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10 Mar 26. Taiwan: Arms agreements will ease tensions with US; defence budget dispute remains. Earlier on 12 March, Taiwan’s three main political parties agreed to allow the government to sign agreements for four US arms packages before their deadlines on 15 and 26 March. These agreements are part of eight US arms packages to Taiwan, totalling USD 11 billion, that were approved in December 2025. The first batch included weapons such as self-propelled howitzers and HIMARS multiple rocket launcher systems, which will improve Taiwan’s asymmetric combat capabilities. This followed months of legislative deadlock over passing the procurement funding, as the government included it in a controversial USD 40 billion special defence budget bill that also covers indigenous arms development. In February, a bipartisan group of US lawmakers expressed concern to their Taiwanese counterparts over the potential payment delays. We assess that Taipei signing the offer letters in time is likely to ease tensions with Washington DC in the short term. The three parties will likely approve the necessary funds to the US before the first payment deadline on 31 March. Regardless, the opposition will highly likely continue advocating for slashing budgets on domestic arms development, which will slow Taiwan’s military modernisation. (Source: Sibylline)
10 Mar 26. Pakistan-Afghanistan: Airstrikes targeting Afghan capital Kabul underscore risk of sustained conflict. Earlier on 13 March, Pakistani news outlets citing security sources stated that Pakistan has conducted airstrikes inside Afghanistan, targeting the capital Kabul. The strikes reportedly targeted the headquarters of the Afghan Taliban’s 313 Corps and an ammunition depot in Kabul, while also targeting an oil storage facility and militant hideouts in Kandahar and Paktia provinces. Afghan Taliban spokesperson Zabihullah Mujahid has stated that Pakistan targeted fuel depots belonging to private Afghan airline Kam Air near Kandahar International Airport (KDH; Kandahar province). The airstrike on Kabul, which underscores elevated tensions and escalation risks, follows sporadic border clashes and Pakistani airstrikes in border regions in recent weeks. It also comes after Afghanistan launched an offensive against Pakistan on 26 February. Furthermore, the latest airstrikes on Kabul follow Pakistan’s refusal to hold talks with Afghanistan, amid reports of Chinese mediation attempts. We assess there is a realistic possibility of further, deeper airstrikes targeting Kabul, which would increase the risks of a prolonged conflict and of more intense clashes along the border. This would also increase the risk of Afghan drone attacks along the border and revenge attacks by Taliban militant groups within Pakistan, particularly Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP). (Source: Sibylline)
25 Mar 26. Kenya: Further fuel shortages likely in coming weeks, elevating supply chain disruption, unrest risks. On 24 March, the head of Petroleum Outlets Association of Kenya (POAK) stated that approximately 20% of nationwide petrol outlets are affected by shortages, triggered by the Israel-US-Iran war. Kenya is particularly exposed to the ongoing war’s disruption, as it receives all its fuel supplies from Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states, whose exports transit through the Strait of Hormuz (currently under de facto closure). In response to the fuel price shock, the Energy and Petroleum Regulatory Authority (EPRA) has frozen petrol prices until 13 April. However, several dealers are allegedly stockpiling petroleum products in anticipation of a price increase in the coming weeks, compounding supply constraints. Shortages will severely disrupt overland supply chains, including from neighbouring states dependent on export via the port of Mombasa (Mombasa county). Moreover, with fuel prices likely to continue rising, government efforts to subsidise the price freeze will compound financial pressure on state revenues, increasing the likelihood of tax rises when the government presents the 2026/27 budget (which will likely be in June). We assess that this is likely to drive unrest and associated security risks in major cities across Kenya.
25 Mar 26. Sudan: Escalating clashes in Blue Nile will increase tensions with Ethiopia, conflict spillover risks. On 23 March, Sudan accused Ethiopia of supporting the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF) amid escalating violence in Blue Nile state (Sudan). Since mid-March, the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) have repeatedly clashed with the RSF and the allied Sudan People’s Liberation Movement – North (SPLM-N) in Al Kurumik (Blue Nile), particularly in areas along the Ethiopia-Sudan border. The RSF and SPLM-N claim that this new joint offensive has captured Deim Mansour, Jurut and Kurmuk (all Blue Nile). The Sudanese government alleges that the Ethiopian authorities have supported the offensive by allowing RSF and SPLM-N militants to operate in nearby Assosa (Benishangul-Gumuz region; Ethiopia). The Sudanese government has repeatedly accused Ethiopia of supporting the RSF; in February, Reuters reported that the RSF is operating a training camp in Benishangul-Gumuz. Clashes in Blue Nile are highly likely to continue in the coming weeks, sustaining threats to locally engaged staff, including NGO personnel. Clashes along the Ethiopia-Sudan border will also increase the risk of conflict spillover into adjacent Ethiopian localities, possibly triggering restrictions to cross-border movement, including for refugees. (Source: Sibylline)
10 Mar 26. Ecuador: Upcoming security operations against armed groups will heighten physical safety risks. On 11 March, Ecuador’s Interior Minister John Reimberg announced an upcoming major security force offensive against organised crime groups (OCGs) in the coming days across multiple provinces. Reimberg also announced that an associated curfew will be in place between 2300hrs and 0500hrs (local time) between 15 and 30 March in El Oro, Guayas, Los Ríos and Santo Domingo de los Tsáchilas provinces. The authorities stated that the curfew will facilitate security force operations against OCGs in these areas, which official data indicates account for approximately 84% of national crime and 91% of ‘violent deaths’. In February, violence notably escalated in El Oro amid an ongoing territorial dispute between the Los Lobos OCG and the offshoot Los Lobos Box; gang-related violence increased by approximately 71% in the province compared to the previous month. We assess that the authorities will likely establish checkpoints and stop-and-search measures for civilians during curfew hours, elevating supply chain and transit disruption risks in the affected provinces. The security force operations will likely precipitate armed clashes with OCGs, increasing physical safety risks in El Oro, Guayas, Los Ríos and Santo Domingo de los Tsáchilas in the short term, particularly during curfew hours.
26 Mar 26. Mexico: Rejection of electoral reform is unlikely to increase policy risk in short term, On 11 March, lawmakers in the Chamber of Deputies rejected President Claudia Sheinbaum’s proposed electoral reform bill. The proposal received 259 votes in favour and 234 against. Given that the electoral reform implied changes to the constitution, it required a two-thirds majority (i.e. 334 votes in favour) for approval, rather than a simple majority. Sheinbaum’s National Regeneration Movement (MORENA) party largely voted in favour, while coalition allies in the Ecologist Green Party of Mexico (PVEM) and Worker’s Party (PT) voted against the bill. This marks Sheinbaum’s first major legislative defeat since she was elected in 2024 and a rare split in the ruling coalition. Sheinbaum suggested that a ‘Plan B’ was being drafted to enact electoral reforms that would not require constitutional amendments and consequently could be approved with a simple legislative majority. If Sheinbaum proposes such a bill, we assess that the Chamber of Deputies will likely approve the reform, sustaining low policy stagnation risks. However, this will highly likely attract criticism from opposition parties and possibly PVEM and PT lawmakers over concerns that the measure seeks to cement MORENA’s political power, increasing polarisation risks. (Source: Sibylline)
10 Mar 26. Paraguay: Security agreement with US government will reduce regional tensions. On 10 March, 53 out of 80 lawmakers in Paraguay’s Chamber of Deputies approved a status of forces agreement (SOFA) with the US government. President Santiago Peña will almost certainly ratify the agreement in the coming days. The SOFA establishes a legal framework for US military personnel to provide training, joint exercises and humanitarian assistance in Paraguay. The agreement also establishes that the US will have criminal jurisdiction over its personnel operating in the country. However, Paraguay’s Minister of Foreign Affairs Rubén Ramírez Lezcano stated that ‘there is no possibility of installing US military bases’ in Paraguay. The agreement comes amid the US’ deepening of bilateral and multilateral relations across Latin America and the Caribbean to support tackling organised crime groups (OCGs). We assess that the agreement will likely bolster anti-OCG capabilities in Paraguay and serve as a legal framework to expand co-operation with the US in the future. Security forces risks and bilateral tensions will decrease in the medium term. However, opposition lawmakers have argued that the SOFA reduces Paraguay’s sovereignty, increasing the risk of associated protests in the capital Asunción (particularly near the US embassy) in the coming days. (Source: Sibylline)
10 Mar 26. Congo (DRC): Further drone strikes are likely across Goma, eastern DRC in coming months. Earlier on 11 March, two explosive-laden drones killed at least three people, including a French UNICEF aid worker, in a strike on a residential area in Goma (North Kivu province) which is currently occupied by the Rwandan-backed M23 rebel group. M23 officials claim the strike was conducted by the Congolese government. Given recent drone strikes by the M23 on Kisangani Bangoka International Airport (FKI, Tshopo province), there is a realistic possibility that the government conducted a retaliatory strike. However, given the targeting of residential areas, it is also possible that the strike was conducted by a government-aligned militia (known as Wazalendo) which have been more actively involved in conflict with the M23 throughout North Kivu and South Kivu over recent months. Regardless, there is a realistic possibility of further drone strikes in Goma over the coming months, substantially elevating physical security threats to staff throughout the city and possibly targeting major transit infrastructure such as Goma International Airport (GOM). Such strikes will increase the risk of broader M23 drone warfare, compounding threats to regional transit hubs across eastern areas of Congo (DRC). (Source: Sibylline)
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Founded in 1987, Exensor Technology is a world leading supplier of Networked Unattended Ground Sensor (UGS) Systems providing tailored sensor solutions to customers all over the world. From our Headquarters in Lund Sweden, our centre of expertise in Network Communications at Communications Research Lab in Kalmar Sweden and our Production site outside of Basingstoke UK, we design, develop and produce latest state of the art rugged UGS solutions at the highest quality to meet the most stringent demands of our customers. Our systems are in operation and used in a wide number of Military as well as Homeland Security applications worldwide. The modular nature of the system ensures any external sensor can be integrated, providing the user with a fully meshed “silent” network capable of self-healing. Exensor Technology will continue to lead the field in UGS technology, provide our customers with excellent customer service and a bespoke package able to meet every need.
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