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Military And Security Developments
Jan 30.
- Russia-Ukraine: US-requested halt on long-range strikes will be vulnerable to violation, collapse. On 29 January, US President Donald Trump claimed that his Russian counterpart, Vladimir Putin, had agreed to refrain from long-range strikes against the Ukrainian capital Kyiv and other urban centres for a week amid extremely low temperatures. In recent weeks, Russia has intensified attacks against Ukraine’s energy infrastructure, which has resulted in the harshest heating conditions since the start of the full-scale invasion in 2022 (see Sibylline Ukraine Monthly Forecast – 23 January 2026). Comments from Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky indicate that the pause would apply to energy infrastructure, though we are unable to confirm this. Details concerning the supposed moratorium, including when it could enter force and which other cities it would apply to, are vague. Russian officials have not yet confirmed Moscow’s agreement. Even if Putin has agreed, any such moratorium will highly likely be vulnerable to violations or fail to hold. While a temporary cessation of Russian attacks would partly alleviate humanitarian risks, it would also enable Russia to stockpile drones and missiles to resume its bombardment of energy infrastructure in the near future.
Jan 29.
• Russia-US: Peace progress will increase likelihood of successful purchase of oil major’s assets. Earlier on 29 January, Russia’s second-largest oil company, Lukoil, announced the planned sale of its foreign assets to the US private equity firm Carlyle Group. Lukoil has specified that the transaction does not apply to assets in Kazakhstan. The Russian oil major has not disclosed the value of the deal, which requires approval from the US’ Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC). Meanwhile, Carlyle has said that the sale is conditional upon due diligence and regulatory approvals. In October 2025, the US sanctioned Lukoil and another Russian oil company, Rosneft, due to Russia’s lack of commitment towards ending the war in Ukraine. Washington DC has thus far rejected two bids to purchase Lukoil’s international assets, including one from the Swiss-based commodity trader Gunvor and another from a group led by US bank Xtellus Partners. We assess that the likelihood of Carlyle’s bid being accepted will increase should Russia continue to engage in US-facilitated peace talks. In the meantime, significant operational disruption at Lukoil’s foreign facilities and elevated energy insecurity in countries hosting such assets are unlikely.
Jan 27.
KEY DEVELOPMENTS
• OFFENSIVES: Russian forces have likely captured around 58.7 square miles (152 sq km) of Ukrainian territory in January – nearly three times less than in December 2025
• SHELLS: According to the Wall Street Journal (WSJ), Germany’s largest defence manufacturer, Rheinmetall, will ‘soon’ be able to produce around 1.5 m 155mm artillery shells per annum, which is reportedly more than the entire US defence industry
• STRIKES: Attempts to impose an ‘EU preference clause’ that would restrict Ukraine’s use of an EU loan would significantly undermine Kyiv’s ability to acquire crucial equipment from non-EU states, such as UK Storm Shadow missiles
• FORECAST: Unconfirmed reports indicate that the US has signalled that its security guarantees are contingent on Ukraine agreeing to a peace deal, which likely requires Kyiv having to cede the Donbas region; this would be a highly controversial move
• OFFENSIVES: As of late January 2026, the Ukrainian OSINT mapping project DeepState indicated that Russian forces had captured about 58.7 square miles (152 sq km) of Ukrainian territory in January – nearly three times less than in December 2025. Russia recorded most of its advances towards Siversk and Kostiantynivka (both located in Donetsk oblast). Various military analysts have cited difficult weather conditions, including freezing temperatures and shorter daylight hours, as a likely factor behind the slowdown in infantry operations. The lull in Russian territorial progress likely underscores Moscow’s difficulties in sustaining a high operational tempo and achieving steady gains. This also possibly an indication of a temporary operational pause ahead of further offensive operations in the coming months. Despite this, we assess that ultimately, growing Ukrainian challenges in the coming months will remain the main enabling factor for future Russian gains.
• SHELLS: According to the Wall Street Journal (WSJ), Germany’s largest defence manufacturer Rheinmetall will ‘soon’ be able to produce 1.5 m 155mm artillery shells per annum, which is reportedly more than the quantity produced by the entire US defence industry. This detail was revealed in a wider article assessing the challenges faced by Europe in rapidly ramping up military production amid efforts to offset the drop-off in US military aid to Ukraine and growing transatlantic tensions. The increased production of 155m artillery shells by Rheinmetall (for which a specific timeline was not given) will realistically benefit Ukraine, which is increasingly reliant on NATO-provided 155mm systems. Rheinmetall is already a major supplier of artillery shells to Kyiv. Despite this, construction has still not begun on its shell production plant in Ukraine, agreed in 2024. The official reason for this is ‘unresolved regulatory issues’, though it is also possible that the growing intensity of Russian strikes has had a deterrent effect. It is unclear whether this factory, originally due to begin production in 2026, was factored into the WSJ calculation.
• STRIKES: The CEO of Ukrainian energy company DTEK, Maxim Timchenko, stated on 23 January that Ukraine is close to a ‘humanitarian catastrophe’ due to Russian strikes on the country’s energy system. Over the past two weeks, Ukraine has experienced temperatures between -15 and -20 C (5 and -4 F), as intensive Russian strikes on energy targets have continued. On 23-24 January, for instance, Russian forces launched a combined strike comprising 396 projectiles, primarily towards Kyiv oblast, which reportedly left 1.2 m properties nationwide without power. On 25 January, Kyiv’s Mayor Vitali Klitschko stated that approximately 15% of the capital’s housing was still without power as a result of the strike.
• STRIKES: Trilateral talks between the US, Russia and Ukraine held in the UAE on 23-24 January failed to result in a moratorium on strikes against energy infrastructure (and coincided with the largest Russian strike on Ukraine over the past week). The US and Ukrainian sides reportedly proposed that Russia halt attacks on Ukrainian energy infrastructure in exchange for Kyiv refraining from strikes on Russian oil refineries and oil tankers, according to the Financial Times (FT). While it is possible that Russia will agree to a limited moratorium on strikes in future talks (as it has done previously), we assess that Moscow will likely continue its strike campaign through the remaining winter months in order to maximise pressure on Kyiv. Any moratorium would likely be limited, as well as highly susceptible to violations and ultimately a breakdown.
• STRIKES: Any attempt to impose an ‘EU preference clause’ that would restrict Ukraine’s use of the EU’s EUR 90 bn (USD 108 bn) loan would significantly undermine Ukraine’s ability to acquire crucial equipment from non-EU countries. On 26 January, The Telegraph reported that France opposes calls to facilitate Ukraine’s purchases of UK-produced Storm Shadow missiles with the EU loan. Paris has consistently advocated a European preference clause that would require Kyiv to prioritise the purchase of defence equipment from EU defence industries in a bid to boost the bloc’s domestic defence industry. However, such a clause would restrict Kyiv’s ability to leverage the EU loan to fulfil its military needs. Under an EU preference clause, Ukrainians would be required to submit purchase plans, which would be reviewed against a set of criteria. However, 11 European countries, including Germany, oppose such conditions and are calling for a relaxation of the rules to facilitate Kyiv’s defence purchases from third-country suppliers, including the UK. Without new sources of Storm Shadow missiles, Ukraine’s ability to strike at Russia’s rear will likely be limited
• STRIKES: On 27 January, German Defence Minister Boris Pistorius urged Western allies to step up support for Ukraine’s air defences. Pistorius noted that Germany has limited capacity to deliver further equipment, including additional US-made Patriot air defence interceptors. Pistorius explained that Germany is awaiting replacements for the equipment that has already been delivered and also acknowledged that the number of other air defence systems supplied to Ukraine (like the IRIS-T) is insufficient. Ultimately, Western partners’ difficulties in transferring crucial air defence equipment will leave Ukraine persistently vulnerable to Russia’s strike campaign. Meanwhile, if the EU imposes restrictions on Ukraine’s use of the EUR 90 bn loan, this would possibly undermine Kyiv’s ability to access US Patriot air defence systems and interceptors, which have proven effective against Russian ballistic missiles.
POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS
• NEGOTIATIONS: Russia, Ukraine and the US held trilateral talks on 23-24 January in Abu Dhabi (UAE) which, despite assessments from various parties that they were ‘constructive’, are unlikely to have resulted in a tangible breakthrough towards ending the war. We had previously assessed that the likelihood of a significant advancement towards peace arising from the talks was unlikely, largely due to the lack of consensus on key areas. Aside from the trilateral consultations, Russian and Ukrainian negotiators also held bilateral talks, according to reports which cited unspecified Ukrainian officials. For further analysis on the role of security guarantees in the talks, see FORECAST below.
• NEGOTIATIONS: Before the talks in the UAE, the Kremlin sought to downplay the prospect of imminent progress towards peace during a meeting on 22 January with a US delegation in the Russian capital Moscow. Presidential aide Yuri Ushakov stated that ‘there is no hope of achieving a long-term settlement’ without resolving territorial issues – as agreed during a summit between Russian President Vladimir Putin and US President Trump in Alaska in August 2025. Details of that summit remain limited, but Russian officials continue to claim that the two sides reached an understanding on the terms necessary to end the war – it remains possible that a misunderstanding over what was agreed in principle will lead to a disconnect between US and Russian expectations.
• NEGOTIATIONS: Talks are expected to resume in the coming days in Abu Dhabi, with reports indicating that the next round will take place on 1 February. According to a report by Axios published on 24 January, one unspecified US official has claimed that the likelihood of a meeting between Putin and Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky is growing. The official also suggested that if the next trilateral meeting yields positive results, the negotiating teams of the warring parties could meet in their respective capitals. However, we assess that this is overly optimistic in the near term given that mutual trust will remain extremely low despite limited, possible progress in talks. In a similar vein, while Zelensky has previously expressed willingness to meet his Russian counterpart, the Kremlin will likely maintain its position that such a meeting can only take place as a final step in reaching a peace deal.
• MARITIME: Further seizures of Russian shadow fleet vessels will increase the risk of maritime grey-zone activity in the coming weeks, with the assets of European countries that have intercepted tankers or supported operations likely to be particularly vulnerable. On 22 January, the French Navy intercepted the ‘Grinch’ oil tanker between the southern coast of Spain and the northern coast of Morocco. The tanker was sailing from Murmansk (Murmansk oblast, Russia) under the Comoros flag. French President Emmanuel Macron said that the vessel is subject to international sanctions and suspected of flying a false flag. Although certain European countries are showing an increasing willingness to adopt an assertive posture against shadow fleet vessels, we assess that the risk of a direct military confrontation with Russia will remain low. Rather, Russian retaliation is more likely to include targeting maritime and undersea infrastructure. For further analysis, see Sibylline Situation Update Brief – 27 January 2026.
FORECAST
GUARANTEES: The Financial Times (FT) reported earlier on 27 January that the US has signalled that its security guarantees are contingent on Ukraine agreeing to a peace deal, which likely requires Kyiv to cede the Donbas region. While unconfirmed, the proposed US protections include a pledge that guarantees will ‘mirror’ NATO’s Article 5 and a co-ordinated military response in the event of renewed Russian aggression. This is according to unspecified insiders. The US has also indicated it would provide Ukraine with more military aid to strengthen its peacetime army if Kyiv withdraws from Ukrainian-controlled areas of the Donbas. However, the White House’s deputy press secretary, Anna Kelly, has refuted the reported conditions linked to security guarantees, arguing that the US’ role in the peace process is to bring both sides together to make a deal.
Gaining full control of the Donbas, which comprises Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts, remains one of Russia’s core, long-standing war objectives. Russian officials have repeatedly demanded that Kyiv withdraw its forces from areas of the region under Ukrainian control. Although Russia is estimated to occupy approximately 88% of the Donbas, Ukraine would (in this scenario) forfeit several strategic cities in Donetsk comprising the so-called fortress belt, namely Druzhkivka, Kostiantynivka, Kramatorsk and Sloviansk. We assess that Russian control of these heavily fortified areas would be highly advantageous for Moscow if it sought to launch a renewed invasion of Ukraine in the future, particularly if the Kremlin doubts Western (specifically US) resolve to commit to agreed security guarantees.
An unnamed senior Ukrainian official quoted by the FT claimed that the US is using guarantees to push Ukraine towards concessions that Washington DC believes could bring Russia to the negotiating table. However, Russia’s territorial claims in Ukraine expand beyond the Donbas (the future status of Kherson and Zaporizhzhia oblasts – annexed by Russia in 2022 – is not specified in the FT’s report). Following the Alaska summit in August 2025, reports claimed that Putin had proposed freezing the frontlines in those two regions in exchange for a Ukrainian withdrawal from the Donbas (see Sibylline Ukraine Update – 18 August 2025).
Despite President Zelensky stating on 25 January that a document outlining US security guarantees for Ukraine was ‘100% ready’, it remains unclear if any such concession of territory has been agreed. In any case, the agreement’s signing is liable to be delayed by lengthy referenda processes. According to Zelensky, Kyiv is awaiting confirmation of the date and location for the security document signing. Zelensky stated that the document would then be sent to the Ukrainian parliament and the US Congress for ratification without specifying a possible timeframe. He also underscored that any territorial concessions would have to be put to a referendum, which would possibly postpone any definitive decision in the short-to-medium term.
We continue to assess that Ukraine remains more malleable to diplomatic pressure than Russia given its strained military position and reliance on Western support, including assurances vis-à-vis its post-war security. Over the coming weeks, Kyiv will almost certainly remain reluctant to make significant territorial concessions without first receiving concrete, robust security guarantees that it believes will prevent a future Russian attack. We have repeatedly assessed that the credibility and durability of security guarantees for Ukraine provided by the West, including the US, will highly likely be fundamental in deterring renewed Russian aggression. However, should US pressure on Ukraine increase significantly (especially if the Trump administration withholds intelligence sharing), Ukraine will find it harder to resist making unfavourable territorial concessions as its operational situation deteriorates further.
Jan 26.
• Russia-Ukraine: War will highly likely continue in near-to-medium term despite possible future talks. On 24 January, the second day of trilateral negotiations between Russia, Ukraine and the US concluded without a significant breakthrough towards ending the Russo-Ukrainian war. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky has disclosed that further discussions could take place as early as this week. The talks were expected to focus on territory, one of the key issues over which the two warring parties continue to disagree. Moscow maintains that it seeks full control of Donbas region (which comprises Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts). Meanwhile, for the foreseeable future Kyiv will be reluctant to cede swathes of territory in Donetsk oblast that Russian forces do not occupy fully. Ultimately, we continue to assess that the positions of Kyiv and Moscow on the key issues needed to end the war are highly unlikely to converge in the near-to-medium term. The absence of an agreement will possibly encourage the US to apply pressure (most likely on Ukraine) in an attempt to facilitate an end to the war in the coming weeks.
• Russia: New citizenship, residency reporting rules will elevate surveillance risks for Russians abroad. On 23 January, a Russian opposition media outlet reported that the foreign ministry has prepared a draft law which would mandate Russian citizens to notify the authorities within 60 days of receiving foreign citizenship or residency abroad. Russians would be required to disclose to Russia’s internal ministry or a consulate abroad that they have obtained a new citizenship or residence permit. Failure to notify the relevant authorities could result in fines or community service. Currently, Russians can voluntarily notify the consulate or embassy of their dual citizenship or residence permit. Hundreds of thousands of Russians are estimated to have left their home country since the start of the full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. If passed in its current guise, the new rules would enter into force on 1 January 2028. While amendments are possible, the legislation will likely be adopted in their existing form, expanding Russia’s control over its expatriate population, particularly anti-Kremlin dissidents. Although details concerning enforcement remain uncertain, compliance with the new requirements will increase surveillance risks for Russians living abroad.
• France: Tanker interception will prompt Russian maritime grey-zone activity, risks to civilian shipping. On 22 January, the French Navy intercepted the ‘Grinch’ oil tanker, a vessel that has been linked to Russia’s shadow fleet. The fleet consists of a group of ageing tankers with opaque ownership structures operating under flags of convenience to bypass Western sanctions on Russian oil exports. The operation took place in the Mediterranean Sea with intelligence support from the UK. The operation indicates a more assertive European posture towards the shadow fleet since the beginning of the year. It comes after the UK Armed Forces supported a US operation to seize the Russian-flagged tanker ‘Marinera’ on 7 January. The UK has also indicated its readiness to conduct a similar operation unilaterally or with European partners. We assess that further seizures of Russian shadow fleet vessels in European waters are likely in the coming weeks and months. This will almost certainly increase regional tensions with Russia, which will likely increase its maritime grey-zone activity in European waters. We also assess that safety and operational risks to civilian shipping will increase as Russia will possibly attempt to retaliate by harassing French and UK-owned, registered or insured vessels in the Baltic Sea, Black Sea and eastern Mediterranean Sea.
• Russia-Ukraine: Peace breakthrough remains unlikely despite trilateral talks with US. On 23-24 January, trilateral talks are expected to take place in Abu Dhabi (UAE) between Russia, Ukraine and the US aimed at ending the Russo-Ukrainian war. Unspecified insiders familiar with the negotiations claim that territory will be the primary issue to be discussed; we continue to assess that this remains a key sticking point in efforts to reach a peace agreement. It comes after US envoys Steve Witkoff and Jared Kushner met with Russian President Vladimir Putin late on 22 January in Moscow (Russia). Russia and Ukraine have engaged in limited direct bilateral talks and held separate negotiations with the US in 2025, though these have failed to yield tangible results towards ending the war. While trilateral talks would be a notable step in the US’ push to broker a cessation of hostilities, Russia and Ukraine remain far removed in their positions on ending the war. We assess that this will highly likely prevent a breakthrough in the near-to-medium term. That said, the two sides could realistically agree to a limited moratorium on strikes against energy infrastructure.
• Russia: Russia will highly likely be able to sustain war in 2026 despite growing public finances strain. On 21 January, Deputy Finance Minister Vladimir Kolychev warned that the federal budget will likely face a growing deficit at the start of 2026 due to lower hydrocarbon revenues and a surge in front-loaded payments. Growing Western sanctions enforcement has tightened pressure on Russian oil exports, which in December 2025 reached their lowest level since August 2025. On 21 January, the EU implemented a ban on imports of refined products made from Russian crude, which has partly reduced oil imports from key buyers such as India. Oil, along with gas exports, has historically accounted for a significant share of Russia’s federal revenues. However, the recent spike in gold prices, for example, has provided Russia with a significant windfall, with Bloomberg estimating that Central Bank of Russia gold holdings have increased by more than USD 216bn since the beginning of the full-scale invasion of Ukraine. As such, despite a decrease in crucial hydrocarbon revenues and mounting financial vulnerabilities, we assess that Russia retains alternative assets that could theoretically be liquidated if needed to enable it to economically sustain the war against Ukraine at least through 2026
(Source: Sibylline)
29 Jan 26. Ukraine Gets 500 km Range Loitering Munitions from France. French company EOS Technologie has delivered its first Rodeur 330 strike drones to Ukraine, AFP reports. A limited number of units have already arrived. The loitering munitions can fly up to 500 kilometers, remain airborne for five hours, and strike targets in fully autonomous mode. The delivery highlights the rapid growth of France’s military drone sector, accelerated by lessons from the war in Ukraine.
EOS Technologie CEO Jean-Marc Zuliani told AFP that Ukrainian forces have gained unparalleled operational experience. According to him, Ukraine currently needs advanced technology more than sheer quantities of equipment, while offering Western manufacturers a real-world testing ground for new systems.
Zuliani described the Rodeur as a potential “shield” for Europe and a “sword” for Ukraine, capable of deep strikes against airbases, defense infrastructure, refineries, and fuel depots inside Russian territory.
The Rodeur 330 combines reconnaissance and strike functions in a single platform. It carries a 4-kilogram payload and uses metric-precision guidance to autonomously hit targets. Two operators can assemble the drone in three minutes and launch it via catapult.
With a 3.3-meter wingspan and a maximum takeoff weight of 25 kilograms, the drone cruises at 120 km/h, can reach altitudes of 5,000 meters, and loiter for up to five hours. Operators require one week of training, with an additional week for maintenance.
EOS Technologie has also partnered with an unnamed major automotive manufacturer, which Zuliani says could produce anywhere from 10,000 to one m drones by 2030. Meanwhile, Ukraine requires roughly 20,000 drones per month, according to Hadrien Canter of French startup Alta Ares, which develops software to improve drone interception rates.
(Source: UAS VISION/EUROMAIDAN)
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