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Military And Security Developments
Feb 26.
- In our updated Strategic Risk Forecast, we put forward various scenarios concerning the trajectory of the Russo-Ukrainian war in the next 12 months. Our baseline scenario is that the war will likely continue in some form without a definitive resolution; there is also a realistic possibility of a fragile ceasefire that will fail to stop the fighting entirely.
- This week, 24 February marked the fourth anniversary of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine; despite continuing efforts to make progress during negotiations, the war is more likely to continue well into its fifth year than definitively end. US-brokered trilateral negotiations have nevertheless continued to intensify this month, though we assess that only modest progress has likely been made, rather than a major breakthrough towards a peace deal (or a ceasefire).
- On the battlefield, Russian advances have been slow this month, though Ukrainian forces have retaken land during a series of counter-attacks, likely facilitated by SpaceX blocking Russian access to its Starlink satellite network in February. While Russian forces are likely to regain access to the network in the coming months, the disruption is likely to be undermining battlefield communication and navigation of long-range drones which had Starlink terminals strapped to them to aid navigation.
- Looking ahead to the coming month, Russia’s long-range strike campaign is likely to shift away from targeting energy facilities ahead of the end of the heating season, and to reprioritise other military-industrial facilities, railways, logistics hubs and wider critical national infrastructure (CNI). The rate of Russian missile and drone strikes has remained extremely high over the last month, with a likely new monthly record set for the number of ballistic missiles fired – underscoring the growing risk that air defence shortages in Ukraine will continue to cause. All these issues will continue to cause profound disruption to business operations across the country, including blackouts.
- Key triggers, warnings and indicators (TWIs) to watch for in March include the official end of the Ukrainian heating season on 31 March and the potential for disruption or tensions during maritime hybrid operations; Iceland and Norway are now unlikely to assist UK and French efforts to seize vessels linked to Russia’s shadow fleet, which will possibly reduce the immediate risks of escalation.
- Ukraine: Expedited EU membership remains unlikely by 2027, even under two-tier model. A Politico article from 25 February reported that Ukraine seeks to join the EU within a narrow window between the Hungarian legislative and French presidential elections (scheduled for April 2026 and April 2027, respectively). Kyiv’s strategy hinges on the belief that the potential defeat of the incumbent and anti-Ukraine Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán would remove Hungary’s veto over its accession path. Ukrainian leaders likewise fear that a hard-right victory in the French presidential election would prompt Paris to oppose Ukraine’s entry to the bloc. Kyiv sees EU membership as crucial for its long-term security and prosperity (see Sibylline Special Report – 5 February 2026). The EU is reportedly considering a fast-tracked, two-tier accession model, under which Kyiv would join with limited powers. A Ukrainian media outlet recently revealed that the EU has sent a confidential list of accession conditions, referred to as the ‘Lviv criteria’. However, we assess that Ukraine’s ability to meet such conditions remains highly constrained by the ongoing war and persistent governance challenges, including corruption. This means that the prospects of Kyiv joining the EU by 2027 remain low, especially if the Russo-Ukrainian war is ongoing by that time.
Feb 25.
- Ukraine-US: UN abstention amid fragile peace process reflects shift in US’ Ukraine policy. On 24 February, the US abstained from a vote in the UN General Assembly (UNGA) in support of a ‘lasting peace in Ukraine’ on the fourth anniversary of Russia’s full-scale invasion. The resolution, proposed by Ukraine, calls for an ‘immediate, full and unconditional ceasefire’ between the warring parties, as well as a comprehensive and just peace ‘in line with international law’. The document also emphasises a ‘strong commitment’ to Ukraine’s independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity within its internationally recognised borders. Keith Kellogg, the Trump administration’s former special envoy to Ukraine, has condemned the abstention; he was largely sidelined in the US’ efforts to broker peace, in part likely due to his perceived pro-Kyiv stance. We assess that this abstention further reflects the US’ transition to what the Trump administration likely considers to be a more neutral policy towards Ukraine, with concerns that a condemnation of Russia or clear-cut support for Ukraine could threaten the fragile peace process. Over the coming months, the US will likely continue to apply pressure on Ukraine to compromise on its conditions for ending the war.
- Russia: Ukrainian strikes against oil infrastructure will pressure revenues, drive regional tensions. Reuters reported on 24 February that Russia’s state-owned oil pipeline operator Transneft has cut oil intake by 250,000 barrels per day (bpd) following a Ukrainian drone strike against a key pumping station on the previous day. The attack forms part of a renewed intensification of Ukrainian drone strikes against Russian oil infrastructure. Through these attacks, Kyiv aims to constrain Russia’s crucial oil export revenues even further – and to amplify the impact of international sanctions on Russia’s oil sector – in a bid to undermine Moscow’s ability to finance its war effort. Also on 24 February, the Centre for Research on Energy and Clean Air (CREA) reported that, while Russia boosted its oil exports by 6% over the previous 12 months, it earned 18% less than pre-war levels due to being forced to sell at steep discounts. We assess that continued Ukrainian strikes will exacerbate the impact of international sanctions on Russian oil revenues, though Moscow will highly likely be able to continue financing its war over the medium term, regardless. Nevertheless, Ukrainian strikes of this type will heighten tensions with countries that continue to import Russian oil, including EU members Hungary and Slovakia.
Feb 24.
KEY DEVELOPMENTS
- OFFENSIVES: Ukraine has continued its counter-attacks in Zaporizhzhia oblast, further illustrating its ability to make localised gains, though a more substantial breakthrough remains unlikely
- STRIKES: When the heating season comes to an end (on 31 March), Russia is likely to shift the focus of its long-range strikes from energy facilities to other critical infrastructure, such as logistics facilities, water supplies and/or telecommunications
- ASSASSINATIONS: An uptick in explosions in urban centres targeting police personnel underscores the potential for tit-for-tat attacks as part of both sides’ hybrid operations against each other
- FORECAST: Continued limited progress in US-facilitated efforts to end the war will likely encourage Moscow to pitch further economic proposals to Washington DC over the coming months, aiming to influence the negotiating process and incentivise concessions in Russia’s interests
- OFFENSIVES: Ukraine has continued its counter-attacks in Zaporizhzhia oblast, further illustrating its ability to make localised gains, though a more substantial breakthrough remains unlikely. On 20 February, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky claimed that Ukrainian forces have retaken around 115.8 square miles (300 sq km) in unspecified areas of southern Ukraine during an undefined period. Zelensky likely referred partly to the recent intensification of Ukraine’s offensive operations in Zaporizhzhia oblast. On the same day, the UK Defence Intelligence (DI) offered a more conservative estimate of approximately 38.6 square miles (100 sq km), while the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) estimated that Ukrainian gains amounted to around 77.2 square miles (200 sq km). According to the DI, Ukrainian forces achieved most of these gains to the north of Huliapole, with additional limited gains further north near Verbove (both Zaporizhzhia oblast). We previously assessed that Ukraine’s operations do not amount to a counter-offensive (see Sibylline Ukraine Update – 17 February 2026). Rather, they are successful localised counter-attacks that likely benefit from disruption to Russian military communications, caused by the suspension of Starlink services and possibly by the Kremlin’s prioritisation of other fronts.
- OFFENSIVES: Continued Ukrainian pressure will possibly complicate Russia’s preparations for a potential summer offensive in Zaporizhzhia oblast. A prominent Ukrainian military observer reported that the Russian command has committed additional forces to areas in Zaporizhzhia oblast contested by Ukraine. However, at this stage, Russian forces are reportedly focused on westward advances near Huliapole. We assess that if Ukrainian forces maintain their current momentum, particularly towards settlements such as Uspenivka or Temyrivka (both Zaporizhzhia oblast) along the Yanchur River, this will threaten to cut off ground lines of communication along the Huliapole-Velyka Novosilka axis. Such a development would disrupt Russia’s operational logistics and ability to co-ordinate manoeuvres across Zaporizhzhia oblast. We assess that Ukraine’s counter-attacks are likely delaying Russian offensive attempts to advance towards Orikhiv (Zaporizhzhia oblast) from the east and broader offensive efforts in the oblast, though it remains unclear for how long Ukraine can maintain the initiative in this section of the frontline.
- DONETSK: Russian forces continue to pressure Lyman, particularly from the north and north-west, possibly indicating plans to bypass the city to advance towards Sloviansk (both Donetsk oblast). On 22 February, Ukrainian Joint Forces Task Force spokesperson Colonel Viktor Trehubov stated that Russian forces are attempting to bypass Lyman from Drobysheve and Stavky (both Donetsk oblast; located to the north of Lyman) in order to reach Sloviansk, a key city in the oblast’s so-called ‘Fortress Belt’. However, Russia remains unlikely to achieve this goal in the short term. It remains questionable whether Russian forces could apply pressure on Sloviansk without first taking Lyman, particularly given the need to cross the Siverskyi-Donets River. Overall, the situation in the area remains fluid, characterised by shifting frontlines and expanding contested grey zones. The above-mentioned Ukrainian military observer reported that Russian activity is intensifying around Zakitne (Donetsk oblast), a town to the east and south-east of Lyman along the Donets River road; this is an attempt to advance south-west towards Kryva Luka and Kalenyky (both Donetsk oblast). Russian forces have also made gains along the Bakhmut-Slovyansk road in recent days, underscoring that this section of the frontline remains particularly intense at present.
- STRIKES: Russia launched a significant high-intensity combined strike overnight on 21-22 February ahead of the fourth anniversary of its full-scale invasion of Ukraine (24 February). The attack comprised 297 drones and 50 missiles, including various ballistic missiles. Ukraine’s air force reported downing 274 drones and 33 missiles. According to the Ukrainian authorities, the attack specifically targeted Ukrainian logistics sites, including railway and water supply infrastructure in urban areas, and notably fewer energy facilities. We assess that when the heating season comes to an end (on 31 March), Russia is likely to shift the focus of its long-range strikes from energy facilities to other critical infrastructure, such as logistical facilities, water supplies and/or telecommunications.
- STRIKES: The Ukrainian authorities reported that the 21-22 February attack struck a sweet factory in Sumy oblast owned by a US multinational company. Western entities, including commercial sites owned by US outfits, have been struck before. While such incidents are possibly the result of miscalculation, particularly during intense barrages, they are also liable to be deliberate due to (possibly erroneous) intelligence indicating potential military activity at the site. Such strikes against Western-owned assets are highly likely to continue on a sporadic basis for the full duration of the war.
- STRIKES: The recent Ukrainian strike against oil infrastructure linked to the Druzhba oil pipeline will heighten tensions with Hungary and Slovakia amid ongoing disputes over oil transit via Ukraine. Early on 23 February, Ukrainian long-range drones hit the Kaleykino oil pumping station in Almetyevsk (Russia’s autonomous Tatarstan Republic). The facility is linked to the Druzhba oil pipeline, which supplies Russian oil to Hungary and Slovakia via Ukrainian territory, and which was already damaged by what was likely Russian military action earlier this month. We assess that the incident will exacerbate tensions between Ukraine and Hungary/Slovakia, possibly prompting further retaliatory measures from both countries. Slovakia has already suspended emergency supplies of electricity to Ukraine; Hungary will possibly adopt a similar move, placing additional pressure on the already-acute energy situation across the country.
POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS
- CEASEFIRE: Despite a supposed agreement for the US to lead on ceasefire monitoring following recent trilateral negotiations in Geneva (Switzerland), the conditions to agree to a viable ceasefire remain elusive. On 20 February, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stated that the US will be ‘primarily responsible’ for monitoring a theoretical ceasefire. According to Zelensky, all sides ‘acknowledged’ the US’ role in observing a potential ceasefire. However, Zelensky did not mention further technical specifics, or how (if at all) the US would respond to any potential violations. While this marks a notable result of the US-facilitated efforts to end the war thus far, we assess that a comprehensive, durable ceasefire (let alone a peace agreement) remains unlikely in the coming months. It is highly unlikely that Russia currently believes that a ceasefire is in its strategic interests without major concessions from Ukraine. At the same time, the positions of the two warring parties remain far apart on key issues; this also undermines the likelihood of a cessation of hostilities in the medium term (at least).
- ASSASSINATIONS: An uptick in explosions targeting police personnel in urban centres underscores the potential for tit-for-tat attacks to form part of both sides’ hybrid operations against the other. On 23 February at approximately 1810hrs (local time), seven police officers were injured in an explosion in the southern city of Mykolaiv (Mykolaiv oblast). According to the chief of Ukraine’s national police, Ivan Vyhivskyi, the blast occurred at a non-operational petrol station when the officers arrived for their shift and parked their vehicles in the vicinity. Later on 23 February, another explosion occurred at a police station in the south-eastern city of Dnipro (Dnipropetrovsk oblast); the incident is being investigated as a terror attack. The developments follow a double bombing on 22 February in the western city of Lviv (Lviv oblast) and underscore an emerging pattern of attacks (see Sibylline Daily Analytical Update – 23 February 2026).
- ASSASSINATIONS: While both sides have utilised sabotage operations and assassinations throughout the course of the war, we assess that the recent spate of explosions indicates a shift in Russia’s hybrid warfare tactics. Ukrainian assassinations in Russia have mainly targeted high-profile figures, largely generals, likely in a bid to demonstrate Ukraine’s capability and will to orchestrate such operations on Russian territory and to disrupt command and control (C2) decision-making processes. Meanwhile, Russia has carried out fewer confirmed assassination operations inside Ukraine. Until now, it is unlikely that assassinations have been the top priority for Russian intelligence operatives inside Ukraine; Russia’s hybrid warfare has hitherto likely focused on recruiting Ukrainian citizens to gather intelligence on Ukrainian infrastructure and military assets to facilitate Moscow’s long-range strike campaign.
- ASSASSINATIONS: As such, the recent incidents likely reflect an (at least temporary) diversification of Russian hybrid activity and potential shift to using its intelligence assets in more overtly kinetic missions. The goal of such attacks is possibly to further strain Ukraine’s law enforcement capabilities and increase societal panic so as to reinforce the psychological impact of the war on the Ukrainian population. A bombing in Moscow (Russia) earlier on 24 February was possibly Ukrainian retaliation (see Sibylline Daily Analytical Update – 24 February 2026); we therefore assess that the likelihood of tit-for-tat attacks remains elevated over the coming weeks and months.
- For further analysis and scenario planning around how the war will evolve in 2026 and beyond, see our updated Sibylline Strategic Risk Forecast – 6 January 2026 and Sibylline Ukraine Monthly Forecast – 23 January 2026.
FORECAST
INVESTMENT: Ahead of the fourth anniversary of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine on 24 February, limited progress in US-facilitated efforts to end the war will likely encourage Moscow to pitch further economic proposals to Washington DC over the coming months, in an attempt to influence the negotiating process and incentivise concessions in Russia’s interests. On 18 February, the head of Russia’s sovereign wealth fund Kirill Dmitriev claimed that the value of potential Russia-US projects in the context of a normalisation in economic relations would be over USD 14 trillion. Dmitriev was responding to reports from recent weeks based on Ukrainian intelligence assessments, which state that Russia has pitched deals worth USD 12 trillion in exchange for sanctions relief.
While we cannot confirm the figure provided by Dmitriev, the development indicates efforts to appeal to President Donald Trump’s eagerness to conclude deals and ensure a financial return for the US in its geopolitical relationships. Irrespective of whether the USD 14 trillion figure is unrealistic (which it highly likely is), Dmitriev’s appointment as a special economic envoy to engage with Washington DC in February 2025 showed that from the start, Moscow has understood the value of leveraging economic opportunities in dealings with the US. Ukraine has likewise sought to attract the Trump administration with deals, including one on minerals (see Sibylline Situation Update Brief – 8 May 2025). However, Russia almost certainly seeks to leverage its greater resource wealth and developed business environment compared to Ukraine’s, in order to extract preferable peace terms over the coming months.
Reports detailing an (unconfirmed) internal Russian document that contains proposals for Russia-US economic co-operation following a deal to end the Russo-Ukrainian war heavily emphasise harnessing natural resources and energy. According to a Bloomberg report on 12 February, the memorandum envisions joint oil and liquefied natural gas (LNG) ventures, including offshore and ‘hard-to-cover reserves’. Such ventures would also consider previous US investments and allow US companies to recover past losses. US firms would also be granted preferential conditions to return to the Russian market. We assess that this offer potentially seeks to mirror the expectations the Trump administration placed on Venezuela following the US military operation that captured its president on 3 January.
Elements of the reported proposals indicate Russia’s apparent willingness to leverage the US’ competition with China, despite China being Russia’s most important trading partner. The document outlines co-operation on raw materials, including copper, lithium, nickel and platinum. This aligns with the Trump administration’s efforts to diversify its sources of critical minerals and reduce dependence on China. Another proposal entails Russia returning to the US dollar (USD) system, including possibly for Russian energy transactions. This would mark a significant reversal from Russia’s long-term pursuit of de-dollarisation in trade settlements, including those with China. We continue to assess that the Trump administration will likely continue to view China as a key competitor and threat over the longer term. Thus, these (unconfirmed) Russian proposals are likely another way in which Moscow seeks to appeal to the Trump administration and to consolidate its strategic advantage over Kyiv in US-brokered negotiations.
Despite the proposed Russian incentives, significant unilateral US sanctions relief is unlikely in the short term; however, if US interest in co-operation grows and lucrative business contracts are offered, the likelihood of punitive measures being relaxed will increase. Nevertheless, the Trump administration is highly unlikely to roll back existing sanctions without considerable progress in the peace process. However, we continue to assess that sanctions are a lever at the US’ disposal to both encourage or coerce Russia, depending on the Trump administration’s stance at any given time. Therefore, it remains possible that the Trump administration could offer Russia limited sanctions relief in the coming months, as it did with Russia’s ally Belarus (see Sibylline Situation Update Brief – 14 October 2025). This could realistically include modest sanctions relief for Russia’s ailing aviation sector (a demand which Moscow has long made), in a bid to begin the normalisation of US-Russia economic relations – which we have long assessed remains a key strategic driver and strategic goal of the Trump administration.
However, if the US moves to relax sanctions on Russia, this would be highly unlikely to precipitate a massive return of US business to the Russian market, at least in the medium term. Our assessment remains that the business climate in Russia is hostile to foreign investment from ‘unfriendly’ Western countries, even if the Kremlin offered nominally favourable business terms to US firms. Furthermore, Canada, the EU, the UK and others are highly unlikely to lift their own sanctions in tandem with the US in the foreseeable future. Ultimately, the emergence of a two-track sanctions regime would increase compliance risks and due diligence requirements for multinational firms, with companies also likely to face reputational backlash for returning to the Russian market.
If the US unilaterally removes significant sanctions on Russia, this would almost certainly further strain the transatlantic alliance, given that many European countries have sought to reduce their dependence on Russia (specifically Russian energy). Before the full-scale invasion of Ukraine, the EU and the UK broadly balanced economic engagement with targeted sanctions for Russian aggression. However, many hawkish European countries now view this approach as not viable. This stance would raise the possibility of threats of additional tariffs, sanctions and trade restrictions in the event of a major rift with the US over the approach to Russia. In this context, the US could realistically increase pressure on Europe to lift sanctions and re-integrate Russia into the global economy over the longer term. If the US proceeds with its own programme of re-opening the Russian market to its firms, numerous business sectors across Europe with traditionally strong business ties to Russia (particularly in Austria, Germany and Italy) are highly likely to lobby for a similar normalisation of economic relations. However, this scenario remains unlikely in the short-to-medium term; sanctions regimes are likely to remain in place and continue to strengthen in the coming months.
- Europe region-Russia: PMC onboard Russia’s shadow sea fleet points to dual purpose of vessels. On 23 February, AFP reported that two employees of Russia-based private military company (PMC) Moran Security Group were found aboard a Russian shadow fleet vessel seized by French forces in September 2025. According to AFP sources, the two employees, one of which previously worked for the Wagner PMC, were responsible for monitoring the ship crew and for gathering unspecified intelligence. Moran Security Group provides armed security services for Russian state-owned companies and oil tankers that belong to Russia’s shadow fleet. The use of this PMC, which has ties to Russia’s intelligence agencies, provides the Kremlin with plausible deniability regarding vessel ownership and in the event that vessels are linked to grey-zone or hybrid activity. The AFP’s report is the latest indicator that Russia’s shadow sea fleet serves the dual purpose of evading Western sanctions and facilitating Russian grey-zone operations; these vessels have been linked to undersea cable damage and suspected irregular drone operations.
- Ukraine: Dispute over oil transit will threaten crucial short-term energy assistance. On 24 February, Slovakian Prime Minister Robert Fico announced the suspension of emergency electricity supplies to Ukraine until oil flows via the Russian Druzhba pipeline resume. The infrastructure, which transits through Ukraine, was damaged by Russian military operations and has been offline since the end of January. Fico, along with the Hungarian authorities, accused Ukraine of withholding oil transit for political reasons. Hungary recently pledged to block EU sanctions against Russia and veto the EU’s approval of a EUR 90 bn (USD 106 bn) loan to support Ukraine. Slovakia’s move will prove highly detrimental to Ukraine, which relies on emergency electricity imports from neighbouring countries to compensate for the severe destabilisation of its energy grid by Russian long-range strikes. Kyiv has reportedly proposed several solutions to resolve the dispute. We assess that a failure to reach an agreement will prolong the suspension of Slovakian (and potentially trigger similar Hungarian suspensions of) electricity supplies, thereby increasing the severity of Ukraine’s energy crisis in the short term. The dispute will moderately threaten the EU’s ability to disburse its loan in the short term, which is crucial for Kyiv’s war effort and socio-economic health (though a resolution is likely in the coming months).
- Russia: Explosion near railway station reflects sustained risk of attacks in capital. At approximately 0005hrs (local time) on 24 February, an unknown person detonated an explosive device near Savyolovsky Station in the capital Moscow, killing one traffic police officer and injuring two others. Russia’s Investigative Committee (SKR) stated that the assailant, who also died at the scene, carried out a suicide bombing after approaching a vehicle patrolling the area. The authorities stated that the deceased officer was a senior inspector in the traffic police. No motive has been established at the time of writing, and the authorities have yet to announce any suspicion of Ukrainian involvement. However, Ukraine has shown an increasing capability and will to orchestrate assassinations across Russia since the beginning of the Russo-Ukrainian war (the fourth anniversary of which is today). Nonetheless, senior Russian generals or military figures have usually been the target of Ukrainian-linked or suspected assassination plots; the nature of the latest attack possibly also indicates Islamist motives. We assess that a heightened security presence in the affected area is almost certain in the coming hours, with security also highly likely to be bolstered at other train and metro stations across the capital.
Feb 23.
- Russia-US: Economic co-operation, sanctions relief remain unlikely in short term, despite proposals. On 18 February, the head of Russia’s sovereign wealth fund Kirill Dmitriev claimed that the value of potential Russia-US projects is over USD 14 trillion in a likely attempt to appeal to the Trump administration as it seeks to end the war in Ukraine. Dmitriev was responding to reports that Moscow has pitched deals worth USD 12 trillion in exchange for sanctions relief. While we cannot confirm the figure provided by Dmitriev, who also serves as a special envoy, it indicates efforts to appeal to the Trump administration’s eagerness to conclude deals and receive a financial return on geopolitical relationships. In a similar vein, on 12 February Bloomberg reported details of an (unconfirmed) internal Russian document containing proposals for Russia-US economic co-operation following a deal to end the Russo-Ukrainian war. Continued limited progress in US-facilitated efforts to end the war will likely encourage Moscow to pitch further economic proposals to Washington DC with the aim of extracting preferable peace terms. If agreeable to Washington DC, this would increase pressure on Kyiv to agree to major concessions, including over territory. While significant unilateral US sanctions relief is unlikely in the short term, if the US’ interest in co-operation grows and lucrative business contracts are offered, the likelihood of punitive measures being relaxed will increase as part of the peace process.
(Source: Sibylline)
24 Feb 26. G7 leaders’ statement on the war in Ukraine: 24 February 2026. G7 leaders’ statement on the war in Ukraine. On the fourth anniversary of the Russian further invasion of Ukraine in 2022, we, the leaders of the G7, reaffirm our unwavering support for Ukraine in defending its territorial integrity and right to exist, and its freedom, sovereignty, and independence. We express our continued support for President Trump’s efforts to achieve these objectives by initiating a peace process and bringing the parties to direct discussions. Europe has a leading role to play in this process, joined by other partners. We also support the commitments under the Coalition of the Willing to provide robust and reliable security guarantees to Ukraine. We acknowledge that only Ukraine and Russia, working together in good faith negotiations, can reach a peace agreement.
We welcome the efforts made by the G7 members and other partners to provide substantial financial and in-kind support to Ukraine to help the country get through this winter. Substantial additional power production capacities have been mobilized in recent weeks together with other critical equipment, including the shipment of more than 2500 generators and other much needed equipment like transformers, turbines, cogeneration units, boilers and repair equipment from the G7 countries to Kyiv since January, and more than half a bn euros of new pledges were made to the Ukraine Energy Support Fund to purchase equipment to repair and protect the Ukrainian energy system. A resilient and robust energy system will be needed ahead of next winter and for the country’s recovery.
We commit to working closely in terms of ensuring nuclear safety, including with the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development and Ukraine to promote fundraising for the rehabilitation at the earliest of the Chornobyl containment arch and to prevent any radiological incident that would have serious humanitarian and environmental consequences for the entire continent.
We also support initiatives aimed at ensuring the immediate, safe and unconditional return of Ukrainian children to their families and communities and commend the work of the International Coalition for the Return of Ukrainian Children.
We will continue to provide humanitarian aid and support to the Ukrainian population. (Source: https://www.gov.uk/)
25 Feb 26. Cuashub.com said today that Ukrainian interceptor drones now down 30% of Russian air targets. Ukraine’s interceptor drones are now responsible for nearly a third of the Russian aerial threats destroyed over the country, highlighting how rapidly low-cost unmanned systems have become embedded in Kyiv’s air defense architecture.
“If we take into account the share of interceptor UAVs in the destruction of air targets, we have already reached the mark of 30%,” said Col. Yuriy Cherevashenka in a video interview published Monday by Ukraine’s air force.
“That is, every third drone target that is destroyed in Ukraine is destroyed by an interceptor UAV,” he added.
Interceptor drones, typically small, fast quadcopters, are designed to pursue and physically destroy incoming one-way attack drones, often by ramming them or detonating an onboard explosive charge. Initially viewed as an experimental or supplementary capability in the early years of the war, interceptor drones became a focus area in late 2024 as Russia intensified its long-range drone strikes against Ukrainian cities and infrastructure. By December, Ukrainian officials said domestic production had reached 950 interceptor drones per day. Russia is known to launch thousands of long-range drones into Ukraine each month, at times massing more than 800 in a single night. Its most frequently used platform is a locally produced version of the Iranian-designed Shahed loitering munition.
Cherevashenka noted the scale of the shift: “Compared to 2022, when the first drone arrived in September over Kyiv, it had a 40-kilogram warhead and was a primitive drone flying by coordinates,” he said. “Now, we have 14 types of warheads for the strike drones of the Russian Federation.”
He also warned that Russia has begun integrating artificial intelligence into its Shahed variants and is known to use mesh networks to guide them.
“We understand that this is not the end, that they will increase their capabilities,” Cherevashenka said. “Moreover, this year they have invested in the production of twice as many drones as last year.”
Interceptor drones represent one layer of Ukraine’s multi-tiered air defense system. The country also deploys truck-mounted machine-gun teams to engage incoming Shaheds, while reserving higher-end interceptor munitions for cruise and ballistic missile threats.
Many of Ukraine’s interceptor platforms are quadcopter-based, built for speed and agility. While the typical Shahed can reach speeds of up to 115 mph, more advanced variants are estimated to reach 230 mph, placing significant demands on pilot skill and reaction time. Successful engagements depend on rapid detection, precise tracking and aggressive maneuvering.
The 30 percent milestone suggests that Ukraine’s investment in inexpensive, rapidly produced interceptor drones is offsetting part of Russia’s numerical advantage in unmanned aerial attacks and reshaping how modern air defense is executed under sustained drone saturation.
Ukrainian interceptor drones now down 30% of Russian air targets
(Source: https://cuashub.com/
25 Feb 26. Metis Aerospace’s Skyperion Lightweight RF sensor previously tested in Ukraine. Metis Aerospace’s newly launched Skyperion Lightweight passive radio frequency (RF) sensor for unmanned aircraft system (UAS) detection has been tested in Ukraine, the CEO of Metis Aerospace, Tony Burnell, told Janes on 4 February. Skyperion Lightweight can detect and “bearing-locate Shahed 131/136 variants that emit RF such as those fitted with telemetry radios, video links, or commercial cellular modems”, according to Burnell. The system is unable to detect Shahed variants which are operating in a fully autonomous global navigation satellite system-aided inertial navigation system (GNSS/INS)-only configuration, Burnell added. This type of configuration means that the loitering munitions are “effectively radio silent”, according to Burnell. Skyperion Lightweight can be integrated within a multisensor counter-UAS (C-UAS). Skyperion performs UAS identification through a signal-level feature extraction, protocol analysis, and comparison against an RF signature library. Skyperion Lightweight is designed for wideband passive RF monitoring from approximately 30 MHz to 18 GHz, according to the company. It enables detection of UAS command-and-control (C2); telemetry and payload emissions across the very high frequency (VHF)/ultra-high frequency (UHF) telemetry bands including L, S, C, and X band links; 2.4 GHz and 5 GHz industrial, scientific, medical (ISM) bands; and commercial cellular bands, according to Burnell. (Source: Janes)
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