News in Brief

Sponsored by Bertin Exensor

 

www.exensor.com

 

—————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————-

23 Oct 25. Ecuador: Strike suspension, military deployments will reduce short-term domestic unrest risks. On 22 October, the Confederation of Indigenous Nationalities of Ecuador (CONAIE) announced the end of its nationwide strike. The decision comes after President Daniel Noboa authorised the military’s deployment to clear roadblocks, including on the Panamericana Norte E35 highway, while concentrating efforts in Imbabura province. CONAIE’s president Marlon Vargas has stated that the alliance decided to end the strike to ‘protect the lives of our people’. However, Vargas issued a series of demands, including the demilitarisation of Imbabura and the release of detainees. Since 22 September, CONAIE members have protested against President Noboa’s decision to remove diesel subsidies. Protests and clashes with the security forces have killed three people and injured hundreds more. Although it is unclear whether CONAIE intends to resume protests if its demands are not met, we assess that the maintenance of military deployments across Imbabura will highly likely deter protest action in the coming days. Domestic unrest and physical security risks will significantly decrease in the short term for emergency services and media personnel operating across Imbabura. Furthermore, ending the strike will decrease disruption risks for the extractive sector operating out of Imbabura. However, ethno-social tensions will remain elevated unless CONAIE’s demands are met. Violent unrest and clashes will possibly resume if President Noboa sustains military deployments in Imbabura in the coming months. (Source: Sibylline)

 

23 Oct 25. North Korea: Missile tests possible ahead of APEC summit; unlikely to pose direct security threat. Earlier on 23 October, North Korea’s state-owned news organisation Korean Central News Agency (KCNA) announced that the authorities successfully tested two hypersonic missiles on October 22, representing a ‘new cutting-edge weapons system’. The missiles were reportedly launched from Ryokpho district towards the north-east of the country and landed within North Korea. This was North Korea’s first missile test since May and comes days before South Korea hosts the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) summit in Gyeongju (North Gyeongsang province) from 31 October to 1 November. Further provocative missile tests are a realistic possibility ahead of and during the summit. However, we assess that North Korea does not intend to initiate a conflict at present; consequently, any tests are unlikely to pose a direct security threat to South Korea. Meanwhile, speculation continues about a possible meeting between North Korean leader Kim Jong-un and US President Donald Trump during the latter’s visit to South Korea for the APEC summit. While a meeting is not necessarily likely, Seoul has not ruled it out. Even if the meeting were to materialise, we assess that a notable outcome is unlikely, as North Korea remains unwilling to consider denuclearisation. (Source: Sibylline)

 

23 Oct 25. US-Latin America: Military strikes in Pacific Ocean will sustain regional tensions, risk of land strikes. On 22 October, US Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth announced that the US had conducted strikes on vessels suspected of carrying illicit drugs in the eastern Pacific Ocean. These mark the eighth and ninth known strikes against such vessels by the US military since 2 September, and the first made outside of the Caribbean Sea. On the same day, US President Donald Trump stated that his administration has the legal authority to carry out strikes on vessels transporting drugs near Venezuela but may seek to notify Congress before hitting any targets on land. This escalation indicates it is highly likely that the US will maintain an enhanced military presence across the region in the coming months. Trump is likely to utilise military strikes more frequently, alongside the threat of economic penalties, to pressure regional governments to increase their security operations. We assess that such pressure will be applied assertively to Colombia, Ecuador and Venezuela in the short term. Increased regional tensions and ongoing military activity will sustain elevated disruption risks for maritime trade operating across the region. (Source: Sibylline)

 

21 Oct 25. Russia: Expanded presidential powers over economy will increase regulatory framework risks. Media reports from 20 October indicated that the Russian Ministry of Finance has drafted legislative amendments to allow the president to impose currency restrictions via decree. As a result of the amendments, the president will be able to ban or limit certain payments, impose restrictions on the amount, timing or currency used in transactions and require special licences or reserve deposits. Presidential decrees will reportedly also define how these restrictions are enforced by federal agencies and banks. The bill expands presidential authority over currency regulation, further centralising economic power in the Kremlin and reducing the Central Bank’s autonomy. This development also likely reflects the Kremlin’s efforts to prepare the economy for a protracted war in Ukraine by strengthening the president’s ability to take emergency economic and financial measures. Ultimately, the measures will increase regulatory uncertainty for businesses; restrictive presidential decrees on currency control are likely to raise operating costs and complicate international transactions. (Source: Sibylline)

 

21 Oct 25. US-Australia: Critical minerals agreement will likely decrease supply chain disruption risks. On 20 October, US President Donald Trump and Australian Prime Minister Anthony Albanese signed a critical minerals agreement to counter China’s dominance in the sector (see Sibylline Situation Update Brief – 16 September 2025). Furthermore, President Trump also indicated his support for a strategic nuclear-powered submarine deal to strengthen security in the Indo-Pacific region. Under the critical minerals deal, each country will invest USD 1 bn into mining and processing projects and set a minimum price floor for critical minerals over the next six months. The White House statement did not specify which critical minerals or locations would be prioritised; however, it signalled that it would target deposits worth USD 53 bn. Subsequently, the US Export-Import Bank also announced that it had sent letters of interest to seven Australian firms to advance critical mineral projects. These investments will likely strengthen Western supply chains for critical minerals and reduce the vulnerabilities associated with Chinese export controls on rare earth minerals. In the long term, these investments will likely decrease supply chain disruption risks across sectors, including in aerospace, communications equipment, defence systems and technology (i.e. semiconductors), by reducing input costs and export compliance risks. (Source: Sibylline)

 

20 Oct 25. Afghanistan-Pakistan: Tensions, risk of attacks along border will persist despite ceasefire agreement. On 19 October, Afghanistan and Pakistan agreed to a ceasefire. Afghan Taliban spokesperson Zabihullah Mujahid announced that ‘neither country will undertake any hostile actions against the other, nor will they [Afghanistan] support groups carrying out attacks against the government of Pakistan’, with both sides refraining ‘from targeting each other’s security forces, civilians or critical infrastructure’. A follow-up meeting between representatives of the two countries will take place in Turkey on 25 October. The announcement follows talks in Doha (Qatar), mediated by Qatar and Turkey. The development comes after reported Pakistani airstrikes in the capital Kabul and Paktika province (both Afghanistan), as well as armed clashes along the border in the past week. Afghan Defence Minister Mullah Yaqoob has stated that issues regarding the Durand line (i.e. an international border recognised by Pakistan but not by Afghanistan) were not discussed during the ceasefire talks. A such, we assess that ceasefire violations are likely, with a realistic possibility of sporadic border clashes in the coming days and weeks, sustaining the risk of renewed hostilities. Additionally, given that Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) was not a party to the talks, militant activity by TTP will highly likely continue to target the security forces in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province (Pakistan), further driving tensions. (Source: Sibylline)

———————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————-

Founded in 1987, Exensor Technology is a world leading supplier of Networked Unattended Ground Sensor (UGS) Systems providing tailored sensor solutions to customers all over the world. From our Headquarters in Lund Sweden, our centre of expertise in Network Communications at Communications Research Lab in Kalmar Sweden and our Production site outside of Basingstoke UK, we design, develop and produce latest state of the art rugged UGS solutions at the highest quality to meet the most stringent demands of our customers. Our systems are in operation and used in a wide number of Military as well as Homeland Security applications worldwide. The modular nature of the system ensures any external sensor can be integrated, providing the user with a fully meshed “silent” network capable of self-healing. Exensor Technology will continue to lead the field in UGS technology, provide our customers with excellent customer service and a bespoke package able to meet every need.

A CNIM Group Company

——————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————–

Sponsored by Bertin Exensor

 

www.exensor.com

 

————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————-

Military And Security Developments

Oct 24.

• Syria-Israel: Persistent cross-border smuggling will increase risk of armed clashes. On 23 October, the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) foiled an attempt to smuggle firearms from Syria into Lebanon in the Mount Hermon area (Quneitra governorate, Syria). The IDF confiscated assault rifles and detained several suspects at the scene. Notably, this is the second time within a week that the IDF has foiled a smuggling operation in the same region. These developments underscore the substantial engagement in arms and narcotics smuggling by local clans affiliated with Lebanese Hizballah (LH) along the Syria-Lebanon border, elevating the risk of clashes between these groups and the IDF in the coming weeks. Israeli operations in Syria will drive an increased risk of attacks on Israeli positions in Syria by rogue jihadist elements but incidents of misfire and/or direct clashes between the IDF and Syrian security forces are unlikely.

Oct 23.

• Israel-Palestinian Territories: ICJ opinion on Israel’s obligations in Gaza will elevate reputational risks. On 22 October, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) issued an advisory opinion stating that Israel must ensure the basic needs of the local population and support UN relief efforts, including through the UN Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA). However, since the ICJ’s opinion is non-binding, we assess that Israel is highly unlikely to resume co-operation with UNRWA, having previously accused the agency of lacking impartiality. Regardless of Israel’s compliance, the ICJ’s opinion is likely to provoke further international scrutiny of humanitarian conditions in Gaza, increasing diplomatic tensions, particularly with Western allies. Israel’s failure to fully comply with the ICJ’s opinion will likely be interpreted as a failure to address the humanitarian crisis in Gaza. This will increase the likelihood of Western countries (particularly EU member states) imposing further restrictions and sanctions on Israel-based firms deemed to be challenging aid provisions or operating in the West Bank. This will raise compliance, operational and financial risks, especially for businesses in the banking, technology and defence sectors. A continuation of the ongoing crisis will likely heighten reputational risks for entities linked to the Israeli government and security forces

Oct 22.

KEY DEVELOPMENTS

IRAN

• Following the expiration of the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), Iran will highly likely attempt to expand its nuclear programme and work alongside China and Russia to undermine sanctions compliance.
• Iran has continued reconstruction activities at several nuclear facilities, driving the risk of a resumption of Israeli airstrikes in the medium-to-long term.
• Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei gave a speech in which he criticised US President Donald Trump, underscoring the diminishing prospects for a nuclear agreement in the short term. Khamenei’s appearance also prompted increasing concerns regarding his health and longevity, highlighting the risk of intensifying factionalism in the coming months.

ISRAEL

• A draft law to annex parts of the West Bank (Palestinian Territories) highlights increasing government instability and internal tensions, and therefore elevated policy risks in the coming months.

PALESTINIAN TERRITORIES

• GAZA STRIP: Efforts by the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) to increase the visibility of the ‘yellow line’s’ boundary will reduce the risk of civilian trespass, though security risks close to the line will remain elevated.
• GAZA STRIP: Armed clashes between militants and IDF troops, followed by airstrikes, highlight the fragility of the ceasefire and the elevated risks in Gaza’s central camps.
• PALESTINIAN TERRITORIES: On 22 October, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) issued an advisory opinion on Israel’s obligations as an occupying power in the Palestinian Territories; this will likely trigger renewed scrutiny of humanitarian conditions in Gaza.

IRAN

• Following the expiration of the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), Iran will highly likely attempt to expand its nuclear programme and work alongside China and Russia to undermine sanctions compliance. On 18 October, the UN Security Council (UNSC) resolution that codified the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) expired. Subsequently, Iran’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs announced that Iran no longer considers the JCPOA’s restrictions, monitoring clauses and reporting mechanisms to be legally binding. The statement almost certainly indicates that Iran does not intend to allow international monitors access to nuclear facilities in the coming months and will highly likely attempt to resume the domestic enrichment of uranium beyond JCPOA-established limits in the medium to long term (see below). Also on 18 October, representatives from China, Iran and Russia announced that they had issued a letter to UN Secretary General António Gutteres disputing the legality of the UNSC’s reimposition of UN sanctions on Iran (see Sibylline Middle East Crisis Update – 29 September 2025). The letter underscores China and Russia’s likely efforts to hinder compliance from UN member states with UNSC directives to reimpose pre-2015 sanctions on Iran. Inconsistent sanctions enforcement will increase sanctions exposure risks for regionally engaged firms, particularly those in the financial and shipping industries. Additionally, firms engaging with Chinese and/or Russian intermediaries in these industries will face greater due diligence requirements and possibly increased regulatory scrutiny from states that do enforce sanctions on Iran. Even so, such efforts are unlikely to entirely mitigate the impact of Western sanctions on Iran in the short to medium term, which will likely continue to undermine socio-economic health conditions.
• Iran has continued reconstruction activities at several nuclear facilities, driving the risk of a resumption of Israeli airstrikes in the medium-to-long term. On 16 October, the Institute for Science and International Security (ISIS) published reports indicating that Iran has begun to re-establish tunnel access to the Isfahan nuclear facility (Isfahan province). During the Israel-Iran war, Israeli and US airstrikes caused significant damage to the facility, which had previously held stockpiles of medium-enriched uranium. While the ISIS’ findings indicate that Iran is not seeking to re-establish access to damaged centrifuges or stockpile storage facilities, satellite imagery indicates that Iran is attempting to reinforce access tunnels and possibly protect the facility against future airstrikes. Subsequently, on 20 October, ISIS published a report indicating that Iran has resumed construction activity at the former Taleghan 2 site within the Parchin nuclear complex (Tehran province). Israel destroyed the Taleghan 2 site in an airstrike in October 2024, and subsequent reconstruction efforts ceased during the Iran-Israel war. The Parchin nuclear complex is central to Iran’s nuclear research and development programme, and reconstruction efforts possibly indicate that Iran aims to resume limited nuclear research activities in the coming months. Concerns that Iran seeks to reconstitute its nuclear research and development programme rapidly will increase the risk of Israeli strikes targeting nuclear facilities in the coming months, particularly if Iran attempts to access stockpiles or construct advanced centrifuge facilities within hardened facilities.
• Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei gave a speech in which he criticised US President Donald Trump, underscoring the diminishing prospects for a nuclear agreement in the short term. Khamenei’s appearance also prompted increasing concerns regarding his health and longevity, highlighting the risk of intensifying factionalism in the coming months. On 20 October, Khamenei criticised public offers from President Trump to resume nuclear negotiations and characterised the US’ approach to negotiations as an ‘imposition’ and ‘bullying’. The speech underscored the diminishing prospects for productive nuclear negotiations between Iran and the US in the short term. The speech also marked one of Khamenei’s first public appearances in recent weeks, amid rising concerns regarding his well-being and longevity. Lately, the former president, Hassan Rouhani, has become an increasingly vocal critic of Khamenei’s leadership, prompting speculation that he is attempting to reassume leadership of Iran’s reformist political factions. In the coming months, Rouhani will likely continue to try to establish himself as a key figure in succession proceedings following Khamenei’s death or incapacitation, contributing to entrenched high-level factionalism within Iran’s executive. Increasing competition between reformist and principalist factions will likely continue triggering deadlock within Iran’s executive in the coming months, compounding the risk of major government instability in the event of Khamenei’s death.

ISRAEL 

• A draft law to annex parts of the West Bank (Palestinian Territories) highlights increasing government instability and internal tensions, and therefore elevated policy risks in the coming months. Earlier on 22 October, two draft bills to apply Israeli law to the West Bank and to the Ma’ale Adumim settlement (Jerusalem governorate, West Bank) passed a parliamentary reading in the Knesset. To enter into law, the bills will need to pass another three readings and several committees, rendering annexation in the immediate term highly unlikely. The bills passed despite the opposition of Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, who ordered his party (the Likud) to abstain from voting, signalling that future tensions within Israel’s ruling coalition are likely. This will increase the risk of legislative stasis and lead to broader policy risks. However, governmental collapse remains unlikely. While one of the draft laws in question referenced the whole of the West Bank, it passed by one vote (25 to 24). As such, it is unlikely to pass a third and final reading in its current form. By contrast, the second draft law only focuses on Ma’ale Adumim and is far more likely to pass in its current form, as it secured a large majority (31-9). As these bills remain in their early stages, they are unlikely to exacerbate tensions between Israel and the international community significantly. However, their progression would increase the likelihood of states (particularly EU members) initiating further legislation or sanctions targeting Israeli operations in the West Bank. This would in turn exacerbate compliance risks for businesses that are either directly or indirectly operationally active in the West Bank.

PALESTINIAN TERRITORIES 

• GAZA STRIP: Efforts by the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) to increase the visibility of the ‘yellow line’s’ boundary will reduce the risk of civilian trespass, though security risks close to the line will remain elevated. Since the ceasefire entered into force on 10 October, the IDF has withdrawn to the pre-agreed ‘yellow line’. However, the line was previously physically unmarked in Gaza, driving accidental incidents of civilian trespass and prompting IDF service personnel to issue warning shots (and in some cases lethal fire). On 20 October, the IDF announced it had started to mark the outline of the yellow line physically with a series of 3.5m-high yellow poles placed approximately every 200m according to terrain conditions. The IDF will likely finish placing the markers by the end of the week (25 October). The markers will increase the visibility of the yellow line, reducing the risk of accidental trespass (though the latent risk of such incidents will persist). Additionally, the placement of the markers, together with recent militant attacks against IDF troops (see below), will possibly prompt the IDF to relax its rules of engagement, further empowering service personnel to open fire on perceived threats and elevating security risks close to IDF positions.
• GAZA STRIP: Armed clashes between militants and IDF troops, followed by airstrikes, highlight the fragility of the ceasefire and the elevated risks in Gaza’s central camps. On 19 October, the IDF conducted intensive airstrikes across Gaza after militants launched three attacks in Rafah (southern Gaza) earlier on 19 October, one of which resulted in the death of two IDF servicemen. The airstrikes primarily targeted Khan Yunis, Rafah (both southern Gaza) and Gaza’s central camps (Nuseirat and Bureij, both central Gaza). Hamas denied responsibility for the attacks and claimed that it had no contact with local cells in Rafah. Later that day, the IDF announced that the ceasefire would resume, but threatened substantial retaliation against any future violations. The ceasefire remains highly vulnerable to allegations of violations and mutual hostilities by both sides. In the past week, the IDF highlighted several events where servicemen opened fire on suspected militants approaching their positions along the yellow line. Additionally, Israel’s continued efforts to collapse militant tunnels will sustain elevated risks of further armed clashes with militants located therein. Efforts by rogue Hamas cells or Hamas-affiliated factions to suppress anti-Hamas militias will also increase the risk of misidentification and armed clashes with IDF troops. Such events will elevate the risk of further IDF airstrikes, driving security risks throughout the strip. These risks will be particularly elevated in Gaza’s central camps, which the military largely avoided throughout the war due to assessments that living hostages were being held therein. Additionally, uncertainty regarding the fulfilment of the ceasefire’s most contentious terms (such as Hamas’ disarmament and the future governance of Gaza) will sustain elevated risks of ceasefire collapse throughout November and December.
• PALESTINIAN TERRITORIES: On 22 October, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) issued an advisory opinion on Israel’s obligations as an occupying power in the Palestinian Territories; this will likely trigger renewed scrutiny of humanitarian conditions in Gaza. The UN General Assembly (UNGA) requested that the ICJ issue the opinion after Israel adopted legislation in 2024 banning the UN Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA) from operating in Israel and areas it administers in the West Bank and prohibited Israeli officials from co-operating with it (see Sibylline Middle East Crisis Update – 31 October 2024). The court opined that Israel has an obligation to ensure that Palestinians are adequately supplied with essential aid, but that the population of Gaza has not been adequately supplied with aid during the Israel-Hamas war. The court also stated that Israel has an obligation to work with the UN, UN bodies and impartial NGOs to deliver aid to Palestinian communities. The court rejected Israel’s claims that UNRWA is not an impartial NGO and stated that Israel has an obligation to co-operate in good faith with the agency, given its central role in providing aid and humanitarian services to Palestinian civilians, particularly in Gaza. As the ICJ’s advisory opinions are not legally binding, Israel is highly unlikely to resume co-operation with UNRWA or increase benchmarks for aid deliveries outlined in the Israel-Hamas ceasefire agreement (see Sibylline Middle East Crisis Update – 15 October 2025). Even so, the court’s advisory opinion will likely trigger further and sustained scrutiny of humanitarian conditions within Gaza, increasing reputational concerns for entities with direct and tangential links to the Israeli government and security forces. The ICJ’s criticism of the Gaza Humanitarian Foundation’s operations will also likely trigger renewed criticism of donors associated with the GHF, as well as security, construction and logistics firms tendering Israeli-issued contracts within Gaza.

RED SEA

• RED SEA: An explosion on a vessel suspected of carrying Iranian liquified petroleum gas (LPG) highlights sustained security risks in the Red Sea. On 18 October, an explosion caused a fire on board the Cameroon-flagged LPG tanker MV Falcon, which was sailing approximately 116 nautical miles (215km) east of Aden (Aden governorate, Yemen). The explosion and subsequent fire killed two crew members and forced the rest of the crew to abandon the ship. The source of the explosion remains unclear; the Houthis have denied involvement. Furthermore, maritime trackers suggest that the vessel was carrying Iranian LPG and was part of Iran’s shadow fleet, which is key to Iranian sanction-evasion efforts. The Houthis are highly unlikely to target Iranian assets directly. While the source of the explosion remains uncertain, the incident highlights the sustained security risks across the Red Sea, particularly in the Gulf of Aden, as well as the heightened insurance premiums and operational risks for shipping companies sailing through the Red Sea in the coming month.

REGIONAL AND GLOBAL DEVELOPMENTS

• ISRAEL-IRELAND: A recent court ruling highlights the global compliance risks facing companies linked to Israeli settlements. On 16 October, Ireland’s High Court overturned a decision by the Garda (police) not to investigate the legality of Airbnb operations in Israeli settlements in the West Bank, rejecting a previous claim that it lacked jurisdiction. Although the ruling does not automatically mandate a police investigation, it does underscore the compliance and legal risks for global businesses linked to Israeli settlements, which are deemed illegal under international law. These risks will be particularly acute for Europe-based companies in the hospitality, retail, fresh produce, tech and construction sectors, given deteriorating relations between Israel and several EU member states. This will drive the risk of further divestitures and capital flight, impacting operations for firms with local operations in Israel (and especially the West Bank) in 2026. Furthermore, Israeli-linked companies will also continue to face increasing reputational risks and media scrutiny, driving exposure to global boycott campaigns through 2026 and subsequent financial losses.
• Syria: Campaigns targeting jihadists will increase in coming days, elevating retaliatory attack risks. Earlier on 22 October, the Syrian security forces launched operations targeting the stronghold of the Firqat al-Ghuraba jihadist group, which is largely comprised of foreign fighters from France, in the city of Harem (Idlib governorate). The casualty figures have not yet been released, but heavy clashes were reported. We assess that the Syrian authorities will likely increase the scope of raids targeting foreign jihadist groups who are not integrated within the new security institutions. Further raids are highly likely to take place in Idlib, which hosts various pockets of rogue foreign fighters, increasing the risks of armed clashes across the governorate in the coming weeks. Retaliatory attacks against military and governmental posts are also likely in the capital Damascus and Idlib. The tendency of foreign jihadist groups to co-ordinate with local al-Qaeda and Islamic State (IS) cells will further augment these risks, with attacks possibly expanding across Syria more broadly.
• Yemen: Al-Qaeda attack underscores persistent militant threat, heightened security risks in south. On 21 October, militants from the Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) group killed at least four soldiers and injured 15 others in two car bomb attacks against a compound belonging to Yemen’s internationally recognised government (IRG) in Al Mahfad district (Abyan governorate). The Yemeni security forces killed five militants wearing explosive belts. The scale and co-ordination of the attack underscore AQAP’s enduring operational capacity and the ongoing security fragility in Abyan, despite sustained efforts by the government and its allies to dismantle the group. The attack possibly marks the beginning of a new campaign, with AQAP exploiting the security vacuum in southern Yemen, where co-ordination between the IRG and the Southern Transitional Council (STC) remains fragile. Further attacks will possibly target military and dual-use infrastructure, including oil and gas transit nodes, elevating security risks to associated personnel due to crossfire and blast impacts, while also increasing energy security risks. Such attacks would likely prompt a response from the UAE and Saudi-backed forces, increasing the risk of conflict escalation.

Oct 21.

• Israel: US vice president’s visit will trigger major travel disruption in coming days. Earlier on 21 October, US Vice President JD Vance arrived in Israel for a three-day visit. Vance’s visit to Jerusalem (Jerusalem district) on 21 October will trigger major travel disruption. Several roads and entrances to the city are due to close from 1500hrs (local time), including Agron Street, Ben Zvi Boulevard, the Customs Intersection, Gaza Street, King David Street, Paris Square and the Shazar Tunnel. These closures also include parts of Highways 1, 6 and 35, as well as several roads inside the Old City. Roadblocks are highly likely to persist intermittently through 23 October. During his visit, Vance will likely travel to southern Israel, triggering further travel disruption in the country’s Southern district (particularly in Kiryat Gat). Vance’s planned departure on 23 October will trigger significant travel disruption along the roads leading to and from Ben Gurion International Airport (TLV, Tel Aviv district) between 1230hrs and 1500hrs due to closures and roadblocks. We assess that disruption to flight operations is also likely, particularly from 1130hrs, increasing the risk of travel delays.

Oct 20.

• Israel-Palestinian Territories: Persistent triggers for hostilities will drive risk of ceasefire breaches. On 19 October, the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) conducted tens of airstrikes in the Gaza Strip following an attack by militants in Rafah (southern Gaza) that killed two IDF soldiers. The IDF accused Hamas of the attack; Hamas denied the allegation and said that it had no contact with local cells in Rafah. Shortly after, the IDF announced that the ceasefire would resume, but threatened to retaliate substantially to any future violations. Nevertheless, the ceasefire remains highly fragile, with both sides at risk of allegations of violations and mutual hostilities. Israel will likely attempt to collapse militant tunnels, possibly driving clashes with militants that are hidden within them. Furthermore, efforts by rogue Hamas cells or Hamas-affiliated factions to suppress anti-Hamas militias will also drive risks of misidentification and clashes with the IDF troops. Additionally, uncertainty regarding the fulfillment of the ceasefire’s most contentious terms (regarding Hamas’ disarmament and the future governance of Gaza) will increase the risk of a ceasefire collapse throughout November and December.
• Morocco: Youth-led protests will likely subside due to draft budget, moderating domestic unrest risks. On 19 October, the Moroccan government unveiled its draft budget for 2026. Although the draft still requires parliamentary approval, it allocates USD 15 bn for health and education, a significant increase from the 2025 budget. The decision comes after weeks of youth-led protests calling for comprehensive reforms to Morocco’s economy, education, governance, and health systems. The parliament will almost certainly pass the budget, likely reducing the incidence of mass demonstrations in the coming weeks. This will likely lower the risk of sporadic clashes between protesters and the security forces, reducing staff exposure to water cannons and tear gas in proximity to large gatherings in major cities. Additionally, the increased spending on key public services will likely moderate socio-economic health risks, reducing inequality and supporting sustainable economic resilience. In turn, this will possibly ease long-term anti-government sentiment and lower the risk of sustained domestic unrest. However, there is also a realistic possibility that the concessions will embolden protesters, driving an expansion of demands and sustaining demonstrations and associated exposure to clashes between demonstrators and the security forces in the coming weeks. (Source: Sibylline)

————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————-

Founded in 1987, Exensor Technology is a world leading supplier of Networked Unattended Ground Sensor (UGS) Systems providing tailored sensor solutions to customers all over the world. From our Headquarters in Lund Sweden, our centre of expertise in Network Communications at Communications Research Lab in Kalmar Sweden and our Production site outside of Basingstoke UK, we design, develop and produce latest state of the art rugged UGS solutions at the highest quality to meet the most stringent demands of our customers. Our systems are in operation and used in a wide number of Military as well as Home land Security applications worldwide. The modular nature of the system ensures any external sensor can be integrated, providing the user with a fully meshed “silent” network capable of self-healing. Exensor Technology will continue to lead the field in UGS technology, provide our customers with excellent customer service and a bespoke package able to meet every need.

A CNIM Group Company

—————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————

Sponsored by Bertin Exensor

 

www.exensor.com

 

———————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————–

Military And Security Developments

Oct 24.

Executive summary

* In our Strategic Risk Forecast, we put forward various scenarios in which we hypothesise the trajectory of the Russo-Ukrainian war in the next 12 months. Our baseline scenario is that the war will likely continue in some form without a definitive resolution; there is also a realistic possibility of a fragile ceasefire that will fail to stop the fighting entirely.

* This month, US President Donald Trump imposed sanctions on Russia’s two largest oil companies, reflecting the administration’s current strategy to increase pressure on Moscow to make progress towards ending the war. While oscillating positions and cycles of rhetoric are likely to continue for the foreseeable future, we assess that these latest sanctions will unlikely be sufficient to force Russia to end the war (or even agree to a stable ceasefire) without serious concessions from Ukraine. China and India have reportedly sharply cut seaborne imports of Russian oil; this will have a significant impact on state revenues if it is sustained. However, it remains our assessment that the Kremlin is willing to endure even worse economic pain, given that years of heavy sanctions have had little to no impact on the Kremlin’s determination to achieve its objectives in Ukraine. While the US could increase pressure further, the Trump administration will likely remain reticent to substantially increase its support for Ukraine at the same time.

* Ukraine’s energy crisis throughout the 2025/6 autumn and winter is likely to be worse than in previous years due to Russia’s innovative strike tactics, which are more co-ordinated and impactful than during previous years. Russia’s strike strategy likely aims to disable the energy system in its entirety by simultaneously damaging electricity generation, transmission and distribution infrastructure. Hits to thermal power plants this month have already triggered unscheduled blackouts, with officials estimating that strikes over the last month have already disabled nearly 60% of Ukraine’s gas production.

* Key triggers, warnings and indicators (TWIs) to watch out for in November include the reported localised ceasefire around the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant (ZNPP; Zaporizhzhia oblast) to enable the repair of the last remaining powerline to the site, as well as the possibility of false-flag or other ‘provocations’ amid high tensions with various Western European countries, including the Baltics, Poland, Romania and the UK.

• Ukraine: War impact will continue to severely undermine socio-economic health. On 23 October, Ukraine’s National Bank (NBU) cut its growth forecast for 2025 from 2.1% to 1.9% and for 2026 from 2.3% to 2%. The NBU noted that the pace of growth remains subdued due to the Russo-Ukrainian war’s ongoing impact. The NBU also highlighted that the energy deficit resulting from Russia’s strike campaign against energy infrastructure, combined with persistent labour shortages nationwide, is impeding business activity. We assess that Ukraine’s energy crisis throughout the autumn and winter will likely be worse than in previous years due to Russia’s increasingly sophisticated and co-ordinated strike tactics, which are proving more effective than in earlier winters. Moscow’s current strategy focuses on simultaneously damaging electricity generation, transmission and distribution infrastructure. This is likely to significantly heighten energy security risks, severely affecting business operations. Meanwhile, Ukraine continues to face a chronic labour shortage, which is sharply undermining the country’s productivity. Overall, we assess that the ongoing war with Russia will continue to severely erode Ukraine’s long-term socio-economic health outlook.

Oct 23.

• Russia: EU LNG ban will further restrict state revenues, adding long-term financial pressure. On 22 October, EU member states approved the 19th package of sanctions against Russia. The new measures include a ban on imports of Russian liquefied natural gas (LNG), following Slovakia’s decision to lift its opposition to the initiative after receiving assurances from the European Commission concerning high energy prices. The ban will be implemented in two phases, with short-term contracts ending after six months and long-term contracts ceasing on 1 January 2027. Russian LNG exports to Europe reached 9.5 m tonnes between January and August 2025; Russia’s total LNG exports over this period amounted to 18.8 m tons. According to the environmental NGO Greenpeace, the Russian state earned approximately EUR 8.1 bn in tax revenues from LNG exports to European countries between 2022 and 2024. Therefore, the latest EU ban will highly likely lead to a reduction in Russian LNG revenues over the long term, adding further pressure on the Russian state’s public finances. However, we assess that this is unlikely to significantly affect Russia’s capacity to continue its war against Ukraine in the short-to-medium term.
• Russia-US: New oil sanctions will unlikely force Moscow to end war in near term. On 22 October, the US sanctioned Russia’s two largest oil companies, Lukoil and Rosneft, alongside several of their subsidiaries, due to the Kremlin’s ‘lack of serious commitment to peace’ in Ukraine. It comes after preparations for a summit between Russian President Vladimir Putin and his US counterpart Donald Trump were shelved. Despite periodic threats from the Trump administration that it will increase sanctions pressure on Moscow and reissue measures adopted during the former president Joe Biden’s administration, these are the first that have been directly imposed against Russia by President Trump in this term. The sanctions mark a tactical change in the US’ efforts to end the Russo-Ukrainian war and are aimed at pressuring Russia to negotiate in good faith. Although the US Treasury has threatened to impose further sanctions, the Trump administration will likely wait for signals from Russia that it is prepared to engage constructively in the peace process. While Russia will possibly feign interest in peace to try reverse the punitive measures and prevent new ones, the sanctions alone are unlikely to alter the Kremlin’s calculus on ending the war in the near term.
• Ukraine: Government, war relief entities face heightened cyber espionage risks. On 22 October, the cyber security company SentinelOne warned about a cyber espionage operation (‘PhantomCaptcha’) that targeted Ukrainian regional government administrations and NGOs involved in war relief efforts earlier in October. The campaign lasted one day, distributing phishing emails impersonating the Ukrainian president’s office to trick victims into opening an embedded PDF attachment. The attachment contained a conference link for the video-meeting platform Zoom that redirected users to a fake CAPTCHA verification page. The page then prompted victims to paste a token that covertly executed multiple payloads to facilitate reconnaissance, data exfiltration and remote command execution, highlighting PhantomCaptcha’s sophistication. While PhantomCaptcha has not been attributed to any groups, the campaign was reportedly linked to another Russian state-sponsored surveillance operation and was operated from Russia-based infrastructure. Consequently, this report underscores the heightened cyber espionage risks facing Ukraine-related entities amid the ongoing war.

Oct 21.

KEY DEVELOPMENTS 

• OFFENSIVES: Reports indicate that Russian forces have launched a series of mechanised assaults in recent weeks; which have been rare in 2025 amid a general pivot towards dismounted infantry assaults due to the saturation of drones the battlefield
• CEASEFIRE: The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) announced that Russia and Ukraine have agreed to a localised ceasefire to facilitate the repair of the last remaining power line to the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant (ZNPP)
• GREY ZONE: Russian intelligence agencies have intensified information operations in recent weeks accusing the UK of preparing ‘provocations’ in Europe, underscoring the realistic possibility of ‘false-flag’ grey zone operations in coming months
• FORECAST: Our assessment remains that the US is unlikely to significantly alter its policy towards Russia and Ukraine, despite a flurry of diplomatic activity and mixed messages from the White House on its policy towards the war
• OFFENSIVES: Reports indicate that Russian forces have launched a series of mechanised assaults in recent weeks; these have been rare throughout 2025 amid a general Russian pivot towards favouring dismounted infantry assaults due to the saturation of drones on the battlefield. On 9 October, Russian forces launched a battalion-sized mechanised assault against Shakhove (Donetsk oblast), a village located around 14 miles (22km) to the north-east of Pokrovsk (Donetsk oblast) in the crook of the Dobropillia salient, which Russian forces have struggled to stabilise for months. Ukrainian sources claim that the Russian attack involved approximately 35 tanks and armoured vehicles, of which three tanks and 16 armoured vehicles were reportedly destroyed or damaged. Meanwhile, Ukraine’s 1st Azov Army Corps reported on 13 and 16 October that Russian forces have conducted smaller reinforced company-sized mechanised assaults near Shakhove. Ukrainian forces allegedly destroyed three tanks and 13 and 11 armoured vehicles during the first and second attacks, respectively. An additional company-sized mechanised assault also took place on 6 October near Pankivka (Donetsk oblast), located just south of Shakhove. While we cannot confirm the details, these assaults appear to have failed to generate any significant results, but they remain significant.
• OFFENSIVES: The sharp uptick in mechanised assaults throughout October likely reflects our previous assessment that Russia has not abandoned mechanised operations and hopes to restore manoeuvre to the battlefield. Notably, the recent mechanised assaults have taken place during poor weather, when drone operations are heavily constrained. We assess that the saturation of the battlefield by first person view (FPV) drones is the most important reason why mechanised assaults are so difficult for both sides, given the ease with which the enemy can identify a large force and subsequently track its movements. As winter approaches, poor weather conditions will likely provide (notionally) better conditions for mechanised assaults. However, the recent attacks clearly underscore that restoring manoevure to the battlefield will remain extremely challenging; this renders a dramatic battlefield breakthrough unlikely in the short term.
• POKROVSK: Ukrainian forces continue to rapidly counter Russian infiltration operations into Pokrovsk, limiting the scope for major advances at present. Ukrainian forces have reported that Russian assault units managed to infiltrate the centre of Pokrovsk, reaching areas near the railway station. However, Ukrainian forces reportedly successfully eliminated these infiltrating units. Similarly, geolocated footage from 19 October shows that Russian forces recently conducted infiltration operations in eastern Myrnohrad (Donetsk oblast), immediately east of Pokrovsk. Ukrainian sources reported that Ukrainian drone operators are contesting Russia’s recent advances in this area.
• POKROVSK: Russia’s use of infiltration tactics likely aims to facilitate flanking operations around Pokrovsk. These operations resemble Russian infiltration tactics in Kupiansk (Kharkiv oblast; located to the north of Pokrovsk), where the primary aim was to probe defences and expand contested ‘grey zone’ areas, rather than to rapidly and permanently occupy territory. We assess that Russia’s goal highly likely remains to envelop Pokrovsk, rather than to capture it through urban fighting and frontal attacks. Nevertheless, it may resort to a grinding assault in 2026 if its efforts to encircle Pokrovsk fail. Infiltration operations in eastern Myrnohrad and southern Pokrovsk also likely serve to fix Ukrainian forces, particularly units of the 7th Air Assault Corps, to limit the prospect of concentrated counter-attacks.
• POKROVSK: A decisive factor in the assault on Pokrovsk will be whether Russian forces succeed in stabilising the front in the direction of Dobropillia (Donetsk oblast) to the north-east, enabling it to continue flanking operations north of Pokrovsk. Russia’s 51st Combined Arms Army (CAA) has been tied up in fighting around Dobropillia, preventing it from committing to enveloping Pokrovsk from the north. If the Dobropillia front is stabilised, the 51st would likely be able to continue operations towards Rodynske (Donetsk oblast; a town located north of Pokrovsk), which would facilitate the broader envelopment of efforts from the north. Regardless, 51st CAA’s inability to simultaneously stabilise the situation in the Dobropillia direction and to conduct encirclement operations around Pokrovsk is likely due to personnel constraints and the current concentration of Ukrainian drones. Therefore, we assess that Ukraine’s successful counter-attacks around Dobropillia are likely to continue impeding Russian operations around Pokrovsk in the short term.
• CEASEFIRE: On 18 October, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) announced that Russia and Ukraine have agreed to a localised ceasefire to facilitate the repair of the last remaining power line to the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant (ZNPP). The plant is the largest nuclear power plant in Europe and has not received stable power in four weeks after severe damage to power lines. While the plant remains in shutdown, it still requires power and has relied on diesel back-up generators to power its systems since 23 September; this constitutes the longest blackout of the war thus far. It is almost certain that amid the current blackout, the Russian authorities are continuing to prepare to connect the ZNPP to Russia’s electricity grid. By integrating the plant into Russia’s power network and consequently disconnecting it from the Ukrainian grid, the Kremlin is clearly indicating its intention to retain control of the plant permanently.
• CEASEFIRE: The details of the proposed localised ceasefire remain limited, with no confirmation of its location and duration. Nevertheless, the IAEA has stated that technical work is underway to restore power to the plant. If such a ceasefire does indeed take place and allows this repair work to complete, it would mark a notable (though highly localised and specific) precedent for limited on-the-ground ceasefires. While US President Donald Trump’s administration may see this as a positive sign towards a general ground ceasefire, we continue to assess that such a ceasefire remains either highly unlikely in the short term, or that if reached it would highly likely collapse soon thereafter. For further analysis on the state of negotiations, see the FORECAST below.
• MOBILISATION: Russia is reportedly scaling back financial incentives for volunteer soldiers, supporting our previous assessment that the Kremlin is likely shifting its military recruitment strategy. Several Russian federal subjects are reportedly reducing and cancelling one-time enlistment bonus payments for new contract service recruits across multiple regions. This is likely part of the federal authorities’ efforts to centralise recruitment after relying on a decentralised force-generation mechanism since the start of the war. These developments follow reports that the number of military contracts being signed is stagnating, even in the regions that offer the highest financial bonuses. While the existing recruitment system has achieved results thus far, we previously assessed that Russia’s current decentralised recruitment model (heavily reliant on financial incentives) is unsustainable in the medium-to-long term and is already showing diminishing returns (see Sibylline Ukraine Update – 14 October 2025).
• STRIKES: Over the past week, Russia’s strike campaign included a significantly large attack on 16 October involving a total of 320 drones, 28 ballistic missiles and nine cruise missiles. The attack primarily targeted Kharkiv and Poltava oblasts, causing power outages in Poltava due to strikes on energy infrastructure. Strikes on other days were relatively smaller but continued to regularly target energy infrastructure.
• STRIKES: The aforementioned attacks form part of Russia’s systematic campaign aimed at degrading Ukraine’s energy capabilities ahead of and during the heating season. However, the current campaign against energy infrastructure is likely to be significantly more damaging than previous campaigns. Notably, on 20 October, Ukrainian Deputy Energy Minister Mykola Kolisnyk stated that Russia’s current strike campaign is more co-ordinated than the campaign during autumn and winter in 2024. According to Kolisnyk, Russia’s current campaign limits targets to specific regions and facilities, whereas a larger set of facilities was targeted in 2024. This will allow for more accurate and concentrated attacks that will likely pose a more systematic threat to the Ukrainian grid. Russian long-range attacks aim to simultaneously damage electricity production and transmission and distribution infrastructure, as well as air defences protecting these facilities.
• STRIKES: Meanwhile, Ukraine has continued its own strike campaign against Russian oil and gas infrastructure with growing success, worsening fuel shortages across Russia. On 19 October, Ukrainian drone strikes targeted the world’s largest gas processing plant in Russia’s south-western Orenburg oblast, forcing the facility to halt gas intake from Kazakhstan. Ukraine has previously struck oil infrastructure in the area, but this constitutes the first attack aimed specifically at a gas plant. The strike has reportedly affected gas production at Kazakhstan’s Karachaganak field (West Kazakhstan region) by between 25 and 30%. Earlier on 21 October, two Western energy companies announced that they had reduced oil and gas output at a major gas condensate field in Kazakhstan. Other Ukrainian attacks this week have also struck several Russian oil facilities. Such attacks typically focus on critical refinery infrastructure rather than on storage tanks or logistical hubs, in order to increase the operational impact on Russia’s oil sector.

POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS

• SANCTIONS: The EU’s 19th sanctions package against Russia may realistically be approved on 23 October, though new punitive measures are unlikely to force the Kremlin to end the war in the near term. This is according to comments on 20 October from the EU’s foreign policy chief Kaja Kallas. Slovakia continues to oppose the measures and reportedly wants a debate at an EU leaders’ summit on 23 October; nevertheless we assess that Slovakia will possibly agree to the measures in the coming days if it secures certain concessions from the European Commission. Meanwhile, on 20 October, EU energy ministers supported a proposal to phase out Russian oil and gas imports to the bloc by January 2028, as part of efforts to end Europe’s energy dependency on Russia. (For further analysis on the 19th sanctions package, see Sibylline Ukraine Update – 22 September 2025).
• SANCTIONS: Meanwhile, the US Senate has decided to postpone its consideration of new sanctions on Russia until after an expected summit between the presidents of both countries. The bill envisions new tariffs of up to 500% on imports from countries that buy Russian energy products and do not actively support Ukraine. However, the Trump administration has been reluctant to impose new sanctions against Russia due to concerns that this could undermine the limited progress made towards peace. Ultimately, we assess that the Trump administration likely wants to avoid imposing new punitive measures against Russia while it seeks an economic and diplomatic rapprochement with the Kremlin. As such, these dynamics will likely reduce the prospect for new US punitive measures against Russia in the near term (see FORECAST below for further analysis).
• GREY ZONE: Russian intelligence agencies have intensified information operations in recent weeks that primarily accuse the UK of being involved in or preparing ‘provocations’ in Europe designed to undermine Russia or Russian interests. Earlier on 21 October, the head of Russia’s Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR) claimed without providing evidence that the UK is planning acts of sabotage in the Baltic and Black seas. Meanwhile, on 16 October, the director of Russia’s Federal Security Service (FSB), Alexander Bortnikov, accused the UK of assisting Ukraine in co-ordinating an audacious, large-scale drone attack against Russian military airfields in June. Bortnikov also accused NATO intelligence agencies of being involved in suspicious drone activity in EU airspace in recent weeks, many of which we assess as likely to be Russia’s responsibility.
• GREY ZONE: The aim of such information operations is likely to sow confusion among Europe’s population and potentially to set the conditions for false-flag operations and/or ‘justify’ grey-zone retaliation across the continent. Russian intelligence networks have previously claimed UK-backed Ukrainian operatives were planning false-flag operations in the past. The latest allegations relate to preparations for a supposed UK-backed operation targeting a European or Russian ship in European waters, using pro-Ukrainian Russian nationals wearing Russian military uniforms. It remains a realistic possibility amid the current escalating tensions in the Baltic region that the Russians will engineer an incident at sea in the coming months, designed to generate further tension, confusion and contradictory claims of blame, as part of its ongoing grey-zone campaign.

FORECAST

DIPLOMACY: Our assessment remains that the US is unlikely to significantly alter its policy towards Russia and Ukraine, despite a flurry of diplomatic activity aimed at ending the war in recent days. Statements from President Trump in recent weeks have signalled the possibility of increased US support for Ukraine and the adoption of a tougher stance on Russia, given the growing frustration at the lack of progress towards a peace deal or a ceasefire. However, we continue to see limited indications that these moves will translate into a significant policy shift in the near-to-medium term. The Trump administration’s rhetoric is likely to continue to oscillate between various possible positions in the coming months, as it attempts to encourage and coerce Russia and Ukraine to negotiate. Previously, the Trump administration has rhetorically alternated between various policy positions on Ukraine multiple times. This possibly reflects a policy of ‘strategic ambiguity’, which avoids the need to commit the US to a more hardline stance in either direction until a time of its choosing.

It remains highly likely that Russian President Vladimir Putin’s call with President Trump on 16 October reinforced that Russia’s terms to end the war remain unchanged and uncompromising; this messaging may realistically have influenced President Trump’s subsequent meeting with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky. During his call with President Trump, President Putin reportedly renewed his demands for Ukraine to surrender full control of Donetsk oblast as a condition for ending the war. Unspecified officials familiar with the call have claimed that President Putin suggested he would be willing to cede parts of Russian-annexed Kherson and Zaporizhzhia oblasts in exchange for this territory. This arrangement would be a non-starter for Ukraine for multiple reasons, including Donetsk oblast’s strategic significance and the lack of any meaningful guarantees that fighting would not resume soon thereafter.

Putin’s reported offer to ‘cede’ parts of Kherson and Zaporizhzhia oblasts (neither of which is under full Russian control) is almost certainly framed to appear as a significant concession, but is highly unlikely to be one. It remains our assessment that President Putin’s alleged comments referred to territory that Russia has nominally annexed but does not control, rather than an offer to withdraw from territory that Russian forces currently occupy. Therefore, Russia’s negotiating position has not changed in recent months. On 20 October, Kremlin press secretary Dmitry Peskov stated that Russia has not deviated from its position on pausing hostilities in Ukraine along the current frontlines, effectively ruling out this possibility.

Unconfirmed reports indicate that President Trump allegedly pushed President Zelensky to agree to various Russian terms during their meeting on 17 October, including Ukraine’s withdrawal from the Donbas region. This comes shortly after President Trump’s own assertions in late September that Ukraine could still win back its land from Russia (see Sibylline Ukraine Update – 25 September 2025). According to reports of the Trump-Zelensky meeting by the Financial Times (FT), President Trump insisted that Ukraine needs to either make a deal or face destruction by Russia. If the FT’s account of the meeting is accurate, this indicates that the Trump administration expects Ukraine to make difficult concessions and that the US is likely unwilling to commit to substantially stepping up support for Ukraine over the long term. Although President Trump reportedly later advocated for a freezing of the frontlines, his alleged comments indicate (at least rhetorically) that he is open to endorsing some of Russia’s current demands to reach a ceasefire.

The lack of any progress on talks to increase support for Ukraine, including selling Tomahawk cruise missiles, reinforces our existing assessment that such discussions primarily remain a negotiating tactic for the US. Despite discussions that the US could supply Ukraine with long-range Tomahawk missiles, President Trump has implied that the US also needs this capability, expressing the hope that the war can be resolved without handing the missiles to Ukraine. Even if Ukraine were to receive Tomahawks in the future as part of US efforts to increase pressure on Russia, the US would likely provide only a small symbolic number. This is largely due to production constraints (the US produced only 22 Tomahawk missiles in 2024) and the US’ desire to maintain its own stockpiles for future military operations. For further analysis on Tomahawk missiles, see Sibylline Ukraine Update – 7 October 2025.

Despite announcements about a second summit between President Putin and President Trump in the coming days or weeks, it remains uncertain if and when it will take place. President Trump had previously suggested that the two leaders could meet in the coming two weeks in Budapest (Hungary). However, an unspecified senior White House official stated earlier on 21 October that there are no plans for the two presidents to meet ‘in the near future’. Similarly, Peskov stated that there was no ‘precise timeframe’ for a summit and stressed that ‘serious preparation’ is needed before it can take place. US Secretary of State Marco Rubio and Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs Sergei Lavrov called on 20 October, though their own anticipated meeting (which Reuters claimed would take place on 23 October) has reportedly been postponed indefinitely. We assess that even if the two sides schedule and hold the summit, a major breakthrough to end the war in Ukraine is highly unlikely in the near term, as none of the key drivers we track which influence the decision-making in Kyiv, Moscow and Washington DC have seriously shifted. (Source: Sibylline)

 

23 Oct 25. Ukraine has taken a bold step towards rebuilding its air power, signing a letter of intent with Sweden to acquire as many as 150 Saab JAS 39 Gripen E multirole fighters. The announcement, made in Stockholm on 22 October following talks between Swedish Prime Minister Ulf Kristersson and Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy, marks one of the most ambitious defence collaborations of the war so far. The letter of intent covers 100 – 150 Saab JAS 39 Gripen Es. If the intent translates into a firm order, it would be by far the biggest export contract in history for Sweden. The signing sets the stage for detailed negotiations on cost and production timelines. As reported in Reuters, Kristersson noted that the first Gripen E/F arrival could be within three years of a firm order being made. While the LOI covers the in-production E variant, separate discussions continue about the transfer of used Gripen C/Ds from Sweden to the Ukrainian forces. Talk about this transfer has been ongoing for months, but Sweden was urged by allies to hold off on the transfer while Ukraine focused on the introduction of the F-16.

“This agreement opens a new chapter in our cooperation,” Zelenskyy said during the joint press conference. “The Gripen is a proven, modern, and reliable aircraft that would dramatically strengthen our ability to defend our skies.”

Ukraine’s air force is still flying Soviet-era MiG-29s and Su-27s, and even with F-16s from Western partners, its long-term modernisation depends on building a more sustainable, interoperable fleet. The Gripen fits that brief perfectly: robust, adaptable, and relatively easy to maintain in austere conditions. Designed by Saab for Sweden’s own dispersed-base operations, the Gripen is known for being able to take off from stretches of highway, refuel quickly, and get back in the air within minutes. Those qualities could prove vital for Ukraine, where airbases are frequent targets for Russian strikes. The latest E-series version brings an active electronically scanned array (AESA) radar, extended range, and a powerful electronic warfare suite, putting it almost on par with some 5th-generation systems in terms of situational awareness. Analysts say a fleet of 150 aircraft would be game-changing. “If realised, this would be the largest single fighter transfer in modern European history,” one defence expert told AGN. “It would effectively make Ukraine the biggest Gripen operator outside Sweden. Of course, ambition comes with a hefty price tag. At roughly $80–90 m per aircraft, the total programme could exceed $12 bn once training, support, and weapons integration are included. Financing is expected to involve a mix of Swedish state support, international aid, and possibly European Union or NATO mechanisms.

“We understand who we are fighting against, and Gripen is one of the best (fighters) in the world,” Zelenskyy said, adding that Ukrainian pilots have already begun training on the Swedish planes.

For Sweden, the agreement highlights its growing profile as a NATO member and regional defence exporter. For Ukraine, it sends a clear signal: even as it fights day-to-day for survival, it’s also planning for the future of its air force and its place within Europe’s security framework. (Source: Google/https://aerospaceglobalnews.com/)

 

23 Oct 25. Trump Denies Lifting Key Restriction on Ukraine Using Long-Range Missiles to Hit Targets Inside Russia. Washington officials cited by the Wall Street Journal said that they expect Ukraine to expand its campaign of cross-border attacks now that the key restriction has been removed.  US President Donald Trump denied reports that the US had quietly lifted a key restriction on Ukraine’s use of some Western-supplied long-range missiles on Wednesday. It came after The Wall Street Journal, citing US officials, said that Washington’s decision would give Kyiv expanded freedom to carry out strikes on targets inside Russia. Trump wrote on his Truth Social network: “The Wall Street Journal story on the USA’s approval of Ukraine being allowed to use long range missiles deep into Russia is FAKE NEWS!”

“The US has nothing to do with those missiles, wherever they may come from, or what Ukraine does with them!” He continued.

The reports had emerged just one day after Ukraine used a British-supplied Storm Shadow cruise missile to hit a munitions and rocket fuel facility in the Russian city of Bryansk, describing the hit as “successful.” Thousands of Latin Americans, primarily Colombians, have joined Ukraine’s fight against Russia’s invasion, bringing military expertise from their homeland. According to the report, Washington’s decision enabled Kyiv to use the missile. The shift allegedly followed an internal change in authority at the Pentagon, as oversight for approving such attacks was transferred from Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth to Gen. Alexus Grynkewich, the top US general in Europe who also serves as NATO commander. Grynkewich previously told a Senate confirmation hearing that he believed Ukraine could win the war against Russia. Washington officials cited by the Wall Street Journal said that they expect Ukraine to expand its campaign of cross-border attacks using the Storm Shadow. The US can restrict Ukraine’s use of the missile because it uses American targeting data.  At least four people have been injured after a second straight night of drone attacks Moscow target civilian targets, including a kindergarten. Storm Shadows have a far shorter range than US Tomahawks, which Trump had said he was mulling supplying to Kyiv before abruptly pouring cold water on the proposal. This, and the fact that Tuesday was not the first occasion on which they had been used, means that renewed use of Storm Shadows is not expected to fundamentally alter battlefield conditions. (Source: https://www.sofx.com/)

 

22 Oct 25. US sanctions Russian oil companies as Moscow holds nuclear drills.

• Summary
• US sanctions Rosneft and Lukoil, in a change of approach
• Russia says it held exercise with strategic nuclear weapons
• US says Putin-Trump summit plans on hold

The United States hit Russia’s major oil companies with sanctions on Wednesday and accused the Russians of a lack of commitment toward ending the war in Ukraine, as Moscow conducted a major training exercise involving nuclear arms. The new sanctions were unveiled one day after plans for a summit between U.S. President Donald Trump and Russian President Vladimir Putin fell apart. Trump told reporters he cancelled the meeting because “it didn’t feel right to me.” The U.S. Treasury Department said Russia’s two largest oil companies, Rosneft and Lukoil, were targeted in a bid to damage Moscow’s ability to fund its war machine. The move marked a sharp turnaround for the White House, which has veered between pressuring Moscow and taking a more conciliatory approach aimed at securing peace in Ukraine. Only last week Trump appeared ready to hold off on new actions targeting Moscow.

“Now is the time to stop the killing and for an immediate ceasefire,” U.S. Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent said. Oil prices extended gains after Bessent’s comments, rising by more than $2 a barrel. ](Source: Reuters)

 

21 Oct 25. Mass production of Ukrainian drones in the UK to launch within weeks. Mass production of Ukrainian interceptor drones in the United Kingdom is gearing up, as the war-torn country transitions to licensed production of domestically designed weapons in partner countries. Speaking at a press conference on Oct. 20, British Secretary of State for Defense John Healey said the joint manufacturing project, dubbed Octopus, would begin “within weeks.” The announcement comes a few days after Ukraine’s government-backed defense technology group Brave1 identified a handful of weapon categories deemed fit for export to Western allies. Over the last few months, Kyiv has explored the possibility of easing its arms transfer ban. In July, leaders launched a new initiative to authorize allied countries, such as members of the Ramstein group of global backers, to produce Ukrainian systems locally. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky has warned that this process will be gradual and will only entail a partial and regulated lift of restrictions limited to weapons in surplus. According to Healey, the Octopus interceptor, a proven system against Shahed-type attack drones, will become the foundation of the so-called European “drone wall” to deter further Russian aerial threats. This joint partnership could result in the production rate of around 2,000 units per month, Bloomberg reported on Oct. 10.

“Through Project Octopus, our Ukrainian friends will share the technology and intellectual property with the UK –in turn, we’ll develop this further and mass-produce it to supply thousands of interceptor drones back to Ukraine monthly,” Healey explained earlier.

In September, the privately-owned Ukrainian drone manufacturer Ukrspecsystems announced that it was investing over $267 m in the building of a new factory in Mildenhall, U.K. The interceptor in question was developed in Ukraine with the support of UK technicians and staff, but reportedly costs less than 10% of the systems it was conceived to target. Britain is doubling down on its drone capabilities, as Healey also announced the creation of a new U.K. Drone Centre, adding that investments in drone and other autonomous systems would double to total more than £4 bn ($5 bn). The country has committed to spending 10% of its equipment budget on new technologies, starting this year. (Source: Defense News)

 

21 Oct 25. Ukraine unveils upgraded sea drone for Black Sea strike missions. Ukraine’s state security service has unveiled an upgraded sea drone it says can now operate anywhere in the Black Sea, carry heavier weapons and use artificial intelligence for targeting. Ukraine has used the unmanned naval drones to target Russian shipping and infrastructure in the Black Sea. The Security Service of Ukraine, known by its Ukrainian acronym SBU, has credited strikes by the unmanned vessel known as the “Sea Baby” with forcing a strategic shift in Russia’s naval operations. The range of the Sea Baby was expanded from 1,000 kilometers (620 miles) to 1,500 kilometers (930 miles), SBU said. It can carry up to 2,000 kilograms (about 4,400 pounds) of payload, SBU officials said. At a demonstration attended by The Associated Press, variants included vessels fitted with a multiple-rocket launcher and another with a stabilized machine-gun turret. SBU Brig. Gen. Ivan Lukashevych said the new vessels also feature AI-assisted friend-or-foe targeting systems and can launch small aerial attack drones and multilayered self-destruct systems to prevent capture.

Developing a new kind of naval warfare

Drone strikes have been used in successful attacks against 11 Russian vessels, including frigates and missile carriers, SBU said, prompting the Russian navy to relocate its main base from Sevastopol in Crimea to Novorossiysk on Russia’s Black Sea coast.

“The SBU became the first in the world to pioneer this new kind of naval warfare — and we continue to advance it,” Lukashevych said, adding that the Sea Baby has evolved from a single-use strike craft into a reusable, multipurpose platform that expands Ukraine’s offensive options.

Authorities asked that the time and location of the demonstration not be made public for security reasons. The craft are operated remotely from a mobile control center inside a van, where operators use a bank of screens and controls.

“Cohesion of the crew members is probably the most important thing. We are constantly working on that,” said one operator who was identified only by his call sign, “Scout,” per Ukrainian military protocol.

Ukrainian sea drones helped push back Russia’s navy

The SBU also said sea drones helped carry out other high-profile strikes, including repeated attacks on the Crimean Bridge, most recently targeting its underwater supports in a bid to render it unusable for heavy military transport. The Sea Baby program is partially funded by public donations through a state-run initiative and is coordinated with Ukraine’s military and political leadership. The evolution from expendable strike boats to reusable, networked drones marks an important advance in asymmetric naval warfare, Lukashevych said.

“On this new product, we have installed rocket weaponry that will allow us to work from a large distance outside of the attack range of enemy fire. We can use such platforms to carry heavy weaponry,” he said. “Here we can show Ukrainians the most effective use of the money they have donated to us.” (Source: Defense News)

 

20 Oct 25. Bell Textron Inc., a Textron Inc. (NYSE: TXT) company, has signed Letters of Intent (LOI) to identify and evaluate areas for cooperation with Ukraine. At a ceremony in Washington, delegates from Bell Textron, the Ministry of Economy, Ecology, and Agriculture of Ukraine, and UkraineInvest signed agreements to assess approaches of Industrial Cooperation as part of a potential procurement of the AH-1Z and UH-1Y aircraft. Under a Foreign Military Sale (FMS) program, Bell would work with the U.S. Government to supply aircraft to the Ukrainian Armed Forces, bolstering their operational capabilities.

“We are proud to announce this agreement, and the potential to supply these incredible aircraft to Ukraine,” said Jeffrey Schloesser, senior vice president, Strategic Pursuits, Bell. “This initiative has been in development for some time, and we look forward to bringing it to completion.”

Bell Textron is a world-leading provider of commercial and military aircraft, serving both public and private sector customers globally. Within the defense sector, the Bell AH-1Z Viper and UH-1Y Venom aircraft stand as two of the company’s premier platforms. Designed to operate seamlessly together, the two aircraft share 85% parts commonality, making the models one of the most versatile and effective helicopter pairings available for modern military operations.

“We are confident that H-1s can play a pivotal role in further building defense capabilities in Ukraine, providing a much-needed upgrade while strengthening current Ukrainian air support,” continued Schloesser.

 

18 Oct 25. Norway has established a new training camp for Ukrainian troops in Poland which hosts more than 200 trainers from the Norwegian Army. Norway has established a new training camp for Ukrainian troops in Poland. Called Camp Jomsborg, the base already hosts more than 200 trainers from the Norwegian Army and a large number of Ukrainian Army trainees. According to the Norwegian Ministry of Defence, the camp will conduct both general training for soldiers and advanced courses for officers and specialists. Norway is the lead nation for Operation LEGIO, an effort to train and equip the Ukrainian armed forces that involves seven other NATO Allies, namely Denmark, Estonia, Iceland, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland and Sweden. Norway has committed approximately 10 bn Norwegian krone to Operation LEGIO. (Source: joint-forces.com)

————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————-

Founded in 1987, Exensor Technology is a world leading supplier of Networked Unattended Ground Sensor (UGS) Systems providing tailored sensor solutions to customers all over the world. From our Headquarters in Lund Sweden, our centre of expertise in Network Communications at Communications Research Lab in Kalmar Sweden and our Production site outside of Basingstoke UK, we design, develop and produce latest state of the art rugged UGS solutions at the highest quality to meet the most stringent demands of our customers. Our systems are in operation and used in a wide number of Military as well as Homeland Security applications worldwide. The modular nature of the system ensures any external sensor can be integrated, providing the user with a fully meshed “silent” network capable of self-healing. Exensor Technology will continue to lead the field in UGS technology, provide our customers with excellent customer service and a bespoke package able to meet every need.

A CNIM Group Company

———————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————-

Sponsored by Bertin Exensor

 

www.exensor.com

 

——————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————–

21 Oct 25. National Guard deployments increase domestic unrest, security forces risks in cities nationwide. On 20 October, the US Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit ruled that the Trump administration can proceed with deploying National Guard troops to Portland (Oregon), dismissing a lower court’s temporary block. On the same day, state and local officials in Illinois urged the US Supreme Court to leave in place a lower court order blocking US President Donald Trump from deploying troops in Chicago (Illinois). In the short term, federal troops will likely be stationed at Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) facilities in Portland, particularly those that have been the focus of protests. As both Chicago and Portland are Democratic-leaning cities, any deployments will likely trigger public backlash. The growing public characterisation of these deployments as an ‘invasion’ will entrench partisanship and increase the risk that the public does not comply with law enforcement. In this scenario, demonstrations against troops are likely near federal immigration facilities, raising the risk of domestic unrest. In both cities, a strengthened law enforcement presence will cause traffic and operational disruption risks for nearby firms. (Source: Sibylline)

—————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————-

Founded in 1987, Exensor Technology is a world leading supplier of Networked Unattended Ground Sensor (UGS) Systems providing tailored sensor solutions to customers all over the world. From our Headquarters in Lund Sweden, our centre of expertise in Network Communications at Communications Research Lab in Kalmar Sweden and our Production site outside of Basingstoke UK, we design, develop and produce latest state of the art rugged UGS solutions at the highest quality to meet the most stringent demands of our customers. Our systems are in operation and used in a wide number of Military as well as Homeland Security applications worldwide. The modular nature of the system ensures any external sensor can be integrated, providing the user with a fully meshed “silent” network capable of self-healing. Exensor Technology will continue to lead the field in UGS technology, provide our customers with excellent customer service and a bespoke package able to meet every need.

A CNIM Group Company

——————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————-

Sponsored by Bertin Exensor

 

www.exensor.com

 

——————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————-

22 Oct 25. The British Armed Forces will continue to support a NATO-led peacekeeping mission in Kosovo for at least another three years. The UK has been a key contributor to the UN-mandated NATO Kosovo Force (KFOR) since it first entered Kosovo in 1999 as a peacekeeping force to bring peace and stability following the conflict of the 1990s. The commitment centres around a reserve force of hundreds of British soldiers who could be deployed out to Kosovo to assist the mission at short notice, if required. The last major UK deployment to support the mission took place in 2023 after a violent attack against police in northern Kosovo. The announcement comes as the Prime Minister hosts the Western Balkans Leaders’ Summit in London today to discuss closer collaboration to tackle the shared challenge of irregular migration.

Prime Minister Keir Starmer said: “The UK’s commitment to peace and security in the Western Balkans is unwavering. By extending our support to NATO’s Kosovo Force, we are demonstrating our role as a leading NATO ally and standing by our values of stability and democracy. Working closely with our partners in the Western Balkans is vital, not only for regional stability, but to ensure security here at home. Kosovo is an important bilateral partner, with the UK having been the first country to recognise its independence in 2008.”

The international NATO peacekeeping mission, supported by more than 30 nations, was established after NATO’s 78-day air campaign in 1999 against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, aimed at preventing a humanitarian catastrophe in Kosovo. It comes as the UK Ministry of Defence prepares to launch a new course targeted to Western Balkans nations that will commence early next year, designed to help build understanding among defence and security organisations on issues around protecting civilian lives, including promoting the role of women in defence. Training of this kind is widely viewed as one of the most effective methods contributing towards conflict prevention and would encourage the development of a network of peers in the region who could be consulted in future. The UK will invite Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, Montenegro, North Macedonia, and Serbia to participate.

Minister for the Armed Forces, Al Carns, said: “Our troops have carried out hundreds of missions over the decades in support of KFOR and this extension to our commitment will keep Kosovo and the Western Balkans safer. Peacekeeping is a critical component of our commitment to keep the UK secure at home and strong abroad, and I would like to thank the hundreds of British troops who remain ready to step up to keep the UK and Europe safe.”

UK forces have worked to enhance KFOR’s Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance capability, significantly increasing the mission commanders’ situational awareness – ensuring the operation can provide a safe and secure environment for the entire population. The support is financed through the government’s Integrated Security Fund, which is shared by multiple departments in tackling national security challenges faced by the UK and partners. KFOR acts as one of the main security providers in Kosovo, with troops contributed by more than 30 nations including Italy, Turkey, Poland and the US, as well as the UK. (Source: joint-forces.com)

 

22 Oct 25. Royal Navy joins NATO in historic operation tracking Russian activity in UK waters.

• UK warship and helicopter shadow Russian destroyer through the English Channel under the command of NATO Allied Maritime Command
• Follows recent Royal Navy tracking of a Russian submarine returning from the Mediterranean
• Royal Navy plays key role in securing UK waters and protecting critical infrastructure essential to economic growth under the government’s Plan for Change

A Royal Navy destroyer and helicopter were deployed on a 48-hour NATO operation monitoring a Russian warship in UK waters, marking a historic first for the alliance. Portsmouth-based HMS Duncan was activated by NATO Allied Maritime Command, headquartered at Northwood in London, to shadow Russian destroyer Vice Admiral Kulakov through the English Channel during the operation. This represents the first time a Royal Navy warship has been tasked under the alliance’s direct command for such an operation, forming part of wider security efforts across northern Europe. The mission complements ongoing work by Plymouth-based HMS Somerset with NATO in the North Atlantic. The Type 45 destroyer utilised her advanced sensors and systems to intercept the Kulakov in the North Sea, monitoring her passage westward through the Channel towards the island of Ushant off the French coast. A Wildcat helicopter from 815 Naval Air Squadron, based at Royal Naval Air Station Yeovilton, joined the operation to provide air support and maintain surveillance of the Russian vessel. The coordinated effort involved three nations, including a Dutch Air Force NH90 and the French Navy. The operation underscores the government’s ongoing commitment to safeguarding UK waters and protecting national security through the Plan for Change.

Al Carns, Minister for the Armed Forces, said: “The Royal Navy stands ready to respond to any Russian Naval activity. They conduct constant monitoring operations to safeguard Britain and our territorial waters.

“Once again the Royal Navy has deployed under Allied Maritime Command underpinning our unwavering solidarity with NATO to counter Russian activity.”

HMS Duncan’s Commanding Officer, Commander Dan Lee, added: “This operation highlights the Royal Navy’s commitment to safeguarding UK waters and working seamlessly with our NATO allies to ensure the security of our shared maritime spaces.

“The close coordination between UK, French and Dutch forces demonstrates the strength of our alliance and our ability to respond collectively to any activity in our region.

“Tracking and escorting the Vice Admiral Kulakov through UK waters was a clear example of NATO’s interoperability in action. The professionalism and teamwork displayed by all involved ensured the operation was conducted safely and effectively, showcasing our shared resolve to uphold international maritime norms.”

HMS Duncan is one of two Royal Navy warships attached to the alliance’s premier task force patrolling northern European waters, Standing Maritime Group 1 (SNMG1). The group also conducts an intensive programme of scheduled exercises, manoeuvres and port visits to strengthen bonds between NATO navies. Whilst Duncan patrolled waters closer to home, Type 23 frigate HMS Somerset conducted Maritime Security Patrols in the sea lanes between Iceland, the Faroe Islands and Scotland – the critical passage between the North Atlantic and Arctic waters. The deployment has also enabled the 200-strong crew to visit Torshavn in the Faroe Islands and Reykjavik in Iceland. Operating as part of SNMG1 allows the Royal Navy’s high readiness units to work within a coordinated effort to establish Alliance presence and demonstrate solidarity with partner nations. HMS Somerset’s Commanding Officer, Commander Matt Millyard, said: “The ship has been deployed since August in support of Operation Relentless, protecting the UK’s nuclear deterrent which is assigned to the defence of NATO.

“Working as part of SNMG1 over the last few weeks has allowed us to further contribute to NATO’s presence in the region. The port visits have been a great opportunity for the crew to relax after a busy operational period and prepare for an even busier period over the next few months.” (Source: https://www.gov.uk/)

 

17 Oct 25. EU unveils defence roadmap to bolster military capabilities. The ‘Preserving Peace – Defence Readiness Roadmap 2030’ builds on the ReArm Europe Plan/Readiness 2030. The European Commission and the High Representative have presented a new ‘Defence Roadmap’ to enhance defence capabilities across Europe. The ‘Preserving Peace – Defence Readiness Roadmap 2030’ includes specific goals and timelines and seeks to address existing capability gaps, promote increased defence spending among Member States and direct the EU towards achieving full defence readiness by the year 2030. It also states that reinforcing Europe’s defence posture aligns with continued support for Ukraine. The plan is a response to a request made by the European Council in June 2025. The roadmap introduces four initial European Readiness Flagships: the European Drone Defence Initiative, the Eastern Flank Watch, the European Air Shield, and the European Space Shield. These projects focus on enhancing deterrence and defence across land, air, sea, cyber, and space domains. They are designed to support Nato capability objectives. European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen said: “The recent threats have shown that Europe is at risk. We have to protect every citizen and square centimetre of our territory. And Europe must respond with unity, solidarity and determination. Today’s Defence Roadmap presents a clear plan with shared goals and concrete milestones on our path to 2030. Because only what gets measured gets done.

“Moving from plans to action, the Roadmap proposes four European Flagships: the European Drone Defence Initiative, the Eastern Flank Watch, the European Air Shield, and the European Space Shield. This will strengthen our defence industries, accelerate production and maintain our long-standing support to Ukraine.”

The plan recommends that member states complete the creation of ‘Capability Coalitions’ in nine specific areas. These coalitions aim to address key capability shortages through joint development and procurement efforts in the following areas: air and missile defence; strategic enablers; military mobility; artillery systems; cyber, artificial intelligence, electronic warfare; missiles and ammunition; drones and counter-drone systems; ground combat; and maritime capabilities. The roadmap builds on the ReArm Europe Plan/Readiness 2030. This initiative increases public and private sector investment, offering member states more flexibility in funding measures that improve production capacity and operational readiness. The commission and the High Representative plan to present this roadmap to the European Council, with proposals for continent-wide flagship projects intended to reach full defence readiness by 2030. Additionally, the roadmap outlines steps to create a unified military mobility area within the EU by 2027. This effort includes developing consistent regulations and establishing a coordinated network of land, air, and sea routes for rapid movement of troops and equipment throughout Europe. The plan is being developed with input from Nato to increase Europe’s capacity for swift crisis response, said the commission. (Source: army-technology.com)

————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————-

Founded in 1987, Exensor Technology is a world leading supplier of Networked Unattended Ground Sensor (UGS) Systems providing tailored sensor solutions to customers all over the world. From our Headquarters in Lund Sweden, our centre of expertise in Network Communications at Communications Research Lab in Kalmar Sweden and our Production site outside of Basingstoke UK, we design, develop and produce latest state of the art rugged UGS solutions at the highest quality to meet the most stringent demands of our customers. Our systems are in operation and used in a wide number of Military as well as Homeland Security applications worldwide. The modular nature of the system ensures any external sensor can be integrated, providing the user with a fully meshed “silent” network capable of self-healing. Exensor Technology will continue to lead the field in UGS technology, provide our customers with excellent customer service and a bespoke package able to meet every need.

A CNIM Group Company

——————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————–

Sponsored by Bertin Exensor

 

www.exensor.com

 

——————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————–

14 Oct 25. Cambodia-Thailand: Signing of ceasefire agreement would help to stabilise border risks. On 14 October, Malaysian Foreign Minister Mohamad Hasan stated that he is aiming for Cambodia and Thailand to sign the ‘Kuala Lumpur Accord’ during the upcoming Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) leaders’ summit. The event will take place in Kuala Lumpur (Malaysia) at the end of the month (26-28 October). Hasan claimed that US President Donald Trump is ready to oversee the signing of a formal peace agreement. The statement comes amid ongoing talks between Cambodia and Thailand. Malaysia and the US are facilitating the discussions, which come after a border dispute between Cambodia and Thailand erupted in July. While both sides agreed to a ceasefire later that same month, tensions have remained heightened along various points of the border; each accuses the other of violating the ceasefire. A formal signing of a ceasefire agreement – which would possibly involve the deployment of an ASEAN-only monitoring team along the border – would help to reduce the risk of armed conflict in the medium term, though a definitive resolution to the various border disputes is unlikely. We assess that a formal ceasefire agreement would also help to facilitate the eventual resumption of cross-border trade and travel, which has been restricted due to the ongoing tensions. (Source: Sibylline)

 

10 Oct 25. Afghanistan-Pakistan: Reported strikes in capital Kabul will drive elevated bilateral tensions. Overnight on 9-10 October, explosions were reported in the capital Kabul (Afghanistan). The Taliban’s chief spokesperson Zabihullah Mujahid confirmed that the blasts occurred but did not provide any details. Separately, Pakistan’s military media wing Inter-Services Public Relations (ISPR) stated that the ‘security forces have been conducting a series of retribution operations against the Ks’ (i.e. ‘Khwarijs’ or militants), without clarifying whether the operations extended to the explosions in Kabul. However, there have been unconfirmed reports of Pakistan conducting airstrikes in Afghanistan, allegedly targeting a high-ranking Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) member; Pakistan has long accused the Afghan Taliban of providing safe havens to the group. This development comes after a TTP attack targeted a security forces convoy on 7 October in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province (Pakistan) and killed 11 military personnel, amid an overall uptick in TTP activity in recent weeks. We assess that this will significantly heighten tensions between Afghanistan and Pakistan, particularly if further airstrikes are conducted inside Afghan territory. Additionally, the TTP will likely escalate militant activity in the coming days (likely concentrated in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa), which in turn will increase the risk of border closures, disrupting overland trade and movement. (Source: Sibylline)

————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————-

Founded in 1987, Exensor Technology is a world leading supplier of Networked Unattended Ground Sensor (UGS) Systems providing tailored sensor solutions to customers all over the world. From our Headquarters in Lund Sweden, our centre of expertise in Network Communications at Communications Research Lab in Kalmar Sweden and our Production site outside of Basingstoke UK, we design, develop and produce latest state of the art rugged UGS solutions at the highest quality to meet the most stringent demands of our customers. Our systems are in operation and used in a wide number of Military as well as Homeland Security applications worldwide. The modular nature of the system ensures any external sensor can be integrated, providing the user with a fully meshed “silent” network capable of self-healing. Exensor Technology will continue to lead the field in UGS technology, provide our customers with excellent customer service and a bespoke package able to meet every need.

A CNIM Group Company

——————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————-

Sponsored by Bertin Exensor

www.exensor.com

——————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————
Military And Security Developments

Oct 17.

* Prior to the Israel-Hamas ceasefire agreement on 9 October, there was a notable intensification in anti-Israel demonstrations across Western Europe, particularly in Italy, the Netherlands and Spain.

* If the Israel-Hamas ceasefire breaks down, we assess that this will almost certainly trigger significant public backlash across Europe, driving renewed threats of major supply chain disruption.

* Dockworker strikes will likely drive logistical disruption in southern European transport hubs, including ports in Genoa, Livorno (both Italy), Marseille (France) and Piraeus (Greece).

* The refusal by airport ground staff to handle Israel-linked cargo will disrupt commercial airline operations across European air traffic networks.

* A resumption of the Israel-Hamas conflict will increase the likelihood of further European punitive measures on Israel, elevating risks for defence and dual-use technology manufacturers.

Context

In recent months, there has been an intensification in pro-Palestine demonstrations across Western Europe, including industrial unrest. Developments in and around Gaza, most recently the Israeli Navy’s interception and detention of Global Sumud Flotilla (GSF) activists on 1 October, have acted as flashpoints for retaliatory industrial action and violent unrest, particularly in Italy and Spain. The ceasefire and hostage release agreement signed by Israel and Hamas on 9 October will likely mitigate immediate domestic unrest risks. However, there is a realistic possibility that the agreement will break down in the coming weeks; we assess that the resumption of Israel Defense Forces (IDF) operations in Gaza will almost certainly trigger significant public backlash. In this scenario, a wave of major pro-Palestine demonstrations will likely target the transfer of Israeli goods via European supply routes (primarily shipping and air freight), driving significant knock-on impacts for logistical operators. It remains unclear whether unions and activists are planning to stage coordinated action if the ceasefire holds; however, in this scenario, they are likely to continue posing periodic disruption in the coming months.

Forecast

Dockworker strikes will likely disrupt the movement of Israel-bound goods via southern European seaports, driving broader maritime supply chain delays

On 26 and 27 September, European dockworkers met in Genoa (Liguria region, Italy) to coordinate efforts to block perceived arms shipments to Israel. Several shipping unions attended this meeting, including France’s Confédération Générale du Travail (CGT) Ports & Docks, Italy’s Unione Sindacale di Base (USB) and Spain’s Coordinadora; these unions wield significant influence over European shipping networks. Dockworkers have threatened to block all trade to and from Israel if the IDF continues its military offensive in Gaza. The unions have not publicly disclosed the details of their agreements; this is likely a strategic move to maximise the impact of any potential industrial action they may decide to initiate. While the meeting was held prior to the Israel-Hamas ceasefire agreement, we assess that the resumption of IDF activity following a breakdown in the peace agreement negotiations will likely trigger coordinated dockworker action.

On 2 October, there were blockades by Italian dockworkers in Genoa (Liguria region) and Livorno (Tuscany region) in response to the IDF’s interception of GSF vessels. This highlight unions’ commitment to follow through on their threats; multiple individual port blockades have demonstrated the logistical impact of union action. On 30 September, the Israeli-flagged Zim Virginia cargo ship was forced to depart Livorno without loading or unloading after workers refused to handle its cargo, prompting the Israeli shipping company ZIM to temporarily suspend operations there.

Temporary halts in port operations will drive knock-on disruption across the wider European shipping network. Delays in cargo processing will drive vessel congestion, shipment delays, container shortages and elevated transport costs. We assess that a co-ordinated wave of industrial action across key European and Mediterranean ports (such as Genoa, Livorno, Marseille and Piraeus) will cause significant delays and operational challenges across European and global maritime supply chains.

* Yemen: Houthi attacks are likely to subside in coming weeks in line with ceasefire agreement. On 16 October, the Iran-backed Houthis claimed that their chief of staff had been killed in August by Israel’s airstrikes in the capital Sanaa; the strikes also killed multiple ministers of the Houthi-run government, including the prime minister. However, the confirmed loss of a key Houthi figure is unlikely to provoke further retaliation against Israel. We assess that due to the Israel-Hamas ceasefire, the risks of Houthi attacks on shipping vessels in the Red Sea and on targets in southern Israel are likely to decrease over the coming weeks. This will moderate security risks for personnel and assets across Israel, as well as to vessels in the Red Sea, including from direct drone, ballistic missile strikes and shrapnel from Israeli interceptions. Additionally, the frequency of evacuations from offices, homes, and hospitality venues in Israel is likely to decrease, moderating business disruptions and threats of harm to personnel from crowd surges. A cessation of Houthi hostilities against commercial vessels in the Red Sea will likely reduce disruptions to key shipping routes, moderating operational and financial risks for businesses in the region.

Oct 16.
* Syria-Russia: Retention of Russian bases will elevate tensions between Damascus, West. On 15 October, Syrian President Ahmed al-Sharaa held his first talks with Russian President Vladimir Putin in Moscow (Russia). Al-Sharaa stated that he would honour all past bilateral agreements, indicating that Russia would keep its two main military bases in Latakia and Tartus governorates (both Syria). This comes days after a Syrian army delegation visited Russia, where it discussed potential weapons deals. This signals that Russia will likely try to assist Syria’s rearmament process. While retaining the Russian bases in Syria will help to reduce instability in the country’s coastal region (where insurgent Alawite cells remain active), the move will also likely elevate diplomatic tensions between Syria and the US/EU. These tensions will in turn elevate the risk of reduced Western investments and financial aid to help with Syria’s post-war recovery. Moscow also indicated its willingness to work on energy infrastructure projects in Syria. However, Russian energy companies are unlikely to enter Syria in 2026 due to Western sanctions imposed against Russia that would in turn elevate compliance risks for Syria. As such, we assess that Syria’s reconstruction efforts will continue to face impediments.
• Tunisia: Further protests against state-owned chemical plant are likely, raising domestic unrest risks. On 15 October, thousands of protesters marched towards the state-owned Tunisian Chemical Group (CGT) complex in Gabès (Gabès governorate). The police used tear gas to disperse demonstrators, who demanded the plant’s permanent closure over phosphate pollution concerns. Despite the growing protest movements, the government continues to operate the plant in Gabès; this will sustain the risk of further demonstrations in the coming days. There is a realistic possibility that the authorities will employ heavy-handed tactics such as tear gas and water cannons to disperse crowds, elevating the likelihood of sporadic clashes and escalating security risks for proximate personnel. Failure by the Tunisian government to respond to demands in the coming days will elevate the risk of further protests spreading and intensifying nationwide, including in the capital Tunis. We assess that the emergence of nationwide domestic unrest would elevate the risk of the security forces suppressing protesters and activist groups aggressively via more forceful means and by carrying out arbitrary arrests, elevating human rights concerns.
Oct 15.
KEY DEVELOPMENTS
IRAN
• Despite positive statements from US and Iranian officials on the potential for a nuclear deal, negotiations are highly unlikely to progress demonstrably in the short-to-medium term.
• Iran has sentenced two French nationals to lengthy prison sentences for espionage, underscoring the increasing risks of long-term detention for foreign nationals as Tehran seeks sanctions relief.
• The US has sanctioned over 90 individuals and entities linked to Iranian oil exports, underscoring the increasing sanctions-exposure risks for firms engaged in regional financial, shipping and energy markets.
ISRAEL
• Hamas’ repatriation of the remains of only four (of 28) deceased hostages has elevated the risk of domestic unrest in Israel and a resumption of military operations in Gaza.
PALESTINIAN TERRITORIES
• GAZA STRIP: Amid ongoing disputes relating to Hamas’ release of deceased hostages, Israel will possibly restrict the entry of critical aid supplies into Gaza in the coming weeks, sustaining humanitarian concerns.
• GAZA STRIP: Strike risks remain heightened around the Israel Defense Forces’ (IDF’s) abandoned positions.
• GAZA STRIP: Clashes between Hamas and opposing militias will sustain elevated crossfire-exposure risks for staff in Gaza; any such incidents are also likely to signal Hamas’ intention to remain active in the governance of Gaza.
• WEST BANK: The release of Palestinian detainees into the West Bank will elevate radicalisation and security risks in the coming months.
IRAN
• Despite positive statements from US and Iranian officials on the potential for a nuclear deal, negotiations are highly unlikely to progress demonstrably in the short-to-medium term. On 11 October, Iran’s foreign ministry announced that Tehran would be willing to strike a ‘fair and balanced’ nuclear and sanctions-relief agreement with the US, but that it had not received any such proposals to date. Subsequently, US President Donald Trump stated that the US was ready ‘to make a deal’ with Iran during a speech in Israel. Despite these statements, neither Iran nor the US have announced changes to their critical negotiating positions regarding Iran’s nuclear programme. Tehran continues to characterise its domestic enrichment of uranium as a non-negotiable component of its nuclear programme, while Washington DC has repeatedly stated that Iran cannot maintain its enrichment capabilities. These conflicting positions triggered the deadlock in negotiations that preceded the Iran-Israel war; talks have yet to resume. Barring substantial concessions from either party on the issue of domestic enrichment, negotiations between the US and Iran are unlikely to resume in the short term, sustaining deadlock and associated regional tensions. Iran’s continued efforts to resume uranium enrichment following the Iran-Israel war will also likely hamper progress towards an agreement, undermining prospects for sanctions relief and associated socio-economic improvement within Iran.
• Iran has sentenced two French nationals to lengthy prison sentences for espionage, underscoring the increasing risks of long-term detention for foreign nationals as Tehran seeks sanctions relief. On 14 October, Iranian state media reported that a court in Tehran found two French nationals guilty of spying for Israel and France, sentencing them to 31- and 32-year prison sentences, respectively. The announcement almost certainly relates to Cecile Kohler and Jacques Paris, the only two remaining French nationals in Iranian custody (the Iranian authorities detained Kohler and Paris in 2022). Iran will highly likely attempt to leverage the continued detention of Kohler and Paris to gain diplomatic concessions from France, such as limited sanctions relief or the release of detained Iranian nationals. Following the re-imposition of UN sanctions against Iran on 27 September (see Sibylline Middle East Crisis Update – 29 September 2025), Tehran will almost certainly continue leveraging the detention of foreign nationals to secure periodic sanctions relief from nations enforcing the UN sanctions regime. As socio-economic pressure on Iran continues to increase in the coming months, foreign and dual nationals will almost certainly face elevated risks of surveillance, harassment and detention, compounding threats to locally engaged staff and travellers, including Iranian individuals who are married to – or have children with – foreign nationals.
• The US has sanctioned over 90 individuals and entities linked to Iranian oil exports, underscoring the increasing sanctions-exposure risks for firms engaged in regional financial, shipping and energy markets. On 9 October, the US sanctioned ten individuals and 40 entities associated with Iran’s oil and gas exports, as well as 44 vessels operating in Iran’s ‘shadow fleet’. The sanctioned entities include numerous firms based in China, Turkey, Singapore and the UAE, underscoring increasing sanctions-exposure risks for regionally engaged firms in the financial, shipping and energy sectors. Of note is the sanctioning of the Rizhao Shihua Crude Oil Terminal Company – which operates a crude oil terminal within the Lanshan port facility in Shandong (Shandong province, China) – and the Shandong Jincheng Petrochemical Group, an associated independent oil refinery in Shandong. Continued sanctions targeting Chinese oil terminals and refineries will likely disrupt ports’ operations, as well as their capacity to receive shipments of Iranian crude, as seen at the Dongjiakou port facility in early September.  The sanctions have also targeted seven Indian nationals associated with firms managing vessels operating in Iran’s shadow fleet, underscoring the US government’s increasing scrutiny of Indian entities and their involvement in the import and transit of Iranian oil to Bangladesh, China and Pakistan. The continued expansion and enforcement of US sanctions will likely further disrupt Iranian efforts to maximise fuel exports and to access foreign currency, compounding the socio-economic pressure facing Iran and undermining its economic stability in the medium term.
ISRAEL
• Hamas’ repatriation of the remains of only four (of 28) deceased hostages has elevated the risk of domestic unrest in Israel and a resumption of military operations in Gaza. In line with the terms of the ceasefire agreement, Hamas released the remaining 20 living hostages on 13 October, after which Israel released 1,968 Palestinian detainees and prisoners. However, in contrast to the ceasefire’s term, Hamas released the remains of only four of 28 deceased hostages. While difficulties in locating the remains of all the deceased rendered this term challenging to fulfil, the number is considerably lower than was discussed in negotiations. Reports initially suggested that Hamas held at least 18 bodies. This has since raised concerns in Israel that Hamas hopes to use the remains of the deceased as bargaining chips in future negotiations. In response, the Hostages and Missing Families Forum has threatened to conduct large demonstrations, demanding that the government stop its co-operation with the agreement. After Israel threatened to limit its compliance with the ceasefire agreement (and due to pressure from the US and various other countries), Hamas released four more sets of remains late on 14 October (though one body was identified as not being that of an Israeli hostage). Even so, earlier on 15 October, Israel announced (in contrast to the agreed terms of the ceasefire) that the Rafah border crossing in southern Gaza would remain closed and that aid would only enter Gaza through the Kerem Shalom crossing (southern Gaza). As Hamas’ ostensibly limited compliance with the ceasefire agreement is likely to continue in the coming days, we assess that the risk of domestic unrest will increase across Israel. Protesters will likely demand that the Israeli government stop co-operating with the ceasefire agreement until Hamas complies fully with its terms. This will likely encourage the Israeli authorities to intensify pressure on Hamas, albeit gradually, reducing their own co-operation with the agreed terms of the ceasefire by further limiting the passage of aid. Such conditions will elevate the risk of the ceasefire breaking down in the coming weeks, though pressure from international mediators will likely ensure it holds for at least the coming 72 hours.
PALESTINIAN TERRITORIES
• GAZA STRIP: Amid ongoing disputes relating to Hamas’ release of deceased hostages, Israel will possibly restrict the entry of critical aid supplies into Gaza in the coming weeks, sustaining humanitarian concerns. On 14 October, Israel announced that it would restrict the entry of aid into Gaza following delays to the release of deceased hostages (see above). These restrictions include the continued closure of the Rafah border crossing (southern Gaza), a ban on fuel or gas deliveries (except for specified deliveries to select NGOs) and a limit of 300 trucks entering Gaza per day from 15 October (the ceasefire agreement stipulates the entry of 600 trucks per day). However, following the release of four additional deceased hostages on 14 October (see above), Israel relaxed the restrictions on aid deliveries (dozens of aid trucks entered Gaza on 15 October). The IDF has also announced that it will continue with preparations to open the Rafah crossing in the coming days. The ceasefire and increase in aid deliveries will likely moderate critical food insecurity conditions within Gaza in the coming weeks, though broader humanitarian and public health concerns will likely remain elevated. Additionally, on 15 October, the IDF announced that Hamas had released the remains of an unidentified individual as part of the hostage-release process on 14 October. The genetic profile of the remains does not match any of the Israeli hostages; there is a realistic possibility that Israel will characterise the incident as a violation of the ceasefire in the coming hours. In response to alleged violations of the ceasefire and hostage-release agreement, Israel will likely announce further temporary restrictions to the cross-border movement of aid in the coming weeks, sustaining critical disruption risks for aid supply chains. Persistent food security concerns in Gaza will also sustain the risk of opportunistic (and planned) robbery targeting aid convoys, storage facilities and distribution points in the coming weeks.
• GAZA STRIP: Strike risks remain heightened around the IDF’s abandoned positions. Following Israel’s official agreement to the ceasefire on 10 October, IDF troops withdrew from Gaza City and other positions within Gaza to a pre-agreed line within the strip (the yellow highlighted area marked in Figure 2). However, the IDF continues to monitor its abandoned positions. On 13 October, an IDF Hermes 450 drone fired warning shots at a group of Palestinians approaching an abandoned outpost in Khan Yunis (southern Gaza). Furthermore, the IDF continues to engage (with lethal force) unidentified individuals and groups that approach its current positions. In one incident in Shuja’iyya (central Gaza) on 14 October, the IDF killed five Palestinians. These incidents highlight the persistent and heightened threats to life, including for media, NGO and other foreign personnel operating in Gaza, particularly in the vicinity of past and present IDF outposts. We assess these risks will remain elevated in the coming weeks despite the ceasefire (or any progress vis-à-vis the agreement).
• GAZA STRIP: Clashes between Hamas and opposing militias will sustain elevated crossfire-exposure risks for staff in Gaza; any such incidents are also likely to signal Hamas’ intention to remain active in the governance of Gaza. Following the official start of the ceasefire, Hamas deployed over 7,500 of its operatives to re-establish the organisation’s authority across the strip. Hamas operatives subsequently conducted numerous public executions and engaged in armed clashes with anti-Hamas militias and clans. At the time of writing, reports indicate that Hamas has killed over 30 Gazans (including seven whom the group allegedly executed publicly). Hamas will likely conduct further such activities in the coming weeks, sustaining bystanders’ exposure to crossfire between the group’s members and adversarial militants. Furthermore, we assess these operations reflect Hamas’ determination to retain its control over the Gaza Strip (in clear contravention of the stated goals of the 20-point peace plan that underlines the ceasefire agreement). On 15 October, President Trump suggested that the group can be dealt with ‘violently’ if it refuses to disarm, highlighting the elevated risk of conflict resumption in Gaza in the coming months.
• WEST BANK: The release of Palestinian detainees into the West Bank will elevate radicalisation and security risks in the coming months. On 11 October, the IDF conducted operations in Nablus, Qalqilya and Ramallah and al-Bireh governorates in preparation for the release of 88 Palestinian detainees into the West Bank on 13 October. The Israeli security forces dispersed gatherings affiliated with Hamas, confiscated material deemed inciteful (including Hamas flags), arrested a number of individuals for allegedly inciting terrorism and searched the homes of those due to be released. Additionally, Israel banned demonstrations and celebrations related to the release in the West Bank. However, in the coming days, gatherings in support of Hamas and to celebrate the releases are likely to take place across the West Bank. Such events will raise the risk of clashes with the Israeli security forces, which are liable to employ aggressive dispersal methods, including stun grenades, tear gas and rubber bullets. Such methods will elevate physical security risks for bystanders – including NGO and media personnel – in the vicinity of all large gatherings. Furthermore, the Israeli security forces will likely augment their presence in the West Bank in the coming weeks, exacerbating travel disruption risks due to active operations and the establishment of additional checkpoints. This increased Israeli presence will likely compound tensions with local Palestinian residents and militants, elevating the risk of sporadic attacks and armed clashes with the Israeli security forces. Crossfire and misidentification risks will be particularly elevated near IDF positions and in Palestinian population centres. In addition, there is a realistic possibility that the IDF will conduct operations to recapture recently released detainees in the coming weeks, particularly if they reconnect with militant elements. Such operations will elevate the risk of domestic unrest in the West Bank and prompt accusations that Israel has breached the ceasefire, increasing pressure on the agreement and raising the risk of it breaking down in the subsequent weeks and months.
RED SEA
• Nothing significant to report
REGIONAL AND GLOBAL DEVELOPMENTS
• Israel-global: Pro-Palestine protesters will likely target football matches involving Maccabi Tel Aviv F.C. and/or the Israeli national team in Europe over the coming weeks and months. On 14 October, thousands of pro-Palestine protesters marched in Udine (Italy) before and during a match between Israel and Italy. The demonstrations culminated in clashes with the police and the arrests of several protesters. Protest-related unrest and harassment targeting Israeli fans is likely during the national team’s matches in Kaunas (Lithuania) and Chisinau (Moldova) on 13 and 16 November, respectively. The risk of physical attacks and harassment by radical pro-Palestine elements against Israeli tourists and athletes during Maccabi Tel Aviv F.C. matches in Europe in late 2025 will also be elevated. Maccabi Tel Aviv F.C. is due to play in Backa Topola (Serbia) on 23 October and 27 November, as well as in Birmingham (UK) on 6 November and in Stuttgart (Germany) on 11 December. Persistent pro-Palestine protest activity will also compound existing reputational and exposure risks for firms associated with major sports events through the remainder of 2025, particularly headline sponsors, security contractors and event-management firms.
Oct 13.
Palestinian Territories: Ban on prisoner-release celebrations will drive security risks in West Bank. On 13 October, Israel released over 1,900 Palestinian detainees as part of the Israel-Hamas ceasefire deal. Of this figure, 88 detainees were released within the West Bank (Palestinian Territories). Israel has banned celebrations in the West Bank. On the day of the release, the Israeli security forces dispersed crowds near Ofer Prison (Jerusalem governorate, West Bank) with tear gas. Regardless of the Israeli orders, we assess that celebrations across the West Bank are likely. Any such celebrations are likely to prompt the Israeli authorities to intensify their security operations in the coming days. This is likely to lead to sporadic clashes between Palestinians and the Israeli security forces. Such a scenario would in turn elevate NGO and business workers’ exposure to tear gas, stun grenades and – in some cases – live ammunition due to crossfire risks, especially if these workers are located in proximity to large gatherings in the West Bank. There is a realistic possibility that Israel will re-arrest released prisoners, which would drive accusations that Israel has breached the agreement. This would also elevate domestic unrest risks in the West Bank and inflame tensions during the ongoing ceasefire negotiations; this would in turn possibly delay the talks.
Israel-global: Peace agreement will partially mitigate against threats to bilateral agreements
On 13 October, Egypt, Qatar, Turkey and the US signed the Trump Peace Agreement at an international summit in Sharm El Sheikh (South Sinai governorate, Egypt). The agreement provides international guarantees for the implementation of the ceasefire and post-war reconstruction efforts in Gaza (Palestinian Territories). While the timeline for the deal’s subsequent phases remains uncertain, the agreement and a likely significant increase in humanitarian aid entering the strip in the coming weeks will reduce criticism of Israel and therefore temper associated threats to bilateral agreements involving Israel and (especially) its European partners. However, neither Hamas nor Israel officially participated in the summit. Given the outstanding disagreements over Hamas’ disarmament and the long-term governance of Gaza, we assess the ceasefire is at risk of temporary lapses (and possibly even a complete breakdown) in the coming months. Such conditions, including challenges to the effective implementation of the agreement driven by existing tensions between Israel and several of the agreement’s sponsors (such as Turkey), will threaten to undercut improving regional tensions. (Source: Sibylline)
———————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————-
Founded in 1987, Exensor Technology is a world leading supplier of Networked Unattended Ground Sensor (UGS) Systems providing tailored sensor solutions to customers all over the world. From our Headquarters in Lund Sweden, our centre of expertise in Network Communications at Communications Research Lab in Kalmar Sweden and our Production site outside of Basingstoke UK, we design, develop and produce latest state of the art rugged UGS solutions at the highest quality to meet the most stringent demands of our customers. Our systems are in operation and used in a wide number of Military as well as Home land Security applications worldwide. The modular nature of the system ensures any external sensor can be integrated, providing the user with a fully meshed “silent” network capable of self-healing. Exensor Technology will continue to lead the field in UGS technology, provide our customers with excellent customer service and a bespoke package able to meet every need.

A CNIM Group Company

——————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————–

Sponsored by Bertin Exensor

www.exensor.com

—————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————-
Military And Security Developments

Oct 17.

• Russia-Ukraine-US: Major breakthrough towards ending Russo-Ukrainian war is unlikely in near term. On 16 October, Russian President Vladimir Putin and US President Donald Trump spoke via telephone and agreed to meet in Budapest (Hungary) for a summit on the Russo-Ukrainian war. President Trump has suggested that this meeting could be held within the next two weeks. The call comes ahead of a meeting between President Trump and Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky later on 17 October in Washington DC. In recent weeks, President Trump has signalled that the US is prepared to take a harsher stance on Russia to increase pressure to end the war, including through discussions about supplying Ukraine long-range Tomahawk missiles. President Putin’s engagement with President Trump indicates that Russia is almost certainly attempting to deter the US from adopting a tougher approach towards the Kremlin. We asses that the next Putin-Trump summit is unlikely to result in a breakthrough towards ending the war. The last meeting in Alaska (US) in August failed to yield a ceasefire. However, Russia and the US could realistically propose a short-term partial ceasefire and/or a moratorium on long-range strikes. Nevertheless, any potential ceasefire announcement will almost certainly remain vulnerable to violations or a collapse.

Oct 16.
• Russia: New UK sanctions seek to weaken oil revenues, further isolate Russian financial entities. On 15 October, the UK government announced sweeping sanctions against Russia’s oil trade and financial sector. The latest punitive measures target Russia’s two largest oil companies, Lukoil and Rosneft, which the UK claims together export 3.1 m barrels of oil per day (bpd). As part of the new sanctions, the UK has targeted four oil terminals in China and 44 tankers in Russia’s shadow fleet, which Moscow uses to circumvent a price cap set by the G7. Meanwhile, the UK has also imposed sanctions against four Russian banks and the National Payment Card System (NSPK), which operates Russia’s Mir payment system (see Sibylline Sanctions Quarterly Review – April 2024). Ultimately, we assess that the latest measures seek to undermine Russia’s ability to generate sufficient revenue with which to sustain its war effort and conduct cross-border payments. Nevertheless, Russia has shown that it is capable of finding workarounds to Western sanctions throughout the Russo-Ukrainian war. This ability will possibly reduce the effectiveness of the UK’s latest measures.
• Ukraine: Removal of port city’s mayor will escalate infighting between central, local governments. On 15 October, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky appointed the governor of Dnipropetrovsk oblast, Serhiy Lysak, to head a newly created military administration for the city of Odesa (Odesa oblast). Lysak’s appointment followed Zelensky’s decision to deprive the city’s (former) mayor, Hennadiy Trukhanov, of his Ukrainian citizenship after Ukraine’s Security Service (SBU) claimed that documents had emerged proving Trukhanov owns a Russian passport. Zelensky’s move to strip Trukhanov of his Ukrainian citizenship effectively ousted Trukhanov from his post. He had served as the mayor of the southern port city since 2014 and was re-elected twice. Trukhanov has denied being a Russian citizen despite long-standing allegations to the contrary; he has vowed to appeal his citizenship’s revocation in court. Despite being embroiled in multiple scandals and having been widely viewed as a Russian sympathiser for several years, Trukhanov has seldom criticised the central Ukrainian government. Nevertheless, we assess that the decision to push Trukhanov out of office possibly indicates that Zelensky is trying to further centralise and exert control over local authorities.
Oct 14.
KEY DEVELOPMENTS
• MOBILISATION: New Russian legislation looks set to increase Russia’s pool of recruits to sustain the attritional war in Ukraine, without declaring a formal partial mobilisation drive, amid wider efforts to reconstitute Russia’s ground forces
• TANKS: Internal documents from the Russian tank producer Uralvagonzavod (UVZ) indicate Russia’s plans to reconstitute its battle tank stocks by expanding T-90 production by 80%, peaking in 2027
• STRIKES: Russian strikes designed to degrade Ukrainian energy security have likely disabled nearly 60% of Ukrainian gas production in recent weeks, with further intense strikes likely to trigger scheduled and unscheduled blackouts
• FORECAST: President Trump has stated that the US may provide Ukraine long-range Tomahawk missiles if Russia does not want to end the war, though it remains unclear whether such sales will occur
• MOBILISATION: New Russian legislation looks set to increase Russia’s pool of recruits to sustain the attritional war in Ukraine, without declaring a formal partial mobilisation drive. On 13 October, the Russian Cabinet of Ministers approved new legislation that will allow members of Russia’s mobilisation reserve to be deployed for ‘defence-related missions’ during peacetime, including outside of Russian territory, without the need for a declaration of war or a formal mobilisation decree. The Chairman of Russia’s State Duma Defence Committee Andrei Kartapolov stated that the new law will allow reservists to be deployed outside of de jure Russian territory, including ‘Ukraine’s Sumy and Kharkiv oblasts’. Under current Russian law, reservists cannot be deployed to conflict operations without a previous declaration of mobilisation or war. The Kremlin has refused to issue another partial mobilisation order since the highly unpopular 2022 decree resulted in notable societal backlash.
• MOBILISATION: Moscow is likely undertaking the legislative preparations to further expand the rolling mobilisation of Russia’s active reserve; this is a strong indication that Russia does not plan to end the war in the short-to-medium term, but rather seeks new means to double down on its attritional strategy. The new law applies to reservists from Russia’s ‘human mobilisation reserve’. This is the country’s active high-readiness reserve, made up of individuals that have signed contracts with the Ministry of Defence (MoD) to serve in this group, normally for a period of three years. Therefore, this is different to Russia’s much deeper inactive reserve, made up of ms of former conscripts. We assess that the new legislation sets an important precedent that will likely enable Russia to conduct rolling low-intensity mobilisations; this will preclude the need for a highly unpopular mobilisation decree, which the Kremlin has clearly sought to avoid since the aforementioned backlash in 2022.
• MOBILISATION: The new legislation comes amid reports that Russia’s existing recruitment strategy, predicated upon financial incentives for individuals to join the military, is seeing diminishing returns. On 12 October, the Russian outlet Idel Realii reported that unspecified employees in military recruitment offices claim that the number of military contracts being signed is not increasing, including in the regions that offer the highest financial signing bonuses. While we cannot confirm this, it likely remains the case that the Russian authorities are able to offset losses by attracting new recruits with lucrative financial rewards, but that this strategy is not sustainable over the medium-to-long term; 2026 likely represents a key crunch point for Russia’s recruitment efforts. This report reinforces the likelihood that the Kremlin will resort to alternative mechanisms to sustain the war in Ukraine. These alternatives will likely include the deployment of active reservists in a bid to reduce the long-term economic costs of Russia’s current recruitment strategy based on ‘volunteers’, which is proving increasingly expensive.
• TANKS: In further indications that Russia is focusing on long-term military reconstitution, internal documents from the Russian tank producer Uralvagonzavod (UVZ) indicate Russia’s plans to reconstitute its battle tank stocks by significantly expanding T-90 production. On 11 October, the Ukrainian open-source intelligence (OSINT) organisation Frontelligence Insight published internal UVZ documents that outline the company’s aims to increase T-90 production by 80% by 2028 (from 2024 rates), as well as to begin serial production of the modernised T-90M2, surging production in 2027. According to the documents, which cannot be confirmed, T-90M/M2 production will remain relatively modest in 2026 at 10 units, before peaking at 428 units in 2028. Overall, UVZ aims to produce 1,118 new modernised T-90Ms and T-90M2s between 2027 and 2029. The timeline to produce over 2,000 new T-90M, T-90M2 and T-72B3M tanks is 2026-2036, though Russia would likely be able to rebuild potent offensive capabilities before 2036.
• TANKS: In tandem with the modernisation of T-72B3Ms and other tanks that have been produced since 2022, the projected UVZ production rates would effectively replenish and modernise Russia’s main battle tank force, enabling the country to fight another major land war by the early 2030s at least, with peak production in 2027. UVZ could realistically fail to meet these targets, particularly due to enduring corruption issues and pressure from sanctions. Nevertheless, the production programme remains realistic and reflects Russia’s clear long-term planning to reconstitute its ground forces, likely as deterrence against and/or in preparation for a potential confrontation with NATO forces. The significance of this development is further underscored by the sustained decrease in tank deployments in Ukraine, where Russia currently focuses on utilising dismounted infantry operations due to the saturation of drones. Despite tanks’ reduced usage, there have been periodic mechanised assaults using armoured fighting vehicles (AFVs) over the last year; this confirms the relevance of tanks (and other AFVs) under conditions when the threat of drones is mitigated, such as during poor weather conditions or electronic warfare (EW) interference. Therefore, we assess that Russia is clearly planning for large-scale mechanised manoeuvre operations in the future.
• OFFENSIVES: While Russian forces continue to prioritise the capture of Pokrovsk (Donetsk oblast), resources have been allocated away from this sector to the south-west, in the direction of Novopavlivka (Dnipropetrovsk oblast). On 8 October, an open-source analyst reported that the Russian military command has largely redeployed the 41st Combined Arms Army (CAA) from southern Pokrovsk in the direction of Novopavlivka. Russia will possibly attempt to close the Ukrainian salient near Novopavlivka and level the frontline in order to provide a more stable basis for further advances into Dnipropetrovsk oblast, where Russian forces have advanced up to 6 miles (10km) in certain areas. Simultaneously, it is possible that Russian forces will intensify efforts to envelop Pokrovsk from both the south-west and the north-east; there have been marginal advances in the latter direction over the past week. We assess that this situation has possibly enabled Russia to transfer 41st CAA elements further south.
• STRIKES: Russian strikes designed to degrade Ukrainian energy security have disabled nearly 60% of Ukrainian gas production in recent weeks, according to unnamed Ukrainian officials cited by the Financial Times (FT). The most significant strike in recent days took place overnight on 9-10 October; it involved two Kinzhal air-launched ballistic missiles, 14 Iskander-M/KN-23 ballistic missiles and 12 Iskander-K cruise missiles, alongside 465 Shahed-type and decoy drones. According to the Ukrainian Air Force, the air defences failed to intercept 60 drones and 13 missiles. The strikes caused power outages in the capital Kyiv and its surrounding Kyiv oblast, as well as Cherkasy, Chernihiv, Dnipropetrovsk, Donetsk, Kharkiv, Odesa, Poltava and Sumy oblasts.
• STRIKES: Russia has consistently targeted Ukraine’s energy infrastructure ahead of and during the winter since it launched the full-scale invasion. These attacks highly likely aim to erode Ukrainian morale and to drive energy insecurity nationwide. Bloomberg has reported that Russian long-range strikes targeting Ukraine’s domestic natural gas production will possibly require Ukraine to spend EUR 1.9 bn (USD 2.2 bn) on fuel imports this upcoming winter. We assess that an increase in successful Russian attacks against Ukrainian energy infrastructure will increase the likelihood of scheduled and unscheduled blackouts, with the former taking place on a rolling basis. In such a scenario, business operations will likely face disruption over the coming months, especially if the Ukrainian authorities prioritise supplying household consumers and/or certain sectors during set hours of the day.
• STRIKES: Ukrainian forces have continued to conduct numerous strikes to degrade Russian oil and gas infrastructure over the past week. Overnight on 12-13 October, Ukrainian forces struck the Feodosia Marine Oil Terminal and several sub-stations in Russian-occupied Crimea. On 11 October, Ukraine’s Security Service (SBU) reported that the Ukrainian forces had struck a Bashneft-Novoil refinery in the Republic of Bashkortostan; a Ukrainian open-source analyst estimated that this refinery is located 869 miles (1,400km) from the Russian-Ukrainian border. On 9 October, Ukrainian forces struck the Korobkovsky Gas Processing Plant in Volgograd oblast; the Ukrainian General Staff claimed that this is one of Russia’s largest natural gas and petroleum gas facilities in southern Russia. These operations underscore Ukraine’s assessment that its strike campaign is effective in driving fuel shortages in Russia (for further analysis on Ukraine’s strike campaign, see FORECAST below).
POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS
• NEGOTIATIONS: US President Donald Trump stated on 13 October that he plans to shift his focus to resolving the Russo-Ukrainian war, after the US helped broker a ceasefire agreement to end the Israel-Hamas war. The establishment of a ceasefire in Gaza and the successful release of Israeli hostages will likely encourage the Trump administration to build on this momentum and increase its efforts to end Russia’s full-scale war. The US will realistically launch a flurry of diplomatic activity aimed at encouraging Russia and Ukraine to engage in negotiations (either bilaterally or separately with the US) over the coming weeks. Nevertheless, even if the US does ramp up efforts to end the war in Ukraine, we assess that a major breakthrough remains unlikely in the short-to-medium term. This is largely due to limited indications that Russia is willing to compromise on the US’ objectives.
• NEGOTIATIONS: Recent comments from Russian officials continue to underscore the Kremlin’s lack of willingness to engage in the peace process. On 8 October, Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Sergei Ryabkov stated that the ‘strong momentum’ generated in August at the Alaska summit between President Trump and Russian President Vladimir Putin has waned. Ryabkov blamed European countries for this, without elaborating further; he also did not acknowledge Russia’s lack of constructive steps towards ending the war since the Alaska summit. Meanwhile, on 10 October, the Kremlin press secretary Dmitry Peskov claimed that Ukraine’s negotiating position is deteriorating steadily. His comments are highly likely an attempt to push Kyiv to negotiate, presenting it as being in the country’s interests to agree to unfavourable peace terms now rather than in the future, when Moscow could potentially toughen its demands for the war to end.
• RAILWAYS: On 11 October, Ukrainian Railways (Ukrzaliznytsia) received hoax bomb threats aboard three long-distance trains, resulting in the evacuation of passengers and a temporary suspension of train services. The affected trains were on various routes either to or from Kyiv, including two domestic trains departing from the cities of Dnipro (Dnipropetrovsk oblast) and Ternopil (Ternopil oblast). Notably, Ukrzaliznytsia received a hoax bomb threat for a service operated between Kyiv and the Polish capital Warsaw, which is a popular route for entering and leaving Ukraine for international visitors and Ukrainians alike during wartime.
• RAILWAYS: Bomb threats of this nature are rare, though they coincide with an intensification of Russian long-range attacks on Ukrainian railway infrastructure since summer. Since August, Russia is estimated to have conducted nearly 300 long-range attacks on Ukrzaliznytsia infrastructure, though these are predominately focused on eastern Ukraine rather than on western routes. We assess that Russia will likely increase efforts to disrupt Ukrainian railways over the coming weeks and months, increasing the likelihood of train services being cancelled, delayed or re-routed at a short notice. However, the Ukrainian authorities are competent at restoring services quickly, including after long-range strikes, meaning that a severe disruption is less likely.
FORECAST
AID: On 12 October, President Trump stated that the US may provide Ukraine long-range Tomahawk missiles if Russia does not want to end the war. President Trump implied that he would possibly inform President Putin of this, in a bid to encourage a settlement to the conflict. However, he did not offer any further details regarding when he would potentially speak with Moscow.
Trump’s comments underscore our earlier assessment that discussions around supplying Tomahawk missiles are likely part of the US’ strategy to utilise a ‘peace through strength’ approach to push Russia to end the war. We have repeatedly assessed the possibility of the Trump administration leveraging military aid and/or sanctions in an attempt to bring an end to Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine (Sibylline Ukraine Update – 2 October 2025). If Moscow continues to show a limited willingness to take productive steps aimed at establishing peace, this will increase the likelihood of Washington DC providing the Tomahawk missiles in the coming weeks or months. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky is expected to meet with Trump in Washington DC on 17 October; the sale of Tomahawks will almost certainly be discussed.
However, even if the US decides to authorise the missiles’ transfer, Ukraine will likely receive a limited number. According to assessments shared by the FT on 13 October, the US could possibly send between 20 and 50 missiles to Ukraine. This low figure is likely due to currently limited stockpiles, very low production rates and the possible need for the US to reserve stocks for strikes against targets near Venezuela’s coast (and possibly on Venezuelan soil). Former Pentagon official Mark Cancian has estimated that the US has 4,150 Tomahawk missiles in total. The US is believed to have launched over 120 Tomahawk missiles out of the 200 that the Pentagon has procured since 2022. Given the low production rates, we assess that the Trump administration will almost certainly prioritise the US’ stockpiles and other competing geopolitical flashpoints over supplying Ukraine with a large number of Tomahawk missiles.
Given that Trump has previously set deadlines on Russia that have lapsed, the timeline for the potential sale of Tomahawks remains unclear amid Russia’s own efforts to deter a decision. On 10 October, President Putin stated that Russia may soon unveil a new weapon (possibly nuclear-capable) that it had previously announced without providing further details; this comment is likely aimed at deterring Tomahawk sales. While Russia is increasing threats of escalation to deter the US, it remains possible that it will also seek to re-engage with President Trump’s diplomatic efforts. However, it remains to be seen whether President Trump would consider any such moves as sufficient, given that earlier efforts have not been successful and that he has adopted a publicly harsher stance against Russia in recent weeks. We assess that the Trump administration could realistically provide the missiles to Ukraine but not authorise their immediate use, thereby providing Russia a window to negotiate. As such, the delivery (and usage) of Tomahawk missiles could realistically take several months, similarly to earlier debates around the provision of other offensive capabilities for Ukraine, some of which dragged out for years
The US has reportedly been providing Ukraine with intelligence to help plan long-range drone strikes on Russian energy infrastructure since the summer; this could realistically indicate decreasing US concerns of escalation. On 12 October, the FT reported details of this, citing unspecified Ukrainian and US officials who claimed that their bilateral co-ordination is part of a wider effort to weaken Russia’s economy in order to pressure it to enter peace talks. According to the FT, US intelligence has helped Ukraine’s military to determine the flight routes, altitude and timing for drones to evade Russian air defences; the US has reportedly been closely involved in planning strikes. Although one US official claimed that Ukraine chooses the targets and strikes alone, other people familiar with the matter claimed that the US also helps identify sites of interest. While we cannot confirm to what extent US intelligence is aiding Ukraine, if true, this could realistically indicate that the Trump administration’s risk threshold is decreasing in regard to Ukrainian long-range strikes against Russia. This would increase the possibility of Tomahawk missiles being sent to Ukraine in the coming months.
In other developments related to military assistance, Western aid supplies have been unexpectedly lower in recent months despite a new aid initiative, as per the Kiel Institute. According to a report published on 14 October, total military aid (measured by value) to Ukraine fell by 43% in July and August compared to the first half of 2025. This is despite the introduction in mid-July of the Prioritized Ukraine Requirements List (PURL) initiative, a new scheme allowing NATO countries to purchase US weapons for Ukraine’s benefit. Military aid allocations from European countries decreased by 57% compared to the period between January and June, even when combining their aid with their contributions to PURL. Ultimately, the report underscores the persistent fluctuations in aid, particularly following the end of packages under former US president Joe Biden. If these shifts in aid continue for prolonged periods of time, they will undermine and constrain Ukraine’s military planning for 2026.
(Source: Sibylline)

 

10 Oct 25. Rheinmetall to supply Leopard 1 Skyranger 35 to Ukraine – order value in the three-digit m Euro range Rheinmetall is supplying Ukraine with further Skyranger 35 air defence systems based on the Leopard 1. The order is worth a three-digit m Euro figure. The systems are being financed by an EU country as part of the EU’s Windfall Profit Mechanism initiative. The production and integration of the systems will be carried out by Rheinmetall Italia SpA at its headquarters in Rome. “We are grateful for the trust that Ukraine has placed in us,” said Armin Papperger, CEO of Rheinmetall AG. “We would also like to thank the EU country, for the support, which underlines our continued efforts to support Ukraine.” The Leopard 1 Skyranger 35 combines the mobility and protection of a proven tracked vehicle with the outstanding effectiveness of a cannon-based air defence system. The Skyranger 35 is equipped with a KDG 35/1000 revolver cannon in 35 mm x 228 calibre with a firing rate of 1,000 rounds per minute. It has an effective range of up to 4,000 metres and a high degree of commonality with the Oerlikon Revolver Gun Mk 3. Thanks to AHEAD technology, the Skyranger 35 is airburst capable. In the future, it will also be possible to equip it with modern guided missiles.

 

10 Oct 25. Russia Deploys Chinese Radars to Track Ukrainian Drones.
Russian air defense units are now equipped with Chinese radar systems designed to detect and track unmanned aerial vehicles. The technology is being integrated into counter-drone units to enhance targeting and guidance of FPV interceptors used against Ukrainian drones.
Russian forces have acquired FSTH-LD02 and FSTH-LD03 radar systems manufactured by Zhejiang Fanshuang Technology. These compact, all-weather radars are described as the “eyes” of Russian anti-drone teams and are now being fielded alongside interceptor drones across multiple units.
FSTH-LD02 and FSTH-LD03
The FSTH-LD03 radar uses a digital antenna array and operates in the X-band frequency range between 8 and 12 GHz, with a wavelength of 3.75 to 2.5 cm. It employs mechanical azimuth scanning and has a stated detection range of up to 15 kilometers against targets with a radar cross-section of 0.01 square meters. Detection accuracy is reported at 10 meters for range and 0.3 degrees for both azimuth and elevation.
The FSTH-LD02 functions on a similar principle but operates in the Ku-band (12–18 GHz, with wavelengths between 2.5 and 1.67 cm). Its maximum detection range is 10 kilometers for targets of the same size, but it offers higher precision — up to 5 meters in range and 0.3 degrees in azimuth and elevation.
Both radars have technical limitations that operators must account for. They feature blind zones of approximately 300 meters (for the LD03) and 150 meters (for the LD02), and are unable to track objects moving at speeds below 1 meter per second. Although the manufacturer has not disclosed dimensions, the systems are estimated to measure roughly 1 to 1.3 meters in length and 0.6 to 0.8 meters in height.
A lighter variant, the FSTH-LD02C, is also widely available through Chinese online marketplaces. This version consumes only 400 watts of power and can detect quadcopter-type drones at ranges of 8 to 10 kilometers. Operating in the 9–10.2 GHz portion of the X-band, it offers slightly lower accuracy — around 10 meters for range and 0.5 degrees for azimuth and elevation — but is more compact at about 1 meter by 0.6 meters in size.
The use of these radars has been observed in the 22nd Air Defense Missile Regiment of Russia’s 11th Army Corps. The deployment suggests that Russia is reorganizing its drone interception capability by integrating FPV drone teams within existing air defense units. This structure is intended to improve coordination between radar operators and drone pilots, enabling a more unified defense approach within shared operational zones.
The introduction of Chinese radar technology into Russian service highlights the evolving nature of drone warfare in the conflict. As Ukraine increasingly relies on small, agile, and hard-to-detect drones for reconnaissance and precision strikes, Russia is seeking ways to counter these threats with more precise detection and guidance systems.
By pairing these radar systems with interceptor drones, Russian units aim to create a layered defense against Ukraine’s rapidly expanding fleet of unmanned systems — a capability that continues to shape the tactical landscape of the battlefield. (Source: UAS VISION/ Defence Blog; Defense Express)

 

10 Oct 25. UK accelerates missile aid to Ukraine, surpassing delivery timelines. The ongoing missile production efforts within the UK is creating 200 new jobs, while sustaining an additional 700 positions.
The UK Ministry of Defence (MoD) has expedited the provision of critical air defence missiles to Ukraine, surpassing the initial delivery schedule by five months. Hundreds of Martlet Lightweight Multirole Missiles (LMMs), produced in Belfast, were delivered under UK’s gifting programme. Produced by Belfast-based Thales, LMM is a surface-to-surface, surface-to-air precision strike missile. The weapons, each weighing 13kg, can travel at a speed of over Mach 1.5.
They have been deployed in Ukraine since the start of the conflict with Russia in February 2022. The delivery coincides with UK Defence Readiness and Industry Minister Luke Pollard’s visit to Kyiv as part of a trade delegation. It also comes as Thales entered a new phase of collaboration with Ukrainian partners.This advancement pertains to a segment of the earlier £1.6bn ($2.1bn) agreement, which will facilitate the enhanced incorporation of these decisive missiles into Ukraine’s air defence infrastructure. The missile production efforts within the UK are not only creating 200 new jobs but also sustaining an additional 700 positions. This contributes to economic growth and aligns with the Government’s Plan for Change.
Luke Pollard said: “The UK is stepping up our ironclad commitment to help Ukraine defend itself against Russia’s illegal invasion. This year alone we are spending £4.5bn on military support for Ukraine, more than ever before.
“It was an honour to lead this trade delegation to Kyiv, and to see so many other countries participating in the event. Driving industrial partnerships is essential so that we can learn from their expertise and together build the industrial base we need to defend the UK, deter our adversaries and support Ukraine.”
Previous trade missions between the UK and Ukraine have yielded over 30 joint ventures and partnerships, fostering job creation, economic prosperity, and enhanced security for both countries.
Notably, Ukrspecsystems, Ukraine’s drone manufacturer, plans to invest £200m in establishing two new facilities in the UK.
This move is expected to generate 500 high-skilled jobs and stimulate economic expansion. The trade delegation visit follows Programme LYRA, a technology sharing initiative that will see joint development of advanced military equipment between UK and Ukrainian industries. This partnership supports British employment while reinforcing national security for both nations. An industrial partnership has emerged from this agreement, leading to Project OCTOPUS, an air defence interceptor drone development venture. The UK aims to produce thousands of these drones monthly to aid Ukraine’s defence against Russia’s ongoing drone attacks on its cities. (Source: army-technology.com)
—————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————-
Founded in 1987, Exensor Technology is a world leading supplier of Networked Unattended Ground Sensor (UGS) Systems providing tailored sensor solutions to customers all over the world. From our Headquarters in Lund Sweden, our centre of expertise in Network Communications at Communications Research Lab in Kalmar Sweden and our Production site outside of Basingstoke UK, we design, develop and produce latest state of the art rugged UGS solutions at the highest quality to meet the most stringent demands of our customers. Our systems are in operation and used in a wide number of Military as well as Homeland Security applications worldwide. The modular nature of the system ensures any external sensor can be integrated, providing the user with a fully meshed “silent” network capable of self-healing. Exensor Technology will continue to lead the field in UGS technology, provide our customers with excellent customer service and a bespoke package able to meet every need.

A CNIM Group Company
————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————

Sponsored by Bertin Exensor

 

www.exensor.com

 

—————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————-

15 Oct 25.  US Army power forward presence with micro nuclear reactors. Senior government officials confirm between 10 and 12 reactors will be built in less than a year. Secretaries of the US Army and Energy Department, Daniel Driscoll and Christopher Wright, announced plans to build micro nuclear reactors to power the Army’s forward presence in the Pacific theatre. The rationale behind the transition to nuclear energy is that it is an alternative power source to diesel generators, which require an extensive and uncertain supply chain, which are not enough to enable Army missions overseas.

“You may be able to store a few weeks of [diesel] fuel – months is probably too much. But think of a forward deployed, small modular reactor that’s out there and can be flown in on a C-17 [or] on the back of a flatbed truck…

“Nuclear energy will provide multiple megawatts of power… meaningful power to do what [the Army are] doing, and it will run for years,” Wright described.

Project JANUS

Up to a dozen reactors will be delivered in less than a year – before 4 July 2026 – under this programme, dubbed Project JANUS. These nuclear reactors will be based, at first, in Idaho and other unspecified Western States. Energy consumption in modern military operations has become insurmountable as the battlespace moves according to the data collected and distributed across an integrated network driven by artifical intelligence.

“If you think about our engagement in a conflict in the Indo-Pacific, it is not going to be like a war we’ve had in the last 40 or 50 years,” Wright intimated. “We’re going to need to be able to access power like we have never needed it before.”

HALEU production

Although Driscoll and Wright were persistent in their claims that the new policy comes down to the advocacy of President Donald Trump, who has indeed sought to advance reactor technologies, the military and other agencies have been working to design, build, and demonstrate a prototype for a mobile nuclear reactor since 2016 under Project PELE. Nevertheless, this latest interagency cooperation aims to cut the bureaucracy of the past, the two maintained. This will see the administration reform the Nuclear Regulatory Commission “to deliver safety and delivery, not bureaucracy,” Wright stated. But in their efforts to carve out their own nuclear energy policy, the government plan to produce High-Assay Low-Enriched Uranium (HALEU). Existing reactors run on uranium fuel that is enriched up to 5% uranium 235 – the main fissile isotope that produces energy during a chain reaction. By definition, HALEU is enriched between 5% and less than 20% and is required for most US advanced reactors to achieve smaller designs that get more power per unit of volume.   Only Russia and China have the infrastructure to produce HALEU at scale, according to the World Nuclear Association. Notably, the former administration under Joe Biden awarded six contracts to secure America’s domestic HALEU supply chain in their closing months in office. (Source: army-technology.com)

 

10 Oct 25. Senate approval of defence bill raises compliance risks for defence sector, mitigating policy risks. On 9 October, the US Senate approved legislation to authorise USD 925 bn for national defence, receiving overwhelming bipartisan support. The bill underscores that funding the US military remains a bipartisan priority, despite the Trump administration’s efforts to slash government spending. Among the amendments, the bill overhauls procedures regarding the procurement of weapons, supporting the large network of private and public organisations that supply the government with military equipment. Consequently, defence contractors will face increased compliance risks; experts suggest that the new rules will likely deter smaller companies from bidding on projects, possibly diminishing competition in the military industry. In the short term, negotiations with the US House of Representatives will possibly stall the bill’s progression, as the House’s version contains a range of conservative social policy directives (including amendments on gender diversity in the military) that the Senate did not include. Nonetheless, we assess that the bill will pass in the coming weeks, sustaining the US military’s strength and force posture in the long term and mitigating defence policy risks. (Source: Sibylline)

 

—————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————

Founded in 1987, Exensor Technology is a world leading supplier of Networked Unattended Ground Sensor (UGS) Systems providing tailored sensor solutions to customers all over the world. From our Headquarters in Lund Sweden, our centre of expertise in Network Communications at Communications Research Lab in Kalmar Sweden and our Production site outside of Basingstoke UK, we design, develop and produce latest state of the art rugged UGS solutions at the highest quality to meet the most stringent demands of our customers. Our systems are in operation and used in a wide number of Military as well as Homeland Security applications worldwide. The modular nature of the system ensures any external sensor can be integrated, providing the user with a fully meshed “silent” network capable of self-healing. Exensor Technology will continue to lead the field in UGS technology, provide our customers with excellent customer service and a bespoke package able to meet every need.

A CNIM Group Company

—————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————

Sponsored by Bertin Exensor

 

www.exensor.com

 

————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————-

13 Oct 25. Royal Navy joins NATO allies as Russian submarine tracked in UK waters.

• UK warship and helicopter shadows Russian submarine through the English Channel in support of NATO mission.
• Comes two weeks after the Royal Navy tracked a Russian frigate and cargo vessel through the Channel.
• Royal Navy plays key role in securing the UK’s waters and areas of interest essential to supporting the economy and growth through the government’s Plan for Change.

The Royal Navy tracked a Russian submarine and carried out a concentrated three-day operation to watch every move as part of joint NATO efforts. The Plymouth-based frigate HMS Iron Duke monitored the surfaced Russian Kilo-class submarine Novorossiysk and its support tug Yakov Grebelsky near the French coast, close to the island of Ushant at the entrance to the English Channel. Over the following 72 hours (from 7 to 9 October), HMS Iron Duke, along with her Wildcat helicopter from 825 Naval Air Squadron, closely tracked and reported every movement of the Russian vessels as they transited through the Channel and into the North Sea. The frigate then passed on monitoring responsibilities to a NATO ally. The operation is part of the government’s ongoing commitment to safeguard the integrity of UK waters and protecting national security through the government’s Plan for Change.

Al Carns, Minister for the Armed Forces said: “Russian vessels have been passing through the English Channel more frequently and our Royal Navy is on the job 24/7, keeping a close eye on their movements to make sure our waters and undersea cables stay safe. This is a clear sign of how the UK stands strong with our NATO allies to push back against Russian aggression. The Royal Navy’s dedication and professionalism are absolutely vital for keeping the UK safe. The Government is fully committed to giving our Armed Forces the tools and support they need to keep us secure at home and strong abroad.”

The operation was part of a carefully coordinated allied effort, with 11 warships from six nations so far linking up to locate, track and handover duties, ensuring constant and unbroken monitoring of the Russians – in the face of challenging weather conditions. It began in the Mediterranean Sea, with HMS Cutlass of the Gibraltar Fast Boat Squadron shadowing Novorossiysk – which spent time dived and on the surface during her voyage – through the Strait of Gibraltar, before NATO warships took up the tasking until the entrance to the English Channel. There, Iron Duke was waiting once more to watch the Russians – the ship’s second such operation in the space of two weeks and her 19th in the last year, as the submarine continued her journey towards the Baltic Sea.

Commanding Officer of HMS Iron Duke, Commander David Armstrong, said: “A surfaced Russian submarine will always focus the mind. This operation was characterised by teamwork. Spanning an extended period, and complicated by severe weather and a Kilo transiting both dived and, on the surface, it has involved 11 surface units from six partner nations – likely more by the time it concludes it voyage.”

Having operated as part of the alliance’s Standing NATO Maritime Group 1 (SNMG1), which patrols northern Europe from the Baltic to the Atlantic to provide security and stability to the region, in the last year, Iron Duke was well-placed to coordinated effectively with allied warships during the operation. The Type 23 frigate and the Wildcat helicopter utilised their powerful sensors and remained poised to pivot to Anti-Submarine Warfare focus if the Kilo-class dived beneath the waves. The UK is steadfast in its support to NATO, increasing defence spending to 2.6% of GDP from 2027, with an ambition to increase to 3% in the next parliament. (Source: Royal Navy)

 

09 Oct 25. Italy unveils €31bn defense budget with NATO target in mind. Italy is spending €31.3bn ($36.2bn) on defense this year, the country’s defense ministry has announced in a long awaited budget document released on Thursday. The figure is up 7.2% on last year’s spending of just over €29bn, but is set to remain stable in 2026 and 2027, the ministry stated. Italy has come under pressure this year to increase spending, as NATO calls on members to hit 5% of GDP by 2035, up from a previous target of 2%. Italy’s spending last year amounted to only 1.54% of GDP, but Rome promised it would reach two percent in 2025. The new document announces that on top of the regular defense budget, a host of outlays that have been recategorized as defense spending have been added into the ledger, including pension payments and parts of the paramilitary Carabinieri police. In the process the €31.3bn defense budget rises to €45.3bn in spending, enough to qualify for the 2% target, the ministry said. The document gives a breakdown on spending this year for each program, but in a departure from tradition does not state the total amount of procurement funding which has been budgeted this year. It does say that defense ministry procurement funding will total €35bn over the next 15 years. In the list of programs to be financed this year, there is €100m to upgrade Italy’s aging Ariete tanks, €50 m to continue the development of new Panther tanks with Germany’s Rheinmetall and €130m for new Lynx fighting vehicles. As the planned Italian F-35 fleet grows from 90 to 115, there are €735 m for the program and €625m for work on the GCAP fighter with the UK and Japan. Italian officials have said they are considering buying the Japanese Kawasaki P-1 maritime patrol aircraft to tackle hostile submarines in the Mediterranean. Without specifying what platform will be purchased, the document says six will be bought, with an initial €30m to kickstart the program in 2027. (Source: Defense News)

 

09 Oct 25. Europol and EIB Group to deepen cooperation through SIENA network. The European Investment Bank today announced it will deepen its cooperation with Europol by joining the organisation’s Secure Information Exchange Network Application (SIENA for short). The platform is Europol’s flagship platform for the secure and swift exchange of sensitive and restricted information among EU law enforcement authorities, European agencies and bodies like Eurojust, Frontex and OLAF, as well as other cooperating states outside the EU. By joining SIENA, the EIB underlines its commitment to fighting fraud and makes sure it can rapidly exchange with the relevant authorities in a secure way.

“For the EIB, participation in SIENA is a strategic move that enhances our ability to collaborate with law enforcement on fraud, corruption and other financial crimes, as well as to exchange information and intelligence swiftly and securely, enabling us to react timely.” said European Investment Bank Inspector General Monique Koning. “This connection will allow the EIB’s Inspectorate General’s Investigations Division to exchange intelligence securely and efficiently, reinforcing the Bank’s role in safeguarding EU and EIB financial interests and supporting broader anti-crime efforts.”

Europol’s SIENA platform enables the swift and user-friendly exchange of operational and strategic crime-related information. It plays an important role in enabling cross-border cooperation, particularly in areas such as organised crime and financial intelligence. Today’s broadened collaboration builds on the signing of a Working Arrangement between both sides in 2021. Europol Executive Director Catherine De Bolle added: “Today’s signature demonstrates our shared commitment to ensuring the solid protection of EU funds and the financial integrity of the Union. Reinforcing our cooperation with the EIB adds another key actor to the EU’s collective efforts to fight fraud, corruption and money laundering. Connecting to SIENA means having access to a secure and compliant channel linking a wide community of European and international law enforcement agencies, with state-of-the-art security and data protection features.”

Background information

The European Investment Bank (ElB) is the long-term lending institution of the European Union, owned by its Member States. Built around eight core priorities, the EIB finances investments that contribute to EU policy objectives by bolstering climate action and the environment, digitalisation and technological innovation, security and defence, cohesion, agriculture and the bioeconomy, social infrastructure, the capital markets union and a stronger Europe in a more peaceful and prosperous world.   The EIB has a zero-tolerance policy towards fraud and corruption. The Investigations Division of the EIB’s Inspectorate General handles allegations of fraud and misconduct affecting EIB Group operations, actively cooperating with national authorities in the countries where the EIB operates, as well as with European investigative bodies, international organisations and financial institutions, to exchange information and strengthen safeguards. See more info about the activities if the Investigations Division here. The EIB encourages anyone with information about potential irregularities in the projects it finances to report them through the dedicated channels.

—————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————–

Founded in 1987, Exensor Technology is a world leading supplier of Networked Unattended Ground Sensor (UGS) Systems providing tailored sensor solutions to customers all over the world. From our Headquarters in Lund Sweden, our centre of expertise in Network Communications at Communications Research Lab in Kalmar Sweden and our Production site outside of Basingstoke UK, we design, develop and produce latest state of the art rugged UGS solutions at the highest quality to meet the most stringent demands of our customers. Our systems are in operation and used in a wide number of Military as well as Homeland Security applications worldwide. The modular nature of the system ensures any external sensor can be integrated, providing the user with a fully meshed “silent” network capable of self-healing. Exensor Technology will continue to lead the field in UGS technology, provide our customers with excellent customer service and a bespoke package able to meet every need.

A CNIM Group Company

—————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————-

Sponsored by Bertin Exensor

www.exensor.com

——————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————-
09 Oct 25. Mali: Military purge underscores increasing pressure on government stability amid fuel blockade. On 7 October, interim President Assimi Goïta signed decrees dismissing 11 high-ranking military officers due to their alleged involvement in an attempted coup. In August, the authorities arrested eight of the dismissed individuals during a purge of the military personnel allegedly involved in a coup attempt that involved a French national. These new decrees underscore President Goïta’s efforts to remove any challenges to his leadership, amid increasing pressure on the military government’s stability. Since the al-Qaeda-affiliated Jama’at Nasr al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM) instituted a blockade on fuel imports in early September, fuel shortages have emerged in major cities nationwide, undermining energy security conditions and exacerbating anti-government sentiment. Regional media reports indicate that the government has engaged in ad hoc negotiations with JNIM units to secure periodic access to fuel in exchange for prisoner releases. We assess that such negotiations are highly unlikely to restore full commercial access to fuel imports and will possibly aggravate tensions within the government, triggering further pre-emptive purges of high-ranking military personnel in order to mitigate the risk of a coup. These purges will likely further undermine the security forces’ capacity in the coming weeks. (Source: Sibylline)

 

09 Oct 25. New Zealand launches defence industry strategy. The New Zealand Ministry of Defence (MoD) has released a strategy to strengthen its defence industrial base and support the capability development of the New Zealand Defence Force (NZDF).
The new 44-page Defence Industry Strategy – published in early October 2025 – lists three objectives: provide greater clarity about defence requirements; harness local industry and support its development; and integration with Australia.
The strategy also outlines actions to be taken over the coming four years to deliver capability to the NZDF more quickly and resiliently. As Defence Minister Judith Collins said, “We’re not the biggest provider … but we can be the smartest.”
The government hopes to mature the local defence industry, which consists of about 800 companies, by presenting opportunities to partner with the NZDF or to act as subcontractors to international primes. This goal is supported by new government procurement rules that state primes must develop and submit industry capability plans to maximise local participation in procurements and sustainment.
In this vein, the Defence Industry Strategy supports implementation of the Defence Capability Plan (DCP) that was published in April and details the MoD’s plan to invest NZD12 bn (USD7 bn) over the ensuing four years on NZDF capability. The MoD will also explore utilising local businesses as ‘thin primes’, where a local enterprise assumes total contract responsibilities to the NZDF, while subcontracting work out to larger original equipment manufacturers. The government believes this approach will engender more competition and allow domestic businesses to ascend the value chain. (Source: Janes)

 

09 Oct 25. China tightens rare earth export controls, targets defence, semiconductor users.
• Summary
• China tightens controls ahead of Trump-Xi meeting
• Expands restrictions on some processing technology
• Foreign defence, semiconductor users targeted
China tightened its rare earth export controls on Thursday, expanding restrictions on processing technology and spelling out its intention to limit exports to overseas defence and semiconductor users.
The Ministry of Commerce’s announcement, which follows a U.S. lawmakers’ call on Tuesday for broader bans on the export of chipmaking equipment to China, expands sweeping controls Beijing announced in April that caused shortages around the world before a series of deals with Europe and the U.S. eased the supply crunch. (Source: Reuters)

 

08 Oct 25. Pakistan: Attack underscores elevated militant threat in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province. Late on 7 October, militants ambushed a military convoy near the Afghan border in Orakzai district (Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province), killing 11 military personnel, including a lieutenant colonel. The militants targeted the convoy with roadside bombs before attacking with firearms. According to the military’s media wing, the security forces were conducting an intelligence-based operation in the area. The Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) group has reportedly since claimed the attack. This comes as the TTP has ramped up attacks against the military in recent months amid Pakistan’s strained ties with Afghanistan, which Pakistan accuses of providing safe heavens for the TTP. We assess that, given the deadly attacks, Pakistan will intensify counter-terrorism operations in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, particularly in districts bordering Afghanistan. This will increase the risk of retaliatory TTP attacks and drive localised market closures. This will in turn possibly disrupt cross-border overland trade. Additionally, persistent militant activity will increase the risk of Pakistan conducting air strikes inside Afghanistan, further straining bilateral ties. (Source: Sibylline)

 

06 Oct 25. Colombia: Attack on military facility will sustain physical security risks in Arauca. On 5 October, suspected National Liberation Army (ELN) personnel attacked a military base in Puerto Jordán (Arauca department), killing one soldier and injuring seven military personnel. Reports indicate the attackers used explosives and firearms, while also damaging several buildings. The Colombian military has accused the ELN’s Domingo Laín Sáenz Front (FDL) of conducting the attack. Previously on 9 September, the ELN’s political leader and chief negotiator Israel Ramírez Pineda (alias ‘Pablo Beltrán’) announced that the group was open to resuming peace talks with the Colombian government. These talks have been suspended on multiple occasions, largely due to Colombian President Gustavo Petro’s assertions that the ELN continues to conduct attacks against military and civilian personnel; talks were most recently suspended in January following an ELN offensive in Catatumbo (Norte de Santander department). In the near term, we assess that ELN factions are likely to continue targeting military facilities using firearms and explosives, sustaining elevated physical safety risks near military infrastructure. Peace negotiations are unlikely to make significant headway as long as the ELN continues attacking such infrastructure, sustaining long-term organised crime risks in ELN strongholds such as Arauca, Chocó and Norte de Santander departments. (Source: Sibylline)

 

06 Oct 25. Venezuela-US: Military strikes on suspected drug traffickers will sustain elevated regional tensions. On 5 October, US President Donald Trump stated that the US military had carried out a strike on a suspected drug trafficking vessel off Venezuela’s coast. Meanwhile, on 3 October, US Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth stated that the US had struck a suspected drug trafficking vessel earlier that day. It is unclear whether President Trump and Hegseth were referencing the same strike. Regardless, this would mark at least the fourth military strike on suspected drug trafficking boats across the Caribbean Sea since 2 September. The Trump administration has determined that the US is engaged in a ‘non-international armed conflict’ with foreign drug cartels, granting authorisation for military action. The strikes come amid a significant US military deployment to the southern Caribbean Sea, including at least eight warships and support vessels, a nuclear-powered attack submarine and several F-35 fighter jets. We assess that further strikes on suspected drug trafficking vessels are likely in the short term, increasing the risk of disruption to maritime trade in the Caribbean Sea, possibly impacting supply chains. Furthermore, sustained strikes will sustain elevated bilateral tensions between the US and Venezuela, though armed conflict risks remain low. (Source: Sibylline)

————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————-
Founded in 1987, Exensor Technology is a world leading supplier of Networked Unattended Ground Sensor (UGS) Systems providing tailored sensor solutions to customers all over the world. From our Headquarters in Lund Sweden, our centre of expertise in Network Communications at Communications Research Lab in Kalmar Sweden and our Production site outside of Basingstoke UK, we design, develop and produce latest state of the art rugged UGS solutions at the highest quality to meet the most stringent demands of our customers. Our systems are in operation and used in a wide number of Military as well as Homeland Security applications worldwide. The modular nature of the system ensures any external sensor can be integrated, providing the user with a fully meshed “silent” network capable of self-healing. Exensor Technology will continue to lead the field in UGS technology, provide our customers with excellent customer service and a bespoke package able to meet every need.

A CNIM Group Company
—————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————-

Sponsored by Bertin Exensor

www.exensor.com

———————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————
Military And Security Developments
Oct 09.
At 1200hrs (local time) on 9 October, Israel and Hamas signed a ceasefire and hostage-release agreement aimed at ending the Israel-Hamas war.
SIGNIFICANCE
• Israel’s cabinet will vote on the agreement this evening (9 October).
• Once approved, the ceasefire will come into immediate effect; the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) will halt operations and withdraw to an agreed-upon line of control within Gaza (Palestinian Territories).
• Hamas has agreed to release all living and deceased hostages; following their release, Israel will free over 1,900 Palestinian prisoners.
FORECAST
The IDF’s withdrawal will reduce security risks across Gaza, though crossfire risks will remain elevated near IDF positions. In the coming days, the IDF will gradually withdraw its forces from most of the Gaza Strip, starting with Gaza City. From the beginning of next week, IDF troops will likely begin withdrawing from most of their axes of control in southern Gaza, particularly in Khan Yunis. According to the agreement, the IDF will retain forces within 53% of Gaza, likely near the strip’s borders. The ceasefire will reduce security risks across the Gaza Strip and allow greater aid provision, though food and water security risks will remain elevated. Exposure to crossfire will remain heightened near IDF positions in the coming days due to the latent risk of opportunistic militant attacks and misidentification by IDF units. Prior to the ceasefire coming into effect, Gazan militants will possibly launch rocket strikes, though these will only slightly raise security risks for Israeli population centres near the strip’s borders due to elevated interception rates. The ceasefire will reduce the likelihood of Houthi attacks against Israeli and Israeli-affiliated shipping in the coming weeks.
Possible delays to hostage releases and negotiations over the agreement’s longer-term clauses will sustain the risk of conflict re-escalation. Despite the likely implementation of the ceasefire in the coming hours, there is a realistic possibility of delays to the release of living and deceased hostages in the coming days. Such delays would increase diplomatic deadlock between Israel and Hamas; the risk of a resumption of IDF operations in Gaza would also increase if this deadlock were to persist over a period of several days. Even if the initial phase of the ceasefire agreement is successfully implemented, negotiations over the agreement’s post-conflict governance clauses would likely be extremely tense. Hamas would almost certainly oppose proposals to disarm its militant factions entirely and to exclude its political leadership from participating in post-war governance structures. Israel and the US would likely characterise this position as a rejection of the ceasefire’s key characteristics, increasing the risk of long-term conflict re-escalation.
Global pro-Palestine activism, particularly in Europe, will likely persist through 2025 despite the ceasefire, sustaining reputational risks for entities affiliated with Israel. While the ceasefire’s implementation will likely reduce the scale and frequency of protests, demonstrations will almost certainly continue, during which physical attacks against Israeli-affiliated businesses and Jewish sites by radical elements are possible. Global boycott campaigns against Israeli-affiliated businesses are also likely to persist into 2026, impacting the tech, defence and fresh produce sectors in particular. Several businesses, especially in Europe, will continue to distance themselves from Israeli companies in these sectors, impacting their global sales and operations. Physical security risks for Israeli tourists visiting Europe in 2026 will remain elevated, undermining operational continuity for several tourism companies, booking platforms, hotels and airlines (particularly those operating in the Mediterranean region) throughout the next year.
• Israel-Palestinian Territories: Ceasefire will moderate security risks, humanitarian conditions in Gaza. Earlier on 9 October, at 1200hrs (local time), Israeli and Hamas delegations signed a ceasefire and hostage release agreement in Sharm El Sheikh (South Sinai governorate, Egypt). The ceasefire will likely take effect later in the day after the Israeli cabinet formally approves the agreement; Hamas will likely release the 20 living hostages by 13 October. The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) will also withdraw to an agreed-upon line outside locations such as Gaza City, though Beit Hanoun (North Gaza Governorate), the Philadelphi Corridor and Rafah (Rafah governorate) are likely to remain under IDF control. The agreement will almost certainly moderate security risks and humanitarian conditions in Gaza by facilitating increased inflows of food and medical aid. There is a realistic possibility of delays to hostage releases, which will sustain tensions in the coming days; however, the first stage of the agreement will likely be completed by 19 October due to assertive diplomacy from Arab states and the US. Negotiations on the peace plan’s further stages will likely take several weeks, given that sticking points remain including Hamas’ disarmament. During the negotiations, we assess that there is a realistic possibility that the IDF will maintain an on-the-ground presence in Gaza, sustaining the risks of conflict resumption in the coming weeks.
• Syria: Resumed clashes underscore ceasefire fragility, elevated risks of armed conflict in Suwayda. On 8 October, heavy clashes erupted between the National Guard (i.e. a Druze militia affiliated with the cleric Hikmat al-Hijri) and the Syrian government’s forces in the town of Walgha (Suwayda governorate). Local media reported that the clashes killed and injured at least eight people. We assess that the National Guard likely attempted to take over several villages along the existing lines of control, which are loosely defined by a ceasefire agreement with the government forces. These clashes underscore the fragility of the agreement, which will likely sustain security instability in Suwayda throughout 2025. We assess that in the coming days, there is a realistic possibility that the National Guard will conduct further attacks against Arab tribal and government forces across Suwayda. These will likely result in the complete closure of provincial highways, disrupting humanitarian aid routes and supply chains to the provincial capital Suwayda. This will increase food and energy security risks in the city as well as the risks of ethno-religious armed conflict resuming in southern Syria in the next three months.

Syria: Lifting of restrictions signals conflict de-escalation, ceasefire will likely hold into 2026. On 9 October, the Syrian government forces lifted restrictions and opened roads to the Kurdish-controlled districts of Ashrafieh and Sheikh Maqsoud in Aleppo (Aleppo governorate). This comes after the agreement of a ceasefire between the leader of the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) and the Syrian President Ahmed al-Sharaa on 7 October, following clashes that had erupted the previous day. The meeting and the subsequent lifting of restrictions signal a de-escalation; we assess that the current ceasefire will likely hold until at least January 2026. Nevertheless, sporadic clashes between the SDF and Turkish-backed factions in the Syrian army remain a realistic possibility, sustaining security instability in Aleppo and along Syria’s northern border in the coming months. These sporadic clashes will likely be small in scale and remain concentrated along the lines of control, primarily around the Tishreen dam in Aleppo, without evolving into a widespread armed conflict.

* Morocco: Anti-corruption protests will likely continue, elevating domestic unrest risks. On 9 October, the Moroccan youth movement GenZ 212 staged further anti-corruption protests in the capital Rabat, as well as in Casablanca (Casablanca-Settat region) and Tangier (Tangier-Tetouan-Al Hoceima region), ahead of King Mohammed VI’s address to Parliament later on 10 October. The group also issued a set of demands calling for the government’s resignation and for comprehensive reforms to Morocco’s economy, education, governance and health care systems. At least three people have died in the ongoing protests, which began on 27 September. Further demonstrations are likely nationwide in the coming days, increasing the risk of sporadic clashes between protesters and the security forces. The authorities are likely to employ heavy-handed tactics, including tear gas, water cannons and possibly live ammunition, elevating exposure to crossfire or misidentification for proximate staff, especially near government buildings and banks. If the Moroccan government does not meet GenZ 212’s demands, protests are likely to increase in scale and frequency in the coming weeks, significantly elevating domestic unrest and security risks.

Oct. 08.
KEY DEVELOPMENTS
IRAN
• Iran continues efforts to moderate the socio-economic impact of UN sanctions through diversified trading partnerships; this strategy will likely increase supply chain exposure risks and struggle to mitigate a broader economic fallout.
• Turkey announced sanctions on Iran in line with UN directives, moderately delaying efforts to increase defence co-operation.
• Increasing separatist activity in western Iran will likely trigger a crackdown on ethno-religious minorities, elevating threats to locally engaged staff.
ISRAEL
• A second Gaza-bound flotilla has underscored the reputational risks for companies in the defence and maritime sectors that are affiliated with Israel.
PALESTINIAN TERRITORIES
• GAZA STRIP: Negotiations between Israel and Hamas have resumed in Egypt, underscoring the improving prospects for a ceasefire and hostage release agreement.
• GAZA STRIP: Security risks in Gaza City and northern Gaza remain elevated despite the halt of the Israeli Defense Forces’ (IDF’s) military operations.
• WEST BANK: The Israeli security forces’ interception of an Iranian weapon shipment to the West Bank highlights continued efforts to arm militants, driving security risks in the West Bank.
IRAN
• Iran continues efforts to moderate the socio-economic impact of UN sanctions through diversified trading partnerships; this strategy will likely increase supply chain exposure risks and struggle to mitigate a broader economic fallout. On 7 October, Iranian government spokesperson Fatemeh Mohajerani stated that Iran will attempt to mitigate the economic impact of UN sanctions by deepening its engagement with non-Western trade partners, through forums such as the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO). Mohajerani also stated that Iran would possibly engage in bartering systems to bypass sanctions exposure. The announcement comes after the Wall Street Journal reported on 5 October that China and Iran have engaged in barter systems and alternative trade mechanisms since 2018 to bypass US sanctions, facilitating the trade of Iranian oil and raw metals for Chinese investment in infrastructure projects. In the coming months, Iran will highly likely attempt to engage in further bartering with trade partners to moderate broader socio-economic pressure by retaining access to key commodities (particularly industrial components, pharmaceuticals and chemical compounds), while preserving its already depleted foreign currency reserves. We assess that such arrangements are unlikely to entirely insulate the Iranian economy from the fallout of broad international sanctions. This will increase risks of anti-government protests in the coming weeks, given sustained inflation, currency depreciation and commodity shortages for consumers. The bartering agreements will also possibly increase supply chain exposure risks for firms that are engaged in the purchase and sale of minerals and metals, particularly given Iran’s substantial exports of aluminium, copper, iron and zinc to China, India, Pakistan and Turkey. This will increase supply chain verification requirements for regionally engaged firms, amid rising scrutiny of Iranian exports and broader economic opacity.
• Turkey announced sanctions on Iran in line with UN directives, moderately delaying efforts to increase defence co-operation. On 1 October, Turkey announced that it would sanction 20 individuals and 18 entities associated with Iran’s nuclear programme, including financial institutions such as Bank Sepah. The announcement comes after the UN Security Council voted to re-impose nuclear sanctions on Iran on 27 September (see Sibylline Middle East Crisis Update – 29 September 2025), underscoring increasing international engagement with sanction requirements. Given Turkey’s significant Iranian diaspora, the sanctioning will likely restrict remittance flows via high-profile Iranian financial entities, increasing risks of money laundering activity and irregular banking transfers within Iran. Consequently, sanctions exposure risks and due diligence requirements will increase for entities in Turkey’s financial sector; these risks will also impact firms purchasing processed metals and polymers from Iranian exporters, given that many Iranian producers have links to government bodies and sanctioned individuals. The announcement came as Iran’s defence minister met with his Turkish counterpart in Turkey’s capital Ankara, also on 1 October, to discuss bilateral security co-operation. Turkey’s efforts to expand and enforce UN sanctions will likely moderately delay the progress towards bilateral co-operation, sustaining long-standing tensions between Iran and Turkey in the medium-to-long term.
• Increasing separatist activity in western Iran will likely trigger a crackdown on ethno-religious minorities, elevating threats to locally engaged staff. On 6 October, unidentified militants conducted a grenade and shooting attack on an Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) operational base in Sarvabad (Kurdistan province), killing two IRGC personnel and injuring three others. The Iranian authorities have claimed that the attack was perpetrated by ‘counter-revolutionaries’; this statement is likely a reference to Kurdish separatist militants. The attack underscores the moderately elevated risks of separatist violence targeting the Iranian security and police forces in western Iran; there has been an uptick in IRGC shooting incidents targeting kulbars (i.e. ethnic-Kurdish porters) during cross-border movements from Iraq following the Israel-Iran war. The shooting incidents highlight Iran’s border security crackdown amid broader efforts to prevent infiltration from Israeli-linked individuals and entities. The Iranian government’s measures will almost certainly continue to disproportionately target ethnic minorities, particularly ethnic-Arabs, ethnic-Balochs and ethnic-Kurds in the short-to-medium term. Continued arrests, shooting incidents and executions will highly likely compound ethno-religious tensions in western and eastern Iran, sustaining risks of further separatist attacks targeting IRGC and government facilities. Subsequent crackdowns will increase the risks of surveillance, harassment and detention for locally engaged staff, particularly for ethnic minorities and foreign nationals.
ISRAEL
• A second Gaza-bound flotilla has underscored the reputational risks for companies in the defence and maritime sectors that are affiliated with Israel. Earlier on 8 October, the Israeli Navy intercepted a flotilla sailing to Gaza, detaining 150 activists. The flotilla comes shortly after the interception of the Global Sumud Flotilla on 1 and 2 October, indicating the possibly increasing utilisation of flotillas by pro-Palestine activists. These campaigns will elevate risks of sporadic spikes in diplomatic tensions between Israel and the countries of origin of the detained foreign activists, particularly in the event of alleged poor treatment of detainees. Such a situation will increase the risk of lawsuits being filed against Israel and the individual Israeli security personnel participating in interception and detention operations. Furthermore, Israel’s interception of flotillas will likely exacerbate pro-Palestine activism globally, particularly in the resident countries of flotilla members. These will also elevate reputational and boycott risks for companies affiliated with Israel over the coming weeks, particularly in the maritime and defence sectors.
PALESTINIAN TERRITORIES
• GAZA STRIP: Negotiations between Israel and Hamas have resumed in Egypt, underscoring the improving prospects for a ceasefire and hostage release agreement. On 3 October, Hamas tentatively agreed to a US-backed 20-point ceasefire proposal to end the Israel-Hamas war. Hamas stated that it would be willing to release all remaining Israeli hostages in line with the proposal, but that further negotiations are necessary to finalise post-war governance structures within Gaza. Indirect negotiations between Israel and Hamas subsequently began in Egypt on 6 October; Egyptian President Abdel Fattah El-Sisi has characterised reports from mediators as ‘very positive’. Earlier on 8 October, regional media outlets reported that delegations from the Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) and the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) would imminently join negotiations in Egypt, underscoring the potential progress towards an agreement involving the numerous militant factions operating in Gaza. The ongoing negotiations and mediators’ substantial engagement underscore the improving prospects for the implementation of a ceasefire and hostage release agreement in the coming days. However, negotiators have yet to finalise a list of the Palestinian prisoners that Israel will release as part of a ceasefire agreement; the US-backed proposal states that Israel will release 250 Palestinian prisoners serving life sentences and 1,700 others detained during the Israel-Hamas war. Hamas highly likely hopes to secure the release of the high-profile Hamas militant Marwan Barghout and of several perpetrators of the 7 October 2023 attack. Israel will likely reject such proposals, increasing the risks of a temporary deadlock. Negotiations will remain extremely sensitive to brinkmanship regarding prisoner releases and the timeline of hostage releases from Gaza; the risks of stalling remain elevated in the coming days, possibly delaying the implementation of a ceasefire proposal. Nevertheless, we assess that there is a realistic possibility that Israel and Hamas will agree to the proposal in the coming days, decreasing risks of armed conflict within Gaza in the short term.
• GAZA STRIP: Security risks in Gaza City and northern Gaza remain elevated despite the halt of IDF military operations. On 4 October, the IDF halted its offensive operations in Gaza, including its ongoing efforts to capture Gaza City. This followed a request from President Trump and a directive by Israel’s Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu amid efforts to negotiate a ceasefire. The IDF has now shifted to defensive operations to enhance security near its positions, including via the continued surveillance of the area to prevent militant attacks. In the past week, Gaza-based militants continued their offensive operations and attacks against the IDF’s positions, prompting return fire and airstrikes. These incidents will sustain security risks across Gaza, particularly within Gaza City and near IDF positions. The IDF will likely retain its current active defensive posture throughout the Sukkot holiday period (6-13 October). However, any delays in the current ceasefire negotiations will elevate risks of a resumption in military offensive operations, in an IDF-led effort to pressure Hamas negotiators. As such, security conditions across Gaza and particularly Gaza City will remain fragile and subject to rapid changes in the coming days.
• WEST BANK: The Israeli security forces’ interception of an Iranian weapon shipment to the West Bank highlights continued efforts to arm militants, driving security risks in the West Bank. Earlier on 8 October, the Israeli security agencies said that they intercepted a large weapon shipment from Iran’s IRGC to the West Bank. According to their statement, the shipment included 29 Claymore mines, 15 anti-tank rockets and four drones, at least two of which had the capacity to drop explosive payloads. The Israeli security agencies referred to some of the weapons in the shipment as ‘balance-breaking’ weapons, severely threatening the security environment in the West Bank. This is the third large Iranian weapon shipment to the West Bank that has been intercepted in the past 12 months (previous instances occurred in March 2025 and November 2024). Iran likely views the provision of more sophisticated ‘balance-breaking weapons’ to the West Bank as key to its national defence strategy, after the degradation of proxies in Lebanon and Syria emboldened Israel to conduct substantial strikes on Iran earlier in 2025. We assess that Iranian shipments will continue, further destabilising the West Bank’s fragile security environment over the coming months. This is highly likely to drive the IDF and other Israeli security agencies to increase their operational presence in the West Bank in the coming weeks, particularly along border areas and Ramallah (Ramallah and al-Bireh governorate). A heightened presence will elevate physical security risks emanating from sporadic clashes and crossfire between the Israeli security forces and militants during IDF raids on suspected militant positions; it will also cause mobility disruption, impacting supply chains across the West Bank.
RED SEA
• RED SEA: Houthi attacks against Israel are highly likely to decrease in the possible event of an Israel-Hamas ceasefire in the coming days. On 7 October, the IDF intercepted four explosive-laden drones over the city of Eilat (South district, Israel) within one hour of their deployment by Houthis. No injuries or damages were reported by the Israeli authorities. However, local Jordanian media reported that shrapnel hit a vehicle in the nearby city of Aqaba (Aqaba governorate, Jordan), causing minimal damage. The drone attack comes a day after local Eilat officials announced that they had installed bomb shelters in several beaches and other public places. While these bomb shelters will help mitigate risks of injuries in Eilat, the risk of collateral damage resulting from drone interception is likely to persist in Aqaba, sustaining ongoing security threats to residents and tourists in the city. However, Houthi attacks against Israel are highly likely to decrease if a ceasefire is reached during the ongoing talks between Hamas and Israel in Egypt.
REGIONAL AND GLOBAL DEVELOPMENTS
• ISRAEL-GLOBAL: Pro-Palestine protests in Europe are likely to persist into the rest of 2025 even if a ceasefire deal is reached. On 7 October, medium-scale pro-Palestinian protests erupted in several countries, including Germany, the Netherlands, Turkey, the UK and the US. Similarly, several pro-Israel events and rallies were organised across Europe, commemorating the second anniversary of the 7 October 2023 attack. The authorities have not reported any altercations between the two opposing groups on that day. As the Israel-Hamas war enters its third year, the frequency of pro-Palestine protests (particularly in Europe) will likely increase through the coming weeks, especially if the ongoing ceasefire talks in Egypt stall. However, we assess that even if a ceasefire is reached in the coming days, pro-Palestine protests in Europe are likely to persist into the final months of 2025, albeit at a reduced frequency and scale. Similarly, boycott campaigns and rallies against Israeli-affiliated businesses are likely to persist, sustaining significant compliance and reputational risks for these entities in Europe through 2026, particularly in the tech and defence sectors.
• GLOBAL: Israeli-linked entities participating in sporting and cultural events will almost certainly continue facing scrutiny from pro-Palestine activists, underscoring elevated event management risks. On 6 October, the Israel-Premier Tech cycling team announced that it would re-name and re-brand itself for the 2026 sporting season, following intense scrutiny of the team’s connections to Israel in recent months. The announcement comes after the organisers of the 4 October Giro dell’Emilia cycling race in Italy withdrew their invitation for Israel-Premier Tech to participate, amid concerns that pro-Palestine protesters would target the event. Previously, Pro-Palestine demonstrators disrupted Spain’s high-profile Vuelta a España cycling race to protest Israel-Premier Tech’s participation, triggering an early finish to the race’s final stage (see Sibylline Middle East Crisis Update – 4 September 2025). The re-branding initiative underscores the significant reputational concerns for Israeli-linked entities, particularly sports teams participating in high-profile events in public spaces. In the coming months, cultural and sporting events involving Israeli participants, delegations and teams will likely continue facing elevated risks of targeted protests and demonstrations, increasing risks of disruption and last-minute cancellations. This will likely trigger increased insurance and security costs for affected events, while efforts to hold events behind closed doors will likely undermine sales revenue and broader engagement from target audiences.
• Belgium: Defence director’s warning highlights demand for clearer counter-drone guidelines. On 8 October, Thales Belgium Director Alain Quevrin warned that drone overflights are being detected at an increasing rate near the defence firm’s sensitive manufacturing sites, including the Évegnée Fort munitions factory (Walloon region). Quevrin has called for clearer legal guidelines for how companies can address the elevated threat of unidentified drone activity near sensitive sites, including the conditions during which they can detect, jam and/or shoot down drones. Under current EU regulations, critical national infrastructure (CNI) providers and defence firms are unable to neutralise drones without co-ordinating with the police or national security agencies. European states are exploring strategies to bolster lagging counter-drone measures, including the construction of a ‘drone wall’, though such efforts are unlikely to mitigate against the threat to sensitive sites in the short-to-medium term. Denmark plans to grant CNI operators autonomy to employ counter-drone systems; this will possibly prompt similar legislation in other EU states. However, we assess that legal and practical challenges – particularly the risk of collateral damage – will limit the legislation’s implementation
Oct 07.
Executive summary
• In response to the recognition of an independent Palestinian state by several Western countries, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has threatened to respond with unspecified measures, raising concerns that he may act to undermine the viability of a potential Palestinian state. This report outlines the most viable and possible scenarios for Israel’s response.
• If Israel decides to fully occupy and annex the West Bank, this would require a substantial military operation, triggering widespread conflict across the West Bank and a third Intifada. By critically undermining the prospects of a two-state solution, Israel would also trigger substantial international and regional isolation.
• If Israel partially annexes the West Bank, it would almost certainly face international backlash, but short of a total breakdown of regional treaties and relations with major allies. Rates of settler violence and clashes with Palestinians would increase in the West Bank, while regional pro-Palestine protests would grow in frequency and scale, increasing hostility to Israeli- and US-linked foreign investment.
• In our most likely scenario, the Israeli government would accelerate and expand its plans to develop new and current settlements, as well as move to legalise outposts. This would drive a gradual escalation of international criticism against Israel and would intensify ethno-religious tensions in the West Bank.
• Alternatively, Israel could possibly limit its response to economic and political measures such as withholding funds from the Palestinian Authority (PA) and pausing relief for external bodies that provide funding, degrading the PA’s capacity to pay civil service employees. In this scenario, Israel would also suspend elements of security co-operation, decreasing the PA’s capacity to respond to militant violence and organised criminal activity.
• There is a very low possibility of Israel deciding not to respond to Western recognitions of Palestinian statehood, reducing diplomatic tensions. However, pro-Palestine activism would likely persist, sustaining security, operational and reputational risks for companies affiliated with Israel (particularly in the defence, construction and food sectors) due to protests, vandalism and boycott campaigns.
Context
In September 2025, numerous Western states, including Australia, Canada and the UK, recognised an independent Palestinian state citing concerns regarding humanitarian conditions in Gaza, rising settler violence in the West Bank and the failure to advance the two-state solution. On 21 September, Prime Minister Netanyahu stated that his government would ‘respond’ with unspecified measures at a later date. This statement, paired with Prime Minister Netanyahu’s long-standing opposition to the formation of a Palestinian state in line with the two-state solution, has triggered concerns from numerous regional and international parties that Israel will retaliate by annexing the West Bank in whole or in part, thereby isolating the PA.
Territorial designations in the West Bank are complex and primarily stem from the 1993 and 1995 Oslo Accords. These treaties designate three areas within the West Bank, as outlined in Figure 1; they do not categorise East Jerusalem, which remains under Israeli civil and security control. Within Area C and the East Jerusalem area, there are 160 Israeli settlements, as well as numerous ‘outposts’ (i.e. settlements recognised as illegal by Israel) with a population of over 700,000. The West Bank is classified as occupied territory under Israeli and international law and consequently does not form part of Israel’s sovereign territory.
Prospects of shifting territorial control in the West Bank are a key driver of inter-communal and militant violence throughout Israel and the Palestinian Territories; they also threaten backlash from foreign governments across the Middle East and beyond. Below, we have outlined the most viable possible scenarios of Israel’s response to the growing international support for Palestinian statehood in the coming three months, analysing the impact of Israel’s potential decision-making. Our most dangerous scenarios consider the West Bank’s full and partial annexation, which would result in substantial backlash, threatening global and regional cooperation with Israel. There is a realistic possibility that these scenarios will be rendered almost entirely unworkable for Israel, especially if there is progress in the ongoing peace negotiations under US President Donald Trump’s 20-point plan. Regardless of diplomatic efforts in the coming weeks, the peace process will remain vulnerable, sustaining the possibility that our dangerous scenarios or our most likely long-term scenario will materialise.
• Region: Anniversary of 7 October 2023 attack in Israel will drive domestic unrest, attack risks. The second anniversary (7 October) of Hamas’ 2023 attack against Israel will likely act as a flashpoint for protests and antisemitic violence across Western Europe. In Italy, the radical pro-Palestine activist group Giovani Palestinesi (Palestinian Youth) has planned demonstrations (allegedly to commemorate the attack) at 1930hrs (local time) in Bologna (Emilia-Romagna region) and Turin (Piedmont region). Activists will likely ignore any protest bans issued by the local authorities, driving the risk of violent unrest. Clashes with the police during nationwide pro-Palestine demonstrations since 1 October have underscored the elevated anti-Israel sentiment across Italy. Elsewhere, thousands of students will likely attend pro-Palestine demonstrations at universities across the UK, despite Prime Minister Sir Keir Starmer’s call for cancellations following the 2 October terrorist attack against a synagogue in Manchester (Greater Manchester; see Sibylline Alert – 2 October 2025). We assess that heightened ethno-religious tensions will elevate the risk of sporadic physical attacks targeting Israeli and Jewish personnel and institutions in Western Europe in the coming hours.
• Yemen: Houthi detentions of UN staff underscore risk of harm for NGO personnel, operational risks. On 6 October, a UN spokesperson confirmed that the Iranian-backed Houthis detained nine of its personnel in Yemen. The statement did not specify the timing or circumstances of the latest detentions but comes amid ongoing Houthi seizures of UN assets in the country. The recent move likely reflects Houthi attempts to uncover foreign intelligence assets; these efforts will likely continue in the coming months, increasing risks of arbitrary stop-and-search and detention practices. These will elevate physical and psychological risks for NGO and foreign personnel due to poor detention conditions and limited access to healthcare. Persistent Houthi detentions are likely to hinder NGO operations on the ground due to the absence of key personnel and assets, also impacting disruption to the provision of aid, elevating food security risks. Additionally, there is a realistic possibility that some charities and NGO personnel will leave Yemen in the coming months, due to the increased scrutiny and risks of detention from the Houthis. This will increase risks of workforce retention, further exacerbating socio-economic risks and the country’s humanitarian crisis.
Oct 06.
• Israel-Palestinian Territories: Ceasefire is realistic, though implementation will likely be delayed. Later on 6 October, an Israeli delegation will arrive in Egypt’s Sharm El Sheikh (South Sinai governorate) for indirect peace talks with a Hamas delegation led by deputy chairman Khalil al-Hayya, based on US President Donald Trump’s 20-point ceasefire plan. On 3 October, Hamas tentatively agreed to the peace plan, stating that further negotiations are necessary before a full commitment. We assess that President Trump’s push for a ceasefire is key and will increase the possibility of both sides reaching an agreement in the coming weeks. The current negotiations are likely to revolve around the first phase of the ceasefire; key sticking points include the lines of withdrawal and the identity of the Palestinian prisoners to be released. These issues are likely to delay the implementation of the agreement, possibly to next week. Furthermore, while the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) have reduced the intensity of their military operations and airstrikes across Gaza, these activities have not completely halted, sustaining elevated security risks for personnel across the strip, particularly near IDF positions. In the longer term, other disputes (such as over Hamas’ disarmament) will present persistent threats to the peace process’ viability over the coming weeks, delaying the implementation of the agreement and sustaining risks of a complete collapse of the peace negotiations.
• Syria: New clashes in northern Syria will elevate armed conflict risks in coming weeks. On 5 October, new clashes erupted between the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) and the Syrian government’s forces near Dayr Hafir (Aleppo governorate). The clashes follow a period of mobilisation by both sides along the front lines in Aleppo’s countryside, as well as within the city of Aleppo where the SDF retains control of the Sheikh Maqsood and Ashrafieh neighbourhoods. The clashes come amid a prolonged impasse in talks over the integration of the Kurdish forces within the Syrian Armed Forces. In the coming weeks, tensions along the lines of control in northern Syria will remain heightened, particularly in the areas near Dayr Hafir and Manbij (Aleppo governorate), as well as surrounding the Tishrin dam; this will sustain elevated risks of further clashes. Additionally, a possible increase in both sides’ deployment of forces in the coming days, including tanks and missiles, will elevate the risks of full armed conflict between the parties. Such a conflict will likely prompt direct Turkish intervention against Kurdish units along the northern border, significantly elevating security instability across Syria. (Source: Sibylline)
——————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————-
Founded in 1987, Exensor Technology is a world leading supplier of Networked Unattended Ground Sensor (UGS) Systems providing tailored sensor solutions to customers all over the world. From our Headquarters in Lund Sweden, our centre of expertise in Network Communications at Communications Research Lab in Kalmar Sweden and our Production site outside of Basingstoke UK, we design, develop and produce latest state of the art rugged UGS solutions at the highest quality to meet the most stringent demands of our customers. Our systems are in operation and used in a wide number of Military as well as Home land Security applications worldwide. The modular nature of the system ensures any external sensor can be integrated, providing the user with a fully meshed “silent” network capable of self-healing. Exensor Technology will continue to lead the field in UGS technology, provide our customers with excellent customer service and a bespoke package able to meet every need.

A CNIM Group Company

———————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————-

Sponsored by Bertin Exensor

 

www.exensor.com

 

—————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————-

Military And Security Developments

Oct 10.

Global: Pro-Ukraine, -West OT systems face elevated disruption risks from pro-Russia hacktivists. On 9 October, the cyber security company Forescout reported that a pro-Russia hacktivist group (‘TwoNet’) is conducting disruptive cyber operations against perceived adversarial critical national infrastructure (CNI). In September, TwoNet used default credentials to infiltrate operational technology (OT) within a decoy water treatment facility that was deliberately created by threat researchers to observe cyber threat actors’ activity. The group then ran a query to identify the system’s databases, before exploiting a software vulnerability (CVE-2021-26829). This displayed a pop-up alert on a compromised human machine interface (HMI); the alert claimed that the attack was successful. TwoNet subsequently disabled logs and other processes, demonstrating its intent and capabilities (despite having merely infiltrated a decoy target). TwoNet is known for targeting IT systems operated by entities that support Ukraine; it typically employs distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) attacks. We therefore assess that the tactics, techniques and procedures (TTPs) demonstrated in this latest incident underscore a possible shift in hacktivists’ modus operandi, elevating security and disruption risks for Western OT systems in the short-to-medium term.

Oct 07.

KEY DEVELOPMENTS

• POKROVSK: Russian forces made a number of significant advances in and around Pokrovsk (Donetsk oblast), including along the flanks of the Russian tactical penetration to the north-east of the city
• STRIKES: Russia launched its largest combined strike to date against Lviv oblast in western Ukraine overnight on 4-5 October amid a steady uptick in long-range strikes targeting energy infrastructure ahead of the winter period
• DRONES: Dutch Prime Minister Dick Schoof stated that there is consensus among European countries that Russia is responsible for drone sightings over the continent, but that its involvement cannot be proven
• FORECAST: President Donald Trump stated that he would want to know how Ukraine plans to use long-range Tomahawk missiles before agreeing to supply them due to concerns about escalating the Russo-Ukrainian war
• POKROVSK: Between 2 and 7 October, Russian forces made a number of significant advances in and around Pokrovsk (Donetsk oblast), including along the flanks of the Russian tactical penetration to the north-east of the city. A prominent Ukrainian military observer confirmed various Russian advances on 6 October, including the seizure of the villages of Dorozhnie and Ivanivka (both Donetsk), which are located around nine miles (15km) to the north-east of Pokrovsk. Russian forces have also advanced further north inside the tactical penetration area; they re-entered the eastern outskirts of Zolotyi Kolodyaz (Donetsk), which is located around 16 miles (26km) to the north of Pokrovsk. Small Russian infantry units are also reportedly operating to the north of the settlement, indicating that Russian forces are continuing their efforts to consolidate the area, despite determined Ukrainian counter-attacks.
• POKROVSK: Around the city of Pokrovsk itself, Russian forces have made notable advances to the north, east and south of the city, placing ever greater pressure on the area. Ukrainian sources confirmed on 6 October that Russian forces have seized Krasnyi Lyman (Donetsk), a village located around three miles (5km) directly to the north-east of Pokrovsk. In more significant developments, however, Russian forces have now likely retaken the entirety of the much larger satellite town of Novoekonomichne (Donetsk), located around six miles (10km) to the north-east of Pokrovsk. Novoekonomichne has been heavily fought over in recent months; while it remains unclear whether Ukrainian forces will be able to launch yet another counter-attack to retake the settlement, its recent seizure will place further pressure on Pokrovsk’s flanks. To add to this mounting pressure, geolocated footage published on 4 October indicated that Russian forces are advancing slowly into the southern outskirts of Pokrovsk itself, namely the city’s Zelenivka district.
• POKROVSK: Despite these recent gains for Moscow, Ukrainian counter-measures continue to limit Russian forces’ ability to make faster advances in the area. Ukraine’s 7th Rapid Reaction Corps reported on 3 October that Russian infantry casualties in the Pokrovsk area increased by 30% in September compared to August, while Ukraine’s interception of Shahed-type drones over Pokrovsk increased by 50% over the same period. The corps also reported that Ukrainian forces have been able to extend a so-called ‘kill zone’ in which they can launch and concentrate first-person view (FPV) drones (in tandem with artillery) several kilometres behind Russian positions. Such efforts, including recurrent Ukrainian counter-attacks, are slowing Russia’s advance; they are also likely increasing the costs for Russian forces trying to consolidate their recent gains in the area.
• RIVER CROSSINGS: Russian forces likely successfully carried out a small river-crossing involving the transfer of heavy military equipment in Donetsk; the operation came amid slow but steady advances in the Lyman direction. Geolocated footage posted on 4 October indicates that Russian forces were likely able to construct a makeshift bridge over the Zherebets River in the Lyman direction, enabling the transfer of at least five tanks, one infantry fighting vehicle (IFV) and one self-propelled artillery system. Poor weather conditions reportedly complicated Ukrainian drone operations in the area, which highly likely facilitated the transfer.
• RIVER CROSSINGS: It is also possible that Russian forces have improved their river-crossing logistics, which constituted a major weakness during the earlier phases of the full-scale invasion of Ukraine (during which period Ukraine was able to strike heavily concentrated Russian equipment and troops successfully). Meanwhile, geolocated footage published on 5 October indicates that Russian forces likely carried out a FAB-300 glide-bomb strike on a bridge in Raihorodok (Donetsk) spanning the Siverskyi Donets River, indicating a relatively high level of precision. The co-ordination of this strike likely indicates that Russian forces are attempting to undermine Ukrainian reinforcements to the area as they increase their offensive momentum to the north-east of Lyman.
• GLIDE BOMBS: Russia has likely intensified its use of glide bombs (and possibly improved their accuracy) along various sectors of the frontline in recent weeks. A Ukrainian drone operator deployed in the Pokrovsk direction stated on 4 October that Russian forces have increased their use of glide bombs both on the frontline and at the Ukrainian rear; he also notably stated that the glide bombs have become more accurate, indicating possible technical improvements. Separately, a Ukrainian officer operating in the Kupiansk (Kharkiv oblast) direction reported on 4 October that Russian forces are consistently carrying out three glide bomb strikes each morning, which has rendered the Ukrainian rear – located approximately 12 miles (20km) from the frontline – less safe. The officer, did, however, note that train stations are not being attacked in Kupiansk, indicating that Russia highly likely aims to seize the town and to leverage it for logistical purposes to support future offensive operations in Kharkiv.
• STRIKES: Russia launched its largest combined strike to date against Lviv oblast in western Ukraine overnight on 4-5 October. The strike (which also hit targets outside the oblast) involved 53 missiles, including 42 Iskander-K cruise missiles, two Kh-47M2 Kinzhal air-launched ballistic missiles and nine Kalibr cruise missiles. In all, 496 Shahed-type and decoy drones were also launched. It is likely that Russia stockpiled missiles during September in order to employ such a significant number of projectiles. It is possible that Russia specifically targeted Lviv, as the city’s air defences are almost certainly thinner than those in the capital Kyiv. According to the Ukrainian air force, 39 missiles were intercepted while a further six were ‘lost in location’ – likely due to electronic warfare (EW) measures. In all, eight missiles therefore struck unspecified targets. Power supplies were disrupted, and an industrial park was damaged in Lviv city. Beyond Lviv, strikes were also recorded in Chernihiv, Sumy and Zaporizhzhia oblasts.
• STRIKES: Russia carried out its largest (combined) strike to date against Ukraine’s gas-production capacity overnight on 2-3 October, supporting our assessment that strikes are once again beginning to take place against energy infrastructure ahead of the winter. The CEO of the Ukrainian energy company Naftogaz, Serhiy Koretskyi, stated that Russia launched 35 missiles and 60 drones at the company’s sites in Kharkiv and Poltava oblasts; he stated that the attacks were the largest to take place against Ukraine’s gas-production sites so far. Koretskyi notably commented that a ‘significant portion’ of Naftogaz’s facilities were damaged, and that some of the destruction was ‘critical’. The attack underscores our assessment that Russia will almost certainly attempt to degrade Ukrainian energy infrastructure ahead of the coming winter in a bid to lower morale among the Ukrainian population and place stress on Ukraine’s defence-industrial capacity. Russia also struck targets in Dnipropetrovsk, Kyiv, Odesa and Sumy oblasts on 2-3 October. The Russian strategy to degrade Ukraine’s energy security was further underlined earlier on 7 October when Russian strikes led to blackouts for customers in Chernihiv, Dnipropetrovsk, Donetsk and Kharkiv oblasts.
• STRIKES: Ukraine has reportedly started to use its domestically produced FP-5 Flamingo cruise missile, which will likely add to the effectiveness of Kyiv’s ‘deep strike’ campaign against Russian oil refineries. According to The Economist, the Ukrainian weapons manufacturer Fire Point is currently producing two-to-three FP-5s each day; production is set to increase to seven each day later in October. While the effectiveness of the FP-5 against Russian air defences remains unclear, the missile is reportedly equipped with significant capabilities. These include a range of over 1,864 miles (3,000km), as well as the ability to fly just 50m above the ground and to change course constantly so as to confuse air defence systems. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky likely alluded to the use of FP-5s on 6 October when he stated that Ukraine has exclusively used its own weapons, and not only drones, to strike targets in Russia in recent days.

POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS

• DRONES: Dutch Prime Minister Dick Schoof stated on 6 October that there is consensus among European countries that Russia is responsible for drone sightings over the continent, but that its involvement cannot be proven. German Chancellor Friedrich Merz made similar remarks on 5 October after drones spotted in German airspace forced the temporary closure of Munich International Airport (MUC, Bavaria state) days beforehand. Drones have violated the airspace of several other European countries besides Germany in recent weeks (specifically Belgium, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Lithuania, the Netherlands and Romania). However, despite the recent incidents, European countries are divided over plans to build a ‘drone wall’ along the EU’s eastern flank, as per reports from 2 October.
• DRONES: The former Russian president and Deputy Chair of Russia’s Security Council, Dmitry Medvedev, stated on 6 October that the recent drone incidents served as a reminder to European nations about the ‘danger of war’. Medvedev did not state that Russia was behind the incursions (though we assess that Moscow was highly likely responsible for the majority of the incidents). Russian motives for orchestrating drone overflights likely include reconnoitring strategic infrastructure (i.e. airports, military sites and power plants) and testing the resolve of Western countries. Even if not all the incidents were directly linked to Russia, we assess that the disruption and alarm caused by the incursions have benefited Moscow, regardless. For further analysis on the implications of recent airspace incursions and suspicious drone activity across Europe, see Sibylline Situation Update Brief – 1 October 2025.
• SABOTAGE: Meanwhile, EU countries have agreed to limit the travel of Russian diplomats within the bloc in response to sabotage attempts. The Financial Times (FT) reported on the proposed rules earlier on 7 October, which, if implemented, would require Russian diplomats stationed in EU capitals to inform other EU governments if they plan to travel to these governments’ jurisdictions. EU security officials have warned that Russian intelligence operatives often use diplomatic cover to facilitate sabotage operations across borders. Nevertheless, a final decision to restrict Russian diplomats’ movements is unlikely to reduce suspected Russian sabotage substantially across EU countries over the coming months, partly due to Russia’s increased use of criminals and amateur agents to conduct such operations. We nevertheless assess that Moscow likely operates a significant number of Russian operatives across the continent, sustaining the threat of sabotage for the foreseeable future.
• NEGOTIATIONS: On 2 October, Russian President Vladimir Putin attempted to push Ukraine to engage in negotiations by emphasising Ukrainian manpower shortages and recruitment challenges. Putin also called on Ukrainian soldiers to flee or surrender and claimed, without providing evidence, that approximately 150,000 troops deserted Ukraine’s armed forces from January to August of this year; we assess this is unlikely to be accurate. Nevertheless, the shortage of personnel is (and will almost certainly remain) a key issue constraining Ukraine’s battlefield operations over the coming months. As such, Putin’s comments are highly likely aimed at weakening Ukrainian morale amid incremental Russian gains across the frontline, while also presenting the Russian president as both uncompromising and confident that Russia can continue fighting an attritional war for the foreseeable future.

FORECAST

AID: On 6 October, US President Donald Trump stated that he would want to know how Ukraine plans to use long-range Tomahawk missiles before agreeing to supply them due to concerns about escalating the Russo-Ukrainian war. Trump did not explicitly rule out their provision and stated that he had ‘sort of made a decision’ on the matter. Despite his comments, this does not necessarily increase the likelihood of Kyiv obtaining this capability in the near term (see Sibylline Ukraine Update – 2 October 2025). Reuters reported on 2 October that the provision of Tomahawk missiles is unlikely, as the US is committing current stocks to its navy (and various other uses). An unspecified US official suggested that other (and shorter-range) projectiles could be supplied to Ukraine without offering further details. The same official also stated that the US could consider allowing European allies to purchase other unnamed long-range weapons for Kyiv’s benefit rather than Tomahawk missiles. Ultimately, we assess that the US is likely to prioritise maintaining inventory levels for its navy, which is the primary user of Tomahawk missiles. Even if the US did choose to supply a limited number of Tomahawk missiles to Ukraine, Trump’s comments indicate that his administration would likely want to vet any possible strikes to avoid perceived escalation. This would likely constrain Ukraine’s ability to conduct long-range strikes, akin to the limitations the Biden administration imposed on Army Tactical Missile Systems (ATACMS) and other such weapons. Such restrictions would possibly provide Russia with more time to move assets further from the range of Tomahawk missiles, where possible. Depending on the variant, the Tomahawk missile boasts a range of up to 1,550 miles (2,500km), which exceeds the capabilities of foreign-provided missiles currently in Ukraine’s possession. We assess that recent statements made by President Putin indicate that Russia is seeking to deter the US from providing Tomahawk missiles to Ukraine. On 2 October, Putin implied that the provision of Tomahawk missiles would risk destroying the limited progress in restoring Russia-US relations; he also claimed that the missiles would offer few benefits for Ukraine’s war effort. Putin claimed that US military personnel would have to participate directly in Ukrainian strikes using Tomahawk missiles, which he stated would mark a ‘new stage of escalation’ – possibly an implied warning that US service personnel could be viewed as ‘legitimate military targets’ in this context. However, Russian officials have repeatedly warned of escalation despite previous discussions among Kyiv’s allies about whether to supply new capabilities to Ukraine, including US-made F-16 fighter jets, main battle tanks and Storm Shadow and ATACMS missiles. These talks did not provoke a direct military response from Russia. Yet while the provision of Tomahawks (or discussions thereof) would also be unlikely to provoke such a response, we assess that the Kremlin is clearly trying to deter this eventuality by ramping up threats of escalation. (Source: Sibylline)

 

09 Oct 25. Cuashub.com said today that Thales develops $10K laser-guided C-UAS rocket for Ukraine. Belgian defense firm Thales is developing a low-cost laser-guided rocket to help Ukraine counter Russian drone swarms, the latest development in an ongoing effort by EU members to supply affordable air defense systems. The 70mm FZ275 LGR is designed to detonate mid-air, releasing a cloud of tungsten fragments capable of destroying low-flying drones. Priced at under $10,000 per unit, the rocket offers a cost-effective alternative to advanced air defense systems like Patriot interceptors, which can cost millions per missile. The airburst warhead’s fragmenting effect makes it particularly suited for low-flying threats such as Iranian-made Shahed drones, which Russia has used extensively since 2022. Thales has accelerated production in response to Ukraine’s operational demands, with the system tested from platforms including helicopters and ground vehicles. Its laser guidance provides precision at ranges of up to 4.3 miles, allowing accurate strikes while reducing risks to civilian areas. Early feedback from Ukrainian operators suggests the rocket could integrate quickly into existing counter-drone strategies. The development reflects a wider NATO focus on scalable and affordable defenses. European allies, including Belgium and France, are supporting the effort to ensure Ukraine receives effective systems without straining their own stockpiles. The emphasis on affordability also responds directly to Russia’s reliance on cheap drones to exhaust high-value interceptors. Beyond Ukraine, the technology carries implications for European security more broadly. Defense officials have noted its potential role in protecting critical infrastructure and contributing to a proposed “drone wall” across NATO’s eastern borders. The rocket’s design, drawing on principles from anti-personnel munitions but optimized for aerial targets, has already attracted interest from other nations confronting drone threats. Challenges remain in scaling production, particularly with tungsten supply chains vulnerable to geopolitical disruption. However, Thales aims to expand output into the thousands annually, with future iterations potentially incorporating autonomous targeting features. The FZ275 LGR highlights how necessity is driving Europe toward cost-effective, asymmetric defenses that could redefine how allied forces counter unmanned aerial systems in the years ahead. https://cuashub.com/en/content/thales-develops-10k-laser-guided-c-uas-rocket-for-ukraine/ (Source: https://cuashub.com/

 

08 Sep 25. Ukraine Deploys Sea Drones with Fiber-Optic FPVs in Russian Port Strikes. Ukraine has reportedly developed a new type of unmanned surface vessel (USV) capable of carrying multiple fiber-optic First-Person View (FPV) drones. According to Defense Express, at least one of these drone boats took part in the September 24 Ukrainian strike in Russia’s Krasnodar region. Footage shared by Russian sources showed a captured Ukrainian sea drone carrying four FPV drones in hull compartments, each tethered to a spool of fiber-optic cable.  The video surfaced following a series of Ukrainian attacks that damaged oil terminals in Tuapse and Novorossiysk, temporarily disrupting port operations.  The development marks the first confirmed use of sea-launched, fiber-optic–controlled FPV drones by Ukraine.  Unlike radio-guided drones, the new system is immune to electronic warfare. Defense Express notes that “surface drone attacks are becoming increasingly complex for the Russians,” as they now must counter not only the “surface threat” but also “FPV-drone attacks that, using fiber-optics, can operate even when electronic warfare systems are active.” The use of fiber-optic FPV drones launched from drone boats was first hinted at earlier this year, when the Ukrainian Navy carried out a series of FPV drone strikes that destroyed two Pantsir-S1 and one Osa short-range air defense systems in Kherson Oblast, about 3.5 miles from the Black Sea coast. At the time, unconfirmed reports suggested that the Ukrainian Navy may have launched the FPV drones from drone boats in the Black Sea, allowing them to bypass roughly 45 miles of Russian-controlled territory and strike targets deep behind enemy lines. (Source: https://www.sofx.com/)

 

07 Oct 25. Ukraine: UK, US, EU parts found in Russian missiles. Thousands of Western components have been found in the wreckage from Russia’s weekend bombardment of Ukraine.

• Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy has said Western components, including from the UK, are being found in Russian munitions
• Other countries implicated include the US, the Netherlands, Germany, South Korea, Japan, Taiwan, and China
• Russia is continuing its bombardment of Ukrainian cities, with weekend attacks blanketing the country

For the second weekend running, air raid warnings were in effect across the entirety of Ukraine as hundreds of missiles and suicide drones were launched by Moscow. Whereas a week prior the missiles struck Kyiv and central and eastern cities, strikes over 4-5 October hit western region, including Lviv. However, a key disclosure on 6 October by the Ukrainian government revealed the presence of western components in Russia’s munitions, including from the UK, despite the heavy sanctions levied against Moscow as a result of its invasion of Ukraine in 2022. According to a release by the office of Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy, a total of 549 drones and missiles were launched by Russia into Ukraine, containing over 100,000 foreign-made components sourced from companies in the US, China and Taiwan, the UK, Germany, Switzerland, Japan, South Korea, and the Netherlands. (Source: army-technology.com)

 

07 Oct 25. Cuashub.com said today that Ukrainian forces showcase drone defense in Danish skies. Ukrainian military personnel demonstrated their counter-drone expertise in Danish airspace last week, successfully neutralizing multiple aerial targets during a joint defense exercise, according to the General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine. During the live demonstration, Ukrainian specialists deployed a “Sting” drone, which intercepted and destroyed a Danish “Banshee” drone in flight. The event formed part of an exchange of battlefield experience between Ukrainian and Danish forces and was observed by representatives from several European countries. The interception, recorded on video, drew immediate interest from foreign counterparts, with Ukrainian operators reportedly fielding numerous inquiries afterward. The exercise coincided with the launch of “Wings of Defense,” a series of joint drills focused on countering aerial threats such as strike drones. The initiative underscores a broader effort to strengthen NATO and European defenses against unmanned systems. The showcase followed recent reports of unidentified drones operating near critical sites in Denmark in late September. The sightings sparked concern over potential Russian reconnaissance activity in the Baltic region, particularly after Danish authorities detected a Russian naval vessel operating near national waters during the same period. NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte and Danish Prime Minister Mette Frederiksen discussed the incidents last week, highlighting growing security risks. European partners have already begun reinforcing Denmark’s air defenses. France, Germany and Sweden deployed military personnel and anti-drone systems to the country after drone incursions led to temporary airport closures late last month. Norway’s police have also joined the mission, which includes France’s Fennec helicopter unit and specialized German and Swedish teams tasked with detecting and neutralizing aerial threats ahead of upcoming European summits in Copenhagen. Ukraine’s General Staff emphasized that its participation in Denmark is aimed at bolstering international cooperation in drone defense, a field where Ukraine has gained extensive operational experience throughout the ongoing war. https://cuashub.com/en/content/ukrainian-forces-showcase-drone-defense-in-danish-skies/ (Source: https://cuashub.com/

 

06 Oct 25. Ukraine “deploys rotating barbed wire fences to counter fibre-optic drones.” Militarnyi reports that the Ukrainian military has begun deploying special engineering barriers to prevent fibre-optic drones from flying beyond the frontline. The article pointed to footage posted by a Russian blogger, in which a Ukrainian soldier explains that the 150-metre rotating barbed wire fence is powered by a battery and controlled by a small controller. The fence breaks the drone’s fibre-optic cable by rotating the barb around its axis. The footage is no longer available. (Source: www.unmannedairspace.info)

 

02 Oct 25. The latest counter-UAS news from Ukraine. In this new section of Unmanned Airspace we provide a round-up of counter-UAS equipment and strategy news from the Ukrainian war, with original material and sources.

Equipment

New low-cost C-UAS Ukrainian intercept missiles have been in the news recently. At this week’s DroneX in London TechEx displayed two new low-cost C-UAS intercept drones –  the Stalker, a 350 km/h intercept drone with a range of 25km, a flight altitude of 4,000m and a target detection range of 500m and the Striker S, a 270km/h intercept missile, with a range of more than 20km, a flight altitude of 5,000m and a target detection range of more than 300m.

Meanwhile, Amazing Drones has developed a C-UAS intercept drone that autonomously detects and intercepts aerial targets at speeds up to 300 km/h. (Source)

Besomar recently developed a reusable interceptor drone equipped with a shotgun and an automated firing system (source: https://ukrainetoday.org/ukraine-creates-reusable-interceptor-drone-equipped-with-shotgun/). “According to the developers, in the current configuration, the system mounted on an aircraft-type interceptor drone allows for two shots, but this number can be increased to four if necessary…. According to the developers, their interceptor can neutralize drones at speeds up to 200 km/h, including Gerbera UAVs that fly at 100-130 km/h and various types of reconnaissance UAVs. Since the interceptor is equipped with a digital communication system with a frequency response function, it can approach the target and hit it unnoticed by the evasion systems installed on Russian drones. A feature of the system is that it can fire at the target not only manually but also automatically.”

UkrDefense unveiled its upgraded Gaarpia interceptor drone at the IT Arena 2025 expo, reports DefenderMedia. Gaarpia features a modular design that can be quickly assembled at the launch site. “It is catapult-launched, capable of reaching speeds of up to 200 km/h, operating at altitudes of up to 5,000 metres, and remaining airborne for up to 100 minutes.” The same news source also announced Piranha Tech at the IT Arena 2025 conference launched the high-speed Shahed interceptor Hunter and the manoeuvrable drone Riki, developed primarily to intercept enemy reconnaissance drones.

In more novel C-UAS initiatives, Ukrainian forces have started to deploy stretched, rotating barbed-wire defences in key logistical areas to cut the cords of Russian FPV drone cable which run along the ground (Source). And Ukrainian BTR-3 armored personnel carriers have been upgraded with specialized anti-drone protection “cope cages” designed to counter the widespread use of unmanned aerial vehicles on the battlefield, according to Defense Express.

Policies, programmes and strategy

“In addition to offering air defense training to the country’s allies, Ukraine is also ready to help NATO partners identify and procure the necessary defensive tools to combat Russian drones,” according to an Atlantic Council blog.  “Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy recently stressed that nobody in the world has enough missiles to shoot down the large volumes of drones currently being deployed by the Kremlin. Instead, a more eclectic approach is needed, featuring ground-based air defenses and jet fighters together with defensive drones, helicopter patrols, and propeller planes”.

Ukraine is now able to down around 90% of incoming Russian drones, even on days when massive barrages happen, such as 7 September when Moscow launched its largest ever attack against Ukraine, firing 810 Shahed-type drones, according to the Ukrainian president.

Ukrainian military specialists have travelled to Denmark to take part in joint counter-drone exercises, following reports of drone incursions in the country. The “Wings of Defense” training will bring together Ukrainian and Danish forces to practice countermeasures against unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), the General Staff of the Ukrainian Armed Forces said. (Source: www.unmannedairspace.info)

 

06 Oct 25. Milrem Robotics to Deliver over 150 THeMIS UGVs to Ukraine in a Dutch-Led Defence Initiative​. Milrem Robotics—the world’s leading robotics and autonomous systems developer—will deliver over 150 THeMIS unmanned ground vehicles (UGVs) to Ukraine as part of a donation funded and coordinated by the Netherlands. A significant portion of these vehicles will be assembled and delivered in collaboration with VDL Defentec. The donation was initially announced in September, however, the identity of the contributing country was not disclosed. On 6 October, the Dutch Minister of Defence, Ruben Brekelmans, joined Milrem Robotics and VDL for a formal announcement and signing ceremony at VDL’s facility in Born to mark the agreement. The deliveries will be executed by Milrem Robotics Netherlands in close cooperation with VDL Defentec, which is establishing a dedicated final assembly line at its Born facility. The assembly setup is designed for scalability, enabling further production and deliveries in response to future requirements. Milrem Robotics will deliver comprehensive training to Ukrainian operators and support staff to ensure efficient deployment and maintenance in the field.

“We are honoured to lead this project in partnership with the Netherlands and VDL. The THeMIS platform has already demonstrated its value under combat conditions, and we believe this contribution will materially strengthen Ukraine’s defence capability,” said Kuldar Väärsi, CEO of Milrem Robotics.

“This initiative highlights the strength of cooperation between partners in Europe’s defence industry and their ability to scale up and contribute directly to international security. Establishing the assembly line in Born supports this donation and creates a foundation for future production and innovation between Milrem Robotics and VDL in the Netherlands,” said Willem van der Leegte, CEO of VDL Groep.

The new units will add to the 15 THeMIS vehicles already in operation in Ukraine, which have been proving their effectiveness on the battlefield since 2022. THeMIS is a proven and highly adaptable unmanned vehicle platform designed to support dismounted forces, logistics, reconnaissance, and combat support missions. It is currently part of robotics programmes or in service in 19 countries, making it the most widely deployed UGV in its class.

 

06 Oct 25. Drone Deal with Ukraine to Give US Access to Battlefield Tech. A Ukrainian team was in Washington last week to craft a landmark agreement with the Trump administration that would involve Kyiv sharing its battle-tested drone technology with the U.S. in exchange for royalties or other forms of compensation, according to officials from both countries. The prospective deal, which has the backing of President Trump and Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky, would mark a milestone in the security relationship between Washington and Kyiv. For years, the Ukrainian military has received U.S. weapons, most recently under an arrangement in which the Trump administration sells arms to European nations that are donating them to Kyiv. Under the new deal, Ukraine would draw on its extensive experience in producing and using drones to battle the Russian military. A team of Ukrainians, led by the country’s Deputy Defense Minister Sergiy Boyev, began several days of talks in Washington with Pentagon and State Department officials on Tuesday. Finalizing the detailed agreement, which could be worth bns of dollars, is likely to take months, a U.S. government official said. While the U.S. companies make some sophisticated drones, the Ukrainians are well ahead in mass producing cheap unmanned aerial vehicles, or UAVs, that have proved to be effective in battle.

“It is just a reality that we need Ukrainian drone tech in the U.S.,”

said William McNulty, a partner at UA1, a U.S. venture-capital fund, which has invested in eight Ukrainian defense companies.

The potential deal also has political significance as Kyiv looks to solidify ties with Trump, whose support for Ukraine has sometimes been erratic. Trump has become increasingly frustrated with Russian President Vladimir Putin’s decision to step up attacks on Ukraine while rebuffing White House appeals to negotiate a peace settlement, which has also opened the door to more U.S. and Ukrainian cooperation. The drone agreement is emerging as part of a package that would include a separate “megadeal” in which Ukraine is hoping to purchase tens of bns of dollars in arms from the U.S., Zelensky said Saturday. Ukraine is hoping that the arms deal includes long-range missiles to expand its striking power against Russia. The potential drone deal also highlights how much the U.S. industry can benefit from Ukraine, which has pioneered new technologies, tactics, as well as the ability to rapidly incorporate innovations for a changing battlefield. With the war in Ukraine rewriting how nations fight, governments, investors and companies in Europe have already been rushing to capitalize on Ukraine’s drone technology. A U.S. government official said the drone deal is designed to allow U.S. forces to capitalize on Ukraine’s competitive advantage in UAVs. In turn, Kyiv is seeking to pay for high-end American weapons. He was referring to the Patriot antimissile system, the Himars launchers that fire GMLRS rockets and Army Tactical Missile Systems, or Atacms, and the Air Force’s multirole fighter. The U.S. and Ukraine are exploring several different mechanisms for facilitating drone technology transfer from Kyiv to the U.S., according to people familiar with the talks. They include deals in which Ukrainian companies provide drone technology and prototypes to American companies in exchange for a royalty or an arrangement in which a Ukrainian company establishes a subsidiary in the U.S. to produce drones. Another possibility is buying the drones directly from Ukraine for the U.S. military. Any accord over drone technology will have to facilitate access to technology and systems from private Ukrainian drone companies. There are more than 300 drone companies in the country, according to the Ukrainian Council of Gunsmiths, a trade organization. The widespread use of Chinese parts in Ukrainian drones is one problem that needs to be managed. U.S. companies that acquire Ukrainian drones and technologies can’t use Chinese components because of the imperative of having secure supply lines. (Source: UAS VISION/The Wall Street Journal)

 

04 Oct 25. The mini-missiles designed to ram Putin’s drones out of the sky. Low-cost interceptor that can be fired from a hand-held cannon could become a powerful part of the EU’s defence capabilities Russian drones flying over airports could be punched out of the sky by a new Swedish defence system which is 16,000 times cheaper than a fighter jet. Nordic Air Defence (NAD), a Stockholm-based tech firm, is building the low-cost mini-missile which uses “kinetic force” to knock out drones whirring over critical infrastructure, such as airports and factories, as seen across EU airspace in recent weeks. The Kreuger 100 interceptor uses infrared sensors to hunt down hostile drones and ram them out of the sky at high speed, making it much safer to use in civilian areas than explosive projectiles.

“These airport incursions are the perfect example of why protecting public spaces against drones needs a more sophisticated solution than just ‘shooting them down’,” Karl Rosander, the chief executive of NAD, told The Telegraph.

“We’re building a small, electricity-driven interceptor which is only kinetic. It doesn’t have any warheads or explosives, it knocks the drone down by coming at high speed. This means police can use it in civil environments,” he said.

“We don’t want to be shooting explosives over airports, so this would be perfect for what happened in Denmark. You avoid shooting expensive missiles, and burning fragments over civilian infrastructure,” Mr Rosander added.

EU-wide drone menace

European Union leaders are urgently looking for ways to defend their airports after a string of suspected Russian drone incursions in Denmark, Norway and Germany. Their main challenge is safety, as shooting down drones with powerful missiles over civilian areas creates the risk of death, injuries and damage to key infrastructure. Another major concern is cost: Russian drones can cost as little as £1,000 each, whereas Nato’s current tactic of scrambling fighter jets, as it did with success in Poland, is enormously expensive by comparison.

“It is unacceptable to shoot down drones costing one or two thousand dollars with missiles that may cost half a m or even a m dollars,” Mark Rutte, the secretary general of Nato, warned this week.

The key advantage of Mr Rosander’s Kreuger system is that its estimated cost is as little as $5,000 (£3,700), a fraction of the price of the F-15 and F-35 Nato fighter jets used to destroy drones over Poland last month.

A mobile anti-drone solution

Concept imagery showed the missiles could be launched in several ways – from a hand-held cannon, a rifle-like device, launch crates that contain projectiles, or vehicle-mounted systems. It would also be beneficial in a war zone, such as Ukraine, where drones are a constant threat to ground troops and hardware. The system would allow soldiers to take out bomb-laden FPV (first person view) drones that are increasingly difficult to jam or shoot out of the sky.

CGI footage showing the NAD missiles being fired from a vehicle-mounted system

The anti-drone systems currently used in Ukraine are also a military variant with an explosive warhead, rather than a kinetic missile which knocks them to the ground. CGI footage released by the firm showed a battlefield scenario in which two quadcopter FPV drones carrying bombs are closing in on a military convoy. A vehicle on the ground, armed with the kinetic missiles, is shown launching the projectiles from a vehicle-mounted system to intercept and destroy the drones before they could reach their target. (Source: Daily Telegraph)

 

03 Oct 25. Former Ukrainian PM says security guarantees won’t work.

Only Article 5 of the Washington Treaty will provide credible security, he stated, while highlighting the need for the joint defence of Europe.

• Former Ukrainian PM said Western security guarantees would be unworkable.
• Membership in Nato and the ability to implement article five is the only credible security, he said in a speech at RUSI on 2 October.
• Resilience is the main concern among European leaders at present as they seek to apply Ukrainian air defence solutions across the continent.

Describing his strategic vision for Europe at the Royal United Services Institute in London, the former prime minister of Ukraine, Arsenyiy Yatsenyuk, dismissed the offer of security guarantees by the West as unworkable. There has been widespread speculation of what future negotiations between Russia and Ukraine, brokered by the United States, might look like over the past several months. Particularly as Russia’s summer offensive ebbs after Ukraine claims to have liberated 160 square kilometres around the strategic towns of Pokrovsk and Dobropillia in the Donetsk region. UK prime minister Keir Starmer and other allies in the so-called ‘coalition of the willing’ are committed to putting ‘boots on the ground’ in the form of a half-baked peace-keeping mission to bolster Ukraine’s security as part of any prospective settlement. (Source: army-technology.com)

 

03 Oct 25. British-Ukrainian Trypillian Unveils Tactical UAV Family Featuring Modular Strike and Recon Platforms. The British-Ukrainian developer Trypillian has unveiled a new family of tactical unmanned aerial vehicles, outlining a modular suite of platforms intended for strike, reconnaissance, communications relay and battlefield logistics. In a statement to Militarnyi on September 30 the company noted that, alongside the initial rollout of four tactical platforms, it is simultaneously developing additional systems—most notably a Deep-Strike drone now in the final stage of field trials. Trypillian says its engineering effort pairs hardware and software to deliver solutions for long-reach strikes, battlefield communications and frontline payload delivery. The lineup opens with an FPV model: a lightweight, cost-effective platform produced in multiple sizes and capable of reaching a top speed of 90 km/h. Next is a relay-carrier variant designed to extend tactical communications in field conditions, with an operational radius of roughly 12 km. According to Militarnyi, the family also includes the Bomber—a multipurpose strike platform whose ground control station is neatly integrated into a transport case for ease of movement and rapid deployment. Rounding out the quartet is a VTOL system (vertical take-off and landing) tailored for reconnaissance and missions in terrain with limited runway space; its maximum operational ceiling is listed at 3,500m. Trypillian emphasises close collaboration with combat units, saying that direct frontline feedback allows rapid iterations of both airframe design and onboard software logic. The company plans to trial the UAV family in joint operations with Ukrainian units under real combat conditions while continuing refinement of its deep-strike system, which remains in active field testing.

“With tactical UAVs our goal is to establish ourselves as an end-to-end defense solutions integrator. Tactical drones are not the product, tactical drones are the process. “Killzone” is the product,” says Ivan Matveichenko, CEO of Trypillian.

Beyond hardware, Trypillian supplies integrated packages that include equipment, software, distributed manufacturing processes and an operational doctrine—components the company says are essential to building a robust perimeter of deterrence against contemporary threats, Militarnyi reported. (Source: UAS VISION/UNITED24MEDIA0

 

03 Oct 25. Cuashub.com said today that Russia deploys mobile C-UAS as Ukrainian drone strikes cripple fuel production. Russia is deploying mobile counter-drone units to defend its energy infrastructure after a series of Ukrainian strikes on oil refineries triggered the country’s most severe gasoline shortage in three decades. The development comes as a response to an ongoing campaign of Ukrainian long-range drone strikes, capable of traveling hundreds of kilometers, which are degrading refining capacity at an unsustainable rate. Estimates suggest that 20–25 percent of Russia’s refining output is now offline, leaving supply chains disrupted and fueling shortages not seen since the 1990s. According to footage shared on Russian social media channels, the new units are equipped with light pickup trucks, including modified GAZelle and UAZ “Farmer” vehicles, fitted with twin-mounted heavy machine guns. The formations are intended to intercept and destroy slow-moving drones before they can reach refineries and other critical sites. Officials in Moscow have framed the deployment as an urgent step to protect vital infrastructure. But military analysts say the units will have limited impact, describing them as “last-resort detachments” rather than a comprehensive approach to air defense. Small arms fire, even when mounted on mobile platforms, is effective only against low-altitude drones. Many Ukrainian systems fly above that range, reducing the likelihood of successful interception. Ukraine has used similar mobile anti-drone groups in recent years, though their effectiveness has been questioned. Drone operators have adapted by altering flight paths and operating at higher altitudes, bypassing ground-based fire. Kyiv has increasingly shifted toward using interceptor drones, systems designed to chase and destroy enemy UAS mid-flight, which have proven more effective against platforms such as the Iranian-designed Shahed and Russian domestic Geran variants. The Kremlin’s decision to adopt mobile counter-drone teams suggests concern of the effectiveness of current counter-drone strategies in safeguarding fuel production. Ukraine’s campaign against Russian refineries, now in its fourth year, has struck facilities deep inside Russian territory and forced Moscow to look for rapid but imperfect defensive measures. While the deployment highlights how drone warfare continues to reshape both sides’ strategies, experts warn the pickup-mounted gun units are unlikely to reverse the trend of successful Ukrainian strikes. Instead, they represent a stopgap effort to buy time while longer-term countermeasures are developed. https://cuashub.com/en/content/russia-deploys-mobile-c-uas-as-ukrainian-drone-strikes-cripple-fuel-production/ (Source: https://cuashub.com/

———————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————-

Founded in 1987, Exensor Technology is a world leading supplier of Networked Unattended Ground Sensor (UGS) Systems providing tailored sensor solutions to customers all over the world. From our Headquarters in Lund Sweden, our centre of expertise in Network Communications at Communications Research Lab in Kalmar Sweden and our Production site outside of Basingstoke UK, we design, develop and produce latest state of the art rugged UGS solutions at the highest quality to meet the most stringent demands of our customers. Our systems are in operation and used in a wide number of Military as well as Homeland Security applications worldwide. The modular nature of the system ensures any external sensor can be integrated, providing the user with a fully meshed “silent” network capable of self-healing. Exensor Technology will continue to lead the field in UGS technology, provide our customers with excellent customer service and a bespoke package able to meet every need.

A CNIM Group Company

———————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————

Sponsored by Bertin Exensor

www.exensor.com

—————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————–
06 Oct 251. Potential troop deployments across US will increase security forces, domestic unrest risks. On 5 October, Illinois Governor JB Pritzker stated that US President Donald Trump had ordered 400 members of the Texas National Guard for deployments to Illinois, Oregon and ‘other locations in the US’. On the same day, the US Department of Defense announced it was reassigning nearly 200 federalised members of the California National Guard to Portland (Oregon), after a federal judge temporarily blocked the deployment of Oregon troops. California Governor Gavin Newsom has since vowed to sue President Trump. A sustained federal focus on Portland indicates that a deployment to the city is likely in the coming days. As both Illinois and Oregon are Democrat-leaning states, we assess that any deployments will raise federal-state tensions. Furthermore, intensifying public characterisation of these deployments as an ‘invasion’ will entrench partisanship and increase the risk that the public will not comply with the law enforcement personnel. In this scenario, demonstrations against troops are likely near major city landmarks, raising domestic unrest risks. A bolstered law enforcement presence in major urban centres in the aforementioned states will possibly cause traffic and operational disruption risks for nearby firms. (Source: Sibylline)
—————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————-
Founded in 1987, Exensor Technology is a world leading supplier of Networked Unattended Ground Sensor (UGS) Systems providing tailored sensor solutions to customers all over the world. From our Headquarters in Lund Sweden, our centre of expertise in Network Communications at Communications Research Lab in Kalmar Sweden and our Production site outside of Basingstoke UK, we design, develop and produce latest state of the art rugged UGS solutions at the highest quality to meet the most stringent demands of our customers. Our systems are in operation and used in a wide number of Military as well as Homeland Security applications worldwide. The modular nature of the system ensures any external sensor can be integrated, providing the user with a fully meshed “silent” network capable of self-healing. Exensor Technology will continue to lead the field in UGS technology, provide our customers with excellent customer service and a bespoke package able to meet every need.

A CNIM Group Company
————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————–

Sponsored by Bertin Exensor

www.exensor.com

——————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————
09 Oct 25. Latvia to strengthen defence infrastructure with EIB advisory support.
• Latvia to develop military base and training area in Selonia region, along with storage facility in Kuldīga Municipality.
• EIB to provide advisory services to help assess and prepare a potential public-private partnership for the defence project.
• New infrastructure to strengthen Latvia’s national defence capabilities.
The European Investment Bank (EIB), the Latvian government and the State Real Estate Agency (VNI) have joined forces to develop a military base and training area in the southeastern region of Selonia, along with a storage facility in Kuldīga Municipality. The initiative aims to enhance both national and regional defence capabilities.
The agreement was formalised today in Riga through the signature of key documents between the EIB, the Latvian government and State Real Estate, marking the official launch of the advisory assignment to assess a potential PPP structure for the defence base project. This support will help ensure the base and associated facilities is developed in line with international best practices and is attractive for financing.
“The Selonia base is a landmark project for Latvia and the Baltic region,” said EIB Vice-President Karl Nehammer. “It’s not just about infrastructure – it’s about resilience, readiness and regional solidarity. The EIB is proud to support this effort with our advisory expertise to help ensure the project is bankable, sustainable and impactful.”
The EIB advisory support stems from a request by the Latvian Ministry of Defence and covers the development of the base, training area and storage facility infrastructure. This would mark Latvia’s first defence infrastructure PPP, which follows successful cooperation with a PPP involving a bypass road in the city of Kekava near Riga and comes amid advisory support for a planned affordable-housing programme.
“In response to the geopolitical challenges and threats posed by Russia’s war in Ukraine, we are actively and thoughtfully implementing the National Armed Forces Development Plan for 2025–2036, which was approved in 2023,” said Latvian Minister of Defence Andris Sprūds. “Public-private partnerships have been identified as one of the effective and forward-looking models we can apply in the future for the development of defence infrastructure”.
The EIB will offer free advisory support through its European PPP Expertise Centre, helping Latvia prepare the project with strong financial planning, feasibility analysis, and impact assessment. The goal is to make sure the base is well designed, financially sound, and attractive to private investors.
“Cooperation with the European Investment Bank is a strong commitment of how to use state resources wisely – by leveraging the expertise of the private sector and international experience that provides valuable knowledge to public administration specialists and additional capital to strengthen Latvia’s defence and economy,” said Latvian Minister of Finance Arvils Ašeradens. “I highly appreciate that since the opening of the EIB office in Riga, its presence in Latvia has become increasingly significant. This year, EIB investments already exceed €330 m that is a significant contribution to the development of our economy.”
Renārs Griskevičs, Chairman of the Management Board of State Real Estate (VAS “Valsts nekustamie īpašumi”), said: “We are honoured to contribute to this strategically important project for Latvia’s and the region’s security. State Real Estate will oversee the project from the implementation phase through to the end of the availability period. Our team brings extensive experience in managing security infrastructure projects, and our expertise in the public-private partnership model will enable us to deliver this large-scale initiative efficiently and to the highest standards.”
The EIB’s support for Latvia’s defence infrastructure development reflects its growing role in strengthening European security and resilience. The Bank is increasingly involved in defence-related projects across Europe, including barracks, logistics hubs, critical infrastructure, industrial capacity, advanced technologies, and support for SMEs. These efforts support EU initiatives such as REARM Europe and underscore the EIB’s commitment to Europe’s security and resilience.
Background information
About the EIB
The European Investment Bank (ElB) is the long-term lending institution of the European Union, owned by its Member States. We finance investments in eight core priorities that support EU policy objectives: climate action and the environment, digitalisation and technological innovation, security and defence, cohesion, agriculture and bioeconomy, social infrastructure, the capital markets union and a stronger Europe in a more peaceful and prosperous world. The EIB Group, which also includes the European Investment Fund (EIF), signed nearly €89bn in new financing for over 900 high-impact projects in 2024, boosting Europe’s competitiveness and security.
In addition to financing, the EIB offers advisory services that help public and private partners develop and implement high-quality, investment-ready projects. The European PPP Expertise Centre is an advisory initiative of the EIB and supports the public sector across Europe in delivering better public-private partnerships (PPPs). In 2024 alone, EIB advisory teams helped mobilise over €200 bn of investment across Europe and beyond.

 

08 Oct 25. German arms makers lukewarm on government stakeholder push. Representatives of Germany’s defense enterprises have responded cautiously to a proposal for the government to become a shareholder in key companies.
German Defense Minister Borius Pistorius pushed ahead with the idea that the state might play a more active role by becoming a significant stakeholder in key military industries during an interview with the business newspaper Handelsblatt at the start of this week. He indicated the proposal had the support of other Cabinet members, notably of the finance minister.
“I am firmly convinced that we need state participation,” said Pistorius, “also to ensure that expertise and jobs remain in Germany.”
German-French tank maker KNDS and shipbuilder ThyssenKrupp Marine Systems are in the crosshairs for such action, Pistorius revealed.
KNDS, which produces the Leopard and Leclerc tanks among other armored vehicles, is planning to go public as soon as next year. At present, the French state holds half of all shares; the contemplated German government investment would aim to balance out French influence in the crucial company.
Hans Christoph Atzpodien, chairman of the defense contractor lobbying association BDSV, said he welcomed the federal government’s intention to secure domestic skills and jobs in strategic technology areas by way of state investments.
But he defended the industry’s free-market philosophy, arguing that heavy-handed government interference could scare away investors. Such a scenario, he said, could leave both companies and the government as the largest customer of defense goods in a worse spot, potentially unable to deliver the surge of military gear required for the country’s rearmament.
It was thanks to private investment, not state actions, he suggested, that the German defense industry was able to ramp up production on short notice in recent years.
There is precedent for the German government to buy shares in private military enterprises for geopolitical reasons.
Berlin acquired a blocking minority stake of 25.1% in the German sensor specialist Hensoldt in 2021, aimed at countering and balancing Italy’s leverage in the company, which it had gained through its own involvement with Leonardo. And the German state holds 11% of all shares of aerospace giant Airbus, although under an agreement from 2012, major governmental shareholders renege on their right to corresponding seats on the board of directors.
In a written statement published on Monday, Atzpodien also countered the defense minister’s concerns that arms makers may be poised to charge astronomical prices due to the sudden influx of cash. Pistorius had called it a “gold rush mentality” and warned of a possible looming “armaments price inflation.”
According to Atzpodien, government rules and the fact that “there is a high degree of responsibility within the industry itself” would combine to avoid price gouging.
Other European governments maintain stakes in their local defense companies: most prominently France with shares in Dassault Aviation, Naval Group, Thales, KNDS and others; Italy in Leonardo; Spain in Indra Sistemas; Sweden in Saab, and Norway in Kongsberg. (Source: Defense News)

 

08 Oct 25. German budget committee approves 20 more Eurofighters for 3.75bn euros. Germany’s budget committee on Wednesday approved the procurement of 20 more Eurofighter jets for around 3.75bn euros ($4.36bn), according to the defence ministry.
The so-called tranche 5 of Eurofighter jets is to be delivered to the air force between 2031 and 2034.
Within the NATO alliance, the new jets are important for data collection and electronic warfare, said Andreas Schwarz, who handles budget for the coalition partner Social Democrats.
“This will ensure the military operational capability of the Eurofighter until 2060,” the lawmaker added.
In total, the committee approved 14 proposals that surpass the threshold of 25m euros, requiring committee approval, for a value of more than 7 bn euros, said the ministry.
“Over the course of the year, we will be submitting further armaments projects on a considerable scale to the German Bundestag in order to continue the positive momentum in procurement for the operational readiness of the Bundeswehr and the needs-based equipping of our soldiers,” the ministry added. ($1 = 0.8596 euros)(Source: Reuters)

 

07 Oct 25. Italy lines up fallback plan for freeing €12bn defense spending.  Italy is ready to use an EU-devised accounting trick to help boost its defense budget by €12bn, or $14bn, as it tries to meet tough new NATO spending targets. The plan devised in Brussels last year allows EU member states to exempt defense spending when they calculate annual deficit spending, allowing them to raise defense budgets without breaking EU deficit rules. The EU normally requires member states to keep their budget deficit below 3% of GDP or face infraction procedures.
An Italian government source told Defense News the so-called National Escape Clause (NEC), if used, could result in Italy adding €12 bn to its defense budget over three years starting from 2026.
Rome’s readiness to use the EU rule was signaled in a Ministry of Finance budget document issued this month, which stated it could be triggered if low-cost EU loans to boost defense spending – dubbed the SAFE program – were not enough to get Italy up to NATO requirement that members spend 5% of GDP on defense and security by 2035.
“The decision on whether to activate the NEC is postponed until after the completion of the SAFE program, when its actual need will be assessed,” the document stated.
Italy has already applied to the EU for €14.9bn in SAFE loans. The document stated that Rome will give the EU a list by Nov. 30 of what defense products it planned to spend the loans on.
It said the list would focus on “joint programs with other member states of third countries interested in developing defense strategies in collaboration with the European Union.”
The document added the European Commission would issue a response to the request by Dec. 31.
Italy spent €29.18bn on defense in 2024, equaling 1.54% of GDP, and has said it will reach 2% this year. Government sources have told Defense News that the gap will be made up by reclassifying parts of the Italian coast guard as military units, but no formal announcement has yet been made, and a proper defense budget document breaking down spending for 2025 has yet to be published.
Looking ahead to 2026, the finance ministry document says a further “gradual” rise in spending will see Italy budgeting 2.5 percent of GDP by 2028.
The document warns that hiking budgets too quickly would prompt a “rush to buy” which would result in the market hiking prices.
“Based on a realistic projection, spending in relation to GDP would rise by 0.15 percentage points in 2016 and again in 2017 then by 0.2 percent points in 2028,” the document states.
Planners would first use the SAFE loans to achieve that, then decide on whether to use the National Escape Clause.
The permission to use the NEC by the EU was part of its March 2025 ReArm scheme to push member states to increase military readiness in light of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.
“The EU’s fiscal rules limit how much member states’ governments can spend. That’s why the EU is allowing additional budgetary flexibility within the fiscal framework to ensure that rising defense expenditure does not jeopardize fiscal sustainability or trigger penalties normally associated with breaching EU budgetary limits,” the EU has said.
“The flexibility under the NEC for defense expenditure would be available for four years, starting from 2025, with an annual excess through 2028 that will not exceed 1.5% of GDP,” it has said.
Italy has previously said it did not want to use the NEC option as long as its annual deficit was already over 3%, meaning it was facing an infraction procedure. But it now predicts it will drop to 2.8% next year. The document contains one paragraph hinting that Italy may not yet need to achieve the 5% spending demanded by NATO.
Its logic is that the 5% target has been established to ensure countries reach specific military capabilities. If Italy can achieve those capabilities through “rationalization strategies and optimizing spending, it could yet be possible to deliver the capabilities assigned to each country with a smaller outlay.” (Source: Defense News)

 

06 Oct 25. European arms industry growth to beat 10% a year, Redburn forecasts. European defense companies may grow their revenue from European customers by an average 10.5% to 11.5% a year for the next decade, as most countries commit to NATO’s 2035 spending targets, financial research firm Rothschild & Co. Redburn said.
The fastest growth will continue to be in countries that have underspent historically, such as Germany, or in parts of Europe “uncomfortably close” to the perceived threat from Russia, analysts Olivier Brochet and Joe Orchard wrote in an Oct. 2 report.
Rising military budgets already led to a “material jump” in order backlog that is yet to be fully reflected in financial results and profit outlooks of the continent’s defense industry, the analysts said. European Union countries lifted defense spending by 19% to a record €343 bn ($400 bn) in 2024, with spending set to rise to €381bn this year, according to the European Defence Agency.
“The European defense industry’s backlog should continue to expand at a faster rate than it is consumed for years,” Brochet and Orchard wrote.
Based on Europe spending 3.5% of GDP on defense in 2035, with 35% to 40% of the budget spent on equipment, European defense equipment spending would be around 1.2% to 1.4% of GDP, more than double today’s levels, the report said.
As it rearms, Europe will “materially outgrow” the United States, which is planning to keep defense procurement steady at about 1% of GDP, according to Brochet and Orchard.
European defense companies on average filled about 34% of their backlog every year between 2013 and 2021, with that number falling to 30% in 2024 due to the acceleration in order intake. The number is expected to return to its historic levels as production capacity increases, the analysts said.
That would then see the industry’s European revenue at least tripling by 2035, Brochet and Orchard wrote, or a compound annual growth rate of 10.5% to 11.5%.
Based on a sample of 11 large Western European defense companies between 2013 and 2024, defense procurement takes about a year to translate into order intake, suggesting the “sharp increase” in defense budgets in 2024 and 2025 could materialize into industry orders in 2025-2026, according to the Redburn analysts.
The backlog for the sample set of companies increased to an average 3.9 years of sales in 2023-24 from three years in the period from 2013 to 2021, they said.
For Europe’s defense industry, the home continent on average accounted for around 65% of 2024 sales, with Naval Group and Rheinmetall getting a larger share from Europe, and BAE Systems on the lower end.
Firms exposed to geographies with the biggest spending increases and those active in air defense and land armament are growing revenue faster than peers, led by the German land-armament defense industry, according to the report.
“Local players disproportionately benefit from the strength in defense spending, as countries aim at reinvesting what is effectively their taxpayer money into their domestic economies,” Brochet and Orchard wrote, adding that has been particularly visible in Germany and Eastern Europe. (Source: Defense News)

 

03 Oct 25. Poland’s link with strategic NATO fuel pipeline to cost $5.5bn. Poland said on Friday that its plan to link to a NATO pipeline network, which is designed to supply troops with fuel in the event of war, will cost 20bn zlotys ($5.5bn).
Earlier in the day, the ministry and Polish pipeline operator PERN signed a preliminary deal to extend the country’s pipelines to connect them to the NATO system.
“We are talking about…construction of pipelines over a distance of 300 km…we are talking about one of the largest investments in the security of the Polish state in the last 30 years,” Deputy Defence Minister Cezary Tomczyk said.
Poland has long sought to connect with NATO’s Central Europe Pipeline System (CEPS), which dates from the Cold War era and transports jet fuel, gasoline, diesel fuel and naphtha across Belgium, France, Germany, Luxembourg and the Netherlands.
The matter has taken on increased urgency for the eastern flank NATO member since Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine and more recently, drone incursions. NATO has allocated 60 m zlotys to Poland. (Source: Reuters)
—————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————–
Founded in 1987, Exensor Technology is a world leading supplier of Networked Unattended Ground Sensor (UGS) Systems providing tailored sensor solutions to customers all over the world. From our Headquarters in Lund Sweden, our centre of expertise in Network Communications at Communications Research Lab in Kalmar Sweden and our Production site outside of Basingstoke UK, we design, develop and produce latest state of the art rugged UGS solutions at the highest quality to meet the most stringent demands of our customers. Our systems are in operation and used in a wide number of Military as well as Homeland Security applications worldwide. The modular nature of the system ensures any external sensor can be integrated, providing the user with a fully meshed “silent” network capable of self-healing. Exensor Technology will continue to lead the field in UGS technology, provide our customers with excellent customer service and a bespoke package able to meet every need.

A CNIM Group Company
——————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————–

Sponsored by Bertin Exensor

 

www.exensor.com

 

——————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————-

02 Oct 25. Russia: New decree indicates willingness to conduct retaliatory seizures of Western assets. Bloomberg reported on 1 October that Russia would possibly nationalise and quickly sell foreign assets under a new privatisation procedure in the event that the EU seizes Russian assets. President Vladimir Putin signed a decree on 30 September allowing for the expedited sale of state-owned assets. The order limits pre-sale valuations to ten days and speeds up the state’s registration of ownership. It specifies that the measure comes in response to sanctions against Russia. An unspecified Russian government insider disclosed that the decree applies to foreign and Russian companies. The EU is currently seeking to provide Ukraine with a loan worth approximately EUR 140 bn (USD 160 bn) using immobilised frozen Russian bank assets (see Sibylline Ukraine Update – 29 September 2025). Ultimately, the decree is almost certainly aimed at deterring the EU from progressing with such plans. The development underscores our long-standing assessment that the use of frozen Russian funds to support Ukraine will increase the risk of Russian retaliatory seizures of Western assets. (Source: Sibylline)

 

02 Oct 25. Australia-Papua New Guinea: Military alliance pact underscores Canberra’s regional clout, ambitions. Earlier on 2 October, the Papua New Guinean cabinet approved the Puktuk treaty with Australia. The treaty involves a mutual defence pact, joint military training exercises and a pathway for up to 10,000 Papua New Guineans to serve in the Australian army. The treaty will likely come into effect by the end of 2025 once it is ratified by the parliaments of both countries. Papua New Guinea had delayed agreeing to the pact in recent weeks, allegedly due to disagreements within its cabinet, as well as political pressure from China. Over the coming months, Australia is likely to seek similarly robust agreements with Fiji, Tonga and Vanuatu as it attempts to compete for influence with China in the region. We assess that most Pacific Island countries will avoid aligning overtly with either Australia or China in order to maximise inward investment from both (mainly in infrastructure and policing). (Source: Sibylline)

 

30 Sep 25. Iraq Transition. Statement by Chief Pentagon Spokesman Sean Parnell on Iraq transition. In accordance with the President’s guidance and in alignment with the U.S.-Iraq Higher Military Commission and the joint statement issued on Sept. 27, 2024, the United States and Coalition partners will reduce its military mission in Iraq. This reduction reflects our combined success in fighting ISIS and marks an effort to transition to a lasting U.S.-Iraq security partnership in accordance with U.S. national interests, the Iraqi Constitution, and the U.S.-Iraq Strategic Framework Agreement. This partnership will support U.S. and Iraqi security and strengthens Iraq’s ability to realize economic development, foreign investment, and regional leadership. The U.S. Government will continue close coordination with the Government of Iraq and Coalition members to ensure a responsible transition. (Source: U.S. DoD)

 

29 Sep 25. SANDF in freefall. The South African National Defence Force (SANDF) is falling apart, with the collapse of state entities and underfunding at the core of its demise. This is according to Chris Hattingh, the Democratic Alliance’s spokesperson for Defence and Military Veterans, who told Biznews that the SANDF is in tatters. He said that the SANDF faces significant challenges stemming from poor leadership, corruption, historical underfunding, and misalignment of national defence objectives. This was echoed by Leleti Maluleke from Good Governance Africa, recently arguing that “despite its strategic importance, it faces serious problems that threaten its operational effectiveness.”

“Underfunding, inadequate resources, maintenance failures and internal discipline issues have weakened the force, raising questions about its ability to fulfil its obligations.”

“The SANDF has almost 200 aircraft, and 16 will be available on a good day. Our submarine fleet is also basically gone, and I don’t think it can be recovered,” said Hattingh.

Earlier in the year, the DA reported that the Air Force would need roughly R8 bn to restore key platforms like Rooivalk and Gripen jets to service. Similarly, for the Navy to refit (a complete maintenance overhaul) its submarines and frigates, it will require roughly R700 m per vessel.

“We’ve also got a rapidly ageing defence force, with the outflow of older people having surpassed the number of younger people entering the SANDF and Air Force.”

In addition to this, Hattingh argues that South Africa’s defence force is operating without direction. He explained that the defence review acts as a road map for the SANDF, asking questions such as what type of defence force is needed, what kind of equipment is necessary, and how the SANDF should modernise. According to the defence review, implementing the first milestone would arrest the SANDF’s decline, the second would rebalance it, the third would capacitate it, the fourth would allow it to respond to challenges, and the fifth would give it limited war capability.

“Not a single milestone from the 2015 Defence Review was implemented, which basically means that the SANDF is rudderless,” Hattingh said.

“Once we become defenceless, we become an easy target. There’s a saying that there will always be a capable military on our soil, whether it’s our own, it’s our own choice.”

The decline of the military industry

South Africa has a R57bn defence budget. Dr Moses Khanyile, director of the Centre for Military Studies at Stellenbosch University, said that the current defense budget is inadequate to maintain a modern military capable of effectively addressing both internal and external threats. Khanyile is calling for increased investment in research and development within local defence industries to ensure that the country does not remain vulnerable. Hattingh also said that while South Africa may still have some of its defensive fleet available, that which remains is falling behind technologically.

“We’re not where we were in 2015. The world has moved on, and so has the defence industry,” he said.

“We had the research and development capacity in Denel and Armscor, but we’ve lost most of that because of state capture and cadre deployment.”

He highlighted that state-owned aerospace and weapons manufacturer Denel was a major player in the international arms community.

“Before the state capturers got their greedy hands on Denel in 2015, it was a top company,” Hattingh said.

This period saw irregular activities, including a R229m hull fabrication contract awarded to Gupta-linked VR Laser in November 2014, instead of the Denel subsidiary LMT as originally specified, which the Special Investigating Unit (SIU) described as “fraught with irregularities.” Denel executives also breached internal policies and the PFMA by awarding R2.8m in bursaries for pilot training to three students, and by acquiring R10 m in legal services from unapproved provider Khampha Attorneys. Additionally, improper financial assistance of R334m was given to LMT, violating both the PFMA and the Companies Act. These and other actions pushed Denel from profitability into years of losses, with cash flow problems so severe that the company struggled to pay full salaries, prompting many employees to seek work in the Middle East

“They were an original equipment manufacturer of note in the world. There’s still a lot of Denel’s technology left after state capture, but the entity has lost a lot of its capability.”

Hattingh says the same is true for the Armaments Corporation of South Africa (Armscor), the SANDF’s arms procurement agency. However, Armscor also faces the issue of the SANDF’s underfunding, with 68% of its budget being allocated to salaries, leaving only 32% for operations, equipment, maintenance, and everything else. This leaves very little to be spent on military infrastructure and arms. (Source: https://www.defenceweb.co.za/)

——————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————-

Founded in 1987, Exensor Technology is a world leading supplier of Networked Unattended Ground Sensor (UGS) Systems providing tailored sensor solutions to customers all over the world. From our Headquarters in Lund Sweden, our centre of expertise in Network Communications at Communications Research Lab in Kalmar Sweden and our Production site outside of Basingstoke UK, we design, develop and produce latest state of the art rugged UGS solutions at the highest quality to meet the most stringent demands of our customers. Our systems are in operation and used in a wide number of Military as well as Homeland Security applications worldwide. The modular nature of the system ensures any external sensor can be integrated, providing the user with a fully meshed “silent” network capable of self-healing. Exensor Technology will continue to lead the field in UGS technology, provide our customers with excellent customer service and a bespoke package able to meet every need.

A CNIM Group Company

————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————

Sponsored by Bertin Exensor

 

www.exensor.com

 

———————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————

Military And Security Developments

Oct 02.

IRAN

• The UK and the US have sanctioned numerous Iranian entities in line with UN sanctions, compounding fiscal pressure on Iran and increasing the risk of hybrid retaliation in the medium term. On 1 October, the UK announced that it had sanctioned over 70 Iranian entities and individuals in line with the re-imposition of UN sanctions (see Sibylline Middle East Crisis Update – 29 September 2025). Sanctioned entities include numerous Iranian-owned banks, the Iran Insurance Company and the government-owned National Iranian Oil Company (NIOC). The UK also imposed asset freezes on Iran’s Ministry of Energy and Ministry of Petroleum, and sanctioned numerous individuals associated with the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran (AEOI). The sanctions will also restrict Iran’s access to critical foreign currency reserves and assets held overseas; four sanctioned banks (Bank Melli, Bank Saderat, Bank Sepah and Persia International Bank Plc) held assets valued at over USD 1.2 billion in the UK in 2024. Financial entities processing payments to Iran, Iranian nationals and Iranian-linked entities will also face significantly elevated regulatory scrutiny, increasing compliance requirements in the medium-to-long term. Also on 1 October, the US announced that it had sanctioned over 40 entities and individuals associated with Iran’s nuclear and missile production programmes, primarily those linked to the procurement of chemical compounds, aircraft parts and sensors. In the coming months, Western states will almost certainly continue to expand and enforce sanctions targeting Iran, deterring engagement with Iranian entities and individuals in key sectors, particularly insurance, finance, logistics and energy. These measures are highly likely to increase fiscal pressure on Iran, triggering a broader hybrid response as part of Tehran’s efforts to ease socio-economic strains. Such measures are likely to include the detention of foreign nationals in Iran, the hijacking of affiliated vessels in the Persian Gulf and escalating cyber activity targeting public and private sector entities associated with nations enforcing sanctions.
• Iran’s accession to an anti-terrorist financing convention will not moderate money laundering exposure risks; it is also unlikely to stabilise macro-economic conditions. On 1 October, the Expediency and Discernment Council approved Iran’s accession to the Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism (CFT). The approval likely reflects Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei’s support for measures designed to remove Iran from the Financial Action Task Force (FATF)’s blacklist. Iran has been blacklisted by the FATF since 2020 due to its extensive financial support for designated terror organisations such as Hamas, the Houthis and Lebanese Hizballah (LH). The accession is highly unlikely to result in demonstrable changes to Iran’s anti-money laundering or anti-terrorist-financing practices. As such, the FATF is unlikely to remove Iran from the backlist in the short term, sustaining significant barriers to Iran’s access to Western financial markets and systems. In the medium term, Iran will likely seek to deepen its economic integration with countries such as China, Russia and various diplomatically aligned states as part of its ‘Turning East’ policy. Although such integration will moderate long-term commodity-shortage risks, Iran’s current levels of economic instability, currency devaluation and inflation will sustain deteriorating socio-economic conditions over the coming weeks, increasing the risk of anti-government protests in major cities in the short term.

ISRAEL

• The Israel Defense Forces’ (IDF’s) interception of the ‘Global Sumud Flotilla’ will elevate international pro-Palestine activism, increasing operational and reputational risks for Israeli-affiliated businesses. Between 1 and 2 October, the IDF intercepted 47 vessels comprising the Global Sumud Flotilla. The operation largely took place outside Israeli-controlled waters off the coast of Gaza (Palestinian Territories). During the operation, forces of the Shayetet 13 naval commando unit boarded vessels, detained activists and redirected the vessels to the Port of Ashdod (Southern district, Israel). Foreign national crew members will likely face brief detentions in Israel before being deported to their countries of citizenship. Such detentions and repatriations are likely to elevate diplomatic tensions moderately between Israel and states whose nationals are detained in Israel. Regardless of the flotilla’s success (or lack thereof), its coverage across international media will likely continue to encourage activism, including pro-Palestine protests and actions that target Israeli and Israeli-linked firms, increasing operational disruption and reputational risks for such businesses.

PALESTINIAN TERRITORIES 

• GAZA STRIP: Hamas is unlikely to accept the US-backed ceasefire proposal unconditionally, sustaining regional tensions and the risk of armed conflict. On 29 September, US President Donald Trump and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu publicly released a 20-point ceasefire plan for the ongoing Israel-Hamas war and post-war governance in Gaza. The agreement would institute an immediate and permanent ceasefire in Gaza, as well as the release of all remaining hostages within 72 hours. The proposal also details the immediate disarmament and demobilisation of Hamas, the subsequent deployment of an ‘International Stabilization Force’ and the formation of a technocratic government (‘Board of Peace’), with the partial involvement of the Palestinian Authority (PA, subject to major reforms). Netanyahu stated that Israel would accept the plan but would immediately resume combat operations should Hamas violate the terms of the agreement. At the time of writing, Hamas has not formally responded as discussions with Qatari and Turkish mediators are ongoing. In the coming days, Hamas will likely respond to the proposal with several conditions that focus in particular on establishing finite timelines for the IDF’s withdrawal and concessions on disarmament. Israel and the US will likely characterise such a response as a rejection of the proposal’s core tenets, meaning that the implementation of a ceasefire and hostage-release agreement remains unlikely in the short term. There is also a realistic possibility that Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) will reject the agreement, moderating the prospects for the immediate release of all Israeli hostages (even if Hamas agrees to the proposal). As such, we assess that IDF combat operations will likely continue in the short term, sustaining the risk of armed conflict, particularly in northern Gaza.
• GAZA STRIP: Further NGO operational suspensions in Gaza City will exacerbate humanitarian concerns in northern Gaza. On 1 October, the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) announced the temporary suspension of operations in Gaza City due to the intensifying military offensive within the city. The UN’s Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Operations (OCHA) reported that only one UN-run health facility remains operational in northern Gaza, underscoring the escalating public health concerns for populations remaining within Gaza City as the offensive progresses. Further NGO operational suspensions are highly likely in the coming days. Civilians in Gaza City therefore face critical food, water and energy security risks. These conditions will almost certainly compound humanitarian concerns and pro-Palestine activists’ scrutiny of IDF operations, increasing reputational exposure risks for Israeli-linked firms, particularly those operating in the security, defence, automotive, shipping and financial service sectors.
• GAZA STRIP: The closure of the Netzarim Corridor and completion of a full military cordon around Gaza City highlight the possible intensification of IDF operations in the coming 72 hours. On 1 October, the IDF confirmed the closure of all south-to-north movement along the Netzarim Corridor (northern Gaza). On the same day, Israeli Defence Minister Israel Katz announced that the IDF had completed the military cordon surrounding Gaza City, issuing a final warning for Gazan citizens to leave the city (stating that all who remain will be regarded as ‘terrorists and terror supporters’). These events signal the IDF’s preparations to move into key Hamas strongholds within Gaza City, as well as a likely intensification of military operations in the coming 72 hours. Such an intensification is likely to include a substantial airstrike campaign, followed shortly after by a large-scale ground manoeuvre into the city, significantly elevating security risks therein, including within humanitarian facilities.
• WEST BANK: Military operations in Ramallah and al-Bireh governorate are likely to intensify following the discovery of rocket shells. On 1 October, the IDF found 15 rocket shells in various production stages (as well as explosive devices and other weapon parts) during operations in Beitunia (Ramallah and al-Bireh). This marks the latest discovery of an apparent rocket-production facility in the West Bank. Increased efforts by West Bank militants to produce rockets are likely to persist over the coming months, elevating security risks across the West Bank due to likely test launches and possible launch failures. Security risks across Israeli population centres in the West Bank and those bordering the West Bank will also gradually increase. The development of militant rocket stockpiles in the West Bank likely reflects a red line for Israel. As such, the IDF will almost certainly escalate its military operations in Ramallah and al-Bireh in the coming weeks. Furthermore, there is a realistic possibility that the IDF will launch intense operations covering all of the West Bank; it will likely focus on Ramallah and al-Bireh and the Jordan Valley area to locate and destroy rocket-production facilities. Such operations will significantly increase the risk of damage to civilian infrastructure in Palestinian population centres across the West Bank, elevating energy and water security risks and worsening socio-economic conditions. Security risks for personnel and bystanders due to crossfire between the IDF and militants will also increase.
• WEST BANK: A car-ramming attack near the al-Khader intersection (Bethlehem governorate) highlights elevated radicalisation and attack risks. On 30 September, a Palestinian resident of Beit Fajjar (Bethlehem) injured two Israeli teens in a car-ramming attack near the al-Khader intersection; a passing IDF reservist subsequently killed the perpetrator. The incident highlights the rising rate of radicalisation among Palestinian residents of the West Bank and the growing risk of opportunistic and low-sophistication sole-perpetrator attacks targeting individuals identified as Israeli civilians. Such attacks are increasingly likely around roads, public transport hubs and gas stations; assailants are likely to employ ‘cold weapons’ such as knives and vehicles. Attack risks will remain particularly elevated in the coming weeks, especially throughout October due to the Jewish High Holidays (1-2 October and 6-14 October).

RED SEA

• RED SEA: The Houthis’ imposition of ‘sanctions’ on US firms will elevate regional tensions and armed conflict risks. On 30 September, the Iranian-backed Houthis announced that they had imposed sanctions on 13 US energy companies, nine executives and two vessels in retaliation for US sanctions imposed in July and September. The announcement underscores the elevated risk of attacks and harassment facing vessels navigating the Arabian and Red seas, especially those that are affiliated with ‘sanctioned’ companies and individuals. There is a realistic possibility that the Houthis will try to board vessels or coerce them to re-route to Houthi ports. Due to the heightened potential for misidentification, these risks will extend to all vessels navigating the area. These elevated security risks will increase insurance costs for shipping operations in the area and possibly prompt the re-routing of vessels, which would increase supply chain delay risks for oil and energy commodities. Any Houthi attacks that strike US-affiliated ships would threaten the viability of the Houthi-US ceasefire, elevating the risk of armed conflict and a resumption of US strikes on Houthi territory in Yemen. This would increase bystanders’ exposure to blasts, particularly around ports and in the capital Sanaa.

REGIONAL AND GLOBAL DEVELOPMENTS

• UK: A terrorist attack against a synagogue has underscored the elevated risk of targeted violence, particularly during religious holiday periods. On 2 October, a sole perpetrator killed two people and injured at least five others in a car-ramming and stabbing attack targeting the Heaton Park Hebrew Congregation Synagogue in the Crumpsall area of Manchester (Greater Manchester county). The attacker targeted the synagogue at approximately 0930 hrs (local time) during the morning Yom Kippur prayer service. Greater Manchester Police personnel shot the perpetrator at the scene and have characterised the event as a terrorist incident. The attack underscores the elevated risks of violence and sole-perpetrator attacks targeting locations associated with the Jewish community during periods of religious significance, such as Yom Kippur and the upcoming Sukkot period (6-13 October). The risk of targeted violence will be particularly acute for Jewish places of worship, community centres, schools and dedicated retail outlets, as well as locations associated with Israel, such as Israeli diplomatic centres, consulates and trade missions. In the coming days, the UK police will likely adopt an elevated posture around such locations, moderating the prospects for successful high-capacity attacks in the short term. However, ethno-religious tensions linked to the Israel-Hamas war will sustain the risk of further low-capacity attacks in the medium-to-long term, particularly for religious institutions with close ties to Israeli communities in the UK.
• GERMANY: An alleged Hamas plot underscores the persistent security threats to Israeli and Jewish institutions, as well as businesses affiliated with Israel. On 1 October, the German authorities announced the arrest of three alleged Hamas members in the capital Berlin. They are suspected of plotting attacks against Israeli and/or Jewish institutions in the country. The security forces carried out property searches in Leipzig (Saxony state) and Oberhausen (North Rhine-Westphalia state). During the arrests, an AK-47 assault rifle, several pistols and significant quantities of ammunition were seized. According to German Interior Minister Alexander Dobrindt, the suspects had been under surveillance for several months. Dobrindt also revealed that it was unclear precisely which institutions the suspects intended to target. This is not the first time that alleged Hamas members have plotted to carry out attacks in Germany; three operatives were arrested in Berlin in 2023. The German authorities have also identified other plots linked to Iran targeting Jewish and/or Israeli institutions over the past year. The latest arrests underscore the persistent threat posed by radical Islamist elements/organisations – including Hamas – to Jewish and/or Israeli institutions in Germany. The risk will remain particularly heightened over the coming 24 hours during the remainder of Yom Kippur (1-2 October). Furthermore, radical elements will possibly exploit pro-Palestine protests in German cities to vandalise businesses/entities affiliated with Israel.
• QATAR-US: A new security arrangement will mitigate against the risk of retaliatory strikes during possible future regional conflicts. On 1 October, US President Donald Trump pledged in an executive order to guarantee Qatar’s security and to regard any attack against the Gulf state as a threat to US security. Notably, the executive order outlined that the US would respond to any attack against Qatar by taking all lawful and appropriate measures (including military action) to defend the interests of both countries. This comes nearly three weeks after Israel struck Doha (Qatar) in an operation targeting Hamas’ political leaders. Doha was also struck by an Iranian missile attack in June that targeted the US’ al-Udeid air base in retaliation for US strikes on Iranian nuclear facilities. We assess that the new security arrangement will mitigate against the risk of similar retaliatory attacks against Qatar by both sides during any future regional conflict (or a resumption of Iran-Israel hostilities in 2026). Nevertheless, in the event of any such regional conflict, the risk of retaliatory Iranian attacks against other US bases and interests in the Gulf region would remain elevated, particularly those in Bahrain, Kuwait and Iraq.
• Israel-global: IDF interception of pro-Palestine flotilla will raise diplomatic tensions, reputational risks. Late on 1 October, the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) intercepted at least 40 vessels from the ‘Global Sumud Flotilla’ in the Mediterranean Sea outside Israeli waters. It transferred the crew members, including the activist Greta Thunberg, to the Port of Ashdod (Southern district, Israel). Foreign crew members will likely face brief detentions in Israel before being deported to their countries of citizenship. Such detentions and repatriations are likely to elevate diplomatic tensions moderately between Israel and states with nationals detained in Israel. Regardless of the flotilla’s lack of success, coverage of the event across international media will likely continue to encourage activism, including pro-Palestine protests and the targeting of Israeli and Israeli-linked firms, increasing operational disruption and reputational risks for these businesses. We assess this trend will be exacerbated due to the realistic possibility of the Israeli navy using excessive force to halt the progress of other vessels from the flotilla if they enter Gaza’s (Palestinian Territories) waters, further inflaming anti-Israel sentiment globally.
• Morocco: Growing protests will elevate security risks; looting, vandalism are likely in major cities. On 1 October, the police fatally shot two protesters while defending a police station in Lqliâa (Souss-Massa region) from a group of young men carrying blades. Nationwide anti-government protests and clashes with the security forces have continued to intensify, with 263 police officers and 23 civilians injured since demonstrations started on 27 September. State media has also reported looting and vandalism at administrative buildings and banks in Agadir, Ait Amira, Inezgane and Tiznit (all Souss-Massa). We assess that protest organisers (mainly the GenZ 212 Discord group) will call for further gatherings in the coming days, particularly over the coming weekend (4-5 October). This would highly likely trigger wider clashes with the security forces in several cities, including the capital Rabat, elevating bystanders’ exposure to tear gas (and possibly even live ammunition) in major Moroccan cities. Physical security risks will be most elevated in the vicinity of banks, government buildings and ATMs during these events; widespread vandalism and looting incidents remain likely.

Oct 01.

• Yemen: Houthi threat on US shipping elevates regional tensions, armed conflict risks. On 30 September, the Iran-backed Houthis announced that they had imposed sanctions on 13 US energy companies, nine executives and two vessels. The Houthis characterised this move as a retaliation for the US’ imposition of sanctions in July and September. This announcement signals an elevated risk of attacks and harassment of vessels sailing in the Arabian and Red seas that are affiliated with the sanctioned companies and individuals. There is a realistic possibility that the Houthis will try to board vessels or coerce them to re-direct their routes to Houthi ports. Due to the high potential of misidentification, these risks will extend to all vessels sailing across the area. These elevated security risks will increase insurance costs for shipping operations in the area and possibly prompt the re-routing of vessels, which would increase supply chain delay risks for oil and energy commodities. Houthi attacks on US-affiliated ships will threaten the viability of the Houthi-US ceasefire, elevating risks of armed conflict and of the resumption of US strikes in Houthi territory; this would drive exposure to blasts, particularly around ports and the capital Sanaa.
• Iraq: Withdrawal of US forces will elevate security risks across Iraq in coming months. On 30 September, the US Department of Defense officially announced that the US military is scaling back its presence in Iraq following what it described as ‘success’ in the fight against the Islamic State (IS). This comes after local media reported earlier in August that US forces had begun to withdraw from the Ain Al Assad airbase (Anbar governorate), while keeping a small number of officers in the capital Baghdad. We assess that it is likely that part of these withdrawn forces will be relocated to Iraq’s Kurdistan autonomous region and to the US’ bases in eastern Syria in 2026. Nevertheless, this withdrawal will almost certainly increase security risks across Iraq; IS and other jihadist groups are highly likely to capitalise on the resultant security vacuum to re-group and expand their influence nationwide. An uptick in attacks against military and government facilities, as well as religious sites, is likely throughout 2026.

Sep 30.

• Israel-Palestinian Territories: US-backed plan will temper security, humanitarian concerns in Gaza. On 29 September, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu announced that Israel had accepted a US-backed peace proposal to end the Israel-Hamas war in Gaza. Under the 20-point plan, the US would co-ordinate with Palestinian and international partners to establish an internal security force (‘International Stabilisation Force’) and a temporary technocratic government (‘Board of Peace’) following the release of all Israeli hostages within 72 hours of Israel’s official acceptance of the plan. Upon Hamas’ acceptance of the deal, Israel will enter a phased withdrawal from Gaza, mitigating against security risks for civilians and personnel on the ground. Furthermore, the plan outlines the establishment of increased aid for certain areas in Gaza, regardless of Hamas’ acceptance. We assess this will moderate the ongoing humanitarian crisis and reduce energy, food and water security risks. However, if Hamas rejects the plan, the US will likely back Israeli military operations in Gaza, significantly elevating security risks and humanitarian concerns within Gaza City.

Sep 29.

KEY DEVELOPMENTS

IRAN

• The UN has re-imposed pre-2015 sanctions on Iran, significantly increasing pressure on the country’s economy, undermining its socio-economic health and raising regulatory framework risks for export firms.
• The re-implementation of UN sanctions on Iran has significantly increased regional tensions and will almost certainly exacerbate compliance challenges for regionally engaged firms.

ISRAEL

• The Houthis’ use of cluster munitions to target Israel highlights sustained elevated security risks across the country.

PALESTINIAN TERRITORIES

• GAZA STRIP: A US-backed ceasefire and hostage-release and post-war governance plan underscore the increasing international momentum towards de-escalating the Israel-Hamas war (though their complete implementation remains unlikely).
• GAZA STRIP: The construction of three new logistical centres in Gaza City highlights preparations for a gradual military advance into the city, sustaining long-term security risks.
• GAZA STRIP: The suspension of NGO operations in Gaza City underscores the deteriorating humanitarian conditions in central and northern Gaza.
• WEST BANK: A car-ramming attack has underscored the elevated attack and international terrorism risks proximate to the Israeli security forces.

IRAN

• The UN has re-imposed pre-2015 sanctions on Iran, significantly increasing pressure on the country’s economy, undermining its socio-economic health and raising regulatory framework risks for export firms. On 26 September, the UN Security Council (UNSC) rejected a China-Russia-proposed resolution to extend sanctions relief for Iran for six months; consequently, UN sanctions came back into force on 27 September. The move re-imposes all UN sanctions adopted between 2006 and 2010, to include an arms embargo, travel bans, asset freezes and a ban on sales of all components that could facilitate the development of nuclear weapons (including munitions capable of delivering a nuclear warhead). The Iranian rial (IRR) subsequently fell to a record low, trading at approximately 1,123,000 per USD on 27 September. Since 1 January, the IRR traded at an average of 80,000 to the USD. As UN member states begin to re-impose sanctions, as well as to freeze the Iranian Central Bank’s assets and to restrict trade with Iranian entities, further currency devaluations are highly likely, increasing socio-economic health concerns, as well as the risk of commodity shortages and the likelihood of anti-government demonstrations in Iran’s major cities. Protests would likely trigger further police and security force crackdowns, sustaining significant human rights concerns and the risk of harassment and detention for locally engaged staff, particularly foreign nationals. In response to increasing socio-economic pressure, the Iranian government will likely move to sell off portions of its gold reserves, possibly increasing price volatility within gold markets in the short term. Iran will also possibly move to alter import and export regulations to moderate the risk of shortages and raise revenue by increasing duties on certain exports, elevating regulatory framework risks and supply chain disruption for Iran’s primary trade partners, including China, India, Pakistan and Turkey. Such disruption would likely primarily impact Iran’s exports of unrefined metals, polymers and agricultural goods, increasing financial-exposure risks of firms reliant on Iranian-derived inputs.
• The re-implementation of UN sanctions on Iran has significantly increased regional tensions and will almost certainly exacerbate compliance challenges for regionally engaged firms. Following the UNSC vote, Iran recalled its ambassadors to France, Germany and the UK; in the coming days, British, French and German nationals (as well as dual nationals) in Iran will face increased scrutiny and arbitrary detention risks, underscoring the sustained threats to locally engaged staff. Although Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian stated that Iran will not withdraw from the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), there is a realistic possibility that Iran’s Supreme National Security Council (SNSC) or legislature will call for Iran’s withdrawal in the coming days, compounding regional tensions in the medium term. Despite the increased economic pressure on Iran resulting from the sanctions re-implementation, the effectiveness of sanctions will depend on the extent to which UN member states adopt domestic legislation to match the international sanctions regime, as well as whether they then enforce such legislation. On 27 September, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov characterised the sanctions re-implementation as ‘illegal’. He also underscored the likely gaps in international enforcement. These ‘gaps’ will likely sustain covert Iranian access to military technology and knowledge sharing, moderating the sanctions’ direct impact on the Iranian security forces’ capacity. Despite inconsistent enforcement, the majority of Western states (particularly the US) will highly likely seek to impose UN sanctions rigorously, increasing compliance concerns for firms with operations in Iran. These risks will be particularly acute for firms engaged in the pharmaceutical, technology and chemical-processing industries. Regulatory scrutiny will likely be most intense for firms engaging in the sale or purchase of items included on the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) Trigger List and Dual-Use List, including machine tools, electronics, industrial materials and chemical compounds. Regionally engaged shipping firms will also likely face increased scrutiny of their rosters and vessels’ travel history (particularly those navigating to and from Iran), resulting in moderate operational disruption and broader exposure to sanctions in the medium-to-long term.

ISRAEL 

• The Houthis’ use of cluster munitions to target Israel highlights sustained elevated security risks across the country. On 28 September, the Iranian-backed Houthis claimed to have targeted Tel Aviv (Tel Aviv district) with a ballistic missile armed with cluster munitions. The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) intercepted the missile successfully; there were no reports of injuries or damage. Since 22 August, the Yemen-based group has increased its use of missiles equipped with cluster munitions to target Israel. While Israel’s air defences remain able to intercept the majority of Houthi ordnance, particularly missiles targeting central Israel, the use of cluster munitions highlights persistent security risks for personnel and assets not in the immediate vicinity of obvious targets. Due to the nature of cluster munitions, the trajectory of a given missile launch is less indicative of the area(s) that is (are) liable to be hit, while air defences will need additional resources to intercept all potential cluster bombs, elevating the likelihood of misses. Furthermore, due to the need to intercept all the cluster munitions, shelter-in-place waiting times will likely increase, delaying the return of staff from shelters and therefore elevating operational disruption risks (slightly).

PALESTINIAN TERRITORIES 

• GAZA STRIP: A US-backed ceasefire and hostage-release and post-war governance plan underscore the increasing international momentum towards de-escalating the Israel-Hamas war (though their complete implementation remains unlikely). On 28 September, numerous regional media sources published the text of US President Donald Trump’s 21-point ceasefire and post-war governance plan for Gaza. If adopted, the proposal would result in an immediate ceasefire in Gaza, as well as the release of all Israeli hostages within 48 hours, the progressive withdrawal of the IDF and the deployment of an international Arab- / Muslim-majority country-led stabilisation force to Gaza. The proposal also details plans for the formation of a non-Hamas, technocratic governance body to administer Gaza in the short term, and conditions the involvement of the Palestinian Authority (PA) on its engagement with a reform package. The text also states that Israel will not seek to annex or occupy Gaza, and that aid will be distributed by organisations not associated with either Israel or Hamas. The proposal underscores the sustained international pressure on Israel and Hamas to accept a ceasefire and hostage-release agreement and will almost certainly inform discussions between Trump and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu during the latter’s official visit to Washington DC (US) on 29 September. However, military operations are ongoing. On 28 September, Hamas’ military wing stated that it had lost contact with two Israeli hostages and called for the IDF to halt its operations in Gaza City’s Sabra and Tel al-Hawa areas to facilitate their relocation. Although there is a realistic possibility that Hamas’ claims are accurate, there is also a realistic possibility that the statement aims to maximise psychological pressure on Israel’s domestic population and further undercut support for the Israel-Hamas war. Even so, the statement will also likely undermine Hamas’ ability to commit credibly to the safe release of Israeli hostages under a ceasefire agreement, moderating the prospects for the immediate implementation of such a deal. Even if Israel and Hamas agree to the implementation of the US-backed plan, the agreement’s complexity will sustain risks of non-fulfilment and violations, undermining its longevity.
• GAZA STRIP: The construction of three new logistical centres in Gaza City highlights preparations for a gradual military advance into the city, sustaining long-term security risks. The centres, which will likely be completed in the next two weeks, will service the IDF’s Divisions 36, 98 and 162 (which are currently operating within the city) and provide daily maintenance for tanks, armoured personnel carriers (APC) and other equipment. The centres highlight likely preparations for a prolonged operation in Gaza City (that will likely last several months). This is consistent with the tactics currently employed by the IDF, which are characterised by a slower, more methodical approach than previous operations. Ground operations to dismantle military infrastructure are typically now preceded by intense airstrikes to clear hostile forces. This will prolong the elevated security risks in Gaza City over the coming months, increasing the likelihood of a further deterioration of humanitarian conditions in the city (see below).
• GAZA STRIP: The suspension of NGO operations in Gaza City underscores the deteriorating humanitarian conditions in central and northern Gaza. On 26 September, Doctors without Borders (Médecins Sans Frontières, MSF) announced it had suspended operations in Gaza City due to the IDF’s ground offensive. The IDF estimates that approximately 700,000 of Gaza City’s 1 m residents have evacuated the city, primarily towards the al-Mawasi humanitarian zone in southern Gaza. The operational suspension underscores critical threats to life for locally engaged NGO personnel as operations in Gaza City continue to intensify. Most recently, on 29 September, the IDF ordered the evacuation of the Shifa Hospital complex ahead of operations in the immediate vicinity of the facility in the coming days. IDF operations within Gaza City will highly likely trigger further NGO service suspensions, restricting civilian access to emergency medical care in northern and central Gaza. This will likely trigger increased demand for NGO services and medical care in southern Gaza, exacerbating pressure on already-strained healthcare resources. Shortages of equipment and medication will increase the risk of altercations and violence targeting medical staff, while also elevating the risk of communicable disease outbreaks in densely populated informal displacement camps in the short-to-medium term. As humanitarian conditions within Gaza remain critical, Israeli-linked firms and individuals will almost certainly continue facing significant scrutiny from pro-Palestine activists, sustaining broader reputational and governance concerns in the short-to-medium term.
• WEST BANK: A car-ramming attack has underscored the elevated attack and international terrorism risks proximate to the Israeli security forces. On 28 September, a Palestinian resident of Nablus (Nablus governorate) crashed his truck into an IDF patrol car at Jit Junction (Qalqilya governorate), killing one soldier. The attacker was shot and killed at the scene. Jit Junction is located at the point connecting Highways 60 and 55 and the access road to Nablus (Nablus). Following the attack, the IDF blocked entrances and exits to Nablus and nearby villages, including Nabi Ilyas (Qalqilya). The attack highlights the increasing radicalisation risks in the West Bank, which will exacerbate the risk of future attacks. These risks are likely to remain elevated throughout October, particularly around the Jewish High Holidays (1-2 and 6-14 October) and the second anniversary of the 7 October 2023 attack. In the coming weeks, the IDF is likely to establish new checkpoints across the West Bank, increasing travel disruption. Such checkpoints are likely to be targeted and to act as bottlenecks for bystanders, increasing exposure to crossfire during possible attacks against Israeli security personnel manning the checkpoints.

RED SEA

• RED SEA: Israel will likely strike Houthi assets in the coming days, further undercutting humanitarian conditions. Israel is likely to intensify its strikes against Houthi targets in the coming days in retaliation for the Houthis’ earlier launch of a missile equipped with a cluster munitions-carrying warhead (see above). As such, there is a realistic possibility that Israel will retaliate forcefully against Houthi government and civilian officials, as it did on 24 August (see Sibylline Middle East Crisis Update – 28 August 2025). Exposure to strikes over the coming days will be highest near government buildings within Houthi-held territory, particularly in the capital Sanaa. Further damage to civilian infrastructure, including energy and water facilities, is also likely; this would undermine living conditions across Houthi-held territory in the coming weeks.

REGIONAL AND GLOBAL DEVELOPMENTS

• LEBANON: Lebanese Hizballah (LH)’s persistent refusal to disarm will continue to raise the risk of unrest over the next six months. On 28 September, tens of thousands of LH supporters gathered in the capital Beirut’s southern suburbs to commemorate the first anniversary of the assassinations of its former leaders Hassan Nasrallah and Hashem Safieddine. The event formed part of an 18-day commemoration period that will continue until 12 October. No major mobility disruption or clashes with the security forces were reported by local media. However, during the event, the current leader of LH, Naim Qassem, reaffirmed his rejection of the government’s nationwide disarmament plan, the first phase of which (targeting Palestinian camps) is already being implemented by the army (see Sibylline Situation Update Brief – 23 September 2025). In addition, Qassem claimed the group is restoring its military capabilities. The belligerent rhetoric likely reflects the widening rift between LH and the Lebanese government over this issue, as well as the growing risk of Shia unrest across the country in the coming six months. However, these risks will be tempered by the likely intensification of mediation efforts by the Amal movement and its leader, Nabih Berry, over the coming weeks. Furthermore, the Lebanese army is likely to extend the planned disarmament timeline to at least mid-2026 in order to reduce the likelihood of a major confrontation with LH and allow space for further negotiations. In addition, LH’s persistent refusal to disarm will also partially increase the risk of armed conflict resuming with Israel in the coming three months (following likely allegations that the group has violated the ceasefire agreement).
• Israel-Yemen: Continued Houthi targeting of Israeli cities will sustain business disruption, injury risks. On 28 September, the Iran-backed Houthis claimed to have targeted Tel Aviv (Tel Aviv district) with a ballistic missile armed with cluster munitions. The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) have intercepted the missile successfully, with no reports of injuries or damage. Houthi weapons have breached Israeli airspace on at least three instances since 7 September, when a Houthi drone reached Ramon Airport (ETM, Southern district). This underscores the Houthis’ growing capacity to evade air defences in southern Israel, sustaining elevated security risks for personnel and assets across the region. We assess that as the Houthis continue to target densely populated cities with large-scale ordnance, including in Tel Aviv, the frequency of air raid sirens triggering evacuations from offices, homes and hospitality venues will likely increase. This will elevate business disruption and the risk of harm to personnel and travellers during evacuations, including with injuries from crowd crushes.
• Iran: Sanctions will elevate compliance, operational risks; worsening national socio-economic health. Earlier on 29 September, the EU confirmed the reinstatement of sanctions on Iran. The announcement came after the UN Security Council (UNSC) re-imposed international sanctions on Iran on 27 September, as part of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action’s (JCPOA) snapback mechanism. The UN sanctions include an arms embargo on conventional weapons, as well as prohibitions on exports and transfers of parts and technologies related to Iran’s nuclear and ballistic program. Furthermore, the EU sanctions include asset freezes on multiple Iranian banks including the Central Bank of Iran; they also impose bans on Iranian purchases and transportation of crude oil, the sale and supply of gold and certain naval equipment. We assess that the sanctions will significantly undercut the value of the Iranian rial (IRR), increasing inflation rates and exacerbating the prevalence of money laundering and organised crime nationwide. Companies operating in Iran will face increasing operating costs for raw materials and wages. International companies operating or dealing with Iran will also face elevated compliance risks, exacerbating financial risks over the coming months. (Source: Sibylline)

———————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————–

Founded in 1987, Exensor Technology is a world leading supplier of Networked Unattended Ground Sensor (UGS) Systems providing tailored sensor solutions to customers all over the world. From our Headquarters in Lund Sweden, our centre of expertise in Network Communications at Communications Research Lab in Kalmar Sweden and our Production site outside of Basingstoke UK, we design, develop and produce latest state of the art rugged UGS solutions at the highest quality to meet the most stringent demands of our customers. Our systems are in operation and used in a wide number of Military as well as Home land Security applications worldwide. The modular nature of the system ensures any external sensor can be integrated, providing the user with a fully meshed “silent” network capable of self-healing. Exensor Technology will continue to lead the field in UGS technology, provide our customers with excellent customer service and a bespoke package able to meet every need.

A CNIM Group Company

————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————–

Sponsored by Bertin Exensor

www.exensor.com

——————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————-
Military And Security Developments
Oct 02.
KEY DEVELOPMENTS
• OFFENSIVES: Prominent Ukrainian open-source monitoring group DeepState has assessed that the pace of Russian advances more than halved in September compared to August
• STRIKES: Ukrainian and Western officials suspect that Russia has successfully upgraded its ballistic missiles to further undermine Ukraine’s air defences, which will likely sustain if not increase the lethality of ballistic missile strikes
• DRONES: French military personnel have boarded a Russia-linked oil tanker suspected of launching drones into European airspace, underscoring growing likelihood that shadow fleet tankers are being used in grey zone operations
• FORECAST: The US will reportedly provide Ukraine with intelligence for long-range missile strikes against Russia’s energy infrastructure; if confirmed, this would represent a notable pivot of US policy in a likely negotiating tactic
• OFFENSIVES: On 1 October, the Ukrainian open-source intelligence (OSINT) monitoring group DeepState assessed that the pace of Russian advances more than halved in September compared to August. According to DeepState’s estimates, Russian forces seized 100 square miles (259 sq km) in September, a reduction of 44% compared to the previous month. DeepState’s analysis states that most of Russia’s advances occurred along the Donetsk-Dnipropetrovsk-Zaporizhzhia oblast border, which aligns with our assessments over the last month (see SOUTHERN below). Ukrainian defences at other critical points of the frontline, including around Pokrovsk (Donetsk oblast), remain broadly stable at present, with Russian forces struggling to build momentum.
• BAKHMUT: Russian forces are continuing to slowly encroach towards Siversk (Donetsk oblast) from the north, east and south, including from the northern banks of the Siverskyi Donets River. Geolocated footage published on 28 September indicates that Russian advances along the Donetska railway to positions roughly two miles (3km) south-east of Siversk’s outskirts. Following the Russian consolidation of the Serebrianske forest north of the Siverskyi Donets River, Russian forces are now applying increased pressure on the town from the north. Geolocated footage from 30 September shows Russian forces operating to the north-east of Dronivka (Donetsk oblast), a village located on the river’s southern banks around 3.5 miles (5.5km) to the north of Siversk. It remains unclear whether these positions were established by Russian forces that had swum across the river, or forces moving westwards along the southern bank of the river from their positions to the east of Serebrianka (Donetsk oblast).
• BAKHMUT: Reports that dismounted Russian troops are swimming across the Siverskyi Donets River underscores the inability of Russian forces to conduct large-scale, mechanised amphibious operations across the river. Russian forces attempted such operations earlier in the war in 2022, to disastrous effects. Given the saturation of the battlefield with drones and Ukrainian fires, any further attempt would likely similarly result in failure.
• BAKHMUT: Further to the south-west, Russian forces have made modest advances west of Kostiantynivka (Donetsk oblast) amid wider efforts to begin encircling the city. Geolocated footage from 28 and 29 September indicates that Russian forces have advanced to the banks of a small reservoir to the north-west of Rusyn Yar, a village roughly 11 miles (18km) to the west of Kostiantynivka. While slow, advances in this direction will support ongoing Russian operations to the west that seek to stabilise a tactical penetration north-east of Pokrovsk.
• DONETSK: Nothing significant to report
• KHARKIV: Nothing significant to report
• KURSK-SUMY: Nothing significant to report
• OSKIL-KREMINNA: Both Ukrainian and Russian forces have achieved small territorial gains in northern Donetsk and Kharkiv oblasts in recent days, though it is unclear if this reflects an intensification of fighting along this axis. In Kharkiv oblast, geolocated footage indicates that Ukrainian and Russian forces have advanced in locations to the south-east of Borova. Similarly, in northern Donetsk oblast, at the southern end of the Oskil-Kreminna line, geolocated footage points to advances by both sides to the north-east of Lyman. On 1 October, a Ukrainian commander operating in Kupiansk (Kharkiv oblast; a key Ukrainian logistical hub and a Russian target on this axis) reported that Russian forces continue attempts to infiltrate the city by sending one or two troops at a time. Reportedly, these troops are wearing civilian clothes; while we cannot confirm this, that would constitute a war crime under the Geneva Conventions. Nonetheless, the commander stated that Russian forces have been unable to control any territory as a result and remain in the city’s northern outskirts.
• SOUTHERN: Russian efforts to establish a so-called ‘buffer zone’ in Dnipropetrovsk oblast continue to progress slowly, with confirmed westwards advances over the last week. Geolocated footage published on 28 September and 1 October indicates that Russian forces have advanced into central Verbove (Donetsk oblast), a village located around 20 miles (33km) west of Velyka Novosilka (Dnipropetrovsk oblast). These efforts are also being supported by further advances to the south, inside neighbouring Zaporizhzhia oblast. Geolocated footage from 30 September indicates that Russian forces have entered eastern Poltavka (Donetsk oblast), located around 10 miles (16km) north-east of Hulyaipole (Zaporizhzhia oblast).
• STRIKES: Unnamed Ukrainian and Western officials suspect that Russia has successfully upgraded its ballistic missiles to further undermine Ukraine’s air defences, according to the Financial Times (FT). This suspicion is based on the worsening interception rate of Ukrainian air defences since September (or conversely, the growing success rate of Russian missile strikes hitting their target). In particular, the officials suspect that Russia has adapted its Iskander-M mobile system and its Kinzhal air-launched ballistic missiles. The missiles have reportedly outpaced Ukraine’s air defences by diving and plunging into a vertical dive, as well as by executing manoeuvres that ‘confuse’ Patriot interceptors, in contrast to more conventional ballistic terminal trajectories. An unnamed official told the FT that improvements made to Patriot interceptors have successfully lagged Russia’s evolving tactics.
• STRIKES: The changes in Russia’s ballistic missiles point to the growing threat posed by Russia’s long-range missiles strikes, as well as Russia’s ability to make battlefield innovations, offsetting Ukraine’s air defence capabilities. The Patriot system is the only system in Ukraine’s possession capable of intercepting Russian ballistic missiles. If the Russian adaptation is confirmed, it would indicate that strikes involving ballistic missiles will pose an increased risk until a counter-adaption has been made, particularly in the capital Kyiv where the systems are most heavily concentrated. This will place significant pressure on businesses (including Western-owned assets) in the coming months, especially given the uptick in the overall intensity of long-range strikes over the summer, the likely further intensification of strikes during the coming winter period and Russia’s expanding missile production rates.
• STRIKES: Overnight on 30 September-1 October, Russian forces launched 49 Shahed-type and decoy drones, as well four Iskander-M ballistic missiles and one P-800 Oniks anti-ship cruise missile at locations across central, northern and eastern Ukraine. According to the Ukrainian Air Force, five drones and all five missiles struck their targets. This underscores the aforementioned reports that Russia has adapted its ballistic missiles to improve its penetration rate of Ukrainian air defences. Strikes were recorded in Chernihiv, Dnipropetrovsk, Donetsk, Kharkiv, Kherson and Sumy oblasts.
• STRIKES: Russia has also carried out two drone strikes in recent days. Overnight on 1-2 October, Russia launched 86 drones in total, including 31 that struck locations in Donetsk, Kharkiv, Kherson, Odessa, Sumy and Zaporizhzhia oblasts. Furthermore, overnight on 29-30 September, Russia launched 32 Shahed-type and decoy drones, with the Ukrainian air defences intercepting 23 drones. Strikes were recorded in Chernihiv, Dnipropetrovsk, Donetsk, Kherson and Sumy oblasts.
• STRIKES: On 29 September, the Ukrainian forces carried out a Neptune missile strike against a Russian defence industrial enterprise in Karachev (Bryansk oblast). The Elektrodetal plant reportedly produced electronic components and military equipment for missile control systems, armoured vehicles and command and control (C2) devices. According to the Russian opposition outlet Astra, the missile forced the plant to halt operations; the extent of the damage remains unclear. This strike underscores Ukraine’s ability to carry out strikes on Russia’s defence industry in conjunction with the ongoing campaign to degrade Russian oil refineries. For further analysis of Ukrainian strikes on Russian energy infrastructure, see FORECAST below.

POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS
• DIPLOMACY: US President Donald Trump has again called for the leaders of Russia and Ukraine to meet, though the prospect of such negotiations taking place in the near-to-medium term is low. On 30 September, President Trump urged a meeting between Russian President Vladimir Putin and Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky, emphasising the need to ‘settle’ the war. Although President Zelensky has emphasised his willingness to meet with his Russian counterpart on numerous occasions, President Putin continues to show reluctance. We assess that Russia will likely prioritise either engaging bilaterally with the US to normalise relations, or proceeding with lower-level technical negotiations with Ukrainian delegations; a concerted effort to make peace with Ukraine remains unlikely. Nevertheless, amid a potential pivot in US strategy (see FORECAST below), this could realistically incentivise Russia to agree to some form of procedural talks in the coming months.
• DRONES: On 1 October, reports emerged that French military personnel had boarded a Russia-linked oil tanker suspected of launching drones into European airspace. A French navy vessel intercepted the Russian oil tanker on 28 September; the ship was en route to India with 750,000 barrels of crude oil from the Russian oil terminal in Primorsk (Leningrad oblast). The vessel, a Benin-flagged tanker known as the Boracay, was one of four Russia-linked vessels spotted near Denmark at the time of drone sightings on 22 September and 24 September. The vessel has operated under numerous names; it was monitored sailing around Denmark under the name Pushpa in late September. On 29 September, President Zelensky accused Russia of using oil tankers in the Baltic Sea to launch drones and to violate countries’ airspace across the region, which we assess remains likely.
• DRONES: While we cannot verify if the Russian ship served as a launchpad for drones against Denmark, if confirmed, it would demonstrate Russia’s willingness to utilise its so-called shadow fleet of oil tankers for grey zone purposes. Russia has typically used these vessels to evade sanctions, specifically the price cap on Russian oil set by the G7 in December 2022. Ultimately, if Russia is using its shadow tankers to launch drones into the airspace of European countries, this will likely reaffirm Europe’s efforts to increase sanctions against such vessels. Nevertheless, Russian attempts to obfuscate the vessels’ ownership and names will likely undermine any initiatives aimed to clamp down on Russia’s shadow fleet over the coming months. This sustains the risk that such ships will be used in Russian maritime grey zone operations across Europe. For further analysis on recent drone incursions, see Sibylline Situation Update Brief – 1 October 2025.
• SANCTIONS: The G7 is prepared to tighten sanctions pressure on Russia by utilising various measures aimed at reducing its revenues, though its impact on the Kremlin’s decision-making will likely remain limited in the short-to-medium term. According to a statement from 1 October, G7 countries agree that it is time to ramp up pressure on Russian oil exports. The source announces that the member states are ready to target ‘those who are continuing to increase’ purchases of Russian oil and the entities facilitating circumvention. The G7 statement also pledges to significantly reduce remaining imports from Russia (including hydrocarbon supplies), with the ultimate goal of phasing these out. It also said that the G7 is strongly considering imposing trade and other restrictions on countries and entities that help finance Russia’s war effort. Ultimately, the G7’s pledges align with President Trump’s efforts to encourage Western countries to forgo Russian oil as a pre-condition for the US to increase sanctions pressure. However, further squeezes on Russia’s budget are unlikely to force an end to the war in the short-to-medium term. For further analysis, see Sibylline Ukraine Update – 15 September 2025.
FORECAST
INTELLIGENCE: The US will reportedly provide Ukraine with intelligence for long-range missile strikes against Russia’s energy infrastructure; if confirmed, this would entail a notable pivot of US policy. The Wall Street Journal (WSJ) first reported this on 1 October, citing unspecified US administration officials; Reuters has corroborated the reports. The US is also reportedly asking NATO allies to provide Ukraine with similar intelligence support.
This development marks the first time that the Trump administration has approved such substantial intelligence support; the move comes as the US considers sending Ukraine missiles, which would significantly strengthen its long-range strike capabilities. The US has long shared intelligence with Ukraine, though officials stated that the expansion of intelligence-sharing will allow Ukraine to target refineries, pipelines and other infrastructure deep inside Russia, marking a step up in the Trump administration’s intelligence support. According to the WSJ, President Trump approved the initiative for intelligence agencies and the Department of Defense to aid Ukraine with strikes shortly before he claimed that Ukraine could retake all of its land occupied by Russia (see Sibylline Ukraine Update – 25 September 2025). As such, the provision of such intelligence indicates a notable shift in the US’ policy towards taking a harsher stance on Russia.
While the move to greenlight this intelligence sharing could realistically signal that the US will supply Ukraine with longer-range missiles, we assess that it is more likely a negotiating tactic (at least in the short term). The Trump administration is still debating whether to supply Ukraine with Tomahawk missiles; the approval of US-Ukrainian intelligence sharing does not necessarily indicate that a decision on the matter is imminent. If it is a negotiating tactic, the Trump administration is likely waiting to see whether the prospect of Ukraine being able to strike energy infrastructure deeper inside Russia will encourage the Kremlin to re-engage in the stalled peace process. If the US perceives that Russia is unwilling to take serious steps to end the war, the provision of Tomahawk missiles could realistically materialise over the coming months. However, even if Russia does make efforts to organise renewed talks, it is unlikely that the US’ decision will encourage Russia to end the war in the near term, despite the growing economic toll Ukrainian strikes are causing Russian refineries.
The US’ decision to begin providing intelligence for these strikes likely reaffirms that the Trump administration perceives that reducing Russia’s energy revenues is key to push the Kremlin to negotiate. In recent weeks, the US has criticised European and NATO countries’ continued purchases of Russian oil; on 13 September, President Trump stated that this weakens the West’s bargaining power over Russia. Meanwhile, Ukrainian drone attacks against Russian oil refineries have proven significantly disruptive. As of 28 September, 38% of Russia’s oil refining capacity was ‘idle’, according to Russian media reports citing the Russian energy market analysis agency Seala. The reports stated that Ukraine’s drone attacks are the main cause for this, estimating that they account for up to 70% of shutdowns. Ukrainian drone strikes on Russian oil refineries have caused fuel shortages and price hikes in certain regions of de jure and de facto Russian territory.
Therefore, Ukraine has already shown its sovereign capability to conduct deep strikes; the new Ukrainian-built FP-5 Flamingo long-range cruise missile will theoretically provide Ukraine with an even deeper strike capability than Tomahawks. While numbers remain uncertain, the Flamingo (which is understood to be operational) has a purported range of 1,800 miles (2,900km) in contrast to the Tomahawk’s range of 1,500 miles (2400km). As such, if Flamingo missiles prove to be a workable capability, Ukraine will not be solely reliant upon the US’ potential missile provision to further increase pressure on Russia’s deep rear and its oil refining capabilities. Nevertheless, the limited numbers of the still broadly unproven Flamingo missile will likely mean that Tomahawks remain an important component in a future Ukrainian deep strike missile campaign.
Russia will possibly respond to the US’ decision by increasing the intensity of long-range strikes against Ukraine and by staging additional airspace incursions into European airspace in the coming weeks, in a bid to deter the provision of Tomahawks. According to reports by Bloomberg, a Russian diplomat claimed during recent talks with Western envoys that recent aerial incursions into NATO airspace were a response to Ukrainian attacks on Russian-annexed Crimea. We assessed that this was an attempt to link Ukrainian long-range strikes directly with Russia’s retaliation against Europe, clearly in an attempt to deter support for providing long-range cruise missiles. Consequently, the already elevated threat of further violations of European airspace or other grey zone sabotage activity will highly likely increase if the US provides the missiles. If Tomahawks are provided, Russia will seek to deter Germany from providing long-range Taurus cruise missiles, which Ukraine has long sought to use to attack Russia’s rear.
Oct 01.
• Recent Russian incursions into Estonian and Polish airspace highlight the intensification of efforts to test NATO’s readiness and responses.
• The risk of unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) activity near critical national infrastructure (CNI), including airports and ports, will remain elevated in coming weeks across various parts of Europe.
• Resultant air traffic restrictions will drive operational disruption for the aviation sector in the Baltic region; an elevated NATO defence posture will also likely exacerbate air traffic disruption in Poland.
• Future drone activity could realistically cause significant disruption at major European ports; this would have knock-on impacts on global supply chains, including riverine cargo.
• Denmark’s proposed security legislation to provide autonomous counter-drone capabilities to airports and other CNI operators will likely face moderate enforcement challenges.
Context
Since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, unauthorised incursions into the Baltic airspace have occurred on a semi-regular basis. However, the recent uptick in Russian jet and drone activity along NATO’s eastern flank likely reflects an intensification of Russian efforts to test NATO’s readiness and responses. In Germany, suspected Russian reconnaissance drone activity has been detected near numerous sensitive military facilities, defence companies and critical infrastructure including liquefied natural gas (LNG) terminals, port facilities and railways. Since 22 September, there have been drone flights over Danish airports and military sites. While these have not been attributed to Russia officially, the Danish government has categorised them as a systematic grey zone attack by a ‘professional’ operator, consistent with patterns of Russian activity.
In response to these incidents, NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte, European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen, US President Donald Trump and numerous European leaders have signalled support for shooting down any Russian aircraft that enters allied airspace. While such engagements would spike regional tensions and threats, we continue to assess that a major NATO-Russia war remains highly unlikely. In the coming months, Russia will highly likely continue conducting grey zone attacks to test NATO’s boundaries; airports, ports and other CNI sites will remain key targets.
Sep 29.
KEY DEVELOPMENTS
• DONETSK: Ukrainian commanders have claimed that their ongoing ‘counter-offensive’ has encircled Russian forces north-east of Pokrovsk, but it remains more likely that counter-attacks are achieving more limited results
• STRIKES: Russian forces launched the third-largest combined strike against Ukraine on 28 September; the fact that the Polish Embassy in Kyiv was damaged underscores high threats to Western assets in the short-to-medium term
• LABOUR: Ukrainian labour shortages in the hospitality sector are likely to worsen following reports expecting mass closures of restaurants, shortly after the government relaxed rules for young men to travel• FORECAST: US Special Envoy to Ukraine Keith Kellogg has stated that US President Donald Trump is in favour of Ukraine conducting long-range strikes against Russia, though the provision of Tomahawk missiles remains uncertain
• BAKHMUT: Heavy fighting continues south of Kostiantynivka (Donetsk oblast), where Ukrainian counter-attacks are containing Russian advances and preventing significant progress towards the city’s southern outskirts. On 26 September, Russian sources reported that their forces had withdrawn from the village of Pleshchiivka, located under four miles (6km) south-east of Kostiantynivka, following a Ukrainian counter-attack. This is likely accurate and underscores the pressure Ukrainian forces can bring to bear on Russian forces. Russian troops have been advancing at a very slow rate northwards towards Kostiantynivka since consolidating their presence in Toretsk (Donetsk oblast).
• BAKHMUT: Further north, the Russian Ministry of Defence (MoD) claimed that its forces had taken Mayske, a village located around three miles (5km) north-west of Chasiv Yar (Donetsk oblast). While we cannot confirm this, numerous Russian sources have claimed advances to the west and north-west of Chasiv Yar over the last week, indicating a realistic possibility that progress has been made towards the village.
• DONETSK: Senior Ukrainian authorities continue to claim successful ‘counter-offensive’ efforts in the Dobropillia sector (Donetsk oblast), though such statements have been moderated by a prominent Ukrainian military observer. Earlier on 29 September, Ukraine’s Commander-in-Chief Oleksandr Syrskyi reported that several Russian units had been encircled near Dobropillia. Syrskyi further stated that Ukrainian forces had liberated around 68 square miles (175 sq km) of territory in the area and had cleared an additional 75.3 square miles (195 sq km) of Russian sabotage groups. Syrskyi also assessed that Russian casualties amounted to 3,185 soldiers, together with the loss of 969 pieces of weapons and military equipment over an undefined timeframe. We continue to assess that Ukrainian operations in this direction constitute counter-attacks rather than a full-scale ‘counter-offensive’.
• DONETSK: A prominent Ukrainian military observer has qualified Ukraine’s aforementioned claims, indicating that a genuine encirclement of Russian forces is currently unlikely at present, in line with our assessment. Earlier on 29 September, the observer described Ukrainian operations in the Dobropillia sector as counter-attacks conducted as part of stabilisation efforts, rather than a full counter-offensive. Russia reportedly continues to hold ground east of Dobropillia, as far north as Kucherov Yar (Donetsk oblast), maintaining much of its tactical wedge east of Dobropillia and west of the Kazennyi Torets River. However, Russian forces continue to struggle to advance westward towards Dobropillia. While the observer acknowledged that Ukraine’s control of positions north of Nikanorivka and Pankivka (two villages located to the east of Dobropillia) creates a genuine threat of encirclement for Russian elements in the area, he nevertheless downplayed the likelihood of an actual encirclement of Russian troops. Geolocated footage from 26 September indicates that Russian forces recently advanced into eastern Dorozhnie, located to the south-east of Dobropillia.
• DONETSK: In recent days, Russian forces have made gains to the south-west of Pokrovsk (Donetsk oblast). Recently published geolocated footage indicates that Russian troops advanced west of Kotlyne as well as on the south-eastern outskirts of Udachne. A prominent Ukrainian military observer acknowledged the deterioration of Ukraine’s operational situation to the east of Pokrovsk, along the Novoekonomichne-Myrnohrad axis. The observer noted that, in addition to gaining a foothold in Novoekonomichne, Russian forces are launching small assault groups towards the mines, which are located to the west of Novoekonomichne.
• KHARKIV: Nothing significant to report
• KURSK-SUMY: Nothing significant to report
• OSKIL-KREMINNA: Russian forces made limited gains along the Oskil-Kreminna line in recent days. Geolocated footage from 28 September shows recent Russian gains south of Zarichne to the east of Lyman (both Donetsk oblast). Meanwhile, Ukrainian forces contested claims of Russian capture of Novoselivka to the north-west of Lyman.
• SOUTHERN: Nothing significant to report
• STRIKES: Russia continues to launch large-scale combined strikes complemented by smaller strikes on other days. On 28 September, Russia conducted the third-largest strike since the onset of the war. It involved 593 Shahed-type drones, two Banderol cruise missiles launched by drones (a relatively new capability), two Kh-47M2 Kinzhal air-launched ballistic missiles, 38 Kh-101 air-launched cruise missiles and eight Kalibr cruise missiles. Ukrainian forces intercepted 566 Shahed drones, both Banderol drones, 35 Kh-101 missiles and all Kalibr missiles.
• STRIKES: Hits were reported in Chernihiv, Khmelnytskyi, Mykolaiv, Odesa, Sumy and Zaporizhzhia oblasts, as well as in the capital Kyiv and its surrounding oblast. The Kyiv oblast authorities reported that the attack caused blackouts. In the capital, the strike killed four civilians, and missile fragments reportedly damaged the building of the Polish embassy. Similarly, the EU delegation building was also damaged; this is the second time it has been hit since August. The damage to these official buildings underscores the growing risks to foreign assets during significantly intense Russian strikes. For more analysis on such risks, please see Sibylline Ukraine Monthly Forecast – 26 September 2025. Zaporizhzhia (Zaporizhzhia oblast) was also heavily targeted by at least eight missiles. Ukrainian authorities noted that Russian forces had adjusted their tactics, flying Shahed-type drones over neighbourhoods up to 12 times before striking.
• STRIKES: The provision of additional US Patriot air defence systems will moderately improve Ukraine’s defences against Russian strikes, particularly in Kyiv, where these systems are most likely to be deployed. On 27 September, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stated that Patriot systems provided by Israel have been operating in Ukraine for a month; he also indicated that Ukraine will receive two more systems later in the autumn. According to The New York Times, Ukraine will ultimately have a total of ten Patriot systems. We assess that this number remains insufficient to significantly enhance Ukraine’s overall air defence capabilities, given the intensification of Russian strikes in recent months. Ukrainian authorities are likely to allocate some of the additional systems to high-priority areas such as Kyiv, which would improve the city’s operational environment, increasing its defences against cruise (and to a lesser extent, ballistic) missiles. Ultimately, the steady provision of Patriot interceptors remains crucial to maintain Ukraine’s long-term air defence capabilities.
POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS
• LABOUR: Ukrainian labour shortages in the hospitality sector are likely to worsen following reports expecting mass closures of restaurants, shortly after the government relaxed rules for young men to travel. According to Stanislav Zavertailo, co-founder of two dining establishments in Kyiv, it is predicted that up to 30% of male hospitality sector personnel between the ages of 18 and 22 will leave Ukraine. Another restaurateur has forecast that hundreds of establishments will close in Kyiv in the coming months. However, Rodion Yeroshek (CEO of Poster, a Ukrainian company automating systems for restaurants and stores) stated that he has not yet seen widespread closures of coffee shops, cafes or restaurants. Ultimately, the Ukrainian government’s decision to ease travel restrictions under martial law for men between the ages of 18 and 22 will likely intensify already-chronic labour shortages in certain sectors, including hospitality.
• ASSETS: Germany is pushing for the EU to use frozen Russian assets to finance a loan supporting Ukraine’s war effort, though such assistance is unlikely to materialise in the near term. In an article published in the Financial Times on 25 September, German Chancellor Friedrich Merz advocated for using these immobilised funds to back a EUR 140 bn (USD 164 bn) interest-free loan for Ukraine. According to him, repayment would be due once Russia has compensated Ukraine for damages caused during the full-scale invasion. Chancellor Merz stated that the loan should be used to fund military equipment, not to cover Ukraine’s budget more broadly.
• ASSETS: Belgian Prime Minister Bart De Wever has opposed appropriating Russian assets as such. On 26 September, Prime Minister De Wever warned that seizing a third country’s bank assets would set a ‘dangerous precedent’. He also expressed concerns that such a measure would lead other EU member states to decide to withdraw their reserves from the Eurozone. Until now, the EU has used the interests generated by frozen Russian assets to support Ukraine. Most of these frozen assets are held by Euroclear, based in Belgium. The Belgian government’s resistance to using Russian assets for Ukraine’s benefit will likely prevent the creation of such a loan in the coming weeks and months.
• SANCTIONS: The EU is reportedly considering modifying its sanctions extension process to prevent Hungary from vetoing punitive measures related to Russia. On 26 September, Politico cited an internal European Commission document which proposes shifting from unanimity to a qualified majority when renewing sanctions. Nevertheless, we assess that even if implemented, Hungary will highly likely cause an obstacle to future sanctions against Russia over the longer term. For instance, Hungary and Slovakia are creating opposition to the EU’s plan to phase out Russian energy as part of its 19th sanctions package.
FORECAST
US: On 28 September, US Special Envoy to Ukraine Keith Kellogg stated in an interview with Fox News that US President Donald Trump is in favour of Ukraine conducting long-range strikes against Russia. Kellogg’s comments were unclear as to whether President Trump has reversed his long-standing opposition to Ukraine conducting long-range strikes against Russia with US equipment.
The US is considering providing Ukraine long-range Tomahawk missiles, according to US Vice President JD Vance; this could realistically signal a shift in the US’ position. On 28 September, Vice President Vance stated that President Trump will make the final decision on this matter, without specifying a timeframe. On 26 September, The Telegraph reported that President Zelensky had asked President Trump in a closed meeting to provide the missiles, which boast a range of up to 1,500 miles (2,414km). This is much farther than the range of Western missiles currently provided to Ukraine, which consists of British and French Storm Shadows/SCALP missiles and the US Army Tactical Missile System (ATACMS). Previously, former US president Joe Biden had rejected Ukraine’s requests for Tomahawk missiles.
If approved, the provision of Tomahawk missiles would significantly expand Ukraine’s existing long-range strike capabilities and allow for further damage to Russian infrastructure, aiding the Ukrainian war effort. On 25 September, Syrskyi stated that Ukrainian strikes against Russia’s oil sector have severely disrupted fuel supplies and logistics for the Russian military. Syrskyi said that Ukrainian forces have hit 85 targets on Russian soil in under two months, including 33 military sites and 52 military-industrial facilities. While Tomahawk missiles can target much larger areas of Russia with precision missiles (together with current long-range drones), they are unlikely to become a war-winning capability for Ukraine in the near-to-medium term.
Discussions surrounding the possibility of the US providing Tomahawk missiles to Ukraine are highly likely part of President Trump’s current strategy of increasing pressure on Russia to end the war. This comes after President Trump claimed on 23 September that Ukraine could reclaim all of its territory from Russia with the help of the EU and NATO. We assess that the Trump administration is highly likely adopting a progressively tougher stance on Russia, signalling that increasing support for Ukraine is possible, because the peace process remains stalled. On 28 September, Vice President Vance stated that Russia is refusing to engage in bilateral negotiations with Ukraine, as well as in trilateral talks with the US. It ultimately remains uncertain if and when Kyiv would receive Tomahawk missiles, and whether talks about their provision are largely aimed at pressuring Moscow. Concerns around limited US stocks of Tomahawk missiles will likely loom large in the US’ decision-making on whether to supply an operationally significant number of weapons to Ukraine.
Russia has indicated willingness to enter new talks, which are expected to be held later this autumn, possibly in response to growing US pressure. On 27 September, Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov said that he had agreed with US Secretary of State Marco Rubio to meet for a third round of talks, though the date remains unknown. According to Foreign Minister Lavrov, the talks are aimed at removing ‘irritants’ in US-Russia relations, though he could realistically use the talks to discourage the US from adopting an increasingly tougher stance on Russia.
On 25 September, Bloomberg reported that unspecified British, French and German envoys had privately warned Russian officials that NATO is ready to respond to further airspace violations with force, including by shooting down Russian aircraft. The Western diplomats reportedly concluded that Russian commanders had ordered the incursion deliberately, even though the Kremlin has publicly claimed that it did not violate Estonian airspace.
A Russian diplomat reportedly said that the recent aerial incursions into NATO airspace were a response to Ukrainian attacks on Russian-annexed Crimea, indicating an attempt to link Ukrainian military action with retaliation in Europe. The diplomat claimed that Russia considers that it is already engaged in a ‘confrontation’ with European countries. While we cannot confirm the veracity of these reports, if true, this would likely indicate that Russia is open to a managed military escalation in order to erode Western support for Ukraine. In this context, Russia is likely to present aerial incursions and other tests of NATO’s eastern flank as a deterrent against Western-backed long-range strikes inside Russia. The Kremlin will likely attempt to prevent Ukraine’s provision of Tomahawk missiles by threatening escalatory retaliation against Europe, sustaining the very credible threat of renewed drone and grey zone operations across the continent.
• Russia-Ukraine-US: Uncertainty over US arms provision will persist. On 28 September, US Special Envoy to Ukraine Keith Kellogg stated in an interview with Fox News that US President Donald Trump is in favour of Ukraine conducting long-range strikes against Russia. Kellogg added that President Trump holds the final decision-making power on whether Ukraine may carry out such strikes. Kellogg also clarified that the US has not yet decided whether to provide Ukraine with long-range US-made Tomahawk missiles, as per Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky’s request. Kellogg’s comments are unclear as to whether President Trump has reversed his long-standing opposition to Ukraine conducting long-range strikes against Russia with US equipment. We assess that Kellogg’s statements are highly likely part of President Trump’s strategy of adopting a progressively tougher stance on Russia, with the goal of coercing Russian President Vladimir Putin into negotiations while managing escalation risks. We assess that even if President Trump were to formally approve such strikes, it remains uncertain whether he will provide Ukraine with Tomahawk missiles ahead of possible US-Russia talks later this autumn. (Source: Sibylline)

 

29 Sep 25. Vatag heavy UGV makes debut in Kyiv. Vatag, a heavy armed and armoured unmanned ground vehicle (UGV), was first unveiled at the Defense Tech Valley 2025 exhibition held in Kyiv on 16–17 September.
Although some UGVs manufactured in Ukraine since 2022 have been armed, Vatag draws attention because of its size. It is larger than the UGVs developed and deployed by the country so far, with its manufacturer Ground Robotics saying it is capable of transporting over 2 tonnes, with integrated software-and-hardware solutions enabling autonomous behavioural decision-making. It was displayed with a 25 mm cannon mounted on a remote weapon station (RWS), which the company called a “proprietary universal combat module”. It added that the range of weapon configurations is being expanded, including the integration of universal combat modules that can be adapted to different mission profiles.
The 8×8 wheeled platform displayed had unspecified sensors and cameras across its body for situational awareness and navigation, potentially enabling the platform to move autonomously. It had cargo rings on its flat top designed to secure cargo for logistical support purposes. In addition, its RWS is apparently gyrostabilised, which would enable operators to shoot while the platform is moving. The modular flat-top design allows the Vatag to be compatible with other types of armament and payloads.
The company said that Vatag is designed for missions from providing fire support during assault or defensive operations to delivering unit support in fully autonomous mode. It added that Vatag has been developed as the foundation of an H (Heavy)-UGV ecosystem. (Source: Janes)

 

29 Sep 25. Ukraine’s Zelenskiy proposes joint air shield with allies.
• Summary
• Zelenskiy suggests joint air defence with allies against Russian threats
• Ukraine to train Polish troops on drone countermeasures
• Germany cautions drone wall project will take years to complete
Ukraine has proposed building a joint air defence shield with allies to protect against threats from Russia, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskiy said on Monday, after a series of airspace incursions that caused alarm on NATO’s eastern flank.
NATO leaders have said that Russia has been testing the alliance’s readiness and resolve with airspace incursions in Poland and the Baltic states, and Kyiv says its experience in dealing with aerial threats would be valuable.
Make sense of the latest ESG trends affecting companies and governments with the Reuters Sustainable Switch newsletter. Sign up here.
“Ukraine proposes to Poland and all our partners to build a joint, fully reliable shield against Russian aerial threats,” he said in an address to the Warsaw Security Forum delivered via video link.
“This is possible. Ukraine can counter all kinds of Russian drones and missiles and if we act together in the region we will have enough weapons and production capacity.”
Ukraine has already said that its troops and engineers will train Polish counterparts on countering drones.
Romania, meanwhile, aims to partner with Ukraine to build drones under a new European Union defence funding mechanism.
Romanian Defence Minister Ionut Mosteanu told the Warsaw Security Forum that new drone fragments were found in the eastern Romanian county of Tulcea, neighbouring Ukraine, on Monday.
The topic of defence cooperation with Kyiv was high on the agenda as leaders gathered in Warsaw for the annual security forum.
German Defence Minister Boris Pistorius told the conference that “Europe’s and Ukraine’s defence industry must work together more closely and effectively”.
“The European Union must back this by providing a much more flexible regulatory framework for the defence industry in Europe.”
Following the Russian incursions into NATO airspace, countries on the alliance’s eastern flank have agreed on the need for a “drone wall” with advanced detection, tracking and interception capabilities.
Polish Defence Minister Wladyslaw Kosiniak-Kamysz said Ukrainian participation would be essential to the project.
“Polish-Ukrainian cooperation in this area already exists, but we expect… there to be cooperation between the European Union and Ukraine,” he said.
“Otherwise, we will have dangerous spaces, we will have gaps in the air, missile and anti-drone defence systems.”
However, Pistorius warned that establishing a drone wall would not be a quick process.
“We’re not talking about a concept that will be realised within the next three or four years,” he said. “We need to prioritise, and recognise that we require more capabilities and capacities than previously described.” (Source: Reuters)

 

25 Sep 25. Ukraine navy, a battle-tested force, plays enemy in NATO drone drill. Representatives from the Ukrainian navy participated in NATO’s largest unmanned maritime systems exercise this month, simulating the opposing force to test the capabilities of two dozen allied countries in scenarios inspired by frontline action. Ukraine was one of 24 countries that took part in the Portugal-led military exercise, REPMUS 2025, from Sept. 1-26, dedicated to testing hundreds of autonomous systems for naval applications.
Captain Valter de Bulha Almeida of the Portuguese Navy told reporters that Ukrainian forces took on the role of the adversarial “red team,” with scenarios shaped by what they were seeing on the battlefield in their defense against Russia.
“The question is not who is winning, I am much more interested in developing tactics – we’re learning a lot from Ukraine, I can guarantee you that, because we have to act as if the threat is real, so they are doing what they do and see on the front lines, and for us it’s very important,” he said during a Sept. 24 media briefing at the Portuguese Navy Operational Experimentation Centre (CEOM) in Tróia.
The official added that Ukrainian unmanned surface vessels participated in the exercise, but did not provide more details, citing security reasons.
A presentation of REPMUS capabilities broke down the number of unmanned assets between the two different teams: the red team was listed as having 61 drones, 57 USVs and one unmanned ground vehicle.
Images purportedly showing an upgraded variant of the Magura V7 drone boat at the CEOM port, produced by the Ukrainian state-owned company SpetsTechnoExport, or STE, were first published by the Portuguese defense blog Defence360.
When asked to confirm the craft’s presence for the exercise, an STE representative told Defense News that the company had no comment, but provided a link to a report from the Ukrainian media outlet Militarnyi detailing the naval drone’s presence in Portugal.
The deployment of Magura naval drones throughout the war has been widely documented. In 2023, at the DSEI trade show in London, the Ukrainian company shared a white paper stating that the Magura V5 was “the world’s first maritime drone with public video confirmation of hitting legitimate targets, including [Russian] warships.”
According to Militarnyi, in this configuration, the Magura V7 weighs approximately 3,400 kilograms and can cover distances of up to 1,500 kilometers.
Naval drones are becoming increasingly common in European militaries.
In 2023, the Portuguese Navy established its first squadron-sized drone unit, which officers here said was directly inspired by the situation on the Ukraine battlefield.
Dubbed X31, the group falls under the authority of the naval command and is primarily responsible for testing and operating aerial, surface, and subsea unmanned systems. It also contributes to the development and coordination of drone warfare doctrine.
Some of the systems the unit is currently trialling were present at REPMUS, including the Trator Do Mar, developed by the Portuguese Navy’s Unmanned Vehicles Operational Experimentation Cell (CEOV). The USV is designed for maritime domain awareness and sea-bed mapping, but is not yet in service. A particularity of the NATO exercise this year was that jamming trials were carried out daily between 5-6 p.m. to test the exercise drones in combat-like environments. (Source: Defense News)
—————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————–
Founded in 1987, Exensor Technology is a world leading supplier of Networked Unattended Ground Sensor (UGS) Systems providing tailored sensor solutions to customers all over the world. From our Headquarters in Lund Sweden, our centre of expertise in Network Communications at Communications Research Lab in Kalmar Sweden and our Production site outside of Basingstoke UK, we design, develop and produce latest state of the art rugged UGS solutions at the highest quality to meet the most stringent demands of our customers. Our systems are in operation and used in a wide number of Military as well as Homeland Security applications worldwide. The modular nature of the system ensures any external sensor can be integrated, providing the user with a fully meshed “silent” network capable of self-healing. Exensor Technology will continue to lead the field in UGS technology, provide our customers with excellent customer service and a bespoke package able to meet every need.

A CNIM Group Company
—————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————-

Sponsored by Bertin Exensor

www.exensor.com

———————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————
30 Sep 25. Trump: Military Will Protect Nation With Focus on Merit, Reawakened Warrior Spirit. The U.S. military, said President Donald J. Trump, is strong again, with a focus on merit and a warrior spirit.
This morning at Marine Corps Base Quantico, Virginia, hundreds of general and flag officers from around the War Department sat shoulder to shoulder in an auditorium to listen to two of the very few collection of people who still outrank them: the secretary of war and the president of the United States.
Trump spoke after Secretary of War Pete Hegseth discussed 10 new directives meant to strengthen the military, including a laser focus on standards.
The United States, Trump said, was built on merit, but the focus later shifted.
“We got away from it for a long time,” the president said. But now merit is back — within the federal government and within the War Department.
“We’re going to be greater than we ever were before,” Trump told the generals. “We’re bringing back a focus on fitness, ability, character and strength — and that’s because the purpose of American military is not to protect anyone’s feelings — it’s to protect our republic. And it’s the republic that we dearly love. It’s to protect our country. We will not be politically correct when it comes to defending American freedom, and we will be a fighting and winning machine.”
A stronger more lethal military, Trump said, comes not just from inside the armed forces with training and adherence to standards. It also requires the support of the civilian leadership above it.
“Together, we’re reawakening the warrior spirit, and this is a spirit that won and built this nation: from the cavalry that tamed the Great Plains to the ferocious, unyielding power of Patton, Bradley and the great Gen. Douglas MacArthur,” Trump said. “In this effort, we’re a team. And so, my message to you is very simple: I am with you, I support you, and as president, I have your backs 100%. You’ll never see me even waver a little bit.”
“Together over the next few years, we’re going to make our military stronger, tougher, faster, fiercer and more powerful than it has ever been before,” he continued.
A stronger military doesn’t just mean stronger troops, who are trained and who follow standards, Trump said. It also means having a military that has the best equipment with which to carry out both offensive and defensive operations, including an improved nuclear deterrent, better aircraft and more surface warfare ships and submarines.
“We’re investing tens of bns of dollars in modernizing our nuclear deterrence capabilities like never before,” the president said. “And we’ve begun construction on what we call the ‘Golden Dome’ missile defense shield. It’ll be the most sophisticated in the world.”
For the Navy, he said, more ships are on the way.
“Under my budget, we will be expanding the U.S. Navy by at least 19 ships next year, including submarines, destroyers, assault ships and more,” Trump told the officers.
“History has shown that military supremacy has never been simply a matter of money or manpower. At the end of the day it is the culture, the spirit of our military that truly sets us apart from any other nation,” he said. “Our ultimate strength will always come from the fierce people, those brilliant people with such pride and the unbending will and the traditions of excellence that have made us the most unstoppable force ever to walk the face of the earth, and that’s what we are.”
It was just over three weeks ago that the Defense Department became the War Department, a change in name the president said is more than cosmetic. Instead, he said, the return to an older name harkens back to a time when he thought the department did a lot more of the thing it should be best at: winning wars.
“We won the first world war; we won the second world war — we won everything in between and everything before that. We only won,” Trump said.
Now the department name from that era is back.
“In the coming months, we’ll be making even more historic announcements to fully embrace the identity of the Department of War,” Trump said. “I love the name. I think it’s so great. I think it stops wars. The Department of War is going to stop wars.” (Source: U.S. DoD)

 

30 Sep 25. Hegseth slams ‘fat generals,’ Trump touts cities as troop ‘training grounds.’
• Summary
• Defense chief: commanders should resign if they don’t back agenda
• Hegseth announces changes to how Pentagon handles discrimination complaints
• Trump’s remarks on US deployments spark fierce reaction from Democrats
U.S. Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth slammed “fat generals” and diversity initiatives that he said led to decades of decay in the military and told a rare gathering of commanders on Tuesday they should resign if they do not support his agenda.
Joining Hegseth was U.S. President Donald Trump, who also delivered an address to the assembled admirals and generals in Quantico, Virginia that floated the idea of using deployments to U.S. cities as “as training grounds for our military.”
The remarks by Hegseth, a former Fox News personality, and Trump, a former reality television star, had a made-for-TV element to them after top U.S. military officials were summoned on short notice last week to the impromptu event.
“Foolish and reckless political leaders set the wrong compass heading and we lost our way. We became the ‘Woke Department,'” Hegseth said as he kicked off the event. “But not anymore.”
Addressing an auditorium full of top brass who flew in from around the world, Hegseth defended his firings of flag officers, including the top U.S. general, who is Black, and the Navy’s top admiral, who is a woman. He said the officers he relieved were part of a broken culture.
He promised sweeping changes to how the Pentagon handles discrimination complaints and investigates accusations of wrongdoing. He said the current system has top brass walking on “egg shells.”
“If the words I’m speaking today are making your hearts sink, then you should do the honorable thing and resign,” Hegseth said.
“I know the overwhelming majority of you feel the opposite. These words make your hearts full.”
Hegseth said it was “completely unacceptable to see fat generals and admirals in the halls of the Pentagon.”
He said all fitness tests would be set to male benchmarks only and emphasized the importance of grooming standards.
“The era of unprofessional appearance is over. No more beardos,” Hegseth told the audience, which sat in silence.
Democrats broadly condemned the event, which they said sought to drive partisan politics deep into the U.S. military.
“It signals that partisan loyalty matters more than capability, judgment, or service to the Constitution, undermining the principle of a professional, nonpartisan military,” said Senator Jack Reed, the top Democrat on the Senate’s armed services committee.
TRUMP TELLS COMMANDERS: I HAVE YOUR BACKS
Trump, as he departed for the event from the White House, told reporters he would fire military leaders if he did not like them.
When Trump took the stage, he delivered a speech that lasted more than an hour.
“If you don’t like what I’m saying, you can leave the room,” Trump joked. “Of course, there goes your rank, there goes your future.”
He then spoke warmly of the military, in sometimes-wandering remarks that touched on issues like the prowess of U.S. nuclear submarines but also included fierce criticism of the media, former President Joe Biden and Venezuela.
Echoing Hegseth, Trump turned his attention to his opposition to diversity initiatives.
“Merit. Everything’s based on merit. .. We’re not going to have somebody taking your place for political reasons, because they are politically correct and you’re not,” Trump said.
“I am with you. I support you, and as president, I have your backs 100%,” Trump said.
The auditorium was filled with uniformed officials, seated in front of a stage with a large American flag, a lectern and boards that read: “Strength. Service. America.”
As Trump spoke, several officers sat looking expressionless, and the room was far quieter than the crowds at Trump’s usual gatherings. A naval officer took notes.
After his speech, Trump departed and there did not appear to be any one-on-one meeting with the assembled military leaders.
The U.S. military is meant to be apolitical, loyal to the U.S. Constitution and independent of any party or political movement. That creates pressure on the commanders to avoid reacting to overtly political comments, by Trump or Hegseth.
It was unclear how much the event cost. Last week, Hegseth ordered military leaders to fly in from around the world for the gathering, just ahead of a potential government shutdown.
REVAMP OF DEFENSE PRIORITIES?
The Pentagon has undergone eight months of blistering changes since Trump took office, including firings, banning books from academy libraries and ordering lethal strikes on suspected drug boats off Venezuela.
This month, Trump signed an executive order to rename the Department of Defense the “Department of War”. That change will require congressional approval.
Over the weekend, Trump announced plans to send National Guard troops to Portland, Oregon. Earlier this year, he sent Guard and active-duty Marines to Los Angeles, despite protests from local officials. He has promised to send troops to Chicago.
In his speech, Trump said he told Hegseth “we should use some of these dangerous cities as training grounds for our military.”
He acknowledged that he has been criticized for deploying the military on U.S. streets, but said America was in the grips of what he described as a war from within waged by immigrants in the country illegally who his administration is seeking to deport.
“America is under invasion from within. We’re under invasion from within, no different than a foreign enemy, but more difficult in many ways, because they don’t wear uniforms,” Trump said.
That triggered a sharp reaction from Illinois Governor JB Pritzker, a Democrat.
“Anyone who talks about their fellow Americans as enemies to be ‘taken out’ is not fit to lead the nation,” Pritzker said on X. (Source: Reuters)

 

29 Sep 25. Hegseth Announces Series of War Department Reforms in Sweeping Speech to Top Military Brass. Secretary of War Pete Hegseth today announced a series of 10 new directives aimed at strengthening the War Department’s people and culture during an in-person speech in Quantico, Virginia, to the U.S. military’s most senior leaders.
The wide-ranging, 45-minute speech before nearly every O-7 and above nonstaff military officer and senior enlisted leader from the joint force covered multiple topics, including the implementation of military equal opportunity and equal employment opportunity reform; changes to grooming and fitness standards; a review of hazing, bullying and harassment definitions; a reduction in mandatory training requirements, and others.
“Good morning, and welcome to the War Department, because the Department of Defense is over,” Hegseth said, noting the recent rebranding of the department emphasizes the military’s requirement to ensure peace by preparing for war, and that the American people deserve a military that will win any war it chooses or that’s thrust upon it.
“The topic today is about the nature of ourselves; because no plan, no program, no reform [and] no formation will ultimately succeed unless we have the right people and the right culture at the Department of War,” Hegseth told the group.
He added that, in his eight months on the job, he has learned the best way to take care of troops is to give them good leaders committed to the War Department’s warfighting culture.
“Not perfect leaders [but] good leaders; competent, qualified, professional, agile, aggressive, innovative, risk taking, apolitical [and] faithful to their oath and to the Constitution,” Hegseth emphasized.
Stating that the military has been forced to focus on the wrong things by misguided politicians for too long, Hegseth said that he’s made it his own mission to uproot the obvious distractions that have made the War Department less lethal in past years.
“The new War Department’s golden rule is this: do onto your unit as you would have done onto your own child’s unit … Standards must be uniform, gender-neutral and high. If not, they aren’t standards, they’re just suggestions,” Hegseth said.
He then began announcing some of the new directives the War Department will begin implementing, starting with changes to fitness standards.
The secretary announced that active component service members from all branches now must execute two annual fitness tests, with one being the already existing fitness test and the other being either a combat field test for combat arms personnel or a CFT or regular fitness test for non-combat arms personnel.
He also announced that active-duty service members are to perform physical fitness training every duty day, and that National Guard and reserve component members must continue to take at least one fitness test annually.
Additionally, Hegseth said that warfighters in combat-related occupations must execute their fitness test at a gender-neutral male standard with a score of 70% or higher.
“It all starts with physical fitness and appearance. If the secretary of war can do regular, hard PT, so can every member of our joint force,” Hegseth said.
Moving next to grooming standards, Hegseth announced that beards will be no longer authorized.
A memo on that topic released in conjunction with Hegseth’s speech explains that service members with facial hair-related medical exemptions will have one year to seek and execute a medical treatment plan to resolve the condition.
“Simply put, if you do not meet the male-level, physical standards for combat positions, cannot pass a PT test or don’t want to shave and look professional, it’s time for a new position or a new profession,” Hegseth said.
He next announced that the War Department will begin undertaking a full review of the definitions of “so-called ‘toxic leadership,’ bullying and hazing,” in order to re-empower leaders to enforce high standards without fear of reprisal.
“Leading warfighters toward the goals of high, gender-neutral and uncompromising standards in order to forge a cohesive, formidable and lethal Department of War is not toxic,” Hegseth said, adding that actual toxic leadership entails endangering subordinates with low standards, among other definitions.
Hegseth also announced the implementation of a military equal opportunity and equal employment opportunity reform, also intended to re-empower leaders to pursue high standards without fear of potentially unjust reprisal.
“We are attacking and ending the ‘walking on eggshells’ and zero-defect command culture. A risk-averse culture means officers execute not to lose, instead of to win,” he said, adding the same goes for risk-averse non-commissioned officers who are afraid to enforce high standards.
“We are liberating an Inspector General process — the “IG” — that has been weaponized, putting complainers, idealogues and poor performers in the driver’s seat,” Hegseth said, adding that being a racist or sexual harasser is wrong and illegal, and that punishment for such actual infractions will be “ruthlessly enforced.”
Hegseth then announced that the War Department will be making changes to the retention of adverse information on personnel that will allow leaders with forgivable, earnest or minor infractions to not be encumbered by those infractions in perpetuity.
He also said that promotions across the joint force should be based only on merit.
“We’ll promote top performing officers and send those faster [while getting] rid of poor performers more quickly. Evaluations, education and field exercises will become real,” Hegseth said.
He also announced a reduction in the high level of mandatory training that service members have to take annually.
“Less PowerPoint reviewer online courses, more time in the motor pool and more time on the [shooting] range,” he said.
The secretary told the assembled leaders that all 10 of the directives the War Department was rolling out are designed to empower them.
“These directives are designed to take the monkey off your back and put you, the leadership, back in the driver’s seat,” Hegseth told the group.
“Move out with urgency, because we have your back, I have your back and the commander in chief has your back,” he said.
Hegseth’s remarks were followed by remarks from President Donald J. Trump. (Source: U.S. DoD)

 

28 Sep 25. Hegseth Speaks at Inaugural Gold Star Advisory Council Meeting. Secretary of War Pete Hegseth today chaired the first-ever meeting of the War Department’s Gold Star Advisory Council, during which he vowed to improve the Pentagon’s overall process for interacting with Gold Star families, including the department’s Casualty Assistance Program.
Gold Star family members are the surviving relatives of U.S. service members who died in the line of duty.
Hegseth established the council — which is tasked with honoring the memories of fallen service members and ensuring their family members are never forgotten or left behind — in May with the signing of a memo.
“For far too long — especially in our generation — there was just a big gap between what ‘right’ looks like and what reality was. Whether it’s husbands or wives or fathers or mothers, the whole casualty assistance and Gold Star process was broken,” Hegseth said, adding that Gold Star families should be welcomed into the arms of a grateful nation, rather than running into bureaucracy or being unable to get the answers they need.
“Our charge here is that there’s a lot of things that are broken [and] a lot of things that need to change. … We may not have broken them, but we’re in charge now and we’re going to fix them, and we’re going to do everything we can,” Hegseth said.
The Gold Star Advisory Council will seek to elevate the voices of Gold Star family members directly to War Department leadership to “tackle real concerns and transform the casualty process for good,” Hegseth told the media earlier in the day, adding that the council has his “full backing to call out the failures, shake up the bureaucratic status quo and drive the changes that will stick.”
Co-vice chairs of the council include Anthony Tata, undersecretary of war for personnel and readiness, and Gold Star wife Jane Horton, who also serves as a senior advisor to Hegseth.
“As much as I can humanly understand — and I know I can’t understand everything that each of you have been through — I know the responsibility I have … to make sure we get this right … and to make sure that we take care of all of you and everyone that you represent,” Tata told the Gold Star family members in attendance.
“And you have my commitment in that regard,” he added.
Horton told the Gold Star family members in attendance that it was an honor to serve them and to represent their fallen service members. She also said she has confidence in Hegseth’s commitment to the council.
“I know that [Hegseth] means it when he says that we’re going to get things done and that there’s going to be action behind these words,” Horton said.
During the meeting, Hegseth was sure to credit past efforts made by those who worked in the War Department’s Gold Star program, stating that it wasn’t for a lack of caring that the program had deficiencies.
“It was just not enough concentration on forging that solution that really works and really shows the humanity to a process that is ultimately a human process,” Hegseth said.
“Hopefully we can aggregate all of that [previous hard work] with the authority of the secretary’s office and drive some of that change that maybe just couldn’t get done because it wasn’t happening at this level,” he added. (Source: U.S. DoD)

 

29 Sep 25. National Guard deployment in Portland (Oregon) sustains elevated domestic unrest risks. On 28 September, US Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth ordered 200 Oregon National Guard troops to be deployed to Portland (Oregon) under federal authority. The deployment comes after US President Donald Trump announced plans to send troops to Democrat-led Portland to protect federal immigration facilities against ‘domestic terrorists’ using ‘full force, if necessary’. It remains unclear what President Trump means by ‘full force’; this increases physical security risks at the pro-immigration and anti-National Guard demonstrations that will likely take place in the coming days. Oregon officials have filed a lawsuit to prevent the National Guard deployment, accusing the Trump administration of using excessive powers. The lawsuit claims that demonstrations at Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) facilities in Portland have been small and contained since June. Furthermore, the lawsuit states that violent crime in Portland has decreased in the first six months of 2025, with homicides falling by 51% year-on-year. We assess that following the 24 September shooting at an ICE facility in Dallas (Texas), federal-state tensions regarding immigration policy will remain elevated, driving risks of domestic unrest across major Democrat-led cities in the near term. (Source: Sibylline)

 

27 Sep 25. U.S. and UAE Conduct 9th Joint Military Dialogue. From September 25-26, senior delegations from the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and the United States (U.S.) convened in Abu Dhabi for the 9th U.S.-UAE Joint Military Dialogue (JMD). The UAE delegation was led by Assistant Under Secretary for Policy & Defense Communication His Excellency Ali Al Ahmed and the U.S. delegation was led by Assistant Secretary of War for International Security Affairs, The Honorable Daniel Zimmerman.
The JMD is the preeminent bilateral forum for advancing the U.S.-UAE defense partnership, providing an opportunity to review common security concerns, develop joint approaches, and advance shared goals in support of a more secure and prosperous UAE and broader Middle East region.
The delegations discussed a range of bilateral and regional defense issues, including integrated air and missile defense, military cooperation, foreign military sales, and emerging capabilities development. The JMD provided an opportunity for delegations to build out the newly announced partnerships between the U.S. Defense Innovation Unit (DIU) and the UAE’s Tawazun Council, as well as the UAE and the Texas National Guard under the State Partnership Program.
The United States and the UAE reaffirmed their commitment to a strong and mutually beneficial bilateral defense relationship, and to enhancing military-to-military cooperation, joint capability development, and long-term defense alignment between the two nations. As Major Defense Partners (MDP), the two sides agreed to deepen their cooperation across multiple domains to advance shared objectives, including a commitment to sign a Special Operations Forces Statement of Intent in the near future. The UAE is one of two countries that was designated by the United States as an MDP. The United States and UAE will continue to invest in this critical partnership on the basis of mutual respect, common interests, and a shared vision of peace through strength. (Source: U.S. DoD)

 

26 Sep 25. New Pentagon strategy to focus on homeland, Western Hemisphere. The Pentagon’s top national security focus will mirror that of President Donald Trump’s “America First” agenda, with multiple U.S. officials telling Military Times that the department will prioritize protecting the homeland and the Western Hemisphere. Countering China will remain a key national security interest of the new National Defense Strategy, which is expected to be released soon, officials said.
The Pentagon document lays out the military’s plans to increase lethality, deter aggression, confront adversaries and defend America’s borders, a mission one official said was “why Trump was elected.”
Republican voters in the 2024 presidential election ranked the economy and immigration as their most important issues, which Trump vowed to address and bring under control. On Jan. 20, on his first day in office, Trump signed an executive order calling on U.S. Northern Command to help “seal the borders and maintain the sovereignty, territorial integrity and security of the United States by repelling forms of invasion including unlawful mass migration, narcotics trafficking, human smuggling and trafficking and other criminal activities.”
“[Protecting] the border is the top priority for the base, and I think for moderates, too. So this shift is fulfilling that promise,” said one official, who spoke to Military Times on condition of anonymity to discuss sensitive policy information.
Defense of the American homeland has historically been the top national security priority for Republican and Democratic presidents alike.
To achieve this goal, the Pentagon has used a combination of projecting military power forward to meet threats where they are, building alliances to work together against common enemies, maintaining a strong nuclear deterrent and building a missile defense capability to protect key population centers.
After the U.S. was attacked on Sept. 11, 2001, Washington shifted to a counter-terror focus, as near-peer competitor Beijing continued to develop its military.
During the first Trump administration, the Pentagon reprioritized to focus on great-power competition with China and Russia over countering terrorism. Keeping its competitive advantage over China and Russia remained the department’s top priority under the Biden administration.
One official stressed to Military Times this week that the new NDS will not be a complete shift away from China. Instead, the official said the Pentagon can use this hyperfocus on the Western Hemisphere to better counter Chinese malign activity in Latin America, a region often thought of as “America’s backyard.”
“For too long, China, Russia and Iran have been active in Latin America, and Washington’s response has often been somewhere between nonexistent and ineffective,” said Bradley Bowman, senior director of the Center on Military and Political Power at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies.
However, analysts, including Bowman, caution that if the U.S. only brings a “military hammer” to a region that needs interagency and public-private sector support for its economic challenges, the U.S. “will lose the competition with China in Latin America and waste a lot of money and military resources.”
He also warned that defending U.S. vital interests in the Pacific, Europe and the Middle East while adopting a more robust U.S. military posture in Latin America could quickly exacerbate existing shortfalls in U.S. military capacity.
“If we take on additional military commitments and requirements and don’t provide the Pentagon commensurate additional resources, readiness will erode. We have seen that movie before, and it is not a good one,” Bowman said.
As part of the new strategy, the department will continue to focus more on drug cartels, including cartels that are tied to China, according to a U.S. official. The official added that China has drastically increased its footprint in Latin America, particularly around the Panama Canal, a critical trade route for both Washington and Beijing.
“So the strategy is still very keyed in on defending against China,” the official stressed.
Michael Shifter, an adjunct professor of Latin American studies at Georgetown University, said the Panama Canal is “clearly” important to Trump. Negotiations are underway to shift two ports there away from Chinese operations to those controlled by the U.S. company BlackRock, and Panama has withdrawn from China’s Belt and Road Initiative, which has extended Chinese investment to more than 100 nations.
With the current administration focused on the illegal drug problem in the region, Shifter hopes U.S. military assistance to Latin America will not repeat the actions of its checkered past. Washington’s war on drugs in the 1980s, along with its determination to keep communism out of the Western Hemisphere, led to policies backing militaries that terrorized local populations and committed human rights atrocities.
The last time the U.S. sent ground troops to Latin America was during the 1989 invasion of Panama to depose de facto ruler Gen. Manuel Noriega, who was wanted in the U.S. for racketeering and drug trafficking. Shifter is “very skeptical” whether the U.S. would send ground troops anywhere in Latin America today.
“I don’t see that the president wants to risk American lives anywhere, and a lot of people got killed in Panama. If he did it in Venezuela, a lot more people would get killed. I think that would be huge risk that I don’t see Trump being prepared to take,” Shifter told Military Times.
Meanwhile, Trump said Friday the U.S. military had carried out its third fatal strike against an alleged drug-smuggling vessel this month.
On Wednesday Colombia’s President Gustavo Petro told BBC News that the strikes on boats in the Caribbean Sea near the Venezuelan coast were an “act of tyranny.” The strikes, which the U.S. says are meant to stop the flow of fentanyl, have reportedly killed at least 17 people.
Shifter said actions like these make people in the region nervous while questioning the strikes’ legality.
“[The administration is] trying to say that these are terrorists, like al-Qaida was a terrorist group, but al-Qaida was a military force. These are people that are breaking the law. They’re not terrorists, per se. They’re not attacking the United States like al-Qaida was, and so the legal justification for this is, I think, questionable,” Shifter said.
(Source: Defense News)
—————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————
Founded in 1987, Exensor Technology is a world leading supplier of Networked Unattended Ground Sensor (UGS) Systems providing tailored sensor solutions to customers all over the world. From our Headquarters in Lund Sweden, our centre of expertise in Network Communications at Communications Research Lab in Kalmar Sweden and our Production site outside of Basingstoke UK, we design, develop and produce latest state of the art rugged UGS solutions at the highest quality to meet the most stringent demands of our customers. Our systems are in operation and used in a wide number of Military as well as Homeland Security applications worldwide. The modular nature of the system ensures any external sensor can be integrated, providing the user with a fully meshed “silent” network capable of self-healing. Exensor Technology will continue to lead the field in UGS technology, provide our customers with excellent customer service and a bespoke package able to meet every need.

A CNIM Group Company
—————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————

Sponsored by Bertin Exensor

 

www.exensor.com

 

—————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————-

02 Oct 25. Swiss Defence Minister Martin Pfister urged Swiss lawmakers to press on with loosening curbs on arms exports to help boost international security cooperation as he warned of potential risks facing the neutral country. The government in February proposed relaxing restrictions on arms exports to bolster its domestic industry and security ties, a sensitive move for a country that has blocked the re-export of its weapons and ammunition to Ukraine. In an interview with the Neue Zuercher Zeitung newspaper published on Thursday, the day Pfister is due to meet his German counterpart Boris Pistorius, the minister said the restrictive Swiss stance undermined “trust” with its security partners.

“That’s why it’s important for parliament to continue to push ahead with the planned revision of the war materials act: We must ensure that Switzerland is a reliable partner,” he said.

Pfister highlighted the risk of cyber attacks and drone incursions, and said there was “great need for improvement” in defence capabilities to cope with the latter. Switzerland would soon propose an appropriate system for that purpose, he added. (Source: Reuters)

——————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————-

Founded in 1987, Exensor Technology is a world leading supplier of Networked Unattended Ground Sensor (UGS) Systems providing tailored sensor solutions to customers all over the world. From our Headquarters in Lund Sweden, our centre of expertise in Network Communications at Communications Research Lab in Kalmar Sweden and our Production site outside of Basingstoke UK, we design, develop and produce latest state of the art rugged UGS solutions at the highest quality to meet the most stringent demands of our customers. Our systems are in operation and used in a wide number of Military as well as Homeland Security applications worldwide. The modular nature of the system ensures any external sensor can be integrated, providing the user with a fully meshed “silent” network capable of self-healing. Exensor Technology will continue to lead the field in UGS technology, provide our customers with excellent customer service and a bespoke package able to meet every need.

A CNIM Group Company

————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————-