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Military And Security Developments
Jan 21. Yemen
Key points
- The status of the Southern Transitional Council (STC) remains disputed after elements of the group announced its dissolution.
- Meanwhile, the internationally recognised government (IRG) aims to consolidate all southern militant factions (including former STC factions) into a new Supreme Military Committee (SMC).
- Splintering within the STC will possibly complicate immediate efforts to stabilise the south, with several UAE-backed groups unlikely to integrate into the new SMC; however, we assess that many likely will.
- As such, the overall internal security environment in the south will likely stabilise unevenly in the coming weeks.
- In turn, the SMC will likely reposition itself for an offensive against Houthi positions in the coming 12 months, increasing security risks across the country’s north-west.
Context
On 9 January, an STC delegation in Riyadh (Saudi Arabia) announced the group’s dissolution after forces of the Saudi-backed internationally recognised government (IRG) recaptured southern and eastern areas of Yemen. The STC seized these areas during its failed December 2025 offensive. However, the STC’s official spokesperson rejected the announcement, stating that only the full council and its president, Aidarus al-Zoubaidi, could issue such a decision following the delegation’s ‘release’ from Saudi Arabia. As such, the status of the STC remains disputed. Furthermore, al-Zoubaidi’s whereabouts are unknown after he fled Aden (Aden governorate) early on 7 January for Somaliland, possibly travelling onward to Abu Dhabi (UAE). Saudi Arabia welcomed the supposed dissolution of the STC and stated it would host a conference on southern Yemeni issues (with all groups invited). By contrast, thousands of Yemenis protested on 10 January in support of the STC in Aden, chanting anti-Saudi slogans and criticising the IRG.
Local media reports indicate that the Southern Giants Brigade militia and other IRG-aligned forces have secured Aden, and that violence across the south has eased in the past week. Additionally, Presidential Leadership Council (PLC) Chairman Rashad al-Alimi has launched efforts to bolster the state’s control of military resources across areas of Yemen outside Houthi dominance. He stated his intention to consolidate weapons under state control and announced the formation of the SMC, a framework that aims to unify and prepare military forces ahead of the next phase of the conflict (if the Houthis reject peaceful solutions).
Forecast
Short-term splintering within the STC will possibly complicate immediate efforts to stabilise the south, with several UAE-backed groups unlikely to integrate into the new SMC
Splintering within the STC is likely in the coming weeks; the group’s dissolution remains disputed and factions loyal to Aidarus al-Zoubaidi are trying to reassert control over the entity and its former assets. Core STC-aligned militias, including the Security Belt Forces, Hadrami Elite Forces and Shabwani Elite Forces, will possibly seek to consolidate their now-siloed command structures in the absence of clear central leadership. In the short term, several will possibly try to re-establish control over positions previously conceded to the Southern Giants Brigades, particularly in Aden and Lahij governorates. This would increase the exposure of local staff to sporadic and sudden bouts of crossfire and also possible instances of misidentification.
As demonstrated by the Southern Giants Brigade’s operation to consolidate STC positions, many groups will likely opt to align with the IRG and willingly dissolve or integrate into the new SMC under the leadership of al-Alimi and the PLC. The Southern Giants Brigade is a militia that was formerly aligned with the STC. However, smaller militia groups with strong secessionist positions (and which were formerly backed by the UAE) will possibly resist integration, increasing the risk of fragmentation. This would complicate short-term efforts to stabilise southern Yemen and consolidate military capabilities aimed at renewed operations against the Houthis in the north-west. While this is unlikely to impact force consolidation and re-posturing significantly, it would possibly delay integration and redeployment, especially if the UAE sustains selective support for STC holdouts.
The security environment in the south will likely stabilise unevenly in the coming weeks as IRG-aligned forces consolidate control
In the absence of significant UAE backing for former STC-aligned groups, the IRG and its allied militias will likely establish a broadly stable force posture in Yemen’s southern governorates under the SMC framework. The SMC will also likely position itself as the primary security force in the south, improving its command-and-control (C2) capabilities to establish coercive control over the region’s various militia groups. As such, the internal security environment in the south is likely to improve moderately, possibly reducing smuggling activity in the short term, as well as organised and violent crime. Yet sporadic secessionist and pro-STC protests will likely continue in the coming weeks, especially in Aden, sustaining an elevated risk of domestic unrest.
Jan 20.
- Syria: Ethno-religious violence, sporadic clashes are likely despite new ceasefire deal. On 20 January, the Syrian government announced a ceasefire with the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), following days of wide clashes in western Euphrates region. The government has given Kurdish-led organisations a four-day deadline to agree on full integration into state institutions. Notably, the SDF has lost most of its territory; ethnic-Kurdish militias have now withdrawn to Al-Hasakah governorate (the last SDF stronghold). This retreat follows government forces and allied ethnic-Arab tribal militias’ seizure of control over Deir ez-Zor and Raqqa governorates, after their rapid advancement across multiple fronts. We assess that the SDF leadership’s control over Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) and People’s Defence Units (YPG) elements is likely faltering. This will increase the risk of sporadic clashes between the government and tribal forces along the current lines of control in the coming hours, despite the ceasefire. These risks will be particularly high in Al-Hasakah. Furthermore, there is a realistic possibility of retaliatory attacks by Kurdish-led militias against ethnic-Arab residents in Al-Hasakah, increasing the risk of wide domestic unrest and ethno-religious violence.
- Iraq-Iran: Kurdish militant group claims Iran struck headquarters in Iraq; diplomatic tensions are likely. Earlier on 21 January, the ethnic-Kurdish Iranian separatist militant group Kurdistan Freedom Party (PAK) accused Iran of launching a ballistic missile and drone attack on its headquarters in Erbil (Iraq) overnight. Although unconfirmed, Iran has previously carried out similar strikes on PAK positions in Iraq, often in retaliation against groups allegedly supporting anti-government protests. If confirmed, Iraq’s federal government and Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) are likely to pursue legal measures against Tehran, possibly by filing a complaint with the UN Security Council (UNSC). This would likely escalate diplomatic tensions between Iraq and Iran and pave the way for further international sanctions against Iran, thereby elevating compliance and regulatory risks for businesses operating in the region. Any cross-border military action by Iran will likely undermine confidence in Iraq’s capacity to protect business assets, moderating international investment and driving some businesses to re-evaluate operations. This will especially impact the energy and logistics sectors within Kurdistan region (Iraq).
- Syria: Clashes with Kurdish-led forces increase risk of total ceasefire collapse. On 19 January, clashes between the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) and the Syrian government resumed on multiple fronts in Al-Hasakah and Raqqa governorates despite the ceasefire agreement. The clashes erupted hours after reports that talks between the SDF leader and the Syrian president had collapsed. The SDF have claimed that Turkish drones carried out airstrikes against the group in Al-Hasakah; they have also accused the Syrian government forces of attacking a prison holding thousands of Islamic State (IS) detainees. Currently, Syria’s government forces are advancing towards Al-Hasakah, which will increase the risk of wider armed conflict. As the situation is increasingly unstable, we assess that there is a realistic possibility of a total ceasefire collapse in the coming hours. Any prolonged conflict with ethnic-Kurdish organisations will increase the risk of the US re-imposing sanctions on Syria. Should Al-Hasakah surrender to government forces, the SDF will likely collapse, prompting thousands of fighters to flee to Iraq’s Kurdistan region. However, we assess that the risks of Kurdish-led insurgency and retaliatory attacks against Damascus will remain elevated throughout 2026, even if the government establishes control of Al-Hasakah.
- Israel: Further ultra-Orthodox protests are likely in coming hours, driving localised security risks. On 19 January, hundreds of ultra-Orthodox protesters clashed with the police in Jerusalem and Beit Shemesh (both Jerusalem district) over the authorities’ plan to perform autopsies on the bodies of two babies found earlier that day at an unlicensed daycare centre. We assess that further protests are highly likely later on 20 January, particularly in ultra-Orthodox population centres, including Beit Shemesh, Bnei Brak (Tel Aviv district) and Jerusalem. There is a realistic possibility that protesters will block major transit routes and burn tyres and waste bins, especially at intersections on Highways 1 and 4 near Bnei Brak and Jerusalem. This will increase localised disruption to overland movement and supply chain risks, while also exacerbating respiratory health conditions. Further clashes between protesters and the security forces are likely, including the use of water cannons (including ‘skunk’ water), stun grenades and batons, elevating security risks to nearby personnel. Demonstrators will possibly also damage nearby vehicles and buildings, elevating financial and operational risks for local businesses.
Jan 19.
- Iraq-US: US withdrawal from Iraqi federal territory will heighten IS resurgence risks in coming months. On 18 January, Iraq’s government announced the full withdrawal of US military forces from facilities under its federal control, excluding the semi-autonomous Kurdistan Region (KRI), after Iraq assumed full control of Al-Asad Airbase in Al Anbar governorate. The withdrawal will almost certainly reduce Iraqi-US co-operation on security and military operations, including intelligence sharing and counter-terrorism activities. As such, there is a heightened risk of an Islamic State (IS) resurgence in the coming months, especially in rural areas where Baghdad’s oversight is limited. The Iraqi security forces are unlikely to sustain the same level of pressure on extremist networks, increasing the risk of localised attacks and associated personnel security risks. Additionally, the Popular Mobilisation Forces (PMF) will possibly consolidate power, as the withdrawal of a US military presence will enable PMF factions to fill security gaps, raising the likelihood of clashes between PMF units and the Iraqi security forces. In the long term, the US will possibly also reduce its political and economic engagement, increasing Iraq’s exposure to sanctions risks and restrictions on oil sales, while further discouraging foreign direct investment (FDI).
- Syria: Ceasefire between government, Kurdish forces will remain highly fragile in coming days. On 18 January, under a US-backed agreement the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) agreed to implement a ceasefire and cede control of Deir ez-Zor and Raqqa governorates to the Syrian government. This came following rapid advances by the government forces towards the Kurdish territories east of the Euphrates River in the past 72 hours, alongside an anti-SDF uprising by the pro-government Arab tribal forces in Deir ez-Zor and Raqqa. The agreement also stipulates the merging of the Kurdish forces into the country’s army and the expulsion of Kurdistan Workers Party’s (PKK) elements. As part of the agreement, government forces will also be deployed to the last SDF strongholds in Aleppo and Al-Hasakah governorates in the coming weeks. However, the ceasefire will remain highly fragile in the coming days, as there is a realistic possibility that radical Kurdish groups within the SDF and the PKK will not abide by the agreement. This will elevate the risks of retaliatory attacks and sporadic clashes with the pro-government forces, particularly in Al-Hasakah and Raqqa. (Source: Sibylline)
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