation with the Mossad and US intelligence agencies) will likely continue to mitigate the threat of Hamas attacks.
  • Iran-region: Flight suspensions, reroutes will increase flight delays, travel, insurance costs. On 24 January, the airline KLM announced that it will avoid flying through the airspaces of Iran, Iraq and Israel until further notice. The airline also suspended flights to Saudi Arabia’s Dammam (Eastern province) and the capital Riyadh, as well as the UAE’s Dubai (Dubai emirate) until further notice. The announcement comes amid a spate of airlines rerouting and cancelling their flights within and through the region over the past two weeks. Tensions between Iran and the US remain elevated, with the US deploying an aircraft carrier strike group to the region, among other military assets, while Iran has suspended all Visual Flight Rules (heavily restricting low-altitude civilian air activity) until 25 April 2026. We assess that risks of conflict escalation between the US and Iran will remain elevated over the coming two to three weeks, with a US strike likely (see Sibylline Middle East Crisis Update – 21 January 2026). This will sustain flight disruption across the region, including flight cancellations and delayed schedules, as well as increased flight times and costs due to lower flight availability and rerouting. This disruption will likely also impact international and logistic flights (as well as raising insurance costs), particularly on the Asia-Europe route.
  • Turkey: Further localised protests are likely following femicide incident in Istanbul’s Şişli district. On 25 January, large crowds protested outside Osmanbey Metro Station in Istanbul’s Şişli district (Istanbul province) after the decapitated body of an Uzbek woman was discovered in a nearby waste disposal unit late on 24 January. Hundreds also gathered in the capital Ankara. The civil society organisation ‘We Will Stop Femicide Platform’ reports a significant rise in femicide in recent years, with perpetrators often facing limited accountability. Turkey withdrew from the Istanbul Convention in 2021, removing its obligation to meet international standards on preventing violence against women. Further protests are likely in the coming days, particularly in Şişli, including the Osmanbey and Pangaltı neighbourhoods, and near Kuyulubağ Sokak (Kuyulubağ Street), where the body was found. Protests are also possible in central areas of Istanbul, including Taksim Square and İstiklal Avenue, as well as in Ankara. While most women’s rights protests in Turkey are peaceful, a heavy-handed police presence in central urban areas will increase the risk of clashes between demonstrators and the authorities, thereby elevating security and arbitrary detention risks for nearby personnel.
  • Israel: Further anti-government protests, strikes by ethnic-Arab communities are likely in February

On 22 January, thousands of ethnic-Arab protesters marched in Sakhnin (Northern district), denouncing what they perceive as police neglect of Arab communities’ safety. This comes amid an uptick in gang violence by organised crime groups (OCGs), who also impose protection rackets on shops. The march is part of ongoing protest and strike action by local businesses in Shakhnin, as well as in other ethnic-Arab communities including Rahat (Southern district). The strike is highly likely to continue in the coming days, until at least 25 January, sustaining risks of business disruption. However, hospitals or education facilities are unlikely to be impacted. There is also a possibility of further (albeit smaller) protests in Sakhnin next week by groups representing younger ethnic-Arab demographics, increasing the risk of clashes with the security forces outside the Misgav police station. Additionally, given that prominent local Arab-led parties also share these safety concerns, further protests and strikes across northern Arab communities (such as in Nazareth; Northern district) are likely in February, sustaining risks of business and mobility disruption.

  • Tunisia: Sentencing of prominent journalists highlights democratic backsliding, unrest risks. On 22 January, a Tunisian court convicted prominent journalists Borhen Bsaies and Mourad Zeghidi of money laundering and tax evasion, sentencing them to three and a half years in prison. The authorities previously jailed Bsaies and Zeghidi in May 2024 on charges of ‘spreading false news’, a move widely perceived as politically motivated. Since President Kais Saied consolidated his power in 2021, Tunisia has experienced significant democratic backsliding, including widespread crackdowns on public dissent. Reactive protests are possible over the weekend (23-25 January) in major urban centres, including the capital Tunis, Sfax (Sfax governorate) and Sousse (Sousse governorate). The security forces will likely adopt a heightened security posture during demonstrations, increasing the risk of sporadic clashes with protesters and elevating domestic unrest risks. The arrest and conviction of other journalists is possible in the coming months, heightening regulatory and compliance risks for businesses and individuals operating within Tunisia’s media sector. These arrests will also increase reputational risks for businesses associated with the Tunisian government, possibly leading to boycotts and reduced consumer engagement.
  • Israel-Lebanon: Strikes on border crossings are likely to intensify throughout first quarter of 2026

On 21 January, the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) stated that they have conducted airstrikes targeting four crossing points along the Syria-Lebanon border allegedly used by Lebanese Hizballah (LH) to smuggle weapons. While the IDF did not disclose any further details, the map the army shared indicates that these are unofficial crossing points located near Hermel (Lebanon). This border area has been a critical node for LH’s logistical network throughout the last decade. The IDF have previously struck border crossings between the two countries over the past two years, including official border checkpoints such as at Al-Masnaa (Lebanon). We assess that the recent strikes likely indicate that Israel is seeking to escalate pressure on LH amid its persistent refusal to disarm. Consequently, strikes are likely to increase in frequency and scope in areas north of the Litani River throughout the next two months. This will significantly increase collateral risks to staff during overland movement through all crossings between Syria and Lebanon in the first quarter of 2026, as well as to business personnel situated in Baalbek-Hermel and Beqaa governorates (both Lebanon). (Source: Sibylline)

 

27 Jan 26. Israel is preparing for talks with the Trump administration on a new 10-year security deal, seeking to extend U.S. military support even as Israeli leaders signal they are planning for a future with reduced American cash grants, the Financial Times reported on Tuesday. Gil Pinchas, speaking to the FT before stepping down as chief financial adviser to Israel’s military and defence ministry, said Israel would seek to prioritise joint military and defence projects over cash handouts in talks that he expected to take place in the coming weeks. (Source: Reuters)

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