NEWS IN BRIEF – UKRAINE CONFLICT

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Military And Security Developments

Jan 16.

• Ukraine: Defence entities face heightened security risks from Russian state actors. On 13 January, international news outlets reported that Russian state-sponsored group ‘Void Blizzard’ targeted Ukrainian defence officials in a cyber operation between October and December 2025. Void Blizzard distributed phishing messages via the popular messaging platforms Signal and WhatsApp as an initial attack vector, tricking victims into downloading a password-protected archive. The archive contains malicious executables that are responsible for deploying a backdoor (‘PluggyApe’) onto compromised systems to ultimately facilitate reconnaissance, persistence and remote code execution. Throughout December 2025, the group reportedly used a new version of PluggyApe which boasts more sophisticated obfuscation techniques, highlighting the malware’s continued development. This operation likely relied on extensive research since it used the Ukrainian language and legitimate mobile operators to enhance authenticity and tailor attacks. Consequently, we assess that Ukrainian military and defence entities will continue to face heightened security risks amid the ongoing Russo-Ukrainian war.
• Ukraine: Two-tier EU membership proposal will likely face strong opposition from member states. Earlier on 16 January, the Financial Times reported that the European Commission (EC) is drafting a proposal to replace the EU’s current accession framework with a two-tier membership model designed to accelerate Ukraine’s path to joining the bloc. Under the proposal, Kyiv would be fast-tracked into the EU but would initially be granted limited decision-making powers, with full voting rights withheld. The EC’s plan would allow Ukraine to gain gradual access to the single market, as well as to the EU’s agricultural subsidies and other internal development funds, provided it meets key post-accession requirements. EU membership is a key element of the peace talks and features in Ukraine’s revised 20-point peace plan. As such, the EC’s proposal is likely aimed at facilitating peace negotiations by providing a tangible outcome for Ukraine if a peace agreement is reached. This would possibly offset other more contentious elements of a settlement, including mooted territorial concessions. However, we assess that several EU member states are highly likely to oppose such a deal, while Kyiv is also expected to remain initially reluctant to accept this system.

Jan 15.

• Ukraine: Deepening energy crisis will worsen humanitarian situation, elevate business disruption. On 14 January, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky declared a state of emergency in Ukraine’s energy sector, with particular emphasis on the situation in the capital Kyiv. The associated measures include the establishment of a headquarters in Kyiv tasked with overseeing the authorities’ response to the energy crisis. Additional steps include deregulating procedures for connecting back-up power equipment, securing the provision of necessary equipment and obtaining additional support from Ukraine’s allies. Zelensky also highlighted efforts to increase energy imports and to review curfew regulations. Russia has intensified its strike campaign against Ukraine’s energy grid in recent weeks, with Kyiv among the most heavily affected areas. The declaration of a state of emergency in the energy sector underscores the severe degradation of Ukraine’s energy infrastructure, with the country facing its most challenging winter since the onset of the war. Amid the ongoing crisis, disruption to business operations is likely to remain elevated, while the humanitarian situation is expected to deteriorate further.
• Kazakhstan: West will unlikely take effective measures to protect vessels in Black Sea in near term. On 14 January, Kazakhstan’s foreign ministry called on Europe and the US to help secure the transport of oil following an uptick in drone attacks on tankers in the Black Sea. As per the ministry, on 13 January, three tankers were targeted by unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) en route to a Caspian Pipeline Consortium (CPC) terminal on the Russian coast to load Kazakh oil. As a result of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, the Black Sea has become increasingly militarised and Ukrainian attacks against Russian energy infrastructure have impacted Kazakhstan’s oil exports in late 2025. Ultimately, it remains unlikely that Europe and/or the US would be willing (or able) to implement measures to guarantee the security of tankers in the near term given concerns about military confrontation with Russia. In fact, European states are discussing tightening sanctions enforcement and even seizing Russian-linked shipping. Instead, we assess that conflict spillover will likely continue to impact Kazakhstan’s oil exports. This will moderately reduce Western investor interest in the Central Asian state’s energy sector for the duration of the war.

Jan 14.

• Russia-Ukraine: Persistent conflict spillover risks will complicate insurance for Black Sea shipping. On 13 January, unidentified drones struck two oil tankers in the Black Sea en route to a terminal exporting Kazakh oil on the Russian coast. According to several unspecified insiders, both vessels were bound for the Yuzhnaya Ozereyevka terminal, which is operated by the Caspian Pipeline Consortium (CPC) near Russia’s port city of Novorossiysk (Krasnodar krai). Ukraine has been targeting Russian energy infrastructure to increase pressure on Russia’s war effort; this terminal came under attack in late November 2025. Also on 13 January, Reuters reported that war insurance for vessels sailing to Black Sea terminals has risen to 1% of the ship’s value, an increase from the 0.6% to 0.8% rates in late December 2025. We assess that given the continued threats of war spillover in the Black Sea, insurance rates are likely to remain volatile and subject to spikes for the duration of the Russo-Ukrainian war. Furthermore, insurers with limited risk appetite could realistically be more reluctant to offer insurance or could require terms to be reviewed more frequently.
• Ukraine: Bribery probe into former prime minister will further erode public trust in institutions. On 13 January, Ukraine’s National Anti-Corruption Bureau (NABU) and the Specialized Anti-Corruption Prosecutor’s Office (SAPO) reported that they were uncovering a bribery scheme involving the head of a parliamentary faction. Former prime minister and Batkivshchyna party leader Yulia Tymoshenko confirmed that she is the target of the investigation and that searches were conducted at her party’s premises. According to investigators, the suspect organised a long-term systematic scheme to bribe MPs through advance payments in exchange for controlled voting behaviour. Tymoshenko has rejected the allegations, describing the probe as politically motivated and intended to weaken the opposition. In 2025, Tymoshenko – who has previously faced other corruption allegations – backed a government-proposed bill that aimed to curtail NABU and SAPO’s independence. We assess that the institutions’ probe is unlikely to be politically motivated. Instead, the investigation likely points to persistent corrupt practices among political officials. This will continue to undermine public trust in state institutions, especially given the recent large-scale corruption scandal in the energy sector. Nevertheless, protest risks remain low.

Jan 13.

KEY DEVELOPMENTS

• STRIKES: We assess that Russia’s recent use of its Oreshnik intermediate-range ballistic missile (IRBM) was part of a strategic messaging effort aimed at deterring future European troop deployments to Ukraine
• MARITIME: The UK government has identified legal grounds that allow for the military to board and detain vessels operating as part of ‘shadow fleets’, indicating that a tightening of UK sanctions against Russia is likely
• GUARANTEES: Despite France and the UK agreeing to send troops to Ukraine at a meeting of the so-called Coalition of the Willing on 6 January, such a deployment is unlikely in the event of a peace deal
• FORECAST: Ukraine is currently experiencing one of the harshest heating seasons since the start of the war, as Russia’s intense strikes against the country’s energy grid triggers widespread blackouts and business disruptions
• OFFENSIVES: Despite recent reports, a large Russian offensive in the direction of Sumy (Sumy oblast) remains unlikely, with Russian forces likely to remain focused on other priority fronts. On 11 January, the 7th Corps of Ukraine’s Airborne Assault Forces stated that Russian forces are attempting to create a beachhead for new offensive operations, possibly setting the stage for an advance towards Sumy. Previously in December 2025, Russian forces launched a series of cross-border attacks into Sumy oblast (see Sibylline Ukraine Update – 23 December 2025). Over the past week, Russian forces have continued offensive operations around recently occupied areas in the oblast. However, a prominent Russian milblogger noted that despite the recent uptick in the intensity of operations, Sumy remains secondary and an offensive is unlikely.
• OFFENSIVES: We assess that a more substantial offensive in the near term is unlikely to utilise the sufficient resources to pose a serious threat to Sumy. According to the above-mentioned Russian source, Russian forces remain focused on other axes, including the Lyman direction in Donetsk oblast and Zaporizhzhia oblast in the direction of Huliapole. In Huliapole, Russian forces have continued to make slow but steady advances in recent weeks; they are likely now in control of around half the city.
• STRIKES: Over the past week, Russia has continued its long-range strike campaign, heavily targeting Ukraine’s critical infrastructure and causing significant disruption to energy, heating and water supplies. For more analysis on the impact of Russian strikes, please see FORECAST below.
• STRIKES: We assess that Russia’s recent use of its Oreshnik intermediate-range ballistic missile (IRBM) was part of a strategic messaging effort aimed at projecting strength. On 9 January, Russia’s Ministry of Defence (MoD) announced that it had launched an Oreshnik at Lviv (Lviv oblast) overnight, near the Polish border. This was part of a larger strike package and was the second of its kind (the first occurred in December 2024 targeting Dnipro; Dnipropetrovsk oblast). Russia claimed that the Oreshnik missile hit and disabled an aircraft repair plant in Lviv. Allegedly, the plant carries out repairs and maintenance of the Ukrainian armed forces’ aviation equipment, including US-supplied F-16 and MiG-29 aircraft transferred by Western countries.
• STRIKES: Russia claimed that the Oreshnik attack on Lviv was a response to an alleged Ukrainian strike against one of Russia’s presidential residences in late December 2025. We previously forecast high-intensity Russian ‘retaliation’ after the alleged strike in Novgorod oblast (Russia; see Sibylline Alert – 30 December 2025). The attack occurred shortly after the US confirmed the seizure of a Russian-flagged vessel in the Atlantic Ocean. The launch also follows the latest meeting of the so-called Coalition of the Willing in France on 6 January, which focused on post-war security guarantees for Ukraine. At the summit, France and the UK signed a letter of intent to deploy troops to Ukraine in the event of a peace agreement (see GUARANTEES below).
• STRIKES: The Oreshnik strike was likely intended as retaliation for the vessel’s seizure and especially to deter Western countries considering sending troops to Ukraine. Lviv’s choice as the target was highly likely intended to demonstrate Russia’s ability to strike anywhere in Ukraine, including areas close to NATO’s border. Therefore, the Oreshnik launch was highly likely intended as a warning to the UK and France that any military deployments – even those positioned far from the frontline – would be regarded as ‘legitimate targets’ for Russian long-range systems.
• STRIKES: Since 2024, Ukraine has extended the maximum radius of its long-range drone strikes, increasing the threat to high-value facilities inside Russia, including targets located more than 621 miles (1,000km) from the frontline. Long-range drone strikes in 2024 were sporadic and largely experimental. They produced mixed effects and relied on the Aeroprakt A-22 in some cases, a Ukrainian light civilian aircraft converted into an unmanned aerial system (UAS) for some attacks. These operations became more systematic in 2025, driven by technological improvements and the introduction of the E-300 Enterprise drone, reportedly based on the Skyranger Ninja aircraft. Reportedly, these drones were employed in repeated attacks against selected targets across Russia. Additionally, Ukraine has continued to upgrade existing drone systems to achieve greater ranges, as demonstrated by enhancements to platforms such as the Liutyi drone, which has been involved in several long-range strikes. We assess that major disruption to Russian oil and military facilities is likely to continue in 2026 as Ukraine escalates its drone campaign in a bid to deter or retaliate against Russian long-range strikes.

POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS

• MARITIME: As of 11 January, the UK government has identified legal grounds that allow for the military to board and detain vessels operating as part of ‘shadow fleets’, indicating that a tightening of UK sanctions against Russia is likely. Unspecified ministers reportedly believe that the Sanctions and Money Laundering Act 2018 can be used to approve the use of military force against any sanctioned vessel that is not correctly flagged. Officials reportedly claim that this mechanism would have applied to the Russia-flagged Marinera tanker (previously named Bella-1) that the US seized last week with the support of the UK. According to the BBC, there are plans for the British armed forces to use these powers to crack down on these ships, after UK Defence Secretary John Healey pledged to tackle the network of shadow vessels operated by Russia. The Times reported on 12 January that British special forces, namely the Royal Navy’s Special Boat Service (SBS), are preparing for such missions.
• MARITIME: A British move to seize significant numbers of Russian-linked vessels would enhance the effectiveness of sanctions against Russia, given that the shadow fleet has, until now, effectively allowed Moscow to circumvent sanctions and continue selling hydrocarbons. The justification for any British seizure of a vessel would require the UK to establish that it is legally stateless (i.e. is not legitimately registered to any country), is flying a false flag or has been disowned by the country under whose flag the vessel is claiming to sail.
• MARITIME: While this does not give the UK carte blanche to seize any vessel, it is estimated that 107 shadow fleet vessels currently fall into these legal categories; as of last week, an estimated 11 such Russia-linked sanctioned vessels were transiting the English Channel. While Russia will likely seek to convoy its vessels to deter any boarding by British authorities, it faces some key obstacles. The nature of the shadow fleet (it being highly dispersed, with complex legal and flagging arrangements) and the fact that the UK and its allies control key maritime chokepoints (namely the English Channel and the Danish Straits) will present serious problems for Russia if seizures begin to chip away at the shadow fleet. It is possible that the UK will seek to launch an operation to help build a legal consensus, with Denmark, the Netherlands and Norway among the most likely to support such an operation.
• MARITIME: However, the seizure of Russian-flagged or -linked shipping will also increase the threat of retaliation, including not only grey-zone threats to the UK mainland but also the harassment of British-linked shipping. We assess that Northern European waters (including the North Sea and Baltic Sea) and the Black Sea will remain the most likely locations for hostile Russian actions towards UK-linked maritime interests. Harassment could realistically involve Russia flying aircraft or drones in proximity to commercial vessels, jamming attempts, intimidation by warships or ‘constabulary’ boarding (and possible seizure). At the same time, repeated UK seizures of sanctioned vessels will moderately increase the risk of Russia using maritime drones against strategically significant ports, including Felixstowe (Suffolk county, UK). We will continue to monitor the situation, but for further analysis of maritime drone threats and Russian grey-zone activity, see Sibylline Situation Update Brief – 1 October 2025.
• GUARANTEES: Despite France and the UK agreeing to send troops to Ukraine at a meeting of the so-called Coalition of the Willing on 6 January, such a deployment is unlikely in the event of a peace deal. According to a press release of the declaration of intent published by the UK government, the ‘Multinational Force-Ukraine’ (MNF-U) would seek to deter Russia from resuming hostilities in the future. The statement acknowledges that the MNF-U would conduct ‘deterrence operations’ in the air, on land, at sea, as well as assist with training, planning and force regeneration. France and the UK have been at the forefront of discussions about sending troops to Ukraine in recent months. The declaration formalises their past pledges, though details remain limited.
• GUARANTEES: Russia has long opposed the presence of Western troops in Ukraine, and this is highly likely a non-starter for Russia; as such, it is more likely that an MNF-U would deploy in the absence of a peace deal, rather than as part of one. The Russian foreign ministry said on 7 January that Russia would view any such deployment as ‘foreign intervention’, echoing past comments about Western forces being ‘legitimate targets’. We assess that the recent Oreshnik strike against Lviv, close to the NATO border in Poland, was almost certainly a signal to London and Paris that any future deployment could be hit by Russian nuclear-capable missiles (see STRIKES above). Ultimately, such threats are almost certainly aimed at deterring countries from sending troops to Ukraine. At the same time, concerns about the US’ willingness (or lack thereof) to support any such reassurance force and provide a credible backstop will also likely discourage other countries from committing troops to Ukraine in the near term. No other countries have yet come out in support of the Franco-British proposals.
• GUARANTEES: Official details remain unknown regarding the number of personnel both France and the UK would be willing (and, more crucially, able) to commit to such a deployment. According to an article published by The Times on 7 January, France and the UK would possibly send up to 15,000 soldiers. Unspecified military insiders claimed that London will dispatch fewer than 7,500 troops, which they assess would likely strain already-stretched resources. Various estimates indicate that the British Army comprises around 73,000 regular full-time personnel, with manpower and equipment continuing to decline. Meanwhile, French President Emmanuel Macron’s declining popularity and domestic political instability would likely undermine his ability to send a large contingent of soldiers to Ukraine.
• GUARANTEES: Even if such a force was to deploy to Ukraine, it is uncertain what the rules for engagement with Russia would be (if it were to attack Ukraine again). Russia has consistently stated that any such troops would be ‘legitimate targets’. The Franco-British press release notes that the MNF-U would be empowered to use ‘necessary means’, including force, to protect its troops, equipment and infrastructure. The locations in which the force would operate are also yet to be determined, with the UK’s statement disclosing that ‘military hubs’ would be established (effectively meaning military bases).
• GUARANTEES: Amongst Russia’s primary justifications for its invasion of Ukraine in 2022 was the perceived need to prevent the establishment of NATO bases and deployments inside Ukraine. While Western deployments would highly likely be away from the frontline, any such deployment would, by its very nature, be entirely contrary to the objectives of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. As such, without Russia facing military defeat on the battlefield, it remains extremely unlikely that Moscow would agree to any Western troop deployments to Ukraine as part of a peace settlement, as this would undermine one of the claimed objectives for which it has been fighting for almost four years. Nevertheless, the declaration underscores British and French commitment to Ukraine, though such deployments are unlikely to form part of a serious peace deal involving Russia.

FORECAST

ENERGY: Ukraine is currently experiencing one of the harshest heating seasons since the start of the war; Russia’s intense strikes against the country’s energy grid and other critical infrastructure are triggering widespread blackouts and business disruption. Recent attacks have heavily impacted the capital Kyiv and its surrounding oblast. Following the 9 January strike, which severely damaged all the capital’s thermal power plants and numerous substations, around 6,000 buildings were left without heating. A subsequent mass Russian strike overnight on 12-13 January left approximately 70% of the capital without power. Meanwhile, these outages have also disrupted water and sewage systems and affected hospitals, public transport and road management, including traffic lights. Other heavily targeted regions include those comprising eastern and frontline oblasts, as well as Odesa oblast in the south.

The process of carrying out repairs to the damaged energy grid remains a highly complex endeavour due to harsh weather conditions and the scale of the destruction inflicted by Russian strikes. A Ukrainian energy expert noted that Ukraine lacks critical spare parts for combined heat and power plants, which Russia has deliberately targeted (as we previously forecast). Meanwhile, private energy operators have warned that the functioning parts of the energy grid are overloaded, rendering further outages inevitable. In addition, daily Russian attacks are further complicating efforts to repair infrastructure, especially as Russian drone operators have reportedly been targeting Ukrainian repair crews, further undermining restoration operations and long-term resilience.

In addition to the humanitarian impact, the significant energy disruption has had a severe effect on businesses, forcing production halts and necessitating operational adaptations that threaten business continuity. Such disruption has particularly undermined industrial output in heavily targeted areas, such as the south-eastern parts of Zaporizhzhia and Dnipropetrovsk oblasts. For instance, in Kryvyi Rih (Dnipropetrovsk) the steelmaker ArcelorMittal reported a temporary suspension of production, while Zaporizhstal in Zaporizhzhia reported similar disruption. Meanwhile, the severe disruption to energy supplies has significantly impacted the service sector, leading to widespread closures, while also threatening business continuity and promoting substantial financial losses.

The chronic strain on Ukraine’s air defence resources is likely to continue facilitating Russia’s strike campaign throughout 2026, including for the duration of the winter period. On 11 January, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky emphasised the need for Ukraine’s allies to transfer additional stockpiles of air defence missiles. His comments highlight a likely shortage of interceptors, despite recent deliveries of air defence systems by various partners (which remain insufficient to sustain Ukraine’s defences against Russia’s ongoing strike campaign). We assess that Russia will continue to leverage its expanding drone and missile production capabilities to implement a saturation strategy aimed at depleting Ukraine’s air defence capabilities. Although highly capable, most Western-provided air defence systems rely on expensive munitions. Against relatively low-cost Russian projectiles, the cost-effectiveness of these systems remains limited, with Western countries unable to resupply Ukrainian forces at scale.

• Russian threat actors pose increased data-theft risks to strategic adversarial sectors. On 12 January, international news outlets reported that the renowned Russian state-sponsored group ‘APT28’ (also known as ‘Fancy Bear’) has targeted the energy, government, military and media sectors in a large-scale data-theft cyber operation since at least February 2025. APT28 likely uses spear phishing emails to trick victims into visiting APT28-made pages that impersonate legitimate email and authentication services. These malicious pages prompt victims to input their credentials. Subsequently, APT28 uses several free services to facilitate data exfiltration, highlighting the cyber operation’s resource-efficient nature. Reportedly, the group also displays legitimate-looking PDF documents pertaining to the sector’s expertise before the phishing pages, likely to enhance the cyber operation’s legitimacy. We assess that APT28 likely uses stolen credentials to hijack user accounts in order to collect strategic intelligence and strengthen its security posture. We assess that this cyber operation will increase security and data-theft risks to the above-mentioned targeted sectors amid ongoing geopolitical hostilities.
• UK-Russia: Possible seizure of Russian shadow vessels will raise harassment risks for UK shipping. On 12 January, The Times reported that UK special forces have been notified of possible deployments to seize Russian shadow fleet vessels. UK officials have reportedly identified a legal mechanism under the Sanctions and Anti-Money Laundering Act 2018 which could allow UK military personnel to board and detain sanctioned vessels sailing without a legitimate flag. Under maritime law, stateless vessels are viable targets for seizure; The Times estimates that there are least 107 UK-sanctioned vessels sailing under false state flags. No official information has been released regarding the target, timeframe or location of a possible operation. However, UK Defence Secretary John Healey’s pledge to ‘clamp down’ on Russia’s illegal shipping network during a visit to Kyiv (Ukraine) on 9 January indicates a growing willingness to seize a tanker in coming weeks (possibly with allied support). We assess that such an intervention will highly likely reinforce Russia’s intention to target the UK with grey-zone operations in the coming months and will increase the risk of retaliatory harassment of shipping – particularly following the UK’s assistance in the US-led seizure of the Marinera tanker on 7 January

Jan 12.

• Ukraine: Widespread energy outages will undermine business operations in Kyiv in coming weeks. On 11 January, Vitaliy Klitschko, the mayor of Ukraine’s capital Kyiv, warned of the city’s deteriorating energy situation as a result of Russian long-range strikes. In particular, a large-scale strike on 9 January severely disrupted heating, electricity and water supplies across the capital. In the aftermath, the city authorities acknowledged difficulties in restoring heating and electricity in some areas, prompting Klitschko to urge residents, where possible, to evacuate temporarily to locations with alternative sources of power. Russia’s systematic strike campaign against energy and other critical infrastructure, combined with low winter temperatures, has triggered escalating energy and heating challenges nationwide, leaving Ukraine facing one of the harshest heating seasons since the start of the war. Moscow is almost certain to continue its strike campaign at the current intensity, characterised by routine daily and semi-regular high-intensity strikes. As a result, we assess that blackouts and major knock-on disruptions to business operations, including water and heating outages, are highly likely to continue over the coming month. (For more analysis of Russia’s strike campaign, (Source: Sibylline)

 

16 Jan 26. UK industry support to Ukraine supercharged with new business centre. A new business centre will open in Kyiv this year to ensure Britain’s cutting-edge defence industry and innovators can step up their work to equip Ukraine’s Armed Forces in their fight against Putin’s illegal invasion.

• A new centre for industry will help UK firms support Ukraine’s Armed Forces against Putin’s illegal invasion.
• Based in Kyiv, the centre will supercharge UK support as nations mark the first anniversary of UK-Ukraine 100-Year Partnership.
• Builds on successful existing UK-Ukraine industry partnerships including the Octopus interceptor drone.

A new business centre will open in Kyiv this year to ensure Britain’s cutting-edge defence industry and innovators can step up their work to equip Ukraine’s Armed Forces in their fight against Putin’s illegal invasion.   Backed by three years of UK Government funding, the facility will help deliver good jobs across the UK by opening up new markets for UK defence companies, especially small and medium sized businesses. On its first anniversary, it is a clear demonstration of the 100 Year Partnership in action – establishing stronger and closer defence cooperation and industrial bases.   The realities of Russia’s brutal invasion mean that travel restrictions, security, insurance requirements and suitable premises make it complicated for smaller UK companies to operate in Ukraine. The new centre will help address some of these challenges to ensure British companies of all sizes can provide Ukraine with the vital equipment they need in their fight.

Defence Secretary John Healey MP said: “An Armed Forces is only as strong as the industry that stands behind them, and our brilliant British industry and innovators are already playing a vital role in sustaining Ukraine’s courageous fight against Putin’s illegal invasion.   This new centre will supercharge that and ensure that British companies, no matter how small, can support Ukraine in the fight today and to secure the peace we hope to see tomorrow. This facility will deliver good jobs at home and bring Ukrainian and UK defence industries closer than ever while embedding the lessons from the battlefield.”

UK and Ukrainian industry and governments are already working in close partnership. The rapid production of British-built Octopus interceptor drones will begin this month, boosting Ukraine’s ability to defend itself against Russian drone attacks on civilians and critical infrastructure.   Designed to take out Russian Shaheeds and other weapons at a fraction of the cost, the UK will produce thousands of Octopus drones per month, building on the UK’s £600 million investment in Ukraine’s air defence this year, part of the Ministry of Defence’s £4.5 billion military support package.   Led by the UK Ministry of Defence’s National Armaments Director (NAD) Group, the centre is being launched on the first anniversary of the UK-Ukraine 100 Year Partnership and follows the UK’s Defence Industrial Strategy published last year. The landmark industrial strategy will drive defence as an engine for growth across the nation.   The centre demonstrates the UK delivering on the Strategic Defence Review’s ambition for UK innovation driven by lessons from Ukraine, including harnessing drones, data, and digital warfare to make our Armed Forces stronger and safer.

UK National Armaments Director Rupert Pearce said: “Economic strength and national security are inseparable. This centre will enable British companies, to partner with Ukraine and deliver the defence solutions they need now. This is the 100 Year Partnership in action – strengthening our industrial ties and proving why the UK remains Ukraine’s closest and most reliable ally.”

Expected to open later this year in secure facilities in Kyiv, the centre will provide an export and matching service to give potential companies clear information on Ukraine’s requirements so British innovators and industry can support the Armed Forces urgent warfighting needs.   With innovation cycles on the battlefield measured in days and weeks, companies will also be provided with the latest data to ensure lessons are learned and embedded to keep Ukraine ahead of the enemy.   The announcement follows a number of trade missions led by the UK Government to Ukraine to drive industrial collaboration and support Ukraine’s fight against Putin’s illegal invasion.   The Ministry of Defence is working with industry and industry bodies to establish the hub and ensure it meets the needs of the businesses who will use it. Further details will be provided in the coming weeks. (Source: https://www.gov.uk/)

 

14 Jan 26. Ukraine’s new defence minister vows innovation on battlefield.

Summary

• Zelenskiy orders fast decisions for air defence, supplies
• Ukraine extends martial law, mobilisation until May
• Fedorov pledges innovation, reforms in military structure

Ukraine’s parliament appointed young technocrat Mykhailo Fedorov as defence minister on Wednesday as the government seeks to drive innovation to strengthen the military during a difficult phase of the nearly four-year war. President Volodymyr Zelenskiy said he had ordered Fedorov, 34, to implement fast decisions to protect Ukraine’s skies, strengthen supplies to the front line and introduce other technological solutions to stop Russian advances. The Reuters Gulf Currents newsletter brings you the latest on geopolitics, energy and finance in the region. Sign up here.

“We immediately identified the first priorities for the ministry of defence. The main one is air defence,” Zelenskiy said in a post on X after meeting Fedorov.

The exhausted Ukrainian army is outmanned and outgunned on the battlefield after Russia’s invasion in February 2022. Russian forces are steadily grinding forward in the eastern Donetsk region and trying to punch through defence lines in the south and northeast. With diplomatic efforts to end the war failing to produce tangible results, Kyiv needs to strengthen its armed forces, which total around 1m personnel.

Zelenskiy said “much broader changes” were needed in the system for mobilising troops for the war.

“Decisions have already been made to ensure a more equitable distribution of personnel among combat brigades,” he said.

Parliament voted to extend martial law and mobilisation until May, the 18th time since Russia’s full-scale invasion.

NEW DEFENCE CHIEF TO DRIVE INNOVATION

Fedorov has already played an important role in shaping Ukraine’s high-tech response to Russia’s invasion in previous roles as the first deputy prime minister and digital transformation minister.

“Today, it is impossible to fight with new technologies using an old organisational structure,” Fedorov told lawmakers before the vote, promising sweeping changes.

“Our goal is to change the system: to reform the army, improve infrastructure on the front lines, eradicate lies and corruption, and make leadership and trust a new culture.”

Fedorov was instrumental in creating a “drone line” — a defensive line of drones meant to inflict maximum damage on Russian troops. He also helped improve connectivity for Ukraine’s forces at the front line by deploying Starlink terminals. Along with strengthening its defence efforts, Ukraine needs to implement big changes to stabilise the battered energy sector. Parliament appointed Denys Shmyhal, a former prime minister, as the new energy minister. Shmyhal, one of the country’s most experienced government officials, faces the dual challenge of keeping Ukraine’s lights on despite heavy Russian attacks while also cleaning up the energy sector. His predecessor was dismissed in November after anti-corruption agencies uncovered a scheme to skim $100 m from Ukraine’s state nuclear energy company. Both new ministers take up their positions weeks after a corruption scandal in the energy sector that caused Ukraine’s biggest wartime political crisis and led to widespread public anger at Zelenskiy’s government. Following that, Zelenskiy replaced several security officials and placed a popular spy chief at the centre of his administration as his chief of staff. (Source: Reuters)

 

15 Jan 26. Spain approves manufacture and delivery of Indra’s Lanza LTR-25 radar to Ukraine. Spain’s Council of Ministers approved a EUR37 m (USD43.1 m) deal with Indra Group for the manufacture and supply of one of its Lanza Long-Range Tactical Radar 25 (LTR-25) systems to Ukraine, according to a 13 January summary from the Council of Ministers. The contract includes logistical support and will run until 31 December 2026, although no delivery timeline was given by the council. The system is intended to strengthen Ukraine’s anti-aircraft capabilities. The LTR-25 is an L-band (1–2 GHz) 3D long-range air-surveillance radar system with a range of up to 240 n mile (approximately 444 km), as per Janes C4ISR & Mission Systems: Land . The radar integrates a 3D primary surveillance radar based on a pencil beam architecture. The target co-ordinates provided by the LTR-25 include target altitude (3D coverage), according to Indra. Some of the radars in the Lanza family have electronic counter-countermeasures (ECCM) capabilities, anti-clutter capabilities, digital signal and data processing, and tactical ballistic missile (TBM) detection and tracking. The LTR-25 can be transported by two trucks or one C-130 cargo aircraft. (Source: Janes)

 

13 Jan 26. US-Made Tempest Air Defense System First Spotted with Hellfire Missiles in Ukraine. Ukraine’s Air Force appears to be operating the U.S.-made Tempest, a high-mobility air defense vehicle armed with AGM-114 Hellfire missiles to counter Russian drones. Footage from the Air Force Command Center shows two Hellfires being launched at drone-like targets, though the system has not been identified. (Source: https://www.sofx.com/)

 

12 Jan 26. Britain aims to arm Ukraine with new shoot-and-scoot ballistic missile system. Standing in front of a blackened block of flats in Kyiv, Defence Secretary John Healey saw first-hand the devastation wrought by Russia’s arsenal of drones and ballistic missiles. With temperatures plunging to -20°C, Moscow has bombarded Ukrainian cities with waves of drones and missiles, targeting key infrastructure and cutting heat and light to thousands of homes. President Volodymyr Zelensky has repeatedly asked for more long-range weaponry to hit back. American Tomahawks and German Taurus cruise missiles would help, but there is no sign they are coming. Built in Britain for use in Ukraine What is though, it has emerged, is a new British-built ballistic missile. The new ground-launched, tactical ballistic missile – part of what is being called Project Nightfall – will be one of the most ambitious missile programmes the UK has seen in decades. The MOD issued an initial contract notice for this new system back in early December, setting out what it wants it to be able to do, and when it wants it delivered. It was very specific, and, interestingly, it reflects a lot of the hard lessons learned from the war in Ukraine. The contract notice calls for a “cost-effective, tactical (>500km) ballistic missile system, capable of being safely ground-launched from a mobile platform in a high-threat tactical environment, navigating to and accurately striking a user-programmed fixed target coordinate”. So essentially what the MOD is after is a missile system on the back of a truck, that can drive onto the battlefield, fire at least two missiles – known as “effectors” – 300 miles into Russian lines, and then escape within 15 minutes.

Shoot, then scoot

This so-called shoot-and-scoot way of fighting reflects the way the battlefield in Ukraine has developed over the past four years. Anything that is stationary for any period runs a high chance of being seen and targeted by Russian counter-battery fire, attack drones or loitering munitions like the Lancet. The other core requirement of this new system is the ability to resist electronic warfare (EW). Russian forces are tactically poor in lots of areas, but EW is one of their strengths. The contract notice says the new system must be “resilient in a complex electromagnetic environment (EME), including within a GNSS contested/degraded environment, and resistant against targeted EW attack and spoofing”. Before Ukraine, electronic warfare was a rather exquisite, nice-to-have capability. Four years on, GPS denial and jamming are so common that having the ability to combat electronic attack is now a non-optional, baseline expectation.

Destructive capability

In terms of payload and performance, the MOD says Nightfall’s effector must be able to “carry a high-explosive payload of around 200kg over more than 500km on a ballistic trajectory at supersonic speeds, with some basic manoeuvrability”. Defence planners say Nightfall missiles must be able to strike targets within 10 minutes of launch. That implies that it could well be used to engage time-sensitive targets such as mobile headquarters, air defence systems or logistics nodes. Russia’s most effective and frequently used short-range ballistic missile is the Iskander-M. It routinely uses them to attack both military and civilian targets. Compared to the Iskander’s 480kg payload, Nightfall’s missiles will carry less punch, but like many Western weapons, there is an emphasis on precision over sheer explosive mass. The calculation is clear that accuracy and speed will be able to offset the British missile’s lower payload weight. In fact, the MOD contract notice also specifies how accurate the Nightfall missile must be. It says it should be able to operate in a “GNSS contested/degraded environment” and must be able to hit within 10 metres of a provided target coordinate 50% of the time. The MOD is stipulating that the Nightfall missile system also needs to be upgradeable, so that its range, in-flight manoeuvrability and on-board telemetry can all be improved over time. It also wants production to be scalable to at least 10 systems a month – another indicator that these will be going onto a highly attritional battlefield.

Going to Ukraine, but what about the UK?

So is the British military also going to get its hands on this missile system in the future? For now, ministers are saying this is a short-term project, purely for Ukraine. The real benefit for Britain will be the boost in missile expertise that this project brings. Following the announcement, Defence Readiness and Industry Minister Luke Pollard said Nightfall would “keep Ukraine in the fight and give Putin another thing to worry about”. In terms of timescale, the Government is planning to award three competing contracts, each worth £9m, by March. Each team will then be expected to design and build three missiles within the next 12 months for test-firing. (Source: forces.net)

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