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NEWS IN BRIEF – UKRAINE CONFLICT

February 19, 2026 by

Sponsored by Bertin Exensor

 

www.exensor.com

 

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Military And Security Developments

Feb 18.

  • Russia-Ukraine: Reported divisions among Ukrainian negotiators will likely further stall peace efforts. The third round of US-brokered trilateral negotiations to end the Russo-Ukrainian war continues today on 18 February, with unconfirmed reports detailing apparent divisions within Ukraine’s delegation on reaching a peace agreement. According to The Economist, the delegation consists of two differently aligned groups, with one wing centred around the head of the Ukrainian president’s office, Kyrylo Budanov, supporting a swift US-led deal to end the war. Reportedly, this faction fears that this opportunity may soon disappear. By contrast, the other side, which the outlet claimed is influenced by Budanov’s predecessor, Andriy Yermak, opposes this approach. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky is reportedly balancing both positions; it remains unclear if he will decide on one approach over another. We assess that this reported split within the Ukrainian delegation will reinforce the already low likelihood of a breakthrough in peace negotiations in the short term. Ukraine will likely remain publicly hesitant to accept a quick deal, especially if it is deemed to favour Moscow and without Kyiv first receiving robust security guarantees. However, the US will possibly leverage divisions among Ukrainian negotiators to pressure or incentivise Ukraine to reach a peace deal (or at least a ceasefire agreement) in the coming months.

Feb 17.

KEY DEVELOPMENTS

  • OFFENSIVES: Over the past week, Ukrainian forces have launched a series of seemingly successful, localised counter-attacks in Zaporizhzhia oblast
  • STRIKES: High intensity strikes continue, but the resumption of scheduled outages (made possible by sufficient reserve capacity across the grid to spread out at various times) remains low in the short term given the scale of damage caused to Ukraine’s grid
  • NEGOTIATIONS: The third round of trilateral talks between Russia, Ukraine and the US will take place today (17 February) and on 18 February in Geneva (Switzerland), though an imminent breakthrough remains unlikely
  • FORECAST: Current discussions linking a peace deal to a Ukrainian election are at an impasse, with Russia demanding Ukraine withdraws from the Donbas before a ceasefire can be agreed, while Ukraine demands that ceding territory can only happen through a referendum (and possible election) two months after a ceasefire
  • OFFENSIVES: Over the past week, Ukrainian forces have launched a series of seemingly successful, localised counter-attacks in Zaporizhzhia oblast. A Ukrainian military observer stressed that these operations do not constitute a broader counter-offensive, an assessment we agree with. Rather, these are limited counter-attacks aimed at stabilising areas where Russian forces have made gains in recent months, including in the direction of Huliapole (Zaporizhzhia oblast). The source noted that persistent constraints in reserves, artillery and air superiority continue to prevent Ukrainian operational escalation. We assess Ukrainian counter-attacks will likely remain limited in scope.
  • OFFENSIVES: Disruption to Russian military communications has reportedly facilitated the effectiveness of recent Ukrainian attacks, following SpaceX’s decision to halt Starlink services for Russian forces and additional interference affecting messaging application Telegram within Russia. In addition to disrupting military communications, the interruption of Starlink has likely undermined Russian short- and medium-range drone strikes. In turn, this decreased the efficacy of Russia’s battlefield air interdiction campaign, which Ukrainian forces have likely exploited to make localised gains. However, it remains unclear how long these opportunities and vulnerabilities will remain and whether Ukrainian forces retain the resources to keep counter-attacking in the coming weeks.
  • RECRUITMENT: We assess that Russia remains capable of sustaining the high attrition rates associated with its assault tactics at least through 2026. A Ukrainian commander, quoted by a media outlet on 12 February, indicated that Russian troop losses in January exceeded the number of newly mobilised and contracted soldiers for the second consecutive month. However, both the source and Ukraine’s military intelligence (GUR) have cautioned that this imbalance does not signal a recruitment crisis for Russia, as the Kremlin continues to implement various recruitment measures to offset battlefield losses. Notably, during the Munich Security Conference (Germany), UK defence secretary John Healey highlighted Russia’s growing reliance on foreign-recruited fighters as part of these efforts. Meanwhile, we previously reported that certain Russian regions had reintroduced lucrative sign-on bonuses for contract soldiers, having reduced them to the federal minimum in 2025 (see Sibylline Ukraine Update – 20 January 2026). Ultimately, despite mounting strains and heavy casualties, Russia highly likely remains capable of sustaining its war effort, while Ukraine faces a much more serious personnel problem.
  • MUNITIONS: While drones currently play an increasingly prominent role in battlefield strikes, artillery continues to account for between 25% and 33% of battlefield casualties, according to an OSINT analytical group. Estonia’s intelligence services have highlighted that Russia expanded its artillery shell production in 2025 to 7 m shells, up from 4.5 m in 2024. Russia has been able to modernise key manufacturing facilities, including with Western high-precision industrial machinery, despite international sanctions. Reports from 2025 indicated that China had assisted Belarus in manufacturing 240,000 artillery shells and 240,000 rockets annually, destined for Russia. Ultimately, Russia’s expanding defence industrial output – enabled in part by assistance from partners such as Belarus, China and North Korea – will allow it to sustain the war in 2026. This will also facilitate the reconstruction of stockpiles if and when the war ends (or pauses), supporting Russia’s wider military reconstitution efforts in the coming years.
  • STRIKES: Russia is continuing its semi-regular high-intensity combined strike campaigns, including one launched early on 17 February. The attack involved 396 drones and 29 missiles; four ballistic missiles and 18 drones made confirmed hits across Ukraine. Such attacks continue to target Ukrainian critical and energy infrastructure heavily. At the time of writing, there are no scheduled power outages in the capital Kyiv (and numerous other cities), meaning that outages can occur with no warning. We assess that the likelihood of a resumption of scheduled outages, made possible by sufficient reserve capacity across the grid to spread out at various times, remains low in the short term given the scale of damage caused to Ukraine’s grid and the frequency of Russian strikes.
  • STRIKES: Ukraine resumed strikes using its Flamingo FP-5 missiles this month, targeting a military depot in Russia’s Volgograd oblast overnight on 11-12 February, according to the General Staff of the Ukrainian Armed Forces. Ukrainian military sources described the facility as one of Russia’s largest storage hubs for missiles, ammunition and explosive materials. The authorities in Volgograd oblast have confirmed that a fire broke out at a military facility, but have not provided any further details. We assess that the use of the domestically produced Flamingo cruise missile will likely allow Kyiv to conserve expensive, high-precision, Western-provided missiles. Ukraine likely possesses a very limited number of such missiles and is saving these for high-importance missions in the future. Meanwhile, Ukraine recently targeted oil infrastructure across Russia with long-range drones. After a lull in January, Ukraine has stepped up drone attacks against oil refineries in February, striking prominent plants. This is likely to continue in the coming weeks, particularly if peace talks stall.

POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS

  • AID: Ukraine’s partners pledged nearly USD 38 bn in new military aid at the last Ramstein summit on 12 February, with most of the support to be used to strengthen Ukraine’s air defence systems and drone capabilities. According to Ukrainian Defence Minister Mykhailo Fedorov, 17 countries, including Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Germany and the UK, promised additional financial and military assistance to Ukraine. According to a report released by the Kiel Institute on 11 February, European-provided military support to Ukraine increased by 67% last year compared to the 2022 to 2024 average. However, total military aid allocations to Ukraine in 2025 were 13% below the annual average over this period, largely due to the halt in direct US support, which fell by 99% last year. While the report underscores European efforts to step up military support for Ukraine, Europe is unlikely to be able to fill the capability void left by the US over the coming months. Further announcements of military support are likely ahead of and on the 24 February anniversary of the full-scale invasion.
  • NEGOTIATIONS: The third round of trilateral talks between Russia, Ukraine and the US will take place today (17 February) and on 18 February in Geneva (Switzerland), though an imminent breakthrough remains unlikely. According to the Kremlin’s press secretary Dmitry Peskov, these negotiations will cover a broader range of issues than the previous discussions held in Abu Dhabi (UAE). Peskov also implied that territory will be the main focus of the talks – a thorny issue on which the two sides remain far removed and highly unlikely to reach a compromise on in the near term. Russia continues to demand that Ukraine withdraw from the remainder of the Donbas region (which comprises Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts), before any ceasefire can be agreed. Ceding the remainder of the Donbas is highly likely to remain a non-starter for Ukraine in the medium term, given that Kyiv has stated that any cession of land can only be approved via a referendum. However, in the coming months US pressure will likely increase on Ukraine, rather than Russia, to soften its terms for ending the war. This will possibly include threats or the actual suspension of intelligence sharing with Ukraine and/or withholding weapons sales permits to Ukraine.

FORECAST

ELECTIONS: Reports that the US is encouraging Kyiv to hold elections in the coming months will likely increase pressure on Ukraine’s leadership, though a vote remains unlikely in the short term. On 11 February, the Financial Times (FT) reported that Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky is expected to announce plans on 24 February (the fourth anniversary of Russia’s full-scale invasion) to hold a presidential election and a referendum. However, an unspecified insider in Zelensky’s office later denied such plans, arguing that the security level is currently insufficient for Ukraine to hold elections.

Zelensky subsequently stated on 14 February that a two-month ceasefire would be necessary in order to hold elections and guarantee the safety of voters. However, the prospect of a ceasefire holding for this long without violations is highly unlikely in the coming weeks. We assess that Ukraine would face a myriad of logistical and security challenges if it chose to hold elections (even if votes were to be held under a ceasefire) given that ms of Ukrainians are internally displaced or residing abroad. Questions also remain about how soldiers on the frontlines would be able to participate, as well as Ukrainians living under Russian occupation. Ukraine would also likely seek to obtain security guarantees from the West (including the US) to ensure that the vote can proceed as fairly and freely as possible given the very credible threats of Russian interference. However, it remains uncertain what support Western states could provide that would ensure Ukraine’s security and adequately deter Russia.

Ukraine’s constitution prohibits elections as long as martial law is in effect; martial law has been in force since the beginning of Russia’s full-scale invasion, and lawmakers have consistently voted to extend it. Most recently, Ukraine’s parliament voted on 14 January to extend martial law for another 90 days (i.e. until 4 May), with a further extension likely despite apparent increasing pressure from the US to end the war by the spring or early summer. The FT reported that the US is pressing Ukraine to hold both votes by 15 May or risk losing proposed US security guarantees. Although Zelensky has denied that the US is making such threats or linking the holding of elections to security guarantees, such guarantees are a means through which the Trump administration can incentivise or coerce Kyiv to make concessions. For further analysis on Western-provided security guarantees, see Sibylline Special Report – 5 February 2026.

Even if elections were to take place later this year, there is no guarantee that the Ukrainian population would approve a peace deal via a referendum, especially if the terms are deemed to be overly preferable to Russia. According to polling commissioned from the Kyiv Security Forum published on 12 February, 33.2% of Ukrainians consider the total expulsion of Russian troops from Ukraine’s 1991 borders – including Crimea and the Donetsk and Luhansk People’s Republics (DNR and LNR) – as a minimum requirement for a peace agreement, even though this is a remote possibility. Meanwhile, 23.5% of respondents stated they were prepared to accept concessions based on the frontline at the time of a peace agreement. As such, if Ukraine’s population rejects the terms of a peace deal in a referendum (which is a realistic possibility), we assess that Russia would likely reject any renegotiations and justify continuing its war thereafter.

Moscow has long argued that the current Ukrainian government lacks legitimacy because elections have not been held during wartime. In an interview published on 15 February, Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Mikhail Galuzin stated that Russia is prepared to refrain from conducting long-range strikes against Ukraine on election day. However, this would almost certainly not eradicate all security threats stemming from the war. Separately, Galuzin reiterated a previous Russian proposal for the UN to bring Ukraine under ‘temporary external governance’. Galuzin stated this would allow for ‘democratic elections’ to be held and for a ‘viable’ government to come to power with which Russia could sign a ‘full-fledged peace treaty’ and ‘legitimate’ documents outlining future interstate co-operation. By making such comments, Galuzin is highly likely attempting to create a justification for why Russia cannot sign a peace agreement with the current Ukrainian authorities. Our assessment remains that Russia seeks the establishment of a Moscow-friendly government in Ukraine as part of its war objectives.

Current discussions are therefore at an impasse, with Russia demanding Ukraine’s withdrawal from the Donbas before a ceasefire can be agreed, while Ukraine demands that ceding territory can only happen through a referendum (and possible election) two months after a ceasefire. Given we continue to assess that it is not in Russia’s interests to agree to a stable ceasefire without significant Ukrainian concessions, the impasse is likely to preclude a timely resolution to the war – and will increase the likelihood of the US pressuring Ukraine to ease its own demands.

  • Ukraine: Charges against former energy minister will maintain governance scrutiny, corruption risks. Earlier on 16 February, Ukraine’s National Anti-Corruption Bureau (NABU) announced that a former energy minister has been charged with money laundering and participating in organised crime in connection with a large-scale corruption scandal. NABU did not name the minister explicitly. However, the agency provided the duration of the former official’s mandate, which correlates with Herman Halushchenko’s time in office (2021 to 2025). According to NABU, a fund was registered in Anguilla (British Overseas Territory) in February 2021 with the aim of attracting USD 100 m worth of ‘investments’, with Halushchenko’s family members among the ‘investors’. The scandal in which Halushchenko was implicated emerged in November 2025 (see Sibylline Situation Update Brief – 28 November 2025). We assess that the development will likely sustain domestic and international scrutiny over Ukraine’s governance standards and persistent corruption concerns, particularly as sensitive talks aimed at ending the war continue. While corruption has traditionally prompted social backlash and large-scale protests, the risk of major domestic unrest will not increase markedly in the near term.
  • Ukraine: Military recruitment will continue to face resistance, isolated clashes with security forces. On 16 February, the Ukrainian military authorities reported that on the previous day, a group of civilians assaulted military recruitment personnel in Odesa (Odesa oblast). The military personnel were escorting an individual who had reportedly violated military registration and recruitment. The personnel were then confronted with an unspecified number of civilians, who reportedly displayed aggressive behaviour and used physical force and tear gas against them. A similar incident took place in late October 2025 in Odesa, when military mobilisation activities met with strong resistance from civilians and quickly escalated into violence. Such incidents have also occurred elsewhere in Ukraine and underscore continued resistance to Ukraine’s mobilisation efforts. We assess that any attempt to expand military mobilisation will meet with growing public discontent, given that the Russo-Ukrainian war is likely to continue at its current intensity in the short-to-medium term and considering Kyiv’s chronic shortage of military personnel. Such efforts will continue heightening the risk of isolated violent confrontations involving recruitment officials, though risks to bystanders will remain low. (Source: Sibylline)

 

13 Feb 26. Sweden strengthens Ukraine’s defence with a contribution of USD 100 million to US package. Sweden is contributing USD 100 million to the US support package Prioritised Ukraine Requirements List (PURL). Together with the Netherlands, Norway and the United Kingdom, Sweden will fund a joint support package totalling USD 500 million aimed at strengthening Ukraine’s defence capabilities.

“Sweden stands firm in its solidarity with Ukraine. Through our contribution to PURL, which will give Ukraine access to prioritised US defence materiel, we are once again demonstrating that we are prepared to take concrete steps to strengthen Ukraine’s defence capabilities. Air defence and ammunition are crucial to allow Ukraine to defend itself against Russia’s continued attacks. Together with our Allies and partners, we are sending a clear signal that demonstrates our shared commitment to peace and security in Europe,” says Minister for Defence Pål Jonson.

This is the third time Sweden has contributed to PURL. On previous occasions, Sweden has:

  • provided USD 275mi for a support package together with Denmark and Norway and
  • provided USD 60m for a support package together with other Nordic and Baltic countries.

Taking into account this new contribution, Sweden has provided a total of USD 435 million in financial support to PURL. Through the PURL initiative, the United States makes high-priority US defence materiel available to Ukraine. Materiel is delivered as a support package funded by Allies and partner countries. The package includes advanced air defence systems and ammunition, both of which are crucial to Ukraine’s ability to defend itself against ongoing attacks. NATO coordinates the implementation of the initiative and ensures that the contents of the packages meet Ukraine’s most highly prioritised needs. Through coordination and joint initiatives, the Allies can provide effective and targeted support. (Source: Clarion)

 

16 Feb 26. Lithuania allocates $265m in military aid for Ukraine in 2026. The assistance will prioritise air defence, Ukrainian drones, and long-range artillery ammunition. Lithuania will allocate $265m in military aid to Ukraine in 2026, Defence Minister Robertas Kaunas has said. The support will focus on air defence, drones, and long-range artillery ammunition. Minister Kaunas outlined the aid package during the 33rd Nato Defence Contact Group session, which was held alongside the Nato Defence Ministerial meeting in Brussels. Discussions at the event included Ukraine’s most urgent requirements, updates from frontline developments, and ongoing peace negotiations.

“We hear the urgent needs of Ukraine. Lithuania’s military assistance has already surpassed USD 1 bn and we have another $265m earmarked for this year to be used in three priority areas: air defence, Ukrainian drones and long-range artillery ammunition,” Minister Kaunas said.

During the session, Kaunas also outlined Lithuania’s continued commitment to enhancing Ukraine’s defence capabilities to the Ukraine Defence Contact Group. (Source: army-technology.com)

 

17 Feb 26. Ukrainian Drone Operators Defeated NATO Combat Group During Joint Exercises. During the Hedgehog 2025 military exercises in May, Ukrainian drone operators decisively outmatched a large NATO combat group, exposing serious vulnerabilities in traditional mechanized warfare, according to a recent report by The Wall Street Journal. Hedgehog 2025 involved more than 16,000 troops from 12 NATO countries training in Estonia alongside Ukrainian drone specialists, some temporarily rotated from active front-line service. The exercise simulated a “contested and congested” modern battlefield dominated by drones, electronic warfare, and rapid information flows. Lieutenant Colonel Arbo Probal of the Estonian Defence Forces said the aim was to overwhelm units with stress and cognitive overload as quickly as possible. In one scenario, a NATO combat group of several thousand soldiers—including British and Estonian units—attempted a mechanized assault. They failed to account for the level of battlefield transparency created by pervasive drone surveillance. Moving without adequate camouflage, their positions, tents, and armored vehicles were quickly identified and “destroyed” in the simulation. Ukrainian forces relied on Delta, an advanced battlefield management system that integrates real-time intelligence, artificial intelligence–driven analysis, target identification, and strike coordination. According to sources, a Ukrainian unit of roughly ten soldiers conditionally destroyed 17 armoured vehicles and carried out about 30 strikes within half a day. Another opposing force led by Estonian unmanned-systems coordinator Aivar Hanniotti deployed more than 30 drones over an area of less than four square miles. Concealment proved nearly impossible. “There was no possibility to hide,” Hanniotti said, noting that mechanized units were located and neutralized rapidly. Overall results for NATO forces were described as “terrible.” Simulated enemy units were able to neutralize the equivalent of two battalions in a single day, effectively stripping them of combat capability before they could reach drone operators. Estonian officials said the exercise shocked participating officers and underscored how Ukraine’s combat experience is reshaping European security thinking. The drills highlighted structural NATO challenges, including slow strike coordination and restricted data sharing, in contrast to Ukraine’s faster, more networked approach to warfare. (Source: UAS VISION/MILITARNYI; UNITED24MEDIA)

 

17 Feb 26. Wingcopter and TAF Industries Establish Joint Venture to Scale Production of Reconnaissance Drones in Germany for Ukraine. German drone pioneer Wingcopter and Ukraine’s largest unmanned aerial vehicle producer TAF Industries have signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) to establish a joint venture aimed at strengthening defence production and long-term industrial cooperation. The MoU was signed during the 62nd Munich Security Conference in the presence of government representatives from Germany and Ukraine. The planned joint venture will reinforce the resilience of Ukraine’s critical defence manufacturing, ensure continuity of supply under wartime conditions, and diversify industrial risk by expanding production into a secure environment in Germany. It also creates a durable framework for German–Ukrainian collaboration in defence technologies that have already been proven in combat. The partnership will operate under the “Build with Ukraine” framework. Under the agreement, TAF Industries will provide licensed designs and operational expertise for its reconnaissance UAV systems, widely deployed in real operational environments. Wingcopter will contribute industrial infrastructure, manufacturing capacity, and engineering expertise to rapidly scale production in Germany. Wingcopter’s expansion into the defence sector through its newly established Wingcopter Security & Defence (WSD) unit forms a strong backbone for the project. WSD complements the company’s commercial delivery and surveying operations by adding intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) and cargo capabilities, leveraging its proven dual-use drone platform and intellectual property. Looking ahead, the partners plan to co-develop and localise future UAV platforms for European and NATO markets, further strengthening Europe’s defence industrial base and enhancing regional security and resilience. Both companies described the partnership as a strategic step to combine battlefield-proven innovation with German industrial strength, scale life-saving systems, create jobs, and build a sustainable industrial bridge between Ukraine and Germany. (Source: UAS VISION)

 

13 Feb 26. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy today received the first Ukrainian drone manufactured in Germany by Quantum Frontline Industries (QFI). German Minister of Defence, Boris Pistorius acted as patron to the handover of the first Linza 3.0 multi-purpose drone for the Ukrainian Armed Forces.

Matthias Lehna, Managing Director of Quantum Frontline Industries, and Mykyta Rozhkov, Chief BD Officer of Frontline Robotics welcomed the President and the Minister of Defence ahead of the official opening of the Munich Security Conference, to highlight the start of production in the new facility of the recently established Joint Venture.

During his address to QFI employees and media representatives, President Zelenskyy said: “I want to thank the people of Germany for the support of your nation since the start of the war. Your solidarity means a great deal to us. I also want to congratulate both companies and say how proud I am of the important work they are doing.”

The German Minister of Defence, Boris Pistorius highlighted Germany’s support and partnership with Ukraine and said: “I would like to express my gratitude for this project, which, as someone put it, was implemented at lightspeed. We learn from successes achieved on the battlefield and benefit from spillover effects in innovations that are exploited.”

Matthias Lehna, Managing Director of QFI said: “Quantum Frontline Industries has started production in just two months after the announcement. QFI is the first of its kind but will not be the last. We are proud to be a flagship company for Ukrainian German industrial cooperation and proud to support the Armed Forces of Ukraine with the best technology of both countries”

Mykyta Rozhkov, Chief BD Officer of Frontline Robotics said: “This first QFI produced Linza 3.0 represents months of dedication from Ukrainian engineers and our international partners. It was created from frontline experience and is already helping Ukrainian forces operate more  effectively. We are proud of the rapid progress of our joint venture and the way it strengthens long-term cooperation between our countries”.

The QFI facility will enable the large-scale production of 10,000 drones for the Ukrainian Armed Forces in Germany within a year and has now started early-stage production, following its announcement in December 2025.  Quantum Frontline Industries will automate its production capacity to meet the demand from Ukraine and has plans to scale further to provide Ukrainian technology to Europe. Linza 3.0, the first Ukrainian drone produced in Germany, was recently presented by Frontline Robotics. It’s the latest generation of its multi-purpose drone already deployed with more than 60 units of the Ukrainian Defense Forces. The drone is equipped with an AI-enabled visual-inertial navigation module, features a 12-inch frame and can carry up to 4 kg of payload over a distance of up to 15 km, remaining airborne for up to 60 minutes.  The visit was facilitated and supported by the Ukrainian Council of Defence Industry, representing Ukrainian private defence manufacturers.

 

13 Feb 26. Saab and Joint Stock Company “Ukrainian Defense Industry” sign memorandum of understanding. Saab and the Joint Stock Company “Ukrainian Defense Industry” (JSC UDI) have signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) regarding their intention to collaborate in the areas of aviation and airborne surveillance, in which they have complementary expertise. The aim is to strengthen Ukraine’s defence capabilities. The MoU was signed today at the Munich Security Conference 2026 in Germany.  JSC UDI has a strong track record as a strategic manufacturer of weapons and military hardware. By consolidating state enterprises and companies, it has become an integral part of Ukraine’s security and defence sector. Saab will contribute its solid defence industry experience and leading expertise in aviation and airborne surveillance technology.

“We look forward to collaborating with JSC UDI, exploring cooperation opportunities relating to Ukraine. Saab is strongly committed to supporting Ukraine’s defence capability and its defence sector,” says Anders Carp, Deputy CEO of Saab.

 

13 Feb 26. Cuashub.com said today that Ukraine pursues domestic “Iron Dome” to counter relentless Shaheds. Ukraine is intensifying efforts to build a domestically produced air defense network, turning to emerging technologies such as laser weapons, interceptor drones and low-cost countermeasures as it confronts sustained aerial attacks from Russia. Among the systems under development is a prototype laser weapon known as the Sunray, which Ukrainian soldiers and engineers recently demonstrated in a field test. Mounted on a pickup truck and resembling a telescope fitted with cameras, the system tracked a hovering drone before destroying it within seconds.

Ukraine pursues domestic “Iron Dome” to counter relentless Shaheds

(Source: https://cuashub.com/

 

12 Feb 26. “Ukraine develops Sunray counter drone laser system.” Ukraine has developed a prototype laser air defence system designed to counter Russian drones at significantly lower cost than comparable Western systems, according to a report in Ukraine’s Pravda news outlet, quoting a story in The Atlantic published on Tuesday, February 10.

“The system, known as Sunray, was demonstrated to The Atlantic during a field test in Ukraine,” said the Ukrainian news source. “The portable laser weapon reportedly fits into the trunk of a car and can be mounted on a pickup truck. During a test described in the report, the laser burned through a small drone midair within seconds, causing it to fall.

“The developers said the system had been created over roughly two years at a cost of several million dollars. The expected price of a single unit is estimated at a few hundred thousand dollars. By comparison, the Helios laser system developed by Lockheed Martin for the US Navy was produced under a US$150m contract.”

No technical details of the system, or the company behind it, have been reported.

For more information: https://www.pravda.com.ua/eng/news/2026/02/11/8020416/

https://www.theatlantic.com/national-security/2026/02/ukraine-drones-lasers-iron-dome/685944/ (Source: www.unmannedairspace.info)

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Founded in 1987, Exensor Technology is a world leading supplier of Networked Unattended Ground Sensor (UGS) Systems providing tailored sensor solutions to customers all over the world. From our Headquarters in Lund Sweden, our centre of expertise in Network Communications at Communications Research Lab in Kalmar Sweden and our Production site outside of Basingstoke UK, we design, develop and produce latest state of the art rugged UGS solutions at the highest quality to meet the most stringent demands of our customers. Our systems are in operation and used in a wide number of Military as well as Homeland Security applications worldwide. The modular nature of the system ensures any external sensor can be integrated, providing the user with a fully meshed “silent” network capable of self-healing. Exensor Technology will continue to lead the field in UGS technology, provide our customers with excellent customer service and a bespoke package able to meet every need.

A CNIM Group Company

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