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05 Feb 26. Venezuela-US: Joint law enforcement operation underscores decreasing regional tension risks. According to reports on 4 February, US and Venezuelan law enforcement conducted a joint operation to arrest Alex Saab and the head of Venezuela’s Globovision TV network, Raúl Gorrín. Saab is a Colombian-born former Venezuelan official and close ally of Venezuela’s former president Nicolás Maduro. US President Donald Trump’s administration expects that Venezuela will extradite Saab to the US in the coming days. The recent joint operation points to increasing collaboration between the Trump administration and acting Venezuelan President Delcy Rodríguez’s regime. In recent weeks, the Venezuelan regime has made a concerted effort to present itself as a collaborative partner with the US; the regime has released over 350 political prisoners, according to human rights groups. Furthermore, the National Assembly passed a reform to the country’s hydrocarbons law, eliminating the obligation for companies to form a majority partnership with state energy company Petróleos de Venezuela (PDVSA). We continue to assess that the Rodríguez regime will co-operate with the US on key issues, such as the energy sector, in order to retain power and dissuade the US from conducting further military action (Source: Sibylline)
05 Feb 26. Colombia: Suspension of peace negotiations will increase physical security risks in short term. On 4 February, the Gulf Clan (AGC) organised crime group temporarily suspended all ongoing peace negotiations with the Colombian government. The decision was taken after a 3 February meeting between Colombian President Gustavo Petro and US President Donald Trump; Petro’s administration reportedly disclosed information about the AGC’s leadership and allegedly threatened to attack the leaders of multiple criminal groups. Since the US’ capture of Venezuela’s former president Nicolás Maduro, Trump has threatened to conduct military action in Colombia in exchange for security concessions (see Sibylline Situation Update Brief – 3 February 2026). We assess that Petro’s disclosure almost certainly points to efforts to increase security collaboration with the US, marginally reducing regional tensions in the coming weeks. In the short-to-medium term, AGC representatives will likely uphold the suspension of peace negotiations and carry out limited armed attacks against military personnel to deter further collaboration. Attack, kidnapping and violent crime risks will heighten, particularly for military convoys and security forces personnel in AGC strongholds (such as Colombia’s northern coast). (Source: Sibylline)
04 Feb 26. India’s MoD claims highest ever funding boost in Union Budget 2026-27. The defence budget has increased to almost three times its 2013–14 level of Rs2.53tn. The Indian Government has allocated Rs7.85tn ($86.7bn) to the Ministry of Defence (MoD) in the Union Budget for the 2026–27 financial year, marking a 15.19% rise compared to the previous year’s estimates. This funding, announced on 1 February 2026, represents 14.67% of the total national budget, the largest share among all ministries. The defence budget has nearly tripled since 2013–14, when it stood at Rs2.53tn. Within the defence allocation, capital expenditure accounts for 27.95%, while revenue spending on sustenance and operational readiness receives 20.17%. Pay and allowances represent 26.40%, pensions make up 21.84%, and civil organisations are allocated 3.64%. The government has earmarked over Rs2.19tn for capital expenditure for the armed forces in 2026–27, an increase of 21.84% over the previous year’s budget estimate. Of this amount, Rs1.85tn is specifically designated for capital acquisitions, reflecting a rise of approximately 24%. The Ministry of Defence plans to utilise these funds to procure next-generation fighter aircraft, advanced weaponry, ships, submarines, uncrewed aerial vehicles and drones, aiming to modernise all three services and strengthen future capabilities. The Border Roads Organisation will see an increased capital allocation of Rs73.94bn for strategic infrastructure projects such as tunnels, bridges, and airfields. Defence services have also received an allocation of Rs9.75bn for an optical fibre cable network. The focus on indigenous manufacturing continues under the ‘Aatmanirbhar Bharat’ or ‘self-reliant India’ initiative, with Rs1.39tn allotted for procurement from domestic defence industries in FY 2026–27. Approximately three-quarters of the capital acquisition budget is reserved for Indian companies, including private sector entities. The government will exempt basic customs duty on raw materials imported for parts used in aircraft maintenance, repair or overhaul in the defence sector to further support domestic production. For research and development, the Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO) will receive an increased budget of Rs291bn in FY 2026–27, up from Rs268bn in the previous year, with Rs172bn set aside for capital expenditure. Since December 2025, several initiatives have sought to promote research and development (R&D) in defence manufacturing. About one-quarter of the DRDO R&D budget has been made available to industry, start-ups, and academia following earlier policy announcements. Between FY 2022–23 and FY 2024–25, cumulative spending on defence R&D reached Rs682bn with a further Rs268bn allocated for FY 2025–26 in addition to this figure. DRDO sanctioned 148 new research projects during this period.Business intelligence and analytics company GlobalData projected India’s defence expenditure to reach $543.1bn between 2026 and 2030. (Source: army-technology.com)
05 Feb 26. “Air manoeuvre – the movement of ground forces by air to gain advantage – is confronted today by the increasing sophistication and density of threats… It is therefore imperative to develop air manoeuvre forces so that they can operate against current and emerging threats.” This is according to Air Manoeuvre Forces in European Large-Scale Combat Operations, a new RUSI research report by Jack Watling, Robert Tollast and Nick Reynolds which assesses the current and future viability of air manoeuvre in European large-scale combat operations against the backdrop of increasingly dense threat environments characterised by pervasive sensing, long-range precision weapons and contested electromagnetic spectrum conditions. Drawing on case studies – notably Russia’s failed attempt to seize Ukraine’s Hostomel airfield in 2022 which prompted scepticism regarding the survivability of helicopters and air assault forces – the report argues that such conclusions conflate poor planning and execution with judgements on the inherent utility of air manoeuvre. The paper says many of the threats that challenge air manoeuvre equally constrain ground manoeuvre, reinforcing the value of forces that can bypass terrain and rapidly reshape the geometry of the battlefield. The report says that modern threats, including networked air defences, ubiquitous UAV surveillance and precision indirect fire, place air manoeuvre forces at particular risk during assembly, insertion and sustainment. However, it also says that technological developments – including assured connectivity, air-launched weapons and unmanned resupply – provide opportunities to adapt air manoeuvre concepts to remain viable. The study says that air manoeuvre forces retain disproportionate operational value if they are restructured, re-equipped and employed as integral components of corps-level operations, capable of operating in a dispersed posture and synchronised with joint fires and air operations. The study says that a failure to adapt risks forfeiting a capability that has repeatedly proven decisive in shaping operational outcomes.
Key Findings
- Air manoeuvre faces unprecedented threat density but remains operationally relevant. “Pervasive sensing, long-range fires and a large number of pop-up threats, against which it is hard to plan, threaten the viability of air manoeuvre operations in conventional war in the European theatre.”
- The very threats confronting air manoeuvre also increase its relative value.
“As many of these threat systems also pose a serious challenge for ground manoeuvre, the ability to move troops unimpeded by terrain arguably makes air manoeuvre more important – not less.”
- Dispersed planning and assured connectivity are central to survivability.
“Assured connectivity and blue force (GPS) tracking should allow air manoeuvre forces to plan and initiate operations from a dispersed posture, thereby mitigating the risk from long-range fires.”
- Precision strike enables denial without occupation. “The same capabilities of ubiquitous precision strike can enable an air manoeuvre force to deny or interdict a target without having to physically occupy it.”
Key Recommendations
- Make air manoeuvre forces an organic corps-level asset. “Air manoeuvre forces are made an organic asset of a corps, so that they can leverage the joint force in planning and execution.”
- Integrate launched effects into air manoeuvre formations. “Air manoeuvre forces are given organic ‘middle strike’ or launched effect elements that train to employ UAVs in conjunction with aviation.”
- Invest in precision strike resilient to electronic warfare. “Air manoeuvre forces are equipped with precision strike capabilities that are not susceptible to degradation by electronic warfare.”
- Strengthen communications resilience in contested environments. “Air manoeuvre forces must have a way of reliably passing targets to the main body in a contested electromagnetic spectrum. This demands investment in satellite communications and relays as well as a software layer to minimise the volume of data that need to be passed.”
Conclusion
The report concludes that air manoeuvre will remain a high-risk capability but one that continues to offer commanders unique operational advantages when employed at appropriate scale and with sufficient integration into joint force planning. Historical experience demonstrates that air manoeuvre has repeatedly succeeded against sophisticated threats when supported by rigorous planning, suppression of enemy air defences and coherent command and control.
In Europe’s emerging threat environment, the question is not whether air manoeuvre is obsolete, but whether NATO forces are prepared to adapt doctrine, force structure and capabilities to ensure its continued viability. The authors argue that failing to do so would unnecessarily constrain operational choice and cede initiative to adversaries capable of exploiting the same technological trends.
Notes to Editors
Air Manoeuvre Forces in European Large-Scale Combat Operations is based on engagement between the authors and air manoeuvre forces across NATO and partner militaries, and consultations with military helicopter manufacturers, as well as a literature review of doctrine and assessment of air manoeuvre operations. Jack Watling is a Senior Research Fellow for Land Warfare at RUSI, Robert Tollast is a Research Analyst in the Land Warfare team and Nick Reynolds is a Research Fellow for Land Warfare. For more information and media inquiries please email
02 Feb 26. Kyrgyzstan-EU: Close ties with Russia will sustain sanctions risks over long term. On 3 February, the Kyrgyz government announced that the EU’s special envoy for sanctions, David O’Sullivan, will visit Kyrgyzstan on 26 February amid concerns that the country is assisting Russia in evading punitive measures. Bloomberg reported on 30 January that the bloc is considering applying its anti-sanctions circumvention tool for the first time against the Central Asian state. Unspecified figures familiar with the matter claim that this mechanism would restrict the export of machine tools and certain radio equipment to Kyrgyzstan. Although a senior Kyrgyz official, Daniyar Amangeldiev, stated that Kyrgyzstan has introduced restrictions on the export of dual-use goods, Russia has used the country and other third jurisdictions to evade sanctions. While O’Sullivan’s expected visit is aimed at avoiding new punitive measures, Kyrgyzstan’s close economic ties with Russia mean that the risk of Western sanctions will remain high over the longer term. Despite the EU’s efforts to tighten enforcement, we assess that Russia will almost certainly continue to find new workarounds to bypass sanctions for the duration of the war in Ukraine, including across Central Asia. (Source: Sibylline)
02 Feb 26. Ethiopia: Drone strike will compound elevated tensions in Tigray, driving risks of conflict resumption. On 31 January, the Ethiopian military (ENDF) killed one person in two drone strikes targeting alleged Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF) supply trucks in Enticho (Tigray region). This follows renewed clashes between the TPLF and the ENDF and allied Amharan militias in Tselemti in western Tigray region (currently administered and disputed by Amharan regional forces). While the TPLF reportedly withdrew from Tselemti (moderating risks of further clashes therein), tensions between the federal government and the TPLF will almost certainly continue to rise in the coming months, particularly ahead of June’s federal elections. This will sustain the risk of further attempts by the Tigray forces to resecure western Tigray and retaliatory airstrikes by the ENDF, increasing collateral and crossfire risks across the region. This is likely to drive the re-mobilisation of armed elements within Tigray (both pro- and anti-TPLF), compounding security risks and ultimately driving the risk of conflict resumption in Tigray (see Sibylline Special Report – 4 December 2025). However, we assess that the splintering of support for the TPLF will undercut its capacity to contest a conflict as effectively as it did during the 2020-2022 Tigray War. (Source: Sibylline)
02 Feb 26. Myanmar-Russia: New defence pact will strengthen military junta; armed conflict risks remain high. On 3 February, Myanmar and Russia signed a new defence co-operation pact that is set to remain in effect until 2030. Russian Security Council Secretary Sergei Shoigu pledged Moscow’s ‘comprehensive assistance, including in the international arena’ and proposed energy co-operation with Myanmar. Russia is one of the main international supporters of Myanmar’s military junta, which has used Russian-made jets to conduct airstrikes against rebel-controlled areas. There is a realistic possibility that Russia will increase its military and diplomatic support to the junta over the coming months. Russia has also recognised Myanmar’s recent month-long general election as legitimate. According to electoral data released on 3 February, the junta-aligned Union Solidarity and Development Party secured a landslide victory in both houses of parliament. While the junta claims the result legitimises its control, most countries consider the polls neither free nor fair. We assess that armed conflict risks will remain elevated this year as the civil war persists, with the junta reportedly escalating its bombing in Tanintharyi region over the past week. (Source: Sibylline)
02 Feb 26. Poland-Belarus: Balloon incursions likely point to grey-zone defence probing, smuggling operations. On 2 February, the Polish authorities reported that balloon-like objects had entered Polish airspace via Belarus for the third successive evening in a row. The Operational Command of the Polish Armed Forces stated that the balloons were launched to carry out reconnaissance and probe air defence systems. Temporary restrictions were imposed on civil aviation in the affected area of Podlaskie voivodeship, though these have since been lifted. There is also a realistic possibility that the balloons were launched by criminals to test new methods for smuggling contraband such as cigarettes into Poland, though ultimately this would likely be carried out with the de facto approval of the Belarusian authorities. In January, the Polish authorities detected small drone activity along the border with Belarus. We assess that such drone activity (that does not entail a clear violation of Polish airspace) is likely for the purposes of identifying weak points in the Polish border fence. Continued probing and small-scale incursions are likely along the Polish-Belarusian border in the coming months, though the impact on aviation will remain low. A single, large-scale violation of Polish airspace by Russian drones will remain a realistic risk in 2026. (Source: Sibylline)
03 Feb 26. Guinea-Bissau: Opposition offer is likely insincere; repression will likely continue in coming months. On 2 February, opposition leaders Domingos Simões Pereira and Fernando Dias both rejected offers by the transitional president, Horta Inta-A Na Man, to join the government. Inta-A had previously announced plans to form an ‘inclusive’ transitional government and facilitated Pereira’s release from prison (though he remains under house arrest). We assess that the move likely reflects an attempt by the junta to appease the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), rather than a genuine effort to broaden democratic participation (see Sibylline Situation Update Brief – 15 December 2025). The junta will likely characterise the offer as symbolic of its commitment to reform, moderating short-term tensions. Nevertheless, the junta is likely to intensify its repression of the opposition in the coming months in anticipation of the 6 December legislative and presidential elections. This will exacerbate tensions with ECOWAS while increasing unrest and strike action risks in major cities. However, we assess that the threat of repression, coupled with Pereira’s limited mobilisation capacity given his house arrest, will moderate protest attendance and associated operational disruption. (Source: Sibylline)
05 Feb 26. Nigeria: Attack makes further US strikes likely, though this is unlikely to improve security conditions. On 3 February, gunmen (known locally as bandits) who are currently aligned with Boko Haram killed at least 170 people in an attack on Woro village (Kwara state). Bandits are active across northern and central Nigeria, where they are tied broadly to the movement of nomadic pastoral communities and the resulting conflict over resources with sedentary communities. The escalating militarisation of these groups has driven frequent mass-casualty attacks, which will almost certainly continue throughout 2026 (see Sibylline Situation Update Brief – 23 January 2026). The latest attack comes as the US announced that it has dispatched a team of military officers to Nigeria to co-ordinate with local officials. The US also continues to conduct aerial reconnaissance missions over northern states after it launched airstrikes against claimed jihadist camps in Sokoto state in December 2025. Though the US’ official mandate covers only Islamic State-affiliated groups across northern states, further mass-casualty attacks will increase the likelihood of further strikes. However, we assess that a US airstrike campaign is fundamentally unlikely to undermine the influence of such groups, sustaining associated security risks throughout 2026. (Source: Sibylline)
02 Feb 26. Congo (DRC): Alleged drone attack in Kisangani underscores possible rebel group tactical shift. On 2 January, the Tshopo provincial government announced that it was not necessary to evacuate the area surrounding Kisangani Bangoka International Airport (FKI) following allegations of an attempted drone attack on the airport. Overnight on 31 January to 1 February, the Rwanda-backed M23 rebel group reportedly launched eight explosive-laden drones towards the airport, which the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC)’s security forces (FARDC) claim to have intercepted. Kisangani Bangoka serves as the primary forward base for the FARDC’s aerial assets engaged in counter-M23 operations in eastern DRC. If confirmed, the attack would represent M23’s westernmost strike in its ongoing insurgency and a potential shift towards targeting the FARDC’s aerial assets with longer-range drones. In addition to ongoing ground operations in North Kivu and South Kivu provinces, M23 will possibly increase the frequency of drone attacks targeting Kisangani Bangoka airport in the coming weeks to maximise pressure on the FARDC and increase prospects for further territorial gains. Increasingly frequent drone attacks will also likely undermine efforts to broker a durable ceasefire between the DRC, M23 and Rwanda, sustaining risks of armed conflict and regional tensions. (Source: Sibylline)
04 Feb 26. Sudan: Army’s South Kordofan advance will not improve security, humanitarian risks significantly. On 3 January, the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) announced that it had recaptured Kadugli (South Kordofan state) from the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF). The city’s capture comes amid an advancing SAF offensive in Kordofan region during the region’s dry season (December – February). On 26 January, the SAF took control of Dilling (South Kordofan) and began moving southwards via the Dilling–Kadugli highway to Kadugli. In the coming weeks, the SAF will likely attempt to secure transport routes connecting Dilling to El Obeid (North Kordofan state), which are currently controlled by the RSF and allied militias. Although these efforts will likely facilitate a partial resumption of aid operations therein, RSF efforts to reinforce its encirclement of El Obeid will drive the risk of the frontlines shifting and rapidly undercutting NGO mobility and operations. The RSF is also highly likely to continue conducting drone attacks on SAF-controlled cities, towns and supply lines in the coming weeks, sustaining risks of staff exposure to explosions. Such conditions will likely undermine the continuity of aid distribution operations, sustaining critical pressure on food security conditions. (Source: Sibylline)
02 Feb 26. Russia claims $15bn in 2025 arms exports, with focus on Africa. Russia earned over $15bn from arms exports in 2025, supplying military equipment to more than 30 countries despite Western sanctions aimed at isolating Moscow over its invasion of Ukraine, President Vladimir Putin announced last week, though questions remain about the number’s validity. Speaking at a Jan. 30 meeting of the Commission on Military-Technical Cooperation in Moscow, Putin said export contracts had been “reliably fulfilled” despite mounting pressure from Western nations attempting to block Russia’s defense partnerships. The revenue, he said, would help modernize defense enterprises, expand production capacity and fund research programs. The $15bn figure represents a significant income stream for Russia’s defense industrial base as the country continues its war in Ukraine, now approaching its fourth year. The revenue may help offset some effects of Western economic sanctions, though the long-term sustainability of these export levels remains uncertain given Moscow’s increased own consumption of military goods and ongoing diplomatic isolation. If accurate, the new numbers would represent a remarkable rebound to near pre-war levels for Russia’s military exports. According to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, which closely tracks the global major arms trade using transparent methodology, Russian large weapons exports fell 47% between 2022 and 2024, while the broader trend reveals a 64% decline comparing the 2015-19 period to 2020-24, though the descent began before the invasion of Ukraine. Russia dropped to third place globally for arms exports, behind the U.S. and France, by 2024 due to its declining influence in the global military marketplace, SIPRI data shows. There may be credibility problems with the official Russian numbers. The government in Moscow claimed $13.75 bn in exports for 2024, while Western analysts estimated them to be bns of dollars lower. Russian arms exports collapsed between 2021 and 2023 and may have dropped from $14.6 bn to approximately $3 bn, according to an analysis from the Jamestown Foundation, a Washington-based think tank founded in 1984 to support Soviet defectors. While exact estimates differ, the trend holds true across methodologies and Western reports. Russia stopped publicly disclosing detailed data on arms export contracts following the start of the full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, including ceasing to provide information to relevant United Nations organizations. This has also made it harder for independent observers to accurately estimate the full picture of Russia’s arms trade, evidenced by divergent estimates by different Western organizations. SIPRI data shows Russia’s leading arms companies, Rostec and United Shipbuilding Corporation, increased their revenues by 23% in 2025, but this growth came from domestic military demand, which the researchers note “more than offset the revenues lost due to falling arms exports.” Putin’s announcement came alongside new remarks from Rosoboronexport’s CEO, Alexander Mikheyev, who told the Russian state news agency TASS that military-technical cooperation with African countries has reached levels last seen during the Soviet era and “surpassed it in some respects.” Rosoboronexport is also expanding its activities in Africa, Mikheyev said, following the presidential commission meeting. Rosoboronexport, Russia’s state arms export monopoly, oversees more than 85 percent of the country’s military exports. The company has concluded over 30,000 contracts with 122 countries since its establishment, with total exports exceeding $230bn. In total, the company’s order book now exceeds $60bn, Mikheyev said on Jan. 30. The Kremlin has prioritized arms sales to Africa, Asia and the Middle East, which aren’t directly subject to the Western restrictions imposed following Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine. Putin said more than 340 joint defense projects with 14 countries were either underway or in development, and announced additional state support measures for military exports covering 2026 through 2028. If the reported numbers are accurate, Russia’s ability to maintain arms exports at these levels would raise questions about Western sanctions effectiveness. While the restrictions have targeted Russia’s banking, technology, and trade sectors, many countries in Africa and Asia continue to do business with Russia and purchase Russian military equipment due to lower costs and longstanding defense relationships. The continued sales also reflect Moscow’s use of its weapons exports to strengthen its geopolitical position in far-flung parts of the globe. However, Russia’s defense industry is already operating at wartime production levels to supply its own military. Defense spending had reached 7.3% of GDP as of December 2025, according to official numbers. Additionally, combat losses of Russian-made equipment in Ukraine, Venezuela and Iran may have raised questions among some potential buyers about the effectiveness of Moscow’s weapons systems in modern warfare. (Source: Defense News)
02 Feb 26. Pakistan: Co-ordinated Balochistan attacks underscore militant threat, possibly deterring investment. On 31 January, militants launched co-ordinated gun and bomb attacks targeting military and government installations, as well as police stations, across Gwadar, Mastung, Noshki and the provincial capital Quetta (all Balochistan province). The militants killed at least 33 people, including civilians and security officials. The Balochistan Liberation Army (BLA) militant group has claimed responsibility. In response, the military launched counter-terrorism operations, reportedly killing 145 militants over the last two days. The provincial government has invoked powers under Section 144 of the Constitution, banning public gatherings and demonstrations until the end of the month. The attacks come amid persistent militant activity in the province and a fragile overall security situation. We assess that these co-ordinated attacks underscore the sophisticated capabilities of the BLA and the growing militant threat in the province. The attacks are likely to undermine investor confidence and possibly deter foreign investment in Balochistan’s mineral sector. (Source: Sibylline)
31 Jan 26. Canada: Statement from the Defence, Security and Resilience Bank (DSRB) Development Group. The DSRB Development Group welcomes the statement by Canada’s Minister of Finance confirming Canada’s leading role with regards the establishment of the Defence, Security and Resilience Bank. Canada’s leadership reflects a shared understanding among allies that strengthening defence and security now requires not only increased spending, but financing structures capable of supporting industrial scale-up, supply-chain resilience, and long-term capacity. The Defence, Security and Resilience Bank is being established to address this challenge by improving access to affordable, predictable financing across defence and security ecosystems, while working alongside existing national and multilateral institutions. The DSRB Development Group is working closely with Canada and other like-minded nations to support the establishment of the Bank, including its design, governance, and operational framework, to ensure it meets the needs of participating nations and their industries. (Source: PR Newswire)
30 Jan 26. Japan-South Korea: Security, economic co-operation likely to expand over coming years. Earlier on 30 January, the Japanese and South Korean defence ministers agreed to boost their security co-operation during a meeting in Yokosuka (Kanagawa prefecture, Japan). The two sides will resume bilateral naval search and rescue exercises for the first time in nine years, work together to develop unmanned weapon systems and hold annual defence ministerial talks. This comes after South Korean President Lee Jae-myung met with Japanese Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi in Japan earlier this month. In recent years, Japan and South Korea have significantly improved relations amid a growing military threat from North Korea and rising Chinese assertiveness in the region. Economic and security ties will highly likely continue to improve, particularly if Takaichi’s Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) wins the upcoming general election on 8 February. We assess that North Korea will likely conduct missile launch tests in response to any joint drills by the two countries, driving regional tensions. However, there remains a latent risk that tensions will be reignited between Seoul and Tokyo over historical wartime disputes, such as the issue of ‘comfort women’. (Source: Sibylline)
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