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09 Jan 26. Mexico-US: US president threatens strikes on cartel positions in Mexico, escalating regional tensions. On 8 January, US President Donald Trump stated that the US will soon strike drug cartel organisations on land and suggested that ‘cartels are running Mexico’. We assess that US unilateral military action in Mexico – or any other country in Latin America and the Caribbean region – is highly unlikely in the short-to-medium term. However, there is a realistic possibility that Mexican President Claudia Sheinbaum will request US military assistance. Such action would likely come in the form of targeted strikes on cartel positions at the direction of the Mexican authorities, or as co-operation between US special forces and Mexican security forces in joint missions. These operations would likely take place in cartel stronghold territories and fentanyl-producing states, such as Michoacán, Sinaloa and Sonora. Furthermore, we continue to assess that security co-operation between Mexico and the US will highly likely escalate in the coming weeks and months. Mexico will likely increase intelligence sharing, extradition of cartel leaders and requests for US surveillance drone and/or spy plane flyovers of cartel territory in Mexico. In response to increasing bilateral security co-operation, cartels will likely increase attacks on the Mexican security forces and erect ‘narcobloqueos’ (roadblocks), increasing physical security and supply chain risks. (Source: Sibylline)
07 Jan 26. Pakistan-Bangladesh: Potential defence pact will increase bilateral ties. On 6 January, the head of the Bangladesh Air Force, Air Chief Marshal Hasan Mahmood Khan, held talks with Pakistan’s Chief of Air Staff, Air Chief Marshal Zaheer Ahmed Baber Sidhu in the Pakistani capital Islamabad. The talks reportedly focused on a potential defence pact and Pakistan’s sale of JF-17 fighter jets to Bangladesh. Pakistan also assured Bangladesh of the ‘fast-tracked delivery’ of PAC MFI-17 Super Mushshak trainer aircraft as well as ‘a complete training and long-term support ecosystem’. The defence talks come after the resumption of direct trade and improving ties between Dhaka and Islamabad since the ousting of former prime minister Sheikh Hasina. The talks also follow Pakistan’s efforts to capitalise on the perceived successes of its air force in the recent conflict with India in May 2025 and to expand weapons sales to other countries. We assess that the potential pact will further promote ties between Pakistan and Bangladesh. Additionally, there is a realistic possibility of the pact worsening already-strained ties between India and Bangladesh. (Source: Sibylline)
07 Jan 26. South Sudan: Conflict with opposition forces is likely to escalate, driving collateral risks to NGOs. On 5 January, government officials confirmed that over 60,000 people have been displaced following the capture of Yuai and Waat (both Jonglei state) by Sudan People’s Liberation Army-in-Opposition (SPLA-IO) forces in recent weeks. Those displaced have largely congregated in Duk county (Jonglei) and Mingkaman (Lakes state), straining resources in these areas. The developments come a day after the SPLA-IO’s acting chief of general staff announced a renewed military offensive against government forces and an intention to push towards the capital Juba. Government operations against SPLA-IO forces over recent months will likely undercut the SPLA-IO’s capacity to fully mobilise loyal elements. However, the call will increase the risk of clashes between the SPLA-IO and government forces across the country. Government forces will likely conduct air strikes on SPLA-IO positions, driving collateral risks to civilian settlements and NGO staff nearby. Persistent conflict over the coming weeks will drive further displacement, increasing the risk of intercommunal violence in host communities and increasing demand for aid. This will, in turn, drive NGO exposure to violent crime and extortion. (Source: Sibylline)
05 Jan 26. Somalia-Israel: Somaliland recognition will likely compound regional tensions, sanctions risk. On 6 January, Israel’s foreign minister met with Somaliland’s president in the breakaway region’s capital Hargeisa. Israel recognised Somaliland’s independence on 26 December 2025, triggering significant diplomatic backlash from Somalia and the African Union (AU). The AU condemned Israel’s recognition of Somaliland’s independence, underscoring rising regional tensions. In the coming weeks, the AU will possibly vote to withdraw Israel’s observer accreditation formally, which was suspended in February 2023. Such a move would almost certainly undermine Israel’s long-standing efforts to develop economic and military co-operation frameworks with the AU. The AU will also possibly move to impose limited and targeted sanctions against Israel, including travel bans, asset freezes and trade restrictions (though implementation will be decided by individual member states). Even so, there remains a possibility that Ethiopia will move to recognise Somaliland’s independence in the coming weeks, in line with a 2024 memorandum of understanding between Addis Ababa and Hargeisa (see Sibylline Situation Update Brief – 12 January 2024). Although such an agreement would grant Ethiopia preferential access to port facilities in Berbera (Somaliland), it would almost certainly exacerbate tensions with Somalia and undercut their bilateral security co-operation. (Source: Sibylline)
05 Jan 26. Russia: Recent official appointments in Chechen Republic underscore efforts to consolidate power. On 5 January, Ramzan Kadyrov, head of the Republic of Chechnya in Russia’s North Caucasus, appointed his son Akhmat Kadyrov as acting deputy prime minister of the autonomous republic. Akhmed Dudayev, Chechnya’s minister for national policy, external relations press and information, was also named as acting deputy prime minister. Over the past two years, Kadyrov has also appointed Akhmat’s younger brother, Adam, to several official roles. This latest move follows reports that Ramzan Kadyrov was urgently hospitalised in December 2025. Speculation about his health has persisted for over a year, raising questions about succession in Chechnya. We assess that the appointment of Akhmat Kadyrov, alongside other relatives and close associates, is highly likely to consolidate the clan’s grip on power and prevent renewed instability. Meanwhile, the Kadyrov family will almost certainly continue to enjoy full Kremlin backing, as maintaining stability in Chechnya and the wider region remains a top priority for Moscow, particularly amid its ongoing war in Ukraine. (Source: Sibylline)
06 Jan 26. Cambodia-Thailand: Risk of border escalation remains despite ceasefire. Earlier on 6 January, the Thai military accused Cambodia of firing mortar rounds into Ubon Ratchathani province (Thailand), violating a 10-day-old truce. Later on the same day, the military claimed that Cambodia had explained the incident as an ‘operational error’, with ‘no intention’ to fire into Thailand. One Thai soldier was wounded by shrapnel in the incident. Also on 6 January, Cambodia claimed that a ‘garbage pile explosion’ injured two soldiers in Preah Vihear province (Cambodia; near the border with Ubon Ratchathani province). The Thai military has warned that it may retaliate if a similar incident occurs again. This follows a new ceasefire agreement signed on 27 December 2025, whereby both sides have accepted to freeze troop movements and to co-operate in demining border areas. However, we assess that a limited border conflict will possibly resume, as troops and heavy weaponry remain deployed along the border. Bilateral tensions will likely persist; major progress in border demarcation efforts is highly unlikely before Thailand’s general elections on 8 February. Thai Prime Minister Anutin Charnvirakul has claimed that formal meetings regarding border demarcation cannot proceed under the caretaker government. (Source: Sibylline)
05 Jan 26. US-Latin America and Caribbean region: Further US military operations are unlikely in near term. On 4 January, US President Donald Trump suggested that the US could take action against other countries after the US military conducted several airstrikes in Venezuela and captured Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro and his wife. Trump specifically threatened Colombia’s President Gustavo Petro, described Cuba as ‘ready to fall’ and reasserted his desire to take control of Greenland (autonomous territory of Denmark). On the same day, congressional Democrats stated that they had still received no information from the Trump administration regarding the operation in Venezuela. In the short term, the Trump administration will likely increase its assertive rhetoric towards Latin American governments that are perceived to support Venezuela or other states considered to be adversarial (such as China and Iran) or heavily involved in drug trafficking (such as Colombia, Cuba and Mexico). Despite threats of military action, we assess that further unilateral US military operations in the region remain unlikely in the immediate term; punitive economic measures and sanctions are more likely. Furthermore, supervision quality risks will increase as the Trump administration allegedly circumvented Congress to conduct the operation in Venezuela. The administration is likely to come under elevated congressional scrutiny in the coming weeks amid concerns that proper checks and balances are being eroded. (Source: Sibylline)
05 Jan 26. Region-US: Condemnation of US military action in Venezuela will increase regional tensions. On 4 January, the presidents of Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Cuba and Mexico all criticised the US’ operation to capture Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro, calling for diplomacy rather than military action. We assess that, although this will moderately increase regional tensions in the short-to-medium term, further US sanctions or tariffs against these countries are unlikely in the immediate term. Meanwhile, also on 4 January, protesters against the US’ military action demonstrated outside the US Embassy in the Costa Rican capital San José. Domestic unrest risks outside US embassies across the region and targeted activism towards firms perceived to aid the US military will increase in the near term. Lastly, a leaked Colombian intelligence report suggests that commanders of the National Liberation Army (ELN) and dissident Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC-D) guerrilla groups in Venezuela may relocate to Colombia due to the possible loss of Venezuelan state protection. We assess that any significant migration of non-state armed groups into Colombia will increase the risk of armed clashes and attacks in the short-to-medium term. (Source: Sibylline)
05 Jan 26. North Korea: Hypersonic missile launches will sustain regional tensions. On 4 January, North Korea reportedly fired at least two hypersonic missiles from the capital Pyongyang’s Ryokpo district, landing approximately 621 miles (1,000km) away in the Sea of Japan. The South Korean authorities have assessed that these could be the Hwasong-11Ma, a short-range ballistic missile equipped with a hypersonic glide vehicle (HGV) warhead. Fully working HGVs could make missile trajectory prediction difficult for Seoul. The missiles were fired following North Korea’s denunciation of the US detention of Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro, with leader Kim Jong-un stressing the need to uphold its nuclear deterrent amid international instability. The launch preceded South Korean President Lee Jae-myung’s state visit to China, also on 4 January. We assess that Lee is highly likely to push China (a historical ally of North Korea) to help advance denuclearisation talks. Given Pyongyang’s strong distrust of Washington DC, there is a remote chance that the North Korean authorities will abandon their nuclear programmes. We also assess that China is highly unlikely to push for such an outcome, as it regards North Korea as a strategic buffer against the US’ presence in South Korea. (Source: Sibylline)
05 Jan 26. Burkina Faso: Alleged coup plot will likely trigger military purges, reducing security forces’ capacity. On 3 January, the authorities allegedly disrupted a plot to oust the interim president, Ibrahim Traoré, in a military coup. Although the military government has yet to comment officially, allegations of a coup plot triggered a pro-junta demonstration in the capital Ouagadougo on 4 January. Although the protest remained peaceful, official statements relating to the alleged plot will possibly trigger further pro-government demonstrations in the coming days, disrupting cross-city transit. Pro-junta media outlets will also likely attempt to link the coup plot to foreign powers, particularly Cote d’Ivoire and France, increasing risks of hostility to foreign investment and harassment for foreign nationals. Regional media reports indicate that the authorities have arrested several military officials in relation to the plot. In the coming months, the junta will highly likely continue purging high-ranking security force personnel to reduce the risk of a successful coup. While these measures will possibly moderate threats to government stability in the short term, they will also likely undermine the security forces’ capacity to counter ongoing insurgencies of regional al-Qaeda and Islamic State (IS) affiliates, sustaining attack risks. (Source: Sibylline)
05 Jan 26. Venezuela-US: US airstrikes, military operation in Venezuela will elevate government stability risks. On 3 January, the US military conducted a series of airstrikes and a special forces operation in Venezuela, capturing Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro and his wife, Cilia Flores (see Sibylline Special Report – 4 January 2025). Following the operation, US President Donald Trump claimed that the US would ‘run’ Venezuela on a temporary basis, likely in tandem with Venezuelan Vice (now acting) President Delcy Rodríguez. In response, Rodríguez published a statement calling for co-operation with the US. We assess that further US military action in Venezuela is unlikely in the coming days. However, this risk will increase in the coming weeks and months if the Trump administration and Rodríguez are unable to co-operate. Meanwhile, we assess that, with Maduro removed from power, the Venezuelan regime will be vulnerable to a coup d’état in the coming days and weeks, increasing the risk of armed clashes, as well as government stability risks. Furthermore, domestic unrest, societal upheaval and repression risks will remain elevated in the near term, with the Venezuelan opposition likely to call for demonstrations while the Rodríguez-led regime attempts to consolidate its position. (Source: Sibylline)
05 Jan 26. The US Commits to Venezuela’s Transition. Can it Succeed? The decision by the US President Donald Trump to carry out military strikes inside Venezuela and extract President Nicolás Maduro and his wife Cilia Flores marks a pivotal moment in Washington’s posture toward Latin America, one that abandons longstanding restraint in favour of a more overt and assertive projection of power on behalf of American national security. The execution of precision hits on at least five military bases signals that the administration is no longer treating the region as a peripheral security concern, but as a theatre of direct confrontation. Yet running the country’s transition is a job that very few will want, as many questions remain unresolved. First, does the US bombing and extraction operation risk triggering unintended escalation? The remaining government in Caracas is unlikely to acquiesce quietly. It is still very early days, too early to decipher what President Trump meant while saying that the US will run Venezuela until a new government is installed. ‘We are going to run the country, until we can do a safe, proper and judicious transition,’ Trump argued from a news conference in Mar-a-Lago, Florida. Yet, the local armed forces, paramilitary actors and criminal networks could intensify defensive operations and build up resistance hotspots, particularly along border zones with neighbouring Colombia, Guyana and Brazil, transforming the Caribbean and Amazonian frontiers into contested spaces to any outside actor, including the US.
In fact, it is likely that the ‘US running the country’ expression is meant to be directed at Venezuela’s leaders as a form of warning more than anything else: the US is now fully committing to drive change in Venezuela, and they better accept – and cooperate with – an approaching transition.
Second, is the legal justification on the entirety of the military build-up and the extraction of Maduro now more certain? While Washington frames its 3 January operation and the almost five months of boat strikes in the Caribbean Sea as part of a counternarcotics mission, critics have questioned the lack of transparency in both intelligence evidence, civilian oversight and command authorisation, raising doubts about compliance with international law and rules-of-engagement norms. The absence of clear communication from the Department of State risks eroding trust and reinforcing perceptions of unilateralism, an issue that has historically strained US-Latin American relations.
Third, how is this operation likely to reverberate throughout the hemisphere? Many regional governments and civil society actors view the strikes as a reversion to interventionist doctrine. This perception may energise anti-US narratives, strengthen extra-hemispheric alignments with powers such as China and Russia and complicate the very regional cooperation Washington claims to seek. The 2025 US National Security Strategy (NSS) presents the Western Hemisphere as the United States’ primary strategic arena, anchored in what the administration terms a new ‘Trump Corollary’ to the Monroe Doctrine. At first glance, the NSS appeared to mark a major strategic reset, rhetorically elevating hemispheric sovereignty, migration control and anti-narcotics operations as core national security imperatives.
But beneath this ideological rebranding lies a substantial continuity: for years, US engagement with Latin America and the Caribbean has been driven less by Washington as a whole than by the expanding remit of the US Southern Command, whose defence diplomacy, security cooperation and operational partnerships have already positioned the region as a quiet but persistent strategic priority. The question, then, is whether the strategy signals a genuine strategic shift, or simply a refresh of long-standing military-led engagement, repackaged in a more assertive doctrinal frame which now includes steering Venezuela towards re-democratisation, 27 years after the coming to power of Hugo Chávez, the man who gave the Venezuelan Presidency to Nicolás Maduro in 2013.
Hemispheric Security Under America First
The America First policy under President Trump represents a recalibration of US foreign policy toward transactional alliances and a heightened emphasis on measures to achieve strategic homeland security. Within this paradigm, Trump’s administration sees Venezuela not only as a source of regional instability but as a direct challenge to US influence in the Western Hemisphere. Venezuela’s significance under America First is, however, intricate and multi-layered. First, the country is framed as a hub of transnational crime and narcotics trafficking, which is presented as directly affecting US domestic security. Second, the regime is portrayed as a proxy for extra-hemispheric adversaries, particularly Russia and Cuba, whose presence undermines US geopolitical leverage in Latin America. Consequently, kinetic measures such as strikes on strategic targets and maritime interdiction operations are consistent with the America First doctrine: they are intended to project power unilaterally, degrade Venezuela’s operational capacity and signal resolve without requiring broad international sanction or support. Domestically, the strikes have occurred in an increasingly polarised US political environment. President Trump’s decision enjoys strong backing among his conservative base, which views decisive military action in the hemisphere as a demonstration of restored American strength and deterrence. According to a Harvard-Harris Poll conducted in early December, 64% of Americans believed Maduro had to be removed from office. On the other hand, a CBS survey from late November found that most Americans opposed military action and instead wanted the administration to explain what the US intends regarding Venezuela. Yet in Congress, reactions are mixed. Republican leadership has largely rallied behind the Trump administration, framing the intervention as a necessary stand against transnational crime and ‘narco-authoritarianism.’ Democrats, by contrast, have raised alarms over the absence of congressional authorisation, potential civilian harm and the risk of entangling the US in another open-ended regional conflict. The result is a fragmented political consensus, one that may limit the administration’s room to manoeuvre diplomatically even as it asserts military resolve abroad.
During 2025, Trump took an unambiguous turn toward kinetic measures in multiple theatres. In the Middle East, the US conducted airstrikes on nuclear facilities inside Iran, targeting key enrichment sites such as Fordow, Natanz and a facility near Isfahan. In the Red Sea region, the US launched a major campaign, codenamed Operation Rough Rider, of air and naval strikes against the Houthi rebels in Yemen with the objective of stopping attacks on shipping lanes. Washington has framed these operations as part of a broader approach of forward defence, arguing that there is no need for formal congressional declarations of war in certain contexts, especially when targeting groups he defines as ‘narco-terrorists.’ At the same time, he has proposed a sweeping upgrade in US defence posture, including intensified intelligence operations, special-operations deployments and significant force buildups in both the Caribbean region and overseas. The result is a more assertive, multi-front approach that sees US threats ranging from non-state actors to state adversaries, all while reducing formal legal barriers for unilateral action. In that sense, Operation Absolute Resolve, that took Maduro, was framed by President Trump as a joint military and law enforcement raid at the request of the Department of Justice.
How Do the Strikes Affect What’s Left in Venezuela?
The joint military and law enforcement raid inside Venezuela exerted decisive pressure against the remaining Maduristas left behind: former Vice President and now interim President Delcy Rodriguez; Minister of Defence Vladimir Padrino and Minister of Interior Diosdado Cabello. Yet its effectiveness is not guaranteed. Tactically, the strikes degraded the regime’s immediate capabilities: the reported destruction and damage to military bases, air assets, fuel depots, radar sites and logistics hubs that the Venezuelan military uses to project power and sustain operations. This raises the material cost of continued resistance and complicates day‑to‑day operations and resupply. At the operational level, the strikes weakened command‑and‑control, disrupted lines of communication and denied safe havens, thereby raising the risk and cost for regime security units and allied militias to operate freely. The coercive air and land strikes could increase incentives for defections among lower‑level officers or transactional elites who fear being cut off from Maduro’s old patronage networks. Politically, the strikes eroded the regime’s aura of invulnerability, a necessary condition if the US hopes to catalyse elite bargaining and have Rodriguez, Padrino and Cabello leaving power. Trump warned them in Saturday’s press conference: ‘Political figures in Venezuela should understand what happened to Maduro can happen to them,’ he said.
However, military pressure on Venezuela can just as easily produce the opposite: a ‘rally‑’round‑the‑flag’ effect, hardened regime repression, a push toward external patrons (Russia, Iran and China) and a nationalist backlash that complicates efforts to induce defections. Recent reporting shows Caracas seeking external assistance, illustrating that strikes can drive external entanglement. Kinetic action without clear end‑states (Trump even argued from Mar-a-Lago that the US was ready to stage a second, much bigger wave of attacks if needed) and parallel political/diplomatic tracks risks delegitimising US moves, empowering regime propaganda and producing long‑term instability to Venezuela.
Right now, Trump’s NSS and broader posture are widely read as trying to reshape the region’s politics, supporting like-minded governments and punishing others. However, to turn that around the US would need to signal that alignment is not contingent on ideological affinity, but on shared interests. Transnational crime stemming out of Venezuela is a shared interest, even if disagreements persist.
What Happens Next?
The US approach to securing regional cooperation frames collaboration in terms of shared security imperatives (counternarcotics, maritime interdiction and anti-smuggling operations) rather than direct combat involvement with regional countries. But how will the US stress respect for sovereignty and multilateral consultation considering the strikes? These attacks were more than an escalation of force; they are a potential inflection point in how the US engages with Latin America. Whether it leads to greater stability, or a cycle of renewed distrust will depend on Washington’s ability to complement military posture with diplomacy, humility and long-term institutional partnership.
Many Latin American governments, either from the left or the right, will try to preserve their autonomy by balancing between great powers, not by aligning wholly with one side. For them, engaging with China (or other powers) may be a way to strengthen bargaining leverage, extract better deals and avoid over-reliance on the US. This considering the recently released Chinese strategic paper for Latin America and the Caribbean, where Beijing ‘pledges aid’ to the region with little-to-no political conditions attached.
As well, if President Trump can turn US investments in the oil industry in Venezuela, as he mentioned during his press conference at Mar-a-Lago, into a cash return for the American people, then his base will certainly approve of such methods. But getting a return from Venezuela’s deeply shattered and malfunctioning oil economy is still a big bet in the short term. Trump claimed a US administration of Venezuela would take wealth from under the ground, with benefits going to the Venezuelan people and to the ‘US as reimbursement from damages’ inflicted against them. Yet to do this, the US would need to allow both American and international firms to revamp the oil sector, put untapped resources into existing installations and relocate many engineers and technicians to Venezuela, which is currently a no-travel zone for many Western countries. Issues of criminality, poverty and infrastructure will also need quick fixing for Venezuela to be attractive; all while managing a safe passage for the re-democratisation of the country to support the rule of law and the running of its economy. Looking ahead, Venezuela hangs in delicate balance. Should the current scenario precipitate the regime’s full capitulation, whether through internal fractures from within, elite defections, or sustained external pressure, the path to democratic transition will be fraught with uncertainty. The opposition, though politically re-energised around the Nobel Peace Prize awardee María Corina Machado, remains mostly abroad and lacks institutional depth after years of repression and separation from politics. The short-term scenario requires robust negotiation to prevent a lengthy power vacuum where the Maduristas keep running the country. For the US and regional countries, the challenge will lie not in engineering regime change, but in supporting a legitimate, inclusive process that restores governance in Caracas, rebuilds the economy across Venezuela and avoids reproducing the cycle of dependency and mistrust that has long plagued the country’s developmental fruition.
08 Jan 26. “Chinese air power in particular poses a fundamentally different level of threat to traditional US dominance in the air domain than it did in 2020…The growth in Chinese air power and ground-based and maritime IADS [integrated air and defence systems] capabilities has already had a transformative effect on US military freedom of action in and around the first island chain during any potential conflict, compared to 2020.” This is according to The Evolution of Russian and Chinese Air Power Threats by Dr Justin Bronk, which examines how Russian and Chinese airpower capabilities have advanced since 2020. It concludes that while Russia remains a serious and increasingly capable threat in Europe, China’s rapid and integrated expansion of air, missile, sensor and networked warfare capabilities has fundamentally altered the balance of power in the Indo-Pacific, particularly within the First Island Chain. The research finds that since 2020, the People’s Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF) and Navy Air Force (PLANAF) have expanded their inventories of advanced fourth and fifth-generation fighters at astonishing speed, while simultaneously fielding long-range air-to-air missiles, modern airborne early warning and control (AEW&C) aircraft, electronic warfare platforms and dense ground-based and maritime air defence systems. Together, these capabilities have already constrained how US and allied air forces could operate in and around Taiwan, Japan and the wider First Island Chain in any high-intensity conflict. By late 2025, China is assessed to have 320–350 J-20 fifth-generation fighters in service, with production rates reaching around 120 aircraft per year, alongside roughly 450 J-16 multirole fighters. These aircraft are armed with missiles that significantly outrange Western equivalents and are supported by an expanding sensor network that includes around 50 KJ-500 AEW&C aircraft, advanced electronic attack platforms and rapidly growing satellite-based ISR (Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance) capabilities. The report says Western aircraft operating inside the First Island Chain would be doing so in contested airspace and at the long end of tanker, basing and electromagnetic chains. As a result, it says previous assumptions of Western air superiority in the Indo-Pacific can no longer be taken for granted.
Key Findings
- China has already reshaped the airpower balance inside the First Island Chain. The report says: “The growth in Chinese air power and ground-based and maritime IADS capabilities has already had a transformative effect on US military freedom of action in and around the first island chain during any potential conflict, compared to 2020.”
- China can threaten key US air and naval enablers at very long range. “The PLA now fields a range of capabilities that can threaten US Air Force aerial refuelling tankers, US Navy carrier groups and forward air bases at 1000 km or more.”
- Chinese fighters enjoy a decisive advantage in air-to-air missile range. “The PLAAF fields at least two air-to-air missiles in frontline service that significantly out-range not just Russian but also American and European equivalents.”
- Western aircraft flying close to China face an operational disadvantage. “Where US or other Allied aircraft can penetrate airspace contested by Chinese forces during a major clash, these aircraft will probably be operating at the end of long and contested tanker, basing and electromagnetic enablement chains.”
Key Recommendations
- Western planners must abandon assumptions of guaranteed air superiority in the Indo-Pacific. “Current Chinese capability growth is sufficiently impressive and rapid that the traditional Western airpower edge is no longer guaranteed.”
- Allied forces should plan for limited, temporary windows of air superiority. “US-led Western forces may still be able to win localised and temporary windows of air superiority in a potential conflict.”
- Investment must prioritise countering long-range Chinese kill chains. “The PLA now fields a range of capabilities that can threaten US Air Force aerial refuelling tankers, US Navy carrier groups and forward air bases at 1000 km or more.”
- Airpower planning must account for the scale and pace of Chinese force generation. “Production rates for the upgraded and technologically mature J-20A (and two-seat J-20S) have reportedly reached around 120 aircraft per year.”
Conclusion
The report concludes that Western dependence on air superiority has increased at precisely the moment when achieving it has become more difficult. In Europe, Russia’s airpower has adapted through hard-won combat experience in Ukraine and now poses a more capable and coordinated threat than it did before 2022. However, these changes are incremental. In the Indo-Pacific the situation is fundamentally different. China’s airpower growth represents a structural and different scale of challenge. The combination of long-range missiles, dense air defences, fifth-generation fighters and powerful sensor networks means that US and allied forces would face sustained pressure throughout the First Island Chain from the opening stages of any conflict. While Western forces may still be able to create temporary windows of air superiority through superior training, fifth-generation platforms and advanced munitions, the report warns that China’s pace of capability development is eroding the margin for error. The traditional Western airpower advantage can no longer be assumed. The Evolution of Russian and Chinese Air Power Threats is written by Dr Justin Bronk, Senior Research Fellow for Airpower and Technology at the Royal United Services Institute (RUSI). His research focuses on combat airpower, military technology and the evolving capabilities of Russia and China. The report draws on interviews conducted during 2024–2025 at fighter weapons schools in the UK, US and Australia, research visits to air force units and defence ministries across Europe and the Indo-Pacific, and extensive analysis of open-source data. For more information and media inquiries please email
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