Sponsored by Bertin Exensor
www.exensor.com
—————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————
20 Jan 26. Cuba: ‘State of war’ declaration will increase government scrutiny, arbitrary detention risks. Reports on 18 January indicate that the Cuban National Defense Council has approved ‘plans and measures for the transition to a state of war’, increasing repression risks. The announcement did not specify any further details. This follows a US military operation to capture former Venezuelan president Nicolás Maduro, a close Cuban ally, on 3 January. During the operation, 32 Cuban military personnel (many of whom served as Maduro’s security detail) were killed. According to the Cuban constitution, a state of war may be imposed ‘in the case of military aggression’. Furthermore, the constitution establishes a framework of measures the government may implement during a state of war, including suspending constitutional rights (such as freedom of movement or assembly) and expanding the security forces’ powers. In the short-to-medium term, the Cuban regime is likely to increase scrutiny over individuals perceived to have celebrated Maduro’s capture or who have expressed significant support for the US. If anti-government protests manifest during the ‘state of war’ against the regime’s declaration and measures, arbitrary detention and human rights risks will increase significantly, particularly for media personnel. We assess that the risk of armed conflict will remain elevated, though unilateral US military action in Cuba remains highly unlikely in the short term. (Source: Sibylline)
20 Jan 26. Afghanistan: Blast in capital Kabul underscores ISKP threat, security risks facing Chinese nationals. On 19 January, a bomb blast occurred at a Chinese-run restaurant in the high-security Shahr-e-Naw neighbourhood of the capital Kabul. According to spokesperson for the Afghan Interior Ministry Abdul Mateen Qani, at least seven people were killed, including a Chinese national. Over a dozen people were also injured in the attack. Islamic State – Khorasan Province (ISKP) has claimed responsibility for the incident. The organisation stated that the attacker deliberately targeted Chinese nationals in retaliation for Beijing’s alleged oppression of its ethnic-Uighur population (i.e. a Muslim minority in China) and criticising Kabul’s dealings with Beijing. The attack comes amid China’s growing presence in Afghanistan and its increased investment in the Afghan oil and minerals sector in recent years. We assess that the attack highlights the threat facing the Taliban government from ISKP, despite the authorities’ claims to have eliminated the group. Additionally, the attack is likely to heighten Chinese security concerns regarding its assets and citizens, increasing pressure on the Taliban to enhance security measures. (Source: Sibylline)
20 Jan 26. Philippines: President will almost certainly survive impeachment motion; policy risks will be elevated. On 19 January, Filipino lawyer Andre de Jesus filed an impeachment motion against President Ferdinand Marcos Jr. for allegedly violating the constitution and betraying public trust. The complaint, backed by a senior opposition lawmaker, claims that Marcos is a drug addict who enabled the arrest of former president Rodrigo Duterte in March 2025 under an International Criminal Court (ICC) warrant. There is a remote chance that the House of Representatives will pass the motion, given that Marcos’ allies are in the majority. However, it underscores growing political difficulties for Marcos as he feuds with Vice President Sara Duterte (Rodrigo’s daughter) and faces public dissatisfaction over corruption linked to flood control projects. We assess that policy risks will be elevated ahead of the 2028 presidential election, which Marcos is unable to contest due to term limits. There is a realistic possibility that one of Marcos’ allies will file an impeachment complaint against Sara Duterte over the coming months to undermine her campaign to be the next president. (Source: Sibylline)
20 Jan 26. South Sudan: Opposition Juba offensive likely to escalate conflict along key route in Jonglei state. On 19 January, Wisley Welebe Samson, the deputy chief of staff for operations for the Sudanese People’s Liberation Army-In Opposition (SPLA-IO), reiterated calls for aligned forces to converge on the capital Juba. This comes after the SPLA-IO captured Pajut town in Duk county (Jonglei state) on 16 January, securing a key node on the Pibor Highway along which they will likely push towards the state capital Bor. Fighting along this axis is likely to escalate significantly over the coming days, with witnesses in Bor reporting a substantial build-up of South Sudan People’s Defence Forces (SSPDF) tank and ground units. Similarly, there is a risk of a further escalation in fighting in Eastern Equatoria state as SPLA-IO-aligned forces there push westwards towards Juba. Fighting along these axes will likely substantially disrupt the flow of aid from Juba towards programmes in northern and eastern regions, while driving substantial disruption, placing increasing pressure on available resources. This will increase NGO staff’s exposure to violent crime and the risk of theft of aid materials and resources over the coming months. (Source: Sibylline)
20 Jan 26. Congo (DRC): Rwanda: M23 withdrawal will lower security risks; conflict will persist in rural areas. On 18 January, the Congolese military (FARDC) re-entered Uvira (South Kivu province, DRC) following the withdrawal of the Rwanda-backed M23 rebels. The M23 had previously pledged to withdraw shortly after seizing the city in December 2025 but failed to do so. Government officials stated that the Gatumba border crossing with Burundi will reopen in the coming weeks, moderating risks of shortages and further displacement. The M23’s withdrawal comes as Congolese President Félix Tshisekedi started negotiations with Angola for the latter to mediate a national dialogue and a possible peace process, amid stalling progress in a separate Qatar-backed process. The M23 continues to benefit from such delays, as they allow the group to entrench its control of lucrative mineral deposits in eastern DRC. As such, the withdrawal possibly reflects efforts to undermine a potential Angolan peace process and instead reinvigorate the more favourable Qatar peace process. Nevertheless, while the M23’s withdrawal will moderate immediate and critical security risks within Uvira, we assess that the M23 will likely continue offensive operations in rural areas of South Kivu, sustaining conflict risks. (Source: Sibylline)
20 Jan 26. Moldova: Exit from Russia-led bloc will sustain societal polarisation, destabilisation risks. On 19 January, Moldova’s foreign minister Mihai Popșoi disclosed that the country is taking steps to withdraw from the Russia-led Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). According to him, Moldova has initiated the process of denouncing three agreements which form the basis of its membership in the organisation. Popșoi explained that denouncing these agreements will allow Moldova to state, from a legal standpoint, that it is no longer a member of the CIS. He added that the government expects to finalise the relevant documents by mid-February before they are submitted to parliament. In recent years, Moldova has distanced itself from the CIS, an intergovernmental organisation established after the collapse of the Soviet Union. While Moldova’s steps to finalise its exit from the CIS are almost certainly aimed at reducing Russian influence, any such move will sustain pro-Russia destabilisation attempts and societal polarisation over alignment with the West versus Moscow. However, large-scale protests are unlikely in the short-to-medium term. (Source: Sibylline)
19 Jan 26. Guatemala: Authorities declare 30-day state of siege, underscoring elevated physical security risks. On 18 January, President Bernardo Arévalo declared a nationwide 30-day state of siege. The measure allows the security forces to carry out warrantless detentions and searches of homes if they suspect criminal activity. Arévalo made this decision after members of the Barrio 18 organised crime group (OCG) temporarily gained control over three different prisons and held approximately 46 people hostage. Subsequently, the security forces regained control over the prisons and arrested Barrio 18’s leader Aldo Ochoa (known as ‘El Lobo’). After El Lobo’s recapture was announced, seven police officers were killed in simultaneous armed attacks across nationwide urban centres. We assess that these simultaneous attacks are almost certainly retaliatory actions against the authorities following El Lobo’s recapture and the dismantling of criminal structures within prisons. Further attacks against security forces personnel remain likely in the coming days, elevating short-term physical security risks near police stations and military bases. Additionally, the state of siege will likely result in additional security checkpoints and stop-and-search operations, increasing overland supply chain and transit disruption risks, particularly within major urban centres. (Source: Sibylline)
19 Jan 26. Tajikistan-Afghanistan: Escalation risk will remain low despite uptick in border incidents. On 18 January, Tajikistan’s Committee for National Security (KDAM) announced that border troops killed four suspected terrorists who had crossed into the country illegally from neighbouring Afghanistan at approximately 0030hrs (local time). According to the agency, the group entered Shamsiddin Shohin district (Khatlon region) from a border village in Afghanistan’s Badakhshan province. As per the KDAM, after being located by the Tajik security forces, the individuals refused to surrender and opened fire, which resulted in an exchange of gunfire. The development follows a series of armed incidents along the Afghan-Tajikistani border since late 2025; five Chinese citizens were killed in two separate attacks in November 2025. An uptick in incidents in recent weeks underscores that the border will highly likely remain vulnerable to similar provocations over the long term given its porous and mountainous nature, which complicates patrolling efforts. Continued security threats emanating from Afghanistan will sustain bilateral tensions with Tajikistan over the coming months, though an escalation along the border is unlikely. (Source: Sibylline)
18 Jan 26. Canada – Prime Minister’s Office. The global landscape is rapidly changing, leaving economies, businesses, and workers in a state of uncertainty. In response, Canada is focused on what we can control: securing new trade and investment partnerships so we are not reliant on a single country, but more resilient to global shocks. We are positioning Canada as a strong, reliable partner to secure new capital, develop new export markets, and create new opportunities for Canadian workers and businesses. To advance that mission, the Prime Minister, Mark Carney, travelled to Doha, Qatar – the first-ever visit by a sitting Canadian Prime Minister to the state. The Prime Minister met with the Amir of Qatar, His Highness Sheikh Tamim bin Hamad Al Thani, to discuss increasing trade, commerce, investment, and security cooperation. Upon concluding the visit, the leaders announced a commitment from Qatar to make significant strategic investments in Canadian nation-building projects. These investments will get major projects built faster, supercharge our clean energy, health, AI, and defence industries, and create thousands of high-paying careers and sustained prosperity for Canadian workers. Building on this momentum, the Prime Minister and the Amir issued a joint statement committing to accelerated two-way investment and collaboration across AI, quantum computing, aerospace, defence technologies, advanced manufacturing, agriculture, and agri-food. After years of stalled negotiations, the leaders agreed to conclude negotiations on a new Canada-Qatar Foreign Investment Promotion and Protection Agreement (FIPA) by this summer. This will enable Canadian businesses to more easily expand their operations in, and attract investment from, Qatar – a country with an economy worth nearly $290 bn. Building on this progress, Canada and Qatar agreed to immediately deepen work together on:
- Bilateral trade and investment through the establishment of a Joint Canada-Qatar Commission on Economic, Commercial, and Technical Cooperation.
- Information technology, expanding investment opportunities in areas such as AI and information and computer technology.
- Defence and security, launching negotiations on a framework to facilitate the exchange of expertise on military, security, and defence matters.
- A new double-taxation agreement to make it easier for Canadians to work and invest in Qatar and vice versa, with negotiations starting soon.
To further build this partnership, Prime Minister Carney announced that Canada will:
- Expand air services between the two countries under the Canada-Qatar Air Transport Agreement.
- Establish an office for Canada’s Defence Attaché in Doha to increase the frequency and depth of bilateral engagements that increase exports from Canada’s defence sector.
- Exchange security-related best practices and lessons learned in preparation for the FIFA World Cup 26, as Canada, Mexico, and the United States prepare to co-host this global sporting event.
As Qatar marks the beginning of its 2026 Year of Culture, Prime Minister Carney emphasised the important and growing people-to-people and cultural ties between the two countries. He extended an invitation to His Highness the Amir as well as Qatar’s Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs, His Excellency Sheikh Mohammed bin Abdulrahman bin Jassim Al Thani, to visit Canada in the coming year. While in Doha, the Prime Minister met with the Minister of Public Health of Qatar to reinforce shared priorities in health and life science. He underscored the potential for Canadian companies to grow their footprint in Qatar’s healthcare ecosystem, including in biotechnology and groundbreaking AI-driven health technologies. He also met with Qatari business leaders and heads of the Qatari Investment Authority to explore more opportunities to collaborate, further positioning Canada as a premier destination for global capital and investment. Canada and Qatar are both economies with preeminent resources, with common goals to diversify trade and investment opportunities, with complementary strengths in technology, security, and international leadership. As Canada works to build major new energy projects, scale up our defence capabilities, and build on our leadership in AI and innovative technologies, strengthening our partnership with Qatar will accelerate these missions.
Quote
“Qatar is an effective, expansive, and increasing diplomatic force in the world today. They are a critical partner to Canada in many shared pursuits of peace and stability, from Ukraine to the Middle East. It is a relationship forged over many years by profound acts of friendship, including the Qataris’ effort to evacuate more than 200 Canadians from Afghanistan in 2021. Now we’re elevating our relationship – with an ambitious, new strategic partnership across trade, commerce, investment, AI, and defence – to deliver greater stability, security, and prosperity for our peoples.” — The Rt. Hon. Mark Carney, Prime Minister of Canada
Quick facts
- This was Prime Minister Carney’s first official visit to Qatar and the first-ever visit by a sitting Canadian Prime Minister.
- Nearly 10,000 Canadians live and work in Qatar, contributing across aerospace, artificial intelligence, defence, and agri-food sectors.
- Two-way trade exceeds $325 m, with Québec accounting for nearly half of Canadian exports – driven by aerospace and advanced manufacturing.
- Today, Qatar’s investment in Canada is growing by nearly 20% a year.
- Qatar is the third-largest economy in the Gulf region, offering significant business opportunities for Canadian companies.
- In November 2025, Canada removed the visa requirement for Qatari citizens and introduced electronic travel authorisation eligibility for air travel to facilitate business and leisure travel.
- In 2018, Canada and Qatar initiated negotiations toward a Foreign Investment Promotion and Protection Agreement (FIPA).
Related product
- Prime Minister Carney meets with Amir of Qatar His Highness Sheikh Tamim bin Hamad Al Thani
Associated link
- Canada-Qatar relations
This document is also available at https://pm.gc.ca
SOURCE Prime Minister’s Office. (Source: PR Newswire)
16 Jan 26. Pakistan-Saudi Arabia-Turkey: Potential defence agreement will expand security co-operation. On 14 January, Pakistan’s Defence Production Minister Raza Hayat Harraj confirmed that a ‘Pakistan-Saudi Arabia-Turkey trilateral agreement is something that is already in [the] pipeline.’ The agreement has reportedly been under discussion for over ten months, although the details have not been made public. Harraj clarified that the potential trilateral deal is separate from the mutual defence pact signed between Saudi Arabia and Pakistan last year, under which an attack on either country would be treated as an act of aggression against both. The announcement comes amid reports of Pakistan engaging in talks to sell JF-17 fighter jets to countries in the Middle East, including Saudi Arabia, and following the military conflict with India in May 2025. We assess that the trilateral defence pact will increase the likelihood of joint production agreements, expanded exercise schedules and enhanced access arrangements at ports and logistics facilities. This will significantly strengthen Pakistan’s defence ties and regional security co-operation. (Source: Sibylline)
16 Jan 26. India: Eased restrictions will increase defence industry growth, arms exports over long term. Earlier on 16 January, news reports citing government officials stated that India plans to ease restrictions significantly on foreign firms seeking to invest in Indian defence companies. Under the proposed rules, the cap on foreign direct investment (FDI) in defence firms holding existing licences under the ‘automatic route’ (i.e. where government approval is not required) would increase from 49% to 74%. The government is also considering removing a requirement whereby foreign investment beyond 74% is permitted only if it ‘results in access to modern technology’. Furthermore, the authorities are considering dropping the condition that fully export-oriented defence manufacturers must establish domestic maintenance and support facilities. Foreign investment in India’s defence sector has been limited thus far, totalling USD 26.5 bn out of cumulative foreign inflows worth USD 765 bn over the past 25 years. These proposed changes follow a military conflict with Pakistan in May 2025. We assess that once implemented, the changes will increase foreign investment in India’s defence industry and support higher defence exports in the long term, as India attempts to transition from an arms-importing country to an arms exporter. (Source: Sibylline)
16 Jan 26. Uganda: Incumbent will almost certainly win election, elevating domestic unrest, security risks. Earlier on 16 January, the Electoral Commission of Uganda (ECU) released provisional results showing that incumbent President Yoweri Museveni led the presidential election with 76% of the vote from 45% of polling stations. Opposition leader Robert Kyagulanyi Ssentamu (known as Bobi Wine) alleged that there has been widespread fraud, including ballot-box stuffing and voter intimidation (see Sibylline Alert – 13 January 2026). The final results are expected to be announced on 17 January and will highly likely act as a flashpoint for anti-government unrest in major cities and opposition strongholds, particularly the capital Kampala, Luweero and Mukono (both Central region). Protest attendance in Kampala will likely be bolstered by allegations that the security forces have surrounded Kyagulanyi’s house, placing him under de facto house arrest. If this persists or if the police formally detain or injure Kyagulanyi, the risk of protest escalation will increase. The security forces are highly likely to employ heavy-handed tactics to disperse protesters, including baton charges, tear gas and rubber bullets, driving risks to staff and assets near large gatherings. The authorities are also highly likely to prolong internet and/or telecommunication services disruption, impeding communication with local staff. (Source: Sibylline)
16 Jan 26. Ethiopia: Ammunition seizure highlights risk of Fano attacks, threats to staff. On 15 January, the Ethiopian Federal Police (EFP) seized 56,000 rounds of ammunition in Weldiya (Amhara region) while inspecting a vehicle travelling from Mekelle (Tigray region) to Shewa Robit (Amhara region). The EFP alleged that the ammunition was sent via Eritrea to the ethnic-Amharan ethno-nationalist Fano forces and that the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF) facilitated the transfer. In the coming weeks, belligerent rhetoric between Ethiopia and Eritrea will likely escalate. This will compound already-elevated bilateral tensions, though persistent domestic security challenges will likely prevent military escalation (see Sibylline Special Report – 4 December 2025). The Ethiopian authorities will likely intensify vehicle and cargo inspection protocols along thoroughfares in Amhara and Tigray in the coming weeks, increasing risks of delays to overland movement and staff exposure to petty corruption at checkpoints. However, these efforts are unlikely to curtail the Fano’s capabilities significantly, particularly in rural Amhara. Continued Fano attacks will sustain security risks for locally engaged staff, including those regularly transiting to major cities in Amhara such as Bahir Dar. Furthermore, tensions between Ethiopia’s federal government and the TPLF will almost certainly continue rising in the coming weeks, increasing the risk of clashes between disparate TPLF factions and staff exposure to crossfire. (Source: Sibylline)
—————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————
Founded in 1987, Exensor Technology is a world leading supplier of Networked Unattended Ground Sensor (UGS) Systems providing tailored sensor solutions to customers all over the world. From our Headquarters in Lund Sweden, our centre of expertise in Network Communications at Communications Research Lab in Kalmar Sweden and our Production site outside of Basingstoke UK, we design, develop and produce latest state of the art rugged UGS solutions at the highest quality to meet the most stringent demands of our customers. Our systems are in operation and used in a wide number of Military as well as Homeland Security applications worldwide. The modular nature of the system ensures any external sensor can be integrated, providing the user with a fully meshed “silent” network capable of self-healing. Exensor Technology will continue to lead the field in UGS technology, provide our customers with excellent customer service and a bespoke package able to meet every need.
A CNIM Group Company
————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————-