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Military And Security Developments
Jan 16.
- Iraq: New PM unlikely to revoke previous government’s deals, though policy risks remain elevated. On 15 January, Nouri al-Maliki, leader of the State of Law Coalition (SLC), stated that he will revoke recent decisions issued by the caretaker Prime Minister Mohammed Shia al-Sudani if he assumes office. Al-Maliki is highly likely to lead the next Iraqi government. Al-Maliki added that these decisions include public sector regulations as well as tax and customs fees measures. We assess that al-Maliki’s statement likely refers to the recent government session where it approved technical measures regulating the public sector. As such, we assess that it is highly unlikely that al-Maliki will revoke government decisions taken before the November elections, particularly those relating to any major investments or oil deals with foreign companies and/or Iraqi Kurdistan. Nevertheless, the selection of al-Maliki as PM by the Shia coalition will raise policy and compliance risks in 2026. Furthermore, his pro-Iran stance will elevate the risk of new US sanctions against the country, possibly impacting banking and logistics operations due to the influence of Iran’s proxies in these sectors.
- Iran-US: Sanctions will likely drive financial, operational risks for businesses with assets in Iran. On 15 January, the US Department of the Treasury sanctioned several senior Iranian security officials and ‘shadow banking’ networks over Tehran’s crackdown on anti-government protesters in recent weeks. The EU has indicated that it is also considering further sanctions on Iran. Such measures will increase legal, financial and operational risks for businesses with assets in Iran and in adjacent supply chains, especially in the petroleum and petrochemical industries. Furthermore, sanctions will heighten compliance and regulatory risks across several sectors, including energy, logistics and shipping companies operating in the region. Additional sanctions from G7 countries (including France and the UK) remain likely and will possibly further impact Iranian exports, including crude oil, natural gas and some agricultural products. While the US’ imposition of sanctions possibly signals a move away from immediate kinetic action against Iran, the risk of military intervention will remain elevated over the coming weeks given the US’ repositioning of its USS Abraham Lincoln (CVN-72) aircraft carrier strike group to the US Central Command (CENTCOM) area of responsibility (which covers the Middle East).
Jan 15.
• Palestinian Territories: Ceasefire will remain fragile despite announcement of peace plan’s Phase 2. On 14 January, US Special Envoy to the Middle East Steve Witkoff announced the launch of Phase 2 of the Gaza ceasefire, which entails the formation of a Palestinian-led authority to govern the enclave and the full disarmament of all armed factions. The transitional government will operate under the supervision of the Board of Peace (BoP) and will be headed by Ali Shaath, a former deputy planning minister in the Palestinian Authority (PA). Despite the announcement, Phase 2’s timeline and implementation remain highly vague. The International Stabilization Force (ISF)’s composition – which is a key part of the peace plan – has yet to be agreed. Consequently, we assess that Phase 2’s implementation will likely be delayed until at least the second quarter of 2026. This will possibly further postpone Israel’s withdrawal from the ‘yellow line’ in Gaza. Furthermore, a full disarmament of Hamas and its allied factions in Gaza remains unlikely. This will constitute a major challenge to the peace plan’s implementation and will increase the risk of a ceasefire collapse in the coming months.
• Iran-US: Risk of US intervention in coming weeks remains elevated amid strike group re-positioning. On 14 January, US President Donald Trump stated that Tehran has told him that the ‘killing has stopped’ and that no executions will take place, following weeks of anti-government protests. This move is possibly aimed at easing immediate bilateral tensions. However, the US has not ruled out military action; it is moving its USS Abraham Lincoln (CVN-72) aircraft carrier strike group to the US Central Command (CENTCOM) area of responsibility (which covers the Middle East). Current statements suggest that the risk of immediate military intervention has moderately decreased. Nevertheless, we assess that the group’s re-positioning underscores that the likelihood of intervention will remain elevated in the coming weeks. Also on 14 January, the UK evacuated staff from its embassy in Iran’s capital Tehran, highlighting the reduced access to consular support for personnel. Iran’s airspace closed overnight on 14-15 January but has now reopened; further airspace closures will reduce access to commercially available evacuation routes and drive disruption to overland transport due to congestion. Several airlines including Lufthansa have confirmed that they will avoid Iranian and Iraqi airspace until further notice, likely increasing transit costs for associated businesses.
Jan 14.
KEY DEVELOPMENTS
IRAN
• Protests unrest has gripped Iran in recent days, though protests are unlikely to undermine government stability critically in the short term.
• US President Donald Trump has repeatedly threatened to engage in ‘action’ targeting Iran amid the escalating crackdown on protests, increasing the risk of retaliation and a regional fallout.
ISRAEL
• ISRAEL-GAZA: US Special Envoy to the Middle East Steve Witkoff announced the launch of Phase 2 of the Gaza ceasefire, though its full implementation is likely to be delayed.
PALESTINIAN TERRITORIES
• GAZA STRIP: The discovery of rocket launchers in the north and south of Gaza by IDF troops highlights the likely prevalence of hidden weapons caches and the long-term threat of Hamas’ rearmament.
• GAZA STRIP: Armed clashes between Hamas militants and IDF troops will elevate the risk of further Israeli airstrikes.
• WEST BANK: The IDF reported that Israeli settler violence substantially increased in 2025; this will likely trigger broader scrutiny of Israeli-linked entities with operations in the West Bank.
IRAN
• Nationwide unrest has gripped Iran in recent days, though protests are unlikely to undermine government stability critically in the short term. Since anti-government demonstrations emerged in the capital Tehran on 27 December 2025, protests and unrest have continued to escalate throughout the country. Bouts of significant unrest have emerged in major cities, including Isfahan (Isfahan province), Mashhad (Razavi Khorasan province), Qom (Qom province), Tabriz (East Azerbaijan province) and Tehran. Protests have primarily taken place during the night, with demonstrators repeatedly clashing with the security forces, blocking major thoroughfares and attacking installations associated with the Iranian government and Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC). During working hours, local reports indicate that numerous merchant associations have engaged in rolling strike action, restricting access to retail outlets and disrupting operational continuity. On 8 January, the Iranian authorities instituted an internet blackout and significantly restricted access to telecommunications services. These efforts have significantly hampered efforts to verify the scale of the protests, as well as the number of associated casualties. Although the US-based NGO Human Rights Activists News Agency (HRANA) has verified over 2,500 protest-related deaths, global media reports indicate that the security forces have possibly killed up to 12,000 protesters and arrested 10,000 more. Amid the intensifying crackdown and restrictions to communications services, protests have likely dissipated moderately in recent days. As such, we continue to assess that the ongoing protests do not present a critical threat to government stability and are unlikely to result in regime change in the coming days. Nevertheless, anti-government sentiment is almost certainly entrenched, and risks of protest re-escalation will remain elevated in the coming weeks. On 13 January, the family of a detained protester, Erfan Soltani, stated that the Iranian authorities plan to execute him on 14 January; executions of protesters and anti-government activists will possibly trigger further unrest in the coming hours and days. The risk of re-escalation will be particularly acute in early to mid-February due to Shia mourning observances, which occur 40 days after an individual’s death (Chehelom). Security force crackdowns on observances and gatherings will increase risks of cyclical protest escalation and de-escalation in the coming months, compounding pressure on economic conditions and government stability in the medium term.
• US President Donald Trump has repeatedly threatened to engage in ‘action’ targeting Iran amid the escalating crackdown on protests, increasing the risk of retaliation and a regional fallout. On 11 January, Trump stated that he was ‘considering’ military action against Iran due to the escalating crackdown on demonstrations, after making numerous remarks in support of protesters. Trump also stated on 11 January that Iran had attempted to initiate diplomatic negotiations; however, both Iran and Trump stated that talks had broken down by 13 January, underscoring diminishing prospects for a diplomatic resolution. The US is highly likely to engage in non-kinetic operations targeting Iran in the coming days, including boosting satellite internet access, conducting cyber attacks and engaging in information campaigns. We also assess that there is a realistic possibility of the US pursuing a limited campaign of airstrikes targeting security forces’ positions in Iran in the coming days, possibly with support from the Israel Defense Forces (IDF). Such airstrikes would almost certainly exacerbate regional tensions and would highly likely trigger Iranian retaliation, including possible missile attacks on US military installations in the region. Amid growing concerns over Iranian retaliation and possible regional escalation, the US advised some of its non-essential personnel to leave the Al Udeid Air Base (Qatar) on 14 January. US airstrikes and Iranian retaliation would significantly increase the risk of major disruption to regional travel (particularly air travel), as well as exposure to missile fire and resulting shrapnel for installations close to US military assets in the region, including in Kuwait, Qatar and the UAE (see Regional and Global Developments Section below).
ISRAEL
• ISRAEL-GAZA: US Special Envoy to the Middle East Steve Witkoff announced the launch of Phase 2 of the Gaza ceasefire, though its full implementation is likely to be delayed. Witkoff announced the move earlier on 14 January. This comes after several Palestinian figures received invitations on 13 January to join a technocratic committee slated to manage Gaza’s daily affairs. However, the formation of the International Stabilization Force (ISF) in Gaza, which is a key part of phase two, has yet to be fully agreed. As such, it is likely that the implementation of all the clauses within the second phase plan will be segmented and delayed for several months. This will likely also include delays to further IDF withdrawals from the ‘yellow line’ and the release of Palestinian prisoners by Israel. The second stage also envisions the disarmament of Hamas, which remains unlikely. As such, the risk of a ceasefire breakdown will be at its highest during this period.
PALESTINIAN TERRITORIES
• GAZA STRIP: The discovery of rocket launchers in the north and south of Gaza by IDF troops highlights the likely prevalence of hidden weapons caches and the long-term threat of Hamas’ rearmament. The discovery was made on 13 January and marks the third time that IDF troops have found launchers in the past week. According to initial military assessments, these are likely old launchers that Hamas positioned in the area before the ceasefire. The discovery signals that further ready-to-use arms likely remain hidden within the strip. This will sustain the long-term risk of rapid Hamas rearmament, likely prompting future IDF military operations across Gaza. This will possibly present long-term friction points in the peace process. Furthermore, security risks for personnel across the strip will remain elevated due to undiscovered weapons and remnants of Israeli munitions. These will also likely continue delaying reconstruction efforts in the coming months.
• GAZA STRIP: Armed clashes between Hamas militants and IDF troops will elevate the risk of further Israeli airstrikes. On 13 January, IDF troops with tank and aerial support clashed with six Hamas militants in western Rafah (southern Gaza). Two IDF servicemen were lightly injured and all six militants were killed. An IDF spokesperson has characterised the incident as ‘a blatant violation of the ceasefire agreement’. The incident comes amid mounting IDF reports over the past week claiming that Hamas intends to attack IDF service personnel guarding the Israel-controlled ‘yellow line’. These reports have identified an increasing frequency in militants’ suspected probing and reconnaissance operations near the yellow line, likely to test soldiers’ conduct and speed of response. Additionally, on 8 January, militant elements in northern Gaza launched a rocket that fell within the strip, near IDF outposts. We assess that the latest incident and the increasing militant activity in the past week will likely prompt IDF airstrikes across the strip in the coming days. These will sustain elevated security risks across Gaza, highlighting the fragility of the ceasefire.
• WEST BANK: The IDF reported that Israeli settler violence substantially increased in 2025; this will likely trigger broader scrutiny of Israeli-linked entities with operations in the West Bank. On 12 January, the Haaretz media outlet published an IDF report detailing a significant increase in incidents of settler violence in the West Bank. IDF data shows that the number of settler attacks increased by 25% in 2025 compared with 2024; violence was most acute in Hebron, Nablus and Ramallah and al-Bireh governorates. The report underscores increasing attack risks for Palestinian communities in the West Bank, particularly those located close to Israeli settlements. In the coming months, Palestinians engaging in agricultural activity will almost certainly continue to face elevated exposure to settler attacks, while those attempting to document attacks will also face elevated risks of harassment and assault. As settler violence continues to escalate, Australia, Canada, the EU and the UK will likely move to expand sanctions on Israeli settlers and associated entities in the agricultural sector. Such efforts will increase compliance concerns for multinational firms with operations in Israel, particularly in the financial, telecommunications, construction and agricultural sectors. Firms providing services to settlements in the West Bank or purchasing goods from settler-linked entities will also likely face continued scrutiny from pro-Palestine activists, increasing reputational and governance concerns.
IRAN-QATAR-US: The mounting indications of possible US strike action against Iran in the coming days will raise the prospect of retaliation against US military assets in the Gulf region; we assess that highly targeted strikes would pose limited threats to host countries. On 13 January, international media reported that the US had advised several of its personnel to leave al-Udeid Air Base (Qatar) by later on 14 January. The Qatari government has confirmed these reports, adding that the departure of US personnel from the base was taken as a ‘precautionary measure’. Additionally, similar reports on the relocation of US military personnel have emerged from Jordan. These reports are consistent with other such measures adopted by US bases in the lead-up to the US’ strike on Iran’s nuclear facilities in June 2025. Consequently, they reflect the mounting possibility of further US strikes against Iran in the coming days. In the event of such US strikes, Iran is highly likely to pursue retaliatory action against US regional bases. However, such retaliatory strikes are likely to be highly targeted and limited to US bases, mitigating the threat to host countries’ broader infrastructure, as well as to locally based foreign commercial assets (including those belonging to US companies). Nevertheless, Iranian retaliatory strikes in the Gulf region (even if they are limited) will almost certainly disrupt regional airline and shipping operations temporarily.
• Iran-US: Protest remobilisation is possible in coming days as US threatens intervention. Earlier on 14 January, direct communication between Iran and the US was suspended after US President Donald Trump urged Iranians to continue anti-government protests and threatened to ‘take very strong action’ if the authorities executed demonstrators. Reportedly, jailed protester Erfan Soltani faces execution later on 14 January. Although the demonstrations have likely calmed since last weekend, Trump’s comments and the prospect of Soltani’s execution will possibly embolden protesters, sustaining the risk of renewed nationwide unrest. Internet access and SMS communications remain restricted; however, phone calling services have resumed and Starlink access is now free, which will possibly facilitate co-ordination for protesters’ remobilisation. Several countries including Canada, France, Germany and the US have urged their citizens to leave Iran; the US has advised departures by land to Armenia or Turkey. However, we assess that Iran’s communication restrictions and checkpoints will likely continue to hinder evacuation procedures, particularly in rural border areas, sustaining elevated personnel security risks. Meanwhile, global media reports indicate that the US has advised some personnel at its Al Udeid Air Base (Qatar) to leave. This underscores heightened concerns about US kinetic action against Iran and a retaliatory Iranian response targeting US regional assets.
• Syria: New military operation against Kurdish group in Aleppo governorate is likely in coming days. On 13 January, the Syrian government declared the area between the towns of Dayr Hafir and Maskanah (both Aleppo governorate) a closed military zone and deployed government forces to the area. Local media also reported on the build-up of Kurdish forces in the area. The area is a critical logistical node for the largely ethnic-Kurdish Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) in the western Euphrates region. As such, the government is highly likely to conduct a major military operation to secure control of the area in the coming days. Government forces likely aim to push the Kurdish factions to the east side of the Euphrates River to mitigate attack threats against Aleppo and the surrounding area. Regardless, radical groups within the SDF are likely to target water pipelines and the electricity grid supplying Aleppo, as well as conduct drone strikes against the city. This will significantly increase the security risks in the downtown area and near government and military facilities.
Jan 13.
• Lebanon: Hurdles to disarmament campaigns will increase risks of armed conflict resumption. On 12 January, local media published claims by unnamed Lebanese officials that the US has issued a ‘grace period’ of several weeks before it will hold Lebanon accountable regarding the second phase of disarming Lebanese Hizballah (LH). This comes days after the Lebanese army announced that it has completed the first phase of LH disarmament south of the Litani River. Nevertheless, the Israeli Air Force continues to target LH’s personnel and assets. These airstrikes are highly likely to continue in the coming days across South and Nabatieh governorates, albeit without a significant uptick. While the US deadline remains unclear, we assess that LH will continue to refuse full disarmament. This will increase the risks of armed conflict resumption with Israel and ethno-religious tensions inside Lebanon during the first quarter of 2026, before Lebanese general elections in May. However, if the US and Israel were to strike Iran during this period (which remains a realistic possibility), the risks of armed conflict in Lebanon will decrease, though they would likely rise in the second half of 2026.
• Iran-US: Protesters’ arrests will almost certainly continue in coming days; US intervention is possible. Earlier on 13 January, Iranian state media claimed that calm had been restored in most cities nationwide following two weeks of anti-government demonstrations. While this statement is highly unlikely to be accurate, communications restrictions (including the jamming of satellite internet services) have possibly contributed to protesters’ moderate demobilisation, particularly in rural areas. An Iranian official has confirmed that around 2,000 people have been killed during the protests; however, according to the NGO Iran Human Rights (IHRNGO), the figure is likely above 6,000. The Iranian authorities have vowed to punish participants ‘severely’. We assess that mass arrests are almost certain to continue in the coming days, increasing the risk of exposure to torture, sexual violence and extortion for detained individuals. Meanwhile, US President Donald Trump’s national security team will meet later on 13 January to discuss possible military, cyber and psychological campaigns against Iran, sustaining the risk of a US attack in the coming days. However, if Iran agrees to engage in nuclear negotiations in the coming days, the US is more likely to pursue non-kinetic action in the short term.
• US-Iran: Secondary tariffs increase tensions with Iran, raising risk of military action in coming days. On 12 January, US President Donald Trump stated that any country doing business with Iran will face a tariff rate of 25% on trade with the US. The measure comes as the Iranian regime seeks to crack down on nationwide anti-government protests. Iran exports a significant amount of oil to China, while India, Iraq, Turkey and the UAE are among its top trading partners. Chinese officials have denounced the US tariff initiative. While Trump stated on social media that this order is ‘effective immediately’, the White House has released no official documentation on the policy or information about the legal authority used for such tariffs. Given that the US is currently engaged in tenuous trade negotiations with China and India, we assess that the threatened ‘secondary tariffs’ are unlikely to be imposed unilaterally in the coming days. Instead, the threat likely represents leverage that Washington DC seeks to use, amid reported diplomatic engagement with Tehran over curbing its nuclear programme. Despite ongoing bilateral talks, there remains a realistic possibility that the US pursues military action against Iran over the coming days, specifically airstrikes (possibly with Israeli support).
Jan 12.
• Iran-US: Anti-government protests are likely to continue at pace; US intervention is possible. On 11 January, the US-based NGO Human Rights Activists News Agency (HRANA) reported that violence during ongoing anti-government protests has killed at least 538 people, while authorities have arrested over 10,000 individuals. Demonstrations will likely continue at pace in the coming days, with further reports of mass casualties possibly triggering escalations in the intensity of unrest. Clashes between the authorities and protesters will almost certainly involve baton charges, live fire and mass arrests. The government continues to restrict internet access, exacerbating nationwide communication and supply chain disruption. Late on 11 January, US President Donald Trump stated that he was considering military action against Iran. Tehran said it was ready for negotiations; however, Trump indicated that the US ‘may’ act ahead of any discussions. As such, the US will possibly pursue military action, specifically airstrikes, against Iran over the coming days (possibly with Israeli support), elevating security risks for personnel near government buildings, state-owned assets and military sites. However, it is more likely that the US engages in non-kinetic operations, including boosting satellite internet access and conducting cyber attacks and information campaigns.
• US: Potential US military action in Iran will increase domestic unrest, violent extremism risks. On 11 January, a sole perpetrator drove a truck into a crowd of thousands of demonstrators in Los Angeles (California), who were marching to support ongoing anti-government demonstrations in Iran. The police have reportedly detained the driver, who was also attacked by protesters. On the same day, President Donald Trump stated that the US military is considering ‘strong options’ on Iran as the country’s regime cracks down on the protests. In the short term, any indications that the Trump administration intends to take military action against Iran (either unilaterally or in support of Israel) will increase the likelihood of violent extremism in the US. This threat will also rise if the Iranian leadership calls for retaliatory violence against targets inside Western nations. In this scenario, there will be an elevated risk of attacks on institutions, protests and public figures who criticise Iran and the regime publicly. Still, the US authorities are largely capable of mitigating sophisticated plots. Sole perpetrators will likely remain reliant on low-capacity attacks employing firearms, vehicle ramming or rudimentary incendiary devices; however, we assess that these remain unlikely across North America.
• Syria: Retaliatory attacks by Kurdish groups remain likely following Aleppo withdrawal. On 11 January, the last groups of Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) withdrew from Aleppo (Aleppo governorate) after days of heavy clashes with the government forces, who now fully control the city. The SDF leader stated that the withdrawal was implemented via an internationally backed agreement with the government. Meanwhile, the authorities claimed that they arrested around 300 SDF fighters and that a further 400 had fled Aleppo. Nevertheless, on the same day, local media reported a buildup of Kurdish forces along the lines of control near Dayr Hafir (Aleppo governorate), though this has not yet resulted in major clashes. While the security situation inside Aleppo city has partly stabilised, drone attacks by radical elements within the SDF, particularly on government and military facilities, will remain likely in the coming days. Electricity and water infrastructure supplying the city will also be possible targets in any Kurdish retaliatory attack. Furthermore, there is a possibility of a gradual increase in clashes around Dayr Hafir and the Tishrin dam, increasing the risks of a wider armed conflict between Damascus and Kurdish groups in the first quarter of 2026.
• Iran-US: Anti-government protests are likely to continue at pace; US intervention is possible. On 11 January, the US-based NGO Human Rights Activists News Agency (HRANA) reported that violence during ongoing anti-government protests has killed at least 538 people, while authorities have arrested over 10,000 individuals. Demonstrations will likely continue at pace in the coming days, with further reports of mass casualties possibly triggering escalations in the intensity of unrest. Clashes between the authorities and protesters will almost certainly involve baton charges, live fire and mass arrests. The government continues to restrict internet access, exacerbating nationwide communication and supply chain disruption. Late on 11 January, US President Donald Trump stated that he was considering military action against Iran. Tehran said it was ready for negotiations; however, Trump indicated that the US ‘may’ act ahead of any discussions. As such, the US will possibly pursue military action, specifically airstrikes, against Iran over the coming days (possibly with Israeli support), elevating security risks for personnel near government buildings, state-owned assets and military sites. However, it is more likely that the US engages in non-kinetic operations, including boosting satellite internet access and conducting cyber attacks and information campaigns. (Source: Sibylline)
13 Jan 26. Update: air strikes against Daesh. The RAF are continuing to take the fight to Daesh in Iraq and Syria. Royal Air Force aircraft have continued to conduct patrols over Syria to help prevent any attempted resurgence of the Daesh terrorist movement following its military defeat at Baghuz Fawqani in March 2019. Careful intelligence analysis identified an underground facility, in the mountains some miles north of the ancient site of Palmyra. This facility had been occupied by Daesh, most likely to store weapons and explosives. The area around the facility is devoid of any civilian habitation.
RAF Typhoon FGR4s, supported by a Voyager refuelling tanker, therefore joined French aircraft in a joint strike on the underground facility on the evening of Saturday 3 January. Our aircraft used Paveway IV guided bombs to target a number of access tunnels down to the facility; whilst detailed assessment is now underway, initial indications are that the target was engaged successfully. There is no indication of any risk having been posed to civilians by the strike, and all our aircraft returned safely. (Source: https://www.gov.uk/)
13 Jan 26. Hamas Readies Gaza Handover to Planned Palestinian Government. Hamas has directed all its governing agencies to prepare for a handover of authority to a planned Palestinian technocratic government, according to the group’s official media outlet, SAFA.
“[Hamas] has issued directives to all government agencies and institutions to be ready to hand over all areas to this body,” SAFA quoted Hamas spokesman Hazem Qassem as saying. “There are instructions to facilitate the handover process in order to ensure the success of this body’s work.”
The planned government will be overseen by President Donald Trump’s proposed Board of Peace, an international body tasked with managing the government and other aspects of the ceasefire that took effect on Oct. 10, including disarming Hamas and deploying an international security force.
Members of the board must be elected by Palestinians and vetted by Israel. Its composition is expected to be announced this month.
Meanwhile, the post-ceasefire death toll in Gaza continued to rise.
Palestinian health officials said that three Palestinians were killed and nine others wounded in Israeli strikes across multiple areas of the Gaza Strip on Sunday, marking the latest violation of the fragile ceasefire between Israel and Hamas. (Source: https://www.sofx.com/)
13 Jan 26. Trump says nations doing business with Iran face 25% tariff on US trade.
• Summary
• Iran facing its biggest anti-government protests in years
• Trump has used leverage of tariffs throughout his second term against many nations
• Trump weighs further options on US action against Iran
President Donald Trump said on Monday any country that does business with Iran will face a tariff rate of 25% on any trade with the U.S., as Washington weighs a response to the situation in Iran which is seeing its biggest anti-government protests in years.
“Effective immediately, any Country doing business with the Islamic Republic of Iran will pay a Tariff of 25% on any and all business being done with the United States of America,” Trump said in a post on Truth Social.
Tariffs are paid by U.S. importers of goods from those countries. Iran, a member of the OPEC oil producing group, has been heavily sanctioned by Washington for years. It exports much of its oil to China, with Turkey, Iraq, the United Arab Emirates and India among its other top trading partners.
“This Order is final and conclusive,” Trump said without providing any further detail.
There was no official documentation from the White House of the policy on its website, nor information about the legal authority Trump would use to impose the tariffs, or whether they would be aimed at all of Iran’s trading partners. The White House did not respond to a request for comment.
The Chinese embassy in Washington criticized Trump’s approach, saying China will take “all necessary measures” to safeguard its interests and opposed “any illicit unilateral sanctions and long-arm jurisdiction.”
“China’s position against the indiscriminate imposition of tariffs is consistent and clear. Tariff wars and trade wars have no winners, and coercion and pressure cannot solve problems,” a spokesperson of the Chinese embassy in Washington said on X.
Japan and South Korea, which agreed on trade deals with the U.S. last year, said on Tuesday they are closely monitoring the development.
“We … plan to take any necessary measures once the specific actions of the U.S. government become clear,” South Korea’s trade ministry said in a statement.
Japan’s Deputy Chief Cabinet Secretary Masanao Ozaki told reporters that Tokyo will “carefully examine the specific content of any measures as they become clear, as well as their potential impact on Japan, and will respond appropriately.”
Iran, which had a 12-day war with U.S. ally Israel last year and whose nuclear facilities the U.S. military bombed in June, is seeing its biggest anti-government demonstrations in years.
Trump has said the U.S. may meet Iranian officials and that he was in contact with Iran’s opposition, while piling pressure on its leaders, including threatening military action.
Tehran said on Monday it was keeping communication channels with Washington open as Trump considered how to respond to the situation in Iran, which has posed one of the gravest tests of clerical rule in the country since the Islamic Revolution in 1979.
Demonstrations evolved from complaints about dire economic hardships to defiant calls for the fall of the deeply entrenched clerical establishment. U.S.-based rights group HRANA said it had verified the deaths of 599 people – 510 protesters and 89 security personnel – since the protests began on December 28.
While air strikes were one of many alternatives open to Trump, “diplomacy is always the first option for the president,” White House press secretary Karoline Leavitt said on Monday.
During the course of his second term in office, Trump has often threatened and imposed tariffs on other countries over their ties with U.S. adversaries and over trade policies that he has described as unfair to Washington.
Trump’s trade policy is under legal pressure as the U.S. Supreme Court is considering striking down a broad swathe of Trump’s existing tariffs.
Iran exported products to 147 trading partners in 2022, according to World Bank’s most recent data. (Source: Reuters)
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