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Military And Security Developments
Nov 14.
- Israel-Palestinian Territories: Rising settler violence will drive security risks, diplomatic response. On 13 November, dozens of Israeli settlers set fire to a mosque near Deir Istiya (Salfit governorate) in the West Bank. The fire was contained, causing limited damage and no injuries. The attack comes days after a large-scale arson attack on industrial and agricultural property near Beit Lid (Tulkarm governorate) on 11 November, amid a broader surge in settler violence during the ongoing olive harvest season (from October to approximately early December). We assess that the increased rate of attacks on Palestinian agricultural, industrial and residential property is likely to continue in the coming weeks, with many incidents likely going unpunished by the security forces. Consequently, a reciprocal escalation is possible, increasing physical security risks for business and NGO personnel and assets situated in or near Palestinian communities and Israeli settlements. The rising settler violence will possibly prompt Western governments to maintain or expand sanctions on Israeli entities operating in the West Bank in the coming weeks, elevating compliance and reputational risks for companies and individuals with direct or indirect exposure to West Bank supply chains and markets (see Sibylline Middle East Crisis Update – 12 November 2025).
Lebanon-Saudi Arabia: Restoration of trade ties will partially ease socio-economic pressure. On 13 November, media reported that unnamed Saudi officials had stated Saudi Arabia will imminently strengthen commercial ties with Lebanon, due to the Lebanese authorities having demonstrated efficacy in curbing drug smuggling to Saudi Arabia. The Saudi officials added that a delegation will soon visit Lebanon to discuss resolving the barriers hindering Lebanese exports. Since 2021, Saudi Arabia has banned all imports from Lebanon, citing the smuggling of captagon. However, we assess that the main reason for the planned easing of commercial ties is primarily political, after the Lebanese government’s approval in September of an unprecedented plan to disarm Lebanese Hizballah (LH) starting south of the Litani River. Despite the plan’s slow implementation and the political barriers hindering full LH disarmament, Riyadh is likely to offer Beirut several financial packages and trade deals contingent upon progress in nationwide disarmament throughout 2026. We assess that the resumption of trade with Lebanon is highly likely to ease socio-economic pressure on Beirut, driven by a likely increase in Lebanese agricultural and fresh produce exports, which are in high demand in the Saudi market.
Nov 13.
KEY DEVELOPMENTS
IRAN
- Iran is unlikely to meet nuclear commitments despite diplomatic signals, sustaining the risk of further sanctions and the prospect of military confrontation in the coming months.
- An alleged Iranian plot to assassinate the Israeli ambassador to Mexico underscores the risk of Iran-Israel tensions spilling over into the international community, elevating security and compliance risks for Israeli-affiliated entities on a global scale.
ISRAEL
- Growing radicalisation among the Arab-Israeli community and the possible spillover of terrorism from the West Bank (Palestinian Territories) will elevate the risk of attacks across Israel.
PALESTINIAN TERRITORIES
- GAZA STRIP: The return of a deceased Israeli soldier’s body by Hamas without the reciprocal release of its militants trapped in tunnels under Rafah will elevate tensions and the risk of a ceasefire collapse.
- GAZA STRIP: The reopening of the Zikim border crossing on 12 November to facilitate the passage of aid deliveries is unlikely to alleviate humanitarian risks in Gaza significantly.
- WEST BANK: Escalating Israeli settler violence underscores the elevated ethno-religious tensions across the West Bank, as well as the increased security and compliance risks facing proximate entities.
- PALESTINIAN TERRITORIES: Palestinian Authority (PA) President Mahmoud Abbas’ dismissal of the PA’s finance minister highlights the ongoing governance risks in the West Bank and the possibility of financial restrictions being imposed against the PA.
IRAN
- Iran is unlikely to meet nuclear commitments despite diplomatic signals, sustaining the risk of further sanctions and the prospect of military confrontation in the coming months. On 11 November, Iranian Deputy Foreign Minister Saeed Khatibzadeh stated that his country seeks a peaceful nuclear agreement with the US that does not compromise its national security. The comments came a day after Iranian state media announced that International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspectors had visited the country the previous week. The announcement likely aimed to underscore Iran’s commitment to its obligations under the NPT (Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons). The timing of the statement and inspections likely reflects Iranian efforts to ease diplomatic tensions with Israel and the West, especially as domestic socio-economic pressures threaten regime stability (they also come as Iran looks to rebuild its military capacity following the Iran-Israel war in June). However, we assess that such an agreement remains highly unlikely in the coming weeks; Iranian references to its ‘national security’ likely indicate that Tehran remains unwilling to concede to US demands for Iran to halt its domestic uranium enrichment activity. Stasis on this issue will drive the risk of a diplomatic breakdown in the coming months, particularly if the IAEA experiences no tangible improvement in Iranian co-operation (such as inspectors being granted access to declared and suspected enrichment sites and the resumption of real-time surveillance). This would most likely result in further sanctions being imposed on Iran’s energy, shipping and banking sectors, but would also raise the possibility of targeted strikes against Iranian nuclear facilities. The possibility of such strikes is consistent with recent reports quoting an Israeli official as stating that Israel aims to topple the Iranian regime by the end of the current US administration’s term in 2029.
- An alleged Iranian plot to assassinate the Israeli ambassador to Mexico underscores the risk of Iran-Israel tensions spilling over into the international community, elevating security and compliance risks for Israeli-affiliated entities on a global scale. On 7 November, US officials disclosed information about an Iranian plot to assassinate Israel’s ambassador to Mexico, Einat Kranz-Neiger. The plot was reportedly ‘active’ during the first half of 2025. The operation was allegedly orchestrated by Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and involved recruiting operatives through Iran’s embassy in Venezuela. US officials stated that the plot had been contained and that there is currently no threat. Tehran has denied the accusations, calling them an attempt to undermine Iran’s relations with friendly states. Mexico’s foreign ministry claimed that it had received no information regarding the alleged plot despite allegations by Israeli officials that the Mexican security services had neutralised the network. Whether it is substantiated or not, media coverage of the alleged plot highlights the global spillover risks stemming from Iran-Israel tensions, as well as the persistent risk of grey-zone activity being waged between the two states. Israeli and Israeli-affiliated assets and individuals remain at an elevated risk of being affected by such operations, globally. Further such incidents will also increase the likelihood of retaliatory grey-zone incursions against Iranian targets abroad, including through cyber attacks. Continued tit-for-tat escalation will heighten security risks for affiliated personnel, including private companies’ staff, NGO workers and diplomats. There is a low-level possibility that sustained escalation in Iran’s asymmetric strategy will prompt Israeli retaliation against Iranian proxy networks in Iraq, Lebanon and Syria, increasing the risk of miscalculation and threatening conflict escalation. Intensified Iranian covert activity will possibly drive Israel’s Western allies to target the IRGC and associated entities with broader sanctions, in turn elevating regulatory and compliance risks for exposed businesses.
ISRAEL
- Growing radicalisation among the Arab-Israeli community and the possible spillover of terrorism from the West Bank (Palestinian Territories) will elevate the risk of attacks across Israel. On 12 November, the State Attorney’s Office filed an indictment against two brothers (aged 18 and 21) from the Arab-Israeli town of Tira (Central district, Israel) for producing IEDs. According to the indictment, the two brothers produced ten pipe bombs (the security forces also found an additional eight bombs in a barn near their home during the arrest operation). Additionally, on 12 November, the State Attorney’s Office filed a separate indictment against an 18-year-old man from the Arab-Israeli town of Tayibe (Central) for planning an Islamic State (IS)-inspired attack against Jewish people. The suspect downloaded guides on how to produce weapons, including IEDs; the security forces also found four pistols and ammunition in the suspect’s home. The indictments highlight growing radicalisation among the Arab-Israeli community, particularly its younger demographics. They will compound existing terror risks driven by the ongoing threat of cross-border attacks and militant operations spilling from the West Bank into Israel. Currently, the Israeli security agencies broadly remain able to foil developing plots, mitigating against the risk of complex or sophisticated attacks. However, growing radicalisation threatens to stretch Israel’s security resources, increasing the risk of terror attacks in Israeli cities in the coming months – particularly in the event of a ceasefire collapse in the Gaza Strip (Palestinian Territories).
PALESTINIAN TERRITORIES
- GAZA STRIP: The return of a deceased Israeli soldier’s body by Hamas without the reciprocal release of its militants trapped in tunnels under Rafah will elevate tensions and the risk of a ceasefire collapse. On 9 November, Hamas returned the body of Lieutenant Hadar Goldin (who was killed in 2014) to Israel. This comes amid efforts by Hamas to secure safe passage for approximately 200 of its operatives trapped in tunnels under the Israeli-controlled ‘yellow zone’ in Rafah. On 4 November, the Israel Defense Forces’ (IDF’s) Chief of General Staff, Eyal Zamir, stated that he was willing to consider granting the operatives’ safe passage in return for Goldin’s body. However, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu later claimed that he gave no such promise. At the time of writing, the Hamas operatives remain trapped in the tunnels. It is likely that Israel will seek to continue using these operatives as a bargaining chip, while also demanding their surrender and arrest. However, it is unlikely that the operatives will surrender, increasing the risk of further clashes between IDF personnel and Hamas operatives trying to escape the tunnels (see Sibylline Middle East Crisis Update – 5 November 2025). Such clashes and possible allegations that Israel reneged on previous promises to grant safe passage will elevate the risk of an (at least temporary) ceasefire breakdown in the coming weeks.
- GAZA STRIP: The reopening of the Zikim border crossing on 12 November to facilitate the passage of aid deliveries is unlikely to alleviate humanitarian risks in Gaza significantly. Aid deliveries will undergo security checks by the Land Crossing Authority of the Israeli defence ministry before they cross into Gaza; this is likely to cause bottlenecks and delays. Furthermore, Israel retains limits on certain items being delivered into the strip, such as syringes. Together with the persistent looting of aid convoys by militants, NGOs and other aid organisations operating within Gaza will likely continue to suffer from severe shortages of key goods. This will undermine their capacity to meet heightened demands for their services, driving threats to local staff and exacerbating public health risks across the strip in the coming months.
- WEST BANK: Escalating Israeli settler violence underscores the elevated ethno-religious tensions across the West Bank, as well as the increased security and compliance risks facing proximate entities. On 11 November, dozens of Israeli settlers launched a large-scale arson attack on Palestinians in Beit Lid (Tulkarm governorate) and Deir Sharaf (Nablus governorate). The rioters vandalised and set fire to Palestinian properties, including the al-Junaidi milk factory and agricultural and residential property belonging to the Bedouin community. The settlers also attacked soldiers and an IDF military vehicle. While the IDF detained six suspects, four others escaped before the Israeli police arrived. Israeli President Isaac Herzog condemned the violence, attributing it to a handful of ‘dangerous’ individuals. The arrests represent an uncommon instance of the Israeli authorities taking enforcement action in response to settler-related violence in the West Bank (which has increased in frequency in recent weeks). These recent surges in ethno-religious violence in the West Bank are likely driven by rising radicalisation – particularly among younger demographics – and escalating cyclical hostilities. In the coming days, further unrest is likely across Nablus and Tulkarm, sustaining elevated physical security risks for nearby personnel and assets, as well as incidental threats in the vicinity of Muslim and Jewish religious sites. Escalating global tensions over Israel’s settlement policy and rising levels of settler violence are likely to prompt Western governments to maintain or expand sanctions against Israeli entities operating in the West Bank, including businesses involved in the construction and utilities sectors (and individuals linked to right-wing organisations). Such measures are liable to heighten compliance and reputational risks for companies and individuals with direct and indirect exposure to West Bank supply chains and markets.
- PALESTINIAN TERRITORIES: Palestinian Authority (PA) President Mahmoud Abbas’ dismissal of the PA’s finance minister highlights the ongoing governance risks in the West Bank and the possibility of financial restrictions being imposed against the PA. On 10 November, Abbas dismissed PA Finance Minister Omar al-Bitar, reportedly for authorising welfare payments to Palestinians in Israeli prisons through the Palestinian Martyrs Fund (a programme often referred to as ‘pay-for-slay’). Abbas had previously issued a decree on 10 February cancelling the programme in an effort to improve diplomatic relations with the US amid threats of reduced international financial support (see Sibylline Middle East Crisis Update – 13 February 2025). The decision follows claims by Israeli Foreign Minister Gideon Sa’ar on 27 October that Palestinian prisoners, including those released under the Gaza ceasefire deal, continue to receive payments under the outdated policy. The move likely aims to demonstrate the PA’s apparent determination to comply with international demands and to strengthen its credibility as a political representative for both Gaza and the West Bank during Palestinian reconstruction efforts. However, it also underscores ongoing supervision and governance risks within the West Bank, including risks related to corruption and weak regulatory oversight. Furthermore, it exposes the PA to renewed accusations of terror financing, which will possibly prompt Israel to withhold financial transfers to the PA; we assess that any such move would exacerbate socio-economic health and security risks across the West Bank in the short term.
RED SEA
- The Iranian-backed Houthis’ letter to Hamas has confirmed that a halt in military operations is due to the Israel-Hamas ceasefire; it also underscores that a ceasefire collapse would act as a key trigger for a resumption in attacks. On 11 November, Hamas published a letter from the Iranian-backed Houthis in which the latter indicate that they are ready to resume military activities against Israel if it ‘renews its aggression against Gaza’. The letter confirms our previous assessment that the Houthis paused their attacks against Israel and Red Sea shipping in response to the Israel-Hamas ceasefire (see Sibylline Situation Update Brief – 29 October 2025). Furthermore, the letter also confirms the possible resumption of Houthi attacks in retaliation for Israeli military operations in Gaza. As such, we continue to assess that the risk of sporadic Houthi attacks against Israel and/or Israeli-affiliated vessels in the Red Sea will increase following Israeli strikes against Gaza. Furthermore, a full resumption of the Houthis’ campaign against Israel is highly likely in the event of a complete ceasefire collapse. Even so, we continue to assess that even if the Houthis were to relaunch such a campaign, it would be unlikely to increase security risks across Israel significantly (though it would drive moderate business disruption risks due to staff having to observe warning sirens/evacuation orders.
REGIONAL AND GLOBAL DEVELOPMENTS
- Israel-Lebanon: The uptick in Israeli strikes on Lebanese Hizballah (LH)’s assets in southern Lebanon will likely continue into 2026. On 6 November, the IDF conducted a series of major strikes against LH facilities in several locations across southern Lebanon, including the towns of Ayta al-Jabal and Taybeh (both Nabatieh governorate), as well as Tayr Debba (South governorate – see Sibylline Alert – 6 November 2025). The IDF stated that it primarily targeted assets belonging to LH’s elite Radwan Force. The strikes follow a prolonged impasse in the Lebanese armed forces’ efforts to disarm LH, as the Lebanese government remains relatively reluctant to risk a military confrontation with LH. As such, it is likely that the escalation in the frequency of Israeli airstrikes on LH personnel in southern Lebanon since mid-October is designed to pressure the Lebanese authorities into pursuing LH’s disarmament more proactively. We assess that the Lebanese government is unlikely to secure LH’s disarmament in the coming months. As such, strikes are likely to increase in scope and frequency throughout the remainder of 2025 and into early 2026; limited ground operations along the Israel-Lebanon border are also possible. While we assess that LH is unlikely to respond to the IDF strikes in the coming weeks, a ceasefire collapse is possible in the event of major IDF strikes against LH strongholds in Beirut (Lebanon), as well as central areas north of the Litani River, such as Sidon (South governorate), Baalbek-Hermel and/or Beqaa governorates. Large-scale Israeli ground incursions into southern Lebanon and/or from Syria’s Mount Hermon area (Quneitra governorate, Syria) would also likely prompt renewed armed conflict. However, we assess that this scenario is currently unlikely. Furthermore, while large-scale IDF strikes on LH assets in Beirut are unlikely in the coming weeks, with the IDF primarily targeting LH operatives, assets, weapons depots and tunnels in southern Lebanon, a limited strike against the Lebanese capital remains possible. Any such pinpoint strike is highly likely to be conducted against a single target in the Dahieh suburb, and will likely be preceded by an evacuation warning to minimise collateral damage.
- Iraq: Absence of definitive majority win will increase political instability during next two months. On 12 November, Iraq’s Independent High Electoral Commission announced that the Reconstruction and Development Coalition (RDC), led by the incumbent Prime Minister Mohammed Shia al-Sudani, came first in Iraq’s parliamentary elections. However, the RDC did not achieve a majority that would allow it to form a government on its own. As such, the RDC will need to forge alliances with several Sunni, Shia and Kurdish parties to form an administration, increasing policy risks and political instability during at least the next two months (see Sibylline Situation Update Brief – 4 November 2025). Any government led by al-Sudani or other RDC figures will likely seek to balance between the US and Iran’s interests in Iraq throughout 2026. However, the RDC includes figures that President Donald Trump’s administration is unlikely to approve of, such as the head of the Iran-backed Popular Mobilisation Forces (PMF), who is sanctioned by the US. This will sustain the risks of US sanctions against the new government or public companies tied to Iran’s proxies in 2026, particularly in the logistics, finance and transport sectors.
- Iran: Official misconduct investigation into self-immolation will elevate anti-government sentiment. On 12 November, the mayor of Ahvaz (Khuzestan province) resigned and several officials were dismissed following the death of a man who set himself on fire the previous week in protest against the local authorities closing his family’s food stand. Iran’s interior ministry has launched an investigation into the conduct of the officials, amid public outcry at allegations that some encouraged his actions. The backlash underscores the elevated levels of anti-government sentiment at government corruption and misconduct, compounded by the cost-of-living crisis and the lingering impact of the Iran-Israel conflict earlier this year. Deteriorating socio-economic health risks will likely compound this trend and further undermine the regime’s legitimacy in the coming weeks. Worsening water shortages will deepen food insecurity and increase the spread of infectious diseases (see Sibylline Situation Update Brief – 8 August 2025), possibly triggering sporadic anti-government protests. The authorities will almost certainly respond to unrest with force, raising security risks for personnel in proximity to large crowds in towns and cities, increasing the likelihood of additional Western sanctions.
Nov 11.
* Egypt: Pro-government victory is highly likely to facilitate removal of presidential term limits. On 10-11 November, Egypt will hold the first phase of its parliamentary elections across 14 governorates. The second phase will take place across the remaining 13 governorates on 21-22 November; the final results are due by mid-December. The first day of voting recorded a significantly low turnout, which we assess will almost certainly continue through the second day. Media outlets have also reported instances of paid and coerced voting nationwide, underscoring the persistent corruption and the risk of harassment facing local staff. Given the authorities’ tight control of the election process and the lack of free speech, we assess that pro-government parties will almost certainly win at least 95% of the seats, including the newly formed National Front (NF). As such, the new parliament is highly likely to propose constitutional amendments by mid-2026, which will abolish the term limits for the presidency. This will allow the incumbent president, Abdelfattah al-Sisi, to run in the 2030 elections. Nevertheless, major reactionary anti-government protests and domestic unrest remain unlikely.
*Syria-US: Extended sanctions freeze will support investment, though long-term concerns will persist. On 10 November, the US Treasury extended its suspension of sanctions against Syria (imposed under the Caesar Act) for 180 days following a White House meeting between Syrian President Ahmed al-Sharaa and US President Donald Trump. Syria also entered a co-operation agreement (likely intelligence-based) in a bid to defeat Islamic State (IS), while the US reaffirmed its support for a Syria-Israel security agreement. The extension will likely continue to ease trade and investment restrictions, while also supporting gradual economic recovery, improving the delivery of humanitarian aid and ultimately moderating long-term socio-economic health risks in Syria. However, a full repeal by the US Congress remains unlikely in the short term (due to concerns over al-Sharaa’s jihadist past), especially in the run-up to the upcoming US midterm election cycle. We assess this will sustain investor uncertainty in the medium term. Meanwhile, co-operation against IS will likely involve a formalised, expanded intelligence partnership rather than a direct military pact, moderating Turkish security concerns and reducing regional conflict risks. A security agreement between Syria and Israel remains possible in the coming months, easing security risks in Syria’s south-western governorates.
Nov 10.
- Iraq: Parliamentary elections will elevate widespread security risks, business, transport disruption. On 11 November, Iraq will hold parliamentary elections. The security forces started voting earlier on 10 November to facilitate deployment on polling day, highlighting the increased security risks surrounding the vote. The elections come amid widespread voter apathy in a sectarian-dominated political system, where incumbent Prime Minister Mohammed Shia’ al-Sudani’s coalition will likely emerge as the frontrunner (see Sibylline Situation Update Brief – 4 November 2025). Over the next 24 to 48 hours, we assess that sporadic incidents of political violence and ethno-religious attacks will possibly occur near polling stations and government buildings in the capital Baghdad and Basra, Dhi Qar and Maysan governorates; intercommunal clashes will possibly break out in Diyala, Kirkuk, Nineveh and Saladin governorates. Crossfire and misidentification during clashes, as well as direct exposure during attacks, will elevate security risks for nearby personnel. The heightened security measures will likely persist through 11 November and possibly in subsequent days; the restrictions on heavy truck and motorcycle movements near polling stations will disrupt local transport and supply chains. Furthermore, election day will be a national holiday, with most public services remaining closed, driving business disruptions for locally engaged firms.
- Tunisia: Hunger strikes underscore persistent political unrest, sustaining risk of further protests. On 8 November, several prominent Tunisian opposition figures announced that they would join a collective hunger strike in solidarity with jailed politician Jawhar Ben Mbarek, whose hunger strike protesting his detention has reached its ninth day. Issam Chebbi, the imprisoned leader of the centrist Al-Joumhouri party, is among the politicians joining the strike; he was convicted in the same mass trial as Ben Mbarek earlier this year. The developments underscore the significant political tensions in Tunisia, with tens of other imprisoned political dissidents in the country possibly joining the strike in the coming weeks. Nevertheless, we assess that the Tunisian president is unlikely to reduce the frequency and scope of his crackdown on dissidents, triggering further anti-government protests in the capital Tunis throughout the remainder of 2025. The deteriorating economic conditions will likely drive participation in protest action by groups such as public sector workers and unions. This will increase turnout, raising the risk of exposure to clashes with the police and tear gas, while increasing disruption to public services and logistics networks. (Source: Sibylline)
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