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NEWS IN BRIEF – MIDDLE EAST – CONFLICT

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Military And Security Developments

Jan 09.

  • Syria: Ceasefire between government, Kurdish forces will remain highly fragile in coming hours. Earlier on 9 January, the Syrian defence ministry announced a unilateral ceasefire in Aleppo (Aleppo governorate), following days of major clashes with the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) in the city’s Kurdish-majority districts, which remain surrounded by the government forces. The ministry announced that it will permit ethnic-Kurdish armed groups to leave the districts during the ceasefire. The ceasefire will allow ethnic-Kurdish militants to carry their personal weapons and will provide them with an escort to the SDF’s territories. The government has already secured control of Aleppo’s Ashrafieh district, while a major bulk of SDF fighters are still surrounded in Sheikh Maqsood district (both Kurdish-majority areas). We assess that the majority of these fighters will accept the deal and evacuate. However, smaller armed groups are unlikely to comply, increasing the risks of renewed clashes in Kurdish-majority districts in the coming hours. Furthermore, despite the full evacuation of fighters, clashes between the SDF and the government along the lines of control near Dayr Hafir and Manbij (both Aleppo governorate) will remain likely.

Jan 08.

  • Yemen: STC president flees Aden; militia secures city, sustaining transport, security risks. Earlier on 8 January, Saudi state-owned media reported that the president of the UAE-backed Southern Transitional Council (STC), Aidarus al-Zoubaidi, had fled Aden (Aden governorate) for Somaliland on 7 January. He then possibly travelled onward to the UAE’s capital Abu Dhabi. Al-Zoubaidi reportedly ordered large military reinforcements into Aden to counter the Saudi-backed advance by Internationally Recognised Government (IRG) aligned forces, before fleeing. However, the Southern Giants Brigades (a pro-IRG militia) have since secured several state institutions, neighbourhoods and Aden International Airport (ADE). Transport disruption will likely continue over the coming days amid heightened security and reduced services at Aden Airport. A curfew was in force between 2100hrs and 0600hrs (local time) overnight on 7-8 January; further curfews are likely, increasing the risk of arbitrary detentions during nighttime hours. Meanwhile, senior STC officials claim that peace talks in Saudi Arabia without al-Zoubaidi on 7 January were positive, raising the possibility of short-term splintering within the STC which would complicate immediate efforts to stabilise the south. If confirmed, al-Zoubaidi’s presence in Abu Dhabi would likely escalate already-heightened tensions between Saudi Arabia and the UAE.
  • Iran: Protests, clashes with security forces are likely to intensify in next 48 hours. On 7 January, anti-government protests and clashes with the security forces continued across several cities, including the capital Tehran. State media reported that protesters had killed security officers in Malekshahi county (Ilam province) and Lordegan city (Chaharmahal and Bakhtiari province). Local activists also reported internet blackouts in several cities. We assess that the scope and intensity of anti-government protests will increase in the next 48 hours, particularly following Friday prayers on 9 January. Such demonstrations will almost certainly trigger further clashes with the security forces, particularly in the vicinity of major mosques, marketplaces, universities and government premises. Partial strikes and business disruption are also possible in Kermanshah and Kurdistan provinces. Additionally, on 7 January, the Mobarizoun Popular Front (MPF), a coalition of ethnic-Baloch anti-government groups, killed a police officer in Iranshahr (Sistan and Baluchestan province). Further attacks against the security forces, governmental facilities and checkpoints in Sistan and Baluchestan will also remain likely in the coming days.

Jan 07.

IRAN  

  • Major anti-government protests have emerged in Iran and will almost certainly continue in the coming days, though threats to government stability are unlikely to escalate to critical levels in the short term.
  • Iran’s efforts to improve its missile capabilities will increase the risk of Israeli airstrikes in the coming months, as well as conflict re-escalation; there is also a realistic possibility that the US will become involved in strikes against nuclear facilities.

ISRAEL

  • The death of a young ultra-Orthodox protester during an anti-conscription demonstration has elevated the risk of escalating domestic unrest in the coming weeks.

PALESTINIAN TERRITORIES

  • GAZA STRIP: Israel’s license revocation of 37 international aid groups due to their failure to comply with new registration requirements (introduced in March 2025) will elevate humanitarian concerns in the Gaza Strip.
  • WEST BANK: The Palestinian Authority (PA)’s efforts to implement financial reforms will likely trigger further protests and possibly lead to election delays.
  • WEST BANK: The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) announced plans to monitor extremist settlers in the West Bank, increasing the risk of settler violence, protests and unrest.

IRAN

  • Major anti-government protests have emerged in Iran and will almost certainly continue in the coming days, though threats to government stability are unlikely to escalate to critical levels in the short term. On 28 December 2025, merchants in the capital Tehran began strike action over deteriorating economic conditions and rapid currency devaluations. Protests have quickly spread to cities nationwide and have involved anti-government activists, including many explicitly calling for regime change. Demonstrations have continued daily, with large-scale protests occurring in Isfahan (Isfahan province), Mashhad (Razavi Khorasan province), Qom (Qom province), Shiraz (Fars province), Tehran and Zahedan (Sistan and Baluchestan province). In response, the Iranian authorities have deployed thousands of police and security forces personnel, including members of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps’ (IRGC’s) Basij paramilitary, to disperse protesters. Human rights groups claim that the security forces’ use of baton charges, tear gas, rubber bullets and live ammunition has killed around 34 protesters. Hundreds have also been detained in mass arrest campaigns. Amid escalating clashes with the security forces, protesters have attempted to storm municipal buildings and police stations in several locations, most prominently in Azna (Lorestan province), Fasa and Marvdasht (both Fars province). In the coming days, anti-government protesters will almost certainly continue to demonstrate in major cities, particularly in marketplaces, public squares, university premises and outside government buildings. The security force crackdown will almost certainly continue at pace in the coming days, likely triggering further unrest and sustaining significant security threats to both participants and bystanders. The authorities will also likely engage in increased digital surveillance of individuals associated with anti-government activism and protest mobilisation, increasing risks of detention for locally engaged staff and their associates (particularly foreign and dual nationals). Protests and unrest will likely continue at pace in the short term, with periods of escalation triggering further crackdowns. However, we assess that sustained repression combined with limited policy concessions from the Iranian government will likely undermine mobilisation in the coming weeks and therefore moderate threats to government stability. We also assess that Israel and the US are unlikely to launch a broad airstrike campaign targeting Iran imminently. However, the risk of airstrikes will increase in the event that protests escalate to the point that they critically threaten government stability (for further analysis, see Sibylline Situation Update Brief – 6 January 2026).
  • Iran’s efforts to improve its missile capabilities will increase the risk of Israeli airstrikes in the coming months, as well as conflict re-escalation; there is also a realistic possibility that the US will become involved in strikes against nuclear facilities. On 22 December 2025, Iranian state media announced that the security forces had held missile drills in numerous cities. Although the statement did not specify where the missile tests took place, social media footage indicates that the tests took place in proximity to Isfahan, Mashhad and Tehran. The test came shortly after the IRGC Navy conducted missile tests in the Persian Gulf on 5 December 2025, and after Iran hosted a five-day joint counter-terrorism exercise with the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO; see Sibylline Middle East Crisis Update – 3 December 2025). The exercises and tests almost certainly form part of Iran’s efforts to demonstrate and improve its military capabilities, particularly inter-service co-ordination. However, continued missile tests will also almost certainly compound regional concerns regarding the extent of Iran’s existing missile and drone stockpiles (as well as Iran’s production capabilities). During a meeting between US President Donald Trump and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu on 28 December 2025, Trump repeatedly called for Iran to cease the build-up of its nuclear and missile programmes, stating that there would be ‘no choice but very quickly to eradicate that build-up’ should Iran continue. This statement underscores the increasing likelihood of Israeli airstrikes targeting Iranian nuclear and security force positions in the coming months, with possible US involvement. Such airstrikes will highly likely trigger retaliatory Iranian attacks targeting Israel, increasing risks of exposure to missile fire and drone incursions for locally engaged staff. Retaliatory attacks would likely escalate into armed conflict, almost certainly disrupting regional flightpaths and undermining regional operational continuity. There is also a realistic possibility that US involvement in airstrikes in Iran would trigger low-capacity and limited Iranian retaliation against US military assets in Iraq, Qatar and/or Kuwait. However, a direct and sustained armed conflict is unlikely between the US and Iran in the coming months, moderating the risk of a critical regional escalation.

ISRAEL 

  • The death of a young ultra-Orthodox protester during an anti-conscription demonstration has elevated the risk of escalating domestic unrest in the coming weeks. On 6 January, thousands of people participated in an anti-conscription protest in Jerusalem’s Bar-Ilan Street (Jerusalem district). Protesters set fires and blocked roads across the city; several attendees attacked a Kan News team covering the demonstration. During the protest, a bus driver drove into a crowd attempting to block the road on Shamgar Street, killing a protester and injuring three others. These incidents come amid growing ethno-religious tensions and ultra-Orthodox protests against military conscription (see Sibylline Middle East Crisis Update – 10 December 2025). The protester’s killing highlights the elevated risks of clashes around key overland routes, driving exposure to vehicular collisions during protests in the coming weeks. Furthermore, the incident will elevate risks of intensified anti-conscription protests led by ultra-Orthodox residents, as well as increase violence risks during demonstrations nationwide. This will elevate security risks for bystanders, particularly near key transport routes such as Highways 1 and 4 and near ultra-Orthodox neighbourhoods in Jerusalem district.

PALESTINIAN TERRITORIES 

  • GAZA STRIP: Israel’s license revocation of 37 international aid groups due to their failure to comply with new registration requirements (introduced in March 2025) will elevate humanitarian concerns in the Gaza Strip. On 1 January, Israel suspended the groups’ licenses to operate in Gaza and the West Bank; the groups will have to leave these territories by 1 March. The new regulations require aid groups to provide Israel with the names and personal details of local and international staff. This requirement contravenes international data protection rules and workers’ privacy rights. The new regulations also allow Israel to ban aid groups over political activity and criticism of Israel. Following the license suspension, Israel barred the affected groups from delivering aid to Gaza, as well as barring the entry of associated aid staff in some cases (including doctors and nurses). We assess that this will elevate threats to food and water security significantly, as well as to Gaza’s broader population health, raising exposure to infectious diseases. Given new regulations’ incompatibility with international data protection laws, there is a realistic possibility that compliance challenges will be solved by mechanisms present in the Gaza peace plan’s second phase. However, the constant delays in advancing the ceasefire to this phase and the likely future challenges in negotiating such mechanisms will likely retain this issue until at least Q2 2026, possibly extending into Q3 2026.
  • WEST BANK: The Palestinian Authority (PA)’s efforts to implement financial reforms will likely trigger further protests and possibly lead to election delays. On 6 January, protests opposing the PA’s efforts to reform the prisoner payment system emerged in Nablus (Nablus governorate). Similar protests on 18 December also occurred in Jenin (Jenin governorate), Nablus, Ramallah (Ramallah and al Bireh governorate) and Tulkarem (Tulkarem governorate). Although the demonstrations remained broadly peaceful, they underscore substantial opposition to the PA’s efforts to reform welfare payments to Palestinians in Israeli prisons through the Palestinian Martyrs Fund (a programme colloquially referred to as ‘pay-for-slay’). PA President Mahmoud Abbas cancelled the programme in February 2025 amid broader efforts to improve diplomatic relations with the US, though the implementation of reforms has been repeatedly delayed. Further anti-PA protests will likely emerge in the coming weeks, particularly in Jenin, Nablus and Ramallah, increasing the risks of localised operational and transit disruption. Large demonstrations will potentially escalate into localised unrest and vandalism, increasing collateral risks for locally engaged assets, particularly those in proximity to PA facilities and the ruling Fatah party’s offices. In the medium term, anti-reform protests will also compound concerns within Fatah over potential electoral losses. This will possibly result in further delays to the holding of presidential and legislative elections, which last took place in 2005 and 2006, respectively.
  • WEST BANK: The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) announced plans to monitor extremist settlers in the West Bank, increasing the risk of settler violence, protests and unrest. On 5 January, the IDF and security agency Shin Bet announced that the head of the IDF’s Central Command, Major General Avi Bluth, had authorised the security forces to use ‘technological monitoring’ to enforce movement restrictions on Israeli settlers in the West Bank. The measures aim to supplement the IDF’s capacity to regulate the movements of extremist settlers, after the Ministry of Defense ended the use of the administrative detention policy for Israeli settlers in November 2024. The announcement comes amid escalating settler violence targeting Palestinian civilians and communities in the West Bank; in 2025, the IDF recorded over 750 incidents of settler violence, compared to 670 incidents recorded in 2024. In recent weeks, Israeli settlers have launched dozens of attacks against Palestinian population centres and agricultural holdings, which have occasionally escalated into altercations with IDF personnel. Efforts to enforce ‘technological monitoring’ through ankle tags are highly unlikely to deter settler violence or moderate risks of attacks in the West Bank. As such, ethno-religious tensions will almost certainly remain elevated. Also on 5 January, the Honenu legal aid organisation announced that it would appeal the decision to authorise the use of electronic monitoring. Legal challenges to the decision will also possibly trigger pro-settlement protests in the Jerusalem area (Jerusalem district), as well as unrest and rioting targeting IDF positions in the West Bank. The risk of vandalism targeting proximate installations and vehicles will be significantly elevated during settler protests, temporarily increasing security threats to locally engaged staff and assets.

RED SEA

  • RED SEA: Armed conflict in Yemen is unlikely to undermine navigability in the Red Sea critically or trigger a wider Houthi campaign against domestic rivals. On 3 January, Saudi-backed Internationally Recognised Government (IRG) forces captured the key port of Mukalla (Hadramaut governorate) from the UAE-backed Southern Transitional Council (STC) amid significant clashes between the two factions that erupted on 3 December 2025. The takeover of Mukalla came one day after the STC stated that southern Yemen would hold an independence referendum by January 2028. Notably, between 4 and 6 January, the IRG also secured strategic gains in Aden and Hadhramaut governorates, indicating a significant degradation of STC military capabilities. On 7 January, local media reported that the IRG managed to secure control of several key districts in the port city of Aden, while heavy clashes between the two parties were ongoing at the time of writing. We assess that these clashes are likely to continue in the coming days while the Saudi-led coalition will likely increase airstrikes against STC positions, especially in Aden, Dhale and Lahij governorates, heightening personnel security risks stemming from direct strikes and exposure to shrapnel. Short-term escalation will likely lead to flight cancellations and transport disruption, undermining personnel evacuation. However, we also assess that the current IRG-STC conflict is unlikely to undermine the navigability of Yemeni waters critically, as a heavy Saudi naval deployment is currently securing transit through the Gulf of Aden and the Bab el-Mandeb strait. Furthermore, the ongoing conflict in the south is unlikely to prompt the Iranian-backed Houthis (who control the capital Sanaa and northwest areas of Yemen) to capitalise on the partial security vacuum along the line of control and conduct a major attack on the rival IRG. As such, there is also a realistic possibility that Riyadh will attempt to include the Houthis in any de-escalation agreement with both the IRG and the STC in Q1 2026, reducing the risk of wider armed conflict and instability across Yemen.
  • ISRAEL-SOMALIA-YEMEN: Israel’s recognition of Somaliland likely forms part of efforts to increase intelligence gathering vis-à-vis the Houthis, increasing the risk of further IDF airstrikes in the medium term. On 26 December 2025, Israel recognised Somaliland’s independence. Although Somaliland declared independence from Somalia in 1991 and maintains informal relations with several states, Israel is the first UN member state to recognise its independence formally. Israeli Foreign Minister Gideon Sa’ar subsequently visited Somaliland’s capital, Hargeisa, on 6 January, drawing significant criticism from Somalia and the African Union (AU). Somali President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud claims that Somaliland has agreed to accept the resettlement of Palestinians and the establishment of Israeli military bases in exchange for Israel’s recognition of its independence. Although Somaliland President Abdirahman Mohamed Abdullahi denied these claims, there is a realistic possibility that Israel will establish military facilities in Somaliland to facilitate intelligence, reconnaissance and surveillance (IRS) operations targeting the Iranian-backed and Yemen-based Houthis in the medium term. Although Israel is unlikely to station naval assets in Somaliland in the short term, increasing IRS operations will facilitate the possible escalation of IDF operations targeting Houthi-controlled territory in the medium-to-long term. Such an escalation would become increasingly likely if the Israel-Hamas ceasefire breaks down and the Houthis resume missile and drone attacks targeting Israel, as well as Israeli-linked vessels transiting the Red Sea. Intensified Israeli airstrikes would almost certainly compound security threats to NGO staff operating within Houthi-controlled territory, while also likely disrupting
  • ISRAEL-SYRIA: An agreement to establish a communication line for co-ordination and intelligence sharing highlights de-escalation, though security challenges and tensions are likely to remain elevated in the coming months. On 6 January, the Trump administration released a joint statement by Israel and Syria announcing a bilateral agreement to establish a dedicated communication cell. The new channel will facilitate intelligence sharing and military de-escalation, as well as diplomatic engagement and commercial opportunities, all under Washington DC’s supervision. The new mechanism will support the rapid resolution of disputes, reducing the risk of escalation to military clashes and improving the prospects of a finalised bilateral security agreement during 2026. However, we assess that there will likely be obstacles to a deal, including Israel’s relations with Druze communities, Israel’s presence in Syria and plans to establish a buffer zone on Syrian territory. This will delay the prospects for commercial co-operation in the coming weeks.
  • Syria: Resumed clashes with Kurdish factions elevate risk of armed conflict in north-eastern region. On 6 January, clashes resumed between government forces and the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) in the Kurdish-controlled districts of Ashrafieh and Sheikh Maqsoud in Aleppo (Aleppo governorate). The ongoing clashes, including mutual shelling and drone strikes, killed at least seven people. Earlier on 7 January, government forces created two humanitarian corridors for residents of the districts to evacuate, before they become closed military zones at 1500hrs (local time). There is a realistic possibility that government forces will attempt to impose a siege and enter the Kurdish districts afterwards, elevating the risk that the clashes will expand in scope and intensity throughout the next 48 hours. Furthermore, any military takeover of the Kurdish districts in Aleppo is likely to trigger a wider armed conflict between the two parties along the lines of control in north-eastern Syria, particularly near Dayr Hafir, Manbij and the Tishrin Dam (all Aleppo), which will undermine bilateral talks.
  • Yemen: PLC removes STC president from government, underscoring conflict escalation risks. Earlier on 7 January, the Saudi-backed Presidential Leadership Council (PLC) removed the UAE-backed Southern Transitional Council (STC) president, Aidarus al-Zoubaidi, from the PLC, accusing him of high treason. Al-Zoubaidi failed to board a flight carrying an STC delegation to Saudi Arabia for peace talks on 6 January. The STC claims that al-Zoubaidi remains in Aden (Aden governorate), overseeing military operations. However, conflicting reports suggest he has fled and that the STC has withdrawn from several checkpoints in Aden, handing them over to the Southern Giants Brigades militia (a pro-Yemeni government militia established with the support of the UAE in 2018). Regardless, there remains a possibility that the STC will push back against Saudi-backed advances in Yemen’s south and secure Aden in the coming days. In that event, the Saudi-led coalition will almost certainly increase airstrikes against STC positions, especially in Aden, Dhale and Lahij governorates, heightening personnel security risks from direct targeting and shrapnel. Short-term escalation will likely lead to flight cancellations and transport disruption, undermining personnel evacuation. These developments reduce the likelihood of a short-term diplomatic settlement to the conflict.

EVENT

Earlier on 7 January, the US Department of Justice, Department of Homeland Security and Department of War confirmed the seizure of the Russian-flagged and Turkish-owned Marinera tanker in the Iceland-UK gap of the North Atlantic Ocean.

  • This development comes after an increasing US military build-up in UK territory, including the deployment of US special forces Pilatus U-28 Draco aircraft. Unconfirmed footage indicates that US MD-6 helicopters deployed US special forces onto the vessel. Other unconfirmed reports indicate that UK and Norwegian forces are supporting the operation in some form. Various indications suggest that a number of UK Royal Air Force (RAF) jets and P-8 Poseidon maritime patrol aircraft were deployed north of Scotland (UK) during the operation.
  • The vessel was previously sailing with the name Bella-1 under a Guyanese flag. It has since been renamed the Marinera and reflagged under Russia. The vessel had reportedly eluded previous attempts by the US Coast Guard (USCG) to board it while it was in the Caribbean Sea. It remains unclear why the boarding did not proceed when it was closer to the Caribbean region. However, the apparent deployment of special forces in the operation earlier on 7 January indicates that US military planners anticipated resistance. Therefore, they possibly had to prepare for a more complex special forces (rather than purely coast guard) operation, allowing the vessel to sail further away in the intervening days.
  • In recent weeks, the US has imposed a de facto maritime ‘blockade’ on sanctioned vessels linked to Venezuela; it has boarded a number of such vessels in the Caribbean Sea. The Marinera sailed north across the Atlantic Ocean after it failed to dock in Venezuela, likely to avoid capture. However, it has been shadowed by maritime patrol aircraft and the USCG Munro legend-class cutter.
  • Russia reportedly deployed at least one submarine and ‘other naval vessels’ to escort the tanker.
  • The US also confirmed its seizure of another Venezuela-linked sanctioned vessel in the Caribbean Sea, the M/T Sophia. The two seizures indicate that the US is committed to tightening its imposed maritime ‘blockade’ on sanctioned vessels across the region.

FORECAST

US forces (potentially alongside allied forces) likely launched the operation before Russian surface warships or submarines could establish an effective convoy, thereby reducing the risk of escalation and limiting Russia’s immediate retaliation options. While the location of these Russian naval assets remains unclear, the US likely aimed to proceed with the operation before Russian warships (particularly surface warships) could deter any US boarding attempt. Currently, Russia’s options for retaliation remain limited. We assess that Russia is unlikely to seek a kinetic confrontation with the US over the Marinera’s seizure, given the wider strategic importance of US-brokered peace talks over Ukraine. Since negotiations over Ukraine are likely to remain the Kremlin’s strategic priority, our most likely scenario involves Russia expressing diplomatic outrage at the incident in a bid to prevent a major diplomatic crisis with the US. The Russian government is likely to invoke the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS; to which the US is not a signatory) and call for freedom of passage to be upheld. However, Moscow’s options to take direct action against Washington DC remain limited. The Russian navy could move to sink the vessel in retaliation. Nevertheless, this remains unlikely, particularly if the US intends to control the Marinera (a move it has made during previous seizure operations). Instead, we assess that Russia is likely to blame Europe and specifically the UK for facilitating the operation, amid the Kremlin’s efforts to keep the US onside during Ukraine’s peace negotiations. In the medium term, the incident is likely to encourage further Russian convoying of its commercial vessels. This trend began in the Baltic Sea and across Northern European waters; its continuation will place greater pressure on the limited number of Russian surface hulls capable of conducting such operations. While Russia is unlikely to target US forces in retaliation, UK assets will be more vulnerable as potential ‘legitimate targets’ if the Kremlin wishes to escalate and demonstrate its resolve. In this more dangerous (but unlikely) scenario, Russia is more likely to target RAF or UK Royal Navy assets, or possibly those of the Royal Norwegian Navy or Air Force, given Moscow’s focus on European support for Ukraine. Furthermore, the operation comes less than 24 hours after UK Prime Minister Keir Starmer signed a declaration of intent in Paris (France) to deploy forces in Ukraine after a ceasefire. This timing will increase the risk of Russian punitive action in a bid to deter further UK efforts to contain Moscow. While an open confrontation remains unlikely, this scenario remains plausible given current UK-Russia tensions. We also assess that this incident will reinforce Russia’s interest in grey-zone operations targeting the UK in the coming months.

Jan 06.

Key points

  • Deteriorating economic conditions have triggered major anti-government protests in cities across Iran, which will likely continue in the coming days. The security and police forces will almost certainly continue to engage in violent crackdowns on demonstrations, increasing the risk of unrest.
  • In conjunction with a sustained crackdown on protests, Iran’s government is likely to make moderate economic concessions to protesters in the coming days, which will undermine anti-government activists’ capacity to mobilise large-scale protests in the coming weeks.
  • Protests will likely continue in Iran’s peripheral provinces, while mourning observances will increase the risk of further protests in early February, along with further operational disruption and unrest.
  • At present, the protests are unlikely to critically undermine government stability, moderating risks of armed conflict and regional spillover. However, there is a realistic possibility that continued unrest will trigger infighting within the security forces and government, increasing threats to government stability in the medium term.
  • Israel and the US are unlikely to launch broad airstrikes targeting Iran during the current protest movement; however, should critical threats to government stability emerge in the coming weeks, airstrikes targeting security force positions will become more likely.

Context

On 28 December 2025, merchants in the capital Tehran began strike action over deteriorating economic conditions and rapid currency devaluation. Further protests subsequently emerged in marketplaces and major cities nationwide, with thousands of university students and anti-government activists joining the demonstrations. Protests have continued daily in numerous urban centres, triggering clashes between demonstrators and the police and security forces. By 3 January, the UN had confirmed reports that the security forces have killed at least eight protesters, though activists have reported 33 fatalities including four children; Iranian state media outlets allege that the unrest has killed at least two security force personnel. Although the demonstrations have not reached the same scale, the campaign marks the most significant outbreak of protests since those following the death of Mahsa Amini in morality police custody in 2022. In response, the Iranian authorities have deployed thousands of police and security forces personnel, including members of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps’ (IRGC) Basij paramilitary, to major cities to disperse protesters. The security forces have employed tear gas, rubber bullets and live ammunition to disperse anti-government demonstrations, while also engaging in mass arrest campaigns targeting hundreds of civilians. Amid escalating clashes with the security forces, protesters have attempted to storm municipal buildings and police stations in several locations, most prominently in Azna (Lorestan province), Fasa and Marvdasht (both Fars province).

The protests reflect Iran’s worsening economic crisis, particularly following the Israel-Iran war in June. Since January 2025, the Iranian Rial (IRR) has lost over 40% of its value; on 27 December 2025 it traded at Iranian IRR 1,429,000 to the USD, a record low. Year-on-year inflation also stands at approximately 42%, while water shortages triggered supply cuts for both urban and rural areas in November and December 2025. Since US President Donald Trump began his second term in January 2025, the resumption of the ‘Maximum Pressure’ sanctions campaign has increased Iran’s isolation from global markets, compounding socio-economic concerns. Iran’s violation of its commitments to limit its nuclear programme under the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) also resulted in the re-implementation of UN sanctions in September, intensifying the economic pressure. Although President Masoud Pezeshkian and Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei have criticised the protests, both have attempted to calm the unrest by characterising protesters’ economic concerns as legitimate. To date however, these efforts have been ineffective and significant fiscal pressure continues to limit the government’s capacity to immediately address protesters’ economic concerns.

  • Yemen: Planned peace talks to moderate long-term conflict risks; diplomatic settlement possible. On 5 January, international media outlets reported that a delegation led by the UAE-backed Southern Transitional Council (STC) president, Aidarus al-Zoubaidi, plans to hold peace talks with the Saudi-backed, internationally recognised government (IRG) in Saudi Arabia. However, the exact timing of the visit remains unclear. The prospect of talks follows recent advances by IRG forces, which have retaken military sites from the STC in eastern Al-Mahrah and Hadhramaut governorates, and have claimed that their troops are advancing towards STC-controlled Aden (Aden governorate). While the prospect of peace talks will moderate the risk of a protracted long-term conflict between factions in the south and increase the likelihood of a diplomatic settlement, IRG officials have told the international media that dialogue will only begin once Aden is secured. As such, conflict risks will remain elevated in the coming days, especially in and around Aden, increasing the security risk to personnel from attacks, crossfire and arbitrary detentions at checkpoints.

Jan 05.

  • Iran: Protests will likely expand in coming days, increasing risk of arbitrary arrests, violent clashes. On 4 January, anti-government protests continued in the capital Tehran, as well as in numerous cities and towns across central and western Iran. Local human rights groups claimed that at least 16 protesters have been killed nationwide so far, amid widespread clashes with the internal security forces. Iranian opposition media outlets also claimed that the authorities had made hundreds of arbitrary arrests over the last three days. Notably, on 3 January, the governor of Qom (Qom province) claimed that one of the protesters was killed by an explosive device he had made which blew up prematurely. We assess that the protests are highly likely to continue and grow in scope over the coming days, particularly in Tehran as well as in Isfahan (Isfahan province), Mashhad (Razavi Khorasan province), Qom (Qom province), Shiraz (Fars province) and Zahedan (Sistan and Baluchestan province). Radical opposition elements will likely re-attempt to storm police stations and Basij (paramilitary) headquarters to acquire weapons, significantly increasing the risk of violent clashes. Thousands of university students are highly likely to join the protests, prompting waves of arbitrary arrests and security campaigns this week in the aforementioned locations.
  • Yemen: Escalating tensions in Aden will elevate personnel security risks from clashes, detentions. On 4 January, Yemen’s Saudi-backed internationally recognised government (IRG) accused the UAE-backed Southern Transitional Council (STC) of restricting movement and conducting mass arrests in Aden (Aden governorate). The IRG forces claimed they have retaken Mukalla (Hadramaut governorate) from the STC on 3 January, with troops advancing towards Aden. These developments will elevate security risks to personnel in and near Aden in the coming days, including exposure to attacks, crossfire and arbitrary detentions at STC checkpoints. On 2 January, the STC stated that southern Yemen will hold an independence referendum by January 2028. This announcement will heighten the short-term risk of clashes between the STC and Saudi-backed factions in southern Yemen, as well as with the Iran-backed Houthis in the north (see Sibylline Special Report – 22 December 2025). Nevertheless, we assess that the IRG’s rapid gains since 2 January underscore the STC’s faltering military and governance capacities, moderately reducing the likelihood of an effective referendum. This will possibly drive the STC to seek a diplomatic settlement to the current military engagement, moderating protracted conflict risks.

Jan 02.

  • Iran: Anti-government protests are highly likely to continue in coming days. On 1 January, anti-government protests continued for the fifth consecutive day in several Iranian cities over a record inflation rate, rising prices and deteriorating economic conditions. Hundreds of residents organised sporadic demonstrations in Isfahan (Isfahan province), Mashhad (Razavi Khorasan province), Qom (Qom province), Shiraz (Fars province), the capital Tehran and several other cities. Violent clashes between demonstrators and the internal security forces have resulted in tens of arbitrary arrests and the killing of at least six protesters. We assess that the government is likely to issue several policies to mitigate the ongoing dissent, possibly including price control measures over certain commodities. Nevertheless, the protests are highly likely to continue across Tehran and most of Iran’s major cities in the coming days. The ongoing protests will increase unrest and strike risks significantly, as well as major mobility and business disruption risks. These risks will be particularly high on 3 January, when thousands of pro-government residents will commemorate the assassination of military officer Qassem Suleimani, significantly increasing the risk of clashes with anti-government protesters.
  • Yemen: Conflict escalation will drive security risks to personnel, elevate humanitarian concerns.  Earlier on 2 January, the Saudi-backed leader of Hadhramaut governorate announced the launch of an operation to retake military positions that were seized by the UAE-backed Southern Transitional Council (STC) during its offensive in December 2025. The announcement comes amid escalating tensions between Saudi-backed and UAE-backed groups in Yemen, which heightened on 30 December 2025 when Saudi-led coalition forces struck an alleged UAE arms shipment bound for the STC in Mukalla (Hadhramaut governorate). After the incident, the UAE announced that it would withdraw its remaining ‘counter-terrorism’ forces from Yemen. At the time of writing, civilian flights from Aden International Airport (ADE; Aden governorate) remain grounded due to a diplomatic dispute between Saudi Arabia and the UAE that began on 1 January. This has resulted in widespread transport disruption and reduced evacuation capabilities for international NGO personnel. We assess that internal fragmentation is likely to persist in the coming days, including direct clashes between Saudi-backed and UAE-backed forces in Hadhramaut and Al-Mahrah governorates, driving security risks for personnel near military assets and major transport routes. The escalating conflict will almost certainly undermine local governance capacities, disrupting public services and heightening humanitarian concerns. (Source: Sibylline)

 

03 Jan 26. Saudi Arabia Bomb UAE-Backed Separatist Forces in Yemen as Government Forces Launch Operation. Saudi warplanes struck military positions held by UAE-backed separatist forces in Yemen’s Hadramout Governorate on Friday, marking another escalation of tensions between the two Gulf allies over control of the country’s oil-rich eastern provinces. The Royal Saudi Air Force conducted at least seven airstrikes on the 37th Brigade military camp in al-Khasha, according to Mohammed Abdul Malik, head of the Southern Transitional Council in Wadi Hadramout.  Additional strikes hit the First Military Region headquarters in Sayun and the city’s airport, sources told AFP. A senior STC official said the strikes caused casualties, though precise numbers were not disclosed. Al Jazeera reported that one STC member was killed and 15 wounded in clashes with Saudi-backed government forces in Sayun, located approximately 220 miles north of the coastal city of Mukalla. Hours after the strikes, the United Arab Emirates confirmed its last troops had departed Yemen.

“The UAE concluded the presence of its counterterrorism forces,” an unnamed government official told AFP.

The withdrawal came after Yemen’s internationally recognized government, backed by Saudi Arabia, demanded the UAE pull its forces within 24 hours on Tuesday. That ultimatum followed Saudi-led coalition strikes on the port of Mukalla, where officials accused the UAE of delivering ships loaded with armored vehicles, weapons and ammunition to the STC. (Source: https://www.sofx.com/)

 

06 Jan 26. Khamenei Plans to Flee to Russia if Protests in Iran Escalate. Iran’s Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei is reportedly planning to flee the country for Russia with up to 20 close aides and family members if unrest intensifies or security forces fail to contain protests, The Times reported.   The plan reportedly includes securing assets, properties abroad, and cash for their escape. Protests over soaring inflation have continued for a ninth day across 222 locations in Iran, leaving more than 20 dead and nearly 1,000 arrested, according to US-based Human Rights Activists News Agency. (Source: https://www.sofx.com/)

 

06 Jan 26. Israel Strikes Hezbollah, Hamas Sites in Lebanon. Israel launched strikes Monday on Hezbollah and Hamas positions in eastern and southern Lebanon.  The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) said the operation included four strikes targeting militant infrastructure, including two underground Hezbollah facilities. The strikes followed evacuation warnings in Hammara, Ain el-Tineh, Kfar Hatta, and Aanan. In an announcement urging residents to evacuate, Israeli military spokesperson Col. Avichay Adraee said the operations targeted Hezbollah sites in response to the group’s attempts to reestablish activity in the region. In a subsequent post, he said that Hamas sites were also among the targets. (Source: https://www.sofx.com/)

 

03 Jan 26. Israel Strikes Hezbollah Training Compound, Weapons Sites in Southern Lebanon. Israeli warplanes carried out approximately 20 airstrikes across southern Lebanon on Friday, targeting what the military said was a training compound used by Hezbollah’s elite Radwan Force along with structures used to store weapons. The Israel Defense Forces said the training site was used by Radwan operatives for live-fire drills and weapons instruction intended to plan and execute attacks against Israeli forces and civilians. “The terrorist operatives were undergoing firearms training and instruction in the use of various combat means,” IDF spokesman Avichay Adraee said on X. The military said it also struck additional Hezbollah “structures” recently used for weapons storage. Lebanon’s official National News Agency reported Israeli aircraft launched “violent airstrikes” targeting the Aqmata Plain and the outskirts of al-Rayhan in the Jabal al-Rayhan area. Minutes later, another wave of strikes hit the area between the village of Ansar and the town of Zrarieh. The valleys between the villages of Kafrwa and Aazza in the Nabatieh District were also struck, according to NNA. A Lebanese army intelligence source reportedly told Xinhua that Israeli warplanes launched more than 35 air-to-ground missiles, “causing massive explosions whose echoes reverberated across most areas of the south.” Videos circulating on social media showed large plumes of smoke rising from the struck areas. The IDF said Hezbollah’s conduct, including training and entrenchment near the border, violates the ceasefire framework that has been in effect since November 27, 2024, and poses a direct threat to Israel.

“The IDF will continue to operate in order to remove any threat to the State of Israel,” the military said in a statement.

Despite the ceasefire agreement, Israel has continued to conduct strikes in Lebanon, saying they target Hezbollah threats. (Source: https://www.sofx.com/)

 

02 Jan 26.  U.S. and Allied Forces Kill, Capture 25 ISIS Fighters in Syria. Nearly 25 ISIS operatives were killed or captured in Syria this month following the Dec. 13 ambush in Syria that killed two U.S. troops and an American civilian interpreter. In a statement, CENTCOM said the operations conducted from Dec. 20 to 29 included strikes against senior and lower-level ISIS members, as well as the elimination of four weapons caches. At least seven ISIS fighters were killed and 11 captured during the operation. A U.S. official told Military.com that growing cooperation with Syria’s new government has allowed U.S. forces to strike ISIS in areas where they had not previously operated. The recent operations followed earlier U.S. strikes targeting 70 ISIS sites across central Syria, which came after President Donald Trump vowed “very serious retaliation” for the Dec. 13 attack on U.S. forces, who at the time were conducting counter-ISIS and counterterrorism operations in the region. Though no group claimed responsibility, Trump identified ISIS as the perpetrator.

“We will not relent,” said CENTCOM commander Adm. Brad Cooper. “We are steadfast in commitment to working with regional partners to root out the ISIS threat posed to U.S. and regional security.”

According to CENTCOM, ISIS inspired at least 11 plots or attacks against targets in the U.S. in 2025.

Over the past 12 months, CENTCOM operations against ISIS have resulted in the deaths of more than 20 fighters and the detention of over 300. (Source: https://www.sofx.com/)

 

02 Jan 26. U.S.-Led Coalition Forces to Withdraw from Iraq’s Ain al-Asad Base Next Week.  The U.S.-led coalition fighting ISIS will withdraw from the Ain al-Asad Air Base in Iraq’s Anbar province next week.  Lt. Gen. Qais al-Mohammadi, deputy commander of the Joint Operations Command said the withdrawal will involve a full handover of the base to Iraqi forces.

“Ain al-Asad will witness a full withdrawal next week and be transferred to our Iraqi units,” Mohammadi said, calling the move a success for Iraqi capabilities and sovereignty.

Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammed Shia al-Sudani said in September that coalition forces are no longer needed in the region, though Iraq plans bilateral defense agreements with some members, including the U.S. Mohammadi said ISIS has lost its ability to plan, operate, control territory or affect security. The group carried out only four attacks in 2025, down from 42 in 2024, and all were deemed ineffective. Ain al-Asad Air Base has frequently been targeted by Iran-aligned militias that oppose the U.S. presence in the region. Even after Iraq’s 2017 victory over ISIS, roughly 2,500 U.S. troops remain in Iraq. They are stationed near Baghdad International Airport and at Irbil Air Base in the Kurdistan Region. (Source: https://www.sofx.com/)

 

05 Jan 26. British, French Jets Target ISIS Weapons Facility in Syria. British and French warplanes struck an underground ISIS facility said to be storing weapons and explosives in Syria’s Homs province Saturday evening.  In a statement, the U.K. said British Typhoon FGR4 jets, armed with Paveway IV bombs and supported by a Voyager tanker, carried out the strike alongside French aircraft. Initial reports indicate the attack was successful with no civilian casualties. (Source: https://www.sofx.com/)

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Founded in 1987, Exensor Technology is a world leading supplier of Networked Unattended Ground Sensor (UGS) Systems providing tailored sensor solutions to customers all over the world. From our Headquarters in Lund Sweden, our centre of expertise in Network Communications at Communications Research Lab in Kalmar Sweden and our Production site outside of Basingstoke UK, we design, develop and produce latest state of the art rugged UGS solutions at the highest quality to meet the most stringent demands of our customers. Our systems are in operation and used in a wide number of Military as well as Home land Security applications worldwide. The modular nature of the system ensures any external sensor can be integrated, providing the user with a fully meshed “silent” network capable of self-healing. Exensor Technology will continue to lead the field in UGS technology, provide our customers with excellent customer service and a bespoke package able to meet every need.

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