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NEWS IN BRIEF – UKRAINE CONFLICT

by

Sponsored by Bertin Exensor

 

www.exensor.com

 

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Military And Security Developments

Feb 05.

  • Doubts about Western commitment to Ukraine’s long-term security will encourage Russia to test the credibility of a peace deal; our worst-case scenario sees Russia resuming hostilities in the future.
  • Bolstering Ukraine’s peacetime armed forces will likely prove the most credible direct deterrent against another invasion, though disputes in Europe will undermine the viability of long-term support.
  • NATO-style protections provided by the US will likely remain Ukraine’s preferred security guarantee in the absence of membership in the alliance, which remains a non-starter for Russia.
  • The deployment of Western troops inside Ukraine as part of a peace deal is highly unlikely due to Russian opposition, as well as chronic personnel and equipment constraints across Europe.
  • A UN-mandated peacekeeping mission is highly unlikely; it would likely encounter difficulties given Russian veto powers and the realities of policing an expansive frontline.
  • A reported proposal to offer Ukraine an accelerated path to limited EU membership is unlikely to offer strong security guarantees on its own, though it could reinforce other guarantees over the long term.
  • A Ukrainian nuclear deterrent remains highly unlikely; it would increase rather than decrease the likelihood of a renewed Russian invasion before any such programme could be completed.

Context

Credible security guarantees for Ukraine will play a key role in any peace deal and in deterring a renewed Russian attack. An intensified push by US President Donald Trump in late 2025 spurred talks among various stakeholders about the kind of guarantees Ukraine could receive following a potential peace deal (or at least a ceasefire agreement). These include sending troops to Ukraine as part of a reassurance force, with France and the UK taking a leading role in any such deployment. Meanwhile, reports from late January claimed that the US had signalled that guarantees which ‘mirror’ NATO’s collective defence principle (Article 5) will possibly hinge on territorial concessions, specifically Ukraine agreeing to cede the Donbas to Russia.

Any Western-provided security guarantees will be defined by the precise terms of a peace deal (or the absence of one). In the short term, the West will possibly leverage the promise of credible security guarantees to incentivise Kyiv to accept politically tough concessions (namely regarding territory). Yet given that Russia’s hardline position has changed little in recent years, the Kremlin will retain the ultimate decision as to whether an agreement is in its interests (at least temporarily) or whether it would limit (to unacceptable levels) Russia’s imperial aspirations in Ukraine – meaning the war would likely continue or freeze without resolution.

The West’s ability to offer ironclad, effective guarantees is increasingly undermined by growing transatlantic divergences and doubts about the US’ willingness to commit to Ukraine’s security over the long term. Russia will highly likely seek to exploit these divisions, both in the short term and in the coming years as competing geopolitical priorities provide Moscow with new opportunities. For a guarantee to be credible and to enforce peace effectively (by deterring war), it requires an unambiguous commitment by Ukraine’s partners over the long term. Ultimately, the perceived or real absence of such a commitment remains the key driver influencing Moscow’s strategic calculus on whether the costs of resuming its war at a later date are acceptable. In this respect, we assess that a policy of ‘strategic ambiguity’ – which was favoured prior to the full-scale invasion in 2022 – will highly likely fail to deter future Russian action. If a security guarantee is perceived as weak or ill-defined (and thus lacking in credibility), the likelihood of a resumption of fighting will increase; as such, any peace or ceasefire agreement signed in 2026 may not end the de facto 12-year-long Russo-Ukrainian war

Feb 04.

  • Ukraine: Metallurgy sector financial issues threaten to undermine long-term reconstruction. On 3 February, Ukrainian steelmaker Metinvest failed to reach an agreement with a group of its creditors to restructure more than USD 1.25 bn of debt. Metinvest is attempting to postpone the repayment dates of its three main bonds by around two to three years, due to the financial impact of the Russo-Ukrainian war. The company owned the Azovstal and Illich plants in Mariupol (Donetsk oblast), both of which fell under Russian occupation, resulting in the loss of 65% of its business. Metinvest’s situation reflects the broader state of Ukraine’s steel sector, which has been heavily impacted by the hostilities in eastern Ukraine, where many steel-producing facilities are located. Meanwhile, plants that are in non-occupied regions remain heavily affected by Russian long-range strikes against energy infrastructure, causing significant operational disruption. Facing growing financial difficulties, Ukraine’s metallurgical sector will face rising bankruptcy risks, which would ultimately curtail government tax revenues. In the long term, this threatens to undermine the country’s reconstruction prospects and economic recovery, given the central role steelmakers are expected to play.

Ukraine: Metallurgy sector financial issues threaten to undermine long-term reconstruction. On 3 February, Ukrainian steelmaker Metinvest failed to reach an agreement with a group of its creditors to restructure more than USD 1.25 bn of debt. Metinvest is attempting to postpone the repayment dates of its three main bonds by around two to three years, due to the financial impact of the Russo-Ukrainian war. The company owned the Azovstal and Illich plants in Mariupol (Donetsk oblast), both of which fell under Russian occupation, resulting in the loss of 65% of its business. Metinvest’s situation reflects the broader state of Ukraine’s steel sector, which has been heavily impacted by the hostilities in eastern Ukraine, where many steel-producing facilities are located. Meanwhile, plants that are in non-occupied regions remain heavily affected by Russian long-range strikes against energy infrastructure, causing significant operational disruption. Facing growing financial difficulties, Ukraine’s metallurgical sector will face rising bankruptcy risks, which would ultimately curtail government tax revenues. In the long term, this threatens to undermine the country’s reconstruction prospects and economic recovery, given the central role steelmakers are expected to play.

  • Europe: Vulnerability exploitation underscores increased security risks from Russian threat actors. On 2 February, cyber security company Zscaler reported that a Russian state-sponsored threat group (‘APT28’) has targeted Microsoft Office users in Romania, Slovakia and Ukraine in a cyber operation (‘Neusploit’) since at least 29 January. The group uses phishing emails in both English and local languages to distribute a malicious RTF file, exploiting a software vulnerability (CVE-2026-21509) affecting Microsoft Office products. This ultimately executes two malware droppers (‘MiniDoor’ and ‘PixyNetLoader’) onto compromised systems. The vulnerability was first disclosed on 26 January, highlighting its rapid exploitation. Upon execution, MiniDoor exfiltrates victims’ emails to threat actor-controlled infrastructure, before deploying PixyNetLoader to install additional malicious payloads, maintain persistence and steal other sensitive information. PixyNetLoader reportedly only executes if it is not located in an analysis environment to enhance obfuscation and detection evasion. We assess that this operation signals the continued expansion of Russia’s cyber strategy, underscoring increased security risks to countries particularly in Eastern Europe.

Feb 03.

KEY DEVELOPMENTS 

  • STRIKES: Russian forces likely adjusted their tactics during a temporary moratorium on striking energy facilities (which has now ended) over the past week; there was increased targeting of railway facilities, particularly in Dnipropetrovsk and Zaporizhzhia oblasts
  • GUARANTEES: The FT has reported that Ukraine has agreed to a ‘multi-tiered’ ceasefire enforcement plan involving Europe and the US, though details remain limited and Russia is highly likely to test the credibility of any such commitment, if approved
  • POWs: Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stated on 30 January that Russia has suspended exchanges of prisoners of war (POWs); if accurate, this would likely represent a negative indicator that a peace deal is imminent
  • FORECAST: On 29 January, US President Donald Trump claimed that his Russian counterpart had agreed to refrain from long-range strikes against Kyiv and other urban centres for a week, though strikes on 3 February indicated that the truce is over
  • VOVCHANSK: In recent days, Russian forces have likely intensified their efforts to capture Vovchansk (Kharkiv oblast) which is located just three miles (5km) from the Russian border. Geolocated footage released on 1 February indicates that Russian forces recently advanced in the south of the town. Additionally, a spokesperson for Ukraine’s Joint Forces, Viktor Tregubov, stated on 2 February that the situation was ‘frankly difficult’, explaining that Russian forces were attempting to bypass the town, as well as to infiltrate the remaining Ukrainian-held positions. The battle for Vovchansk has been heavily protracted, with Russian forces getting bogged down soon after their cross-border operation began in May 2024. It remains unclear whether Russian forces have sufficient capabilities in the area to make major advances in the coming weeks, though their rate of advance has increased over the last month or so in contrast to almost no movement over the previous year.
  • INTELLIGENCE: According to the Financial Times (FT), an unnamed Western official has stated that Ukraine’s reliance on US intelligence could be significantly reduced within months. These comments follow French President Emmanuel Macron’s recent claim that France now provides Ukraine with two-thirds of its intelligence needs. While we cannot confirm the veracity of these claims, the report points, at least in part, to an increase in European weapon systems provided to Ukraine. US-manufactured equipment typically requires US intelligence to be able to function and therefore a decrease in those systems likely entails a decrease in corresponding intelligence requirements. However, given that Europe plans to support Ukraine through the purchase of US weapon systems, the extent to which reliance on US intelligence can be reduced remains unclear. The long-term impact on Ukraine’s war effort in the absence of US (primarily CIA) intelligence support also remains unclear; this intelligence support was bolstered in 2014 and has been critical to Ukraine’s war effort.
  • STRIKES: The CEO of SpaceX, Elon Musk, stated on 31 January that the company had successfully halted the Russian military’s ‘unauthorised use’ of the company’s Starlink satellite system to carry out strikes on Ukraine. The announcement was made after the Ukrainian authorities reported in January that Starlink dishes had been discovered among the wreckage of hundreds of Russian long-range drones. The Starlink connection increased the range of the drones and augmented their defence against electronic warfare (EW) measures. We previously reported on the extensive use of Starlink by the Russian military. On 1 February, Ukrainian Defence Minister Mykhailo Fedorov reported that work was in progress to ensure that only authorised Starlink terminals operate in Ukrainian territory in a bid to ensure that only Ukrainian forces are able to access the technology. However, the precise nature of these measures remains unclear; there are potential knock-on disruption risks, not only for military communications, but also for the extensive civilian use of Starlink.
  • STRIKES: Russian forces likely adjusted their tactics during a temporary moratorium on striking energy facilities (which has now ended) over the past week; this likely involves the increased targeting of railway facilities, particularly in Dnipropetrovsk and Zaporizhzhia oblasts. A strike on a rail facility in Synelnykove (Dnipropetrovsk) caused damage to freight cars, electric (train) cars, railway tracks and power grids. The state railway operator Ukrainian Railways (‘Ukrzaliznytsia’) was forced to restrict train services and make greater use of bus replacements between Dnipropetrovsk and Zaporizhzhia. This followed numerous other strikes on fuel trucks and buses in Dnipropetrovsk. On 31 January, Russian forces carried out a so-called ‘double tap’ strike (which is a war crime) on a bus belonging to the Ukrainian energy company DTEK that was transporting coal miners in Dnipropetrovsk, killing 12 civilians. For more analysis of Russian strike patterns, see FORECAST below.
  • STRIKES: On 30 January, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky blamed European leaders for leaving Ukrainian air defences exposed to Russian ballistic missile strikes due to a delay in critical deliveries. Pac-3 interceptor missiles used in Patriot air defence systems – the only type capable of intercepting Russia’s ballistic missiles – allegedly arrived a day late due to a missed payment under the Prioritised Ukraine Requirements List (PURL). Zelensky’s comments indicate that he was referring to a combined strike on 20 January that included 34 ballistic and cruise missiles. His comments also point to the extent of Ukraine’s dependence on foreign military aid to ensure that the country’s air defences remain operational; a single day’s delay is liable to result in serious defensive gaps. Given the intensity of missile strikes, including the largest such strike of the year on 3 February (see FORECAST below), Ukraine’s air defences will almost certainly remain insufficient to prevent major disruption to the country’s energy grid in the short-to-medium term.

POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS

  • GUARANTEES: Earlier on 3 February, the FT reported that Ukraine has agreed to a ‘multi-tiered’ ceasefire enforcement plan involving Europe and the US. According to unspecified insiders, a Russian violation would trigger a response within 24 hours, starting with a ‘diplomatic warning’ and necessary military action by the Ukrainian army. If hostilities continued after that, forces from the so-called ‘Coalition of the Willing’ would intervene. However, of the countries within this coalition, only France and the UK have formally pledged to send troops to Ukraine in the event of a peace deal (in any case, we assess that their deployment would be highly unlikely as part of any peace deal). The FT’s report does not specify the other roles that those countries which have not agreed to send troops to Ukraine would be expected to play; details concerning logistics are similarly vague. The last tier envisions that, in the case of an expanded attack 72 hours after the initial breach, a co-ordinated military response by a ‘Western-backed force’ involving the US military would ensue.
  • GUARANTEES: While we cannot confirm the report, our assessment remains that (genuinely) credible and robust security guarantees would prove crucial components for deterring renewed Russian aggression. However, a ‘diplomatic warning’ is unlikely to deter Russia, which has broken numerous ceasefires since the Russo-Ukrainian war de facto began in 2014. If implemented, Russia would highly likely seek to test the capability and will of the West (particularly the US) to act. If Moscow perceives that Kyiv’s Western partners are preoccupied with domestic or other international crises or do not want a long-term embroilment in Ukraine, the credibility of the guarantees is likely to be insufficient to deter subsequent Russian military action. The likelihood of renewed aggression will be elevated if a ceasefire agreement does not grant Russia the territories that it desires in Ukraine’s Donbas region. Additional analysis on Ukrainian security guarantees will be issued in a forthcoming Special Report.
  • NEGOTIATIONS: Another round of peace talks between Russia, Ukraine and the US is due to take place on 4 and 5 February in Abu Dhabi (UAE), though the prospect of an imminent, major breakthrough remains low. Trilateral negotiations were widely expected to resume on 1 February, though it is unclear why they were delayed. Separately, the Russian envoy, Kirill Dmitriev, met US officials on 31 January in Miami (US) for bilateral negotiations, which US Special Envoy Steve Witkoff described as ‘productive and constructive’. The upcoming talks come amid a renewed push by the US since late 2025 to broker an end to the Russo-Ukrainian war. Despite an ‘agreement’ to halt Russian long-range strikes against Ukrainian energy infrastructure temporarily (see FORECAST), the talks have thus far yielded few tangible steps towards peace (and are unlikely to in the near term).
  • NEGOTIATIONS: Russia maintains that a meeting between Russian President Vladimir Putin and President Zelensky can only be held in Moscow (Russia), which Kyiv will almost certainly continue to oppose for clear security (and symbolic) reasons. On 2 February, the Kremlin press secretary, Dmitry Peskov, dismissed the prospect of the two leaders meeting in a neutral jurisdiction. Presidential aide Yuri Ushakov claimed on 28 January that Moscow would guarantee Zelensky’s safety should he visit for face-to-face talks with Putin. However, the Ukrainian president will almost certainly not travel to Moscow for a myriad of reasons, namely low levels of mutual trust and security concerns. In a similar vein, the prospect of Putin travelling to Kyiv (Ukraine) for talks with Zelensky is remote. Ultimately, Russia’s insistence that presidential talks should be held in Moscow is highly likely a means to avoid a Putin-Zelensky summit, amid continued US pressure for such a meeting.
  • POWs: President Zelensky stated on 30 January that Russia has suspended exchanges of prisoners of war (POWs); if accurate, this would likely represent a negative indicator that a peace deal is imminent. According to Zelensky, the Russian side stopped the prisoner swaps due to a lack of interest and because Moscow does not see the benefit of such an arrangement. Zelensky stated that the last exchange of POWs was conducted on 2 October 2025. The two sides have exchanged POWs on several occasions throughout the full-scale invasion of Ukraine, including many such swaps in 2025.
  • POWs: We previously assessed that these exchanges allow for trust building and lower-level co-operation between the warring parties that would likely assist in negotiations aimed at ending the war at a later date. The current heads of the Russian and Ukrainian negotiating delegations, Admiral Igor Kostykov and Lieutenant General Kyrylo Budanov (the head and former head of both countries’ military intelligence, respectively), have both been heavily involved in POW negotiations in recent years. If such negotiations have been suspended, it remains unclear whether this is because the focus has switched to other areas (as some officials indicated during the recent trilateral negotiations in the UAE), or whether negotiations are being stalled. POW exchanges have long been an important litmus test for continued direct (albeit lower level) negotiations between the two sides. As such, Russia’s potential disengagement from POW exchanges further reinforces our assessment that significant advancements towards peace are unlikely in the near term.

FORECAST

TRUCE: On 29 January, US President Donald Trump claimed that his Russian counterpart had agreed to refrain from long-range strikes against Kyiv and other Ukrainian urban centres for a week amid extremely low temperatures. President Zelensky later disclosed that negotiators had discussed the matter during the first round of trilateral negotiations, which took place on 23 and 24 January, and indicated that the supposed moratorium would apply to energy infrastructure.

However, subsequent statements from the Kremlin indicated possible misinterpretation or misunderstanding of the scope of the supposed ‘truce’, which has now very much ended. According to Peskov, Trump had asked Putin to halt strikes targeting only Kyiv and to create ‘favourable conditions for negotiations’ until 1 February. Meanwhile, President Zelensky stated earlier on 3 February that the truce was to begin on 30 January and to last for one week (meaning a likely end date of 6 February). At the time of Trump’s announcement, it was unclear whether this energy truce had already entered into force or when it was due to do so, as well as which other Ukrainian cities it would apply to.

Ambiguities and vaguely defined terms increase the likelihood of ceasefires being violated (either deliberately or inadvertently) or failing to hold; previous US-brokered temporary agreements have also resulted in much confusion. By ‘agreeing’ to a temporary cessation of strikes against Ukraine’s energy infrastructure, Russia highly likely wanted to present itself as willing to negotiate and act in good faith, even if it possibly intentionally misinterpreted the length of a supposed truce. Despite showing limited willingness to take genuine steps towards peace, Moscow highly likely wants to avoid alienating the Trump administration, given it has previously shown some alignment on Russia’s terms on which to end the war.

Russia’s large-scale overnight strikes on 2-3 February definitively ended the ‘truce’ and reinforced our previous assessment that a short pause would enable Russia to stockpile for more intensive strikes in the aftermath of the moratorium. Russia’s large-scale combined strike focused primarily on targeting energy infrastructure when overnight temperatures in Kyiv reached below -20 C (-4 F). In total, 521 projectiles were fired, including 71 ballistic and cruise missiles, primarily in the direction of Dnipropetrovsk, Kharkiv, Kyiv, Odesa and Vinnytsia oblasts (all Ukraine). According to the Ukrainian energy company DTEK, the company’s thermal power stations were ‘significantly damaged’ in the attack, which marked the ninth large-scale attack on DTEK power plants since October 2025. DTEK described the attack as the most significant against the country’s energy infrastructure of 2026 so far. According to preliminary data provided by Ukraine’s air force, 38 missiles and 412 drones were intercepted – indicating a significant percentage of the missiles penetrated Ukraine’s defences and likely struck their targets.

We assess that energy security risks will remain heightened in the coming weeks amid continued low temperatures. In turn, humanitarian risks will remain elevated across different urban centres, including the capital Kyiv, where an exodus of citizens has occurred due to the energy emergency. As such, the likelihood of further scheduled and emergency blackouts will remain elevated, which will undermine business operations (particularly for entities involved in energy-intensive work) across Ukraine.

Prior to the 3 February strikes, Zelensky had signalled a level of Russian compliance with the truce; it also remains unlikely that the potential Russian ‘misunderstanding’ will prompt a hardline US diplomatic response. The timelines and details of what was agreed remain unclear. Nevertheless, the Ukrainian president stated on 2 February that Russia had not carried out any missile or drone strikes against Ukrainian energy infrastructure in the past 24 hours. Similarly, he did not report any strikes against energy targets overnight on 29-30 January. This partial adherence to the US-brokered agreement possibly provides Moscow with diplomatic cover amid trilateral negotiations, which are due to restart on 4 and 5 February in Abu Dhabi. However, it remains unlikely that the Trump administration will punish Moscow severely, despite Zelensky’s open accusation that the Kremlin ‘took advantage’ of the US proposal. If further such temporary or more substantial truces are to hold in the future, the conditions of any such agreements must be detailed and clearly spelled out; a ground ceasefire agreed under similarly unclear conditions will only increase the already elevated likelihood of violations and collapse.

  • Russia-Ukraine: Tiered ceasefire violation plan alone is unlikely to deter future Russian hostilities. Earlier on 3 February, the Financial Times reported that Ukraine has agreed to a ‘multi-tiered’ ceasefire enforcement plan involving Europe and the US. According to unspecified insiders, a Russian violation would trigger a response within 24 hours, starting with a ‘diplomatic warning’ and necessary military action by the Ukrainian army. If hostilities continued after that, forces from the so-called ‘Coalition of the Willing’ would intervene. In the case of an expanded attack 72 hours after the initial breach, a co-ordinated military response by a ‘Western-backed force’ involving the US military would ensue. While we cannot confirm the report, our assessment remains that credible, robust security guarantees would prove crucial components for deterring renewed Russian aggression. However, a ‘diplomatic warning’ is unlikely to deter Russia, which has broken numerous ceasefires since the Russo-Ukrainian war de facto began in 2014. If implemented, Russia would highly likely seek to test the capability and will of the West (particularly the US) to act. If Moscow perceives that Kyiv’s Western partners are preoccupied or do not want a long-term embroilment in Ukraine, the credibility of the guarantees is likely to be insufficient to deter subsequent Russian military action (particularly if a ceasefire agreement does not grant Russia the territories that it desires in Ukraine’s Donbas region).

Feb 02.

  • Russia-Ukraine: Prospect of significant breakthrough in next US-brokered peace talks remains low. On 1 February, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky said another round of peace talks between his country, Russia and the US is due to take place on 4 and 5 February in Abu Dhabi (UAE). Trilateral negotiations were widely expected to resume on 1 February, though Zelensky did not specify why they had been postponed. Neither Russia nor the US have confirmed the new date of the talks at the time of writing, however. The slated talks come amid a renewed push from the US since late 2025 to broker an end to the Russo-Ukrainian war, with territory remaining one of the key sticking points in negotiations. Despite an uptick in diplomatic activity and negotiations in recent weeks, we continue to assess that the likelihood of a major breakthrough towards peace remains low in the near term. (For further analysis of our expected scenarios and outcomes of the war in Ukraine. (Source: Sibylline)

 

04 Feb 26. Ukraine’s Gripen jets likely to come with long-reach Meteor missiles. Ukraine and Sweden are discussing the prospect of arming Kyiv with Europe’s top air-to-air missile, the Meteor, which a Saab official said would be a “natural content” of a weapon package for Gripen users. Ukrainian Defense Minister Mykhailo Fedorov announced last week that the country was discussing the potential transfer of JAS 39 Gripen jets and Meteor missiles to the war-torn country. These beyond-visual range, air-to-air missiles can currently only be integrated on the Gripen, Eurofighter, and the Rafale fighter jets, although the United Kingdom is leading ground-based integration testing on the F-35.

“The Meteor missile would be a natural content in a weapon package for any Gripen user, discussions are taking place with several export nations, including Ukraine,” Jussi Halmetoja, operations advisor in the air domain at Saab told Defense News at the Singapore Airshow here.

Halmetoja added that the Meteor missiles would enhance Ukraine’s operations by providing pilots with extended engagement ranges, denying Russian aircraft freedom of movement and control of the air.

Late last year, Ukraine and Sweden signed a letter of intent to export up to 150 Gripen fighter jets to Kyiv, although no final deal has been concluded.

The Meteor is 419-pound (190 kilo) munition manufactured by MBDA that first entered into service with the Swedish Air Force on the Gripen in 2016. It was developed in a joint project of six European countries, including Sweden, and led by MBDA.  It uses a rocket booster as well as a throttleable ramjet motor that can continue to power the missile until impact, allowing for late-stage maneuverability. That capability increases its kill-zone compared to more common rocket-powered air-to-air missiles that coast after their initial boost. Saab lists Meteor’s range as more than 100 kilometers and its speed at over Mach 4, though the range is regularly reported as being around 200 kilometers. Meteor was “arguably the most capable AAM currently in service on Western combat aircraft,” the London-based International Institute for Security Studies wrote in a report in September 2022. Last year, Sweden procured its third batch of Meteor missiles destined for the Gripen aircraft. The acquisition was done through international cooperation, whereby the British arm of MBDA is the one providing the systems. (Source: Defense News)

 

02 Feb 26. Ukraine’s “counter-UAS interception rate fell from 84% in November to 81% in December.” Ukraine’s rate of Russian drones fell to 81% in December 2025, down from 84% in November 2025, according to a new publication Ukraine Air War Monitor published by Foundation Office Ukraine/Konrad Adenauer Foundation.

“In December, 987 drones could not be intercepted (previous month: 844). Interception rates for ballistic missiles and cruise missiles changed little: approximately 25% of ballistic missiles were intercepted, and an average of 85% of cruise missiles,” said the publication.  In December, Russia deployed 5,131 drones against Ukrainian cities and civilian targets (6% fewer than in the previous month), as well as 120 cruise missiles and 57 ballistic missiles, according to the publication. For the first time, the use of an Iskander-1000 missile was reported. Medium-range ballistic missiles (IRBMs) of the Oreshnik type are expected to be stationed in Belarus.

The Ukraine Air War Monitor reports:

“In 2025, the Russian army carried out approximately 56,700 air attacks, primarily using long-range drones (96% of all attacks), against civilian targets in Ukraine — more than four times as many as in 2024 (13,300). In 15 nights in 2025, attacks involving more than 500 drones were recorded. Drone defense remained the greatest challenge for the Ukrainian Air Force. The interception rate for long-range drones fell from 98% in February to as low as 80% in October.

Ukraine was able to restrict Russian drone production through targeted strikes on factories and supplier companies. From August 2025 onward, the number of Russian long-range drones deployed declined steadily. China remains the most important supporter of Russia’s drone production.”

For more information: https://www.kas.de/en/web/ukraine/blickpunkt-ukraine/detail/-/content/ukraine-air-war-monitor-vol-xi (Source: www.unmannedairspace.info)

 

02 Feb 26. SpaceX Disables Starlink Terminals on Russian Strike Drones. According to Ukrainian authorities, Russian forces recently began using attack drones fitted with Starlink terminals to strike military targets inside Ukraine. The issue was raised urgently with SpaceX after drones using satellite connectivity were detected operating over Ukrainian cities. Ukraine’s Minister of Defence, Mykhailo Fedorov, said his team contacted SpaceX immediately and proposed technical steps to halt the unauthorized use. On January 29, he wrote that within hours of the reports, the ministry had shared concrete solutions. He later confirmed that SpaceX responded quickly and started implementing restrictions to disable Starlink terminals when used on Russian unmanned systems. Fedorov thanked SpaceX President Gwynne Shotwell and Elon Musk for the swift response. Open-source monitoring groups from Ukraine and Russia reported that the countermeasures include speed-based restrictions. Starlink terminals are disabled when movement exceeds roughly 75–90 kilometers per hour, preventing use on fast-moving platforms such as strike drones while preserving service for ground users and slower systems. The steps were aimed at drones such as the BM-35 and “Molniya,” reportedly modified to carry Starlink terminals for long-range navigation and command-and-control. Musk said the measures appeared effective and invited feedback if more was needed. Fedorov replied that the first actions were already producing results and that coordination would continue.

Serhii Beskrestnov (“Flash”), an adviser to Fedorov, said many Ukrainian users were already observing the countermeasures. He noted that current steps are temporary and will be replaced by a broader, long-term solution.

Beskrestnov also emphasized the need to gather nationwide information on military Starlink users, acknowledging past reluctance among soldiers using volunteer-provided terminals. Starlink has been central to Ukraine’s communications since early 2022, supporting military and civilian connectivity during attacks on infrastructure. (Source: UAS VISION/Defence Blog; Ukrinform)

 

30 Jan 26. Russia’s Starlink-equipped Geran drones increase Ukraine’s counter-UAS challenges. According to multiple media reports, Ukraine’s Defence Minister Mykhailo Fedorov has been intalks with Elon Musk’s SpaceX over concerns that Russian drones have started to use internet services from Starlink satellites during attacks on Ukrainian cities. New versions of Russian Shahed/Gern drones have been identified by Ukranian forces equipped with Starlink terminals which feature command-and-control and video/telemetry links which are extremely difficult to detect and jam. According to Mykhailo Fedorov in a social media post: “Within hours of Russian drones with Starlink connectivity appearing over Ukrainian cities, the Ministry of Defence team promptly contacted SpaceX and proposed ways to resolve the problem…I’m grateful to SpaceX President Gwynne Shotwell and personally to Elon Musk for their swift response.” The last few months have seen a rapid evolution of the Geran range of drones, with Geran-4 drones now capable of reaching 350–500 km/h and Geran-5s equipped with a 90 kg warhead and a 1,000 km range, both of which can be air launched, extending range even further. The addition of Starklink to the Geran family, and other long-range Russian drones, will make the counter-UAS challenges for Ukraine even more difficult.

According to the Odessa Journal:

“(Starlink) terminals have been recorded on long-range Shahed kamikaze drones with ranges of up to 2,000 km; on tactical FPV drones of the Molniya series, including the Molniya-2 and Molniya-2R variants, actively used since December 2025 by the Rubikon unit; and on the long-range BM-35 drone, recorded with Starlink in January 2026 during strikes on Dnipro and Odessa.”

For more information: https://www.euronews.com/2026/01/29/ukraine-contacts-spacex-over-russian-drones-allegedly-using-starlink-officials-say

https://odessa-journal.com/russia-uses-starlink-to-boost-uav-reconnaissance-and-strikes-bypassing-sanctions-via-third-countries (Source: www.unmannedairspace.info)

 

26 Jan 26. Ukraine MoD appoints defence technology adviser and discusses US air defence support. The Minister of Defence of Ukraine, Mykhailo Fedorov, has appointed Serhii “Flash” Beskrestnov as adviser on defence technology.   Fedorov noted that “Flash” is among the leading practical experts in drones, electronic warfare and the analysis of enemy decision-making. “He was the first to report on the use by Russians of FPV drones equipped with machine vision, as well as the use of jet-powered Shahed drones. His current primary focus is on systemic solutions to counter Russian strike and reconnaissance drones.” In addition to advising Fedorov on defense technology, “Flash” will also analyse captured enemy equipment and evaluate new military developments.   The appointment follows Fedorov’s meeting last week with Julie S. Davis, the U.S. Chargé d’Affaires in Ukraine. Fedorov thanked the US for its assistance and spoke about ongoing work with partners to extend the long-term supply of critical U.S.-made defence technology.

“To protect the sky, it is crucial to have, as soon as possible, a clear forecast of air defence missile deliveries for this year and to build reliable supplies for the years to come,” Fedorov stated.

Both parties also discussed the organisation of joint analytics on the use of key US systems, including Patriot, HIMARS and others, drawing on battlefield data to enable both countries to jointly advance these systems and improve their effectiveness.

“We also gave particular attention to implementing the large-scale Drone Deal,” Fedorov said. “We are working to enable US partners to directly test Ukrainian drones without unnecessary bureaucracy.” (Source: www.unmannedairspace.info)

 

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